Heidi Christina  Thysen

Heidi Christina Thysen

PhD Candidate in Economics

Department of Economics

Telephone
+44(0)7565331771
Room No
32L.04.08
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Languages
Danish, English
Key Expertise
Microeconomic Theory, Behavioural Economics, Game Theory, Political Economy

About me

Research interests
Microeconomic Theory, Behavioural Economics (primary)
Game Theory, Political Economy (secondary)

Job market paper
Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations – Joint with Heiner Schumacher (Revise and Resubmit at Theoretical Economics)

Read the abstract and download the paper

We study a principal-agent framework in which the agent forms beliefs based on a misspecified subjective model of the principal’s project. She fits this model to the objective probability distribution to predict output under alternative actions. Misspecifications in the subjective model may lead to biased beliefs. However, under mild restrictions, the agent has correct beliefs on the equilibrium path so that the optimal contract is non-exploitative. This allows for a behavioral version of the informativeness principle: The optimal contract conditions on an additional variable only if it is informative about the action according to the agent’s subjective model. We further characterize when misspecifications affect the optimal contract. One implication of this characterization is that the scope for belief biases depends on the agent’s job, e.g., her position in the hierarchy.

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Publications and additional papers

Strategic Interpretations – Joint with Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler (Revise and Resubmit to Journal of Economic Theory)

Abstract: We study strategic communication when the sender’s multidimensional messages are given an interpretation by the sender himself or by a proxy. Interpreting messages involves the provision of some data about their statistical state dependence. The receiver can only use this data to decipher messages. In this way, strategic interpretation of messages can influence the receiver’s understanding of their equilibrium meaning. We show that in a two-action, two-state setting, the sender can attain his first-best payoff when the prior on one state exceeds a threshold that decays quickly with message dimensionality. We examine the result’s robustness to the critique that the receiver may attempt to draw inferences from the selective interpretation itself.


Persuasion with Endogenous Misspecified Beliefs – Joint with Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler (a follow up note to “Strategic Interpretations”)


Correlation Neglect as a Commitment Device

Contacts

Placement Officer
Professor Mark Schankerman

Supervisor
Professor Gilat Levy

References
Professor Gilat Levy
Professor Ran Spiegler
Dr Andrew Ellis

Contact information

Email
h.c.thysen@lse.ac.uk

Room number
32L.04.08

Office Address
Department of Economics,
London School of Economics and Political Science,
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE