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**The Psychology of Security Threats in
Ethnic Warfare: Evidence from Rwanda's
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Abstract

This article addresses the role of threat in explanations of ethnic and other inter-group conflict and examines two issues in particular. First, it explains how security threats work by providing micro-level evidence of the psychological causal mechanisms behind them. Second, it contributes to two longstanding meta-theoretical debates in security studies on the causes of ethnic warfare. It asks how important are emotions – such as fear, resentment, and hostility - compared first with structural and materialist factors in explanations of ethnic conflict, and compared second with rationalist approaches. On the first issue, the article identifies four psycho-social mechanisms at work when an ethnic in-group faces a security threat: boundary activation, out-group derogation, out-group homogenization; and in-group cohesion. I show that the greater the threat, the stronger each of these psychological effects. Addressing the two meta-theoretical debates, the article suggests they present a false theoretical choice. Both emotions and material opportunities matter in ethnic conflict, and emotion and rationality are not opposing alternatives. I propose then two simple but fundamental precepts to refine existing theories. First, I distinguish between support for violence - which I term ethnic mobilization – and participation in violence - which I term ethnic violence. Emotions matter for mobilization, but material opportunities matter more for violence. Second, I apply an axiom in social psychology - that emotion and reason interact in numerous ways in individual judgement and decision-making - and illustrate these psychological mechanisms using micro-data. The article draws inter-regional and inter-temporal comparisons from within the case of Rwanda's civil war (1990-94). The war culminated in a genocide that involved one of the most rapid and deadly mobilizations of a civilian population in world history. It uses a combination of survey data of ordinary Rwandans, content analysis of national radio broadcasts, and micro-case studies of four Rwandan communities.

Scholarly explanations of violent conflict between social groups – most notably those defined along ethnic boundaries – have revolved around two big debates in recent years.¹ Broadly, both debates focus on the role of group emotions or sentiments in such conflicts, in particular a subset of negative emotions: fear, anger, resentment, and hatred. The first debate pits these emotions against the relative importance of structural or material opportunities in explaining ethnic conflict, while the second weighs the influence of these emotions against the pre-eminence of individual rationality. In the first debate, ‘emotion’ proponents have over the years pointed for example to anxiety-laden perceptions, grievances, ethnic prejudices, ethnic fears, and hostilities embedded in hate narratives.² Proponents of structural or materialist opportunity on the other hand have instead emphasized the availability of natural resources to finance conflict, the security capacity of the state or other actors to repress conflict, the physical geography favourable to conflict, the demographic over-supply of young men to be recruited for conflict, and the transition from autocracy to democracy allowing ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize for conflict.³ In the second debate between emotion and rationality – a debate which is related to but which should not be conflated with the first one – many of the ‘emotion’ advocates cited above stress identities, loyalties, symbols, and myths whereas defenders of rationality or reason point to interests, strategy, logic, and elite calculation and manipulation. These debates are not merely theoretical. If widespread grievances, deep-seated fears, or latent hostility towards the other are important, then policies which address injustices, promote inter-group cooperation, and educate may be most effective. However, if instead demographic imbalance, primary commodity dependence, or a weak security apparatus are responsible, the policy prescriptions would be quite different.

¹ These debates have been exemplified in this journal. See the exchange between Arman Grigorian and Stuart J. Kaufman, “Hate narratives and ethnic conflict,” *International Security* 31, no. 4 (2007): 180-191.

² For inter-group anxieties, see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict* (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 2000), p.179. For grievances, see Ted Robert Gurr, *Why men rebel* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1970), p.25. For an assessment of ethnic prejudice, see D. P. Green and R. L. Seher, “What role does prejudice play in ethnic conflict?,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 6 (2003): p.525. For ethnic fears, see Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern hatreds : the symbolic politics of ethnic war* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), p.31. For hostility, see Marc Howard Ross, *Cultural contestation in ethnic conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.42-43.

³ For natural resource dependence, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): pp.587-588. For physical geography and weak state capacity, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American political science review* 97, no. 1 (2003): p.76. For demographic ‘youth bulges’, see H. Urdal, “A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence,” *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (2006): 607-629. For political transition, see Jack L. Snyder, *From voting to violence: democratization and nationalist conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000), p.31.

In this article, I suggest that the dichotomies created by these two debates represent a false theoretical choice. In explaining violent inter-group conflict, I posit that both emotion and opportunity matter, and that rationality and emotion are not incompatible. The debates arise because the specific causal role of emotion – that is the precise way it matters in inter-group conflicts - is ambiguously defined in several of these theories. Thus in the first debate - between emotions and structural or materialist opportunities – it is unclear whether emotions represent independent causal factors, or whether they are merely incidental to or consequential of changes in material and structural opportunities for violent conflict. Do people commit ethnic violence because they feel aggrieved, fearful, or hostile or do these feelings instead simply result from unequal resource allocation, objective security threats, or ethnic diversity for example? In the second debate, while emotion and rationality are often juxtaposed in mainstream political science, close examination of several theories of ethnic conflict reveals that often they nonetheless both feature in the explanations. The interaction of ‘affect’ and ‘cognition’ in individual judgement and decision-making has been explicitly acknowledged in twenty-five years of research in social and political psychology, yet it remains a stark dichotomy in rational-choice oriented political science.⁴

In this article, I draw on social psychology to study one particular emotion - fear - the feeling produced by a threat from one group to another. In doing so, I suggest two simple but fundamental precepts to refine existing theories of ethnic conflict and to reduce the persistent ambiguity over the importance of emotions, material opportunities, and rationality. First, I argue a distinction needs to be made between attitudes and behaviour in inter-group conflict. Although it is a basic point in social psychology, the difference between support for violence - group attitude or sentiment – and participation in violence – group behaviour or action - is not always clearly distinguished in political science theorization of inter-group conflict. In a given conflict while many may be mobilized – that is hostility, fear, or grievance may be widely-felt - only few may actually commit violence. Conversely, violence may be engineered by a select few even in the absence of widespread mobilization. In this paper, I term group attitude **ethnic mobilization**, and group behaviour **ethnic violence**, and argue we should see them as conceptually distinct explananda or separate dependent variables. I posit that emotion is important in ethnic mobilization, but structural or

⁴ See Daniel Todd Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, *The handbook of social psychology* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), p.335.

material opportunity mediates ethnic violence. The second, equally axiomatic point is the need to recognize that emotion and rationality are not opposing alternatives, but interact in numerous ways in individual judgement and decision-making. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity in attitude and behaviour at the micro-level in violent conflicts, and individuals differ in the degree to which emotionality and rationality enter into their judgement and decision-making, and also differ in their level of support for group violence and in their willingness to commit it. Yet often the level of analysis in the theorization is that of ethnic groups assumed to be unitary actors, or else events such as ethnic wars, which obscure important micro-level variation. We have little systematic evidence of the actual impact of threats on the thoughts and feelings of ordinary individuals in ethnic conflicts, and even less evidence of heterogeneity among them.⁵ In short we lack a solid empirical base on which to build the theoretical micro-foundations of violent inter-group conflict.

This article focuses on the specific emotion of fear to engage with the broader debate on emotions, opportunity, and rationality in violent conflict more generally. In so doing, it considers a set of theories of violent inter-group conflict which have at their heart the notion of threat. Threat-centric theories – where the underlying emotion is fear - share the basic idea that a threat to one ethnic group's security by another can mobilize the threatened group against the threatening group. However, such theories disagree on how exactly fear works, that is the specific role it plays in causing ethnic conflict - and the scholarly disagreement has, ironically, been quite emotionally expressed. For example, in the first debate - between opportunity and emotion - a widely-known opportunity-centric theory, Posen's 'Ethnic Security Dilemma', sees fear as either incidental to or consequential of objective structural conditions, in particular as the product of the anarchic opportunity caused by collapsing states such as Yugoslavia in the 1990s.⁶ In contrast, a notable emotion-based theory, Kaufman's 'Symbolic Politics' thesis, sees ethnic fears as one of several necessary and distinct pre-conditions or antecedents to violent conflict.⁷ Ambiguity also persists in the second debate – between rationality and emotion. For example, Lake and Rothchild describe their theory as a 'rational choice-oriented' explanation of ethnic conflict, yet at the same time state such conflict is the product of interactions between 'strategic dilemmas' on the one hand and

⁵ A point already-recognized. See Green and Seher, "What role does prejudice play in ethnic conflict?," p.526.

⁶ See Barry R. Posen, "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict," *Survival* 35, no. 1 (1993): 27.

⁷ See Kaufman, *Modern hatreds : the symbolic politics of ethnic war*, p.31.

‘political myths and emotions’ on the other.⁸ Emotion and rationality then appear to co-exist. I argue that this uncertainty over how threats operate – the causal mechanisms - arises in part because ethnic mobilization and ethnic violence are not distinguished in such theorization, and in part because the level of analysis has often been that of the aggregated ethnic group. I argue then for an approach, best-described as ‘psychological’, that distinguishes between attitude and behaviour, and that does not oppose emotion with reason.

In this article, I focus on ethnic mobilization and I draw on individual-level data on ethnic group members from a real-world conflict to illustrate the contribution of the ‘psychological’ approach to understanding how threats mobilize such individuals at the micro-level. Theoretically I draw on social psychology, and empirically I draw on the case of Rwanda’s civil war, fought between the Rwandan government and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from 1990 to 1994. The war culminated in a genocide that involved one of the most remarkable cases of ethnic mobilization and ethnic violence in world history. In little over one hundred days, the genocide claimed the lives of between 507,000 and 800,0000 Rwandans.⁹ The perpetrators were drawn overwhelmingly from Rwanda’s ethnic Hutu majority, and the victims mostly from its ethnic Tutsi minority. I identify and demonstrate four psycho-social mechanisms at work in ethnic mobilization. The first mechanism is *boundary-activation*: as the threat grows, the more important the social identities distinguishing in-group from out-group become. The threat is framed increasingly as part of a conflict between two readily-identifiable social groups, such as those defined along ethnic, sectarian, or racial lines. In Rwanda, the civil war would become understood as an *ethnic* conflict, one between the Hutu majority ingroup and Tutsi minority outgroup. It was not understood as simply a conflict between the government and rebels. The second mechanism is *out-group negativity*: the greater the threat, the greater the references that denigrate the out-group. Often the threat is framed to resonate against negative historical and cultural beliefs – myths or narratives - that exist within the in-group about the out-group. In Rwanda, historical references to Hutu oppression at the hands of the Tutsi increased as the threat itself increased. The third mechanism is *out-group homogenization*: the greater the threat, the greater the de-individualization of out-group members. The threat is perceived as one posed not

⁸ See David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Michael Brown et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), p.98.

