Mr Krittanai Laohakunakorn

Mr Krittanai Laohakunakorn

PhD Candidate in Economics

Department of Economics

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Key Expertise
Microeconomic Theory

About me

Research interest
Microeconomic Theory (primary)

Job market paper
Rent Extraction with Information Acquisition

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This paper revisits the classic mechanism design question of when buyers with private information in an auction setting can expect to receive economic rents. It is well known that under standard assumptions, the seller can fully extract rent for generic prior distributions over the valuations of the buyers. However, a crucial assumption underlying this result is that the buyers are not able to acquire any additional information about each other. This assumption can be seen as a special case of a general model where buyers have access to some information acquisition technology. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information acquisition technology that allows the seller to fully extract rent, and we show that the set of information acquisition technologies where these conditions are satisfied is small in a topological sense.

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Publications and additional papers

  • “Private and Common Value Auctions with Ambiguity over Correlation,” (with Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin), Journal of Economic Theory, 184 (2019)
  • “A Nash Threats Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Local Monitoring,” Working paper.


Placement Officer
Professor Mark Schankerman

Dr Francesco Nava

Dr Francesco Nava
Professor Balazs Szentes
Professor Ronny Razin  

Contact information


Phone number
+44 (0)75 3053 2245

Room number

Office Address
Department of Economics,
London School of Economics and Political Science,
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE