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**Becoming a London Goldsmith in the
Seventeenth Century: Social Capital
and Mobility of Apprentices and
Masters of the Guild**

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Becoming a London Goldsmith in the Seventeenth Century: Social Capital and Mobility of Apprentices and Masters of the Guild.

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Abstract¹

Social capital has been used to describe the links between guildsmen in pre-industrial times. However, contemporary historical research has shown that both English society and the guilds displayed more openness to newcomers than had been previously thought. This new perspective however does not preclude the use of social ties by individuals to gain a competitive advantage, as potential apprentices to find a master, or as Freemen to climb the ladder of power within the guilds.

This dissertation will enquire into what type of social capital was used and by whom predominantly in the Goldsmiths' Company. It rests on the creation of a new data set of fifty-seven masters who practiced their trade in the second half of the seventeenth century. Social capital will be analyzed according to geographical proximity, occupational proximity and kinship as they manifested in social networks. Results indicate that on the one hand, the Goldsmiths' Company was on the whole open to individuals with no previous contacts through geographical proximity, occupational proximity or kin. The openness must however be nuanced with respect to the rural and poor apprentices as well as women. On the other hand, internal mobility within the guild highly depended on the belonging to a sub-group of goldsmiths who were practising banking activities. These findings confirm the recent literature on openness but bring new light to the processes of mobility and social capital within the guild of the London Goldsmiths' Company.

Introduction

The guilds have long been portrayed as closely-knit groups, typical of pre-industrial communities (*Gemeinschaft* in the vocabulary of Tönnies), supported by kinship ties, neighbourhood and parish proximity, that is networks with strong bonds. Such an image of the guild did fit into the framework of rigid and stratified societies with little mobility and

¹ I acknowledge the much appreciated comments and advice of Dr. Oliver Volckart, Dr. Patrick Wallis, Prof. Larry Neal and Joseph Burke as well as the availability of David Mitchell, the Goldsmiths' Company Library and London Metropolitan Archives staff. Of course, any errors are my own.

implied a relative closure of the guilds to newcomers. Additionally, internally, guilds have been portrayed as being extremely hierarchical leaving few opportunities for small masters to participate in the direction of the guild. According to this view, becoming a guildsman was a highly regulated and exclusionary process.

More recent historical research has nonetheless cast doubt or nuanced such a representation of the early modern guilds and society. Migration was an essential feature of the growth of cities like London and furnished the ranks of the London apprentices. Mercantile occupations were taken up by sons of husbandmen as well as sons of the gentry. Endogamy has been shown to be relatively low at an aggregate level. However, such a representation of the past does not preclude the existence of social capital, on the contrary, but it may be understood differently. Guildsmen socialized with their customers, their fellow workers, their apprentices, their kin and such social ties could serve them to increase their mobility by comparison to other groups. Social capital is indeed a theory about the “competitive advantage” of the network, “a function of social structure [that produces] advantage”². Careful investment in social ties could considerably help a craftsman to set up his shop, for instance with the dowry of his wife or by entering the business of his former master. Becoming a guildsman could be open to many, but social ties would considerably ease the process.

Besides, although mobility and flexibility have been used in the literature to characterize the guilds, these institutions were structured organizations where not all members had the same level of influence. Many members would belong to a Yeomanry, some would enter the Livery. However, only a few participated to the Court of Assistant, the ruling body, or reached the official position of Warden or Prime Warden.

²Ronald S. Burt, "The Network Structure of Social Capital," *Research in Organizational Behaviour* 22 (2000). p. 348.

The ruling elites of the guilds have been deemed to be more connected to the world of politics. A few studies have suggested that the guilds were the centre of alliances, networks and family ties that served strategic purposes.

Although the latter emphasis on mobility and flexibility is a much more dynamic image of the guild than previously presented, it suggests that social capital, understood as the benefits that accrue to an individual by participating to a group, could remain significant in early modern society, as it is today. Recent reappraisal of the guilds in the early modern era forces us, however, to rethink how guilds were networks where social capital was created and used, who invested most in social capital and for what purposes.

To answer the question of where social capital was located in the London Goldsmiths' Company, I collected a new data set on its members in the second half of the seventeenth century. In comparison with the continent, English guilds have been deemed as more open for apprenticeship and mastership. Besides, the Goldsmiths' Company was of modest size in comparison with other guilds such as the Grocers or Clothworkers and that could potentially favour proximity of its members. On the other hand, the Goldsmiths' Company experienced profound transformations in the second half of the seventeenth century with the development of new types of banking activities. Various activities within the guild could render investment in social ties more advantageous to certain individuals. Retailing required customer skills; banking and credit rested on monitoring but also trust. Production demanded technical skills but a wide-range of contracts and customers were necessary to be assured of constant revenue. I limited this study to two groups in the Goldsmiths' Company at the end of the seventeenth century: a group of goldsmith bankers, whose role in the premises of banking have been

discussed at length in the literature, and a group of craftsmen and retailers who did not engage primarily in financial services.

Social capital could be created and accumulated in several ways and used to enter or progress within the guild. Geographical proximity favoured social contacts and ties in the parish, Church, coffee-houses amongst others and could serve for instance to place sons into apprenticeship. The socio-economic background and occupation of the parents was also a source of social capital. Sons of masters were well-informed of the apprenticeship system but also on the strategic networks that spanned through the guilds. They may intuitively be considered to have dominated the population of the guilds. Kinship was another source of social capital to secure benefits, but its place with respect to the guilds is uncertain as a complementary or competitive network to that of the guild.

In the rest of the dissertation, I will first review the literature on social capital in the guilds and discuss the specificity of the London Goldsmiths' Company. Then I will examine the new data set of fifty seven English goldsmiths in the second half of the seventeenth century and discuss to what extent social capital was a resource of the Company's members.

I. The Guilds and the Literature on Social Capital

a) Definition of Social Capital

Social capital has remained a fuzzy concept, subject to multiple interpretations and sharp criticisms³. It has been variously understood in

³For an overview Joel Sobel, "Can We Trust Social Capital?," *Journal of Economic Literature* 40, no. 1 (2002). For criticisms on the term, Kenneth J. Arrow, "Observations on Social Capital," in *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*, ed. Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999). Robert M. Solow, "Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance," in *Social Capital: A Multifaceted*

the literature on the guilds. One of the first and most precise definitions of social capital may be that of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who defined social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition"⁴. The concept thus referred to the benefits that accrue to an individual when the latter participates to groups or is involved in developing social ties. This instrumental understanding of social capital embraces a methodological individualism. The concept was further developed by Loury⁵ who emphasized how a lack of connections (social capital) restricts the opportunities of minorities. Coleman characterized social capital as "a variety of entities with two elements in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors - whether persons or corporate actors - within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible"⁶. Granovetter has given a striking example of how networks affect labour mobility and the "heavy dependence of individuals on their existing set of personal contacts for information about job-change opportunities."⁷ Mobility and social stratification have therefore often been seen as the possession or lack of social capital.

Perspective, ed. Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999).

⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. John G. Richardson (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986). p. 248.

⁵ Glenn C. Loury, "A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences," in *Women, Minorities and Employment Discrimination*, ed. Annette M. Lamond and Phyllis Ann Wallace (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books / D. C. Heath, 1977).

⁶ James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *The American Journal of Sociology Structure* 94 (1988). p. S98.

⁷ Mark S. Granovetter, *Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). p.4. and also Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (1973).

Social capital at the level of the group, a “conceptual twist”⁸, was introduced in its most influential way by Putnam⁹, who defined social capital as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”¹⁰ Putnam's work has been formalized by institutional economics and this form is dominant in the recent literature on the guilds. The guild is seen as an institution¹¹ which, by changing the benefits and costs of cooperation or defection, affected economic outcomes and therefore allowed the reaching of higher levels of welfare inside the group¹². The work of institutional economists and traditional researchers of social capital use closely interrelated ideas but with different foci. Institutional economics focuses on institutions, perceived to be a source of trust and thus of greater social interactions. Meanwhile, traditional researchers of social capital have grounded their analysis on networks, the structure of social ties and how these provide benefits for the individuals involved in them.

⁸Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998). p. 18.

⁹ Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993). p. 167.

¹⁰ Robert D. Putnam, "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life," *The American Prospect* 4, no. 13 (1993).

¹¹ Defined as : ‘the humanly devised constraints that understood shape social interaction’, reducing ‘uncertainty by providing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction’, Douglass Cecil North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). pp. 3-4.

