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Killing the Dead: The Logic of Cemetery Destruction during Genocidal Campaigns

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1. Abstract

This dissertation seeks to challenge the distinct treatment of cultural destruction and genocide in both international legal policy and academia. The neglect in policy and academia of cultural violence during genocidal conflict reveals a serious misunderstanding of the fundamental logic of cultural destruction itself, and its connection to the concepts of genocide, ethno-nationalism, and collective identities.

This dissertation contends that cultural destruction during genocidal campaigns is a dimension of genocide itself, and is evidence of the intent to completely erase the targeted group from existence. It will focus on a powerful, yet under-examined, form of cultural violence; namely the destruction of cemeteries and graveyards. My argument will be demonstrated through the localised case study of the town of Zvornik, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the destruction of two Muslim cemeteries that took place there during genocidal campaigns against the Muslim communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1992-1995 war.

Through identifying the logic and legacy of cemetery destruction, this dissertation will show that any attempt to dissociate biological genocide against individuals from the eradication of their culture is misinformed and artificial. Failure to recognise the multidimensional nature of genocide will obstruct our capacity to combat it, and prevent the delivery of justice in its aftermath.

2. List of Abbreviations

ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
UN	United Nations
UNCPPCG	United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

3. Introduction

“The right to life and the right to cultural identity go together, they are ineluctably intermingled. Physical and biological destruction is interrelated with the destruction of a group’s identity as part of its life, its living conditions.”

Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade (ICJ 2016: p345)

“For me, one thing is destroying a mosque, but graves ... I don’t think it can get much sicker than that.”

Interview with Muslim Bosnian survivor, 29/07/2020 (see bibliography)

As the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 drew to a close, a local architect named Kresimir Sego lamented the enormous cultural destruction that his town of Mostar was subjected to. Sego recalled: “even the cemeteries were destroyed with the town” (in Bobic 2019: p62). The cultural fabric of the town was destroyed alongside the genocidal campaigns primarily launched against Muslim Bosnians (‘Bosniaks’), driven by, among other phenomena, Croat and Serb ethno-nationalist ideals of a ‘purified’ ethnic land. So potent was this desire to rid Bosnia of Muslims that even the deceased members of the Bosniak community who rested in the town’s Muslim cemeteries were attacked. Those passed, and the cemeteries themselves, provided testimony of the Muslim community’s

historic presence in the land, contradicting the ethno-nationalist narrative of a pure ethnic territory.

The Bosnian War, one of the conflicts forming the break-up of the former-Yugoslavia during the 1990s, was marked by massive and intentional destruction of cultural, religious, and historical property (Riedlmayer 2007: p107; Coward 2009: p7; Bevan 2016: p40). Subsequently, the attention of policy-makers and academics turned to the protection of cultural heritage, particularly during conflict and genocidal campaigns. And still, despite the initial growth in discourse, over two decades after the end of the Bosnian war, there has yet to emerge any comprehensive overview or analysis of the destruction of Bosnian cultural heritage, its impact, and its legacy (Walasek 2015: p1). This is particularly true of cemetery destruction, which has consistently been neglected in both policy and academia, despite consensus on the prevalence of this form of destruction during the war (Balic 1994: p270; Juvan & Prebalic 2014: p64; Pickard & Celiku 2008: p27).

The neglect in policy and academia of cemetery destruction and cultural violence during genocidal conflict reveals a serious misunderstanding of the fundamental logic of cultural destruction itself, and its connection to the concepts of genocide, ethno-nationalism, and collective identities. I contend that until we recognise that the fate of peoples and their cultures are inextricably connected, there will be no solution to the continuing attacks on both.

In the original conception of genocide, destruction of cultural property was held in the same regard as violence against humans. This was founded on the idea that individuals are organically and inseparably integrated into the culture to which they belong (Lemkin 1994: p79; Powell 2007: p534). Thus, the murder of humans motivated by their membership of a specific ethnic, cultural or religious group, and attacks on manifestations of their collective identity - such as language, traditions, religious spaces, and cultural institutions - constitute differing elements of the *single*, but multidimensional, process of genocide. And yet, this interlinked nature of the killing of people and cultural destruction is not reflected in much of the international legal policy relating to genocide. The measures outlined in the United Nations 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict may be disregarded if seen to inhibit military progress - a substantial loophole that fails to recognise the significance of cultural destruction (Bevan 2016: p37).

It was not until 2015 that a conviction of the war crime “destruction of historical and religious monuments” was secured by the International Criminal Court against Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi, a leading member of the Malian Islamic militia Ansar Dine (ICC-01/12-01/2015). While the decision was lauded for its precedential value recognising the connection between an attack on a group and its culture, the judgment itself must be scrutinised. Despite the religiously-motivated murders committed by Ansar Dine that accompanied the destruction of cultural property, the crime of genocide

was not invoked (Bilsky & Klagsburn 2018: pp373-4). This absence of the crime of genocide demonstrates that genocide and cultural destruction remain functionally distinct in both international legal practice and much of the relevant academic discourses. Such separations obstruct efforts to address the multidimensional phenomenon of genocide. Hence, the implications of this research are highly consequential for the lived experiences and realities of innumerable communities who are subjected to attacks and violence of all natures today.

Whilst it follows that international legal policies addressing genocide warrant reconsideration, it must be underpinned by a review of our theoretical approaches to the concept of genocide itself. I argue that the shortcomings of current policies stem from a limited definition of genocide as solely violence against human bodies. As such, effective policy is contingent on a reappraisal of the very nature of genocide. This dissertation aims therefore to demonstrate the foundational role that cultural destruction plays in genocidal campaigns by exploring the logic of cemetery destruction in the context of a single, localised and triangulated case study.

This dissertation will be organised into the following sections: (i) a literature review contextualising scholarly gaps relating to genocide and an explanation of the social role of cemeteries; (ii) an overview of methodological approach and the case study of the north-eastern Bosnian town of Zvornik; and (iii) two main sections of analysis, each responding to the following research questions:

1. Why do people destroy cemeteries during genocidal campaigns?
2. What is the impact and the legacy of this form of violence?

This dissertation will show that cultural destruction during genocidal campaigns is a dimension of genocide itself. It is evidence of the intent to completely erase the targeted group from existence. An attempt to dissociate biological genocide against individuals from the eradication of their culture is artificial, because groups exist through cultural markers of their shared identities. Failure to recognise the multidimensional nature of genocide will obstruct our capacity to combat it, and prevent the delivery of justice in its aftermath.

4. Theoretical Framework

4.1 International Legal Framework

The paucity of study into the phenomenon of cemetery destruction reflects a neglect more generally of the wider concept of cultural destruction, both in the international legal arena and in academia. Cultural destruction - the obliteration of another population's cultural heritage - remains merely a conceptual framework that may be linked to genocide. This stands in direct contradiction to the original conception

of genocide that Raphael Lemkin, the lawyer responsible for coining the term, had proposed.

In the wake of the Holocaust, and having been deeply impacted emotionally by the Armenian Genocide earlier in the century, Lemkin recognised the need for a concept for mass murder and cultural destruction. He suggested that the distinguishing feature of genocides is the *reason* why those people are killed; they are not targeted as individuals but each individual represents the larger community. A genocide is not the equivalent of a large number of homicides at once - rather, it is the killing of an ethnic or national community, and, in targeting a 'nation', also aims at destroying the cultural elements of a nation's collective identity. As Powell (2007: p534) argues, genocide cannot be reduced to the killing of individuals because the existence of a nation "does not reduce to the physical survival of the individuals that make it up, any more than a person's life reduces to the cells that make up their body."

For Lemkin, if the point of genocide is the total destruction of a national or ethnic group, this fundamentally involves the destruction of the group's physical, social and cultural existence. Thus, his original conception of genocide consisted of two key elements: barbarity, by which he referred to attacks and violence against people; and vandalism, meaning attacks on culture as an expression of a people's genius, such as monuments, archives, religious spaces, language and traditions (Frieze 2013: p172). Crucially, however, the entire article delineating Lemkin's notion of 'vandalism' was removed from

the 1948 United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCPPCG) at the insistence of the United States of America's representatives, who were concerned that their own treatment of the native communities in the United States would be subsequently criminalised (Churchill 1998: p365). Consequently, there is no mention of cultural destruction in the UNCPPCG - Article II of the Convention defines genocide as: "Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" (UN 1948: p277). The methods by which genocide could be measured were also listed in Article II to include: mass killing; inflicting serious mental or bodily harm; expulsions and deportation; prevention of births; transfer of children from the targeted group to another group. These definitions clearly reflect the destruction of living bodies of the targeted group. How that group identifies, collectively represents or understands itself - in other words, its collective culture - is not present as a measure by which to judge genocidal actions (Bevan 2016: p41). Therefore, from the conceptual genesis of genocide in international law, the notion of barbarity against the corporeal has been divorced from the destruction of the essential cultural and social foundations of the targeted group.

Tentative progress towards the reconciliation of these two dimensions of genocide has been made, but proves ultimately insufficient. The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (UNESCO 1954: Article 4) calls on warring parties to "refrain from any act of hostility directed against such property" and to "undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to ... any acts of vandalism

directed against cultural property.” The same article, however, retracts this obligation “in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.” This sizeable loophole was narrowed somewhat with the 1977 Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949, when The Hague’s provisions regarding the protection of cultural heritage were incorporated into the humanitarian laws of the Geneva Convention (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977: Article 53). However, these efforts still failed to acknowledge the intertwined nature of genocide and cultural destruction; a notion yet to find its place in international law. This legacy is evident in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former-Yugoslavia (ICTY) at The Hague, established to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity occurring during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. While under Article 3(D) of its Statute, the ICTY exercises jurisdiction to prosecute the “destruction, or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to religion ...[and] historic monuments”, the role of cultural destruction in ethno-nationalist campaigns continues to be misidentified. As Bevan (2016: p12) argues, at the ICTY the destruction of heritage has been tentatively accepted as “potential *evidence* of genocide, but not as an intrinsic method of achieving genocide even if they are an element of blatant attempts to erase an entire people’s history and identity.” Bevan’s critique of the ICTY, whose approach is paralleled by the United Nation’s International Court of Justice (ICJ), is shared with Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, who articulated his dissenting opinion at The Hague in 2016 towards the verdict on a genocide case between Serbia and Croatia. Judge Trindade

expressed his disgust at the court's insistence that cultural and religious destruction does not amount to acts of genocide:

“Whether one wishes to admit it or not, body and soul come together, and it is utterly superficial, clearly untenable, to attempt to dissociate one from the other” (ICJ 2016: p347).

Trindade argued that the ICJ denies justice as it overlooks systematic patterns of cultural violence in its pursuit of establishing too onerous a level of evidence proving intent to commit genocide; he asserts that the consistent pattern of cultural destruction is itself evidence of a desire to annihilate a people and an identity. Trindade's view, which clearly reflects Lemkin's original perspective of genocide as comprising both barbarity and vandalism, is still yet to be holistically adopted within the international legal framework. This, as discussed in depth in the following section, has considerable implications for the reliable protection (or lack thereof) of cultural heritage across the globe, but also misconstrues the *logic* of cultural destruction itself.

4.2 Genocide and Cultural Violence

The failure in international law to conceive the inherent connection between cultural cleansing and genocide has been rehearsed to a limited extent in the respective academic literature. A. Dirk Moses (2002) identifies a pattern in which the relevant

academia falls into either the 'liberal' or the 'post-liberal' school of thought. Moses argues that the 'liberal' school of thought understands genocide as the *intentional action of a coherent agent*, thus centring on states that demonstrate a will towards genocide (see, for example, Charny 1994: p75; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990: p10). The 'post-liberal' conception of genocide, by contrast, focuses on the *structural processes that produce genocide, even if no coherent exterminatory intent is manifest* (see, for example, Barta 1987: p239). Thus, post-liberals highlight processes of settler-colonisation and destruction of indigenous societies and cultures as genocide, which scholars belonging to the 'liberal' school of thought may oppose. Powell (2007: pp531-2) suggests that the distinction between the two conceptions of genocide is ultimately a question of *intent* or *effect*. Highly 'liberal' perspectives identify killing as the substance of genocide, viewing cultural destruction as secondary, or profoundly peripheral. By contrast, an articulated 'post-liberal' perspective that holds the destruction of collective identity and life as the substance of genocide may not consider actual killing as fundamental to that process. To cite Lemkin's concepts, a 'liberal' position promotes "barbarity" at the expense of "vandalism", whereas 'post-liberal' approaches risk relegating the notion of "barbarity" in order to highlight "vandalism." I argue that the dichotomy between these two positions obscures the multi-dimensional nature of genocide and the mechanisms through which it functions.

A number of scholarly works has emerged recently, each dealing with little-discussed specific forms of destruction of culture and identity, such as: "libricide", the destruction

of books and libraries (Knuth 2003); “domicide,” the destruction of the home (Porteous and Smith 2001); “identicide,” the destruction of identity (Meharg 2001); and “urbicide,” the destruction of the urban environment (Coward 2009). This body of literature does much to illuminate the logic and impact of each respective form of destruction. However scholars, including Coward through his exploration of “urbicide”, draw distinctions between the concept of genocide and the destruction on which they focus. Coward asserts that we should treat urbicide and genocide as distinct forms of political violence. He suggests (2009: p40) that subsuming urbicide into the concept of genocide would limit our understanding of the targeting of the built environment to acts of symbolic destruction or simply acts of collateral damage in a conflict. This is problematic as it perpetuates a paradigm that misidentifies the concept of genocide and the phenomenon of cultural destruction of which it is partially composed.

