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Margaryta Klymak and Tim Vlandas

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The Impact of Russia's Invasion on European Attitudes

Margaryta Klymak* and Tim Vlandas**

Abstract

What is the effect of wars abroad on the attitudes of people living in countries that are not directly involved? Using the tenth wave of the European Social Survey, this paper explores how the Russian invasion has affected the political and social attitudes of people across eight European countries. The overlap between the survey fieldwork in these eight countries and the Russian invasion allows us to recover causal estimates by adopting the 'Unexpected Event during Survey Design'. We find that the invasion increased support for democracy and the welfare state, reinforced positive views of the European Union and immigration, while it reduced authoritarian attitudes.

Keywords: Attitudes, unexpected event during survey design, Russia's invasion, European Social Survey, immigration attitudes, democracy, authoritarianism, redistribution, EU, war, conflict

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* Fellow and Tutor in Economics at Somerville College, University of Oxford, and Associated Member of the Department of Economics, University of Oxford (Email: margaryta.klymak@economics.ox.ac.uk)

** Associate Professor of Comparative Social Policy at the Department of Social Policy and Intervention, University of Oxford, and Fellow of St Antony's College, University of Oxford (Email: tim.vlandas@spi.ox.ac.uk)

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The Impact of Russia's Invasion on European Attitudes

1. Introduction

Wars are an existential threat to humanity. Despite historically low levels of interstate conflicts in the second half of the 20th century (Jackson and Nei, 2015; Clauset, 2018), the European continent is once again facing the threat of war at its doorstep. Public opinion plays a crucial role in shaping public policies (Brooks and Manza, 2006; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Dassonneville et al., 2021) so whether and how the Russian invasion has affected the attitudes and views of citizens in other countries will be an important factor in European governments' continuing humanitarian and military support to Ukraine. Yet, no literature to date provides evidence about whether and how wars abroad influence public opinion in countries that are not directly involved in a military conflict. This article provides the first systematic empirical analysis of whether and how a wide range of attitudes are affected by wars abroad.

We examine European attitudes since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has led to substantial loss of life, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and a large negative economic shock to the region and beyond. As a result of the invasion, over 18 million people already require humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 2022*b*), nearly 17,000 casualties have been documented (United Nations, 2022*a*) and over 7.5 million people were forced to flee Ukraine (UNCHR, 2022). In addition, there have been over 700 attacks on health centres WHO (2022), over 300 cultural sites were damaged (NYT, 2022). Finally, the Russian military has targeted critical civilian infrastructure which has left many – including 7 million children - without access to water, heating or electricity (UNICEF, 2022) while food security has been compromised (FAO, 2022).

The Russian invasion constitutes a multidimensional shock. First, it represents an important negative shock to European security and heightens the threat of Russian aggression (e.g. CEP

(2022); NATO (2023)). The fact that this greater security risk emerges from an authoritarian state might affect perceptions of authoritarianism and satisfaction with democracy. Second, the invasion was also an adverse economic shock. It exacerbated the challenges of already struggling European economies with many in the grip of an inflationary shock coupled with a slowdown of economic activity post-pandemic (OECD, 2022). These negative economic effects could in turn potentially affect public opinion about solidarity and redistribution preferences. Third, the invasion led to substantial cross-border movements of population. Indeed, nearly 5 million Ukrainian refugees are also registered for Temporary Protection in the European Union (UNCHR, 2022) and the European Council has adopted its ninth sanctions package against Russia in December 2022 (EU Council, 2022*a*). Finally, the conflict has a very clear European dimension. On the one hand, European Union member states have so far been supportive, most notably by providing military and humanitarian support to Ukraine. On the other hand, the invasion has also accelerated Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU: Ukraine applied to the EU four days after the start of the invasion and was granted candidate status in June 2022 (EU Council, 2022*b*). The invasion might therefore have led to a shift in attitudes towards European integration.

While the nature of the shock could in principle affect the attitudes and views of the European public, we still lack systematic evidence about whether and how European public opinion has in changed since the invasion. Existing literature suggests that conflicts have substantial consequences for directly involved countries, for instance on economic performance (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003), collective action, cohesion, cooperation, trust, political participation and support for the incumbent (Grosjean, 2014; Voors et al., 2012; Bauer et al., 2016; Wollebæk et al., 2012; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii, 2014; Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014). However, the effects are contested Croco (2011) and many attitudes are often not considered. Moreover, there is no systematic empirical evidence on the effects of wars abroad on public opinion at home for countries that are not directly involved. This is important because the evolution of public opinion in Europe may prove crucial for the future evolution of European government policy towards Russia and continuing support to Ukraine.

As the Russian invasion represents a multidimensional shock - to security and integration, to democracy, to stable migration patterns and to economic insecurity and risks, we investigate the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on a wide range of individual attitudes and preferences across five dimensions: support for democracy, immigration, the European Union, redistribution, and authoritarian attitudes. While these attitudes have been the focus of a large literature evaluating their determinants (De Vries et al., 2021; Scheve and Stasavage, 2010; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016), no literature to date has explored the impact of wars abroad on these attitudes. To address this gap, we use data from the tenth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) which maximizes external validity and high-quality data collection by using representative sampling with strict random probability methods, minimum sample sizes, face-to-face interviews, and high response rates. Respondents in eight countries that were surveyed just before and right after the Russian invasion: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Montenegro, Macedonia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Therefore, our sample includes both EU member states and non-member states, with different economic and political systems in both Eastern and Western Europe. Our research design employs the 'Unexpected Event During Survey Design' (UEDSD) method (Hainmueller, 2012; Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2020) to estimate the causal effects of the invasion on European public opinion. Since the day and person interviewed are fixed in advance and not affected by the war, our design resembles a natural experiment: the invasion is a random shock to respondents who were interviewed just after the start of the war, which we then compare to respondents that were interviewed before the invasion began. This UEDSD design has been previously used to estimate the causal effect of other types of shocks on attitudes (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 2018; Bateson and Weintraub, 2022; Harding and Nwokolo, 2022).

We find that the conflict in Ukraine had significant effects on public opinion in Europe. The invasion reduced authoritarian attitudes whereas it increased support for democracy, Europe, redistribution, and positive views of immigration. Specifically, the respondents were less likely to find it acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law and more likely to say that they did not follow traditions and customs, while the war increased the declared importance of living in a democratically governed country and of being free. Greater support for the welfare state following the invasion is noticeable in terms of more favourable redistribution preferences. Respondents also became more emotionally attached to the

European Union and more supportive of European unification. Finally, they adopted more positive views of immigration, although these effects for some variables fade in the medium term.

Our findings contribute to previous research showing that during times of crisis, such as economic, security, and health crises, people may shift their political attitudes and references (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso, 2017; De Vries et al., 2021; Hale, 2022). In contrast to the effects of these other events, the Russian invasion is a multidimensional shock to Europe and therefore affects several distinct types of attitudes in European public opinion. Indeed, we show that foreign invasions affect a wide range of preferences and views of people in countries that are not directly involved in the conflict. These results also contribute to our understanding of the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on attitudes and perceptions abroad. Previous research had found that the 2014 invasion of Ukraine had a positive effect on EU identity among Eastern European member states (Gehring, 2022). Our article shows that the Russian invasion also had important effects across many other different dimensions of public opinion besides European integration, including support for democracy, freedom, immigration, and the welfare state. This contributes to previous findings that considered other types of foreign events, for instance foreign electoral outcomes (Malet, 2022) and intervention (Tomz and Weeks, 2020), external threats (Myrick, 2021), diplomacy (Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Matush, 2021) and terrorist attacks (Legewie, 2013). These foreign events are distinct from the Russian invasion in at least two main ways. First, they tended to be much smaller shocks to European security, hence constituted less of a threat. Second, they were comparatively more unidimensional by contrast to the Russian invasion that represents a shock to security, economy, population flows, and European integration.

2. Data and Method

We use the tenth wave of the European Social Survey released in December 2022 for our analysis. The survey covers a representative sample from over 20 European countries. Crucially for our purpose, the interview dates for surveyed respondents are clearly

preassigned. Respondents in eight countries were surveyed both just before and straight after the invasion: Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal (Table 1). Our sample therefore includes countries both inside and outside the EU, although over 50% of the respondents are in Southern Europe. Overall, there is a good spread of respondents before and after the start of the war on 24th February 2022 (Figure 1), even if this varies depending on the country under consideration (Figure 2). As the Russian invasion of Ukraine took place during the ESS fieldwork period, it represents an exogenous shock to the subset of respondents that were randomly interviewed after the start of the war.

Table 1: Frequency of respondents across countries

Country	Frequency	Percentage
Switzerland (CH)	376	5.20
Greece (GR)	2,209	30.54
Italy (IT)	2,040	28.20
Montenegro (ME)	633	8.75
Macedonia (MK)	768	10.62
Netherlands (NL)	510	7.05
Norway (NO)	265	3.66
Portugal (PO	432	5.97
Total	7,233	100

Notes: This table shows the distribution of respondents across countries in our sample.

Figure 1: Distribution of respondents before and after start of war



Notes: The histogram shows the distribution of respondents by day of their interview for all countries covered by the ESS which overlapped before and after the war (see appendix for details). The vertical line indicates the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

Figure 2: Density of data collection 60 days before and after the invasion



Notes: This figure shows histograms plotting the distribution of respondents by day of their interview for each country covered in our sample. The vertical line indicates the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

We estimate the effect of the invasion on a series of dependent variables by using the following equation:

$$y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta\ \text{Invasion}_{ic} + \gamma\ \mathbf{X}_{ic} + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{ic} \qquad (1)$$

Our outcome variable, y_{ic}, represents the attitudes of respondent i in a country c. We focus on five types of attitudes which we describe briefly in the next paragraphs (see Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix for details and summary statistics). First, to capture authoritarian attitudes, we use three questions that ask respondents whether they find it acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law, whether following rules and traditions is very much like them or not at all like them, and whether they agree that their country needs the most loyalty towards its leaders. Second, two questions allow us to measure democratic attitudes.

Specifically, respondents are asked to rate the importance of living in a democratically governed country and being free, respectively. Third, to assess attitudes towards the European Union, we rely on five variables. The first two ask respondents whether they are emotionally attached to their country and Europe, respectively. Next, we also have a question about whether European unification has gone too far (or should go further). We then include a question to respondents who live in countries that are not member states about whether they would like their country to join the EU and to respondents who live in EU member states about whether they would like their country to leave or remain in the EU. Fourth, for immigration attitudes, respondents are asked whether immigration is bad or good for the country's economy, culture, and "as a place to live". They can also express a view about whether the government should allow more immigration for two hypothetical groups: "different race/ethnic group from majority" and "immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe". Fifth, respondents are asked whether their government should reduce differences in income levels and another question about whether their government protects all citizens against poverty.

We control for several relevant individual characteristics X_{ic}: the age, gender of respondents, residence in urban areas, years of education, subjective income insecurity, and source of income (wages, unemployment, social assistance, pensions, or investments). Summary statistics for all controls are shown in the appendix. Country-specific fixed effects γ_c are also included to capture unobservable cross-national heterogeneity, while our baseline models report robust standard errors ϵ_{ic}, although we also check robustness for different clusters. All coefficients are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares, but using ordinary logistic regressions does not change our conclusion.

The effect of the invasion is captured by β. The exact date of the invasion is as good as random in terms of whether respondents got interviewed just before or just after the war began. These dates are decided at the sampling stage and, according to ESS sampling procedures, are never changed. In the next paragraphs, we discuss the key conditions for causal identification in 'Unexpected Event during Survey Design' and its challenges, following Hainmueller (2012) and Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández (2020): full compliance, ignorability and exclusion.