¹²Avner Greif, *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). On the similarities and differences between the social capital approach and New Institutional Economics, Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack, "Social Capital, Social Norms and the New Institutional Economics," in *Handbook of New Institutional Economics*, ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley (Springer, 2005). On the effect of social capital on economic performance, Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack, "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, no. 4 (1997). On the danger of equating institutions or social capital with economic performance, Sheilagh Ogilvie, "Whatever Is, Is Right'? Economic Institutions in Pre-Industrial Europe," *Economic History Review* 60, no. 4 (2007).

b) The Guild as an Institution Fostering Social Capital

The analysis of social capital, understood as access to resources through a network, is most prominent in studies on mobility. Guilds regulations had an exclusionary character that could have restricted mobility, favoured sons of masters or wealthy individuals. With respect to apprenticeship, the Statute of Artificers (1562) allowed only the “children of masters and the holders of certain property qualifications”¹³ to take an apprenticeship. The Goldsmiths’ Company also required that apprentices be able to read and write. In addition to these regulations, apprenticeship was costly and therefore excluded groups with limited resources. Costs included payment to the Company (twenty shillings at the Goldsmiths’ Company¹⁴) but the most expensive fee was paid to the master, between £20 and £50 in the second half of the century¹⁵ for a working goldsmith. However, the literature suggests that they varied with wealth and family connections¹⁶. Enquiry into the master’s reputation¹⁷ also implied higher costs for outsiders. Sons of guildsmen seem to be at an advantage to enter apprenticeship and this is what some have suggested: “the guilds system was a gerontocracy and patrimony and family preference gave all Companies and trades an hereditary character.”¹⁸

Regulations on the entry into a Company were also exclusionary. Freedom from a Company conveyed citizenship of London, gave the right to produce and trade in London, to take apprentices and to participate in

¹³ K.D.M. Snell, "The Apprenticeship System in British History: The Fragmentation of a Cultural Institution," *History of Education* 25, no. 4 (1996). p. 304.

¹⁴ T. F. Reddaway, "The London Goldsmiths Circa 1500," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (Fifth Series)* 12 (1962). p. 58.

¹⁵ Peter Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660-1730* (London: Methuen London, 1989). p. 94.

¹⁶ Richard Grassby, *The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). p. 66.

¹⁷ Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, "Service and the Coming of Age of Young Men in Seventeenth-Century England," *Continuity and Change* 3, no. 1 (1988).

¹⁸ Grassby, *The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England*. p.65. Although Grassby has a nuanced judgement on mobility in the seventeenth century England, pp. 384-94.

civic life. Such access was, however, carefully regulated through the quotas of apprentices, redemption fees and patrimony requirements. Those who entered through redemption had to pay a fee of £20 to the City of London¹⁹ and an additional fee to the Company. Celebration of the newcomer, with a feast paid by the him, was also commonplace²⁰ but quite costly. Besides, production was limited to Freeman, who were the only ones allowed to bring plate to the Assay until 1700. Foreigners and women faced additional restrictions. The former had to provide letters of testimonials²¹ which could be quite strenuous to obtain. They were not welcome by masters who signed petitions against their competition²². In England, women were not forbidden to enter the guilds, but faced restrictions as 'feme coverts'. 'Feme soles' were restricted in their elective rights of guild officials.²³ As such, it appears that the legislation and the practices to admit new members favoured individuals with connections inside the guilds.

Financial costs for setting up a shop²⁴ or paying quarterage fees (eight pence at the Goldsmiths' Company) were often covered by raising capital through the family, kin, friends and other networks. Becoming a Freeman of the Goldsmiths' Company therefore seems to have involved high levels of social capital to overcome all these restrictions. Sanctions for not abiding by the City and Company's rules could also be dependent

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 65.

²⁰ Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, "Failure to Become a Freeman: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern England," *Social History* 16, no. 2 (1991). p. 161.

²¹ Lien Bich Luu, *Immigrants and the Industries of London, 1500-1700* (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005). Chapter 7.

²² John Forbes, "Search, Immigration and the Goldsmiths' Company: A Study in the Decline of Its Powers," in *Guilds, Society and Economy in London 1450-1850*, ed. Ian Anders Gadd and Patrick Wallis (Centre for Metropolitan History, 2002).

²³ Richard Grassby, *Kinship and Capitalism: Marriage, Family, and Business in the English Speaking World, 1580-1720* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Chapter 8.

²⁴ Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660-1730*. p. 107.

on one's position in the guild and therefore potentially on the level of influence and social capital of a master²⁵.

Overall, the guild regulations and costs associated with membership, trade and production may very well have favoured individuals with large networks and those who were already connected to the Goldsmiths' Company, namely the masters' sons.

Within the guilds, social capital could also be used for personal benefit. Indeed, guilds were far from being monolithic institutions. Traditionally, the guild has been seen as a hierarchical structure, increasingly oligarchic in the seventeenth century²⁶. For Reddaway, the Goldsmiths' Company was "a benevolent autocracy."²⁷ Many Companies were divided between the Yeomanry, deemed to have been composed of smaller masters and the Livery²⁸, representing high-status Freemen. In the Goldsmiths' Company²⁹, liverymen could then nominate two choosers who would, with the ex-Wardens and Aldermen, decide on the Company's officials, that is, the Wardens. These two choosers were required to have served already an office in the Company as Assistants, an intermediary court between the Livery and the Wardens. According to

²⁵ Even though this is one hypothesis among others only Patrick Wallis, "Controlling Commodities: Search and Reconciliation in the Early Modern Livery Companies," in *Guilds, Society and Economy in London 1450-1850*, ed. Ian Anders Gadd and Patrick Wallis (Centre for Metropolitan History: 2002).

²⁶ G. Unwin, *The Guilds and Companies of London* (1908) and James R. Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914, New Approaches to European History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). p. 160.

²⁷ T. F. Reddaway and Lorna E. M. Walker, *The Early History of the Goldsmiths' Company, 1327-1509* (London: Arnold, 1975). p. 53.

²⁸ The Yeomanry may not have systematically existed in all guilds. For an account of their evolution, Unwin, G., *The Guilds and Companies of London*, (1908). pp. 58-61. For an account of the links with the Livery and the Court of Assistant in the Merchant Taylors' Company of London, Nigel Sleigh-Johnson, "The Merchant Taylors' Company of London under Elizabeth I: Tailors' Guild or Company of Merchants?," *Costume* 41 (2007).

²⁹ Ian W. Archer, *The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London*, *Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). p. 103.

Reddaway, elected positions after the entrance into the Livery “are lost in the limbo to which personalities, influence and prejudices used to go”³⁰.

Opportunities within the guilds have also been recorded as highly and increasingly unequal in the seventeenth century. The capacity of smaller masters to influence and be heard by the governing bodies of the guild is deemed to have been weakened³¹. The Livery has also been depicted as dominated by the mercantile interest, by opposition to the working craftsmen. Tensions opposing different groups have been noticed in the literature and broken the monolithic aspect of the guilds³².

Promotion within the guilds, to the Livery and to the Councils, therefore may have required more social capital than mere entrance into the guild³³. Endogamy at the top of the guilds has been the focus of a few studies, including Cerutti’s on the Tailors of Turin³⁴. Kaplan has also suggested that family ties were stronger between the eldest and most powerful members of the Parisian guilds in the eighteenth century and “provided long-term continuity of dominion.”³⁵ The top of the guilds were also more involved in politics and access to such powerful positions was restricted for artisans³⁶.

³⁰ Reddaway, "The London Goldsmiths Circa 1500." p. 54.

³¹ Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914*. pp.161-4, G. Unwin, *The Guilds and Companies of London* (1908). pp. 217-42.

³² Steven L. Kaplan, "The Character and Implications of Strife among Masters inside the Guilds of Eighteenth-Century Paris," *Journal of Social History* 19, no. 4 (1986), Carlo Poni, "Norms and Disputes: The Shoemakers' Guild in Eighteenth-Century Bologna," *Past and Present* 123, no. 1 (1989).

³³ Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914*. pp. 35-6.

³⁴ Simona Cerutti, "Group Strategies and Trade Strategies: The Turin Tailors Guild in the Late Seventeenth Century and Early Eighteenth Centuries," in *Domestic Strategies: Work and Family in France and Italy, 1600-1800*, ed. Stuart Woolf (Cambridge: 1991).