4.3 Cultural Destruction as a Fundamental Dimension of Genocide

Genocide is not simply the destruction of the individual members of the targeted group. If this were the case, the term “mass murder” would suffice (Bilsky & Klagsbrun 2018: p374). Indeed, it was precisely Lemkin’s insistence that genocide could not be reduced to mass murder that drove his advocacy for the novel legal category of genocide - one which would adequately connote the motivation of the crime, fundamentally based on racial, religious or national consideration (Lemkin 1946: p227). We must understand that the term genocide refers to *something greater* than the

murder of individuals: at its very essence, genocide *is* the holistic destruction of a national, ethnic, or religious group. According to Powell (2007: p534), this may occur through two principal mutually-reinforcing mechanisms: the mass killings of the members of the targeted nation, or a systematic attack that aims at the 'essential foundations' of the collective life and identity of the group.

As we have discussed, it is this second mechanism that is often overlooked but which embodies a key dimension of genocide. Cultural destruction, or Lemkin's "vandalism", matters because if a group's collective identity is eradicated through the annihilation of its tangible cultural and religious property, as well as intangible social markers such as language and traditions, the end result is similar to the physical eradication of that group: they cease to exist as a distinct cultural community (Bevan 2016: p12). The destruction of a group's cultural heritage annihilates what Weil (1952: p43) calls the "moral, intellectual and spiritual life", which roots the community and the individuals of which the group is comprised. Thereby we see that the motivations behind the pursuit of genocidal campaigns are far more existential than mass murder - at the core of any genocide is the notion of identity, particularly collective identity. It is for this reason that culture, and the visible markers of the victimised group in particular, hold such power.

As Jacobs (2005: p423) asserts, culture embodies that key aspect of human behaviour through which groups continually affirm and reaffirm themselves, thereby preserving and transmitting their collective identity to their adherents. Culture serves as a

“multi-generational foundation for [the] continuing survival” of the group (ibid: p423). If the goal of genocide is the destruction of the national, ethnic or religious group as an existential fact, genocide fundamentally involves attacks on its cultural and architectural existence. As Powell (2007: p534) contends in his arguments as to why cultural destruction must be included in the examination of genocide:

“Genocide does not *reduce* to the killing of individuals because the life of a nation does not reduce to the physical survival of the individuals who make it up, any more than a person’s life reduces to the cells that make up their body.”
(Emphasis author’s own)

The logic of genocide must feature both attacks on human individuals, and the cultural institutions that allow them to exist as a distinct social group, and that, as Judge Trindade (ICJ 2015: p345) suggests, guarantee the right to live with dignity. Therefore, I argue, along with a developing school of academic thought, this “something greater” which is destroyed in genocide can be most potently understood by examining the intentional destruction of the visible markers of the targeted group (see Powell 2007; Bevan 2016; Moshman 2007). Cultural violence must not be treated as a coincidental side-effect of genocidal campaigns; rather, it should be viewed as part-and-parcel of the process of genocide itself. The core of this dissertation serves to reconcile the somewhat antagonistic academic schools of thought on genocide by identifying the multidimensional nature of genocide. In order to understand the significance of

cemetery destruction within the context of genocide, we must first explore what a cemetery represents and means to its community.

4.4 The Social Role of Cemeteries

Cemeteries, referred to by Lilly (2019: p677) as “communities of the dead”, in fact preserve existing communities of the living. They are simultaneously universal in existence and culturally-specific in reality. Cemeteries hold extremely strong discursive power; they play a prominent role in confirming land-ownership, and as markers of identity in a specific place (Scheele 2006: p861). Generations of a family are able to prove their long-standing presence in a space, which renders cemeteries the foundation for communities to claim a historical right there. As Hallam, Hockey and Howarth (1999: pp29-30) argue, dead bodies themselves embody the past, symbolic of historic continuity and grounding the present in a shared past. Cemeteries are places where society remembers itself, and thus hold strong symbolic potential.

However, it must be recognised that cemeteries are not mere symbols of a specific cultural heritage; they are also integral aspects of local landscapes (Scheele 2006: p860). This renders cemeteries, in some respects, a relatively mundane and standardised element of a society’s built environment given that cemeteries are generally ubiquitous across societies and cultures. By destroying elements of the local landscape, ethno-nationalist parties attack what Coward (2009: p14) suggests are the

conditions that allow for the “possibility of community”. To be sure, the destruction of public spaces, regardless of how explicit their cultural symbolism, embodies ethno-nationalist conflict aims as they represent the violent foreclosure of culturally-heterogeneous arenas as such, laying the groundwork for reconfiguring society according to one homogeneous political and ethnic programme. Even when a cemetery does not appear to be explicitly religious or cultural in its imagery, it fundamentally represents the existence and historical presence of the community to which it belongs.

The destruction of cemeteries in genocidal campaigns dispels the notion that cultural destruction occurs during a conflict as collateral damage. In the chaos of conflict, it is not always possible to distinguish the multiple motivations that influence wartime destruction: Brosché et al (2016: p3) identify a number of drivers behind the destruction of cultural property during conflict, including military-strategic attacks, signalling attacks, and economic incentives. It might be argued that cultural violence arises as a side-effect of a conflict, or as a form of collateral damage. However, given the extent of the damage and military strength employed during the Bosnian war, and specifically the widespread destruction of cemeteries, arguments of collateral damage appear less convincing. During the 1992-1995 Serb siege of the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, the principal Jewish cemetery was obliterated. According to the Commission for Preservation of National Monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, about ninety-five percent of the stones were at least damaged, if not fully destroyed during the war. The

cemetery was then filled with landmines - a fate shared by the majority of Jewish cemeteries in Serb-occupied Bosnia (Gruber 2011: p25). The extent of the destruction of Muslim cemeteries at the hands of Serb forces in Bosnia paints a similar picture of violence exceeding what was necessary for simply rendering a cemetery unusable. In the midst of the conflict, Balic (1994: p270) reported that Muslim cemeteries were not just destroyed, but were subsequently bulldozed, and the rubble removed. While it may at first seem illogical to devote war-time military resources to attacking already-deceased members of the targeted community, it is clear from the prevalence of this phenomenon that there is a strong logic behind the destruction. Not a trace of the former cemetery could be tolerated as it reflected a history that contradicted the narrative of ethno-nationalist campaigns. The excessive amount of military material devoted to the destruction of cemeteries highlights its significance, serving as a powerful dimension of cultural violence that demonstrates the fundamental role cultural destruction plays in genocidal campaigns.

5 Methodology

5.1 Research Design

I have selected the methodological approach of a highly-localised case study in order to best demonstrate the role of the destruction of cemeteries in cultural violence and identity myth-making more generally. A localised case study is most appropriate for

a number of reasons. Firstly, there is currently no completed quantitative dataset that fully enumerates this phenomenon, neither in the context of the former-Yugoslavia nor elsewhere, and thus a case study methodology will provide an important initial framework. Secondly, as Baxter and Jack (2008: p544) suggest, a case study ensures that a phenomenon is explored *within* its context; a central consideration for this dissertation in analysing the logic of cemetery destruction within the context of genocidal campaigns. Another strength of this approach is that the phenomenon is not examined through one single-variable lens, but rather a number of triangulated lenses, providing space for a variety of dimensions to be revealed. Thirdly, a focus on the *logic* of a phenomenon requires the exploration of perceptions, interpretations and individual and collective understandings, offering insight into the meaning of a phenomenon, thus suiting the research questions and motivations of this dissertation.

Regarding my sources, the data forming the basis of my case study was found in expert witness testimony given by Andras Riedlmayer at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and witness testimony gathered by the United States Department of State, featured in a Submission of Information to the United Nations Security Council. There are certain limitations with solely relying on official witness testimony gathered by external actors; principally that the context and motivations behind their data gathering was distinct from the hypotheses in this dissertation. Hence, I have triangulated the data from the ICJ and United Nations Security Council with other approaches, including various methods and resources, so as to develop a solid case study that can support

convincing findings and analysis. By triangulation, I refer to the implementation of multiple methods and data sources to develop a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon (Patton, 1999). This process also strengthens the validity of conclusions drawn from the research as it confirms the convergence of information from a variety of sources (Cope 2014: p545).

Methods of triangulation include analysis of dialogue and discourse expressed by perpetrators and those overseeing the cultural violence in question, such as the Serbian war-time mayor of Zvornik, Branko Grujic, as this will shed light on the articulated motivations, goals and justifications behind the destruction of cemeteries. Additionally, this discourse will include an interview I carried out with a Bosnian survivor who fled the Serb-occupied town of Prijedor during the conflict: a town which now finds itself located in the Republika Srpska, as does the town of Zvornik - the case study of this dissertation. The purpose of this interview was to enrich my literature-based research, further triangulating my findings, rather than embodying a fundamental method on which this dissertation rests.

My case study is the north-eastern town of Zvornik in Bosnia-Herzegovina, situated on the Bosnian-Serb border in Republika Srpska. This destruction occurred in the context of heinous genocidal campaigns against the local Bosniak Muslim population, including mass murders, torture, physical and psychological abuse, rape, destruction of mosques and other religious heritage, destruction of homes, mass deportations and expulsions

(Gratz 2011: p415). The main reason behind the selection of Zvornik as my case study was the availability of data, or the lack thereof, due to the fact that this phenomenon has been neglected in policy-making, in the international legal sphere, and in the relevant literature. This, however, ultimately represents a strength of the case study of Zvornik, as the formative process of triangulation, both in terms of methods and data sources, has resulted in a foundationally-solid case study that is backed up by multiple sources and methodological approaches.

An approach centred on one area's localised geopolitical storyline closely reflects the understandings of the Bosnian conflict widely shared by ethno-nationalists and targeted communities (Dahlman and Tuathail 2005a: p646). The Bosnian conflict was not a singular event unfolding evenly across the republic. Rather, it developed as a series of localised conflicts, each with its regional dynamics of violence, genocidal campaigns, destruction, and post-war legacy. Of course, the conflict, along with its ethno-nationalist rhetoric, was not conceived on the local level; it was one element of the greater violent breakup of Yugoslavia, largely planned by the Milosević leadership in Serbia, and then executed by the Yugoslav Army along with numerous Serb militias (Gow 2003). Trends and experiences can be extrapolated across Bosnian and Yugoslav regions, but can only be holistically understood in their own context. Thus, in this dissertation I will look at a case study that embodies much of the violence that marks this period.

So far, the quantitative research conducted regarding cemetery destruction during the Bosnian conflict demonstrates that the phenomenon was indeed prevalent. Chapman (1993: p121, Table 1) cites a special issue of the Newsletter of the Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture produced in 1993, where he states that in the first year of the Serb-led assault of Islamic heritage in Bosnia, thirty-three Muslim cemeteries were destroyed, and a further two were severely damaged. Riedlmayer's (2002b) highly-cited documentation of destroyed Islamic heritage in the Bosnian Conflict reveals that over half of the ninety Islamic mausolea and shrines, often located in cemeteries, were destroyed or damaged during the conflict. Riedlmayer (2002b: p2) also documents the number of mosques destroyed or damaged during the conflict: of 1,706 mosques known to have existed before the war, 1,186 were found to be destroyed or damaged, constituting 69.52 percent of the total. This statistic relating to mosques is central to the exploration of cemetery destruction because, as Lilly (2019: p700) asserts, a great many Muslim cemeteries were attached to mosques or other religious buildings. Consequently, we can infer that a high number of Muslim cemeteries will have been destroyed along with their connected mosques, although the precise number is unknown. Thus, prior efforts to document the destruction of cultural heritage confirm the presence of the phenomenon of cemetery destruction, providing a stable foundation for this dissertation. However, it is for this reason that a case study, supported by data and method triangulation, is the most effective methodological approach to understand the logic of the destruction of cemeteries during genocidal campaigns.

5.2 Case Study

5.2.1 Yugoslav Context

Amidst the violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, ethno-nationalist campaigns were unleashed, predominantly on the part of the Serbs but also by Croat nationalists, in order to “cleanse” captured territories of ethno-religious minorities, with particular suffering inflicted on the Muslim community of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the war ensued, it became evident that the intent was not simply to create an ethnically-homogeneous and “pure” state, but also to eradicate any indications of a multicultural past. In this way, systematic and intentionally-planned campaigns were developed to target identity and cultural heritage. Across the former-Yugoslavia, the heritage of the all local religious denominations - Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Muslim, Jewish - suffered significant damage. In Bosnia, however, it was the Ottoman Islamic heritage that was subject to the highest and most severe levels of destruction (Bevan 2016: 40-41). Caught between the advancing Croat and Serb forces, by 1995, which marked the official end of the conflict in Bosnia, the region’s Muslim heritage was shattered.

As Riedlmayer (2002b: p98) suggests, the assault on Bosnia-Herzegovina at the hands of the Serb-led Yugoslav People’s Army was characterised by two features that had little to do with legitimate military objectives: namely, the mass expulsion of and violence

against civilians for being of the “wrong” ethnicity and religion; and the deliberate targeting and destruction of cultural, religious and historic landmarks by nationalist extremists. He rejects the notion that the destruction was fueled by “ancient hatreds”, as had been argued by some preceding scholars (see Kaplan 2005). Rather, Riedlmayer convincingly maintains that it was the evidence of a shared past that ethno-nationalists sought to erase, given the history that was destroyed all spoke eloquently of centuries of pluralism and tolerance in Bosnia.

It is important to note that, although the communist regime of the former-Yugoslavia did manage to dismantle much of the institutional powers of religious communities, the state seemed more inclined to exercise accommodation and tolerance regarding burial culture and religious cemeteries. The picture of the government’s somewhat ambivalent attitudes towards the secularisation of cemeteries is illustrated by the fact that the state, in many cases, provided mixed-heritage graveyards with ethno-religious boundary markers in order to preserve the ethnic communities of the living reflected in the burial sites of their dead (Lilly 2019: pp679-680). Therefore, the examination of ethno-religious cemeteries remains a pertinent endeavour in the case of the former-Yugoslavia, and more specifically to this dissertation, in Bosnia, since, as Lilly (2019: p681) argues, “every funeral or visit to a loved one in a separate cemetery or segregated section served as a reminder of who was included and who was not.”