⁹ For the lower figure, see Alison Des Forges, *Leave none to tell the story : Genocide in Rwanda* (Human Rights Watch; International Federation for Human Rights, 1999), pp.15-16. For the higher figure, see Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda crisis, 1959-1994 : history of a genocide* (London: Hurst and Company, 1995), p.265.

only by those bearing arms, but by all members of the out-group. In Rwanda as the threat peaked, all Tutsi civilians would be seen as the enemy. It was not just rebel combatants who represented the threat. The fourth and final mechanism is *in-group solidarity*: the greater the threat, the stronger the demand for in-group loyalty. Countering the threat is framed as a test of loyalty. In Rwanda, accusations of Hutu disloyalty increased in response to the growing threat, and those disloyal were seen as the enemy or else as the enemy's collaborators.

To be clear, this article provides an explanation of ethnic mobilization in Rwanda, and not an explanation of Rwanda's genocide. More than half the Rwandans whom I surveyed lived through the genocide without committing any violence. Yet many of these same individuals gave answers indicative of their mobilized state of mind and pointing to the operation of these four psycho-social mechanisms. Overall, I found that the fear emotion did play a powerful role in ethnic mobilization. However, security fears created by the civil war did not alone cause Rwanda's genocide. It additionally required opportunity to ultimately provoke ethnic violence. I argue separately it was the move to democratize and the assassination of Rwanda's longstanding, autocratic President which ultimately created the macro-political opportunity for ethnic violence to occur.¹⁰ Ethnic extremists used this window to capture the state and to use its apparatus for genocide. In sum, genocide was the product of both emotion for mobilization and structural opportunity for violence.

This article is structured as follows. In section one I present the theoretical framework in which I situate these findings. Section two introduces the choice of case-study: Rwanda's civil war. In section three I present the data and methods used in the project. Section four then presents the evidence to support each of the four psycho-social mechanisms which operated to mobilize the Rwandan Hutu ethnic group.

Section One: Theoretical Framework

This article draws on theoretical insights from social psychology to address a longstanding question in security studies: how exactly do threats impact relations between ethnic groups, or to frame it in terms of emotions, what role does fear play in ethnic conflicts? I begin by summarizing how threat, and the underpinning emotion of fear, is treated in existing theories of ethnic warfare,

¹⁰ See [deleted to preserve anonymity]

and continue by identifying ambiguities in our understanding that I believe the psycho-social literature helps to clarify.

(i) Threat-based Theories of Ethnic Conflicts

Broadly, threat-centric explanations of ethnic warfare divide into ‘rationalist’ theories –often associated with structuralist and materialist explanations - and ‘affective’ camps – which are closely allied with culturalist and psychological theories. The simplest rationalist explanations emphasize elite calculations. When the power of ruling elites is threatened, ethnic violence is a strategic choice made in order to preserve their position. Valentino is a strong proponent of this quintessentially instrumentalist argument. In his view, Rwanda’s genocide for example was the product of such a calculation. ‘Hutu extremists arrived at the decision to launch a systematic genocide only after they had concluded that less violent options for dealing with the Tutsi threat had failed and that other potential solutions would be impractical or insufficient.’¹¹ Valentino also stresses the role of structural and material factors behind mass killings. ‘Ethnic mass killing is more likely the greater the physical capabilities for mass killing possessed by the racist or nationalist regime.’¹² Emotions play little or no causal role in this explanation of such violence.

The domestic ‘security dilemma’ is a more contingent rationalist and structuralist explanation. Confronted with structural collapse, such as the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, one ethnic group cannot distinguish defensive from offensive security measures taken by the other group to protect itself in the ‘emerging anarchy’.¹³ Faced with this dilemma, the first group has a strong incentive to take pre-emptive military action to eliminate the threat before it is realized, shifting the balance-of-power in the first group’s favour. Lake and Rothchild point to two factors which intensify this existential threat in rationalist theory: information failures – when the intentions and capabilities of the other side cannot be known; and (ii) credible commitments – when neither side can trust the promise of peace by the other.¹⁴

¹¹ Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final solutions : mass killing and genocide in the twentieth century* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), p.184.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.76.

¹³ Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival* 35, no. 1 (1993): p.27.

¹⁴ Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” pp.102-104.

A third rationalist explanation asserts that fear is rational, and that both leaders and followers make strategic calculations concerning ethnic violence. De Figueiredo and Weingast argue that leaders, when their power is gravely threatened, ‘gamble for resurrection’ by taking extraordinary action, such as ethnic violence, to preserve their position.¹⁵ Applying this to Rwanda, they argue that Hutu extremist leaders calculated that (i) genocide would eliminate the Tutsi support base of the rebel RPF should it take power; and (ii) ordinary Hutu forced to commit atrocities against Tutsi, would then fear Tutsi reprisals. For followers, they argue that ordinary Hutu committed violence (i) out of fear of being targeted for non-participation, and (ii) out of fear arising from the uncertainty over how an incoming Tutsi government would treat them. Faced with a choice between a Hutu government and an uncertain Tutsi government, ordinary Hutu calculated the former was the better choice and thus participated in violence.

In contrast, ‘affective’ theories, with which culturalist and psychological explanations are closely associated, emphasize emotional rather than rational responses to threats in ethnic warfare. For Horowitz the emotion of ‘anxiety’ of the other lies at the heart of ethnic conflict. Group anxiety is the inevitable consequence of comparisons made between groups. Anxiety ‘limits and modifies perceptions, producing extreme reactions to modest threats.’¹⁶ Fear of extinction is one such extreme emotional reaction to threat. Yet the threat need not be an existential one. The threat can be to the group’s cultural identity, its demographic survival, or to its self-worth. Ethnic conflict is the result of a threat to – or more precisely anxiety over - one group’s status relative to another.

The ‘symbolic politics’ theory of ethnic conflict combines emotional and materialist factors. Kaufman argues three pre-conditions are necessary for ethnic warfare: (i) symbols and myths justifying hostility towards an ethnic group; (ii) an opportunity to mobilize politically against a group; and (iii) ethnic fears.¹⁷ The second condition – the opportunity to mobilize – represents a structural factor while the third condition – ethnic fears – represents the emotional factor. For Kaufman it is primarily emotion, and not reason that drives groups to violence. “The symbolic politics theory

¹⁵ Rui De Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, “The rationality of fear: Political opportunism and ethnic conflict,” in *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 261-302.

¹⁶ Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, p.179.

¹⁷ Kaufman, *Modern hatreds : the symbolic politics of ethnic war*, pp.30-33.

would suggest an explanation based less on logical than on psychological factors.’¹⁸ The role of emotion has been given similar prominence in another psycho-cultural theory of ethnic conflict. Ross argues that psycho-cultural narratives embedded within groups can cause, intensify, and mitigate ethnic conflict, and that such narratives are important because of their emotional power. These narratives often provide the historical link between existing and past threats. ‘In bitter conflicts, among the strongest feelings people express are fears about physical attacks on their group, and on symbolic attacks on its identity...Both fears involve feelings of vulnerability, denigration, and humiliation that link past losses to present dangers.’¹⁹

All of these explanations represent variations on a theme. What they have in common is the belief that threats drive groups to mobilize. Many of these explanations have also suggested threat accounts not only for ethnic warfare, but for genocide as well. Thus Valentino and De Figureido and Weingast explicitly apply their theory to Rwanda’s genocide. Posen draws largely on the case of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and argues that in a security dilemma: ‘the drive for security in one group is so great that it produces near-genocidal behaviour towards neighbouring groups.’²⁰ Lake and Rothchild have argued theories of ethnic conflict can apply to ‘selective genocides’ – and include the case of Rwanda as one of the ‘highly destructive outcomes’ possible.²¹ Kaufman also sees genocide as a case of ‘extreme violence’ in ethnic warfare, and has extended his ‘symbolic politics’ argument to Rwanda in detail.²²

Yet, as I have suggested, the distinctions between ‘emotion’ and structural opportunity, and ‘emotion’ and rationality are not so stark when these theories are examined more closely. To begin with, fear features in almost all of the structuralist/materialist theories. These theories acknowledge then that fear clearly has some role to play, and that emotion is implicitly not incompatible with structural or material factors. However, the principal ambiguity in the structuralist-emotion division is over the specific role fear plays in ethnic conflict. Is fear an incidental by-product of changes in structural and material opportunities or does it have independent causal significance? In Posen’s

¹⁸ Ibid., p.38.

¹⁹ Ross, *Cultural contestation in ethnic conflict*, p.37.

²⁰ Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival* 35, no. 1 (1993): p.30.

²¹ David A. Lake and Donald S. Rothchild, *The international spread of ethnic conflict : fear, diffusion, and escalation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), p.21.

²² Stuart J. Kaufman, “Symbolic politics or rational choice? Testing theories of extreme ethnic violence,” *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 45-86.

security dilemma, fear is described as the consequence of a structural condition, notably an emerging anarchy created by the implosion of a multi-ethnic state. In contrast, in Kaufman's Symbolic Politics theory ethnic fears are a necessary pre-condition, that is they are a distinct and antecedent causal factor in ethnic conflict. The Symbolic Politics theory is also the most explicit in acknowledging possible endogeneity. Kaufman relaxes the unitary actor assumption behind ethnic groups in order to differentiate between elite and mass-led mobilization. In mass-led conflict, the fears are antecedent and drive the conflict. In elite-led conflict, it is the elites themselves who 'provoke' and magnify the fears.²³ Fear in other words can be both a cause and consequence of ethnic conflict.