³⁵ Kaplan, "The Character and Implications of Strife among Masters inside the Guilds of Eighteenth-Century Paris." p. 633.

³⁶ Unwin, *The Guilds and Companies of London*. p.113. Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914*.p.188.

Horizontal connections with other members of the guild could occur through family networks³⁷. The kin was a source of physical, human and social capital³⁸ that could help corner markets and develop niches. It could provide the credit and supervision necessary for hazardous projects or investments and help cover costs for setting up a business³⁹. The kin was also a great source of information and a source of reputation⁴⁰.

The networks that spanned throughout the guilds required places and times for socialization. The guild rhetoric suggests that guilds aimed at forging a strong identity (which undoubtedly would also lower monitoring costs). In the Goldsmiths' Company brotherliness was a duty formally expressed in the mandatory attendance to each brother's funeral (in the sixteenth century). Ceremonies, rituals and social events equally contributed to reinforce ties between guildsmen⁴¹ and to develop this guild identity. Annual celebrations included the patron saint's Feast Day, St Dunstan in the case of the Goldsmiths' Company, pageants, processions, parades or the London Mayor's show in the seventeenth century⁴². Resources devoted to the poor relief in the Goldsmiths'

³⁷ Sheilagh Ogilvie, "The Use and Abuse of Trust: Social Capital and Its Deployment by Early Modern Guilds " *CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1302* (2004). p. 6.

³⁸ Grassby, *Kinship and Capitalism : Marriage, Family, and Business in the English Speaking World, 1580-1720*.

³⁹ Joan Lane, *Apprenticeship in England, 1600-1914* (London: UCL Press, 1996). pp. 229-239.

⁴⁰ For an example of such claims in the Goldsmiths' Company, Philippa Glanville, "Introduction," in *Goldsmiths, Silversmiths and Bankers : Innovation and the Transfer of Skill, 1550 to 1750 : A Collection of Working Papers Given at a Study Day Held Jointly by the Centre for Metropolitan History and the Victoria and Albert Museum*, 24 November 1993, ed. David Mitchell (Stroud: Sutton & Centre for Metropolitan History, 1995). p. 3

⁴¹ Unwin, *The Guilds and Companies of London*. Chapters 12 and 16. Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914*. Chapter 7.

⁴² For a description, William Chaffers, *Gilda Aurifabrorum : A History of English Goldsmiths and Plateworkers, and Their Marks Stamped on Plate, Copied in Facsimile from Celebrated Examples; and the Earliest Records Preserved at Goldsmith's Hall, London, with Their Names, Addresses, and Dates of Entry, 2500 Illustrations, Also Historical Accounts of the Goldsmiths' Company and Their Hall Marks; Their Regalia; the Mint; Closing of the Exchequer; Goldsmith-Bankers; Shop Signs; a Copious Index*,

Company were high in comparison with other guilds such as the Grocers or the Clothworkers⁴³. Confraternities had additional socializing purposes through charity works and mutual aid. The confraternities, replaced by “clubs”, were an additional way of forming social capital, without the tensions and competition that could arise from the craft⁴⁴.

c) Limits to Guilds' Capacity to Foster Social Capital

The capacity of social capital creation by the guild has however been nuanced in the recent literature. Although the powers of the guilds were theoretically extremely high, including that of outlawry from London⁴⁵, the rise of suburbs of London, the existence of the Liberties and a few Parliamentary Acts gradually weakened the guilds' regulatory powers⁴⁶ and therefore their exclusionary powers as well. The dilution of the identity between the calling and the trade practised, the blurring of the distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, the participation of the Liveries to underground practices in the suburbs⁴⁷ and an increasing social differentiation⁴⁸ within the guilds participated to the decline of Companies' individual identities. Migration was another possibility for those who did not complete the apprenticeship⁴⁹, an option that eventually would undermine corporate identity. Drop-out rates in the

&C. &C., *Preceded by an Introductory Essay on the Goldsmiths' Art*, New ed. (London: Reeves and Turner, 1899). pp .9-13.

⁴³ Archer, *The Pursuit of Stability : Social Relations in Elizabethan London*. p. 123.

⁴⁴ Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914*. p. 229.

⁴⁵ Reddaway, "The London Goldsmiths Circa 1500."

⁴⁶ J.R. Kellett, "The Breakdown of Gild and Corporation Control over the Handicraft and Retail Trade in London," *Economic History Review* 10, no. 3 (1958). p. 384.

⁴⁷ Joseph P. Ward, *Metropolitan Communities: Trade Guilds, Identity, and Change in Early Modern London* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997). pp. 42, 71.

⁴⁸ Archer, *The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London*. P.188. Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914*.

⁴⁹ On alternative opportunities for apprentices who migrated, Ben-Amos, "Failure to Become a Freeman: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern England."

Goldsmiths' Company (forty five percent) are in line with the other London guilds⁵⁰.

Besides, recent reappraisals of the geographical and socio-economic origins of apprentices suggest that these were quite diverse. The share of the gentry increased through the century and penetrated mercantile activities. The husbandry and yeomanry's mobility were not as remarkable, in part due to a rise of the entrance fees⁵¹. From a geographical perspective, in 1690, seventy percent of the apprentices of London were still from outside the City⁵². Furthermore, according to Ben-Amos, entry into Freedom was not influenced by the apprentice's social origin⁵³. She equally downplays the capacity to create social capital through apprenticeship because of the competitive pressures that rested on the masters' shoulders.⁵⁴ The position of women in the guilds was also "eroded" between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century⁵⁵.

The hierarchical nature of the guilds has been to a certain extent nuanced. Even if artisans did not participate in the decision-making of their Company, the Court of Assistant was sometimes a place where artisans could express their concerns⁵⁶, especially if the ruling body was divided between powerful masters with conflicting interests⁵⁷. Artisans may have possessed their own circles of influence in the middle tiers of the companies⁵⁸.

⁵⁰ Grassby, *The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England*. p. 139.

⁵¹ Christopher Brooks, "Apprenticeship, Social Mobility and the Middling Sort, 1550-1800," in *The Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society, and Politics in England, 1550-1800*, ed. Jonathan Barry and Christopher Brooks (Basingstoke: 1994).

⁵² Grassby, *The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England*. p. 155.

⁵³ Ben-Amos, "Failure to Become a Freeman: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern England." p.160.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p.164 Grassby agrees and suggests that Masters preferred apprentices to remain journeymen.

⁵⁵ Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914*. p. 40.

⁵⁶ Archer, *The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London*. p. 106.

⁵⁷ Ward, *Metropolitan Communities: Trade Guilds, Identity, and Change in Early Modern London*. pp. 74-5.

⁵⁸ Archer, *The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London*. p. 107.

The systematic character of family relationships within the guilds has also been questioned albeit in non-English contexts. E. J. Shephard's⁵⁹ study of Dijon suggests that only a minority of apprentices were sons of masters. Claire Dolan⁶⁰ claims that in Aix-en-Provence, family ties were not strong in all guilds. Higher capital requirements in the weaver's guild (where the possession of a loom was crucial) could have triggered people to invest more in social capital in the form of kinship ties. Farr in his analysis of the Dijon artisanry⁶¹ has also noticed that seventy-five to eighty percent of the marriages were contracted with individuals unrelated to the guilds. Cerutti's analysis⁶² confirms the strategic aspect of marriage, as a way for the guild elite to form alliances with trades and occupations complementary to the Turin Tailor's, such as Turin's merchants.

II Case study: The Goldsmiths' Company in the Seventeenth Century

a) The Goldsmiths' Company During the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century

The Company had a specific relationship with the Crown. When chartered in 1327, it received privileges and was requested by the King to perform specific functions such as supervision of the currency, especially

⁵⁹ Edward J. Shephard, "Social and Geographic Mobility of the Eighteenth-Century Guild Artisan: An Analysis of Guild Receptions in Dijon, 1700–1790," in *Work in France. Representations Meaning, Organization, and Practice*, ed. Steven L. Kaplan and Cynthia J. Koepp (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986).

⁶⁰ Claire Dolan, "The Artisans of Aix-En-Provence in the Sixteenth Century: A Micro-Analysis of Social Relationships," in *Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France*, ed. Philip Benedict (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

⁶¹ James R. Farr, "Consumers, Commerce, and the Craftsmen of Dijon: The Changing Social and Economic Structure of a Provincial Capital, 1450-1750," in *Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France*, ed. Philip Benedict (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

⁶² Cerutti, "Group Strategies and Trade Strategies: The Turin Tailors Guild in the Late Seventeenth Century and Early Eighteenth Centuries."

foreign currency from the distant trade. It was granted jurisdiction over London in 1478 and over the country in 1509. The national character of the guild could have implied higher connections between the London goldsmen and their counterparts in the rest of the country.