5.2.2 Zvornik

Located at the Bosnian-Serb border of the River Drina, Zvornik was seen in the eyes of Serb-nationalists as a historically-Serb “fortress on the Drina” - the river was not considered a border line but rather the ‘backbone of the Serb homeland’ (Dahlman and Tuathail 2005a: p647). According to the 1991 census, the county of Zvornik had a population of 81,111. Ethnic Bosnians (Muslims) made up 59.4% of the population, while Serb nationals constituted 38%. Regarding the town of Zvornik itself, out of a total population of 14,660 people, 61% were Bosnian, 29.2% were Serb, 0.5% of the population were Croat nationals, and the remaining 9.3% were defined as “others” - predominantly Roma and Jews (Tretter et al. 1994: p2). Surveys that took place in the immediate pre-war period demonstrate that there was a generalisable level of coexistence in the minds of Zvornik’s residents: in a 1990 survey, only around 5% of both Bosnian Muslims and Serbs strongly agreed with the notion that “each nation should have its own state” (Vratusa-Zunic 1997). However, two years after the 1991 census shows that the majority of Zvornik residents identified themselves as Muslim Bosnians, the population of the town was 100% Serbian (Riedlmayer 2002b: p27). This was the result of a two-month concerted campaign carried out by the Yugoslav People’s Party between April to June 1992, in which an estimated 2,500 people were murdered in the first few days of the siege, and many more were tortured, imprisoned and/or raped before being expelled from Zvornik (ibid: p27). The subsequent destruction of most Islamic cultural property demonstrates that the aggressors wanted to eradicate all

memories of the prior existence of the purged ethnic group (Tretter et al 2010: p33). As Dahlman and Tuathail (2005b: p593) assert, “what was once a Muslim majority town is no longer recognisable.”

During this process of the forced expulsion and ethnic cleansing of Zvornik’s Muslims, considerable amounts of cultural destruction have also been documented. Included in the items targeted for destruction in the Zvornik area are the *tekija* (house of meditation) and numerous mosques. Practically all religious buildings relating to mourning and the housing of the dead were damaged or destroyed. Multiple *turbes* (mausolea) in the area were completely destroyed, including the *turbe* of Hasan Sheikh Kaimi-baba in Zvornik town (Pickard and Celiku 2008: p27). This brings us to the destruction of the Muslim cemetery in Zvornik, testimony of which was part of a Submission of Information to the United Nations Security Council (USA Department of State 1992). A 64-year-old Bosniak witnessed this destruction and reported that in mid-April, 1992, Serbian forces began using a bulldozer to dig pits in the Muslim cemeteries southwest of Zvornik-proper. He saw buses and trucks loaded with bodies taken to Zvornik’s stone quarry. The centuries-old cemetery, the bodies and the tombstones, were all removed. The Muslim cemetery in the village of Divic, situated around three kilometres south of the town of Zvornik, was subjected to a similar fate. Divic was home to 1,388 Bosnian Muslims and four Serb residents according to the 1991 census; however, on 26 April 1992, Serb-nationalist forces entered the village and ordered the men to surrender all weapons, before damaging and destroying buildings and property belonging to the

Muslim community (Riedlmayer 2006: p32). Riedlmayer's expert testimony in the ICTY's case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (2006) shows that the old Muslim cemetery, along with Divic's mosque, was completely razed, before a Serb Orthodox church was erected to replace it on the same site. As Riedlmayer argued to the court, "The aim, clearly, was to eliminate both the [Muslim] community in Divic and its historical, cultural and religious identity and even the very memory of its existence" (2006: p32, paragraph 64).

6 Analysis

6.1 Why Destroy a Cemetery?

In response to the first research question, three overarching findings have been gathered and represent an independent section in my analysis; (i) strengthening the myth of historical national purity (ii) taking back what belongs to 'us' (iii) erasing all visible evidence of 'the other'.

6.1.1 Strengthening the myth of national purity

Hobsbawm and Ranger conclude through *The Invention of Tradition*, that the process of myth-making based on a specific interpretation of history will likely be intensified "when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social

patterns for which 'old' traditions had been designed, producing new ones to which they were not applicable" (1983: p4). This was certainly the case for the Serb-nationalist forces and the breakdown of the former-Yugoslavia, and more specifically in what occurred in Zvornik. The Bosnian Civil War was based on an invented, and ultimately false, historical past, subsequently manipulated by political elites, that perceived each area of the West Balkans as having been once ethnically homogeneous and capable of being again (Chapman 1993: p5). This was the very *raison d'être* of the Serb ethno-nationalist forces. As Riedlmayer (2002b: p114) argues, the goal was to create an ethnically and religiously "pure" future, founded on the premise that coexistence is - and always was - impossible.

In order for this narrative to be convincing, however, any relics or items of heritage that undermined it had to be removed. Cemeteries, through their very existence, were proof that the "others", in this case Bosniaks, had historical roots there stretching over generations. In other words, as they refute the very premise of the nationalist call to war itself, cemeteries were systematically targeted for destruction. Therefore, one of the reasons that cemeteries were destroyed during the Bosnian conflict was that it strengthened the central Serb myth of national and territorial purity, justifying the war. The rhetorical power of destroying cemeteries and other items of cultural heritage can be found in a speech made by the Serb wartime mayor of Zvornik, Branko Grujic, who declared that, after the cemetery and the town's mosques had been shelled and then bulldozed: "There were never any mosques in Zvornik" (in Sells 1996: p4). By

eradicating the evidence of the Muslim community in Zvornik, the constructed myth of Serb territorial purity was consolidated.

The historical existence of the “other” that is engendered through cemeteries can also be found in other items of cultural heritage, such as archives, which were similarly targeted for destruction during the war. The Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, home to Bosnia’s largest collection of Islamic manuscripts and Ottoman documents, was shelled during the siege of Sarajevo in May 1992, and all of its contents were destroyed. One of the most significant losses of the Institute’s destruction was the Ottoman provincial archive, which contained over 200,000 documents and primary source material for 500 years of Bosnia’s history (Riedlmayer 2007: p112). Thus we observe the aim to consolidate the Serbian driving myth of historical purity not just in the destruction of cemeteries, but also in the targeting of other cultural spaces that articulate the other’s longstanding presence in the region.

Nevertheless, the destruction of cemeteries holds a deeper significance for members of the targeted community, as in people’s day to day lives they experience a closer personal affinity and connection to the local graves of deceased family members than archival material in the country’s capital. In this way, cemetery destruction was a necessary step in the process of “formalisation and ritualisation”, to use Hobsbawm and Ranger’s terminology (1983: p4), of their guiding ideology that denied a past of coexistence, cultural pluralism and tolerance. As Hobsbawm (December 1993)

suggests, “If there is no suitable past it can always be invented. The past legitimises.” The eradication of cemeteries was thus an essential method through which Serb ethno-nationalists could transmit their ideology, and justify their calls for genocidal campaigns against impure elements of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As such, it is evident that the destruction of cemeteries was not an independent endeavour, but was an element of the genocidal campaigns against the Bosniak community.

6.1.2 Taking Back What is Ours

Another finding that emerged was that the cemetery in Zvornik was destroyed because, according to the Serb forces, it was part of a campaign to take back the territory that they held as rightfully theirs. One element of communicating this was to destroy parts of the landscape that did not conform. Again, Zvornik’s mayor, Branko Grujic, expressed such sentiments when he attempted to justify the destruction of the town’s cemetery and the mosque through a discourse that conflated time into what Dahler and Tuathail (2005a: p649) call a “mythic symmetry”: “The Turks destroyed the Serbian church that was here when they arrived in Zvornik in 1463. Now we are rebuilding the church and reclaiming this as Serbian land forever and ever” (in Dahler and Tuathail 2005a: p649). The destruction of the cemetery and other accompanying instances of cultural violence were legitimised by the argument that *our* attacks are defensive and are acts of recuperating what historically belongs to us.

Kaufman (2001: p37) offers an enlightening explanation regarding the logic of this aspect of cultural violence. He argues that even atrocities require a normative basis, founded on two key components: a mythical belief that the opponent has already engaged in atrocities, and that retaliatory atrocities are thus morally acceptable. This is why, he maintains, ethnic violence and cultural destruction are always defined defensively by the perpetrators; atrocities are legitimised by claiming that they are the only way to defend what is *rightfully ours*. Indeed, as cemeteries both bear the memory of the past and simultaneously serve to demarcate communal boundaries, cemeteries embody the historical continuum in the connection between territory and ethnic groups (Juhasz 2007: p11). As Colović (2002: p27) argues in his work on Serbian perceptions and symbolisms of the period, “Wherever there are Serbian graves, there is Serbia. Graves mark the boundaries of Serbian land.” It is logical that the same notions would apply to Muslim graves in the eyes of Serb nationalists - wherever there are Muslim graves, there is Islam, and therefore the enemy. In this way, Muslim cemeteries in Zvornik and Divic were explicitly targeted for destruction in order to demonstrate the territorial domination of what was deemed a fundamentally Serb space. Further comments from Zvornik’s mayor Grujic substantiate this notion: in the ICTY proceedings against Momčilo Krajišnik, a high-level Bosnian Serb leader during the war, Grujic was quoted to have said in the final stages of the conflict: “Return to Zvornik ... the Muslims must be joking. This was a Serbian town before Islam existed in the Balkans” (ICTY IT-00-39-T 2006). Therefore, one important dimension of the logic of cemetery destruction, in the context of genocidal campaigns, is embodied by the notion that the

existing cultural property of the “other” is illegitimate, as is the human presence of the community, and thus must be eradicated in line with ethno-nationalist aims.

6.1.3 Erase all visible evidence of ‘the other’

The third and final finding in response to the research question, ‘why do people destroy cemeteries during genocidal campaigns?’, relates to the logic of cemetery destruction involving the erasure of all visible markers of “the other”: the creation of a blank slate on which to build a future in line with ethno-nationalist values.

The eradication of a cemetery, and other cultural monuments and heritage, amounts to the claim that “the other” never lived here - never even existed. Cemeteries, mosques, libraries, and other communal spaces were systematically targeted in a precise and purposeful manner, demonstrated by the fact that areas around them were often left unaffected (Sells 1996: p2). The specific targeting of particular cultural spaces belonging to the Bosniak community mirrors the specific targeting of Bosniak individuals that figures in genocide. The cultural destruction that occurred was not just a backward history-facing endeavour to right the historical record in the minds of ethno-nationalists, but also sought to reshape what futures were possible. In other words, the destruction did not take place in order to leave an absence in landscape or historical narrative, but embodied the first step in the creation of a new vision. This notion forms a key reason

why all visible evidence of the “other” had to be destroyed - the slate was wiped clean upon which the ethno-nationalist ideological view of history could be written.

In a report for the ICTY, Colin Kaiser (2002 IT-00-39, p4), UNESCO representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, contends that the erasure of symbols of Muslim heritage, such as cemeteries and minarets, was the “architectural equivalent to the removal of the population, and visible proof that the Muslims had left.” To cleanse the area of Muslim individuals would not suffice; the communal markers of their culture also posed a threat to an ethnically-pure future. The removal of any cultural trace of Muslim Bosniaks communicated a message that they were unwanted on the territory, but it was also an attempt to reconstruct a landscape so that no proof of the expelled community’s prior existence there remained (Walasek 2015: p58). Anything displaying the community’s deep roots in the place was removed - an effect of which was to make permanent ethno-nationalist campaigns by ensuring that “the other” would find nothing with which they could identify upon their return. The practical implications of this in Zvornik were considerable: following the 1992 attacks, which left it almost entirely depopulated of its pre-war residents, Zvornik quickly became a resettlement site for approximately 31,000 Serbs leaving the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and resettling in Republika Srpska (Dahlman and Tuathail 2005a: p648).

This process of repopulation, of creating a new Serb majority in the once predominantly Bosniak area of Zvornik, represented the creation of a new Serb collective identity.

Testifying at the ICTY in 1998, Kaiser (IT-1995-14-T) noted that cultural destruction was not just aimed at eradicating “the other” and cleansing society, but also symbolised an attempt to change the identity of one’s own people. He argued that, by destroying any remnant of the expelled community, you are creating a new identity for your own people - one who “has not the memory and the experience of having lived with somebody else.” Powell (2007: p542) supports this perspective, and suggests that genocide is the violent culmination of social relations orientated around different identities, and thus while the othered group is subjected to violent collective obliteration, the nature of the perpetrators’ collective identity is also deeply affected. Cemeteries were destroyed in Zvornik as a critical element in the Serb ethno-nationalist genocidal campaign to erase all visible evidence of Zvornik’s Bosniak past, and crucially to create a new Serb identity cleansed of any Muslim influence. Roger Boyes, a journalist for The Times newspaper who reported from the former-Yugoslavia during its break-up, succinctly expressed the impact of cultural violence in this way:

“Why else ... trample on ancient cemeteries? They are moving to make their occupation permanent. Soon, when there are no more mosques left in Bosnia, they will even be able to rewrite history and declare that the natural religion of the country is the Orthodox faith. Welcome to Greater Serbia” (1992, August 28).

We can see that the destruction of cemeteries represents a dimension of genocide itself, and formed a crucial mechanism through which Serb ethno-nationalist genocidal

campaigns were perpetrated. In this way, the logic of cemetery destruction, and cultural violence more generally, is part-and-parcel of genocidal processes. To treat it as such serves to illuminate the logic of genocide, from which point improved policies can be developed in order to protect both individuals and their cultural heritage.