A similar ambiguity persists in the emotion-rationality debate. Emotion in fact features in rationalist theories of ethnic conflict. De Figueredo and Weingast go so far as to even describe fear itself as rational. However, the main disagreement once again is over the specific role of emotion in ethnic conflict. Lake and Rothchild for example see emotions as simply the product of elite strategic calculus to manipulate them to their own advantage. 'Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs build upon these fears of insecurity and polarize society. Political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving groups further apart.'²⁴ Emotion then is used instrumentally and as an intensifier. In contrast, Kaufman sees emotions as integral to, and not merely consequential of the judgement and decision-making process - a type of heuristic. '...emotional appeals short-circuit the complicated problem of making trade-off decisions because they encourage people to put ethnic issues ahead of other concerns.'²⁵

It is the need to resolve such ambiguities that in part motivates this article. I suggest two basic but important precepts to be recognized in theorization of ethnic conflict to address them. First, I argue we must parse the dependent variable: ethnic conflict. We need to distinguish group attitudes – what I term ethnic mobilization – from group behaviour – ethnic violence. While violence has already been analytically distinguished in civil wars, mobilization, however, has yet to be so differentiated.²⁶ I argue that mobilization and violence are distinct components of ethnic conflict

²³ Kaufman, *Modern hatreds : the symbolic politics of ethnic war*, p.35.

²⁴ Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," p.97.

²⁵ Kaufman, *Modern hatreds : the symbolic politics of ethnic war*, p.30.

²⁶ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The logic of violence in civil war* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.20.

and as such have distinct causes. Emotions drive mobilization, but it is opportunity that mediates violence. Negative group sentiment based on feelings of fear, hatred, resentment, and anger is likely to exist between groups in all societies to different degrees at different times. Yet only sometimes are such group attitudes expressed as violence. It is shifts in structural and material opportunities that ultimately explain the timing of such violence. This distinction, however, is obfuscated because of likely endogeneity. Negative group emotions may exist independently of such changes in structural conditions, but they may also be produced by them. Surveys of attitudes among Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews may reveal a generalized distrust and dislike of each other, but these feelings may increase significantly in depth and breadth when new settlements are built in the West Bank or when a suicide attack succeeds in Tel Aviv. Second, we need to recognize that emotion and rationality are not opposing alternatives, but in fact co-exist and interact in individual judgement and decision-making. Petersen has made the most systematic attempt to explain the significance of emotions, notably fear, hatred, and resentment, in ethnic violence. For him an emotion is a mechanism which ‘... raises the saliency of one desire/choice over others... and heightens both cognitive and physical capabilities necessary to respond to the situational challenge.’²⁷ Emotions in other words are not exclusive of rationality and structural opportunities, but are instead integral to both decision-making and action, a point long-acknowledged in social psychology. This interaction between emotion and reason is best seen with micro-level evidence. However, the bias towards macro-analysis in ethnic conflict where the ethnic group is usually treated as a unitary actor, obscures the micro-mechanisms at work. At best a distinction is sometimes made between the group’s leadership and followership, where elites are often seen as rational actors strategically manipulating the emotions of the masses. However, this does not reflect the true extent of intra-group heterogeneity and we need to gather systematic evidence to build a stronger micro-foundations of ethnic conflict. I posit social psychology offers a strong theoretical framework for interpreting such micro-evidence.

(ii) Psycho-social Theory on Inter-group Relations

Social psychology, and in particular the specialized sub-field of inter-group relations, offers potentially rich theoretical insights into our understanding of real-world ethnic conflict. As a field,

²⁷ Roger Dale Petersen, *Understanding ethnic violence : fear, hatred, and resentment in twentieth-century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.17.

it overcomes the two main weaknesses identified above in existing scholarly explanations first by clearly distinguishing between attitude and behaviour in inter-group relations, and second by being unconstrained by the view that emotionality and rationality are opposing alternatives. In contrast, in mainstream political science today, rational choice remains the dominant paradigm for explaining political phenomena. Technically, as an approach, rational choice assumes that preferences are reflexive, complete, and transitive, and often when a ‘thick’ rationalist explanation is given it usually comprises a model predicting that actors will act strategically in their self-interest to maximise their utility as defined by those preferences. ‘Thin’ rationalist accounts are simpler and refer to the approach whereby actors use the best means to achieve a particular end: states maximize power, firms maximize profits, politicians maximize votes.²⁸ Emotions, sometimes described as passions or visceral reactions in the political science literature, are seen as a subversion of rationality and an inferior form of judgement and decision-making.²⁹ As such, their causal importance is hotly-contested by rational choice proponents.³⁰ Yet in social psychology, the consensus based on over twenty-five years of empirical research, is that there is in fact an interactive relationship between emotion and reason. Instead of being opposing alternatives, rationality and emotion are believed to work together when an individual makes a choice or when an individual takes action.

In summing up this psycho-social research, Keltner and Lerner state in the standard reference work for the field: ‘...the study of emotion and reason reveals that almost every cognitive process – attention, evaluative judgements, probability estimates, perceptions of risk, out-group biases, and moral judgement – is shaped by momentary emotions in systematic and profound ways.’³¹ Thus research has shown that fear causes individuals to be more selectively *attentive*, that is particularly sensitive to the possibility of threats when anxious.³² Other research has shown that momentary emotions – moods – influence individuals as they make positive or negative *evaluative* judgements.³³ Fear also affects individuals’ perceptions of *risks*, increasing the expectation of pessimistic

²⁸ Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of rational choice theory: a critique of applications in political science* (Yale University Press, 1996).

²⁹ Martha Craven Nussbaum, *Upheavals of thought: the intelligence of emotions* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

³⁰ Grigorian and Kaufman, “Hate narratives and ethnic conflict.”

³¹ Gilbert, Fiske, and Lindzey, *The handbook of social psychology*, p.335.

³² Andrew Mathews and Fred Klug, “Emotionality and interference with color-naming in anxiety,” *Behaviour Research and Therapy* 31, no. 1 (January 1993): 57-62.

³³ N Schwarz and GL Clore, “Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: informative and directive functions of affective states,” *Journal of personality and social psychology* 45, no. 3 (1983): 513-523.

outcomes.³⁴ Fear, triggered by perceptions of out-groups as strong, also provokes in-group *bias* or prejudice against the threatening out-group.³⁵ The highly mathematical field of judgement and decision-making, even during the ‘cognitive revolution’ of the 1970s, has also recognized the multiple influences of affect, particularly on probability assessments.³⁶ Yet these findings have only entered into a small subset of political science theorization on ethnic conflict. This is partly because we lack micro-level data to see the operation of these emotional influences, thereby forcing scholars to make inferences from highly-aggregated phenomena. The case for testing theoretical insights from social psychology with real-world ethnic conflict data is I submit then strong.

Research on inter-group relations has shown that in-groups and out-groups can form through the mere categorization or creation of groups (the minimal group paradigm).³⁷ It is an insight which has been recognized in ethnic conflict.³⁸ Moreover, loyalty and preferences, even within groups without recognizable commonalities, can form very quickly, in less than a day. It is unsurprising then that ethnicity is a particularly powerful and easily-activated group identity, given the possibility of commonalities such as shared cultures, phenotype, histories, languages, ancestry, religions, origin myths, and worldviews which have often been developed over centuries. Implicit in most psycho-social theories of identity then is the understanding that social identities are malleable and their salience is context-specific, a view consistent with the dominant constructivist paradigm in identity politics.³⁹ Research has indeed indicated that ‘the introduction of meaningful differences between groups in resources, status, or power’ alter the degree of group identification.⁴⁰

Competition is one widely-recognized external context that activates group boundaries. Realistic group conflict theory posits that in a conflict for scarce material resources, an individual will choose to identify with his in-group in order to maximize his chances of sharing in the

³⁴ Jennifer S. Lerner et al., “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism,” *Psychological Science* 14, no. 2 (March 1, 2003): 144 -150.

³⁵ Diane M. Mackie, Thierry Devos, and Eliot R. Smith, “Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79, no. 4 (October 2000): 602-616.

³⁶ Gilbert, Fiske, and Lindzey, *The handbook of social psychology*, p.559.

³⁷ Henri Tajfel et al., “Social categorization and intergroup behaviour,” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1, no. 2 (1971): 149-178.

³⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict*, p.144.

³⁹ J. D. Fearon and D. D. Laitin, “Violence and the social construction of ethnic identity,” *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 845-877.

⁴⁰ Marilyn B. Brewer and Norman Miller, *Intergroup relations* (Open University Press, 1996), p.61.

resource.⁴¹ Social identity theory, in contrast, believes the underlying mechanism is not the rational pursuit of individual gain, but the maintenance of self-esteem which drives individuals to identify with the in-group.⁴² Whether it is status or material resources, implicit in the finding that competition is a context which activates group identification, is the importance of inter-group threat. When a threat to the group materializes, group members identify more strongly with the group. There has been extensive research on the role of threat as a moderator of in-group identification in social psychology.⁴³ This research has recognized that such threats may be symbolic as well as realistic. Realistic threats are those to wealth, power, influence, and security, whereas symbolic threats are to values, beliefs, status, and norms of the group.⁴⁴ “Threat can be perceived in terms of the in-group’s social identity, its goals and values, its position in the hierarchy, even its existence.”⁴⁵ Security threats, the subject of ethnic conflict in this article, represent a threat to a group’s existence.

Once threat activates the boundaries between groups— that is group identities become more salient – one important and well-established consequence is inter-group bias: favouritism towards in-groups and derogation of out-groups. In-group positivity may be expressed as pride, loyalty, and perceived superiority, whereas out-group negativity may appear as stereotyping, discrimination, and prejudice.⁴⁶ Applying inter-group bias to theories on civil wars and ethnic warfare, in-group positivity may lie at the heart of (ethno-)nationalism, while out-group negativity may lie at the root of historical narratives or myths that denigrate the other group as the enemy.

Threat then can intensify inter-group bias, though the mere act of social categorization can also create bias.⁴⁷ This bias may express itself in two ways in addition to in-group favouritism and out-group negativity. The first effect is in-group cohesion. As Sumner puts it: “The relationship of comradeship and peace in the we-group, and that of hostility and war towards other-groups are

⁴¹ Muzafer Sherif, *The Robbers Cave experiment: intergroup conflict and cooperation* (Wesleyan University Press, 1988).

⁴² Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in *The Social psychology of intergroup relations*, ed. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel (Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 1979).