Before the seventeenth century, the goldsmiths provided the Church with precious religious items. Goldsmiths also supplied sound investment to their customers through the sale of plates, silverwares and other items in precious metals but also sold jewellery. On the manufacturing side, goldsmiths refined gold and silver. Most financial services were before the second half of the century circumscribed to pawning and foreign exchange⁶³.

Several short-term events must have been particularly disruptive on the Company networks. The draft of men into the armies of Charles I, the plague in 1665 and then the Great Fire in 1666 had deadly consequences on the Company's members. Besides, the latter deprived the Company from using its hall, one of the centres of socialization of the masters and destroyed much of its property owned throughout London.

As in other London industries, the Goldsmiths' Company was also affected by long-term trends. Changes of fashion and increased consumption required larger stocks for the retailers and therefore higher levels of capitalization. It also raised start-up costs. For a goldsmith, Earle estimated the entry cost to have been between 500 to 3000 pounds⁶⁴. Such capital requirements could keep competition at bay and reduce openness of the guild to more wealthy families or individuals who could rely on their networks to obtain credit or capital.

⁶³ David. Mitchell, "Innovation and the Transfer of Skill in the Goldsmith's Trade in Restoration London," in *Goldsmiths, Silversmiths and Bankers: Innovation and the Transfer of Skill, 1550 to 1750: A Collection of Working Papers Given at a Study Day Held Jointly by the Centre for Metropolitan History and the Victoria and Albert Museum, 24 November 1993*, ed. David Mitchell (Stroud: Sutton & Centre for Metropolitan History, 1995).

⁶⁴ Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660-1730*. p. 107.

Specialization⁶⁵ supported the sub-contracting system which modified the traditional structure of the workshop. It operated potentially to the detriment of large households and to the development of social capital between masters, apprentices, journeymen and sub-contracted workers. However, this might not have been very pronounced for the goldsmiths, as Kahl⁶⁶ suggests that levels of apprenticeship remained high until 1720 (between 743 and 790 between 1690 and 1719) and fell only thereafter.

b) The Development of Banking Activities at the Goldsmiths' Company

The goldsmiths experienced a great change in the second half of the seventeenth century with the development of banking⁶⁷. Gradual innovation was however necessary to develop this new "technology"⁶⁸. Scriveners were the other main providers of financial intermediaries, keeping money deposits for the purpose of loans⁶⁹. According to Richards, the goldsmiths' banking activities involved⁷⁰: "Interest was paid on deposits; loans were supplied; bills of exchange, tallies and various types of Treasury-Exchequer payment orders were discounted; promissory notes, which circulated freely, were issued; cheques were used; bullion was bought and sold; foreign coins were changed; systematic accounts were kept in special ledgers.". One of the main differences between the goldsmiths and the Bank of England was that of

⁶⁵ James R. Farr, "On the Shop Floor: Guilds, Artisans, and the European Market Economy, 1350-1750.," *Journal of Early Modern History* 1, no. 1 (1997).

⁶⁶ W. F. Kahl, "Apprenticeship and the Freedom of the London Livery Companies, 1690-1750," *Guildhall Miscellany* 7 (1956). p. 18.

⁶⁷ These transformations were perceived by contemporaries, " 'the New-Fashioned Goldsmiths'," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 2, no. 2 (1888).

⁶⁸ Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth, "Banking as an Emerging Technology: Hoare's Bank, 1702-1742," *Financial History Review* 13, no. 2 (2006).

⁶⁹ Richard D. Richards, *Early History of Banking in England* (London: 1929).

⁷⁰ Ibid. pp. 23-4.

clearing house function that appeared only in the latter⁷¹. Goldsmiths operated on a bilateral system solely. The banking services involved high risks; large overdrafts could be monitored in an unregulated system⁷² only with great difficulty. Higher levels of social capital could increase information flows among goldsmith bankers.

However, several crises would hit the goldsmiths and test the resilience of their system, namely the Stop of the Exchequer in 1672, the creation of the Bank of England in 1694 and eventually the South Sea Bubble in 1720 which then marks the end of the public banking activities of the goldsmiths⁷³.

III Analysis of the Data Collected on London Goldsmiths

a) Sources and Samples

Two samples of goldsmiths were constructed to enquire into the questions of openness of the group, intra-guild mobility, and social capital through business or family networks. To make sure that the goldsmiths practiced the trade of goldsmithing or silversmithing⁷⁴, a sample was drawn from the Court of Orphans Inventories between 1665 and 1729 (Appendix). Inventories specify, amongst others, whether the master owned a shop, a working house, working tools and the type of wares in the shop⁷⁵. Selected goldsmiths either owned a shop exclusively (twenty goldsmiths), a workhouse (one goldsmith) or both (four goldsmiths). Additionally, masters who could be identified in the Goldsmiths' Company

⁷¹ Stephen Quinn, "Goldsmith-Banking: Mutual Acceptance and Interbanker Clearing in Restoration London," *Explorations in Economic History* 34 (1997).

⁷² Quinn compares it to the 'free-banking' era in the United States. Ibid. p. 414.

⁷³ Stephen Quinn, "Money, Finance, and Capital Markets," in *Cambridge Economic History of Britain since 1700*, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁷⁴ As noticed above there is a decline in the identity between the Freedom from a Company and the trade practiced in the sixteenth and seventeenth century.

⁷⁵ It thus allows to exclude individuals practising others trades.

Records and who were not described as goldsmith bankers in the secondary literature were selected⁷⁶. In total, our sample of craftsmen and retailers not involved in banking activities contains twenty-five individuals. We call this sample “Craftsmen” as shorthand in the rest of the data analysis. Compared to the total population of masters (estimated at 290 Freemen between 1690 and 1699)⁷⁷ our sample is modest. It draws individuals over a wide time stretch (see Table 1 with over a third of the masters indentured before 1650). This undoubtedly biases the sample of the Craftsmen against cohesiveness as they may not have been in contact with each other personally.

The second sample of thirty-two goldsmiths, here called ‘Bankers’, was engaged in banking activities as explained above. They are recorded in the 1677 London Directory as “goldsmiths that keep running cashes”⁷⁸. Those additionally confirmed in the secondary literature to be goldsmith bankers and who could be matched in the Goldsmiths’ Company records form our sample. Twenty-nine goldsmiths were identified following this procedure and a further three were added from the Court of Orphans list as mentioned above. By comparison, the sample of Bankers is large relative to the total population of goldsmith bankers. It must however be noted that the real population size must have constantly varied as many abandoned banking⁷⁹ or simply went bankrupt⁸⁰ especially after the Stop of the Exchequer in 1672. Grassby counts 93 goldsmith bankers between 1670 and 1700 but only five remaining in 1700⁸¹. Hilton-Price⁸² counts 31

⁷⁶ Quinn, “Goldsmith-Banking: Mutual Acceptance and Interbanker Clearing in Restoration London.”, Richards, *Early History of Banking in England* .

⁷⁷ Kahl, “Apprenticeship and the Freedom of the London Livery Companies, 1690-1750.” p. 18.

⁷⁸ Thanks to Pr. Larry Neal for pointing me towards this source. *The Little London Directory of 1677*, (London: John Camden Hotten, Piccadilly., 1878).

⁷⁹ Temin and Voth, “Banking as an Emerging Technology: Hoare’s Bank, 1702–1742.” p. 149.

⁸⁰ Bankruptcy was nonetheless more prevalent among the bankers of political authorities than among the retailers of the gentry.

⁸¹ Grassby, *The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England*. p. 253.

in 1670, 44 in 1677 and 35 in 1687, 42 in 1700. The sample of Bankers is also much more concentrated time-wise due to the sample construction procedure (all were practising in 1677, see Table 1), except for three Bankers who were added from the Court of Orphans. It can bias the sample towards more connections between the individuals if guilds displayed strong social capital at each generation.

