One for one and none for all – The Radical Right in the European Parliament

Matthias Diermeier, Hannah Frohwein & Aljoscha Nau

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Abstract

The radical right in Europe seemed to be on an unprecedented rise. In the run-up to the European Parliament elections in 2019, a newly founded ‘super-faction’ profoundly scared established politicians. In contrast to the widespread fear of a consolidated right-wing, this contribution carves out that the radical right’ policy congruence in the European Parliament is limited due to internal division primarily caused by the parties’ nativist core ideology. Splitting the radical right into its Eastern and Western European offshoots, reveals a significant economic nativism that systemically prevents comprehensive interregional cooperation. What is more, despite common authoritarian grounds with foreign powers such as the Peoples Republic of China and Russia and their significant advance on influencing the European radical right, nativism divides the radical right also in their stance on foreign autocracies. Whereas economic nativism triggers an opposition against China within the Western European radical right, political nativism in the East obviates cooperation between European right-wingers regarding Russia.

Keywords: radical right, authoritarianism, nativism, economic policy, European Parliament

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1. Introduction

Of all party families present in the European Parliament (EP), the radical right has faced the largest difficulties to build transnational cooperation. Not only did established parties actively try to suppress their advances, also did radical right parties of different nations themselves come across significant ideological conflict: The difficulties of the radical right in the EP “to form parliamentary groups are indicative of the primacy of nationalisms which undermine any potential for ideological alliances” (Fieschi, 2000: 518). What is more, McDonnell and Werner (2018) explain the lack of a single radical right EP faction as a result of an effective cordon sanitaire as parties shy away from ties to disreputable partners that would cushion electoral aspirations at home. Such a focus on national vote-seeking fundamentally distinguishes the radical right from members of other EP party families who primarily thrive for policy congruence (McElroy and Benoit, 2010).

In contrast to this divisive nationalism and vote seeking egoism, Startin (2010) spearheads that on top of “tactical necessity” (p. 431) a “shared ideological conviction” (p. 436) around national identity and anti-immigration resentment pulls the radical right together. As an example for the radical right’s taste for cooperation, he quotes at the time Front National leader and founder of the extraparliamentary radical right association Euronat Jean-Marie Le Pen: “The Nationalist phenomenon cannot be and
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will not be restricted to an island, cooperation is essential to achieve freedom and our common goals” (Startin, 2010: 437). And indeed in line with their typical chameleonic behaviour (Taggart, 2004), the Austrian Freedom Party and the Italian Lega Norte have recently been found to move between the lines and cooperate with hard and moderate eurocritics alike (Heinisch et al., 2020), conveying the notion of a potentially unified radical right – despite all differences.

Having said that, it is no wonder that during the run-up to the EP election in 2019 commentators were going haywire as reports spread about party leaders such as Matteo Salvini, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders and other right-wingers from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Estonia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria gathering in Milan 2019 and announcing the foundation of a ‘super-faction’ in the European Parliament. Finally, it seemed, would the radical right become the “driving force in the politization of Europe in the electoral arena” (Dolezal and Hellström, 2016), combine electoral power and bring their policies to the European heartlands in Brussels.

In the end, right-wing parties did win more votes in 2019 than in 2014, however, they were only able to increase their vote share from 21 to 23 percent, whereas the Greens and the liberal group (including Macron’s En Marche) increased their combined vote shares from 16 percent to 24.3 percent. The newly founded ‘super-faction’ Identity and Democracy secured only 73 of the 751 seats in the parliament – three more than its predecessor ENF – and remained entirely insignificant in the election of Ursula von der Leyen as the new European Commission president. However, Eastern European populists from Poland (ECR) and Hungary (EPP) presumably lent von der Leyen decisive support.

We take this most recent antagonism of radical right rise and failure to cooperate as a motivation to review the radical right’s behaviour in the European Parliament. By analysing roll-call-votes in the legislative period 2014-2019, this contribution seeks to
assess the congruence of the radical right in the EP in comparison to other party families. Building up on the literature discussing the difficulties and motivations for the radical right’s cooperation in the EP, we zoom in on the parties’ nativist and authoritarian core ideology. We argue that their common ‘thin ideology’ (Mudde, 2007) fails to bind the parties together as nativist based egoisms trigger strong geographically centred dividing lines.

The remainder of this article offers a literature review on specific characteristics of European right-wing parties and their relationship with foreign authoritarian powers from Russia and the Peoples Republic of China. A third section introduces our data and empirical strategy followed by a discussion of our results in the fourth section. The final section concludes.

2. Literature Review: Europe’s right-wing giant – a medusa

2.1. Nativism: the radical right’s dividing line

Although functionally equivalent, the radical right is a vivid group of parties that has always been in flux and until today faces significant differences in their electorates, policy supply and organizational structures (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2018). From an issue perspective, only their opposition to immigration really serves as an unequivocal positional melting pot in the European Parliament. Correspondingly, the increased refugee migration after 2015 mostly directed through Eastern and to Northern- and Western-Europe united parties on the right end of the political spectrum (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019). In contrast, already the varieties of radical right parties’ positioning on euroscepticism serves as an example of the divisive potential that an at first sight uniting issue might develop (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004; Startin, 2010).
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What is more, it might come as a surprise that in contrast to its skyrocketing electoral success of similarly shaped parties all over Europe, the radical right’s similarities are much more inexplicit than those of other party families. In general, Taggart (2004) argues that populism is ideologically flexible, lacks “core values” and “tends to be highly chameleonic” (Taggart, 2004: 275). More specifically, Mudde (2007) identifies that popular radical right parties merely follow a ‘thin ideology’ that consists of three main characteristics: First, populism is marked by a stylized division of the society into a corrupt elite and the pure peoples’ will (‘volonté générale’) that they putatively represent. Second, authoritarianism characterises the attraction of a worldview based on law and order or discipline. Lastly, nativism represents the Populust Right Wing Parties (PRRPs’) main dogma and is centred around a xenophobic nationalism that disapproves any interference with national authority from abroad or supra-national. Combining these characteristics into a joint concept, the rise of the mono-cultural nation state can be carved out as the main goal of radical right-wing parties (Mudde, 2007).

Although such a ‘thin ideology’ allows to identify certain common policy goals and anti-EU narratives (Startin, 2010), in contrast to other party families that are founded around an internationalist history (social democrats or socialist parties) or issues that need interventions on the global level (such as environmental parties), the radical right has much less ‘natural’ reason for cooperation. In fact, once the nativist based “primacy of nationalism” (Fieschi, 2000: 518), is echoed as ‘my nation first’ type of policies, transnational cooperation is fundamentally challenged. Indisputably, the radical right is particularly prone to such nativist reflex. Whereas in the end a group of right-wing parties might agree on closing borders or even on their different perspectives on the EU (Heinisch et al., 2020), when it comes to burden sharing or questions of mutual responsibility, right-wing coalitions become inherently instable.

H1: Due to their prominent nativist ideology, the radical right in the European Parliament is more divided than other political factions.
2.2. Economic nativism: The East-West divide among the European radical right

The European radical right is built on common grounds (Mudde, 2007) insofar as the Eastern European radical right behaves “contextually distinctive and functionally equivalent” (Pytlas, 2018b) to its Western counterpart. Western and Eastern PRRPs form a party family defined after Mudde’s (2007) definition of a ‘thin nativist ideology’ and can be compared and analysed in a pan-European context, however, with contextual specificities taken into account.

Nevertheless, it has been argued that the political systems in Eastern and Western Europe differ so significantly that also right-wing parties in the neighbouring regions remain incomparable as particularly the societal and economic transformations in Eastern European countries challenged the young democracies (Thieme, 2005). In addition the civil societies continue to face a post-communist legacy that triggers low trust and general scepticism regarding political parties (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2011) – favourable breeding grounds for anti-system parties.

Clearly, many systemic differences exist between the long-run established party systems that have been organized over time-invariant cleavage structures in the West (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), and the disruptively established democracies after the fall of the iron curtain in the East. Because Eastern European PRRPs’ extreme socio-cultural positioning was in fact not too distant from established competitors and due to the high salience of socio-cultural issues (Pytlas, 2018a), PRRPs in the East are generally considered to have been more influential – even if electorally less successful – than in the West (Mudde, 2007). Also on the economic end, Buštiková (2018) finds that right-wing parties in Eastern Europe hold rather left-wing economic positionings. Those include support for stronger state interventions, protectionism and a taste for social spending (Buštiková, 2018). On the contrary, Western European PRRPs are
traditionally leaning towards a neoliberal policy stance (see the ‘winning formula’ developed by Kitschelt and McGann (1995)). Today, some members of the party family such as the German AfD or the Austrian FPÖ still follow a rather neoliberal economic stance (Diermeier, 2020; Rathgeb, 2021), albeit others have abandoned such an economic agenda as a response to a more diverse and working class centred electorate (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Rooduijn, 2018). Interestingly, during the recent economic and financial crisis, even formerly unsuspicious issues such as monetary interventions by the ECB have been politized by the Western European radical right who pushed monetary policy in line with the national economic interest into the realm of the European political and public arena (Hobolt, 2015). As an example of Western European ECB protest, Arzheimer (2015) describes the -eurosceptic- emergence of the German AfD.

Regarding the positioning on European integration, it should be noted that the radical right in Western and Eastern Europe has significantly different interests. The fact that North-Western European countries are net contributors to the EU budget leads to nativist parties’ natural interest of restricting the national contributions. In contrast, nationalist parties in Eastern European countries that are net-recipients of EU funds have an interest in larger cohesion or regional development funding. Haughton and Rybar (2009) even claim that following a strict economic nativism “politicians in these net-recipient states tend to see the EU as a ‘cash cow’ to be milked” (p. 550). In fact, in Bulgaria, Rumania, Lithuania, Hungary, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland the share of public gross fixed capital formation funded by the EU fluctuates within the impressive range of 55 to 75 percent. In most Western economies it is negligible (Busch and Diermeier, 2019). The interest in EU funding is expected to be particularly
strong if nativist parties hold government offices. This again is particularly frequent in Eastern European countries.¹

The conflicting interests within the radical right show the divisive power that nativism can unfold between Western and Eastern European representatives of the party family. What is more, as the controversies seem to be centred around common financial and economic concerns, we believe it is a specific economic nativism that separates the party family geographically.

**H2: On EU economic policies and particularly regional development funding, economic nativism divides the radical right between Western and Eastern Europe.**

### 2.3. Authoritarianism and political nativism: The European Radical Right and authoritarian states

Recalling Mudde (2007), PRRPs across Europe share common authoritarian values, must constantly distinguish themselves from the established parties and simultaneously acquire new allies. The result is an alliance between the radical right and foreign authoritarian regimes, especially from China and Russia. Both sides gain from this collaboration: Authoritarian regimes can establish their narratives, promote their governance systems and undermine the EU’s unity, not only through their own channels but also via (democratically elected) populist parties; PRRPs gain ‘global legitimacy’ from being acknowledged and courted by these countries.

¹ In the election year 2014 this is the case only for Fidesz (HU, since 2010), the Party Order and Justice (LT, since 2012), the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance (LT since 2012) and the National Alliance "All For Latvia!" (LV since 2014). In 2015, additional radical right parties such as the Polish PiS and the Finnish True Fins entered their respective governments.
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That explains why foreign influence operations have steadily grown since 2014. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates this again: Initial nationalistic responses by EU member states and a lack of coordination among EU institutions allowed authoritarian governments to instrumentalize the crisis for geopolitical ambitions through disinformation and propaganda. China and Russia are currently engaged in a ‘global battle of narratives’ (Borrell, 2020). Chinese official and private actors have been very active in reframing the narrative of the virus outbreak and are promoting Chinese ‘politics of generosity’ (Borrell, 2020) or ‘mask-‘and ‘vaccine diplomacy’. However, nowadays policy makers are more alert: The European External Action Service (EEAS) and leading Members of the European Parliament (with the important exception of PRRP representatives) have openly raised concerns “about current disinformation and propaganda efforts coming especially from China and Russia’, which were clearly aimed “to undermine the EU and sow mistrust among the local population and European neighbours towards the EU, its democratic values and institutions” (European Parliament, 2020).

The natural alliance? Right-wing attitudes towards Russia

“A vote for populists is a vote for Putin” (Verhofstadt, 2019), warned Guy Verhofstadt, liberal ALDE party leader in the European Parliament, just a few days before the EP elections 2019. Russia has a long history of influence operations in Europe and its hybrid toolbox ranges from economic pressure, cyber-attacks and political assassinations to mis-/disinformation campaigns and propaganda through state media (Russia Today, Sputnik), or academic/civil organizations. It is constantly “adapting to the targeted country’s local circumstances, narratives and audiences” (Bentzen, 2018: 3). Accordingly, Russia has spun a wide network to parliamentarians across Europe and within the European Parliament, including several cooperation agreements and so-called ‘friendship groups’ (Nielsen, 2018).

After Russia’s unlawful annexation of Crimea, its covert war in Eastern Ukraine and its accountability for shooting down the civilian Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17,
however, the EU implemented – alongside the USA – sectoral sanctions that went far beyond expectations. Confronted with a rather unified EU, “Moscow began to strongly court Europe’s far-right in official channels in 2014” (Weiss, 2020: 7) and Russian officials, as well as President Putin, hosted delegations of right-wing leaders, including Italian politician Salvini. Shortly after, Italian Northern League and Austrian FPÖ started to condemn sanctions and justified Russian aggression. This loose linkage soon led to formal cooperation agreements between the ‘United Russia’ government party and both FPÖ (2016) and Northern League (2017). Similarly, right-wing leaders from Germany, France and Hungary cozied up to Russia and publicly called for an end of EU sanctions, legitimated Russia’s annexation of Crimea or - in the case of Viktor Orbán - even suspended energy supplies to Ukraine in 2014 (Klasa et al., 2019). Although the populists’ view on sanctions ultimately did not challenge the EU’s foreign policy - as neither Italy nor Austria or Hungary vetoed the renewal of sanctions in the European Council - it certainly caused dissent among EU member states according to Weiss (2020).

Contrary to the Western radical right, for historical reasons several Eastern European countries hold strong resentments against the aggressive Russian foreign policies. Famously, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Polish right-wing populists, blames Russia for the plane crash in Smolensk in 2010 where his brother and Poland’s president at the time died (Przybyski, 2018). Russia has an ongoing interest in destabilizing unity and democratic institutions in the Eastern member states. It has led cyber-attacks in Estonia and has become more assertive. The European Parliament counts 998 disinformation cases attributed to Russia by October 2019, compared to 434 cases in the previous year 2018 (European Parliament, 2019). To counter disinformation attacks, the East-Stratcom task-force was established within the EEAS in 2015 (EEAS, 2018). Nonetheless, in the respective countries, especially the Baltics,
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the Russian aggressions on Europe’s Eastern borders can hardly be condoned – particularly not by nativist politicians.

In fact, the scepticism of several Eastern European radical right parties in the face of Russia’s aggressions uncovers a second variety of nativism: Besides economic nativism (see Chapter 2.2), and in line with Mudde (2007) definition, we coin the strict focus on sovereignty from foreign powers as political nativism. Rooted in the several Eastern European countries’ historical experiences, in these nations political nativism is expected to be particularly influential in determining the radical rights’ voting behaviour on Russia. In contrast, Western right-wing parties are likely to admire Russia’s strength.

H3: While united in their support for authoritarian governance, political nativism divides the radical right in their stance towards Russia in Western admirers and Eastern sceptics.

Right-wing allegiance to Beijing? Chinese influence and regional differences

As China’s economy expands and matures, it has gained more and more ‘economic gunpowder’ (Norris, 2016: 63) to turn its growing wealth into power and influence. Under Xi Jinping, Chinese (economic) statecraft employs a broad toolkit of economic ‘carrots and sticks’ (Ferchen, 2016: 3), involving numerous governmental and commercial actors in ministries, private- and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), as well as banks (Reilly, 2013: 4). Multiple cases prove how China uses boycotts, public ‘naming-and-shaming’ campaigns, as well as blunt threats, when foreign officials or companies criticize China regarding human rights, territorial claims or engage with disputed leaders, such as the Dalai Lama (i.e. Fuchs and Klann (2013). Assessing China’s ‘authoritarian advance’ in the EU between 2015 to 2017, Benner et al. (2018: 21) declare that “EU institutions have also not been immune to Chinese political pressure”. Whereas Benner et al. (2018: 22) claim that “the EP has not toned down its criticism of Chinese human right shortcomings in response”, assuming that “EU institutions might be more able to play hardball in
relations with China than individual EU member states”, other authors argue that self-censorship among European policymakers has become no exception. However, no research has thoroughly evaluated the nexus between China and the radical right in the European Parliament to date.

Even though Chinese influence operations have long occurred under the radar, China did not suddenly show up on Europe’s doorstep: Already since the 2008 global financial crisis, China has continuously expanded its economic and political presence (Godement and Vasselier, 2017). One example that sent shock waves through EU policy circles was Greece’s reluctance in the European Council to support a resolution on the South China Sea arbitration in 2016. The coalition of left- and right-wing populists from Greece and right-wing populists from Hungary blocked a more ambitious text by the EEAS. While the final text noted China’s legal defeat and called for a peaceful resolution in line with international law, it carefully avoided criticizing Beijing, reflecting that the EU was unable to speak with one voice (Emmott, 2016). Furthermore, with growing investment ties and the Chinese take-over of the Port of Piraeus, Greece objected to ‘unconstructive criticism’ (Emmot and Koutantou, 2017) of human rights abuses in China and the Tsipras-government prevented a united EU position at the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2017 (Godement and Vasselier, 2017: 50; Duchâtel and Sheldon-Duplaix, 2016). Comparable tit-for-tat methods have been observed in the context of Chinese ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ to shape voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly (Bentzen, 2018), or in the form of so-called ‘Debt Trap Diplomacy’ along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Chellaney, 2017; Brautigam, 2020). For China, economic ‘win-win’ deals seem to pay off twice: economically and politically.

2 However, the use of economic means ‘to buy votes’ or to promote favourable public statements is not unique to China (Taylor (2010).
However, a critical debate about ‘China’s foreign influence operations in Western liberal democracies’ (Grieger, 2018) has only recently emerged in Europe - predominantly in the Western member states. China’s ‘sharp power’ toolkit also includes non-economic, more subtle “unorthodox means to co-opt political elites, academia, think-tanks and media to support CCP policy goals, and to silence criticism on sensitive topics” (Grieger, 2018: 1). It has adapted to the specifics of the supranational EU institutions, i.e. by establishing the ‘EU-China friendship group’ in the European Parliament. Termed by Nielsen (2018), as the ‘backdoor for pariah regimes’, friendship groups are loosely organized, circumvent public and parliamentary scrutiny and offer foreign actors a significant lobbying foothold inside the parliament. Initiated in 2006, the group and its approximately 45 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) have no formal mandate in representing the EU abroad, yet members have been courted by China and were invited to numerous consultations with high-ranking CCP officials and diplomats (Yang Yanyi, 2014; Martin and Crawford, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2019). While it is difficult to assess the direct impact on MEPs attitudes, several members of the friendship group have spoken out publicly in favour of China (Zahradil, 2018-2020; Lulu, 2019: 10ff.; Xinhua, 2019). They have repeatedly defended China’s BRI and dismissed Western criticism by arguing that China is a responsible stakeholder instead of “an aggressive colonial power” (Xinhua, 2019). Left alone, this is not overly problematic. However, these pro-Chinese statements have been portrayed by Chinese state media as official EU views (Xinhua, 2019; China Daily, 2014). Thus, Lulu (2019) argues that the group is a tool of extraterritorial influence and “effectively functions as a proxy for CCP propaganda”. Lately the group has received greater scrutiny. After critical media reports about the controversial group evolved in November 2020, the EU-China Friendship Group has been (temporarily) suspended by its Chair, Czech MEP Jan Zahradil, from 1st December onwards. MEP Zahradil reported the decision while defending the group during a hearing on 25th January of the EP’s Special Committee
on Foreign Influence, which was explicitly created to uncover foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU (Cerulus, 2021). China has strengthened its overseas influence by making the party-led ‘United Front Work Department’ and the CCP’s ‘International Liaison Department’ (ILD), China’s ‘magic weapons’ (Brady, 2017; Thomas, 2020) in mobilising Chinese expatriates and in shaping a positive CCP-narrative abroad.

Despite the Chinese advances on the European radical right and shared authoritarian themes, one cannot expect a united pro-Chinese faction among the radical right. Many Western European right-wing parties represent an electorate that has presumably suffered economically from the rise of China through import competition. In fact, the radical right in Western Europe is particularly successful in regions that have lost competitiveness and thus suffered the most from cheap Chinese imports: causal effects of import competition on right-wing election successes have been proven for Germany (Dippel et al., 2016), France (Malgouyres, 2017) and other Western European countries (Colantone and Stanig, 2018). As these presumable ‘losers of globalization’ demand stronger state interventions, they support protectionist trade policies ‘normally’ known from the populist left (van der Waal and Koster, 2017). Thus, economic nativism among the Western right-wing is expected to negatively influence its voting behaviour towards China. Opposite, Eastern member states have been less vulnerable to Chinese competition due to a lower level of unit labour costs. Besides, Eastern European countries have so far received the smallest share of Chinese FDI, accounting for only 1.5 percent of all Chinese investment in the EU between 2000 and 2018 (Hanemann et al., 2019). Accordingly, following their economic nativism, the region is expected to be ‘hungry’ for Chinese investments and eager to intensify economic cooperation. This should be reflected in the Eastern radical right’s voting behaviour.
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Additionally, differing public opinion towards China in the East and West might further impact the voting behaviour in the EP. Here, the two-level game between European and national levels could play a role: McDonnell and Werner (2018) have shown that radical right party members have favoured national “respectability” calculations when joining alliance strategies, allying in the EP with more moderate mainstream parties “to gain respectability in the eyes of national publics and/or prospective coalition partners” (p. 13). In the case of China, this might not be the intention, but the radical right parties can be expected to join alliances that reflect the regional differences in economic business models. The goal is to signal to their national voters that they understand their economic interests which depend on geography rather than party family colour. Thus, even with authoritarianism as the binding link between the radical right, *economic nativism* is expected to split the radical right on China, ultimately indicating that the PRRPs might opt for national interests instead of policy congruence.

\[H4: \text{Despite common authoritarian grounds, economic nativism splits the radical right on China between Western parties who putatively represent the ‘losers of globalization’ and those in the East who see China as an economic and political partner.}\]

3. Data and Methodology

To assess the voting behaviour of radical right-wing parties this paper draws on data from VoteWatch\(^3\) Europe on voting records of Members of the European Parliament (MEP). The analysis considers final votes as well as separate votes on amendments, paragraphs and reports during the legislative term 2014-2019. All roll-call-votes in the

\(^3\) https://www.votewatch.eu/
EP plenary are included. These are obligatory for all final votes on legislations since 2014 and enable the individual link between a MEP and their voting behaviour.4

At the start of the legislative term 2014, national parties formed seven factional groups.5 Figure 1 shows the allocation of the 751 seats in the European Parliament (EP) per political group after the 2014 European Elections. In 2015, an additional right-wing faction was created, the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), by national parties who were formerly part of the ‘Non-Inscrits’ (NI) and ECR, mainly consisting of France’s National Front and Italy’s Northern League.

National parties in our analysis are characterized as radical right by their membership to Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) or Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD). Parties are added to the radical right if they are classified as eurosceptic right by Hobolt (2015), resulting in the inclusion of 13 further parties in our classification who are members of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) or European People’s Party (EPP).6 In line with our research focus on authoritarianism and nativism such a selection goes beyond the populist core in the radical right. According to this

4 Hence, roll-call-votes give the number of votes for and against each single vote as well as abstention votes for every national party and their corresponding MEPs.

5 The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&d), the European People’s Party (EPP), Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA), European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and a group of MEPs with no attachment to any faction, the Non-Inscrits (NI).