First, full compliance requires individuals in the treatment group to have actually been treated. In cases where the treatment is administered by a researcher (e.g. RCT or survey experiments), it is straightforward to assume that all individuals in treated groups have received the treatment. In our case, the treatment is the receipt of information about the start of the war for all respondents to the survey that were interviewed after the invasion has started. It is in general very difficult to formally test this assumption since there is no a priori way to be sure that all respondents were aware that the invasion had started before the time of their interview. That being said, non-compliance is highly unlikely in our case because the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a major event in 2022 that received widespread attention both in print media and online. According to Google's 2022 report, Ukraine was the third most searched term on their search engine overall and number one in the news category. Compliance was also likely immediate as the invasion occurred before the first interview on February 24th and was widely reported in the morning news across European countries.

Second, the ESS ensures in its sampling and weighing protocols that samples are representative and balanced in terms of the characteristics of respondents. Our treatment is random and not related to the distribution of respondent characteristics, so that in principle there are no reasons for individuals of particular age, residence, gender, education or income to be more or less likely to have been interviewed after the start of the war. Since respondents cannot change the time of their interview, and since the ESS decided this time in advance, there are no possibilities for certain types of respondents to be more or less likely to pull out after the invasion began. This limits the potential for selective attrition in terms of treated respondents with certain characteristics dropping from the sample. However, it could be that through a purely random allocation process individuals with certain characteristics end up being over- or under-represented before versus after the start of the war. A balance test shows that there indeed exists a statistically significant difference between the mean values of individuals interviewed after the start of the war, at least for some of the covariates. To address this issue, we apply entropy rebalancing between the treatment and control groups (Hainmueller, 2012). The resulting reweighting effectively ensures that the distribution of each covariate is the same in the reweighted treated and control group.

Third, the exclusion assumption requires us to exclude the possibility that unrelated cyclical dynamics, and/or other closely occurring events, confound the effect of our treatment. To address this issue, we replicate our analyses for different bandwidths around the start of the war. Reducing the bandwidth entails potential benefits and risks (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2020). On the upside, reducing the bandwidth makes it more likely that the exclusion restrictions are met. The closer the time of the interview to the date of the treatment cut-off point, the more likely that the treatment is as random as possible for a subset of individuals with relatively fewer unobservable differences in characteristics. This has the additional advantage of limiting the likelihood that other unrelated events drive the observed treatment effect. In terms of risks, a tighter bandwidth reduces the number of individuals included in the sample, while not always ensuring that these individuals share more similar characteristics and will therefore not automatically decrease bias, while the variance rises. At the same time, the smaller sample and shorter time frame limit generalizability by providing more local treatment effects. If the true treatment effect of the event occurs only over time, a narrower bandwidth might also wrongly suggest a null effect. We therefore use eight different time frames in our analysis: 7, 14, 21, 28, 31, 40, 50 and 60 days after the start of the invasion.

3. Results

We estimate the effect of the invasion on a series of dependent variables capturing different views and preferences of respondents across the eight countries. Specifically, we include authoritarian and democratic attitudes, views about the European Union and immigration, and redistribution preferences. The results for OLS regressions of the effect of war on all our dependent variables with the different bandwidths are shown in Figures 3 to 6, while more full results are reported in tables B1 to B17 in appendix. All regressions include the set of controls described earlier as well as country fixed effects, and p-values are calculated using robust standard errors. We report results for different bandwidths since Russia's invasion of Ukraine began.

Figure 3 shows that respondents became less authoritarian in their attitudes. Respondents were less likely to find it acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law and more likely to say that they did not follow traditions and customs as well as to disagree that

a country needs most loyalty towards its leaders, although in both cases statistical significance disappears in the medium term. The results for democratic and redistribution attitudes are presented in Figure 4. The war increased both the declared importance of living in a democratically governed country and of being free. Respondents became less likely to disagree strongly that the government should reduce differences in income levels and more likely to think that the current government protects all citizens against poverty.

Next, the effect of the invasion on views of the Europe Union is displayed in Figure 5. Respondents become more emotionally attached to the EU (as well as their country) after roughly one month following the invasion. There is no statistically significant effect on joining the EU, a question that is asked only to respondents living outside the EU, but there is a negative statistically significant effect on leaving the EU in the first 14 days for respondents who live in current EU member states. For bandwidths in the first 31 days, results strongly suggest a positive and statistically significant effect of invasion on respondents wanting European unification to go further.

Moreover, results for immigration attitudes are shown in Figure 6. By and large, respondents are more likely to think immigration is good for the country's economy, culture, and as a place to live, in the short to medium term. However, these effects fade in the medium term (> 31 days). After one month, respondents become more favourable to welcoming more immigrants into Europe. More specifically, they are less likely to express views that the government should allow no immigrants for two groups: immigrants from "different race or ethnic groups from the majority" and "immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe", but these effects are only statistically significant in the medium run (after 28 and 31 days).

Finally, we carry out a range of robustness checks to assess the stability of these results in tables C1 to C17 in the appendix C. First, we report the war coefficient for different sets of controls with and without country fixed effects. Second, our baseline results report robust standard errors. As robustness checks, we therefore opt for alternative clusters, at the day, country week, and country-day levels, respectively. Third, we rerun our analyses when restricting our sample only to the five countries with the largest number of observations (i.e.

Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Macedonia and the Netherlands). Fourth, we rerun all our analyses with ordinal logistic models.

Figure 3: Authoritarian attitudes



Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Russian invasion on three dependent variables. The first dependent variable is based on a question about whether respondents find it acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law, coded from 0 "not at all" to 10 "completely". Second, they are asked whether following traditions and customs is 1 "very much like me" to 6 "not like me at all". Third, respondents are asked whether they agree strongly (coded 1) to disagree strongly (coded 6) with a country needing most loyalty towards its leaders. Circles are OLS coefficient estimates from distinct regressions of each dependent variable on a dummy variable taking value one if respondents were interviewed after the start of the invasion, and zero otherwise, for different time bandwidths. All regressions include controls, country fixed effects and entropy weights (see appendix for description and summary statistics). Horizontal bars are 90 per cent confidence intervals calculated with robust standard errors.

Figure 4: Democracy and redistribution



(a) Importance of democracy

(b) Importance of being free

(c) Government should reduce income differences

(d) Government protects people from poverty

Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Russian invasion on four dependent variables. First, respondents are asked to rate the importance of living in a democratically governed country on a 10-point scale from 0 "not at all important for democracy" to 10 "extremely important for democracy". Second, they also answer a question about whether it is 1 "very much like them" to 6 "not like me at all like them" that to say that it is important for them to make their own decisions and be free. Third, respondents are asked whether they 1 "agree strongly", 2 "agree", 3 "neither agree nor disagree", 4 "disagree" or 5 "disagree strongly" with the statement that the government should reduce differences in income levels. Third, they choose whether the statement in their country the government protects all citizens against poverty 0 "does not apply at all" or 10 "applies completely". Circles are OLS coefficient estimates from distinct regressions of each dependent variable on a dummy variable taking value one if respondents were interviewed after the start of the invasion, and zero otherwise, for different time bandwidths. All regressions include controls, country fixed effects and entropy weights (see appendix for description and summary statistics). Horizontal bars are 90 per cent confidence intervals calculated with robust standard errors.

Figure 5: Attitudes towards Europe versus nation state



(a) Emotionally attached to country



(b) Emotionally attached to the EU



(c) Leave EU



(d) Join EU



(e) More EU unification

Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Russian invasion on five dependent variables. The first two asks respondents about whether they are not at 0 "not at all" to 10 "very emotionally attached" to their country and Europe, respectively. We then include the variable taking the value of one if the respondent answered that they would vote to leave the EU and zero if they would prefer to remain in the EU. Next, we include a question about whether they would like their country to 1 "join the European Union" or 0 "not join the European Union". Finally, respondents are asked if European unification has 0 "gone too far" to 10 "it should go further". Circles are OLS coefficient estimates from distinct regressions of each dependent variable on a dummy variable taking value one if respondents were interviewed after the start of the invasion, and zero otherwise, for different time bandwidths. All regressions include controls, country fixed effects and entropy weights (see appendix for description and summary statistics). Horizontal bars are 90 per cent confidence intervals calculated with robust standard errors.

Figure 6: Immigration attitudes



Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the effect of the Russian invasion on five dependent variables. Respondents are asked whether immigration is bad (coded zero) or good (coded ten) for the country's economy (panel a), culture (panel d), and as a place to live (panel e). They can also express a view about whether the government should 1 "allow many to come and live here", 2 "allow some, 3 "allow a few" or 4 "allow none" for two hypothetical groups: "different race/ethnic group from majority" (panel b) and "immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe" (panel c). Circles are OLS coefficient estimates from distinct regressions of each dependent variable on a dummy variable taking value one if respondents were interviewed after the start of the invasion, and zero otherwise, for different time bandwidths. All regressions include controls, country fixed effects and entropy weights (see appendix for description and summary statistics). Horizontal bars are 90 per cent confidence intervals calculated with robust standard errors.

4. Conclusion

In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which immediately led to widespread international condemnation from numerous governments as well as international organizations. This invasion had profound effects on international relations and the economies of many countries besides Russia and Ukraine. Using data from the European Social Survey, we estimate the causal impact of this invasion on attitudes and preferences in European countries that were not directly involved in the conflict. Our article is the first to document the consequences of wars abroad for attitudes at people living in countries that are not directly involved in the conflict. Our findings show that the invasion increased support for democracy and freedom, the welfare state and Europe, while it reduced authoritarian attitudes. In addition, respondents initially adopt more positive views of immigration, but these effects for some variables fade in the medium run. These findings represent the first empirical attempt to shed new light on the indirect effects of Russian invasion on European views and attitudes. Future research could consider other attitudes, for instance about foreign policy and support for refugees, which we could not measure with our survey, and also explore whether the shifts we document in this article hold up in the very long run.

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Appendices

A Summary Statistics

Table A1: Coding of variables

VARIABLE NAMES						
Acceptable for country to have a strong leader above the law	0 Not at all	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	10 completely			
Important to follow traditions and customs	1. Very much like me	2. Like me	3. Somewhat like me	4. A little like me	5. Not like me	6. Not like me at all
Country needs most loyalty towards its leaders	1. Agree strongly	2. Agree	3. Neither agree nor disagree	4. Disagree	5. Disagree strongly	
Important to make own decisions and be free	1. Very much like me	2. Like me	3. Somewhat like me	4. A little like me	5. Not like me	6. Not like me at all
How emotionally attached to [country]	0 Not at all	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	10. Very emotionally attached			
How emotionally attached to Europe	0 Not at all	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	10. Very emotionally attached			
Would vote for [country] to remain member of European Union	0. Remain outside	1. Become member of EU				
Would vote for [country] to remain member of European Union or leave	0. Remain member of the EU	1. Leave the EU				
European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	0. Unification already gone too far	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	10. Unification go further			
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	0. Bad for the economy	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	10. Good for the economy			
Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	1. Allow many to come and live here	2. Allow some	3. Allow a few	4. Allow none		
Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	1. Allow many to come and live here	2. Allow some	3. Allow a few	4. Allow none		
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	0. Cultural life undermined	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	10. Cultural life enriched			
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	0. Worse place to live	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	10. Better place to live			
Government should reduce differences in income levels	1. Agree Strongly	2. Agree	3. Neither agree nor disagree	4. Disagree	5. Disagree strongly	
In country the government protects all citizens against poverty	0. Does not apply at all	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	10. Applies completely			

Table A2: Variables summary statistics

	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Strong leader	3.16	3.15	0.00	10.00
Follow traditions	2.42	1.21	1.00	6.00
Loyalty toward leader	3.22	1.12	1.00	5.00
Importance of democracy	8.83	1.85	0.00	10.00
Importance of being free	2.18	1.08	1.00	6.00
Emotionally attached to country	7.87	2.43	0.00	10.00
Emotionally attached to the EU	5.51	2.59	0.00	10.00
Join the EU	0.77	0.42	0.00	1.00
Leave the EU	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
More EU unification	5.24	2.59	0.00	10.00
Immigration good for economy	4.67	2.57	0.00	10.00
More immigration from non-majority group	2.67	0.97	1.00	4.00
More immigration from poorer & non-EU	2.71	0.96	1.00	4.00
Immigration good for culture	4.91	2.62	0.00	10.00
Immigration makes place better	4.64	2.44	0.00	10.00
Government should reduce income differences	1.98	0.92	1.00	5.00
Government protects people from poverty	3.96	2.65	0.00	10.00
Observations	4180			

Figure A.1: Google trends for a search item "Ukraine"



Note. The figure presents the interest in the search item "Ukraine" between December 2021 and December 2022. The highest point on the graph indicates the peak of its popularity. Google releases its trends data at a weekly level. Therefore, the dashed line represents the week in which the Russian invasion began.