A note of caution should be struck with regards to specialization of the banking activities. This division has probably been amplified by the diverging trends in the literature, on one side in banking history and on the other side in silver studies⁸³. There are numerous examples of so-called 'Bankers' who had retailing activities for plate, jewels, or who were even involved in imports of precious stones⁸⁴. Similarly 'shop-keeping goldsmiths' (retailers and wholesalers) could be involved in pawns, and most businessmen relied on credit⁸⁵ with each other and their customers. They may have invested money in securities and other financial instruments provided by the Lotteries or the East India Company for private uses⁸⁶. However, their banking activities were never as consistent or as sophisticated as the Bankers referred to by the financial literature. It is accordingly possible to differentiate the two groups; one of Bankers, and another of Craftsmen and Retailers.

⁸² F. G. Hilton Price, *A Handbook of London Bankers; with Some Account of Their Predecessors, the Early Goldsmiths: Together with Lists of Bankers from 1670, Including the Earliest Printed in 1677, to That of the London Post Office Directory of 1890 (Many Hitherto Unpublished)*, Enlarged ed. (London: Leadenhall Press, 1890). pp. 182-5.

⁸³ Mitchell, "Innovation and the Transfer of Skill in the Goldsmith's Trade in Restoration London."

⁸⁴ David Mitchell, "'Mr. Fowle Pray Pay the Washwoman': The Trade of a London Goldsmith-Banker, 1660-1692," *Business and Economic History* 22, no. 1 (1994). p.28, Edgar R. Samuel, "Sir Francis Child's Jewellery Business," *Three Banks Review* 13 (1977).

⁸⁵ Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660-1730*. p. 121.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 154.

In addition to the masters described above, a list of the masters' apprentices was drawn from compiled sources at the Goldsmiths' Company. One problem is that the Company's list is allegedly not comprehensive. Our sample is likely to bias upward the number of apprentices: masters who had zero apprentices during their working life have been omitted in the same way as masters missing in the Records of pairs of masters and apprentices. The two groups were indeed not distinguishable and thus omitted from the sample's statistics.

The Goldsmiths' Company Apprenticeship Books record the following information: the name, place of origin, name of the father, occupation of the father, date of indenture. It concerns 150 apprentices for the Bankers and 93 apprentices for the Craftsmen. I transcribed the information only from the Apprenticeship Books One to Four.

Finally, the Wills from the Court of Canterbury were searched and transcribed for seven identified Bankers and twelve identified Craftsmen (Appendix). Wills proved at the Court of Canterbury belonged to individuals with a certain personal wealth⁸⁷, which brings a bias towards the wealthiest goldsmiths. The Wills are used below to trace family relationships and the integrative capacity of the Goldsmiths' Company. Additional secondary sources used were Boyd's *Inhabitants of London*, Boyd's *Family Units 1209-1948*⁸⁸ and the 1692 Poll Tax database originally created by J. Alexander.⁸⁹

b) Overview of the Characteristics of the Goldsmiths

As suggested in the literature, Table 1 shows that only a very small fraction of the goldsmiths entered the Company through patrimony or

⁸⁷ Property left was to be estimated worth at least 5 pounds, and 10 pounds in London, for a Will to be proved in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury.

⁸⁸ Electronic version by The Society of Genealogists.

⁸⁹ Provided by Dr. Patrick Wallis (LSE), for details on the database J. Alexander, "The Economic Structure of the City of London at the End of the Seventeenth Century," *Urban History* 16 (1989).

redemption. The occupations recorded in the 1692 Poll Tax indicate that eleven individuals in our sample were working as goldsmiths, two as silversmiths (to be found only in the Craftsmen sample), three had no occupation recorded and one was described as "gentleman". Estimation of wealth⁹⁰ on property (rack rent values) and on working capital and goods not related to the household (taxed stocks) suggests that the group of Bankers was much more wealthy than the group of Craftsmen, with a Rent value more than twice as high and taxed stocks value about four times higher than the Craftsmen's. Unless the Bankers came from extremely wealthy families or inherited in a disproportionate way in comparison with their Craftsmen counterparts, their activities must also have been more lucrative trades.

The size of the household was slightly higher in the group of the Bankers (by nearly one member) because of the greater number of servants or apprentices⁹¹ working in their households (by nearly two members). None of the households contained kin members in our samples. Such results are in line with the literature⁹². Earle has shown that the size of the household depended as well on the age of the head of the household and the number of years after marriage⁹³. Due to the biases in the sample, it is possible that the average household of the Craftsmen was younger than that of the Bankers. It is also possible that being wealthier, the Bankers recruited more than the Craftsmen.

On average, both Craftsmen and Bankers in the above samples took their freedom shortly after the date they were supposed to finish apprenticeship. If the length of the indentures were respected, goldsmiths

⁹⁰ Alexander, J. "The Economic Structure of the City of London at the End of the Seventeenth Century." p. 48.

⁹¹ Distinction between servants and apprentices is not always reliable, Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class : Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660-1730*. p. 213.

⁹² Ibid. pp. 212-8.

⁹³ Ibid. pp. 212-8.

entered on average a year and a half after they had terminated their indentures, with no major discrepancy between the two groups. This is an extremely fast rate in comparison with Ben-Amos' figures for Bristol at the beginning of the seventeenth century⁹⁴ (with more than forty percent of the apprentices taking the Freedom only after two years or more). Wealth, networks and social ties could have helped the apprentices of our sample to enter the Company relatively quickly.

Entrance into higher offices is strikingly different between the two groups of goldsmiths, which once again justifies studying their characteristics separately. Sixty nine percent of the Bankers entered the Livery whereas only forty eight percent of the Craftsmen did the same. Entrance into the Livery was costly⁹⁵ and this may be why Bankers, who were wealthier, were over-represented. At the level of Warden or Prime Warden the discrepancy is even wider: forty one percent of the Bankers entered the office whereas only eight percent of the Craftsmen did as well. The group of Bankers is therefore disproportionately represented in the highest positions of the Company. Interestingly, not only were the Bankers more numerous in the offices of the Company, they also entered them more quickly, thereby suggesting that seniority was not the only criteria for holding office.

⁹⁴ Ben-Amos, "Failure to Become a Freeman: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern England."p.159.

⁹⁵ Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660-1730*. p. 253.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of the Bankers and the Craftsmen

		Bankers	Craftsmen
Masters' characteristics	Sample size	32	25
	indentured	32	24
	Patrimony	1	1
	Redemption	0	1
1692 Poll Tax	Identified masters	8	9
	goldsmith	6	5
	silversmith	0	2
	gentleman	1	0
	no occupation recorded	1	2
	Mean value Rents in pounds	66.4	28
	Mean value taxed stocks in pounds	462.5	108.3
	Mean household size (includes master, wife, children, servants, apprentices and kin recorded)	6.8	6
	Mean number of servants and apprentices	4	2.2
Masters' apprenticeship	Indenture starting date		
	Before 1650	4	9
	1650-1670	26	7
	1670-1690	2	7
	After 1690	0	2
	Average years indentured	7.5	7.7
Masters' freedom	Years between start of indenture and freedom from the Company	8.7	9.1
Entrance into the Livery	Number	22 (69%)	12 (48%)
	- of those not entered by apprenticeship	0	0
	Average number of years after taking freedom	6,1	8,1
Wardens	Number	13 (41%)	2 (8%)
	Average years after freedom	25,8	40
Participation to Civic Life	Alderman	6 (19 %)	1 (4%)
Apprentices	Number of apprentices who are also masters	8	2
	Number of goldsmiths who took at least one apprentice	26 (82%)	20 (80%)
	Average number of apprentices for masters who took at least one apprentice	5.5	4.7
	Minimum number of apprentices of masters who took at least one apprentice	1	2
	Maximum number of apprentices of masters who took at least one apprentice	10	12
Wills	Number	7	12
	Bequest to the Company	1	0

Bankers who took at least one apprentice recruited slightly more than the Craftsmen by nearly one apprentice on average. It is not possible to estimate if it was due to a high turnover in the shops of the Bankers, if they were wealthier to afford training more apprentices (including by requiring higher fees) and hiring more servants, if they attracted more apprentices or simply accepted more apprentices. However, Bankers transferred their skills to their apprentices: twenty four out of thirty-two of the Bankers were trained by other Bankers⁹⁶ from a former generation. We cannot compare these results with that of the Craftsmen, as the court of Orphans' Inventories do not allow us to distinguish between various specializations of goldsmiths.