6 These national parties are the Alternative for Germany (ECR), Danish People’s Party (ECR), Fidesz (EPP), Croatian Party of Rights (ECR), National Alliance "All For Latvian" – "For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK" (ECR), New Majority (NOVA) (ECR), Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (ECR), Finns Party (ECR), Right Wing of the Republic (ECR), Law and Justice (ECR), Freedom and Solidarity (ECR), Reformed Political Party (ECR), IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (ECR) and the Slovenian Democratic Party (EPP).
classification the radical right in 2014, at the start of the legislative term contains 130 MEPs.²

As our aim is to study the division of the radical right between Western and Eastern Europe, the right-wing parties are further divided along the former iron curtain line (Appendix Table 1). Parties that were identified as radical right but officially belong to a faction such as ECR or EPP were excluded from their official faction to avoid overlapping in our analysis. In total, 293 votes on a variety of issues are considered during the legislative term (Table 1). Special focus is put on EU policy areas regarding votes on trade agreements, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as relations with Russia and the People’s Republic of China. While the EP is a co-legislator on trade agreements with the Council and thus holds a certain amount of legislative power on those policies, the power on foreign and security issues lies exclusively within the Council and to some degree the European Commission’s competencies. However, the European Parliament can influence negotiations by adopting resolutions and issuing recommendations on sanctions, the state of the WTO or foreign current events in line with TEU Article 36. A resolution passed by the EP’s Plenary cannot (anymore) be ignored by the other EU institutions.

² For simplification, the single MP from the neo-fascist antidemocratic radical party Greece’s Golden Dawn that would solely represent the Southern European radical right is excluded from our classification. As we follow Manow (2018) in classifying the Italian PRRP Northern League as a ‘Western European’ right-wing party (and not as a Southern European party) due to its disproportional success in Northern Italy.
Similarly, broader policy areas concerning selective internal issues are considered such as votes regarding the European Central Bank, Banking Union and Capital Union. As the EP adopts a resolution on the annual report on monetary policy presented by the European Central Bank (ECB) every year (European Parliament, 2019a) the EP’s votes regarding that resolution can be interpreted as a direct assessment of the ECB’s work. Concerning the EPs own budgetary affairs, even though it shares its budgetary authority with the Council, it adopts and monitors the implementation of the general budget and discharges. Therefore, all votes during the legislative term regarding the general budget are included. In addition, all votes during the legislative term concerning regional development, as well as employment and social affairs are analysed.

In order to deconstruct the division of Western and Eastern European right-wing national parties on the specific subjects, a congruence index is created. The index takes the highest share of voters in a political group that is either for or against a resolution. The cohesion index thus provides a measure of unity ranging from total dissent (=0.5) to complete agreement (=1).
Table 1: Overview of the selective topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>Selective Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>All votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R. China</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>All votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>CETA, TTIP, Trade negotiations and agreements with Japan, Colombia, Peru, Australia, New Zealand and Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Monetary Affairs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Capital Union, Banking Union and European Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and Social Affairs</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>All votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget and Budgetary Control</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>General Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development and Regional Development</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>All votes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Results – Deep dividing lines within the radical right

Exploiting the data described above, Figure 3 pictures the party family congruence among 293 economic votes in the legislative period between 2014 and 2019. The congruence index takes 1 if all parliamentarians of a party family vote equivalently and 0.5 if all parliamentarians of a party family are equally divided in their votes. The index takes the average over the congruence in the 293 votes, respectively by party family.

Confirming Hypothesis 1, the radical right in the European Parliament is much more divided than the other factions. Whereas all other party families score between 0.91 (ECR excluding PiS) and 0.98 (Greens /EFA), the cohesion for the right-wing party family lays at 0.69 and thus closer to complete division than to complete congruence.8

8 This result also holds if the right-wing factions ENF or ECR are considered separately.
Interestingly, separating the radical right geographically between Western and Eastern Europe reveals a significantly higher congruence of 0.78 in the West and 0.81 in the East.

**Figure 2. Congruence Index on all Votes**

Although even after dividing the radical right geographically, congruence remains significantly lower than among other party families, the increase in regional right-wing congruence matches with the discussed topic specific dividing lines that are particularly present among nativist parties. A topic-specific analysis gives further insights into radical rights’ geographical division (see Table 2). The right-wing shows the lowest congruence among 0.63 and 0.67 on the economic questions concerning regional development, international trade, China and Russia – whereas the congruence among all other factions lies above 0.9 for all topics. Eastern European
radical right parties agree on economic questions regarding China (0.94) and international trade (0.9). Western European radical right parties agree on Economic and Monetary Affairs (0.92). Unfortunately, the index only represents a useful tool to measure topic specific congruence but remains silent on the actual party families’ positioning, motivating an in-depth qualitative analysis.

Table 2. Congruence Index on topic-specific votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Radical Right</th>
<th>Radical Right East</th>
<th>Radical Right West</th>
<th>Average other factions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Monetary Affairs</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and Social Affairs</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary Control</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Development</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALL</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.68</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.81</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.77</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.93</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1 Economic and Monetary Affairs: A melting pot for the Western European right-wing

On the EU level, the major economic decisions during the legislative period between 2014 and 2019 dealt with the repercussions and lessons from the financial and sovereign debt crisis. In general, the trade-off between risk sharing and risk control has been at the core of the political controversies. The importance of quantitative
easing measures taken by the European Central Bank in containing the crisis in several member states has led to a strong politization of monetary policy within the Eurozone (Kriesi and Grande, 2016). Several North-Western right-wingers argued that for the sake of rescuing endangered economies, the ECB undermined financial stability and hence economic prosperity (Hobolt, 2015; Arzheimer, 2015). In general, nativist parties in the affluent economies in Western Europe have a genuine interest in pronouncing the dangers of risk sharing and advocating stricter risk control. Until today, this trend is reflected in Western radical right opposition of mutualized debt instruments such as the so called ‘Corona-Bonds’.

This common opposition to European risk sharing measures is reflected in the unique unanimity of the Western European radical right in the resolutions on economic and monetary affairs. In comparison with the Eastern European right-wing, the Western European radical right shows stronger disapproval in every single resolution in this category. First, these parties rather than their Eastern European counterparts oppose the ECB and their legitimacy in interfering with national authorities. Second, they oppose the European Banking Union that amongst others includes the delegation of banking regulation to the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Third, Western right-wingers strongly disapprove the building of a Capital Markets Union that aims at improving access to finance for SME companies that is targeted for Southern and Eastern markets.