B Results for each attitude with different bandwidth

Table B1: The effect of invasion on strong leader.

	Strong leader							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	-0.418***							
	(0.128)							
14 days		-0.238**						
		(0.106)						
21 days			-0.327***					
			(0.0938)					
28 days				-0.338***				
				(0.0876)				
31 days					-0.397***			
					(0.0859)			
40 days						-0.372***		
						(0.0821)		
50 days							-0.352***	
							(0.0810)	
60 days								-0.347***
								(0.0810)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4417	4856	5364	5716	5846	6169	6494	6743
R2	0.106	0.0936	0.0816	0.0792	0.0773	0.0885	0.0900	0.0889
Mean Dep. var.	2.890	3.013	3.006	2.976	2.952	2.894	2.919	2.948

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B2: The effect of invasion on emotionally attached to country.

	Emotionally attached to country							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.119							
	(0.0959)							
14 days		0.00124						
		(0.0727)						
21 days			0.0385					
			(0.0625)					
28 days				0.0333				
				(0.0575)				
31 days					0.0564			
					(0.0563)			
40 days						0.101*		
						(0.0542)		
50 days							0.114**	
							(0.0532)	
60 days								0.128**
								(0.0530)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4542	5000	5515	5872	6003	6332	6664	6917
R2	0.192	0.173	0.149	0.144	0.142	0.134	0.128	0.123
Mean Dep. var.	8.054	8.024	8.079	8.099	8.111	8.098	8.090	8.084

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B3: The effect of invasion on emotionally attached to the EU.

	Emotionally attached to the EU							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.135							
	(0.105)							
14 days		0.0684						
		(0.0825)						
21 days			0.0794					
			(0.0737)					
28 days				0.0838				
				(0.0688)				
31 days					0.125*			
					(0.0677)			
40 days						0.145**		
						(0.0653)		
50 days							0.153**	
							(0.0638)	
60 days								0.151**
								(0.0634)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4511	4970	5489	5845	5976	6304	6636	6887
R2	0.142	0.107	0.0901	0.0864	0.0839	0.0792	0.0752	0.0728
Mean Dep. var.	5.563	5.582	5.612	5.629	5.652	5.716	5.747	5.754

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B4: The effect of invasion on join the EU.

	Join the EU							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.0150							
	(0.0315)							
14 days		0.0295						
		(0.0258)						
21 days			-0.00888					
			(0.0247)					
28 days				-0.00637				
				(0.0235)				
31 days					-0.00430			
					(0.0219)			
40 days						0.00515		
						(0.0225)		
50 days							0.00663	
							(0.0227)	
60 days								0.00960
								(0.0228)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1278	1369	1476	1525	1560	1662	1702	1726
R2	0.530	0.526	0.481	0.508	0.520	0.538	0.540	0.537
Mean Dep. var.	0.719	0.682	0.684	0.651	0.666	0.584	0.552	0.536

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B5: The effect of invasion on leave the EU.

	Leave the EU							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	-0.0673***							
	(0.0158)							
14 days		-0.0295*						
		(0.0151)						
21 days			-0.0173					
			(0.0141)					
28 days				-0.0158				
				(0.0131)				
31 days					-0.0127			
					(0.0130)			
40 days						-0.00921		
						(0.0128)		
50 days							-0.00543	
							(0.0129)	
60 days								-0.00728
								(0.0130)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2619	2930	3259	3508	3589	3785	4031	4225
R2	0.0423	0.0249	0.0260	0.0271	0.0278	0.0298	0.0297	0.0286
Mean Dep. var.	0.0976	0.128	0.142	0.140	0.142	0.148	0.155	0.159

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B6: The effect of invasion on more EU unification.

	More EU unification							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.216**							
	(0.110)							
14 days		0.226***						
		(0.0870)						
21 days			0.252***					
			(0.0751)					
28 days				0.167**				
				(0.0705)				
31 days					0.144**			
					(0.0689)			
40 days						0.0793		
						(0.0673)		
50 days							0.0690	
							(0.0674)	
60 days								0.0778
								(0.0679)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4251	4693	5191	5532	5659	5979	6298	6546
R2	0.115	0.112	0.115	0.108	0.110	0.101	0.0931	0.0869
Mean Dep. var.	5.356	5.249	5.141	5.108	5.075	5.055	5.061	5.065

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B7: The effect of invasion on government should reduce income differences.

	Government should reduce income differences							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	-0.0673							
	(0.0410)							
14 days		-0.0686**						
		(0.0326)						
21 days			-0.0830***					
			(0.0289)					
28 days				-0.0843***				
				(0.0272)				
31 days					-0.0982***			
					(0.0266)			
40 days						-0.0716***		
						(0.0263)		
50 days							-0.0555**	
							(0.0260)	
60 days								-0.0622**
								(0.0258)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4476	4931	5446	5802	5933	6262	6591	6844
R2	0.0833	0.0731	0.0655	0.0669	0.0656	0.0689	0.0661	0.0650
Mean Dep. var.	1.926	1.952	1.960	1.965	1.960	2.002	2.018	2.019

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B8: The effect of invasion on government protects people from poverty.

	Government protects people from poverty							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.218**							
	(0.106)							
14 days		0.124						
		(0.0835)						
21 days			0.128*					
			(0.0753)					
28 days				0.131*				
				(0.0702)				
31 days					0.130*			
					(0.0692)			
40 days						0.128*		
						(0.0671)		
50 days							0.145**	
							(0.0659)	
60 days								0.130**
								(0.0656)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4501	4954	5468	5825	5956	6281	6607	6859
R2	0.159	0.130	0.114	0.121	0.116	0.134	0.131	0.127
Mean Dep. var.	4.126	4.180	4.207	4.244	4.244	4.354	4.385	4.376

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B9: The effect of invasion on immigration good for economy.

	Immigration good for economy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.176*							
	(0.104)							
14 days		0.160*						
		(0.0821)						
21 days			0.167**					
			(0.0727)					
28 days				0.160**				
				(0.0674)				
31 days					0.126*			
					(0.0663)			
40 days						0.0194		
						(0.0643)		
50 days							-0.0230	
							(0.0631)	
60 days								-0.0301
								(0.0629)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4473	4928	5442	5796	5928	6255	6583	6836
R2	0.179	0.164	0.162	0.161	0.160	0.160	0.157	0.152
Mean Dep. var.	4.838	4.850	4.827	4.846	4.822	4.878	4.904	4.923

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B10: The effect of invasion on more immigration from non-majority group.

	More immigration from non-majority group							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.0268							
	(0.0374)							
14 days		-0.0243						
		(0.0291)						
21 days			-0.0574**					
			(0.0256)					
28 days				-0.0749***				
				(0.0240)				
31 days					-0.0794***			
					(0.0236)			
40 days						-0.0381*		
						(0.0230)		
50 days							-0.0245	
							(0.0227)	
60 days								-0.0253
								(0.0226)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4476	4929	5438	5791	5923	6251	6581	6833
R2	0.300	0.295	0.281	0.283	0.277	0.269	0.264	0.260
Mean Dep. var.	2.710	2.640	2.605	2.592	2.586	2.545	2.527	2.513

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B11: The effect of invasion on more immigration from poorer and non-EU.

	More immigration from poorer and non-EU							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.0649*							
	(0.0362)							
14 days		-0.00299						
		(0.0292)						
21 days			-0.0439*					
			(0.0260)					
28 days				-0.0635***				
				(0.0243)				
31 days					-0.0703***			
					(0.0239)			
40 days						-0.0309		
						(0.0234)		
50 days							-0.0301	
							(0.0231)	
60 days								-0.0312
								(0.0230)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4482	4930	5440	5793	5924	6252	6583	6836
R2	0.322	0.300	0.279	0.271	0.269	0.258	0.256	0.252
Mean Dep. var.	2.755	2.675	2.634	2.621	2.615	2.575	2.547	2.532

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B12: The effect of invasion on importance of being free.

	Importance of being free							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.0840*							
	(0.0498)							
14 days		0.115***						
		(0.0389)						
21 days			0.129***					
			(0.0342)					
28 days				0.131***				
				(0.0319)				
31 days					0.120***			
					(0.0314)			
40 days						0.0921***		
						(0.0299)		
50 days							0.0667**	
							(0.0292)	
60 days								0.0409
								(0.0289)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4519	4976	5493	5848	5979	6307	6637	6889
R2	0.0645	0.0663	0.0576	0.0597	0.0596	0.0576	0.0562	0.0557
Mean Dep. var.	2.200	2.214	2.230	2.219	2.215	2.199	2.191	2.184

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B13: The effect of invasion on importance of democracy.

	Importance of democracy							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.127*							
	(0.0769)							
14 days		0.107*						
		(0.0622)						
21 days			0.102*					
			(0.0564)					
28 days				0.0560				
				(0.0523)				
31 days					0.0747			
					(0.0517)			
40 days						0.126**		
						(0.0506)		
50 days							0.131**	
							(0.0511)	
60 days								0.168***
								(0.0517)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4522	4979	5494	5849	5980	6306	6632	6883
R2	0.0771	0.0739	0.0776	0.0771	0.0762	0.0730	0.0703	0.0692
Mean Dep. var.	8.994	8.933	8.889	8.888	8.886	8.893	8.870	8.861

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B14: The effect of invasion on follow traditions.

	Follow traditions							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.188***							
	(0.0542)							
14 days		0.141***						
		(0.0430)						
21 days			0.102***					
			(0.0369)					
28 days				0.112***				
				(0.0349)				
31 days					0.0987***			
					(0.0342)			
40 days						0.0405		
						(0.0335)		
50 days							0.00987	
							(0.0328)	
60 days								-0.0135
								(0.0325)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4525	4982	5497	5851	5982	6307	6638	6890
R2	0.135	0.104	0.106	0.105	0.105	0.108	0.104	0.104
Mean Dep. var.	2.553	2.530	2.502	2.523	2.514	2.522	2.513	2.505

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B15: The effect of invasion on immigration good for culture.

	Immigration good for culture							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.404***							
	(0.103)							
14 days		0.316***						
		(0.0817)						
21 days			0.280***					
			(0.0732)					
28 days				0.249***				
				(0.0684)				
31 days					0.218***			
					(0.0672)			
40 days						0.0950		
						(0.0656)		
50 days							0.0455	
							(0.0652)	
60 days								0.0371
								(0.0652)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4489	4943	5452	5802	5933	6261	6583	6833
R2	0.176	0.175	0.174	0.176	0.173	0.169	0.162	0.157
Mean Dep. var.	5.147	5.132	5.102	5.108	5.092	5.146	5.154	5.161

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B16: The effect of invasion on immigration makes place better.

	Immigration makes place better							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.119							
	(0.0954)							
14 days		0.112						
		(0.0753)						
21 days			0.144**					
			(0.0679)					
28 days				0.144**				
				(0.0636)				
31 days					0.128**			
					(0.0627)			
40 days						0.0546		
						(0.0605)		
50 days							0.0129	
							(0.0594)	
60 days								-0.00598
								(0.0595)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4467	4918	5431	5782	5911	6233	6555	6804
R2	0.153	0.157	0.155	0.155	0.151	0.155	0.154	0.155
Mean Dep. var.	4.724	4.744	4.740	4.765	4.757	4.812	4.812	4.803

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table B17: The effect of invasion on loyalty toward leader.