The Bankers appear as a distinctive group in the Goldsmiths' Company. They were wealthier, recruited more apprentices in their shops and were promoted inside the company at a much faster and greater rate than the Craftsmen. Reaching such positions required talent, skill, probably wealth, but, as suggested by the literature on social capital, ties are invaluable to reach access to resources and positions. We now enquire where social capital was located in the Company: who was accepted in the Company, who was co-opted into the higher offices? What network or types of social capital were mobilized to enter in the Company and progress into its hierarchical order?

c) Did the Goldsmiths' Company Display Strong Social Capital?

(i) Geographical Origins

Proximity can be a source of social capital and geographical mobility an indicator of the openness of the Goldsmiths' Company to newcomers. Masters and future apprentices or their fathers could have

⁹⁶ Only eight Bankers were bound into apprenticeship by Masters from our sample but the financial literature reveals that another sixteen Masters are known to been financiers of an earlier generation.

socialized as neighbours, by going to the same local tavern, coffee-house or to the same club. Middling people knew each other well within the boundaries of their neighbourhoods⁹⁷. Geographical proximity also raised information about available placements, the master's character and qualities, the apprentice's character and socio-economic background⁹⁸. In a nutshell, individuals with common geographical origins can easily develop stronger ties with each others.

Table 2 below confirms the literature on geographical mobility in the second half of the seventeenth century. Twenty eight percent of all the apprentices came from London (Bankers, Craftsmen, masters and apprentices). The four adjacent counties to London accounted for another fourteen percentage points. The fourteen counties around London and London were the origin of sixty three percent of all apprentices. We can notice that there are hardly any differences between the Bankers and the Craftsmen, the former attracting only slightly more apprentices from London. This result could be due to two combining factors: first, the time stretch over which the Craftsmen are indentured is greater than that of the Bankers', and second, the literature suggests that apprentices' geographical origin became less diverse and more centred on London by the end of the century. Kahl⁹⁹ had found that fifty three percent of the goldsmiths between 1690 and 1699 were from London which suggests a strong decreasing geographical mobility in the very last decades of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century.

⁹⁷ Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660-1730*. p. 241.

⁹⁸ Ben-Amos, "Service and the Coming of Age of Young Men in Seventeenth-Century England."

⁹⁹ Kahl, "Apprenticeship and the Freedom of the London Livery Companies, 1690-1750."

Table 2 Geographical Origins of the Goldsmiths

	Bankers	Cumulative percentage	Craftsmen	Cumulative percentage
London	44	29%	25	26%
London + 4 ⁽¹⁾	63	42%	41	43%
London + 14 ⁽²⁾	96	64%	60	63%
Total	151	100%	95	100%

⁽¹⁾ London, Essex, Kent, Middlesex and Surrey

⁽²⁾ London, the four counties above and Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire, Southamptonshire and Suffolk.

These findings suggest that the Goldsmiths' Company was open geographically to newcomers during our era of study especially in comparison with later periods. The recruitment of new members was not restricted to the London area¹⁰⁰. Therefore, social capital localized in the parish, neighbourhood, Church or any institution in London could have been used to place apprentices (less than thirty percent of them were from London) but it remained modest in comparison with the early eighteenth century.

¹⁰⁰ Three apprentices are coming as far as 'The Kingdom of Ireland' to be apprenticed at the London goldsmiths.

Table 3 Chain Migration with Masters and Apprentices

	Bankers' apprentices	Craftsmen apprentices
Number of masters who took at least one apprentice	26	19
Number of apprentices in the sample	129	71
Master – Apprentices networks of migration		
Number of apprentices from the same county as the master	31 (24 %)	10 (11%)
- excluding London	19 (15%)	10 (11%)
Average number of apprentices by master from the same county as their master	1.7 (18 masters)	1.3 (8 masters)
Apprentice – Apprentice networks of migration		
Number of apprentices from the same county indentured at the same master	52 (40%)	28 (40%)
- excluding London	23 (18%)	10 (14%)
Average group size of apprentices from same county	2.4 (19 masters)	2,3 (9 masters)

An economic and historical analysis of migration has put forward the concept of chain migration¹⁰¹. Networked migrants widely draw on their social capital for help and information. Members of the network may also provide some forms of financial assistance, find a placement or accommodation. It is extremely difficult to know whether the immigrants from our sample all had a contact in London. It is however possible to trace the number of apprentices who come from the same county as their masters. We can also verify whether several apprentices came from the same county, the apprentice being the conduit for chain migration.

Results in Table 3 give information by county and not by village or town so they are only an upper bound. The results from such pairing suggest only moderate rates of shared origins both between masters and apprentices and between apprentices. In the case of masters and apprentices networks, we observe that for both groups of Bankers and

¹⁰¹ Dudley Baines, "European Emigration, 1815-1930: Looking at the Emigration Decision Again " *The Economic History Review, New Series* 47, no. 3 (1994).

Craftsmen, less than a quarter of the apprentices came from the same county as their masters. When one excludes London, this rate falls even lower, below fifteen percent. Given that an analysis at the county level largely overestimates shared origins, the number of apprentices and masters from the same county was probably much lower. On average, masters who shared a geographical origin with their apprentices did so with only slightly over one apprentice out of an average of five enrolled apprentices. The percentage of apprentices with the same origin as their masters is slightly greater for the Bankers.

Rates of shared origins among apprentices are slightly higher but it is mostly due to the demographic predominance of London. After excluding apprentices from London, the rate of shared origin by county falls to slightly over fifteen percent. Overall, for seventy percent of the Bankers and forty seven percent of the Craftsmen, at least two apprentices were from the same county. However, as explained above, counting at the county level is only a large upper bound of common shared origins.

How does the geographical origin influence climbing up the ladder of the Goldsmiths' Company? In the sample of the Craftsmen, none of the liverymen were from London. In the group of Bankers, five liverymen out of twenty two (22.7 percent) were from London. Overall, when the samples of Bankers and Craftsmen are combined the geographical repartition in the Livery is somewhat less favourable to those from London and the repartition in the rest of the Company. Thus, there is no reason to consider that not being from London was an obstacle to entry into the Livery. Geographical origin seems to have been neither a barrier to entrance in the guild nor to progression in the Livery.

With respect to Wardenship, two goldsmiths in the sample of Craftsmen became Warden or Prime Warden but they were not from London. It should be remembered, however, that this sample is extremely

small. In the sample of the Bankers, thirteen goldsmiths became Warden or Prime Warden and only three of them were from London (twenty three percent). The proportion of Bankers who were Warden or Prime Warden and came from London is very close to the geographical repartition within the guild. Coming from a county outside London did not harm the chances of an apprentice to enter the Goldsmiths' Company in the middle and the second half of the seventeenth century. Neither was it detrimental to progress as an official of the guild. Thus the social capital that the family had accumulated in the county of origin was not indispensable to move upwards in this London guild. The apprentice who had entered the Company was likely to rely on other forms of social capital.

(ii) Occupational Networks

The occupation or the status' similarity of an apprentice's father with the master goldsmith must have increased the existing social ties between them. Practising the same trade as their parents would provide the future apprentices with the greatest available information. Moreover, parents of a "to-be apprentice" in related occupations could also use their social capital for a placement.

The occupation of the apprentice's father reported in the Apprenticeship Books is however far from being interpretable in a straightforward manner. Besides, it is often simply replaced by an indication of status. High status such as "esquire" initially described "sons of barons, knights, royal creations and their heirs but (...) was adopted by the doctors of law and divinity, officials, judges, sheriffs and JPs."¹⁰² The gentry did not always map onto the land-owning society. According to Brooks up to twenty percent of the 'gent' recruits were sons of

¹⁰² Grassby, *The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England*. p. 142. For a discussion of the categories pp.141-4.

professional men and “well-to-do townsmen”¹⁰³. Status classification is deceptive as many apprentices may have wanted to hide a genteel status under the term “yeoman”.

Table 4 Status and Occupations of the Apprentices’ Fathers

	Bankers (n=174)	Craftsmen (n=118)
Esquire	27 (16%)	3 (3%)
Gentleman	50 (29%)	21 (18%)
from London	8 (5%)	0 (0%)
Esquire + Gentleman	77 (44%)	24 (20%)
Yeoman	13 (7%)	13 (11%)
Professional	15 (9%)	10 (8%)
Mercantile, Trade or Craft	48 (28%)	43 (36%)
from London	32 (18%)	24 (20%)
Goldsmiths	7 (4%)	7 (6%)
Citizens of London	27 (16%)	15 (13%)
Other	2 (1%)	5 (4%)
Unknown	19 (11%)	23 (19%)

Nonetheless, the first striking result is that only four to six percent of the apprentices’ fathers (respectively for the Bankers and the Craftsmen) were goldsmiths. This excludes however other forms of family relationships, for instance if brothers or uncles were in the Company as well (and it is therefore discussed in the next section) and masks the matrilineal line.

