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# Values in International Cooperation

## *Scoping study for the British Council – Lot 2*

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
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# 1. Introduction

This scoping report aims at providing a systematic review of the existing evidence base on the role of values in international cooperation, identifying key research gaps in relation to the programme objectives (RFP 7.3.1), and making practical recommendations on the design of a practicable pilot programme. We ask to what extent shared values help build positive perceptions of different groups, whether within countries or across international boundaries, and enable cooperation on important global challenges, such as international development, climate change and technology. The report proceeds in three stages. First, we outline the conceptual framework which governs our approach to this question. Second, we summarise some of the key findings in the existing literature. Third, having identified a research gap which the British Council is well-placed to fill, we offer recommendations for how the Council may want to proceed in the next step of this project.

## 1.1. Summary

Our key points and findings are summarised below:

1. We focus on how 'meta-values' – the values of mutuality, equality, diversity, tolerance, respect and inclusion identified by the British Council - can be purposively promoted through facilitated spaces for deliberation on social and political issues.
2. The existing literature on the determinants of quality and cooperative attitudes in deliberative exercises is a literature which closely tracks this issue.
3. We survey this literature, with special reference to three questions:
  - 3.2 Does increased diversity – especially national diversity – among participants in a deliberative exercise lead to better deliberation and cooperative orientations?
  - 3.3 Does actively promoting meta-values such as tolerance, respect and equality in the structure of a deliberative exercise increase the quality of deliberation and cooperative orientations?
  - 3.4 Do the answers to the above two questions differ when deliberation is conducted online as opposed to face-to-face? If so, how do they differ?
4. Regarding the first question, our review finds no studies which explicitly make the national diversity of participants an independent variable. Other studies, however, compare homogenous and diverse deliberators along other dimensions of diversity, such as ethnicity. They find that participant diversity positively impacts deliberative quality.
5. Regarding the second question, a substantive majority of the literature concurs that deliberative exercises which purposively promote meta-values such as tolerance and respect have higher quality deliberation.
6. Regarding the third question, we find that both online and face-to-face deliberation can promote the meta-values identified by the British Council. However, several studies suggest that the specific meta-values and outcomes which each form of deliberation promotes are different.

7. Based on these findings we recommend that the British Council consider conducting a mixed experimental and qualitative action-research project to directly address the three research questions identified above:
  - 7.2 We recommend conducting deliberative exercises involving at least eight different samples. Each sample will differ only along three dimensions: whether participants are diverse in terms of nationality, or not; whether the deliberative session will be structured by a moderator trained to emphasise the values of equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance among participants, or not; and whether the deliberation is conducted face-to-face or online.
  - 7.3 To complement this experimental set-up which will tell us whether there is a relationship between the independent variables and the outcome, we propose a qualitative component to the research to examine *how* such relationships emerge.

## 2. Conceptual Framework

1. In investigating how values shapes people's attitudes towards international cooperation, we pay special attention to exploring the values which are implicit in cultural relations activities, and the extent to which such activities might change values and attitudes. As indicated by the British Council, "The review will focus on values connected to the cultural relations approach described in section 7 of the RFP, for example mutuality, equality, diversity, tolerance, respect and inclusion." (Annex 2, 1.8). We refer to this set of values as "meta-values", as they are expected to facilitate meaningful engagement even among people who do not share the same substantive values, such as beliefs regarding religion.
2. Focusing on these meta-values is justified by their role in the organizational aims of the British Council. "Based on its long international experience, the British Council believes that trust and understanding can be built most effectively through a cultural relations approach which stresses mutuality, respect, tolerance and values of equality, diversity and inclusion." (RFP 7.2.3). In turn, this approach is based on its broader organizational mandate: "The British Council was founded to create a 'friendly knowledge and understanding' between the people of the UK and wider world by making a positive contribution to the countries we work with, and in doing so making a lasting difference to the UK's security, prosperity and influence."<sup>1</sup>
3. Given the British Council's overarching aim to make a "lasting difference", we are especially interested in how the meta-values can be promoted purposively through facilitating active engagement among people. The extent to which these meta-values are already accepted in a society as a result of childhood socialization or other background factors is less relevant for our purposes. In other words, we survey research that captures the potentially dynamic aspect of adherence to meta-values, rather than treating them as a fixed feature of the national and international landscape.
4. An assessment of the effect of meta-values requires a careful specification of what they have an effect on. The following statements from the British Council provide a useful starting point: "By building trust, we help people from the UK and other countries to

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<sup>1</sup> British Council, *Understanding Cultural Relations, briefing paper.*



*understand each other better and work together to address global challenges*”,<sup>2</sup> and “Our cultural relations approach means we engage with individuals, civil society and states in dialogue and exchange, supporting them to have *an appreciation and understanding of the perspectives of others*, so that they can *seek shared solutions*”<sup>3</sup> (emphases added). These statements encompass two important and related elements: appreciating and understanding the perspectives of others, and seeking shared solutions. We consider them in turn.