	Loyalty toward leader							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7 days	0.119**							
	(0.0481)							
14 days		0.0798**						
		(0.0383)						
21 days			0.0595*					
			(0.0341)					
28 days				0.0542*				
				(0.0317)				
31 days					0.0414			
					(0.0312)			
40 days						0.0216		
						(0.0302)		
50 days							0.0188	
							(0.0299)	
60 days								0.00883
								(0.0299)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	4445	4892	5389	5741	5871	6189	6514	6762
R2	0.165	0.167	0.160	0.168	0.164	0.162	0.164	0.163
Mean Dep. var.	3.329	3.289	3.275	3.288	3.284	3.232	3.196	3.170

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

C Analysis of each attitude

Table C1: The effect of invasion on government protects people from poverty.

	Government protects people from poverty									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.246***	0.103	0.124	0.126	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.0870	0.170*
	(0.0855)	(0.0827)	(0.0825)	(0.0834)	(0.0835)	(0.0772)	(0.121)	(0.0902)	(0.0617)	(0.0958)
Education			0.0307**	0.00280	0.00463	0.00463	0.00463	0.00463	0.00389	0.0114
			(0.0124)	(0.0137)	(0.0138)	(0.0168)	(0.0142)	(0.0145)	(0.0106)	(0.0164)
Age			0.00466*	0.00451	0.00452	0.00452	0.00452	0.00452	0.00349	0.00517
			(0.00254)	(0.00329)	(0.00329)	(0.00337)	(0.00393)	(0.00324)	(0.00251)	(0.00386)
Female			0.0447	0.0249	0.0217	0.0217	0.0217	0.0217	0.0121	0.0888
			(0.0827)	(0.0838)	(0.0839)	(0.0809)	(0.107)	(0.0830)	(0.0633)	(0.0961)
Income difficulties				-0.370***	-0.375***	-0.375***	-0.375***	-0.375***	-0.289***	-0.323***
				(0.0612)	(0.0615)	(0.0720)	(0.0808)	(0.0608)	(0.0472)	(0.0693)
Income: Self-employment				-0.551***	-0.540***	-0.540***	-0.540***	-0.540***	-0.435***	-0.599***
				(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.152)	(0.141)	(0.138)	(0.0965)	(0.139)
Income: Farming				-0.471*	-0.451	-0.451	-0.451	-0.451	-0.301	-0.624**
				(0.286)	(0.287)	(0.296)	(0.385)	(0.319)	(0.230)	(0.295)
Income: Pensions				-0.129	-0.0936	-0.0936	-0.0936	-0.0936	-0.0956	-0.167
				(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.133)	(0.210)	(0.150)	(0.109)	(0.160)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.166	-0.115	-0.115	-0.115	-0.115	-0.277	0.0190
				(0.636)	(0.634)	(0.736)	(0.596)	(0.583)	(0.443)	(0.830)
Income: Other benefits				-0.0920	-0.118	-0.118	-0.118	-0.118	-0.0919	-0.516*
				(0.278)	(0.276)	(0.244)	(0.346)	(0.280)	(0.213)	(0.285)
Income: Investments				0.134	0.145	0.145	0.145	0.145	0.0834	0.117
				(0.301)	(0.301)	(0.291)	(0.158)	(0.294)	(0.224)	(0.329)
Other income sources				0.0332	0.0462	0.0462	0.0462	0.0462	-0.112	-0.142
				(0.303)	(0.303)	(0.353)	(0.258)	(0.303)	(0.201)	(0.334)
Born in country					-0.421***	-0.421**	-0.421***	-0.421***	-0.338***	-0.133
					(0.155)	(0.161)	(0.134)	(0.157)	(0.117)	(0.207)
Urban resident					-0.0246	-0.0246	-0.0246	-0.0246	-0.106	-0.0119
					(0.0947)	(0.113)	(0.213)	(0.112)	(0.0714)	(0.110)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5138	5138	5079	4959	4954	4954	4954	4954	4954	3839
R2	0.00143	0.110	0.114	0.128	0.130	0.130	0.130	0.130		0.0491
Mean Dep. var.	4.013	4.158	4.183	4.176	4.180	4.180	4.180	4.180	4.180	3.910

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C2: The effect of invasion on government should reduce income differences.

	Government should reduce income differences									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	-0.0624*	-0.0729**	-0.0693**	-0.0689**	-0.0686**	-0.0686	-0.0686	-0.0686*	-0.150**	-0.0812**
	(0.0320)	(0.0322)	(0.0325)	(0.0326)	(0.0326)	(0.0422)	(0.0568)	(0.0368)	(0.0698)	(0.0369)
Education			0.00343	-0.00513	-0.00305	-0.00305	-0.00305	-0.00305	-0.00411	-0.00137
			(0.00493)	(0.00525)	(0.00527)	(0.00536)	(0.00816)	(0.00593)	(0.0109)	(0.00620)
Age			-0.000150	-0.000234	-0.000346	-0.000346	-0.000346	-0.000346	0.000423	0.00106
			(0.000959)	(0.00121)	(0.00122)	(0.00114)	(0.00153)	(0.00111)	(0.00253)	(0.00138)
Female			-0.0731**	-0.0725**	-0.0706**	-0.0706**	-0.0706**	-0.0706**	-0.156**	-0.0403
			(0.0327)	(0.0331)	(0.0332)	(0.0308)	(0.0300)	(0.0320)	(0.0701)	(0.0378)
Income difficulties				-0.141***	-0.142***	-0.142***	-0.142***	-0.142***	-0.312***	-0.144***
				(0.0224)	(0.0223)	(0.0238)	(0.0482)	(0.0242)	(0.0482)	(0.0248)
Income: Self-employment				-0.0945*	-0.0989*	-0.0989*	-0.0989*	-0.0989*	-0.213*	-0.132**
				(0.0516)	(0.0515)	(0.0542)	(0.0550)	(0.0528)	(0.114)	(0.0543)
Income: Farming				-0.0451	-0.0690	-0.0690	-0.0690	-0.0690	-0.104	-0.0354
				(0.0925)	(0.0935)	(0.102)	(0.110)	(0.0889)	(0.213)	(0.0954)
Income: Pensions				-0.00867	0.00337	0.00337	0.00337	0.00337	-0.0403	0.00406
				(0.0533)	(0.0536)	(0.0433)	(0.0604)	(0.0486)	(0.114)	(0.0595)
Income: Unemployment benefit				0.111	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.0461	0.350
				(0.239)	(0.234)	(0.187)	(0.254)	(0.248)	(0.589)	(0.267)
Income: Other benefits				0.0640	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.0702	0.200	0.152
				(0.126)	(0.128)	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.238)	(0.160)
Income: Investments				0.0782	0.0904	0.0904	0.0904	0.0904	0.231	-0.00272
				(0.206)	(0.211)	(0.195)	(0.270)	(0.204)	(0.504)	(0.225)
Other income sources				-0.173*	-0.158*	-0.158**	-0.158	-0.158*	-0.329	-0.114
				(0.0899)	(0.0891)	(0.0723)	(0.0952)	(0.0849)	(0.208)	(0.0964)
Born in country					-0.0764	-0.0764	-0.0764	-0.0764	-0.111	-0.0440
					(0.0663)	(0.0681)	(0.0575)	(0.0708)	(0.135)	(0.0898)
Urban resident					-0.0893**	-0.0893*	-0.0893	-0.0893*	-0.165**	-0.114***
					(0.0371)	(0.0511)	(0.109)	(0.0533)	(0.0792)	(0.0426)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5120	5120	5061	4935	4931	4931	4931	4931	4931	3798
R2	0.000736	0.0580	0.0587	0.0706	0.0731	0.0731	0.0731	0.0731		0.0566
Mean Dep. var.	1.965	1.952	1.959	1.951	1.952	1.952	1.952	1.952	1.952	1.903

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C3: The effect of invasion on immigration makes place better.

	Immigration makes place better									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.146*	0.0946	0.106	0.130*	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.0790	0.142*
	(0.0777)	(0.0771)	(0.0754)	(0.0761)	(0.0753)	(0.0977)	(0.0916)	(0.0817)	(0.0636)	(0.0858)
Education			0.0728***	0.0579***	0.0648***	0.0648***	0.0648***	0.0648***	0.0612***	0.0348**
			(0.0117)	(0.0127)	(0.0126)	(0.0120)	(0.0137)	(0.0125)	(0.0106)	(0.0147)
Age			-0.0147***	-0.0119***	-0.0119***	-0.0119***	-0.0119***	-0.0119***	-0.00931***	-0.0179***
			(0.00233)	(0.00296)	(0.00291)	(0.00316)	(0.00310)	(0.00319)	(0.00248)	(0.00336)
Female			0.121	0.118	0.125	0.125*	0.125	0.125	0.105	0.159*
			(0.0759)	(0.0770)	(0.0764)	(0.0668)	(0.0843)	(0.0825)	(0.0652)	(0.0874)
Income difficulties				-0.233***	-0.260***	-0.260***	-0.260**	-0.260***	-0.178***	-0.317***
				(0.0545)	(0.0540)	(0.0572)	(0.109)	(0.0587)	(0.0470)	(0.0604)
Income: Self-employment				-0.444***	-0.423***	-0.423***	-0.423***	-0.423***	-0.385***	-0.406***
				(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.0800)	(0.122)	(0.105)	(0.132)
Income: Farming				0.136	0.101	0.101	0.101	0.101	0.0917	0.0316
				(0.232)	(0.233)	(0.263)	(0.279)	(0.252)	(0.192)	(0.249)
Income: Pensions				-0.216*	-0.106	-0.106	-0.106	-0.106	-0.0890	-0.107
				(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.112)	(0.104)	(0.125)	(0.103)	(0.136)
Income: Unemployment benefit				0.200	0.359	0.359	0.359	0.359	0.346	0.213
				(0.364)	(0.362)	(0.405)	(0.358)	(0.366)	(0.283)	(0.450)
Income: Other benefits				0.392	0.354	0.354	0.354**	0.354	0.285	0.245
				(0.286)	(0.274)	(0.274)	(0.176)	(0.264)	(0.248)	(0.312)
Income: Investments				-0.742**	-0.703**	-0.703**	-0.703***	-0.703**	-0.685***	-0.603
				(0.310)	(0.326)	(0.308)	(0.200)	(0.327)	(0.263)	(0.391)
Other income sources				0.415*	0.491**	0.491**	0.491**	0.491**	0.426**	0.545**
				(0.224)	(0.220)	(0.238)	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.202)	(0.231)
Born in country					-1.268***	-1.268***	-1.268***	-1.268***	-1.124***	-1.534***
					(0.146)	(0.166)	(0.174)	(0.146)	(0.140)	(0.187)
Urban resident					-0.312***	-0.312***	-0.312**	-0.312***	-0.288***	-0.458***
					(0.0866)	(0.0846)	(0.123)	(0.0937)	(0.0739)	(0.100)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5102	5102	5044	4923	4918	4918	4918	4918	4918	3809
R2	0.000602	0.0833	0.122	0.133	0.157	0.157	0.157	0.157		0.105
Mean Dep. var.	4.671	4.741	4.740	4.736	4.744	4.744	4.744	4.744	4.744	4.442

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C4: The effect of invasion on immigration good for culture.

	Immigration good for culture									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.378***	0.315***	0.324***	0.328***	0.316***	0.316***	0.316***	0.316***	0.222***	0.378***
	(0.0846)	(0.0825)	(0.0815)	(0.0824)	(0.0817)	(0.0943)	(0.116)	(0.0835)	(0.0645)	(0.0924)
Education			0.0705***	0.0679***	0.0729***	0.0729***	0.0729***	0.0729***	0.0617***	0.0536***
			(0.0121)	(0.0134)	(0.0133)	(0.0127)	(0.0145)	(0.0136)	(0.0108)	(0.0156)
Age			-0.0158***	-0.0172***	-0.0173***	-0.0173***	-0.0173***	-0.0173***	-0.0125***	-0.0218***
			(0.00245)	(0.00308)	(0.00306)	(0.00356)	(0.00282)	(0.00354)	(0.00247)	(0.00353)
Female			0.0849	0.105	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.0937	0.0945
			(0.0815)	(0.0827)	(0.0821)	(0.0735)	(0.0940)	(0.0919)	(0.0655)	(0.0930)
Income difficulties				-0.139**	-0.166***	-0.166**	-0.166	-0.166**	-0.0898*	-0.236***
				(0.0600)	(0.0593)	(0.0670)	(0.146)	(0.0667)	(0.0475)	(0.0667)
Income: Self-employment				-0.0817	-0.0599	-0.0599	-0.0599	-0.0599	-0.0507	-0.111
				(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.127)	(0.103)	(0.137)
Income: Farming				0.314	0.279	0.279	0.279	0.279	0.232	0.155
				(0.286)	(0.294)	(0.341)	(0.297)	(0.305)	(0.221)	(0.313)
Income: Pensions				0.125	0.229*	0.229	0.229**	0.229*	0.172	0.230
				(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.162)	(0.113)	(0.139)	(0.109)	(0.152)
Income: Unemployment benefit				0.0894	0.253	0.253	0.253	0.253	0.193	0.651
				(0.468)	(0.458)	(0.527)	(0.506)	(0.481)	(0.389)	(0.480)
Income: Other benefits				0.286	0.238	0.238	0.238	0.238	0.233	0.0194
				(0.329)	(0.317)	(0.326)	(0.248)	(0.319)	(0.270)	(0.356)
Income: Investments				-1.174***	-1.012**	-1.012***	-1.012***	-1.012**	-0.805***	-0.790**
				(0.405)	(0.413)	(0.364)	(0.355)	(0.409)	(0.286)	(0.400)
Other income sources				0.368	0.450*	0.450**	0.450*	0.450**	0.266	0.569**
				(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.179)	(0.254)	(0.204)	(0.184)	(0.247)
Born in country					-1.210***	-1.210***	-1.210***	-1.210***	-0.973***	-1.577***
					(0.139)	(0.159)	(0.194)	(0.140)	(0.121)	(0.179)
Urban resident					-0.291***	-0.291***	-0.291**	-0.291***	-0.220***	-0.447***
					(0.0922)	(0.0973)	(0.143)	(0.101)	(0.0723)	(0.106)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5134	5134	5075	4948	4943	4943	4943	4943	4943	3826
R2	0.00344	0.120	0.153	0.157	0.175	0.175	0.175	0.175		0.123
Mean Dep. var.	4.989	5.133	5.134	5.125	5.132	5.132	5.132	5.132	5.132	4.775

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C5: The effect of invasion on more immigration from poorer and non-EU.

	More immigration from poorer and non-EU									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	-0.0411	-0.00223	0.000447	-0.00858	-0.00299	-0.00299	-0.00299	-0.00299	0.0102	0.00468
	(0.0334)	(0.0294)	(0.0290)	(0.0294)	(0.0292)	(0.0321)	(0.0510)	(0.0320)	(0.0686)	(0.0335)
Education			-0.0218***	-0.0184***	-0.0183***	-0.0183***	-0.0183***	-0.0183***	-0.0456***	-0.0115*
			(0.00450)	(0.00496)	(0.00488)	(0.00482)	(0.00642)	(0.00482)	(0.0116)	(0.00586)
Age			0.00649***	0.00648***	0.00643***	0.00643***	0.00643***	0.00643***	0.0150***	0.00766***
			(0.000893)	(0.00109)	(0.00109)	(0.00119)	(0.00138)	(0.00123)	(0.00253)	(0.00129)
Female			-0.0195	-0.0252	-0.0286	-0.0286	-0.0286	-0.0286	-0.0493	-0.0281
			(0.0290)	(0.0296)	(0.0294)	(0.0286)	(0.0319)	(0.0327)	(0.0693)	(0.0338)
Income difficulties				0.0388*	0.0463**	0.0463**	0.0463	0.0463**	0.104**	0.0696***
				(0.0208)	(0.0207)	(0.0217)	(0.0417)	(0.0233)	(0.0501)	(0.0235)
Income: Self-employment				0.0588	0.0473	0.0473	0.0473	0.0473	0.115	0.0441
				(0.0511)	(0.0510)	(0.0492)	(0.0473)	(0.0502)	(0.118)	(0.0544)
Income: Farming				0.106	0.0920	0.0920	0.0920	0.0920	0.260	0.133
				(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.0949)	(0.103)	(0.245)	(0.111)
Income: Pensions				0.0314	0.00362	0.00362	0.00362	0.00362	-0.00236	0.00600
				(0.0459)	(0.0459)	(0.0368)	(0.0405)	(0.0448)	(0.107)	(0.0510)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.0322	-0.0775	-0.0775	-0.0775	-0.0775	-0.236	-0.0873
				(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.199)	(0.246)	(0.226)	(0.478)	(0.273)
Income: Other benefits				0.103	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.125	0.261	0.154
				(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.0947)	(0.0851)	(0.105)	(0.249)	(0.130)
Income: Investments				0.387***	0.391**	0.391**	0.391***	0.391**	0.888**	0.444**
				(0.143)	(0.157)	(0.155)	(0.107)	(0.157)	(0.429)	(0.191)
Other income sources				0.131	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.239	0.0966
				(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.0934)	(0.0849)	(0.0895)	(0.241)	(0.112)
Born in country					0.363***	0.363***	0.363***	0.363***	0.827***	0.501***
					(0.0537)	(0.0464)	(0.0852)	(0.0482)	(0.131)	(0.0724)
Urban resident					0.00620	0.00620	0.00620	0.00620	-0.00207	0.0232
					(0.0330)	(0.0371)	(0.0952)	(0.0415)	(0.0799)	(0.0386)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5120	5120	5061	4934	4930	4930	4930	4930	4930	3817
R2	0.000291	0.257	0.288	0.290	0.300	0.300	0.300	0.300		0.262
Mean Dep. var.	2.698	2.664	2.668	2.676	2.675	2.675	2.675	2.675	2.675	2.816

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C6: The effect of invasion on more immigration from non-majority group.

	More immigration from non-majority group									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	-0.0540	-0.0245	-0.0226	-0.0285	-0.0243	-0.0243	-0.0243	-0.0243	-0.0363	-0.0219
	(0.0329)	(0.0296)	(0.0291)	(0.0294)	(0.0291)	(0.0332)	(0.0550)	(0.0324)	(0.0686)	(0.0336)
Education			-0.0264***	-0.0219***	-0.0207***	-0.0207***	-0.0207***	-0.0207***	-0.0508***	-0.0159***
			(0.00442)	(0.00485)	(0.00482)	(0.00488)	(0.00721)	(0.00529)	(0.0118)	(0.00581)
Age			0.00669***	0.00590***	0.00577***	0.00577***	0.00577***	0.00577***	0.0137***	0.00664***
			(0.000866)	(0.00108)	(0.00107)	(0.00121)	(0.00152)	(0.00124)	(0.00254)	(0.00127)
Female			0.00933	0.00446	0.00362	0.00362	0.00362	0.00362	0.0225	0.00510
			(0.0290)	(0.0297)	(0.0294)	(0.0273)	(0.0286)	(0.0321)	(0.0694)	(0.0340)
Income difficulties				0.0735***	0.0799***	0.0799***	0.0799**	0.0799***	0.193***	0.0972***
				(0.0206)	(0.0204)	(0.0237)	(0.0359)	(0.0240)	(0.0482)	(0.0230)
Income: Self-employment				0.0426	0.0291	0.0291	0.0291	0.0291	0.0354	0.0123
				(0.0500)	(0.0494)	(0.0516)	(0.0586)	(0.0484)	(0.114)	(0.0529)
Income: Farming				0.117	0.0774	0.0774	0.0774	0.0774	0.223	0.101
				(0.0953)	(0.0940)	(0.0771)	(0.0896)	(0.0880)	(0.215)	(0.0979)
Income: Pensions				0.0480	0.0265	0.0265	0.0265	0.0265	0.0494	0.0249
				(0.0466)	(0.0463)	(0.0375)	(0.0504)	(0.0441)	(0.109)	(0.0520)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.251	-0.287	-0.287	-0.287	-0.287	-0.719	-0.327
				(0.205)	(0.203)	(0.194)	(0.247)	(0.244)	(0.473)	(0.261)
Income: Other benefits				-0.0280	0.00860	0.00860	0.00860	0.00860	0.0564	0.0124
				(0.0909)	(0.0916)	(0.0968)	(0.106)	(0.0928)	(0.215)	(0.111)
Income: Investments				0.305**	0.323*	0.323*	0.323**	0.323*	0.751*	0.370*
				(0.148)	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.154)	(0.168)	(0.424)	(0.198)
Other income sources				-0.0135	-0.0121	-0.0121	-0.0121	-0.0121	-0.0209	-0.0391
				(0.0908)	(0.0893)	(0.0877)	(0.0825)	(0.0808)	(0.204)	(0.0989)
Born in country					0.358***	0.358***	0.358***	0.358***	0.820***	0.493***
					(0.0560)	(0.0448)	(0.0791)	(0.0547)	(0.138)	(0.0782)
Urban resident					-0.0755**	-0.0755*	-0.0755	-0.0755*	-0.193**	-0.0800**
					(0.0332)	(0.0381)	(0.0968)	(0.0411)	(0.0798)	(0.0389)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5120	5120	5061	4933	4929	4929	4929	4929	4929	3813
R2	0.000505	0.239	0.278	0.283	0.295	0.295	0.295	0.295		0.243
Mean Dep. var.	2.660	2.627	2.632	2.641	2.640	2.640	2.640	2.640	2.640	2.786

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C7: The effect of invasion on immigration good for economy.

	Immigration good for economy									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.255***	0.150*	0.161**	0.176**	0.160*	0.160*	0.160	0.160*	0.0944	0.211**
	(0.0844)	(0.0825)	(0.0817)	(0.0826)	(0.0821)	(0.0890)	(0.165)	(0.0877)	(0.0641)	(0.0935)
Education			0.0784***	0.0665***	0.0701***	0.0701***	0.0701***	0.0701***	0.0596***	0.0556***
			(0.0122)	(0.0132)	(0.0131)	(0.0112)	(0.0159)	(0.0127)	(0.0106)	(0.0154)
Age			-0.0116***	-0.00884***	-0.00888***	-0.00888**	-0.00888**	-0.00888***	-0.00666***	-0.0138***
			(0.00245)	(0.00315)	(0.00313)	(0.00392)	(0.00380)	(0.00326)	(0.00248)	(0.00362)
Female			-0.0900	-0.0798	-0.0741	-0.0741	-0.0741	-0.0741	-0.0745	0.0349
			(0.0814)	(0.0827)	(0.0822)	(0.0802)	(0.0833)	(0.0786)	(0.0646)	(0.0941)
Income difficulties				-0.153**	-0.177***	-0.177**	-0.177	-0.177***	-0.117**	-0.204***
				(0.0608)	(0.0604)	(0.0713)	(0.111)	(0.0681)	(0.0483)	(0.0684)
Income: Self-employment				-0.192	-0.169	-0.169	-0.169	-0.169	-0.167	-0.247*
				(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.107)	(0.127)	(0.112)	(0.103)	(0.143)
Income: Farming				0.289	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.219	0.241
				(0.294)	(0.295)	(0.314)	(0.346)	(0.322)	(0.212)	(0.315)
Income: Pensions				-0.213	-0.116	-0.116	-0.116	-0.116	-0.100	-0.149
				(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.142)	(0.108)	(0.142)	(0.109)	(0.150)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.0412	0.106	0.106	0.106	0.106	0.0525	0.175
				(0.415)	(0.406)	(0.401)	(0.414)	(0.399)	(0.285)	(0.529)
Income: Other benefits				-0.0392	-0.0854	-0.0854	-0.0854	-0.0854	-0.0333	-0.0817
				(0.394)	(0.397)	(0.459)	(0.297)	(0.419)	(0.315)	(0.457)
Income: Investments				-1.629***	-1.612***	-1.612***	-1.612***	-1.612***	-1.223***	-1.596***
				(0.449)	(0.505)	(0.477)	(0.254)	(0.508)	(0.399)	(0.574)
Other income sources				0.236	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.219	0.384
				(0.241)	(0.242)	(0.267)	(0.296)	(0.250)	(0.174)	(0.260)
Born in country					-1.166***	-1.166***	-1.166***	-1.166***	-1.002***	-1.460***
					(0.162)	(0.142)	(0.190)	(0.147)	(0.136)	(0.212)
Urban resident					-0.195**	-0.195*	-0.195	-0.195*	-0.162**	-0.386***
					(0.0927)	(0.101)	(0.171)	(0.102)	(0.0734)	(0.107)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5117	5117	5058	4933	4928	4928	4928	4928	4928	3812
R2	0.00161	0.113	0.141	0.147	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164		0.110
Mean Dep. var.	4.717	4.844	4.847	4.843	4.850	4.850	4.850	4.850	4.850	4.505

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C8: The effect of invasion on more EU unification.