Overall, the goldsmiths drew their recruits mainly from the gentry or groups with higher status (about a third overall) and nearly in the same proportion from the mercantile occupations, trades and crafts. It is relatively similar to the London Grocers or Apothecaries at the end of the century¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰³ Brooks, "Apprenticeship, Social Mobility and the Middling Sort, 1550-1800." p. 61. Brooks calls this phenomenon “status inflation” in the seventeenth century.

¹⁰⁴Ibid. p. 59.

Two categories are extremely under-represented: husbandmen and labourers. We found only one labourer, four graziers and two mariners in our sample. If social capital excluded certain socio-economic categories from being bound into the Goldsmiths' Company, the poor, rural and low status groups seem to have been most affected. This conclusion is similar for most London Liveries. Brooks' synthesis suggests that at most nine percent of the apprentices were sons of the husbandman. With regards to the socio-economic background of their recruits, the Newcastle Merchant Adventurers, the London Apothecaries and Barber-Surgeons are the most similar Companies to our sample of goldsmiths.

Contrary to the analysis on geographical proximity, contrasts between the group of Bankers and Craftsmen are noticeable with respect to the occupation of the apprentices' fathers. The Bankers drew forty four percent of their apprentices from the gentry and social groups with higher status and slightly less than a third (twenty eight percent) from sons of traders, retailers and other mercantile activities. The lucrative prospect of the trade and lack of handicraft work must have attracted the gentry. By comparing the trades of the apprentices' fathers to D.V. Glass' analysis of the 1692 Poll Tax¹⁰⁵, we observe that about sixty percent had fathers who were in occupations supposed to be just as, or more, lucrative than the goldsmiths. The recruitment of the Bankers was therefore centred on the higher strata of society, both in terms of occupation, status and wealth.

Craftsmen on the contrary drew more sons of traders and craftsmen than sons of the gentry and other higher classes. Whereas Bankers attracted, or maybe also selected individuals with very comparable background as the other large mercantile trades, Craftsmen's

¹⁰⁵ D.V. Glass, "Socio-Economic Status and Occupations in the City of London at the End of the Seventeenth Century," in *Studies in London History*, ed. A.E. J. Hollander and W. Kellaway (1969)., pp. 382-3 for a list of these categories.

recruitment is comparable to London crafts and smaller retailing trades¹⁰⁶. On average they recruited apprentices whose fathers were as or less affluent than an average goldsmith, according to D.V Glass' classification.

Overall, the percentage of professionals' sons is relatively high compared to the London average of two percent¹⁰⁷. The main occupation of apprentices' fathers listed in the professional category was that of clerk. One could suspect that sons of clerks had higher literacy and numeracy skills that were extremely useful to become a goldsmith, especially to become a banker.

Given that we do not have access to fees premiums, it is very difficult to assess whether the fees were prohibitive to be bound to a Banker, whether apprentices were self-selected or if they followed network strategies. The restrictions to mobility detailed above cannot be interpreted in a straightforward manner. Banking was, nonetheless, likely to be a visible and known occupation to the higher circles of the gentry who shopped in the West End or to the City and Royal officials who dealt with loans and securities traded by the Bankers.

¹⁰⁶ Brooks, "Apprenticeship, Social Mobility and the Middling Sort, 1550-1800." pp. 58-59.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 59.

Table 5 Entry into the Livery and Occupation of the Apprentices' Fathers

	Bankers (n=22)	Craftsmen (n=12)	Total (n=34)
Esquire	3 (14%)	0 (0%)	3 (9%)
Gentleman	5 (23%)	4 (33%)	9 (26%)
from London	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
<i>Esquire + Gentleman</i>	8 (36%)	4 (33%)	12 (35%)
Yeoman	2 (9%)	3 (25%)	5 (15%)
Professional	3 (14%)	2 (17%)	5 (15%)
Mercantile, Trade or Craft	9 (41%)	3 (25%)	12 (35%)
from London	5 (23%)	0 (0%)	5 (15%)
Goldsmiths	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Citizens of London	4 (18%)	0 (0%)	4 (12%)
Other	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Unknown	1 (5%)	0 (0%)	1 (3%)

Table 5 indicates that the socio-economic background of those entering the Livery is still relatively similar to that of the overall sample. About a third of the apprentices' fathers were involved in mercantile activities and crafts, a fourth belonged to the gentry, a sixth to the yeomanry. In comparison, Table 6 shows an increasing dominance of the sons of craftsmen and traders. The reasons for this narrowing of the socio-economic background are hard to ascertain. The gentry may have wanted to distance itself from running a Company which was still dominantly populated by producers and retailers of plate, jewels. Another possibility is that sons of craftsmen and traders could be more familiar with the functioning of the guild and therefore managed more easily to enter higher offices. Social capital was possibly necessary to progress in a guild, it required alliances. Sons of craftsmen may have been most exposed to the inner working of the guilds.

Table 6 Wardens or Prime Wardens and their Fathers' Occupation and Status

	Bankers (n=13)	Craftsmen (n=2)	Total (n=15)
Esquire	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Gentleman	2 (15%)	0 (0%)	2 (13%)
from London	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
<i>Esquire + Gentleman</i>	2 (15%)	0 (0%)	2 (13%)
Yeoman	3 (23%)	0 (0%)	3 (20%)
Professional	1 (8%)	0 (0%)	1 (7%)
Mercantile, Trade or Craft	5 (38%)	2 (100%)	7 (47%)
From London	3 (23%)	0 (0%)	3 (20%)
Goldsmiths	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Citizens of London	2 (15%)	0 (0%)	2 (13%)
Other	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Unknown	2 (15%)	0 (0%)	2 (13%)

The Company was therefore open to the sons of individuals in a large variety of trades but selectivity towards the gentry may have diminished the prospect of poorer groups such as the husbandmen. The former, through their social capital or their wealth maintained very high levels of entrance in the Bankers' group. Whether it is a process of selection or self-selection is hard to tell but it implies that connections of the Bankers and that of the Craftsmen were relatively different.

(iii) Kin

The literature that stresses the existence of social capital in the guilds has tried to unearth family ties and kinship relationships. As Grassby¹⁰⁸ noticed, business still rested on the household work which comprised family or kin members. Apprentices could eventually be integrated into the family, but how many were family-related?

We have seen above that only a very small minority of the apprentices' fathers were goldsmiths (five percent of our total sample).

¹⁰⁸ Grassby, *Kinship and Capitalism : Marriage, Family, and Business in the English Speaking World, 1580-1720*.

Table 7 indicates that very few apprentices in our sample were also related to their masters directly as sons, brothers or cousins.

Table 7 Kin Relationships in the Samples of Masters and Apprentices

	Bankers	Craftsmen
Number of apprentices ¹	151	93
Number of masters with at least one apprentice	27	20
Number of masters with last name identical to apprentices	10 (37%)	5 (25%)
Number of apprentices with last name identical to master	13 (9%)	5 (5%)
Son	3 (2%)	1 (1%)
Brother	6 (4%)	2 (2%)
Other family tie	4 (3%)	1 (1%)

¹ The previous sample of apprentices was completed in this table with an additional search in the Records of Freedom and Apprenticeship at the Goldsmiths' Company which found one more apprentice bound to his father.

Thirteen apprentices of the Bankers, and five of the Craftsmen, share the same name as their masters. That represents only nine percent of the total sample of apprentices for Bankers and five percent for the Craftsmen. This percentage is an upper bound limit to the number of family members in the male lineage trained by our sample of goldsmiths (for example, sons, brothers, and cousins who shared last names). However, this table under-records other types of relationships, through the female lineage. Unexpected in these results is the number of brothers being trained, in close proportions to the number of sons, even if the overall figures remain low (about three percent). Limited endogamy has been explained by a diversification strategy. Farr has suggested that craftsmen did not display guild endogamy but artisanry endogamy¹⁰⁹. This is verified partially in the case of the Goldsmiths' Company but we can observe small group differences between the Bankers and the

¹⁰⁹ Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914*. p. 246.

Craftsmen with the former training slightly more family members personally.

