Strategic Interpretations – Joint with Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler (Revise and Resubmit to Journal of Economic Theory)
Abstract: We study strategic communication when the sender’s multidimensional messages are given an interpretation by the sender himself or by a proxy. Interpreting messages involves the provision of some data about their statistical state dependence. The receiver can only use this data to decipher messages. In this way, strategic interpretation of messages can influence the receiver’s understanding of their equilibrium meaning. We show that in a two-action, two-state setting, the sender can attain his first-best payoff when the prior on one state exceeds a threshold that decays quickly with message dimensionality. We examine the result’s robustness to the critique that the receiver may attempt to draw inferences from the selective interpretation itself.
Persuasion with Endogenous Misspecified Beliefs – Joint with Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler (a follow up note to “Strategic Interpretations”)
Correlation Neglect as a Commitment Device