5. *Appreciating and understanding the perspectives of others* can be both an aim in itself and a means to achieve mutually beneficial cooperation. In the social sciences, the extent to which this desideratum is attained in actual communicative interactions is often conceptualized as “quality of deliberation” or “deliberative quality”. As shown in the literature, deliberative quality encompasses a number of different elements, but they can be summarized as follows: participants are willing and able to present well-thought-through arguments and evidence in support of their positions and preferences, to listen respectfully and attentively to the arguments presented by interlocutors whose views may differ from theirs, and to engage constructively with those views.
6. *Seeking shared solutions* means to conceptualize the relationship between groups – especially, for our purposes, countries – as potentially win-win situations, as opposed to zero-sum interactions where gains for one side inevitably mean a loss of the other side. In practice, this means that people expect their leaders to seek solutions to global problems by negotiating with the leaders of other countries and using what the negotiation literature calls integrative strategies as opposed to distributive strategies.<sup>4</sup> To simplify, in this report we call this bundle of preferences “cooperative orientations”.
7. The preceding considerations lead us to a more specific formulation of the overarching research question: *Can the meta-values of inclusion, diversity, equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance be embedded in a conversation about global problems in a way that enhances both deliberative quality and cooperative orientations among its participants? If so, how?*
8. We find it useful to break up this overarching research question into distinct elements. Specifically, we suggest dividing the meta-values into two sets: inclusion and diversity on the one hand, and equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance on the other. The first set relates mainly to who participates in the conversation, the second set relates mainly to how participants treat each other. As shorthand, in this report we will call the former set “who-values” and the latter set “how-values.”
9. Considering the who-values first, diversity and inclusion can refer to numerous dimensions: gender, age, race, ethnicity, religion, political beliefs, and other features. These are all very important, but we expect that the British Council is especially interested

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<sup>2</sup> *Strategic Framework, 2015, cited in British Council, Understanding Cultural Relations, briefing paper.*

<sup>3</sup> *Cultural relation approach to building stability and reducing conflict, British Council publication, cited in British Council, Understanding Cultural Relations, briefing paper.*

<sup>4</sup> Distributive negotiation strategies include demanding unilateral concessions, publicly pre-committing to particular outcomes, manipulating information to one’s advantage, and threatening to make the other player’s best alternative to agreement less attractive. By contrast, integrative strategies entail proposing exchanges of concessions for mutual benefit, sharing information openly, offering to explore common problems and mutual gain solutions, and reframing the issue space itself to overcome deadlocks. See for instance Odell (2009).

in inclusion and diversity in terms of nationality. International dialogue and cooperation are central to its mission, but beyond this motivation it should be stressed that the British Council is uniquely capable to generate new knowledge on the effects of national diversity and inclusion on deliberative outcomes. *The question that we propose for further investigation by the British Council is whether, to what extent and how deliberation that is more inclusive and diverse with regard to the national background of the participants leads to higher deliberative quality and cooperative orientations.*

10. Considering now the how-values, there are various factors that may influence the deliberative quality and orientations of the participants in deliberative exercises. Mindful of the fact that the British Council does not want merely to gather and disseminate knowledge on values but also make a positive impact, we suggest to focus on one specific bundle of factors, which is more directly suitable to deliberate intervention by cultural relations institutions: the extent to which deliberation is purposively designed and structured to foster equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance among the participants. *The question that we propose for further investigation by the British Council is whether, to what extent and how deliberation that is purposively designed to foster equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance among participants leads to higher deliberative quality and cooperative orientations.*
11. Institutions that wish to promote positive attitudes towards international cooperation based on high-quality deliberation face the challenge of achieving that aim through an efficient use of resources. For each individual who is reached, face-to-face deliberation is significantly more costly than online deliberation. Or, to put it differently, for any amount of resources that can be devoted to such a programme, using online channels will reach more people than face-to-face sessions. For this reason, *the question that we propose for further investigation by the British Council is whether, to what extent and how the relationship between deliberation embodying the meta-values and attitudes towards international cooperation varies depending on whether deliberation is conducted face-to-face or online.*
12. The following section reports the findings of a literature review on these questions. To summarize, we are interested in three questions: we ask
  - a. *whether, to what extent and how deliberation that is more inclusive and diverse with regard to the national background of the participants leads to higher deliberative quality and cooperative orientations;*
  - b. *whether, to what extent and how deliberation that is purposively designed to foster equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance among participants leads to higher deliberative quality and cooperative orientations;*
  - c. *whether, to what extent and how the relationship between deliberation embodying the meta-values and attitudes towards international cooperation varies depending on whether deliberation is conducted face-to-face or online.*

### 3. Literature Review

1. This section summarises findings in the existing literature on the three questions identified above. Our review does not attempt to cover the totality of the very extensive literature on deliberative exercises in the world, but focuses instead on the three questions. We report findings that are either indirectly or directly relevant for the question. An important proviso is that we only report findings that are based on an explicit comparison of deliberative settings that differ along the dimensions of interest, i.e. at least one of the following: (1) deliberative settings that are highly diverse are compared to those that have low diversity; (2) deliberative settings that are purposively designed to foster equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance among participants are compared to those that are not; and (3) online deliberative exercises are compared to face-to-face deliberative exercises. The reason for this restriction is methodological: it is difficult if not impossible to draw conclusions on whether a design feature of a deliberative exercise matters if the observations in the study display no variation with respect to that feature.
2. In line with the aims presented above, the literature covers studies that examine the determinants of deliberative quality and/or shifts in attitudes, beliefs and preferences among participants, regardless of the topic being debated.

#### 3.1. Diverse vs homogeneous participants

3. One of the variables we are most interested in is whether, other things being equal, the diversity of participants – particularly in terms of nationality – affects deliberative quality and cooperative orientations. Very few studies explicitly compare mono-national and multi-national participation, which is one reason why this presents a significant research gap.

##### 3.1.1. Indirectly relevant: race, partisanship, etc

4. Several studies do, however, compare diverse and homogenous groups along other dimensions of diversity, such as race and ethnicity. One study, for example, finds that multi-racial juries engage in higher quality deliberation than all-white groups. Importantly, this is not attributable solely to the performance of black jurors, since white jurors cite more facts, make fewer errors, and are more amenable to discussing racism when in diverse groups (*Sommers 2006*). Caluwaerts and Reuchamps' comparison of inter-group and intra-group deliberation among Dutch- and French-speaking Belgians finds that the most important factor promoting the development of positive attitudes towards members of the other linguistic group is being confronted with them during the process of deliberation (*Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2014*). Tarik Abdel-Monem et al. find that, while all participants in the deliberative exercise they study enjoy the opportunity to deliberate in racially and ethnically diverse groups, participants from racial and ethnic minorities displayed significantly more positive perceptions of the quality of deliberation. The authors suggest this may be because the respectful tone of the conversation and the equality of opportunities to speak and be heard contrast with the experience of many minorities in being silenced or marginalised, whereas white individuals may take equal treatment for granted in public deliberation settings (*Abdel-Monem et al. 2010*).



5. Other studies examined the question of whether ideological or attitudinal diversity within deliberative groups increases quality, with several suggesting that it does (*Suiter et al. 2016*). Schkade et al. find that 'enclave deliberation' – deliberation with like-minded individuals – leads deliberators to converge on more extreme views (liberals become more liberal, conservatives become more conservative, and so on). By contrast, intergroup deliberation has two desirable social effects. First, exposure to competing positions generally increases political tolerance, in the sense that individuals become more willing to extend civil liberties to groups whose political views they profoundly disagree with. Second, deliberation in diverse groups increases deliberators' awareness of competing rationales and makes them more able to identify potential counterarguments for their views (*Schkade et al. 2007*). Grönlund et al., however, caveat this finding, arguing that deliberative procedures and norms themselves moderate this tendency of like-minded groups to move towards extreme opinions, suggesting that a sufficiently deliberative setting can alleviate the mal-effects of enclave deliberation (*Grönlund et al. 2015*). Moreover, Himmelroos et al., suggest that enclave deliberation should not be seen as wholly negative for deliberative quality, because like-minded groups can act as protected spaces in which individuals with lower levels of resources feel more able to contribute their viewpoint (*Himmelroos et al. 2017*).

### 3.1.2. Directly relevant: nationality

6. While most studies which test for the effects of participant diversity focus on characteristics such as race and political attitudes, there is a small literature which looks at the effects of national diversity. Doerr, for example, compares deliberative practices in multilingual – and multinational – European Social Forum gatherings with national Social Forum gatherings in three Western European countries. She concludes that the multilingual nature of deliberation in the European Social Forum increases the inclusivity of the deliberation as compared with the national forums, because participants are aware of the need to listen attentively to the points made by others, and because the multilingual nature of the deliberation has given rise to translation initiatives which explicitly try to counteract the potential for the exclusion of minority perspectives (*Doerr 2012*). It is important to note, however, that Doerr's study is primarily about *linguistic* rather than national diversity. While the two are of course correlated, national diversity is not the explicit independent variable in the study.
7. There is also a small literature on specifically transnational deliberation. Fiket et al., for example, analyse the pan-European 2009 'Europolis' deliberative poll, measuring the quality of deliberative using the Discourse Quality Index, finding that deliberators are able to interact according to deliberative norms across languages and cultures. They also find that the process of deliberation on transnational issues itself makes the participants more likely to consider themselves part of a pan-European constituency of democracy, rather than a group of randomly selected individuals (*Fiket et al. 2014*). Di Mauro and Fiket echo this finding in a further paper on the 'Europolis' poll, arguing that the deliberative exercise enhanced levels of European, as opposed to exclusively national, identity (*Di Mauro and Fiket 2017*). Gerber et al. study differential levels of deliberative capacity among participants in the 'Europolis' poll, finding on the one hand that there do exist deliberators who adhere closely to deliberative ideals of listening respectfully, offering reasons for preferences and so on, even in a nationally diverse forum. On the other hand they find that deliberative abilities are unequally distributed among social

classes (Gerber *et al.* 2016). The key limitation of this literature for our purposes, however, is that it does not *compare* deliberation between nationally homogenous and nationally diverse groups of participants, and thus does not fill the research gap identified above.

8. There is reason to hypothesize that nationally diverse samples will reach higher levels of deliberative quality and cooperative orientations, given the findings of studies in related fields such as management and development. Han and Koenig-Archibugi argue, for example, that – contrary to arguments which stress the adverse effects of ‘aid fragmentation’ – having a more nationally diverse set of donors to a given recipient country generates a greater diversity of donor perspectives, which in turn is correlated with better policy outcomes (Han and Koenig-Archibugi 2015). Within the management literature, Stahl *et al.*’s meta-analysis of the effect of cultural diversity on work-teams argues that multi-cultural groups experience higher levels of creativity and satisfaction (Stahl *et al.* 2010). However, the evidence is not unequivocal; Stahl *et al.* caveat the above finding by noting that multi-cultural groups experience decreased social integration within the team, as well as greater levels of conflict over the tasks being performed (Stahl *et al.* 2010). Moreover, in both literatures, the dependent variable is different to the outcomes of deliberative quality and cooperative orientations which we are interested in here. In Han and Koenig-Archibugi’s case, the outcome is the quality of policies selected, and in the management literature, the outcome is generally some dimension of productivity or decision-quality, not the cultivation of cooperative dispositions in work-group members themselves. In Stahl *et al.*’s case, the independent variable is also slightly different: they include *both* intra-national and cross-national cultural diversity in their meta-analysis, rather than narrowing their focus to cross-national differences. This suggests that, while these related literatures offer clues as to the hypotheses that a British Council-run experiment on national diversity could posit, there remains a research gap to be filled.

### 3.2. Active vs passive facilitation

9. A further key distinction in the literature surveyed is between active facilitation, and passive facilitation. Passive facilitation denotes a moderation style in which participants are generally left to deliberate as they wish, without direction as to the norms and procedures they should follow. Active facilitation, by contrast, explicitly tries to cultivate meta-values such as equality, respect and tolerance in deliberators, either through the interventions of the moderator, or through the structure of the deliberative exercise. Generally, the literature concurs that active facilitation is correlated with higher levels of deliberative quality and cooperative orientations.

#### 3.2.1. Indirectly relevant: various facilitation styles

10. Johnson *et al.*’s study of a deliberative exercise about neighbourhood-level community issues found that initially deliberators had difficulty instantiating norms such as turn-taking, and giving evidence for one’s opinions. In response, they developed an intervention which they term ‘Community Conversational’, a table-top game which specifies procedures and norms to guide discussion. When the ‘game’ was introduced and deliberation became more structured, deliberative quality increased (Johnson *et al.* 2017). Gastil echoes this finding in his study of the development of democratic

dispositions during the National Issues Forums in the USA. Where moderators had been trained to model democratic norms in their own contributions, and also explicitly reminded participants about the importance of such norms (for example by reminding participants of the need not to dominate discussion), then deliberative quality increased, particularly in terms of the number of competing policy positions deliberators would consider adopting (*Gastil 2004*).

11. Studies of the effect of moderation generally distinguish between active facilitation and facilitator bias, praising the former but rejecting the latter. Garard et al.'s study of the elements that make multi-stakeholder deliberative exercises successful suggests that facilitation is successful where the facilitator has an in-depth understanding of the issues being deliberated (in particular where the subject of discussion is complex or technical), is able to highlight and summarise the diversity of perspectives being shared by deliberators, while still refraining from judging the substantive opinions of different deliberators (*Garard et al. 2018*). De Vries et al. note that examining only the *quantity* of facilitator input is unhelpful as a guide to whether facilitation is effective or not, because different groups of deliberators require different levels of facilitator intervention to secure deliberative quality, defined in terms of equal participation, respect for the opinions of others, adoption of a societal rather than self-interested perspective, and offering reasoned justifications for one's conclusions (*De Vries et al. 2010*).

### 3.2.2. Directly relevant: emphasis on the meta-values of tolerance, respect, etc.

12. Other studies of the effect of active facilitation focus directly on the meta-values identified by the British Council such as tolerance and respect. Maurissen et al. find that, in school-based deliberative exercises, the openness of the discussion climate is positively correlated with student-teacher (deliberator-moderator) relations characterised by fairness and respect (*Maurissen et al. 2018*). Importantly, Karpowitz et al.'s study assesses the effect of different moderation or facilitation strategies *in the context of* participant diversity. They find that certain structural features of a deliberative exercise promote the aim of encouraging inclusiveness and equality, but these features vary depending on the characteristics of the deliberators. In trying to achieve gender equality in participation and influence in deliberation, for example, when women make up a minority of the deliberators it is preferable to use unanimous rule, but when women form a (significant) majority of the participants, deliberative equality is best served by majority rule (*Karpowitz et al. 2012*). Trénel concurs that active facilitation is important in avoiding what Habermas terms 'internal exclusion' – which occurs when an individual is formally included in deliberation, but is marginalized during the process of discussion. He cites evidence from a series of town hall deliberations, in which groups experienced either 'basic' (passive) or 'advanced' (active) facilitation, finding that inclusion levels for both non-white and women deliberators were significantly higher under 'advanced' facilitation (*Trénel in Davies and Gangadharan 2009*).

### 3.3. Face-to-face vs online deliberation

13. One important question for real-world attempts to instantiate deliberation is whether the beneficial outcomes of face-to-face deliberation also apply to online deliberative

exercises, which are a much more feasible way to reach large numbers of participants over broad geographic areas. A number of studies surveyed address this question.

14. Several studies find that online deliberation is able to deliver similar outcomes, in terms of deliberative quality and cooperative orientations, to face-to-face deliberation. Min finds that both online and face-to-face deliberation increase participants' issue knowledge, and willingness to participate in political discussion (*Min 2007*). Fishkin echoes this, suggesting that the results of an online deliberative exercise, conducted at the same time as an equivalent face-to-face exercise, on American foreign policy generated 'broadly similar' results (*Fishkin, in Davies and Gangadharan 2009*). This does not mean that we can conclude the two forms of deliberation generate identical results – Baek et al.'s survey of a sample of Americans who reported participating in one or both forms of deliberation suggests that online deliberation is less likely to generate consensus – suggesting that a direct comparison of the two forms of deliberation would be a productive research avenue for the British Council (*Baek et al. 2017*).
15. Moreover, while both online and face-to-face deliberation can promote the meta-values identified by the British Council, the specific meta-values promoted by each form of deliberation may be different. Wojcieszak et al. find that face-to-face and online deliberation deliver different outcomes. Online discussions are suited to extending individual discussion networks to include more diverse conversation partners, and facilitate people's understanding of dissimilar perspectives. However, participants' reasons for joining such forums are often individualistic in nature. By contrast, participation in face-to-face deliberation is often driven by collectivist reasons – such as to bring local neighbourhood actors together to solve a collective problem. However, face-to-face deliberation, according to the authors, does not enhance appreciation for diversity to the same extent as online deliberation. Thus, rather than being substitutes for one another, online and face-to-face deliberation constitute complementary opportunities for citizen discussion (*Wojcieszak et al. 2009*). Pedrini echoes this finding about the differential effects of online and face-to-face deliberation in her comparison between an online citizens' deliberative poll in Switzerland, and the quality of deliberation among Swiss representative politicians. She finds that political elites offer higher levels of justification for their preferences, but achieve lower levels of deliberative quality in terms of the respect shown between deliberators (*Pedrini 2014*). Although participants in online deliberation are of course affected differently by moderation and the structure of deliberation than face-to-face deliberators, it appears that contextual meta-values – values built into the structure of a deliberative exercise – do affect outcomes. In this vein, Manosevitcha et al. find that including cognitive cues, in the form of visual banners, to remind deliberators in an online forum that they are in a deliberative setting and should adhere to deliberative norms (such as tolerance, respect and so on) increases deliberative quality (*Manosevitcha et al. 2014*).

## 4. Recommendations

1. The above survey of the existing literature highlights several areas in which further research could usefully be undertaken. While some of the studies discussed above touch on the questions we are interested in, the existing literature does not conclusively answer any of the three questions posed in the 'Conceptual Framework' section of this report. Thus our recommendations focus on the kind of mixed experimental and qualitative action-research project which could generate insights into these questions.
2. As stated above, the three questions are:
  - a) *whether, to what extent and how deliberation that is more inclusive and diverse with regard to the national background of the participants leads to higher deliberative quality and cooperative orientations;*
  - b) *whether, to what extent and how deliberation that is purposively designed to foster equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance among participants leads to higher deliberative quality and cooperative orientations;*
  - c) *whether, to what extent and how the relationship between deliberation embodying the meta-values and attitudes towards international cooperation varies depending on whether deliberation is conducted face-to-face or online.*
3. The three research questions all have a "whether/to what extent" aspect and a "how" aspect. To investigate the former, we recommend to use an experimental set-up. To investigate the "how" aspect, we recommend to use qualitative methods. We elaborate on each recommendation in the following.

### 4.1. Experimental component

4. We propose to conduct deliberative sessions involving at least eight differently constituted samples. The samples would be different only along three dimensions: whether they are diverse in terms of nationality, or not; whether the deliberative session will be structured by a moderator trained to emphasise the values of equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance among participants, or not; and whether the deliberation is conducted face-to-face or online. In principle, the samples could be split further if resources permit: for instance, they could be homogeneous, moderately diverse, or very diverse in terms of nationality (three categories).
5. The crucial feature of the research design we propose is that, except for the nationality criterion, participants will be allocated randomly to each sample, whatever the relevant population is chosen to be. This will ensure that any difference in the outcome of deliberation can be attributed to the treatment rather than other factors, in line with the logic of experiments.



	<b>Treatment group:</b>	<b>Control group:</b>
	Participants diverse in terms of nationality	Participants homogeneous in terms of nationality
<b>Treatment group:</b>		
Active facilitation	<i>Face-to-face: Sample 1</i> <i>Online: Sample 2</i>	<i>Face-to-face: Sample 5</i> <i>Online: Sample 6</i>
<b>Control group:</b>		
Passive facilitation	<i>Face-to-face: Sample 3</i> <i>Online: Sample 4</i>	<i>Face-to-face: Sample 7</i> <i>Online: Sample 8</i>

6. Ideally the population from which the samples are to be drawn would consist of sections of the general population of a country, such as all persons aged 18 to 35.5 However, the research questions could be answered also by using convenience samples, notably groups of people with whom the British Council would have a relationship anyway, i.e. irrespective of their recruitment into the Big Conversation programme. For instance, it could consist of students enrolled in language courses; individuals in the process of being trained as Active Citizens facilitators or in other training courses; participants in Future Leaders Connect; and/or individuals involved in other British Council programmes. To ensure methodological rigour, it would be important to ensure the random assignment of participants to treatment and control groups regardless of whether the population under investigation is nationally representative or in a prior self-selected relationship with the British Council.
7. As noted above, though it is advisable to test this hypothesis during the pilot study, there is reason to believe that similar results would be obtained if the proposed deliberative experiment is conducted online rather than face-to-face, which would significantly reduce the cost of the exercise, as well as increase its potential reach. There is a growing literature on the subject of how to conduct online political deliberation, with most studies concurring that it is feasible, and investigating both the methodological aspects of designing online deliberative exercises (“how to ensure deliberation is inclusive and flows well” etc), as well as the technical aspects (“what software should be used” etc).
8. Regarding the methodological aspects, Friess and Eilders synthesise some of the key findings in the literature on online deliberation design, picking out several key elements. First, they suggest deliberation should be asynchronous rather than real-time, to allow