⁴³ For a review of this literature, see David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, *Oxford Handbook of political psychology* (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.539-542.

⁴⁴ Blake M. Riek, Eric W. Mania, and Samuel L. Gaertner, “Intergroup Threat and Outgroup Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 10, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 336 -353.

⁴⁵ Miles Hewstone, Mark Rubin, and Hazel Willis, “Intergroup bias,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 53 (2002): p.586.

⁴⁶ Gilbert, Fiske, and Lindzey, *The handbook of social psychology*, p.1086.

⁴⁷ Anne Maass, Roberta Ceccarelli, and Samantha Rudin, “Linguistic Intergroup Bias,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, no. 3 (1996): 512-526.

correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside.⁴⁸ The second effect is out-group homogenization: people are more likely to see variation between individuals within their own group, than within a group to which they do not belong.⁴⁹ Applying this to ethnic conflict, an ethnic in-group member can see the distinctiveness in the character and behaviour of his fellow co-ethnic, but he is more likely to generalize the threatening behaviour of an ethnic out-group member to all other out-group members. Thus all ethnic out-group members appear threatening.

Yet despite its intuitive appeal for understanding civil wars and ethnic conflicts, much of the psycho-social research on inter-group relations comprises experiments conducted in either laboratories or constructed field settings. We have few studies that test these insights using data from actual social conflicts. Clearly there are practical limitations, especially in the case of violent conflict. But the shortage of real-world testing remains nonetheless, and is a deficit that needs to be addressed.

Section Two: The Choice of Case Study

I draw then on data from Rwanda's civil war of 1990-94 to illustrate the relationship between threats and group mobilization. Rwanda's genocide has etched itself into the world's conscience, and has become the high waterline for violence in Africa, as well as for international difference toward it. It has attracted considerable scholarly attention, and has become a key case in studies of genocide. There have been excellent accounts of the history leading up to Rwanda's genocide already.⁵⁰ In this section, I provide merely a historical sketch of the salient events in this case.

On April 6th 1994, a plane coming in to land in the tiny, central African nation of Rwanda was shot down, killing the country's President, Juvénal Habyarimana, and re-kindling an on-going civil war. Almost immediately, in the ensuing power vacuum, a small group of extremists seized

⁴⁸ William Graham Sumner, *Folkways: A Study of Mores, Manners, Customs and Morals* (Cosimo, Inc., 2007), p.12.

⁴⁹ D M Messick and D M Mackie, "Intergroup Relations," *Annual Review of Psychology* 40, no. 1 (1, 1989): 45-81.

⁵⁰ See Prunier, *The Rwanda crisis, 1959-1994 : history of a genocide*. Des Forges, *Leave none to tell the story : Genocide in Rwanda*. Mahmood Mamdani, *When victims become killers : colonialism, nativism and the genocide in Rwanda* (Oxford: James Currey, 2001).

control of the state, and then deployed its civilian and military apparatus, and mobilized many ordinary Rwandans, against the country's Tutsi minority. It was war, and Hutu extremists had declared the Tutsi the enemy. In the face of the violence, the international community failed to respond. Instead of intervening to stop the slaughter, it moved to evacuate foreign nationals and to draw down the 2700-strong UN peacekeeping force on the ground to monitor the now-broken peace agreement. In the end, only 450 blue helmets remained. Both combat between government and rebel forces, and violence against Tutsi civilians, continued largely unchecked. Some one hundred days later, the rebels emerged victorious. However, in that short time, a genocide against the country's Tutsi minority had also been perpetrated.

In 1994, and still today, Rwanda comprised three ethnic groups: a Hutu majority, a Tutsi minority, and an even smaller Twa minority.⁵¹ A Tutsi monarchy had ruled this tiny kingdom for some time before European colonization. Both the Germans from 1897, and then the Belgians from 1916 continued to rule indirectly through the native king, the *Mwami*. The Belgians believed the Tutsi minority to be racially superior, and had privileged them, amplifying perceived differences between them and the Hutu majority. However, shortly before Rwanda's independence in 1962, a popular revolution overthrew this now unpopular monarchy. The Hutu revolutionaries proclaimed Rwanda's first Republic, with Grégoire Kayibanda as its first President. A new Hutu elite now controlled the state. However, this historic event also triggered the exodus of tens of thousands of Tutsi out of Rwanda. Between 1962 and 1967, these exiles would make ten armed attempts to return, each ending in failure. Their attacks did succeed, however, in sparking retaliatory violence against the Tutsi who had remained within Rwanda. This minority would live under an authoritarian and highly exclusionary regime until 1973, when a small group of northern Hutu, discontent with favouritism shown to southern Hutu under Kayibanda's rule, wrested power from him in a coup d'état. A young General Juvénal Habyarimana, himself a Hutu from northern Rwanda, became President of Rwanda's Second Republic. For the next seventeen years, under Habyarimana's rule the Tutsi would continue to be largely excluded from political life in Rwanda, but were not, however, the targets of state-sponsored violence.

⁵¹ The exact demographic balance is contested but most estimates for Hutu range between 85% and 91%, Tutsi 8% and 14%, and Twa almost always 1% or less.

This non-violent co-existence altered when the descendants of the Revolution's exiles established the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987 in neighbouring Uganda, along with dissidents from Habyarimana's Rwanda, and decided to make yet another attempt at armed return. It began in the afternoon of October 1st 1990, when a small group of RPF soldiers launched a surprise attack on a Rwandan border-post from Uganda. The attack, rapidly repulsed, marked the start of Rwanda's civil war. For the next 1285 days until the fateful plane crash, this first phase of the war was characterized by long periods without combat, interrupted by occasional bursts of largely guerrilla activity. In June 1992, the two sides agreed to participate in a formal peace process in Arusha, Tanzania, under the auspices of international mediators. Concurrent with this civil war, a second important process was ongoing within Rwanda: Habyarimana was under international and domestic pressure to democratize. At the negotiating table, having earlier legalized opposition political parties, Habyarimana then agreed to accept four of these parties into a coalition government. The remaining challenge was now to reach an agreement on how to share power with the RPF. In July 1992 a ceasefire entered into effect, which held for just over six months until February 8th 1993 when the RPF launched another major but short-lived offensive, this time stopping just thirty kilometres short of the capital. At this point, the war had displaced close to one million Rwandans in the north of the country, and had claimed the lives of between 2500-3000 Tutsi civilians in reprisal attacks.⁵² Finally, in August 1993 the peace process yielded an overall deal on power-sharing with the RPF, and a UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMIR, was authorized to monitor the agreement. The deal, however, was unpopular, particularly with hardliners at home, and politics inside Rwanda grew tenuous.

Events climaxed on April 6th 1994. The shooting down of Habyarimana's plane, by attackers still unknown, re-ignited the civil war. The war now entered a second, genocidal phase. When Hutu hardliners seized control of the government in Kigali and began to target moderate Hutu politicians and Tutsi civilians, the RPF responded immediately. The 600-strong contingent in the capital broke out of its barracks and engaged the elite Presidential Guard. At the same time, under the command of Major-General Paul Kagame, the bulk of RPF forces moved out from behind the cease-fire lines in the north of the country, engaged the Rwandan army, and advanced towards the capital. Their goal was the capture of the state outright. 102 days later the rebels succeeded. They pushed

⁵² Amnesty International, *Rwanda: Persecution of a Tutsi Minority and Repression of Government Critics 1990-1992*, 1992.

Rwanda's extremist government, armed forces, militia, and about two million Hutu civilians over the border into what was then eastern Zaire. Their victory ended the genocide. In that short time to victory, however, the violence claimed somewhere between 507,000 and 800,000 victims, the overwhelming majority of whom were Tutsi.

Rwanda's genocide is shocking - for several reasons. The characteristics of the violence impress themselves upon your mind. First, the intensity leaves little doubt as to whether the intent was genocidal. By one estimate, nearly three-quarters of Rwanda's Tutsi population was exterminated.⁵³ Then there is the sheer speed of the violence. These people were killed in little over one hundred days, and there is evidence to suggest the majority of the victims perished in the first two to three weeks.⁵⁴ The nature of the violence is also distressing to learn. It was collective, crude, and highly intimate. Killers wielded agricultural implements - machetes, forks, and hoes - as well as traditional weapons - nail-studded clubs, knives, bows and arrows, and spears. They confronted their victims face-to-face and overwhelmingly in groups. Next, there is the astounding geographic scope of the violence. There are very few places in Rwanda where violence did *not* occur. Tutsi were targeted wherever they resided or wherever they fled. However, one of the most controversial and distinctive aspects of the violence is the scale of civilian involvement. In practically every community where the Tutsi 'enemy' lived, there were Hutu, and also Twa, who mobilized against them. Their victims were often people known to them personally. Rwanda genocide then was the result of a civilian mobilization remarkable for both its scale and its speed.

It is these characteristics of Rwanda's genocide that have inscribed it as an event of enduring significance in world history, and that have defined it as a benchmark for violence in Africa. They also present an empirical puzzle. How and why did Rwandans mobilize so quickly, and in such great numbers? I argue in this article that one piece of this puzzle lies in the political communications Rwandans received from above, as well in how they were interpreted below.

Section Three: Research Design, Methods, and Data

⁵³ [deleted to preserve anonymity]

⁵⁴ Philip Verwimp, "Death and survival during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda," *Population Studies* 58, no. 2 (2004): 233-245.

In this article, I illustrate the relationship between war-time threat and ethnic mobilization through two comparisons. The first, across time, is between the pre-genocide and genocidal phases of the war. In the first, pre-genocide phase (1 Oct. 1990 – 5 Apr. 1994), the threat was minor: the war affected a small part of the country to the north, there were long periods of ceasefire whilst a peace deal was negotiated, and combat comprised mainly hit-and-run guerrilla activities. In the second, genocidal phase (6 Apr 1994 – 17 Jul 1994), however, the threat intensified: the Head of State of seventeen years standing had been assassinated, senior politicians were being targeted, the power-sharing deal was broken, and a battle to the end for outright control of the state had begun, and this time it involved combat in the capital Kigali. The second comparison, across space, is between the north and the south of the country. In the north, located on the war's front-lines, the threat was clear and present: northerners suffered civilian casualties, were displaced by the fighting, and generally experienced the sights and sounds of war first-hand. In the south, where the war by contrast was distant, the threat was minor: southerners were not the victims of war-time violence, they did not have to flee their communities, and generally they relied on the radio and second-hand sources for news of the war. In short, these two comparisons were selected to capture variation in the level of threat to or fear within Rwanda's Hutu population.