Eastern European radical right parties might have less interest in opposing a strengthening of European institutions regarding monetary and financial affairs than the radical right in the West for different reasons. First, several Eastern European countries have not adopted the Euro as a currency and are simply not affected by ECB decisions or the SSM’s supervision over systemically relevant banks in the Eurozone. Second, in the frequent case that Eastern European governments, firms or households
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hold Euro denominated debt, however, they did profit from a looser monetary policy in the Eurozone. Third, measures to improve financing conditions for small and medium sized companies have been explicitly directed at easing the distressed banking system in Eastern European economies. Although such measures would mean a further strengthening of EU institutions, they are in line with economic nativism.

4.2 Regional Development: The European cash cow

For questions of (regional) development⁹ the nativist character of the radical right from ‘net recipients’ and ‘net creditor’ countries could represent a potential spirit of discord. Indeed, Table 2 reveals a stark division within the right-wing party family – with the Eastern radical right showing a stronger agreement on regional development issues. What is more, also in this category most resolutions are rather approved by the radical right from the East, however, there is a few motions that find higher approval rates among the Western European radical right.

This is due to the oftentimes regionally targeted nature of the respective resolutions. The strongest difference between the two groups in terms of higher support by Eastern right-wing parties emerges in resolutions on the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), investments for jobs and growth, acceleration of implementation of cohesion policy, the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) and other resolutions targeted at regional cohesion. In line with the notion that Eastern European countries are net recipients of EU funds and their right-wing parties consider the EU a ‘cash cow’ (Haughton and Rybar, 2009: 550), the Eastern nativists rather agree on most resolutions in this category. In contrast, they rather oppose the few motions directed at Western economies. This holds for resolutions that allow a country like France to apply dock dues exemptions for products from their overseas territories, allowances for specific reduced rates of tax or special cohesion strategies for insular

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⁹ For the sake of clarity, this section discusses both qualitatively equivalent topics development and regional development.
regions. Thus, confirming Hypothesis 2, in economic questions and particularly when it comes to the distribution of the EU funds, a ‘natural’ economic nativist dividing line between the East and the West can be carved out with the radical right in line with regionally opposing interests.

4.3. A Bad Deal? Authoritarian regimes’ impact on votes in the European parliament

Given the overwhelming anecdotal evidence of foreign influence operations, the key question is whether authoritarian regimes have already been successful in influencing MEPs’ votes in the European Parliament and are ultimately shaping EU policy.

Friend or Foe – The radical right’s voting regarding Russia

The cohesion for the right-wing party family on votes related to (economic) relations with Russia (0.66) lays significantly below the average of other factions (0.92). However, dividing the radical right geographically, shows remarkably higher cohesion scores for the East (0.84) and the West (0.82).

Confirming Hypothesis 3, the voting behaviour in the EP indicates a division among the radical right between Western parties that admire Russia’s strength – and those in the East that are afraid of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy stance – often related to historical experience and geographic proximity. Due to political nativism, the Eastern radical right votes relatively contra-Russia compared to their Western colleagues. They are more likely to support resolutions that criticize Russia’s foreign policy actions and violations of international law. Opposite, Western right-wing parties are more likely to endorse cooperation with Russia, i.e. in the economy or in science and technology.

Most notably are the votes related to the war in Ukraine and Russia’s unlawful annexation of Crimea, Russia’s engagement in Syria and Libya, as well as the situation
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of political prisoners and Russian opposition leaders such as Alexei Nawalny and Oleg Sentsov. Most Eastern right-wing MEPs supported the European Parliament resolution on the state of EU-Russia political relations, which directly criticized “Russian interference aimed at influencing elections and referenda and stoking tensions in European societies”, as well as the “Kremlin support for anti-EU parties and far-right movements” (European Parliament, 2019b: 4). Their Western colleagues were less supportive of the critical resolution, proving the lacking cohesion among the radical right in the European Parliament. While authoritarian values can be regarded as a binding link, in its relations with Russia, political nativism among the Eastern right-wing dominates authoritarian commonalities, as well as the economic rationale. This ultimately limits cooperation among the European radical right. The East is willing to forego economic opportunities, whereas their Western counterparts are attracted by Russia’s authoritarian governance and hope to profit from (economic) cooperation.

The far East - China’s intent to send a ‘Trojan horse’

Despite China’s growing influence within the European Parliament, a united pro-China faction among the right-wing party family has yet to be established. Once again, the radical right is extremely divided: 0.67 cohesion on economic relations with China. Besides votes on international trade and Russia, this is the lowest level of unity. A different picture is revealed after separating Eastern and Western Europe, with cohesion increasing sharply to near unanimity 0.94 among Eastern right-wing parties and to 0.72 for their Western counterparts. Thus, the Eastern radical right’s cohesion is almost equivalent to the average unity of other factions 0.95.

However, the cohesion scores remain silent on what the party families agree or disagree on. Assessing all 11 resolution votes, one can attribute a slightly more positive voting behaviour to the Eastern right-wing party family, compared to a relatively more critical attitude towards China by their Western colleagues. Eastern right-wing populists are more prone to support EU-China cooperation and coordination i.e. in the fields of security (Europol, organized crime, cyber security), trade and investment.
(trade facilitation, WTO Dispute Settlement, investment treaty) and infrastructure (BRI), than Western right-wing delegates. Therefore, Chinese ‘sharp power’ seems somewhat successful in shaping a positive narrative among Eastern right-wing parties, in dividing MEPs, and most importantly in translating its influence operations into pro-China votes in the EP. At first sight, this evidence confirms Hypothesis 4, arguing that the geographical division is rooted in economic nativism and occurs among parties who portray themselves as representatives of the ‘losers of globalization’ and those in Eastern Europe who instead see China as a strategic economic and political partner. Accordingly, the radical right’s nativist economic interests seem to dominate the political nativism in the case of China.

However, comparing all 11 votes related to China between 2014 – 2019, two topics stick out and present a puzzle:

**China Market Economy Status: To grant or not to grant? That is the question.**

On 11 December 2016, some provisions of Section 15 of China’s Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (2001), which deal with the issue of dumping, were going to expire. Section 15 allows importing WTO members to decide - under national law - whether China is a market economy. The EU had labelled China a non-market economy (NME) in 2009. Granting or not granting market economy status (MES) has significant consequences regarding price comparability, subsidies and protective measures against dumped products (Barone et al., 2016). While the request for MES was initially introduced as a technical issue, the vagueness of the legal text, pressure from inside and outside of the EU and conflicting interpretations of what would happen after the WTO provisions expire, made it a political tipping point. The European Parliament did not grant MES and adopted with great majority by 546 votes to 28, with 77 abstentions, a joint resolution, tabled by the EPP, S&D, ECR, ALDE and Greens/EFA groups, emphasizing that “China is not a market economy and that the
five criteria established by the EU to define market economies have not yet been fulfilled” (European Parliament, 2016).

Here, the data indicates that the Eastern right-wing MEPs have voted relatively more in favour of the joint resolution (thus, against granting the MES), compared to their Western counterparts. This is puzzling at first, given that one would expect Western right-wing parties to be more critical towards granting China the MES. The Western radical right claims to represent voters that have suffered from Chinese competition in the global economy which presumably led to deindustrialization and job losses in Western-Europe. However, a closer look at their voting behaviour does not necessarily undermine Hypothesis 4. First, the absolute number of votes shows no significant difference: Western right-wing (For: 41/Against: 11/Abstentions: 33), Eastern right-wing (For: 35/Against: 4/Abstentions: 6). Overall, more Western than Eastern radical right members voted for the resolution. Second, the lower support in favour of the joint motion for resolution might lie in strategic considerations rather than the content itself. Notably, the right-wing party family had previously tabled two resolutions which had not gathered sufficient support. However, like the joint resolution, both motions criticized China’s state-led economic model and denied the MES. The ENF group’s text, introduced by leading Western radical right members i.e. Le Pen or Salvini, called on the EU Commission to withhold MES and to improve trade defence instruments, warning that granting MES would have detrimental effects on EU manufacturing jobs and economic growth (European Parliament, 2016a). Similarly, the EFDD Group, urged the Commission to withhold MES and to leave the ‘burden of proof’ to China (European Parliament, 2016b). Both right-wing motions, which were strongly supported by Western PRRPs, did not pass, with the other parties mainly abstaining from the votes. Instead of then voting for the joint resolution, a greater share of the right-wing members in return abstained or voted against. This should be regarded as a protest against the other, more moderate parties and their lack of support, rather than an opposition against the content of the joint resolution (which
was in line with the economic nativist argument), given that the right-wing’s motions did not differ substantially from the final text adopted.

**Framework for the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI) into the EU**

The second vote of special importance was on a legislative resolution for Regulation 2019/452 of the European Parliament and the Council, on establishing a framework for screening FDI from third countries into the EU. On 14 February 2019, the text was adopted with great majority by 500 votes to 49, with 56 abstentions (Grieger, 2019). The framework, which became fully operational on 11th October 2020, enables the screening of FDI on the grounds of (national) security or public order. The EU Commission can issue opinions, yet member states keep responsibility for their national security and are not limited in deciding whether to screen or block a particular investment on that basis (European Parliament, 2019c). Nonetheless, the framework was an important step towards better policy coordination. Until then, the EU had neither a single centralised FDI screening mechanism, nor a formal coordination system among member states and the EU Commission in place. When the legislative process started in 2017, only 13 of the 28 member states had already set-up their own national security FDI reviews. Even more, the lack of coherent FDI regulations and legal definitions, allowed member states to employ varying policies but also prevented “Member States from leveraging their collective bargaining power” (Grieger, 2017: 6f.). And compared to other industrialized countries, EU member states had been reluctant to block foreign takeovers in practice (Grieger, 2017: 8–10).

The legislative initiative and increased scrutiny over FDI started after a sea-change in EU-China investment relations, the introduction of the ‘Made in China 2025’ industrial strategy (in 2015) and a surge of high-profile takeovers in strategic sectors, most prominently the acquisition of German robotics manufacturer KUKA by Chinese Midea in 2016. These developments alarmed member states (especially in Western
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Europe), business and public alike and provoked a policy shift. Even though EU officials emphasized the neutrality of the measure and China was not mentioned in the legislative text, China’s “recent acquisitions of key European firms were clearly in the minds” (Stanzel, 2017) of the policymakers. As a side effect, the debate and legislative process incentivized policy action, increasing the number of national screening mechanisms to 16 by the time the EP adopted the legislation (Grieger, 2019).

The overwhelming majority for the framework also included votes from the radical right. Recalling Hypothesis 4, Western right-wing parties presumably draft policies in favour of voters who have been hit harder by Chinese competition. In line with economic nativism and referencing the ‘China shock’ thesis, one would expect greater support for an investment screening mechanism from the Western right-wing, who fear increased competition from China and worry about the transfer of knowledge or (manufacturing) jobs to the East. Opposite, Eastern member states have been less targeted by Chinese investments and were not so vulnerable to Chinese competition due to a lower level of unit labour costs. Naturally following their economic nativism, the Eastern member states could be expected to be ‘hungry’ for Chinese FDI and only barely inclined to restrict investments.

Contrary to these assumptions, the data shows that Eastern right-wing parties voted relatively more in favour of establishing the FDI screening mechanism, compared to the Western ones. However, as with the vote on the Market Economy Status, the analysis of the absolute votes makes the difference less significant. Overall, more Western right-wing members (For: 39, Against: 23, Abstentions: 24) voted for the regulation than MEPs from the Eastern right-wing parties (For: 35, Against: 4, Abstentions: 1). Besides, the voting behaviour needs to be reviewed by considering that most Western countries already had national screening mechanisms at the time of the EU legislation. Thus, an EU coordination mechanism might have been regarded by the Western radical right as an unnecessary tool at best, but rather as another attempt of the EU Commission to amass more competences that initially belonged to
member states. As shown before, the transmission of national competences to EU institutions has always been a red flag for the nativist radical right in the West, ultimately provoking their opposition. This confirms once again our overarching hypothesis that the nativist core ideology of the radical right is restraining transnational cooperation in the EP. Even though Western right-wing parties were aware of the value an EU coordinated FDI screening mechanism could have to limit strategic takeovers and possible deindustrialization – as manifold motions and remarks in the parliamentary debates prove – they still voted (relatively more) against the resolution and thus against their economic nativism in the final vote. On the contrary, most Eastern countries did not have their own national screening mechanisms in place. Thus, an EU coordination mechanism seemed to be an easy way to address the topic and to make sure that the EU could be blamed in case of repercussions from foreign investors. Here, one can argue that this action remains in line with their economic nativism.

5. Conclusion – nativists’ difficulties to cooperate

The rise of the radical right in European Parliament elections terrified politicians, journalists, and political commentators. In contrast to this fear, in line with former findings (Fieschi, 2000) the analysis of the legislative period of the EP between 2014 and 2019 reveals the deep divisions between radical right-wing parties. In fact, right-wing voting behaviour comes closer to complete division than to the relative unanimity that the other party families manage to achieve. Although the right-wing divide is reduced considerably once the parties are split up geographically in their Western and Eastern European components, even this set-up reveals that a much stronger division prevails within the radical right than among the other factions.
Particularly once their national economic interests are concerned, the radical right finds it difficult to rally around a common flag. A regional-specific exception to this rule is the common interest of the radical right in post-communist countries to profit from EU development funding. The parliamentarians’ understanding of the Union’s development programs resembles “a ‘cash cow’ to be milked” (Haughton and Rybar, 2009: 550). However, such a perspective objects the economic interests of their Western European counterparts who unanimously disapprove resolutions that strengthen the European level regarding monetary and financial competencies or institutions. Given the regional differences in economic business models and the unwillingness to strive for transnational cooperation, economic nativism is a major barrier for comprehensive right-wing cooperation.

Additionally, we follow up on the importance of the right-wing’s common authoritarian grounds that they share with different foreign powers and that might pave the way for the radical right becoming a ‘Trojan horse’ of authoritarians from Russia and China in the European Parliament. We find that despite a massive authoritarian advance a united pro-China or pro-Russia faction among the European radical right has yet to be established. Russia and China have been only partially successful in influencing right-wing politicians in the European Parliament. We argue that different forms of nativism can incentivise or disincentivise authoritarian forces from within and outside Europe to rally together and join forces against the EU.

First, turning away from the authoritarian advance causes economic opportunity costs and goes against the radical rights’ economic nativism. This holds particularly regarding looming investments from China in Eastern Europe. Here, the far east great power is endorsed as a potential trigger for economic stimulus even if it comes at the cost of a certain political dependency. In this sense economic interests dominate the nativists’ hunger for full sovereignty that we coin political nativism. The opposite is true for the Western European radical right. For having lost a certain share of their industry to global competition and offshoring, Western European right-wingers rather oppose
China and Chinese investments in their economic nativism. However, the two specific votes on granting China the MES and on establishing an FDI screening mechanism illustrate the complexity with regard to voting behaviour towards China and partially limit this interpretation. Here, further research is necessary to clarify the economic- and political nativism, as well as conflicts between the two that promote or restrain support for China among the radical right.

Second, for historical experiences the right-wing from Eastern Europe is rather critical in European Parliament votes on Russia despite the costs stemming from economic sanctions amongst others. Hence in this case, political nativism clearly dominates the East’s economic rationale. Again, the opposite is true among the radical right in the West where Russia’s political control is less feared, and its authoritarian occurrence is rather admired. In the case of Russia, political nativism in the East is the major dividing element within the radical right. Hence, despite common authoritarian grounds, political nativism hinders foreign powers to strategically employ the radical rights’ representatives in parliamentary.

Finally, this paper shows that the radical right party family in the European Parliament functions differently from all other factional groups. Whereas established parties in the EP form political factions as the greatest common denominator that still allows policy congruence (McElroy and Benoit, 2010), above all, radical right parties vouch for national interests – not policy congruence. Hence, despite all common goals and tactical aspirations, their nativist backbone hinders effective cooperation – even in its negative occurrence to blockade policy proposals from established factions. Anyways, it remains an open question whether the radical right’s electorate even expects policy congruence from their representatives at the cost of compromise and alliance building. Having said that, it does not come as a surprise that until today the radical right failed
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to form a ‘super faction’. And even if it will merge in the future, it can be expected to fail achieving congruence on crucial votes.

What is more, this contribution clarifies that nativism can take an economic as well as a political course. In the interdependent and complex world politicians face today, economic and political nativism might first not always be as obvious and second not in line with each other. Where no historically grown aversion against an authoritarian power exists, economic nativism might incentivise right-wing parliamentarians to engage with foreign powers even at the cost of losing political sovereignty. Hence, depending on the generosity of authoritarians’ funding and the radical right’s nativist cost-benefit calculation, the radical right might no longer be constrained to a ‘Trojan pony’ and could instead become a ‘Trojan horse’ in the European Parliament.
Matthias Diermeier, Hannah Frohwein and Aljoscha Nau

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Annex

Table 1: Considered Radical National Parties over the legislative term 2014-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radical Right - West</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Radical Right - East</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternative for Germany</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance</td>
<td>HU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Jobbik – Movement for a Better Hungary</td>
<td>HU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>National Alliance &quot;All For Latvia!&quot;</td>
<td>LV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers of Italy</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Party Order and Justice</td>
<td>LT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Party of Austria</td>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td>PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Slovenian Democratic Party</td>
<td>SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Reload Bulgaria Party</td>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Party of Free Citizens</td>
<td>CZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Français Libres</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement</td>
<td>BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Patriots</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Wolność – Liberty</td>
<td>PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party of Germany</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic</td>
<td>PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(KORWIN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Freedom</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Croatian Party of Rights</td>
<td>HR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformed Political Party</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Congress of the New Right</td>
<td>PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden Democrats</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania</td>
<td>LT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– Christian Families Alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Brexit Party</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>New Majority (NOVA)</td>
<td>SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Ordinary People</td>
<td>SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemish Interest</td>
<td>BE</td>
<td>The Right Wing of the Republic</td>
<td>PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Droite Indépendante</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Slovak National Party</td>
<td>SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns Party</td>
<td>FI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 This categorization is based on all parties Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) or Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) as well as parties that are classified as eurosceptic right by Hobolt. Unusually this procedure includes 13 further parties who are members of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) or European People’s Party (EPP) – amongst others Law and Justice (Poland) and Fidesz (Hungary).
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