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<sup>5</sup> The cost of generating a truly representative sample of a national population for a deliberative face-to-face exercise would be very high. It has been reported, for example, that a ‘deliberative poll’ conducted in California cost approximately \$1.5m for a weekend of deliberation: <https://news.stanford.edu/news/2011/september/statewide-deliberative-polling-090111.html>. Thus, while there may be trade-offs in terms of the generalisability of the study’s conclusions, it may be more feasible to conduct the experiment using audiences that the British Council already reaches. If this approach is pursued, one crucial consideration is making sure participants within the study are assigned to samples randomly, except on grounds of nationality.

participants to spend time reflecting and constructing arguments before making contributions to discussion (*Strandberg and Berg 2015* echoes this finding). Second, while participant anonymity may have benefits in helping participants feel free to express their thoughts, overall it leads to lower deliberative quality, particularly in terms of civility, rationality and sincerity. This suggests that participants should be identifiable to one another. Third, as suggested in the literature review above, active moderation is positively correlated with deliberative quality. However, this does not mean that contributions to an online forum should only be visible after being reviewed by a moderator; the immediate appearance of user content lowers the perceived entry barriers to discussion, and thus increases the amount of discussion. Fourth, online discussion forums are more deliberative when participants view their contributions as meaningful to either other users or the final outcome; in other words, when they view their contributions as consequential. Fifth, complex issues should be broken down into smaller parts to enable discussion to remain focused, and allow participants to focus their contributions on areas of personal interest or competence. Finally, online deliberative spaces should both provide information to participants (much like expert testimony in face-to-face deliberative exercises), as well as allow, or indeed encourage, participants to post external information to support their arguments (*Friess and Eilders 2015*).

9. The technical aspects of organising an online deliberative exercise will have to be considered in more detail if an experiment of this type is commissioned. Public opinion research firm, Polimetrix, for example, has generated nationally representative samples for prior online deliberative exercises, if the British Council wished to look more widely for deliberators than participants in its own programmes. There are several software platforms used to conduct online deliberation exercises including 'Common Ground for Action', 'DemocracyOS' and the 'Stanford Online Deliberation Platform'. The software platform selection process can take place once the desiderata (e.g. does it allow asynchronous discussion? Does it allow the experiment organisers to vary the type of moderation?) for the platform are determined.
10. There is significant scope for an element of action-research in the initial design of this experiment. Specifically, the second treatment outlined above requires that certain samples be given a moderator trained to emphasise the meta-values of equality, mutuality, respect and tolerance among participants, and that the control samples, who experience passive facilitation, proceed without this. This treatment relies on there being a distinct set of moderator actions or behaviours which promote the relevant meta-values. One area where the co-production of knowledge by practitioners and those designing the experiment may be particularly useful is in the formulation of the training that moderators performing 'active facilitation' receive. That is, in addition to the experiment designers specifying how facilitators should be trained and behave, they would refine their understanding of what effective 'active facilitation' looks like based on the experience of practitioners. Mansbridge et al.'s inductive study of deliberative norms performs this kind of task, investigating what practising deliberation moderators understand "good deliberation" to be. The overarching standards for evaluating deliberation that the moderators identify are unsurprising from a theoretical perspective: a) maintaining a positive 'group atmosphere' and b) making progress on the group's task. Beyond these general principles, though, the moderators identified several of the practical, nuanced elements to promoting, say, a positive group atmosphere, pointing

to, among other things, the importance of humour, and a distinction between seriousness (important for making progress on the issue) and formality (bad for deliberative quality because it encourages a hardening of positions) (*Mansbridge et al. 2006*). For this proposed experiment, practitioners of deliberative group exercises may well have equivalent real-world experience of what helps participants in deliberation overcome certain obstacles to deliberative quality and cooperative orientations such as a lack of equality or respect among participants. Incorporating these into the design of the experiment through action-research may increase their quality.

## 4.2. Qualitative component

11. The experimental component can give us high confidence with regard to whether and to what extent there is a relationship between the treatments and the outcome, but it is less suitable to show us how such a relationship emerges (or not). We propose to complement the experimental component with a qualitative component that examines the deliberative process from the point of view of the persons involved in it, i.e. the participants but also the moderators and the organizers. This component would use qualitative methods, notably participant observation and semi-structured interviews, to investigate the meanings that participants attribute to their experience and the psychological and sociological mechanisms that connect the process to the outcomes. This component would be especially suitable for the application of Action Research methods and procedures, including conversations with critical friends and members of participant groups.
12. The present draft report does not provide details on the content and procedure of the proposed deliberative exercises, but these can be added in the final report if there is preliminary support for the general recommendation within the British Council.

## 4.3. Measurement of outcomes

13. As noted in the Conceptual Framework section above, the focus of the deliberative exercises is on their ability to foster (1) an appreciation and understanding of the perspectives of others and (2) the willingness to seek shared solutions. In the following we discuss how these outcomes can be measured in the context of deliberative exercises organized by the British Council.
14. As noted above, in the literature on deliberation the appreciation and understanding of the perspectives of others is often related to the concept of “quality of deliberation”. The British Council project could usefully draw on existing research that has developed tools to measure deliberative quality in real-world settings. This literature includes Andersen and Hansen (2007), Dutwin (2003), Stromer-Galley (2007) – Black et al. (2010) provide a useful review of methods. We suggest to draw on what is arguably the most established framework for measuring deliberative quality, the “Discourse Quality Index” (DQI) originally developed by Steiner et al. (2004) and then adapted in various ways. The DQI has various components, and we believe that the following components are especially relevant for our purposes (the quotations in brackets come from the version in Gerber et al. 2016):

*Justification rationality.* The DQI distinguishes four levels of justification rationality in contributions to discussion: "(0) no justification; (1) inferior justification where the linkage between reasons and conclusion is tenuous (this code also applies if a conclusion is merely supported with illustrations); (2) qualified justification where a linkage between reasons and conclusion is made; (3) sophisticated justifications where a problem is examined in-depth by providing various, well-justified arguments."

*Respect towards other participants' arguments.* The DQI distinguishes four levels: "whether speakers include other participants' arguments but degrade them (coded 0), whether speakers ignore other participants' arguments (coded 1), whether they include other arguments in a neutral fashion (coded 2), and whether they value other participants' arguments (coded 3)."

*Questioning.* "We operationalize inquisitiveness via questioning. Questioning has an informational and a critical function, even though the two frequently complement each other. We code whether a speech contains an informational or critical question (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Questioning is an additional measure of engagement."

15. The three components just mentioned can be measured at the level of the individual participant in deliberation or – with some qualifications - even at the level of individual contributions to discussions. In addition, the "democratic" dimension of deliberative quality arguably depends on equality of participation, which can be measured at the level of group sessions (Gerber 2015).

16. The DQI, in the version used by Gerber et al. (2016), has two additional components:

*Common good orientation.* The underlying idea is that "good" arguments should be formulated with an eye on what we have in common and what is universal, as opposed to narrow group or constituency interests. In the context the pan-European deliberation 'EuroPolis', the coders distinguished between "references to country interests (coded 1), references to two sorts of interests, country and European interests (scored 1.5), European Union (coded 2) and world community interests (coded 3), and the absence of such references (coded 0)." We agree that this measure is relevant, but we think that it is better conceptualized as part of our second outcome of interest – *cooperative orientation* – instead of an indicator of deliberative quality.

*Respect towards groups.* "Deliberative quality also entails that participants show empathy and 'take into account the goals or values of persons unlike themselves'. In the context of the 'EuroPolis' discussions on immigration, this concerned third-country migrants. We capture whether speakers denigrate migrants (scored 0), don't refer to them (scored 1), whether they make reference to migrants in a neutral fashion (scored 2) or whether they show explicit respect towards them (scored 3)." Again, it could be preferable to regard "respect towards groups" as part of our second outcome of interest – *cooperative orientation* – instead of an indicator of deliberative quality.

17. The second outcome of interest is the promotion of cooperative orientations among discussion participants, i.e. – to use the wording of the British Council's strategic framework – their belief that countries should "work together to address global

challenges”.<sup>6</sup> In relation to this outcome, there is no existing measurement framework that is as established as the DQI for deliberative quality. The nature of the outcome is also different: the DQI index focuses on what participants do and say during the deliberative exercise, while cooperative orientations are attitudes that can be expressed not only during the exercises but also after they have ended, potentially (and ideally) with a long-lasting effect.

18. Two possible components of an index of cooperative orientations have already been mentioned above: common good orientation and respect towards groups. However, it is important to note that to score highly on cooperative orientation it is not necessary for a speaker to abandon an orientation to national interests in favour of a purely “cosmopolitan” value system. As we noted in the Conceptual Framework section, “seeking shared solutions” can also entail seeing the relationship between groups – especially, for our purposes, countries – as potentially win-win situations, as opposed to zero-sum interactions where gains for one side inevitably mean a loss of the other side. In practice, this means that people expect their leaders to seek solutions to global problems by negotiating with the leaders of other countries and using what the negotiation literature calls integrative strategies as opposed to distributive strategies.<sup>7</sup> Speakers oriented towards the “national interest” can still display a cooperative orientation when they focus on what makes national interests compatible with those of other countries, as distinct from what makes them opposed.
19. To identify further components of a measure of cooperative orientation, the British Council project could draw on the International Relations literature on foreign policy beliefs in public opinion. The research by Rathbun et al. (2016) and Rathbun (2016) may be especially useful. Focusing on U.S. public opinion, they fielded a survey on a nationally representative sample of American adults for a “Core Values Project”, with the aim of investigating the relationship between personal values (measured with the Schwartz Model of value relations), foreign policy outlooks, and political attitudes. The survey questions aim to distinguish between three broad attitudes: what they label “militant internationalism,” reflective of a general *hawkishness* with regards to international relations; “cooperative internationalism”; and “isolationism”. The survey questions relating to each broad orientation were partly derived from previous studies on foreign policy attitudes, and are shown in the box below.