I draw on three main kinds of evidence to make these inter-temporal and inter-regional comparisons. First, I analyze broadcasts from Rwanda's hate radio station, Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), from before and during the genocide: it provides evidence of how Rwanda's extremist elite understood and framed the war from above. Second, I use survey data collected from ordinary Rwandans from the north and south of the country who lived through the war: it provides individual-level evidence of how the war was understood and framed from below. Third, I enrich both sources with more in-depth interviews with Rwandans who were resident in four case-study communities, again from the north and south of the country. Together, these data show the operation of the four psycho-social mechanisms.

The radio was the most effective tool for direct mass communication in Rwanda. 29.9% of all Rwandan households, that is nearly one in three, owned a radio in 1991.⁵⁵ While Rwanda's print media was remarkably diverse, it had only a marginal and indirect impact on the majority of

⁵⁵ Commission Nationale de Recensement, *Récensement Général de la Population de l'Habitat au Août 1991: Résultats Définitifs* (Kigali, Rwanda: Ministère du Plan, 1994).

Rwandans' lives: in 1991 only 56.2% of the population aged over seven knew how to read and write and only 6.5% of the population aged between 15 and 24 years old had had more than a primary-school education.⁵⁶ During the war Rwandans, reception permitting, had a choice of three radio stations. The first was Radio Rwanda, the national radio station that had been broadcasting from before the start of the war. It was effectively the voice of the government up until 1992 when opposition parties demanded and received more moderation and less partisanship. The second was RTLM, a private radio station that began its transmissions on July 8th 1993 and stopped reporting 361 days later on July 3rd 1994 when the RPF captured Kigali. Infamously known as Radio Machete during the genocide, RTLM had strong ties to elements of both Rwanda's ruling elite and hardliners. Of its fifty shareholders, forty came from the north, the region of President Habyarimana's birth and thirty-nine belonged to Habyarimana's ruling MRND party. A third radio station, Radio Muhubura, based in Uganda, broadcast on behalf of the rebel RPF from July 1992. Although its discourse emphasized national unity over ethnic differences, its signal did not extend far into Rwanda.⁵⁷ The radio with the most radical content during the war then was clearly RTLM. In spite of stigma associated with RTLM in post-genocide Rwanda, a surprisingly high number of Rwandans, 61.3% of my survey respondents, admitted they listened to it. Given its remarkable power of outreach, RTLM's broadcasts represent a rich source of data on how Rwanda's extremist elite chose to communicate and frame the war to ordinary Rwandans.

The RTLM radio transcripts came from the International Monitor Institute, a non-profit organization commissioned by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to translate its broadcasts from Kinyarwanda into English and French for use as evidence in trials. The translated transcripts covered fifty-five days, or 15.3% of RTLM's 361 days of broadcasting: sixteen days from the pre-genocide phase, and thirty-nine days from the genocidal phase. Altogether, the transcripts contained 410,067 words, and they have been the subject of two excellent quantitative analyses - testing different hypotheses - previously.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Des Forges, *Leave none to tell the story : Genocide in Rwanda*.

⁵⁸ Hege Gulseth, "The Use of Propaganda in the Rwandan Genocide: A Study of R.T.L.M" (Master's thesis, University of Oslo, 2004). Scott Straus, "What Is the Relationship between Hate Radio and Violence? Rethinking Rwanda's "Radio Machete"," *Politics Society* 35, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 609-637.

I conducted the content analysis of the broadcasts in two stages. In the first stage, I compiled a list of words that I believed would be indicative of the four psycho-social mechanisms that I was testing. I then counted the occurrence of each of these selected words in each day's broadcast. The second stage involved more intensive human judgement. I checked the wider context of each word. I rejected those words used in contexts which did not illustrate the psycho-social mechanism being tested. Finally, I calculated the occurrence of the remaining words as a proportion of all words used in each day's broadcast. This allowed me to compare the relative concentration of the frames across time. Table 1 reports the findings in two ways. First the relative frequencies of each relevant term as a proportion of **all words** in the database (Statistic A), and second the relative frequencies of each relevant term in the pre-genocide and genocide time periods as a proportion of **all appearances** of the term in the two time periods combined (Statistic B).

[Table 1 here]

I also conducted a stratified two stage cluster survey of 294 individual Rwandans in 2003. The survey instrument comprised 223 questions relating to attitudes and beliefs, as well as demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. I stratified the survey first regionally, and second by perpetrator status. As a result, the first stratum comprised 151 northern respondents and 143 southern respondents.⁵⁹ This stratification captured the differential impact of the war in Rwanda: war-time threat was high in the north, and low in the south. The second stratum comprised 104 perpetrators (defined as an individual who had committed at least one act of violence), and 190 non-perpetrators. I personally administered the questionnaire to the perpetrators in prison with the assistance of an interpreter, and hired and trained a team of enumerators to administer the survey for the non-perpetrators living in rural communities. 273 respondents identified themselves as Hutu, and 21 as Tutsi, and I report separate results for each group. The frequencies reported in the article take into account the survey's design effects.

Last, I selected four communities or *cellules*, the smallest administrative unit in Rwanda, as micro-case studies. On average a *cellule* was home to 200 households. I chose two communities from the north, where the war was close, and two from the south where the war was distant. I

⁵⁹ I selected Ruhengeri Prefecture from the north, and Butare Prefecture from the south. In 1994, Rwanda's territorial administration comprised 11 prefectures, 145 communes, 1545 sectors, and approximately 9000 *cellules*.

interviewed a cross-section of individuals from each community using a semi-structured questionnaire designed to complement the structured questionnaire in the survey.

Section Four: Hypotheses

In the next four sub-sections, I test for the operation of the four psycho-social mechanisms in Rwanda's civil war, evidenced in the framing of the conflict in the radio broadcasts, survey data, and interview testimony.

Hypothesis I – Boundary Activation: the Greater the Threat, the more Salient the Social Identity

The first indicator of ethnic mobilization is the framing of the war as ethnic. The war is not simply one between a government and a rebel group, but one between one ethnic group and another. In hypothetical terms, the greater the threat, the more widely-perceived the conflict as ethnic. The primary psycho-social mechanism here is boundary activation: threat brings to the foreground of society ethnic differences that had previously existed in the background.⁶⁰

RTLTM broadcasts reflect this higher salience of ethnicity in Rwandan society. Its broadcasters increasingly framed the conflict in ethnic terms as the war escalated. In the pre-genocide stage of the war, when the threat was minor, RTLTM broadcasters used the non-ethnic identifiers 'RPF' or 'rebels' to define the enemy. However, in the genocidal phase, when the threat had grown more acute, we see a decline in the use of the neutral descriptors, and a rise instead of ethnic identifiers to define the enemy. Table 1 shows that the terms *Inkotanyi* and *Inyenzzi* rose significantly in frequency in the second, genocidal phase of the war. *Inkotanyi*, or 'fierce warriors' is a historical reference to a regiment in the army of the Tutsi king of old, while *Inyenzzi*, or cockroaches, refers to Tutsi invaders of the 1960s, so named because they often attacked at night. Rwandans understood both terms to refer to Tutsi.

This activation of ethnic identities can also be seen below, in how ordinary Rwandans framed inter-group tensions in their society. The distance is not between supporters of the rebels

⁶⁰ Charles Tilly, "Social Boundary Mechanisms," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 34, no. 2 (June 1, 2004): 211 - 236.

and supporters of the government, but between individuals of one ethnic group and individuals of the other. As the threat intensifies, members of the ethnic in-group increasingly suspect members of the ethnic out-group of supporting the enemy.

This increased ethnic distrust can first be seen in the survey data through an inter-temporal comparison. I asked Rwandans, in open-ended questions, to describe the changes in their communities following (i) the outbreak of the war in 1990 (pre-genocide phase) and (ii) the President's assassination in 1994 (genocidal phase). Table 2 summarizes the three main impacts that emerged after coding their responses. In the pre-genocide phase, ethnic distancing was the most common answer (48.8%), followed by insecurity (27.1%), and lastly economic hardship (26.3%).⁶¹ The outbreak of war then clearly did make ordinary Rwandans think in ethnic terms. In addition, in the second genocidal phase when the threat intensified, respondents reported the same three effects but in greater numbers: 66.5% of respondents for example reported ethnic distancing following the President's assassination.

[Table 2 here]

We can also see this increased ethnic distance in a second comparison, this time an inter-regional one between the northern and southern communities. In the northern community of Rukungira, located within the zone of combat where the threat was most acute, Tutsi were targeted immediately following the initial attack that triggered the war in October 1990. Hutu villagers from a neighbouring community brought three of Rukungira's thirty-five Tutsi to the local government office where they were interrogated and beaten before being released. Following another rebel attack on the major northern town of Ruhengeri four months later, the same group of villagers targeted the same family, but this time killed the household head. Distrust was growing between the two ethnic groups, as the following juxtaposition from a Tutsi and Hutu in one of the northern communities exemplifies.

⁶¹ In coding **ethnic distance**, I looked for references to distrust, misunderstandings, disagreements, poor cooperation, and hate between ethnic groups. Northern respondents additionally mentioned arrests, harassment, and violence that targeted Tutsi. References to **insecurity** in the south typically meant a fear that the war might eventually reach them there. However, in the north insecurity was more concrete and dramatic. It included references to the deployment of soldiers and the machinery of war, immobility resulting from roadblocks, compulsory participation in night-time security patrols, the arrival of refugees fleeing the war, personal stories of flight from rebel attacks, as well as the killing of civilians. **Economic hardship** during the war usually referred to the inability to farm one's land in safety, the theft of food crops by war-refugees, price increases, the closure of local markets, and more generally hunger, poverty, and an unwillingness to work with an uncertain future ahead.

What happened in your community after the RPF attacked in 1990? There was distrust between the Tutsi and the Hutu. Almost everyone was demoralized as it was the first time for many people that they heard of an attack or a war against Rwanda. In the evenings and in the mornings the Tutsi liked to stick together in groups. We were always afraid of these groups as it was being said that they were making a plan to kill us. We were afraid of each other. Then when Habyarimana died the fear became generalised. We did not do anything and we did not go anywhere. We stayed in our homes as was ordered. The killers led by the Councillor [a local state official] started their work to kill the Tutsi on the same day we heard of the President's death.

Donatelle, Hutu farmer, aged 35, Mutovu cellule, northern Rwanda, July 2003

What happened in your community after the RPF attacked in 1990? When the RPF attacked the country the trust between us and the Hutu was broken. They [Hutu] began to say that it was us [Tutsi] who had started the war against Rwanda and that we were making them suffer for it. The Hutu began to control all our activities. They said that we were sending our children to fight at the front but it was not true. It was just an excuse to threaten and to attack us. It is thanks to God that before 1994 we did not suffer any human losses, if I remember rightly. But when the plane came down it was another thing. We were hunted like wild animals. My wife and children were killed in these operations. I had fled and hid myself in the bushes. It was by the grace of God they did not find me.

Constantin, Tutsi farmer, aged 44, Mutovu cellule, northern Rwanda, July 2003

In contrast, in the south where the threat was weaker, the distrust was less pronounced following the start of the war. There were no arrests, no harassment, no violence and no other highly visible forms of ethnic distancing within these communities. The suspicions, if any, were latent as Véronique, a genocide survivor describes.

What happened in your community after the war started in 1990? For those who had radios, they were afraid but for those who did not, they were not concerned. *Who exactly was afraid?* It was everyone who was afraid – not just the Hutu but also the Tutsi as they had both heard there was war. But there were no problems between Hutu and Tutsi as a result here. There was nothing bad said about the Tutsi at the time. Perhaps people said it in their huts but they did not say it to me. *Nothing happened to you?* There was one man who was strong here and each time he saw me he said he would pull my nose and say he wished he could shave [make it smaller] it now. But that was all.

Véronique, Hutu woman married to Tutsi farmer, aged 31, Tamba cellule, southern Rwanda

In the south then, ethnic distance was much more muted, reflecting the lower threat-level in the region. In short, the evidence suggests that war-time threats first serve to activate boundaries between ethnic groups. Consistent with psycho-social theory, as threat or fear increases, so too does the salience of social identities.

Hypothesis II - Out-group Negativity: the Greater the Threat, the Greater the Out-group Derogation

The second indicator of ethnic mobilization is out-group negativity. The threat is framed to resonate against existing negative beliefs that the threatened in-group possesses of the threatening out-group: the greater the threat, the greater the negativity. In psycho-social theory, out-group negativity is an expression of inter-group bias, and the converse of in-group favouritism.⁶² Negativity towards the out-group can be expressed in both behaviour (discrimination) and attitude (prejudice). Several theories of ethnic warfare have also recognized negative sentiment towards the out-group as important in conflict. It has alternately been described as ethnic prejudice, ethnic antagonism, hatred, social cleavages, myths and narratives of hostility, and in extreme cases dehumanization.⁶³ However, a key point in psycho-social theory is that the intensity of these negative sentiments is variable. It recognizes out-group negativity is dependent on various moderators, including threat.⁶⁴ Thus as the conflict escalates (that is the threat intensifies), we would expect to see more negative references to the out-group. These negative references need not be untrue. They may simply increase in frequency as the threat intensifies. The threat thus resonates more strongly against existing negative beliefs that the in-group hold of the out-group.

In Rwanda, an anti-Tutsi narrative did pervade its society. It has its roots in a specific Hutu interpretation of Rwanda's history. The derogatory narrative comprised some core beliefs: (i) the Tutsi were alien invaders. According to this belief, Hutu had settled in Rwanda first as farmers, and Tutsi had arrived subsequently as herders, and by implication had a weaker link to the country; and (ii) the Tutsi had oppressed the Hutu. According to this belief, the Tutsi king had sat at the apex of a system that had subjugated Hutu until the Hutu revolution of 1959-62 which overthrew the monarchy.

RTLTM radio broadcasts illustrate how out-group negativity increased as the threat intensified. Its broadcasters sought to link the ongoing civil war with the anti-Tutsi narrative of Rwanda's history described above. As the war escalated, RTLTM increasingly framed it as an attempt

⁶² Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, "Intergroup bias."

⁶³ For prejudice, see Green and Seher, "What role does prejudice play in ethnic conflict?." For ethnic antagonism, see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic groups in conflict* (Berkeley, Calif. London: University of California Press, 2000). For hatred, see Petersen, *Understanding ethnic violence : fear, hatred, and resentment in twentieth-century Eastern Europe*. For social cleavages and dehumanization, see Valentino, *Final solutions : mass killing and genocide in the twentieth century*. For myths of hostility, see Kaufman, *Modern hatreds : the symbolic politics of ethnic war*.

⁶⁴ Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis, "Intergroup bias."

to reverse the outcome of the 1959 Hutu Revolution, and to reinstate the oppressive pre-revolutionary order. Table 1 shows that such negative references to the Tutsi out-group more than doubled as the threat intensified, a statistically significant increase. RTLM broadcasts emphasized two points in propagating this injustice frame. First, the RPF rebels were the descendants of the generation of Tutsi exiled following the Hutu Revolution. It was not an unfounded allegation. While the RPF had attracted some disaffected Hutu, its core leadership and rank-and-file was indeed Tutsi. Here is how Ferdinand Nahimana, a renowned Hutu ideologue, described the relationship on RTLM.

There is no difference between the RPF [rebels] and the *Inyenzi* [lit. cockroaches] because the *Inyenzi* are refugees who fled Rwanda after the mass majority Revolution of 1959, the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of a democratic Republic. Those who denied the Republic and democracy went into self-imposed exile. Not long after, between 1962 and 1967, those refugees tried to replace the new Republic with the former monarchy. They launched attacks that killed people. However, Rwanda had then a national army, the National Guard. Those sons of the nation did their best and drove those attackers out and in 1967, the *Inyenzi* stopped their attacks.

Interview with Ferdinand Nahimana, RTLM broadcast, November 20th 1993

RTLM's second point was that these Tutsi exiles did not just want to come home. They wanted to reverse the gains or '*les acquis*' of the Hutu Revolution and to reinstate the former socio-political order in which a Tutsi elite had monopolized power and had subjugated Hutu. Here is how Froduald Karamira, a leader of an extremist Power faction of the MDR, responds to the question of what the difference is between the political contests of 1959 and the 1990s.

Froduald Karamira: At the beginning of the war we thought it was a matter of refugees who wanted to come back to their country. Is it now still the case? Before the RPF said it wanted Habyarimana. We wonder what they are fighting for now that have they killed him. They are fighting for the power they had in 1959 and think they can get it back. War has clearly shown their intentions and Rwandans have realized it. That is why if they hope that the people and political parties will go on quarrelling, they are wrong because it is no longer possible. Now they are aware of the hidden meaning of the war."

Interview on RTLM radio station with Vice-President of MDR Party, Froduald Karimira, April 22nd 1994, 18 days into the genocide

Table 1 shows that RTLM references to this particular period in Rwanda's history increased significantly in the genocidal phase when the threat intensified. The repeated references to the monarchy, its feudal system, and to the revolution which ended them served to keep this memory of

Hutu subjugation uppermost in their listeners' minds. RTLM used these references with greater frequency to stimulate greater hostility toward the Tutsi out-group who were widely seen as being at the top of the pre-revolutionary socio-political order.

These negative references resonated against a very strong in-group collective memory – that is a set of shared anti-Tutsi beliefs, or myths or narratives about the Tutsi out-group. As Table 3 shows, first, the majority did not see Tutsi as indigenous to Rwanda: 58.6% believed Tutsi originated outside of the country, rising to an astounding 96.4% if we assume those respondents who claimed they 'did not know' were in fact disguising their true beliefs. Second, the majority recalled the pre-revolutionary era as a period of subjugation: 75.4% saw *ububake*, an institution associated with monarchic rule, as unfair. *Ububake*, an outlawed form of feudal clientship, involved the exchange of a cow from a patron or master (*shebuja*) against a life-time of service from the client or servant (*mugaragu*). 80.4% of respondents believed that Tutsi were usually the masters, and Hutu usually the servants and 75.4% thought it was unfair. Third, the majority also remembered the pre-revolutionary era as a period of Tutsi privilege: 70.3% believed the Tutsi monarch had favoured Tutsi over Hutu.

[Table 3 here]

The data then corroborate the psycho-social theory first that out-group negativity is indeed variable and second that it varies with out-group threat: the greater the threat, the greater the negativity.

Hypothesis III - Out-group Homogenization: The Greater the Threat, the Greater the De-individualization of Out-group Members

The third indicator of ethnic mobilization is out-group homogenization. In psycho-social theory, the unwillingness to distinguish between individuals is greater for groups to which a subject does not belong.⁶⁵ In ethnic conflicts, this de-individualization of the out-group can be seen in the framing of the enemy. As the threat increases, the definition of the enemy out-group enlarges. The enemy is framed no longer only as rebel combatants, but extends to include civilians. If psycho-social theory is correct, then when the threat is most acute, the enemy out-group should ultimately

⁶⁵ Messick and Mackie, "Intergroup Relations."

form a single homogenous group. At this extreme point, all group members represent a threat to be eliminated: the basis for genocide. This mechanism has also been described as ‘collective ethnic categorization.’⁶⁶

RTLIM broadcasts reflected the process of homogenization in their characterization of the enemy or threat. As described earlier, the term ‘*inyenzi*’ was the pejorative, ethnic identifier used to describe the enemy. However, the term was used sometimes to refer only to Tutsi combatants, and sometimes to **all Tutsi** – including Tutsi civilian men, women, and children. Table 1 shows that statements explicitly equating *inyenzi* with all Tutsi increased as the threat intensified across the pre-genocide and genocide periods. Similarly, statements which left it unclear in the listeners’ minds as to the distinction between all Tutsi and *inyenzi* also significantly increased. However, the data are not unequivocal. Statements which did explicitly distinguish all Tutsi from *inyenzi* also increased across the two time periods.

An inter-regional comparison between northern and southern communities, however, clarifies the relationship between threat and out-group homogenization. For northerners, the Tutsi were identified with the enemy from early on in the war. In the two northern communities, Tutsi faced intimidation, arrest, detention, and violence, especially when the rebels advanced. They were seen as enemy collaborators at best. One northerner explains the mental equation between the rebel RPF and his Tutsi neighbours thus:

What happened in your community after the war broke out in October 1990? In October 1990 when we learned on the radio that the country had been attacked by the RPF, who were mostly Tutsi and the brothers of our neighbours, we told ourselves that if they [our neighbours] were not accomplices they would have told us that the country was going to be attacked. If they did not inform us of the danger then they must be the enemy. Some Tutsi families secretly began to send their own sons to the front to fight for the RPF, saying that their children were going to study. This aggravated the distrust between the two ethnic groups because a neighbour was now becoming the enemy. In April 1994 when the radio informed us that the plane of the President, who had just signed the peace agreement, had been shot down, we told ourselves it was the RPF, the enemy of the country who did it. It was thus Tutsi aggression that continued.

Jean-Marie, Hutu shop-keeper, aged 39, Mutovu cellule, northern Rwanda

⁶⁶ Scott Straus, *The order of genocide: race, power, and war in Rwanda* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

In contrast, the story in the two southern communities was quite different. In the initial, pre-genocide phase, we do not see targeting of Tutsi as we did in the north. In fact, in the second, genocidal phase Hutu and Tutsi initially co-operated during the uncertainty that prevailed in the first two weeks. In one southern community, a local state official, the sector councillor, organized defensive barriers at the borders of his community to stop the surrounding chaos from invading them. Both Hutu and Tutsi manned those barriers. Communities organized night patrols to guard against enemy infiltration. Hutu and Tutsi again both participated. However, clues eventually trickled in that the Tutsi were the target: Tutsi fleeing violence elsewhere passed through their communities; Tutsi homes were the ones burning on the adjoining hilltops; Tutsi bodies, the reports said, were piling up in the neighbouring sector. Here is one young man's description of how residents in one southern community came to realize that the Tutsi were the target.

Tell me what happened in your community right after Habyarimana died: When Habyarimana died the political parties said they [the Tutsi] had killed our leader. Then people's hearts changed even more. They [the politicians] said your father [Habyarimana] has been killed by the enemy. The extremist Emmanuel said we should wake up and fight for our survival. *Who was Emmanuel?* He belonged to the MDR [opposition political party] and he lived here in Mwendu. In a few days we started to see smoke of burning houses coming from Gikonkoro [a neighbouring prefecture]. Then everyone was afraid – both Hutu and Tutsi. We wondered who was burning the houses? People said those who were doing the burning had covered themselves in banana leaves so you could not see who it was. But when we found out that it was Tutsi houses burning, the fear of Hutu decreased while the fear of the Tutsi increased as they now knew who was the enemy. After a few days it was evident that there were two groups – those being hunted and those who hunted. Then people became greedy and started killing and eating people's cows. After it was clear that there were some people [Tutsi] who were the enemy, some people said that 'we are used to this because of history.' Then those hiding people told the people to flee rather than dying where they were hiding.

Leopold, secretary of the Gacaca committee, aged 32, April 2003, Mwendu cellule, southern Rwanda

As Leopold states, the war did eventually reduce the community into two groups: the Tutsi, who were the enemy and to-be-hunted, and the Hutu, their opponents who hunted them. However, this perception of the Tutsi as the enemy happened late - *after* the President's assassination. This delay reflects the war's initially lesser impact in the south.

What happened in these four communities was not unusual. Table 4 shows that in most southern communities Hutu *and* Tutsi participated together in night patrols even *after* the President's assassination. 80% of Tutsi respondents corroborated this. Southern Hutu then did not identify Tutsi with the enemy even on the eve of the genocide. However, as we know, this changed during

the violence. When asked whom people thought were the enemy *during* the genocide, 70.5% responded that it was *all Tutsi*. An additional 20.6% concurred, but went on to say the enemy also included others such as Hutu collaborators. The micro-evidence suggests then that out-group homogenization, the tendency not to differentiate between members of an ethnic group, is indeed a third psycho-social effect of threat.

[Table 4 here]

Hypothesis IV - In-group Solidarity: the Greater the Threat, the Greater the Demand for In-group Loyalty

The fourth indicator of ethnic mobilization is in-group cohesion. Action to counter the threat is framed as a test of an individual's loyalty to the group. In psycho-social theory, feelings of group solidarity are a natural corollary of threats.⁶⁷ Applying this to ethnic conflicts, as the enemy threat grows, pressure for ethnic solidarity should also grow. The need to distinguish friend from foe, or patriots from traitors, becomes stronger. As the threat intensifies, individuals are forced to choose sides. Eventually, the zero-sum mindset, infamously epitomized by former US President, George W. Bush, among others, of "either you are with us or you are against us", prevails.

In Rwanda, in-group cohesion was expressed in ever-more demands for loyalty, as well as in ever-more accusations of disloyalty during the war. As we shall see, the negative accusation of disloyalty proved more powerful in strengthening in-group cohesion than positive appeals to patriotism or nationalism.

RTLTM frequently broadcast appeals for unity during the war. As Table 1 shows, in the pre-genocide phase of the war, some of these broadcasts called for unity between Hutu and Tutsi, whilst a smaller number explicitly appealed for solidarity among Hutu. However, the majority of these appeals did not specify who should unite. It was a general plea for unity. Moreover, appeals for unity – of any kind - did not increase significantly in the second, genocidal phase of the war.

⁶⁷ Arthur A. Stein, "Conflict and Cohesion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20, no. 1 (March 1, 1976): 143 -172.

Instead, RTLM relied more on accusations of disloyalty to enforce group solidarity. In the pre-genocide phase, charges of complicity with the enemy were relatively limited in number. When made, RTLM levelled these accusations mainly at Tutsi and at moderate Hutu politicians who favoured peace through negotiation with the RPF. In the genocidal phase, however, there was an enormous spike in RTLM allegations of Hutu complicity with the enemy, compared with only a moderate increase in allegations of Tutsi collaboration. Now, not only Hutu opposition politicians, but any Hutu was vulnerable to the charge of collaborator [*ibyitso*] through their action or inaction. RTLM's list of activities deemed disloyal was extensive: advocating dialogue with the rebels, desertion from the Rwandan army, civilian looting or engaging in other opportunistic crime, and fleeing the capital instead of staying to confront the rebels. Disloyalty spelt exclusion from the in-group, and reclassification as a member of the out-group. In this passage Valerie Bemiriki uses the infamous enemy label of 'cockroach' [*inyenzi*] to describe *Hutu* who fled instead of fighting.

The worst kind of *Inyenzi*, I don't mean just Tutsi who are all *Inyenzi*, for me the worst kind of *Inyenzi* is a Hutu *Inyenzi*. A Hutu who plots with other Hutu telling them: "Get up, run away" when the *Inyenzi* are not even there yet.

Valerie Bemiriki, RTLM journalist, RTLM broadcast, June 14th 1994

Ordinary Rwandans also reported that the charge of enemy collaboration was used to enforce group cohesion in their communities. Table 5 shows that when survey respondents were asked in an open-ended question who was called an enemy accomplice or *ibyitso*, the answer was not only the Tutsi.⁶⁸ Many Hutu were also accused of disloyalty. Moreover, the accusation was more common in the north than in the south, again reflecting the differential impact of the war on these regions. Thus twice as many Hutu who belonged to the opposition parties were seen as enemy collaborators in the north than in the south. The demand of loyalty was strongest where the threat was greatest.

[Table 5 here]

⁶⁸ Although about two-thirds of respondents in both the south and north indicated that Tutsi were called '*ibyitso*', I suspect that the figure was in reality lower for the south before the genocide. The survey question did not clearly distinguish between the pre-genocide and genocide periods of the war and instead used the ambiguous phrase 'during the war'.

The article has aimed to articulate and demonstrate the psychology of threat in the numerous threat-centric macro-theories of ethnic conflict where individual-level mechanisms have remained obscure. I have tested and shown the operation of four micro-mechanisms, recognized in psycho-social theory on inter-group relations, in the mobilization of social groups in ethnic conflict. Boundary activation, out-group derogation, out-group homogenization, and in-group cohesion can each be observed in the political communication that takes place within the ethnic group in times of war. In Rwanda, this could be seen in how the war was framed above in radio broadcasts from the country's extremist elite, and also in how it was understood below in survey data from ordinary Rwandans. I termed the aggregated effect of these four mechanisms 'ethnic mobilization' and found that emotion, fear in this case, is very clearly a driver of mobilization: the greater the fear, the higher the mobilization.

I introduced the concept of ethnic mobilization, a composite measure of group sentiment, in order to distinguish it from ethnic violence, the behavioural component of ethnic conflict as I believe the conflation of the two has contributed to the ambiguity in the larger emotion-opportunity debate. This distinction becomes clearer when ethnic conflict is studied at the micro-level and in this case it is evidenced in the fact that while many of my respondents felt 'mobilized', only a few actually committed violence. This article's focus has been mobilization rather than violence, but I argue separately that at the micro-level the reason why some killed and others did not had more to do with micro-situational opportunities and micro-structural factors.⁶⁹ For example local geography mattered – how remote your home was; local demography – whether members of the other ethnic group were present in your community; local sociology – whether your social network included other killers - among other local factors. At the macro-level, the security fears created by Rwanda's civil war explain ethnic mobilization, but it was not until the macro-political opportunity created by the assassination of Rwanda's President in April 1994, that ethnic extremists captured the state and massive genocidal violence began. In short, societies may experience high levels of group mobilization – a 'mass' phenomenon where emotions run high - but there may be little or no violence if the opportunity to act on these sentiments is constrained. The converse is also possible. Societies may experience group violence even in the absence of widespread, mass mobilization. In such cases, violence is usually engineered by a small number of elite entrepreneurs, a point already

⁶⁹ [deleted to preserve anonymity]

recognized in the scholarly literature.⁷⁰ There are obvious linkages between mobilization and violence – most notably a feedback loop whereby elite-engineered violence may lead to mass mobilization – but the main point is that mobilization and violence should be distinguished in ethnic conflict. In short, emotions matter more for mobilization, structural and material opportunities matter more for violence. Both matter for ethnic conflict.

On the second debate – between emotion and rationality - it is a case of a distinction which has been overstated. Again, this becomes more apparent when ethnic conflict is studied at the micro-level. The data confirm that while there were strong psycho-social effects resulting from insecurity, mobilization was not universal. Thus in Rwanda, it was not all of my respondents who saw the war in ethnic terms, perceived all Tutsi as the enemy, thought negatively of them, and felt closer to their Hutu brethren. This variation in feelings confirms the basic but important point that there is heterogeneity at the micro-level in how ordinary people respond to threats, a fact obscured in meso- or macro-level analysis where ethnic groups are treated as unitary actors. Some react more emotionally, and others more rationally. Intuitively, I imagine the distribution of such preferences would vary across societies. Moreover, it is a widely-accepted point in social psychology that both cognition and affect influence individual decision and judgement-making. Reason and emotion are not alternatives, but rather interact as an individual forms opinions and makes choices. It is reductionism and over-simplification to suggest that elites only respond rationally while the masses react emotionally to threat situations.

Finally, I should point out possible limits on the external validity or generalizability of these findings. First, the case study, Rwanda, has several unusual characteristics which deserve mentioning as they may impact ‘mobilization’. Demographically, Rwanda comprises only three ethnic groups, making it among the least ethnically diverse societies in sub-Saharan Africa, and these three groups unusually share a common language and culture. Geographically, Rwanda is also one of the smallest and most densely-populated polities in sub-Saharan Africa. All of these characteristics make Rwandans easier to mobilize - it is simply easier to communicate in one language across a small territory where people live close together. That said, I believe these factors would affect the speed and scale of mobilization, but not the four underlying psycho-social mechanisms I articulate. Second, this research focused on a single emotion – fear. Yet explanations

⁷⁰ See Valentino, *Final solutions : mass killing and genocide in the twentieth century*, p.35.

of ethnic conflict have also involved resentment (related to grievance), and to a lesser extent anger and hostility. I cannot say with certainty that these other emotions drive mobilization in the way that fear did in this case. Indeed some emotions may work in tandem, such as fear and anger, but this project didn't examine such combinations. Moreover, it is worth noting that these emotions are themselves only a small subset of the broad panoply of emotions that engage social psychologists. Rarely does political science consider other negative emotions such as guilt, jealousy, sadness, shame, envy, embarrassment, and disgust. Thirdly, the research design does not allow us to disambiguate the potential endogeneity between mobilization and violence. The data show that most of the mobilization occurred in the second, genocidal phase of the war when most of the violence also occurred. But was mobilization the cause or consequence of the violence? It is likely, given the remarkable speed of the mobilization and the violence, that the causation runs in both directions. Some Rwandans were mobilized before, and some were mobilized as a result of the violence but we cannot know for certain from this research design. Lastly, this project focused on ordinary individuals rather than elite actors, and looked at mobilization rather than violence. But are elite actors susceptible to these psycho-social mechanisms too? If emotions are a driver of mobilization, what then are the drivers of violence? I end then with a plea. We need more micro-level research to answer such questions. As with the contributions that early micro-foundations proponents made to macroeconomics, it is through our understanding of the micro-dynamics of ethnic conflict that we will better understand the causal relationships between aggregate variables and complex, real-world conflicts.⁷¹

⁷¹ See Robert Lucas, "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique," in *The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets*, ed. K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy (New York: American Elsevier, 1976).

Table 1: Comparing Impact of Threat on Radio Broadcasts across Pre-genocide and Genocide Phases of Conflict

	<i>Model A:</i> <i>As proportion of all words in each sample</i> <i>(Pre-genocide: n = 96961</i> <i>Genocide: n=313106)</i>		<i>Model B:</i> <i>As proportion of all words in each sub-sample</i> <i>(adjusted for sample size)</i>	
	<i>Pre-genocide</i> <i>(100ths of %)</i>	<i>Genocide</i> <i>(100ths of %)</i>	<i>Pre-genocide</i> <i>(%)</i>	<i>Genocide</i> <i>(%)</i>
<i>Mechanism I: Boundary Activation</i>				
<i>Enemy outgroup identified non-ethnically as 'rebels' or 'RPF'</i>	39.3	29.6***	57.1	42.9
<i>Enemy outgroup identified ethnically as 'Inkotanyi'</i>	29.6	57.7***	33.9	66.1
<i>Enemy outgroup identified ethnically as 'Inyenzi'</i>	3.0	33.1***	8.3	91.7
<i>Mechanism II: Outgroup Negativity</i>				
<i>Negative references to Tutsi outgroup oppression of Hutu ingroup</i>	2.2	5.5***	28.4	71.6
<i>Mechanism III: Outgroup Homogenization</i>				
<i>'Inyenzi' distinguished from all Tutsi outgroup members</i>	2.9	13.7***	17.4	82.6
<i>'Inyenzi' equated with all Tutsi outgroup members</i>	0.0	2.0***	0.0	100.0
<i>Inyenzi-Tutsi outgroup distinction ambiguous</i>	0.1	17.1***	0.6	99.4
<i>Mechanism IV: Ingroup Cohesion</i>				
<i>Appeals for Hutu ingroup unity</i>	0.0	0.5***	0.0	100.0
<i>Appeals for Hutu and Tutsi unity</i>	0.2	0.2	56.4	43.6
<i>Ethnically ambiguous appeals for unity</i>	0.3	0.3	51.8	48.2
<i>References to Tutsi outgroup disloyalty</i>	0.5	0.7	42.3	57.7

Table 2: Boundary Activation - An Inter-temporal Comparison

	<i>In what ways did life change in your community after the war started in 1990?</i>	<i>What happened in your community right after President Habyarimana died in 1994?</i>
	<i>Open-ended questions, multiple responses permitted</i>	
	(N=254)	(N=264)
<i>Life did not change</i>	15.3%	0%
<i>Deterioration in inter-ethnic relations</i>	48.8%**	66.5%**
<i>Deterioration in sense of security</i>	27.1%***	62.5%***
<i>Deterioration in economic conditions</i>	26.3%	0%
<i>Unable/unwilling to say</i>	4.6%	0%

*** and *** Proportions compared using a Wald test significant at 5% and 1% thresholds respectively*

Table 3: Negative Beliefs held by the In-group of the Out-group

All Hutu	
Question: At the time of the genocide, where did most people think Tutsi came from originally? (open-ended)	
(N=267)	
<i>Outside of Rwanda</i>	58.6%
<i>Indigenous to Rwanda</i>	3.7%
<i>Unwilling/ unable to say</i>	37.7%
Question: Under <i>ububake</i> (an outlawed form of feudal clientship), who was usually the <i>shebuja</i> (master) and who was usually the <i>mugaragu</i> (servant)?	
(N=269)	
<i>Tutsi was master and Hutu was servant</i>	80.4%
<i>Unable/unwilling to answer</i>	9.2%
Question: In your opinion, was <i>ububake</i> fair?	
(N=271)	
<i>No, it was not fair</i>	75.4%
<i>Unable/unwilling to answer</i>	5.7%
Question: When he ruled, did the <i>Mwami</i> (Tutsi monarch) favour any ethnic group?	
(N=270)	
<i>The Mwami favoured the Tutsi</i>	70.3%
<i>Unable/unwilling to answer</i>	12.2%

Table 4: Out-group Homogenization: An Inter-regional Comparison

	<i>Ethnicity</i>		<i>Region</i>	
	Hutu	Tutsi	South	North
Question: When did the night patrols to look for the enemy first start in your community?				
	(N=257)	(N=20)	(N=121)	(N=136)
<i>Before the President's death</i>	67.0%	69.6%	42.3%	89.8%***
Question: When the night patrols first started, did the Tutsi also participate in them to look for the enemy?				
	(N=260)	(N=20)	(N=126)	(N=134)
<i>Yes, the Tutsi participated</i>	64.0%	80.0%	91.9%	36.7%***
Question: During the genocide who did people think was the enemy? (open-ended)				
	<i>Ethnicity</i>		<i>Region</i>	
	Hutu	Tutsi	South	North
	(N=268)	(N=21)	(N=129)	(N=139)
<i>All and only Tutsi</i>	70.5%	90.5%***	76.5%	64.5%
<i>All Tutsi and others</i>	20.6%	9.5%*	18.1%	23.0%
<i>RPF rebels only</i>	1.9%	0.0%*	2.5%	1.3%
<i>Other response</i>	1.1%	0.0%	1.2%	1.1%
<i>Unable/unwilling to say</i>	5.9%	0.0%*	1.7%	10.0%

* / ** / *** Proportions compared using a Wald test, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% thresholds respectively


Table 5: In-group Cohesion

Question: During the war, who were people calling 'ibytso' (enemy collaborators) in your community? (open-ended, multiple answers allowed)


	<i>Ethnicity</i>		<i>Region</i>	
	Hutu (N=261)	Tutsi (N=20)	South (N=126)	North (N=135)
<i>All Tutsi</i>	66.1%	95.1%***	65.6%	66.6%
<i>Tutsi in the opposition parties</i>	12.8%	0.0%**	4.5%	21.1% *
<i>Tutsi who supported the rebel RPF</i>	8.0%	0.0%***	4.7%	11.2%
<i>Hutu in the opposition parties</i>	35.3%	19.8%	24.8%	45.7% *
<i>Hutu who supported the Tutsi or the rebel RPF</i>	35.4%	35.1%	37.3%	33.5%
<i>Hutu who did not support the genocide</i>	10.4%	24.7%	13.5%	10.4%

* / ** / *** Proportions compared using a Wald test, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% thresholds respectively


Graph 1: Use of Ethnic Identifiers in RTLIR radio broadcasts (relative frequencies)




Graph 2: References to Rwanda's history of Tutsi oppression of Hutu in RTLIR radio broadcasts (relative frequencies)



Graph 3: References to the subject of the 'enemy within' in RTLIR broadcasts (relative frequencies)



Graph 4: Appeals for unity in RTLIR radio broadcasts (relative frequencies)



Graph 5: Assumptions of identity in RTLIR radio broadcasts (relative frequencies)