	More EU unification									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.131	0.240***	0.238***	0.232***	0.226***	0.226**	0.226*	0.226**	0.159**	0.202**
	(0.0873)	(0.0864)	(0.0858)	(0.0870)	(0.0870)	(0.0950)	(0.114)	(0.0911)	(0.0658)	(0.0986)
Education			0.0646***	0.0638***	0.0652***	0.0652***	0.0652***	0.0652***	0.0508***	0.0538***
			(0.0135)	(0.0147)	(0.0149)	(0.0129)	(0.0146)	(0.0151)	(0.0114)	(0.0176)
Age			-0.0101***	-0.0128***	-0.0127***	-0.0127***	-0.0127***	-0.0127***	-0.00883***	-0.0189***
			(0.00256)	(0.00332)	(0.00333)	(0.00321)	(0.00423)	(0.00346)	(0.00252)	(0.00385)
Female			-0.167*	-0.127	-0.124	-0.124	-0.124	-0.124	-0.118*	-0.113
			(0.0862)	(0.0879)	(0.0881)	(0.0749)	(0.0833)	(0.0853)	(0.0667)	(0.100)
Income difficulties				-0.165***	-0.178***	-0.178**	-0.178***	-0.178**	-0.102**	-0.209***
				(0.0635)	(0.0635)	(0.0793)	(0.0659)	(0.0759)	(0.0485)	(0.0711)
Income: Self-employment				-0.135	-0.129	-0.129	-0.129	-0.129	-0.0888	-0.0966
				(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.114)	(0.161)
Income: Farming				0.478**	0.477**	0.477**	0.477*	0.477**	0.408**	0.445*
				(0.222)	(0.221)	(0.234)	(0.257)	(0.223)	(0.172)	(0.236)
Income: Pensions				0.165	0.205	0.205	0.205*	0.205	0.152	0.226
				(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.140)	(0.122)	(0.144)	(0.111)	(0.163)
Income: Unemployment benefit				0.339	0.420	0.420	0.420	0.420	0.373	0.713
				(0.397)	(0.396)	(0.457)	(0.517)	(0.403)	(0.267)	(0.518)
Income: Other benefits				0.387	0.354	0.354	0.354	0.354	0.211	0.214
				(0.364)	(0.359)	(0.363)	(0.363)	(0.355)	(0.294)	(0.423)
Income: Investments				-0.650	-0.663	-0.663	-0.663	-0.663	-0.634*	-0.883*
				(0.523)	(0.470)	(0.465)	(0.398)	(0.479)	(0.342)	(0.481)
Other income sources				-0.338	-0.311	-0.311	-0.311	-0.311	-0.277	-0.291
				(0.266)	(0.271)	(0.237)	(0.398)	(0.241)	(0.194)	(0.298)
Born in country					-0.583***	-0.583***	-0.583**	-0.583***	-0.408***	-1.066***
					(0.173)	(0.164)	(0.258)	(0.186)	(0.131)	(0.232)
Urban resident					-0.114	-0.114	-0.114	-0.114	-0.0450	-0.209*
					(0.0976)	(0.126)	(0.152)	(0.106)	(0.0729)	(0.112)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	4877	4877	4822	4698	4693	4693	4693	4693	4693	3647
R2	0.000420	0.0787	0.102	0.108	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.112		0.118
Mean Dep. var.	5.267	5.253	5.248	5.247	5.249	5.249	5.249	5.249	5.249	5.125

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C9: The effect of invasion on join the EU.

	Join the EU									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	-0.103***	0.0197	0.0300	0.0258	0.0295	0.0295	0.0295	0.0295	0.285	-0.00695
	(0.0347)	(0.0264)	(0.0260)	(0.0267)	(0.0258)	(0.0187)	(0.0316)	(0.0217)	(0.259)	(0.0238)
Education			0.00614	0.00600	0.00618	0.00618	0.00618	0.00618	0.0575	0.000987
			(0.00449)	(0.00503)	(0.00504)	(0.00436)	(0.00554)	(0.00506)	(0.0462)	(0.00504)
Age			0.0000878	-0.000221	-0.000170	-0.000170	-0.000170	-0.000170	-0.00169	-0.000750
			(0.000742)	(0.000863)	(0.000878)	(0.000772)	(0.000717)	(0.000800)	(0.00893)	(0.000565)
Female			0.0299	0.0269	0.0297	0.0297	0.0297	0.0297	0.269	0.00522
			(0.0260)	(0.0263)	(0.0261)	(0.0271)	(0.0191)	(0.0233)	(0.256)	(0.0236)
Income difficulties				-0.00991	-0.0107	-0.0107	-0.0107	-0.0107	-0.133	-0.0121
				(0.0175)	(0.0176)	(0.0224)	(0.0155)	(0.0186)	(0.181)	(0.0171)
Income: Self-employment				0.00463	0.000441	0.000441	0.000441	0.000441	0.0360	-0.00103
				(0.0478)	(0.0472)	(0.0437)	(0.0412)	(0.0454)	(0.455)	(0.0304)
Income: Farming				-0.0540	-0.0656	-0.0656	-0.0656	-0.0656	-0.655	-0.0628
				(0.0701)	(0.0702)	(0.0658)	(0.0399)	(0.0616)	(0.569)	(0.0805)
Income: Pensions				0.0248	0.0228	0.0228	0.0228	0.0228	0.210	-0.00418
				(0.0392)	(0.0386)	(0.0382)	(0.0468)	(0.0405)	(0.415)	(0.0344)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.0709	-0.0842	-0.0842	-0.0842	-0.0842	-0.613	-0.635***
				(0.427)	(0.430)	(0.426)	(0.434)	(0.434)	(3.360)	(0.238)
Income: Other benefits				0.0438	0.0540	0.0540	0.0540	0.0540	0.485	0.132***
				(0.0481)	(0.0536)	(0.0652)	(0.0736)	(0.0555)	(0.555)	(0.0398)
Income: Investments				-0.0947	-0.0985	-0.0985	-0.0985	-0.0985	-0.716	0.0883***
				(0.0799)	(0.0844)	(0.0853)	(0.0807)	(0.0859)	(0.638)	(0.0342)
Other income sources				0.0994*	0.105**	0.105**	0.105**	0.105**	1.244*	0.0867***
				(0.0519)	(0.0524)	(0.0421)	(0.0466)	(0.0407)	(0.665)	(0.0270)
Born in country					0.0400	0.0400	0.0400	0.0400	0.312	0.0735
					(0.0592)	(0.0691)	(0.0462)	(0.0648)	(0.531)	(0.0824)
Urban resident					-0.0256	-0.0256	-0.0256	-0.0256	-0.251	-0.0675**
					(0.0288)	(0.0260)	(0.0310)	(0.0291)	(0.280)	(0.0280)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	1396	1396	1387	1370	1369	1369	1369	1369	1369	1082
R2	0.00738	0.514	0.529	0.525	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.526		0.0588
Mean Dep. var.	0.756	0.674	0.676	0.681	0.682	0.682	0.682	0.682	0.682	0.917

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C10: The effect of invasion on leave the EU.

	Leave the EU									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	-0.00642	-0.0217	-0.0254*	-0.0297**	-0.0295*	-0.0295	-0.0295	-0.0295*	-0.275*	-0.0356**
	(0.0143)	(0.0150)	(0.0149)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0180)	(0.0240)	(0.0154)	(0.144)	(0.0173)
Education			-0.00369	-0.00193	-0.00182	-0.00182	-0.00182	-0.00182	-0.0160	-0.00150
			(0.00245)	(0.00276)	(0.00278)	(0.00245)	(0.00276)	(0.00280)	(0.0248)	(0.00336)
Age			0.000854*	0.00117**	0.00117**	0.00117**	0.00117*	0.00117**	0.0109*	0.00145**
			(0.000468)	(0.000593)	(0.000595)	(0.000579)	(0.000608)	(0.000585)	(0.00562)	(0.000704)
Female			-0.00714	-0.00224	-0.00193	-0.00193	-0.00193	-0.00193	-0.0203	-0.00926
			(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0152)	(0.0226)	(0.0156)	(0.0177)	(0.139)	(0.0173)
Income difficulties				0.0184	0.0187	0.0187*	0.0187	0.0187*	0.178*	0.0194
				(0.0115)	(0.0115)	(0.0103)	(0.0148)	(0.0110)	(0.105)	(0.0133)
Income: Self-employment				0.0319	0.0321	0.0321	0.0321	0.0321	0.288	0.0340
				(0.0253)	(0.0255)	(0.0246)	(0.0249)	(0.0250)	(0.209)	(0.0276)
Income: Farming				-0.0494	-0.0509*	-0.0509	-0.0509	-0.0509*	-0.528	-0.0487
				(0.0308)	(0.0309)	(0.0309)	(0.0367)	(0.0307)	(0.371)	(0.0323)
Income: Pensions				-0.0118	-0.0127	-0.0127	-0.0127	-0.0127	-0.124	-0.0166
				(0.0245)	(0.0245)	(0.0250)	(0.0132)	(0.0266)	(0.213)	(0.0273)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.103***	-0.104***	-0.104***	-0.104***	-0.104***	-1.618*	-0.112**
				(0.0353)	(0.0350)	(0.0360)	(0.0380)	(0.0358)	(0.964)	(0.0437)
Income: Other benefits				-0.0434	-0.0441	-0.0441	-0.0441	-0.0441	-0.401	-0.0272
				(0.0629)	(0.0632)	(0.0594)	(0.0715)	(0.0608)	(0.605)	(0.0835)
Income: Investments				-0.0374	-0.0370	-0.0370	-0.0370	-0.0370	-0.376	-0.0316
				(0.0605)	(0.0607)	(0.0609)	(0.0856)	(0.0599)	(0.725)	(0.0660)
Other income sources				-0.00394	-0.00383	-0.00383	-0.00383	-0.00383	-0.0752	0.00221
				(0.0475)	(0.0474)	(0.0486)	(0.0428)	(0.0480)	(0.500)	(0.0519)
Born in country					0.00951	0.00951	0.00951	0.00951	0.119	-0.00572
					(0.0337)	(0.0366)	(0.0315)	(0.0352)	(0.328)	(0.0478)
Urban resident					-0.00123	-0.00123	-0.00123	-0.00123	-0.0191	0.00550
					(0.0165)	(0.0154)	(0.0214)	(0.0153)	(0.159)	(0.0196)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	3054	3054	3012	2931	2930	2930	2930	2930	2930	2220
R2	0.0000642	0.0165	0.0212	0.0247	0.0249	0.0249	0.0249	0.0249		0.0207
Mean Dep. var.	0.127	0.133	0.130	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.138

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$

Table C11: The effect of invasion on emotionally attached to the EU.