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<sup>6</sup> *Strategic Framework, 2015, cited in British Council, Understanding Cultural Relations, briefing paper.*

<sup>7</sup> Distributive negotiation strategies include demanding unilateral concessions, publicly pre-committing to particular outcomes, manipulating information to one’s advantage, and threatening to make the other player’s best alternative to agreement less attractive. By contrast, integrative strategies entail proposing exchanges of concessions for mutual benefit, sharing information openly, offering to explore common problems and mutual gain solutions, and reframing the issue space itself to overcome deadlocks. See for instance Odell (2009). An unpublished paper by Brutger and Rathbun (2017) may be the first systematic study of mass public preferences for distributive vs integrative bargaining in international economic negotiations.



*Militant internationalism: agreement with*

- 1) Rather than simply countering our opponents' thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent's power.
- 2) The United States must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it.
- 3) The United States should always do what is in its own interest, even if our allies object.
- 4) The United States should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power.

*Cooperative internationalism: agreement with*

- 1) The United States needs to cooperate more with the United Nations.
- 2) The United States should contribute forces to international peace-keeping efforts.
- 3) The use or threat of force sometimes creates more problems than it solves by creating hostility or fear on the part of the opposing side.
- 4) In deciding on its foreign policies, the U.S. should take into account the views of its major allies.

*Isolationism: agreement with*

- 1) The U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.
- 2) We should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home.

Source: Rathbun, Brian C., Joshua D. Kertzer, Jason Reifler, Paul Goren, and Thomas J. Scotto. "Taking foreign policy personally: Personal values and foreign policy attitudes." *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (2016): 124-137. Web-Appendix

20. The questions in the "Core Values Project" could not simply be adopted for a British Council project, because they partly reflect the distinctive U.S. role in world affairs and because they focus on the use of military force and neglect other challenges that the British Council may wish to emphasise, such as international development, climate change and technology. The same limitation affects some surveys of public opinion conducted in other countries. For instance, to measure the hawkishness of the Chinese public the representative survey reported by Weiss (2019) asked, amongst other things, "In general, does China rely on military strength too much, too little or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals?" This question could usefully be asked with regard to a number of countries, but it would need to be complemented by questions that are more focused on specific instances of cooperation or unilateralism.

21. Our general recommendation with regard to measuring cooperative orientations is to combine generic questions adapted from the existing literature (e.g. "My country must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it") with questions that are tailored to the specific global challenge that is the topic of discussion and, if applicable, to the countries that have a direct stake in negotiating how the challenge is met.

#### 4.4. Deliberative exercises and nationally representative polling

22. Under a Deliberative Poll model (trademark James Fishkin), a separate survey of attitudes among the population of interest would not be necessary: since the individuals who participate in the deliberative sessions already approximate a random sample of the general population, their pre-deliberation attitudes on the issues under discussion should have the same distribution as the attitudes of the population (if the sampling worked properly). This feature allows the researchers to say that any attitude change observed among the participants between pre- and post-deliberation would also be observed among the general population of interest if all of its members had participated in a similar deliberative exercise. It is important to note that the Deliberative Poll logic is not limited to nationally representative samples, but it applies to any group that the researchers would define as the population of interest. So if the population of interest is, for instance, “individuals who have expressed an interest in British Council activities”, e.g. by providing an email address to it, then the findings of the deliberative exercise could be generalized to the whole population of interest as long as the participants approximate a random sample of the individuals for whom the British Council has an email address.
23. Would it be useful to combine deliberative exercises involving a sample of a narrowly defined population (e.g. participants in British Council programmes) with survey of a nationally representative sample? The main potential benefit would emerge if such a combination would help extrapolate the observed effects of deliberation from the narrowly defined sample to the national population. We think that the extrapolation would be persuasive with regard to the *existence* of an effect, i.e. a hypothetical conclusion that deliberative quality on international issues is higher in multinational discussion groups compared to mononational groups. Extrapolation would be on less solid ground with regard of the *size* of any observed effect, i.e. a hypothetical conclusion that in multinational discussion groups deliberative quality is on average 2 points higher on a 10-point scale compared to mononational groups. Members of the convenience sample are likely to be too different from the general population with regard to features that can potentially interact with the treatment to allow a generalization of the size effect.
24. Having said that, recent advances in poststratification may improve the generalizability of the findings from the deliberative exercises, for instance the entropy balancing method developed by Hainmueller (2012). This is where a parallel opinion poll representative of the general population (or 18-35 olds) might be of use. Entropy balancing has been used to reweight convenience sample data to match the demographic distributions (e.g. age, gender, education) from the populations of each country (e.g. Bansak et al. 2017). The problem with generalizing findings gathered from participants who have self-selected in British Council programmes is that they are likely to differ from the general population in ways that is not completely captured by the standard demographic variables (e.g. age, gender, education). But this problem can be mitigated by using attitudinal variables from an especially commissioned national opinion poll, which uses the same questions on cooperative orientations as the deliberative exercises: deliberation participants whose views match more closely with national averages (and who are likely to be underrepresented in the British Council samples) can be given a higher weight when the size of the treatment effect is estimated. For instance, if the views of participants are already skewed towards “cooperative internationalism” *before* the deliberation (compared to the general population), individuals who are more hawkish at the start of

the deliberation could be given more weight when it comes to calculating the difference that treatment makes relative to the control group. This can provide a stronger methodological rationale for the conclusion that the effects observed in the samples would similarly apply to the general population (if it had participated in a similar exercise). But the discussion of entropy balancing and similar post-stratification approaches is evolving fast, and their application would require researchers with state-of-the-art statistical competencies.

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