Prospects for US Carbon Markets

Nathaniel O. Keohane, Ph.D Chief Economist

Current Challenges in the Emission Permit Markets London, 2 November 2010



Climate policy Prospects for US Carbon Markets

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
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


Agenda


- 1. How did we get here?
- 2. What happens now?
- 3. What are the prospects for a US carbon market?

1. How did we get here?






June 26, 2009



- Kerry-(Graham)-Lieberman
 "American Power Act"
- Similar to Waxman-Markey
- Stalled in the Senate after failure to get bipartisan support



2. What happens now?





At federal level, focus shifts to EPA

• GHG reporting rule





- GHG reporting rule
- Mobile sources





- GHG reporting rule
- Mobile sources
- Tailoring rule





- GHG reporting rule
- Mobile sources
- Tailoring rule
- PSD/BACT





- GHG reporting rule
- Mobile sources
- Tailoring rule
- PSD/BACT
- Source-specific performance standards (NSPS)




Regulatory focus on coalfired power plants

- GHG regulations
- SO_{2,} NOx, Hg
- Other environmental regs (coal ash, water)



Regional efforts

Regional
 Greenhouse
 Gas Initiative
 (NE states)



Regional efforts

- Regional
 Greenhouse
 Gas Initiative
 (NE states)
- AB32 (California)

3. What are the prospects for a US carbon market?

Is cap and trade dead?

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Depends on what you mean by "cap and trade"...

Is cap and trade dead?

Depends on what you mean by "cap and trade"...

and by "dead."

Why (still) cap and trade?

1. U.S. politics

- 1. U.S. politics
- 2. Proven success

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- 2. Proven success
- 3. International harmonization

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- 3. International harmonization
- 4. Self-adjustment

- 1. U.S. politics
- 2. Proven success
- 3. International harmonization
- 4. Self-adjustment
- 5. Virtues of a quantity limit: thresholds and tipping points


Two common objections to cap and trade

- 1. "The price will be too volatile"
- How volatile are prices actually?
- How much does short-term volatility matter?
- 2. "The price won't be high enough"
- The goal is reducing emissions not deploying certain technologies. If price is too low, tighten the cap!
- The current EU experience demonstrates the procyclicality of emission prices — which is a good thing.
- Key question: Why do we want price to do double duty?

In both cases, the key is a **credible long-term policy** – once again raising the issue of **regulatory risk**.

Importance of banking (1/2)


Evolution of EUA Prices 2005-2007



Source: Ellerman and Joskow 2008

Importance of banking (2/2)

U.S. SO2 trading program, 1995-2006



Source: EPA, 2007

Major policy design issues (1/6)

Targets and timetables

Scope and point of reg.

Offsets

Int'l competitiveness

Cost containment

Allocation

HR2454:

2012: 3% below 2005

2020: 17% below

2050: 83% below

Notes:

- 2005 emissions were 17% above 1990.
- 2009 emissions were 9.6% below 2005.

Major policy design issues (2/6)

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Scope should be as broad as possible to capture largest gains from trade.

Key political question:
 Coverage of transportation
 sector

"Point of regulation" – upstream vs. downstream.

Major policy design issues (3/6)

Targets and timetables

Scope and point of reg.

Offsets

Int'l competitiveness

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Allocation

Offsets effectively expand the scope of the market and make more aggressive targets feasible.

But strong scientific review will be crucial.

Not all offsets are created equal:

- Domestic offsets
- Tropical forest carbon (REDD)
- International
 - CDM (project-based)
 - Sectoral crediting

Major policy design issues (4/6)

Targets and timetables

Scope and point of reg.

Offsets

Int'l competitiveness

Cost containment

Allocation

A legitimate environmental and economic issue despite trade concerns.

Avoid carbon leakage from trade-exposed manufacturing sectors.

Solutions:

- Output-based allocation
- Border adjustments

However, largest source of leakage is indirect.

Major policy design issues (5/6)

Targets and timetables

Scope and point of reg.

Offsets

Int'l competitiveness

Cost containment


Allocation

A price collar, sure – but will it be "hard" or "soft"?

Classic tension between greater certainty about cost and greater certainty about about outcomes.


Prevailing solution is a hybrid "allowance reserve" approach.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND SHORT, MEDIUM, LONG RUN



Reserve vs. trigger price

Cumulative reserve needed as a function of trigger price, 2015-2034



Major policy design issues (6/6)

Targets and timetables

Scope and point of reg.

Offsets


Int'l competitiveness

Cost containment


Allocation

What matters is how allowance value is distributed, not auction vs. free allocation.

Chart shows HR2454 allocation



Mapping the political reality (1/2)



Mapping the political reality (2/2)