6.2 The Legacy of Cemetery Destruction

The legacy of cemetery destruction sheds further light on the logic underpinning cultural violence and its intrinsic connection to genocidal campaigns, and thus opens up significant dimensions of this phenomenon for analysis. As we broaden our attention from the previous section's specifics regarding the direct aims of cemetery destruction, the following section contextualises the targeting of cemeteries within the wider view of cultural destruction against the Muslim population of Zvornik, and its role in the genocidal campaigns to which the community was subjected. I will address the following three elements relative to three overarching findings: (i) the cementing of cultural separation and mistrust (ii) the consolidation of ethnic cleansing through deterring refugees' return and (iii) the platform for continued violence on the part of the 'winners'.

6.2.1 The Cementing of Cultural Separation and Mistrust

The Bosnian conflict has seriously affected the psyche of Zvornik's residents, particularly when it comes to the possibility of coexistence and security in the future, as

was the aim of Serb ethno-nationalists in reconfiguring social lines towards ethnic homogeneity. In direct contrast to surveys already cited in this dissertation that found that pre-war popular opinion in Zvornik did not endorse the view that each ethno-religious community required its own state, surveys carried out in the post-war period of Zvornik indicate a societal shift: 42% of Bosnian Croats are “most interested in gaining their own entity within Bosnia”, while 65% of Bosnian Serbs declare that “their most important interest is independence for Republika Srpska or its annexation by Serbia” (UNDP 2002: p46). Muslim Bosniaks appear to diverge from this trend towards ethnic separation, with about one third expressing a longing to return to pre-war Bosnia, and a further 52% supporting a Bosnia in which “its peoples are equal citizens.” Nevertheless, as is evident by the data collected from Croat and Serb participants, the ethno-nationalist campaigns of mass murder, expulsions, and cultural destruction can be seen to have achieved a level of success.

Key to this shift, Denich (1994: pp368-9) suggests, was the physical reconfiguration of the community, regarding both the ethnic make-up of Zvornik’s residents as well as its cultural and spatial landscape that serves to reflect the area’s history. Van der Hoorn (2009: p68) agrees, suggesting that the cultural destruction, such as the eradication of Muslim cemeteries, acted as the “main catalyst” for defining cleavages between “us” and “them”. This is because the act of transmitting these ideologies from the intellectual realm to that of mass politics necessitates the manipulation of the physical landscape, principally items of cultural heritage (Denich 1994: p368). The destruction of cemeteries

is a particularly potent mechanism for effecting this sort of social change, from one of general tolerance to one of widespread intolerance, because of the finality in its destruction. Unlike other items of cultural heritage, such as mosques, cemeteries cannot be rebuilt. Once the bodies are removed and disposed of or dynamited, they cannot be restored. Therefore, given that cultural destruction serves to cement the communal separation that ethno-nationalism calls for, nothing is more unequivocal or final than destroying a cemetery. For this reason, focusing on the destruction of cemeteries and its legacies in a post-war era pinpoints the logic behind cultural violence as a fundamental part of consolidating the goals of separation and mistrust that ethno-nationalisms seek.

6.2.2 Consolidating genocidal campaigns through deterring refugees' return

One clear legacy of the destruction of cemeteries and cultural heritage more generally is the message it sends to the targeted community regarding their ability to return to their prewar homes and towns. This legacy embodies both an emotional, psychological dimension, as well as a practical reality for many Bosniak refugees hoping to return home. The long-term psychological impact that cemetery destruction and cultural violence has on a member of the targeted community's ability to envision their post-war return was a conscious tactic endorsed by Serb local leadership in the Republika Srpska during the war. During his expert testimony at the ICTY, Riedlmayer quoted Simon Drljaca, Civil and Secret Police Chief for the Prijedor area during the war,

who called for the destruction of Islamic cultural heritage by framing it in the following way in 1992:

“You’ve got to shake up the foundations [of the community] because that means they cannot build another. Do that, and they’ll want to go. They’ll just leave by themselves.” (2002a: p12)

This demonstrates a consciousness of the significance of cultural destruction on the part of the perpetrators, and how it formed an element of the genocidal campaigns they pursued. Moreover, it confirms the ethno-nationalists’ understanding of the longer-term consequences of cultural violence, the legacy of which would present the option of returning for Bosniak refugees as an impossibility. This motivation was transmitted fully to Bosniaks from the Prijedor area. The Bosnian survivor interviewed, who grew up in Prijedor, recalled the shock on Serbs faces who now dominated the town when he returned to visit Prijedor in 2002:

“When I was walking through my street and it was ... you can see the neighbours looking around puzzled as to like ... “why are you coming back?” ... It almost felt like, you know, “what else do we have to do for you not to come back?””. (See bibliography)

Thus we see the very real emotional legacy of cemetery destruction and wider cultural violence as a means of deterring the return of Bosniak refugees, and consolidating the ethnonationalist visions of a pure, homogeneous Serb territory.

While the above actors are not from my case study of Zvornik, the town and surrounding area of Prijedor was subject to similar patterns of violence given their mutual location in Republika Srpska, so parallels between the areas regarding attitudes and motivations can be drawn. Many academics have centred the role of cultural destruction in their analysis of why Bosniak refugees did not return home. Gratz (2011: p415) highlights findings from a report conducted by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, which confirmed that the systematic manner in which violence, destruction, and expulsions were carried out indicates that their “purpose was to prevent the Muslim population from returning.” This notion is supported by Tretter, Muller, Schwanke, Angeli and Richter (1994: p33), who argue that the subsequent destruction of Muslim cultural property, such as cemeteries, demonstrates that “the aggressors apparently also wanted to extinguish all memories of the cultural existence of the purged ethnic group.”

Indeed, statistical data regarding the rates of return to the town of Zvornik and the Zvornik municipality demonstrates that only a small proportion of those expelled chose to return home: the return of less than 13,000 Bosniaks is set in comparison to a prewar Serb population of 28,000, previously constituting the minority, which was then enlarged

by an additional 30,000 Serbs displaced from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dahlman and Tuathail 2004: p444). The return statistics may be higher than appropriate, as they include many Bosniaks who returned to obtain their property and then immediately sell it to Serb residents (Dahlman and Tuathail 2005b: p591). These overall numerical trends are not peculiar to Zvornik: over a million Bosniak refugees have chosen not to return to their prewar homes (Dahlman and Tuathail 2005b: p595). Thus, in the pursuit of ethnic cleansing goals, including projecting the notion that refugees should not attempt to return to the prewar homes, the violent attack on the cemeteries and Islamic cultural heritage of Zvornik and the surrounding villages communicated a clear message of deterrence and threat to Bosniaks who may have been considering returning home.

This method in the pursuit of genocide has been identified in other contexts, suggesting the prevalence and transferability of this finding. For example, Ungor asserts that the destruction of the architecture of the Armenians during what has become known as the Armenian Genocide 1914-1923 served two distinct purposes. He argues (2013: p102) that "It apparently proved that the victims had never even existed in the area, and it ensured that the survivors had nothing recognisable to return to." The consequence of erasing a people's history is erasing the possibility of a future - a fundamental dimension of genocide. Therefore, we see that key to the legacy of cemetery destruction is the effort to prevent the return of surviving members of the targeted

group, which demonstrates the connection between cultural violence and genocidal campaigns at large.

