
London School of Economics

Positions, Activities and Organization: An economist view of strategy from conception to implementation




Learning Curves



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Source: Robert Grant

(too) Simple industry and firm analysis: BCG



Long-term Profitability of US Industries: EVA 1986-97


| Industry | EVA | Industry | EVA |
|---------------------------|-------|---------------------------------|-------|
| Tobacco | 9.4 | Paper and products | (1.5) |
| Computer software | 9 | Broadcasting and | |
| & services | 5.9 | publishing | (1.5) |
| Personal care | | Cars & trucks | (1.5) |
| products | 2.8 | Healthcare services | (1.7) |
| Medical products | 2.7 | Machine tools, hand tools (1.7) | |
| 6.0Printing & | | Appliances and home | |
| advertising | (2.0) | furnishings | (1.9) |
| Food processing | 2.5 | Telephone equipment 8 | |
| Drugs & research | 0.7 | services | (2.1) |
| Beverages | 0.2 | Plastics & products | (2.6) |
| Textiles | (0.1) | Computers & peripherals | (3.1) |
| Fashion retailing | (0.4) | Electrical products | (3.3) |
| Building materials | (0.6) | Aerospace & defense | (3.3) |
| Metals | (1.0) | Railroads | (3.4) |
| Telecom services | (1.2) | Airlines | (4.1) |
| Discount retailing | (1.2) | Steel | (6.4) |
| Semiconductors | | Cable television | (7.2) |
| & components | (1.3) | Electronics | (9.2) |
| | | Average | (1.1) |

Source: Hawawini et al, Strategic Management Journal (January 2003)


Structure Conduct Performance

Market Firm Firm Performance


Porter's "Five Forces"




The Modern version (Brandenburger and Nalebuff)



The Modern version (Brandenburger and Nalebuff)



Environment, Positions





Example 2: Rental car industry

How attractive is the environment where rental car companies operate?

Actual and Potential Rivals

Rivalry fierce (no differentiation)


Easy entry

•Airport! Suppliers (space, counter) Complementors Firm **Buyers**

Enterprise

- Scope
 - Replacement market/2nd car
 - Local: garages/bodyshops/city corners
- Competitive advantage
 - Convenient
 - Friendly
 - Service/partner of garages

An update: Game Theory



Pricing like a prisoner's dilemma (players a and b)

| | (b) confess | (b) deny |
|-------------|-------------|----------|
| | | |
| (a) confess | -10 | -25 |
| | -10 | -1 |
| (a) deny | -1 | -3 |
| | -25 | -3 |

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Some insights

On market structure

depends on the extent to which endogenous sunk costs matter (Sutton)

e.g. Coke vs. Pepsi

On price competition changing the game?

Environment, Positions, Organization

Recall

Assignment:


design a firm that can implement the previous rental strategy

service oriented, flexible

convenient

replacement (local segment)

referral flow from garages



Organizational Structure


People

Architecture

- Ø Division of labor
- Ø Hierarchy
- 1. Managerial decision rights and incentives
- 2. Unit Structure: Grouping units into subunits
- 3. Integrating Mechanisms


Culture

2. Hierarchy + Strategy



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2. Hierarchy + Strategy



3. Decision Rights and Incentives


Complementarities between DR and incentives

Substitutions among efforts in tasks
the danger of high powered incentives
"you get what you pay for"
measurability

example: FBI counterterrorism

Initiative Versus Coordination

3. Coordination vs Motivation



Motivation (or initiative/innovation)

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4. Unit Structure and Strategy

(with Dessein, Gertner)

General principle:

Client units: adaptation

• Operational units – shared resources: Synergies/cost savings

Hybrid structures: communication out of unit critical— which limits incentives strength

5. Integrating Mechanisms

Rarely only one principle (e.g. functional vs. product) used

I. Hybrids: Functional principle at some level, business at another

II. Using specialized coordinators:

One principle has priority, with coordinating devices: Teams, centers of excellence, and other intermediate coordination devices

III. Matrix: Both at the same time

Culture

(with Cremer, Prat)

- Knowledge –based
 - Codes/language... Shared Specific Human Capital
 Application: tradeoff between merger/stand alone

Culture and Incentives

Incentives –based

Unforeseen contingencies: what constitutes acceptable behavior?
 What is undesired cheating that must be punished?

High powered incentives

 Use culture (relational contracts) to help control Multitasking (YGWYPF)

Low Powered Incentives

Use culture (relational contracts) to substitute for direct, explicit incentives

Complementarities among tools

- Lots of peaks/partial optima
 - Non-convexities gets worse before it gets better
- System-changes
 - Partial adjustment is useless or worse
 - Need to move multiple tasks

(leader needed! Vision, conviction...)

Back to Enterprise

• How would you implement it?

Application: Some thoughts on BP

Application: Some thoughts on BP

From strategy to organization

E&P- few interdependencies, measurable...

high powered incentives

Process safety

like counterterrorism, hard to measure, hard to measure consequences of mistakes (take years) easy to save on today...

Wholesale change?

True, complementarities exist

But can do better on existing structure

- Seggregate hard to measure tasks into separate job and hierarchy
- Use lower power incentives for those
- Rely on direct control/monitoring