	Emotionally attached to the EU									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.0978	0.0339	0.0610	0.0730	0.0684	0.0684	0.0684	0.0684	0.0310	0.0558
	(0.0837)	(0.0829)	(0.0815)	(0.0825)	(0.0825)	(0.0735)	(0.148)	(0.0816)	(0.0638)	(0.0952)
Education			0.104***	0.0995***	0.104***	0.104***	0.104***	0.104***	0.0803***	0.0967***
			(0.0125)	(0.0135)	(0.0137)	(0.0127)	(0.0138)	(0.0148)	(0.0108)	(0.0166)
Age			-0.00882***	-0.0116***	-0.0118***	-0.0118***	-0.0118**	-0.0118***	-0.00840***	-0.0187***
			(0.00244)	(0.00312)	(0.00313)	(0.00298)	(0.00447)	(0.00325)	(0.00246)	(0.00367)
Female			-0.0531	-0.0594	-0.0552	-0.0552	-0.0552	-0.0552	-0.0303	-0.0434
			(0.0816)	(0.0827)	(0.0827)	(0.0948)	(0.0755)	(0.0774)	(0.0646)	(0.0956)
Income difficulties				-0.123**	-0.136**	-0.136*	-0.136	-0.136**	-0.113**	-0.135**
				(0.0590)	(0.0591)	(0.0723)	(0.0848)	(0.0686)	(0.0462)	(0.0661)
Income: Self-employment				-0.201	-0.211	-0.211*	-0.211	-0.211*	-0.223**	-0.258*
				(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.123)	(0.136)	(0.123)	(0.107)	(0.145)
Income: Farming				-0.258	-0.322	-0.322	-0.322	-0.322	-0.237	-0.292
				(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.217)	(0.352)	(0.268)	(0.217)	(0.297)
Income: Pensions				0.151	0.190	0.190	0.190	0.190	0.142	0.206
				(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.115)	(0.128)	(0.106)	(0.153)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.974***	-0.904**	-0.904**	-0.904**	-0.904**	-0.682***	-1.151***
				(0.355)	(0.363)	(0.343)	(0.366)	(0.366)	(0.246)	(0.420)
Income: Other benefits				0.206	0.244	0.244	0.244	0.244	0.257	0.254
				(0.308)	(0.309)	(0.369)	(0.354)	(0.311)	(0.256)	(0.373)
Income: Investments				0.250	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.107	-0.0215
				(0.368)	(0.364)	(0.403)	(0.527)	(0.352)	(0.302)	(0.375)
Other income sources				-0.167	-0.108	-0.108	-0.108	-0.108	-0.105	-0.0666
				(0.272)	(0.273)	(0.280)	(0.277)	(0.288)	(0.226)	(0.294)
Born in country					-0.309**	-0.309*	-0.309**	-0.309*	-0.227*	-0.243
					(0.147)	(0.156)	(0.154)	(0.164)	(0.120)	(0.199)
Urban resident					-0.271***	-0.271**	-0.271	-0.271**	-0.197***	-0.389***
					(0.0948)	(0.115)	(0.183)	(0.123)	(0.0754)	(0.110)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5163	5163	5106	4975	4970	4970	4970	4970	4970	3841
R2	0.000237	0.0596	0.0958	0.103	0.107	0.107	0.107	0.107		0.0973
Mean Dep. var.	5.531	5.592	5.597	5.582	5.582	5.582	5.582	5.582	5.582	5.396

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C12: The effect of invasion on emotionally attached to country

	Emotionally attached to country									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.135*	-0.0114	0.00643	-0.00998	0.00124	0.00124	0.00124	0.00124	-0.00643	0.0105
	(0.0776)	(0.0729)	(0.0724)	(0.0733)	(0.0727)	(0.0742)	(0.107)	(0.0756)	(0.0671)	(0.0834)
Education			0.0353***	0.0300**	0.0348***	0.0348***	0.0348**	0.0348***	0.0165	0.0349**
			(0.0112)	(0.0120)	(0.0121)	(0.0119)	(0.0138)	(0.0129)	(0.0109)	(0.0144)
Age			0.0146***	0.0129***	0.0123***	0.0123***	0.0123***	0.0123***	0.0108***	0.00765**
			(0.00219)	(0.00287)	(0.00287)	(0.00264)	(0.00404)	(0.00280)	(0.00259)	(0.00336)
Female			-0.0520	-0.0368	-0.0411	-0.0411	-0.0411	-0.0411	-0.0308	-0.00986
			(0.0726)	(0.0739)	(0.0731)	(0.0756)	(0.0631)	(0.0677)	(0.0675)	(0.0837)
Income difficulties				0.00178	0.0216	0.0216	0.0216	0.0216	0.0685	0.0258
				(0.0534)	(0.0530)	(0.0679)	(0.0437)	(0.0582)	(0.0513)	(0.0601)
Income: Self-employment				0.0445	-0.00445	-0.00445	-0.00445	-0.00445	-0.0261	0.00721
				(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.173)	(0.110)	(0.103)	(0.114)
Income: Farming				-0.107	-0.250	-0.250	-0.250	-0.250	-0.124	-0.174
				(0.281)	(0.282)	(0.309)	(0.456)	(0.307)	(0.268)	(0.285)
Income: Pensions				0.0559	0.00108	0.00108	0.00108	0.00108	0.0278	0.0801
				(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.139)	(0.123)	(0.113)	(0.135)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-1.068**	-1.152***	-1.152**	-1.152**	-1.152***	-1.110***	-1.711***
				(0.454)	(0.447)	(0.470)	(0.476)	(0.428)	(0.373)	(0.476)
Income: Other benefits				-0.387	-0.276	-0.276	-0.276	-0.276	-0.350	-0.329
				(0.316)	(0.306)	(0.331)	(0.395)	(0.310)	(0.257)	(0.389)
Income: Investments				-0.160	-0.0848	-0.0848	-0.0848	-0.0848	-0.0423	-0.138
				(0.370)	(0.391)	(0.362)	(0.631)	(0.398)	(0.335)	(0.478)
Other income sources				-0.290	-0.269	-0.269	-0.269	-0.269	-0.274	-0.364
				(0.249)	(0.246)	(0.232)	(0.210)	(0.229)	(0.216)	(0.269)
Born in country					0.937***	0.937***	0.937***	0.937***	0.858***	1.567***
					(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.249)	(0.167)	(0.123)	(0.199)
Urban resident					-0.288***	-0.288***	-0.288*	-0.288***	-0.261***	-0.397***
					(0.0856)	(0.0698)	(0.145)	(0.0836)	(0.0787)	(0.0999)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5195	5195	5138	5005	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	3862
R2	0.000513	0.136	0.152	0.156	0.173	0.173	0.173	0.173		0.191
Mean Dep. var.	7.893	8.007	8.018	8.026	8.024	8.024	8.024	8.024	8.024	8.053

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C13: The effect of invasion on importance of being free.

	Importance of being free									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.0908**	0.106***	0.101***	0.117***	0.115***	0.115***	0.115**	0.115***	0.203***	0.158***
	(0.0385)	(0.0393)	(0.0386)	(0.0388)	(0.0389)	(0.0357)	(0.0544)	(0.0407)	(0.0676)	(0.0454)
Education			-0.0416***	-0.0420***	-0.0407***	-0.0407***	-0.0407***	-0.0407***	-0.0693***	-0.0432***
			(0.00574)	(0.00610)	(0.00618)	(0.00540)	(0.00656)	(0.00561)	(0.0109)	(0.00747)
Age			0.00409***	0.00437***	0.00435***	0.00435***	0.00435***	0.00435***	0.00774***	0.00416**
			(0.00116)	(0.00142)	(0.00142)	(0.00152)	(0.00145)	(0.00147)	(0.00247)	(0.00169)
Female			0.0326	0.0302	0.0313	0.0313	0.0313	0.0313	0.00781	0.0756
			(0.0387)	(0.0393)	(0.0394)	(0.0460)	(0.0320)	(0.0385)	(0.0679)	(0.0461)
Income difficulties				-0.0231	-0.0230	-0.0230	-0.0230	-0.0230	-0.0328	-0.0183
				(0.0283)	(0.0282)	(0.0300)	(0.0546)	(0.0297)	(0.0497)	(0.0319)
Income: Self-employment				-0.197***	-0.201***	-0.201**	-0.201**	-0.201***	-0.354***	-0.177***
				(0.0614)	(0.0612)	(0.0771)	(0.0763)	(0.0696)	(0.113)	(0.0685)
Income: Farming				0.0251	0.00571	0.00571	0.00571	0.00571	-0.0662	-0.0474
				(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.150)	(0.137)	(0.168)	(0.307)	(0.172)
Income: Pensions				-0.0251	-0.0252	-0.0252	-0.0252	-0.0252	-0.0880	-0.0136
				(0.0620)	(0.0624)	(0.0685)	(0.0680)	(0.0754)	(0.107)	(0.0710)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.180	-0.175	-0.175	-0.175	-0.175	-0.321	-0.0640
				(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.204)	(0.217)	(0.181)	(0.415)	(0.255)
Income: Other benefits				0.232	0.245	0.245	0.245	0.245	0.433	0.304*
				(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.149)	(0.185)	(0.163)	(0.273)	(0.184)
Income: Investments				-0.317	-0.308	-0.308	-0.308	-0.308	-0.476	-0.312
				(0.208)	(0.207)	(0.202)	(0.220)	(0.213)	(0.408)	(0.241)
Other income sources				0.0133	0.0234	0.0234	0.0234	0.0234	0.0171	0.0471
				(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.116)	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.224)	(0.140)
Born in country					0.0159	0.0159	0.0159	0.0159	0.0214	-0.0936
					(0.0679)	(0.0742)	(0.0961)	(0.0728)	(0.124)	(0.0960)
Urban resident					-0.0643	-0.0643	-0.0643	-0.0643	-0.116	-0.0292
					(0.0432)	(0.0487)	(0.0578)	(0.0464)	(0.0772)	(0.0510)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5160	5160	5102	4980	4976	4976	4976	4976	4976	3838
R2	0.00111	0.0295	0.0606	0.0659	0.0663	0.0663	0.0663	0.0663		0.0443
Mean Dep. var.	2.197	2.217	2.217	2.213	2.214	2.214	2.214	2.214	2.214	2.282

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C14: The effect of invasion on importance of democracy.

	Importance of democracy									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.156**	0.126**	0.121**	0.107*	0.107*	0.107	0.107	0.107	0.125*	0.0934
	(0.0611)	(0.0620)	(0.0619)	(0.0621)	(0.0622)	(0.0758)	(0.140)	(0.0755)	(0.0723)	(0.0726)
Education			0.0651***	0.0680***	0.0721***	0.0721***	0.0721***	0.0721***	0.0945***	0.0617***
			(0.00909)	(0.00951)	(0.00965)	(0.0107)	(0.0114)	(0.00993)	(0.0117)	(0.0113)
Age			0.00872***	0.00577**	0.00557**	0.00557**	0.00557**	0.00557**	0.00547**	0.00335
			(0.00183)	(0.00235)	(0.00234)	(0.00212)	(0.00212)	(0.00220)	(0.00269)	(0.00277)
Female			0.00816	0.0228	0.0203	0.0203	0.0203	0.0203	0.0803	0.0584
			(0.0619)	(0.0624)	(0.0624)	(0.0592)	(0.0496)	(0.0571)	(0.0729)	(0.0734)
Income difficulties				-0.0325	-0.0316	-0.0316	-0.0316	-0.0316	-0.0534	-0.0229
				(0.0458)	(0.0460)	(0.0590)	(0.0884)	(0.0558)	(0.0516)	(0.0529)
Income: Self-employment				0.0605	0.0406	0.0406	0.0406	0.0406	0.0148	0.0666
				(0.0890)	(0.0901)	(0.108)	(0.135)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.0983)
Income: Farming				0.127	0.0580	0.0580	0.0580	0.0580	0.200	0.00550
				(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.235)	(0.145)	(0.225)	(0.227)	(0.229)
Income: Pensions				0.157	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.276**	0.186
				(0.0992)	(0.0990)	(0.101)	(0.112)	(0.0991)	(0.120)	(0.115)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.123	-0.112	-0.112	-0.112	-0.112	0.0205	0.266
				(0.428)	(0.428)	(0.417)	(0.540)	(0.431)	(0.466)	(0.372)
Income: Other benefits				-0.386	-0.365	-0.365	-0.365	-0.365	-0.247	-0.492
				(0.322)	(0.326)	(0.348)	(0.384)	(0.305)	(0.306)	(0.416)
Income: Investments				0.0168	0.0582	0.0582	0.0582	0.0582	0.158	0.0359
				(0.298)	(0.306)	(0.276)	(0.514)	(0.308)	(0.446)	(0.362)
Other income sources				-0.422*	-0.393	-0.393*	-0.393*	-0.393*	-0.233	-0.596**
				(0.243)	(0.242)	(0.198)	(0.226)	(0.233)	(0.242)	(0.268)
Born in country					0.0873	0.0873	0.0873	0.0873	0.145	0.191
					(0.123)	(0.146)	(0.160)	(0.132)	(0.142)	(0.176)
Urban resident					-0.193***	-0.193**	-0.193*	-0.193**	-0.214***	-0.256***
					(0.0694)	(0.0753)	(0.107)	(0.0881)	(0.0821)	(0.0817)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5169	5169	5109	4983	4979	4979	4979	4979	4979	3850
R2	0.00116	0.0489	0.0655	0.0712	0.0739	0.0739	0.0739	0.0739		0.0708
Mean Dep. var.	8.859	8.921	8.917	8.930	8.933	8.933	8.933	8.933	8.933	8.868

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C15: The effect of invasion on loyalty toward leader.

	Loyalty toward leader									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.124***	0.0893**	0.0832**	0.0786**	0.0798**	0.0798*	0.0798	0.0798*	0.145**	0.119***
	(0.0395)	(0.0378)	(0.0379)	(0.0382)	(0.0383)	(0.0443)	(0.0674)	(0.0429)	(0.0672)	(0.0443)
Education			0.0120**	0.0128**	0.0140**	0.0140**	0.0140	0.0140*	0.0248**	0.000606
			(0.00590)	(0.00634)	(0.00640)	(0.00656)	(0.00987)	(0.00779)	(0.0110)	(0.00770)
Age			-0.00497***	-0.00396***	-0.00393***	-0.00393***	-0.00393*	-0.00393***	-0.00663***	-0.00446***
			(0.00117)	(0.00142)	(0.00143)	(0.00143)	(0.00225)	(0.00145)	(0.00248)	(0.00168)
Female			0.000745	0.0120	0.0139	0.0139	0.0139	0.0139	0.0451	0.00894
			(0.0379)	(0.0385)	(0.0386)	(0.0354)	(0.0279)	(0.0371)	(0.0680)	(0.0448)
Income difficulties				0.0709***	0.0716***	0.0716**	0.0716	0.0716**	0.136***	0.0794***
				(0.0274)	(0.0275)	(0.0333)	(0.0518)	(0.0307)	(0.0489)	(0.0305)
Income: Self-employment				0.0444	0.0409	0.0409	0.0409	0.0409	0.0472	0.0553
				(0.0641)	(0.0643)	(0.0827)	(0.0978)	(0.0761)	(0.116)	(0.0713)
Income: Farming				0.0701	0.0632	0.0632	0.0632	0.0632	0.110	0.0425
				(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.118)	(0.195)	(0.122)
Income: Pensions				-0.0835	-0.0830	-0.0830	-0.0830*	-0.0830	-0.137	-0.0766
				(0.0607)	(0.0609)	(0.0563)	(0.0495)	(0.0611)	(0.107)	(0.0678)
Income: Unemployment benefit				0.223	0.223	0.223	0.223	0.223	0.405	0.425*
				(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.241)	(0.284)	(0.249)	(0.409)	(0.228)
Income: Other benefits				-0.202	-0.194	-0.194	-0.194	-0.194	-0.409	-0.369**
				(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.173)	(0.168)	(0.288)	(0.185)
Income: Investments				-0.861***	-0.860***	-0.860***	-0.860***	-0.860***	-1.510***	-0.968***
				(0.161)	(0.158)	(0.179)	(0.162)	(0.155)	(0.262)	(0.146)
Other income sources				-0.179	-0.174	-0.174	-0.174	-0.174	-0.305	-0.241*
				(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.218)	(0.136)
Born in country					0.0376	0.0376	0.0376	0.0376	0.0738	0.0837
					(0.0742)	(0.0745)	(0.0917)	(0.0746)	(0.131)	(0.103)
Urban resident					-0.0186	-0.0186	-0.0186	-0.0186	-0.0468	-0.0516
					(0.0435)	(0.0502)	(0.105)	(0.0569)	(0.0781)	(0.0505)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5079	5079	5020	4896	4892	4892	4892	4892	4892	3775
R2	0.00196	0.150	0.158	0.168	0.167	0.167	0.167	0.167		0.169
Mean Dep. var.	3.241	3.296	3.285	3.290	3.289	3.289	3.289	3.289	3.289	3.353

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C16: The effect of invasion on follow traditions.

	Follow traditions									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	0.168***	0.132***	0.141***	0.139***	0.141***	0.141***	0.141**	0.141***	0.228***	0.185***
	(0.0424)	(0.0428)	(0.0425)	(0.0429)	(0.0430)	(0.0436)	(0.0658)	(0.0468)	(0.0670)	(0.0476)
Education			0.0260***	0.0237***	0.0243***	0.0243***	0.0243***	0.0243***	0.0378***	0.0127
			(0.00654)	(0.00703)	(0.00702)	(0.00612)	(0.00617)	(0.00691)	(0.0110)	(0.00811)
Age			-0.00889***	-0.0101***	-0.0100***	-0.0100***	-0.0100***	-0.0100***	-0.0159***	-0.0118***
			(0.00128)	(0.00163)	(0.00163)	(0.00177)	(0.00172)	(0.00175)	(0.00259)	(0.00184)
Female			-0.179***	-0.176***	-0.174***	-0.174***	-0.174***	-0.174***	-0.246***	-0.212***
			(0.0426)	(0.0430)	(0.0432)	(0.0408)	(0.0419)	(0.0428)	(0.0673)	(0.0479)
Income difficulties				-0.0645**	-0.0645**	-0.0645**	-0.0645*	-0.0645**	-0.129***	-0.0744**
				(0.0299)	(0.0301)	(0.0267)	(0.0323)	(0.0297)	(0.0474)	(0.0329)
Income: Self-employment				0.0769	0.0757	0.0757	0.0757	0.0757	0.104	0.110
				(0.0779)	(0.0781)	(0.0768)	(0.103)	(0.0884)	(0.119)	(0.0824)
Income: Farming				-0.210	-0.209	-0.209	-0.209*	-0.209	-0.438*	-0.252
				(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.126)	(0.115)	(0.133)	(0.245)	(0.160)
Income: Pensions				0.0901	0.0904	0.0904	0.0904	0.0904	0.114	0.107
				(0.0685)	(0.0688)	(0.0773)	(0.0769)	(0.0711)	(0.108)	(0.0756)
Income: Unemployment benefit				0.432	0.428	0.428*	0.428*	0.428*	0.691	0.414
				(0.265)	(0.266)	(0.247)	(0.239)	(0.231)	(0.430)	(0.273)
Income: Other benefits				0.277	0.277	0.277	0.277*	0.277	0.388	0.362
				(0.186)	(0.187)	(0.182)	(0.157)	(0.187)	(0.293)	(0.229)
Income: Investments				-0.567***	-0.566***	-0.566***	-0.566***	-0.566***	-0.842**	-0.563***
				(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.181)	(0.151)	(0.178)	(0.332)	(0.185)
Other income sources				0.199*	0.197*	0.197	0.197**	0.197	0.323*	0.157
				(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.123)	(0.0889)	(0.127)	(0.177)	(0.125)
Born in country					0.000516	0.000516	0.000516	0.000516	-0.0291	-0.0784
					(0.0797)	(0.0778)	(0.0770)	(0.0830)	(0.120)	(0.0981)
Urban resident					-0.0115	-0.0115	-0.0115	-0.0115	-0.0262	-0.0496
					(0.0476)	(0.0551)	(0.0784)	(0.0521)	(0.0741)	(0.0526)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5168	5168	5110	4986	4982	4982	4982	4982	4982	3847
R2	0.00307	0.0581	0.0957	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.104		0.0769
Mean Dep. var.	2.456	2.525	2.529	2.531	2.530	2.530	2.530	2.530	2.530	2.415

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

Table C17: The effect of invasion on strong leader.

	Strong leader									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Invasion	-0.266**	-0.240**	-0.222**	-0.230**	-0.238**	-0.238*	-0.238	-0.238**	-0.145**	-0.254**
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.131)	(0.179)	(0.120)	(0.0667)	(0.125)
Education			-0.0779***	-0.0841***	-0.0795***	-0.0795***	-0.0795***	-0.0795***	-0.0532***	-0.0618***
			(0.0161)	(0.0173)	(0.0173)	(0.0186)	(0.0184)	(0.0178)	(0.0112)	(0.0213)
Age			-0.000711	0.00433	0.00432	0.00432	0.00432	0.00432	0.000711	0.00867*
			(0.00317)	(0.00401)	(0.00402)	(0.00332)	(0.00427)	(0.00381)	(0.00254)	(0.00481)
Female			-0.0593	-0.0614	-0.0434	-0.0434	-0.0434	-0.0434	-0.0172	-0.0549
			(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.0976)	(0.137)	(0.114)	(0.0670)	(0.125)
Income difficulties				0.000177	-0.0168	-0.0168	-0.0168	-0.0168	-0.00998	0.00589
				(0.0761)	(0.0761)	(0.0687)	(0.122)	(0.0723)	(0.0487)	(0.0872)
Income: Self-employment				-0.284	-0.281	-0.281	-0.281	-0.281	-0.175	-0.353*
				(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.189)	(0.220)	(0.186)	(0.108)	(0.197)
Income: Farming				-0.470	-0.571**	-0.571*	-0.571*	-0.571*	-0.314*	-0.651**
				(0.295)	(0.290)	(0.317)	(0.293)	(0.334)	(0.175)	(0.310)
Income: Pensions				-0.413**	-0.375**	-0.375**	-0.375*	-0.375**	-0.206*	-0.492**
				(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.155)	(0.218)	(0.167)	(0.109)	(0.193)
Income: Unemployment benefit				-0.292	-0.201	-0.201	-0.201	-0.201	-0.0640	-0.733
				(0.657)	(0.658)	(0.670)	(0.690)	(0.610)	(0.450)	(0.792)
Income: Other benefits				-0.447	-0.382	-0.382	-0.382	-0.382	0.00539	-0.500
				(0.317)	(0.319)	(0.321)	(0.398)	(0.303)	(0.192)	(0.400)
Income: Investments				2.031*	2.119**	2.119*	2.119*	2.119**	1.198	2.491**
				(1.042)	(1.072)	(1.087)	(1.097)	(1.066)	(0.851)	(1.183)
Other income sources				-0.258	-0.177	-0.177	-0.177	-0.177	-0.0488	-0.115
				(0.313)	(0.307)	(0.262)	(0.257)	(0.287)	(0.198)	(0.346)
Born in country					-0.237	-0.237	-0.237	-0.237	-0.140	-0.274
					(0.193)	(0.163)	(0.227)	(0.196)	(0.125)	(0.277)
Urban resident					-0.402***	-0.402***	-0.402	-0.402**	-0.302***	-0.432***
					(0.122)	(0.143)	(0.383)	(0.171)	(0.0804)	(0.148)
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
SE	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Dates	Region	Country Dates	Robust	Robust
Ord. logit	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Large sample	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
N	5034	5034	4978	4861	4856	4856	4856	4856	4856	3745
R2	0.00117	0.0744	0.0843	0.0898	0.0936	0.0936	0.0936	0.0936		0.0249
Mean Dep. var.	3.104	3.010	3.019	3.018	3.013	3.013	3.013	3.013	3.013	3.413

Notes: The bandwidth in all specifications is 14 days since the invasion. Country FE corresponds to country fixed effects. We apply entropy balancing for the control group in all regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted at the individual level. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$.

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