6.2.3 Continued violence by winners

Thus far, it has been demonstrated that this form of violence serves to uphold and consolidate the war-time genocidal campaigns, by communicating that the different ethnic communities in the Balkans cannot coexist, and by deterring the expelled community from returning. Ultimately, we observe a clear element of the legacy of this phenomenon as a form of continued and perpetuating violence by the ‘winners’ of the conflict in Zvornik; namely, the newly-dominant Serb population, within the greater internationally-recognised Republika Srpska.

As demonstrated, destroying a cemetery wipes the historical slate clean, and allows for the victors to recreate a more desirable historical past. A direct example of this is the frequent phenomenon of erecting a Serb Orthodox Church on the land where a mosque or another Islamic building once stood. This was precisely what happened to the cemetery and mosque in the village of Divic, as Riedlmayer attested at the ICJ. The Serb Orthodox Church is still standing on the ground of the previously dynamited cemetery and mosque, despite repeated orders from the Human Rights Chambers of Bosnia-Herzegovina to relocate it. Riedlmayer (ICJ 2006: p25) argues that the clear aim of this endeavour was “to eliminate both the [Bosniak] community in Divic and its

historical, cultural and religious identity and even the very memory of its existence.” Replacing a Muslim cemetery with an Orthodox Church is an act of permanently denying the possibility of restoration, and thus the fate of the case study’s cemeteries demonstrates the logic behind targeting a cemetery for destruction. It also highlights that the local Serb leadership of Republika Srpska were rightfully confident that they could dismiss official challenges to their actions, and could act with impunity.

Cemeteries and mosques were not only destroyed in order to be replaced with Serb Orthodox religious spaces, but were often cleared so that the local wartime leadership could profit commercially from the empty space. As Dahlman and Tuathail (2005b: p593) report, a new apartment complex has been constructed on the bare land where Zvornik’s oldest mosque and cemetery once stood. This apartment complex is owned by a founding member of the Serb Democratic Party, who served as Chief of Police for the area during the attack on the town’s Muslim population by Serb militias, demonstrating the direct linkages between the perpetrators of genocidal campaigns and those who stand to gain personally from the spoils of war. Riedlmayer (1996: p38) summarises this point, contending that through the burning of documents, the razing of mosques and the bulldozing of graveyards, the nationalist forces who took over predominantly Muslim towns in Bosnia have been able to “insure themselves against any future claims by the people they have driven out and dispossessed.” The goal was not simply to pull down Muslim cultural heritage, but to destroy its very foundations, and subsequently reappropriate the void space for their own cultural or personal gain.

The cultural destruction and its legacy of power networks in localities such as Zvornik demonstrate the continued violence embodied by the eradication of Muslim cemeteries and other heritage assets; even after the conflict was officially ended by the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, the genocidal campaigns were conducted and cemented by other means, the grounds of which had been laid in large part by the destruction of Muslim cemeteries and other items of cultural heritage. It is evident that the destruction of cemeteries and other symbols of cultural heritage featured significantly in genocidal campaigns, guaranteeing the ethno-nationalist enduring victory in these spaces.

7. Conclusion

Overall, this dissertation has illuminated the logic of cemetery destruction, with the intention of demonstrating the intrinsic connection between attacks on communities and the visible markers of their collective cultures. When it comes to genocide, the subject in question is the collective, not the individual. Therefore, genocide does not simply equate to the killings of numerous people, but an attack on something greater - an attack on the communal structures, both tangible and intangible, that hold these people together as a collective (whether authentic or imposed). This understanding of genocide, which was suggested in the term's original conception by Raphael Lemkin, thus holds different types of destruction - be they cultural, physical, biological - to be

elements of a single, multi-dimensional process, as opposed to distinct phenomena in their own right.

This dissertation has demonstrated the logic of cemetery destruction to genocidal campaigns as one type of cultural destruction by focusing on the localised case study of Zvornik and its neighbouring village of Divic in relation to two research questions: firstly, why do people destroy cemeteries during genocidal campaigns, and secondly, what is the impact and legacy of this form of violence? Each research question formed its own section of analysis, and garnered three overarching findings.

In relation to the first research question, three motivations behind the destruction of cemeteries during genocidal campaigns emerged, namely: the goal of strengthening the myth of national purity; the objective of reclaiming land that is “ours”; and the attempt to erase all visible evidence of “the other” - all of which fit clearly into genocidal intentions to justify the eradication of the targeted community. The second section of analysis, which deals with the impact and the legacy of cemetery destruction, also conforms greatly to the concept of genocide. Again, three findings were demonstrated regarding the legacy of cemetery destruction, namely: the reinforcement of the cultural separation and mistrust that genocidal campaigns foster; the consolidation of genocidal campaigns by deterring the return of surviving refugees; and the provision of space for continued violence on the part of the winners - who, in my case study, were the earlier perpetrators of genocide. It is clear that any attempt to examine or analyse a genocide

without considering the dimension of cultural destruction will fundamentally ignore crucial aspects of the nature, shape, and legacy of genocidal campaigns themselves.

In Bosnia, cemeteries continue to be targeted even during peacetime, demonstrating their enduring communicative power and the legacy of wartime cemetery destruction and its messaging. Dakin (2002: p254) highlights that even after the Dayton Peace Agreement came into force, Islamic cemeteries in Banja Luka, located in Republika Srpska, have been destroyed and cleared, including exhumed remains of Muslim dead. The 2005 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom submitted to the Committee on International Relations in the United States House of Representatives (2006: p292) also revealed that in 2005, 26 graves in the historic Muslim cemetery in Prnjavor and numerous Muslim graves were desecrated in the Brezicani cemetery near Prijedor, both located in Republika Srpska. This phenomenon continues to hold discursive power even during peacetime, warranting further examination utilising both a quantitative methodological approach in order to fully enumerate its occurrence, and the consideration of other case studies to shed further light on the operation and understanding of cemetery destruction in specific contexts. Examples of cemetery destruction during genocidal campaigns are not unique to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A number of studies explore the significance and messaging of cemetery destruction in the cases of Native American communities (Cameron 1994), in Iraq (Makiya 1993), during the Armenian genocide (Balakian 2013), in Mali (Martinez 2015), and in multiple other contexts in which genocidal processes have either been

identified or are suspected. This suggests the transferability of an approach to the nature of genocide that centres the destruction of cemeteries as its metric.

This dissertation has presented one significant dimension of the logic of cultural violence in one localised case, but suggests that there is much more research, both quantitative and qualitative, to be done. The stakes are high for this research: our policy and academic misidentification of the nature of genocide and how the logic of cultural destruction fundamentally reinforces it means that our ability to resolve attacks of this type will be limited by our conceptual misunderstandings.

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