Table 7, however, misses family members from the male lineage of Bankers and Craftsmen who were apprenticed to colleagues or sons who obtained Freedom through patrimony. An additional search, outside the previously described sample of apprentices was carried out in the Records of Freemen and Apprentices and Apprenticeship Records. Individuals who shared the same last name as the Bankers or Craftsmen, who were from the same county and whose fathers' details could be traced are identified below as sons, daughters, brothers and wives of the Bankers and Craftsmen. The secondary literature and the wills from the Court of Canterbury were also used to document family links¹¹⁰. The table below therefore excludes links that were accounted for in Table 7.

Table 8 Additional Kin Relationships Outside the Sample of Apprentices

	Bankers (n=32)	Craftsmen (n=25)
Master with another family tie in the company	10 (31%)	11 (34%)
Son/daughter	11 (7 bankers)	12 (11 craftsmen)
indentured to another master	6 (6 bankers)	5 (4 craftsmen)
by patrimony	5 (4 bankers)	7 (7 craftsmen)
brother	7 (4 bankers)	1 (1 craftsmen)
wife	0	3 (3 craftsmen)

The above information is an upper bound¹¹¹ to the number of kin relationships outside our initial sample in the male lineage. It suggests that slightly over thirty percent of the Bankers had a member of their family involved with the Goldsmiths' Company. This family member was

¹¹⁰ Samuel, "Sir Francis Child's Jewellery Business.", Mitchell, "'Mr. Fowle Pray Pay the Washwoman': The Trade of a London Goldsmith-Banker, 1660-1692."

¹¹¹ It includes presumed family relationships: in the case of freedom by patrimony, records do not indicate the father's name or occupation so such ties are mostly are a large estimate of real existing ties.

either being trained by a colleague, receiving Freedom through patrimony or, for wives, they were being involved in the workshop. Overall, when one combines the data of Table 7 and Table 8, that is kin members trained by the sampled goldsmiths and kin members not trained by the sampled goldsmiths, we observe that thirteen Craftsmen (fifty two percent of the sample) and seventeen Bankers (fifty three percent) have at least one kin member in the Goldsmiths' Company. The average number of kin was 1.5 for the Craftsmen and 1.7 for the Bankers.

Sons of Bankers were more likely to be trained by their fathers than sons of Craftsmen. Bankers trained many more of their brothers than the Craftsmen. The expected wealth to be gained from the trade could have stimulated such family strategies for the Bankers. The sample of Craftsmen on the other hand reveals that wives were involved in the training of brothers or sons if the master died prematurely. Given that Craftsmen households were poorer it is possible that women were more involved in the production process. It might also have been easier to teach crafts than banking activities. One daughter was also recorded as taking the Freedom of the Goldsmiths' Company by patrimony.

The tables above do not reveal whether having one to two family members in the trade was a very large number. To do so, it is necessary to estimate the share of children placed as apprentices or taking Freedom by patrimony from the Company¹¹². The Wills of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury give us another indication of how many sons were oriented towards the trade of goldsmithing as a proportion of the children, what we call "trade continuity". Nineteen wills (seven for the Bankers, twelve for the Craftsmen) were examined (Table 9 below). Although we cannot be

¹¹² The Poll tax indicates an average of 1.9 children in Craftsmen's households and 1.1 in Bankers' households but the age of masters and the number of years after marriage – data not available yet – could be explaining this difference. These values thus can not be considered as indicative of systematic demographic differences between Bankers and Craftsmen's households.

certain that all children inherited, the literature suggests that equal share among the children was most common¹¹³ and we will therefore assume that all the children were mentioned in the wills.

In this reduced sample of nineteen goldsmiths, Bankers have an average of 1.9 children per household and Craftsmen a 2.9 average. In both samples, half of the sons (about sixteen percent of the children) became Freemen from the Goldsmiths' Company. It represents a low rate of trade continuation, especially when one considers that Freedom from the Company did not imply practising the trade of goldsmith.

Table 9 Trade Continuity

	Bankers	Craftsmen
Number of wills	7	12
Number of children ¹	13	35
Number of sons ²	(1.9 per master)	(2.9 per master)
Known percentage of sons to become goldsmiths (including by patrimony)	4 (33%)	12 (39%)
Other member of family mentioned as being goldsmiths	2 (50%)	6 (50%)
	4	5

¹ All children who are mentioned in the wills or recorded by the Court of Orphans.

² The percentage is calculated only on the number of children for which the sex was known.

How do the Bankers differ from the Craftsmen at the Livery level? In the sample of twelve Craftsmen who were in the Livery, the sons of only four Craftsmen (thirty three percent of the masters) further continued as an apprentice in the Company or took Freedom from the Company by patrimony. In the sample of the Bankers, seven of the twenty two members (thirty two percent of the masters) of the Livery had sons

¹¹³ Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, *The Culture of Giving : Informal Support and Gift-Exchange in Early Modern England*, *Cambridge Social and Cultural Histories* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). p. 19.

involved in the company, as apprentices or as Freemen by patrimony. There is thus no advantage for the sons of Bankers involved in the Livery over the sons of Craftsmen. This suggests that, for goldsmiths who reached higher levels of the Company, the decision of sons to enter into the Company was similar for both groups. Nonetheless, Bankers in the Livery had more kin members in the family because of the greater number of brothers who were being trained in this group.

(iv) Integrative Capacity of the Goldsmiths' Company

To enquire into the guilds' capacity to create shared values and a sense of brotherhood among their members, the wills proved at the Prerogative Court of Canterbury were used.

The analysis of nineteen wills (Table 10) reveals weak links of masters with the Goldsmiths' Company and a low willingness to bequest to its members and the poor of the Company. Overall, only one goldsmith gave to the poor of the Goldsmith's Company. Four other masters donated to the poor of their county of origin or parish of residence. These figures (twenty six percent of the masters donated to the poor) are close to Earle's estimates who calculated an average of thirty percent¹¹⁴. Bankers in our sample donated more to the poor, probably because of their wealth and other sample biases (two Bankers were childless) but overall only one goldsmiths donated to the poor of the Company. Four goldsmiths made bequests to non-family related colleagues (twenty nine percent of Bankers and seventeen percent of Craftsmen). The figures rise to fifty seven percent for the Bankers when bequests were made to goldsmiths who were also family members and remains at seventeen percent for the Craftsmen. These numbers seem to indicate that the likelihood to donate to fellow goldsmiths was increased by existing family

¹¹⁴ Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class : Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660-1730*. pp. 316-9.

ties. Donations to the family seem the most important and common pattern to both groups: most of the wills name the wife and the children as the main benefactors. It suggests therefore that social capital in the guilds and social capital in the kin could be in competition. Even if Bankers were more likely to give to goldsmiths who were not family-related than the Craftsmen, the vast majority of the bequests was to their respective families and friends.

Table 10 Bequests and Wealth Management

	Bankers	Craftsmen
Number of wills	7	12
Number of goldsmiths who made :		
- bequests to the Company, its poor, or officials	1 (14%)	0 (0%)
- bequests to poor from parish or county of origin	3 (43%)	1 (8%)
- bequests to goldsmiths who are not family members	2 (29%)	2 (17%)
- bequests to goldsmiths who are family members	4 (57%)	2 (17%)
Executors : The number of wills appointing:		
Family members only	5 (71%)	9 (75%)
Goldsmiths family-related and family members	2 (29%)	1 (8%)
Not family-related goldsmiths only	0 (0%)	1 (8%)

Executing a will was a crucial task after the decease of a goldsmith. This task was sometimes shared between several individuals, as noticed in the literature. In our sample, only two goldsmiths appointed unrelated goldsmiths as executors. Most executors were family-related to the testator and not members of the Goldsmiths' Company (seventy one to seventy five percent of the Wills). In three cases only was this task shared with family members who were also goldsmiths. Most often the wife was to carry out this task alone or shared the burden with the testator's brother and sons-in-law.

It therefore appears that the guilds had little grip on family donations and even less on its wealth management after the goldsmith's

death. Bequests were probably dependent on individuals' wealth, their friendships with other goldsmiths but it was not the norm in the Company. The evidence on a closely-knit network of individuals with powerful social capital is therefore mixed for the overall sample.

Summary

Various types of social capital could be at work to enter or progress into the London Goldsmiths' Company. Geographical origin seems to have mattered for neither of them. Occupational proximity on the other hand reveals curious patterns. Although the gentry and groups with higher status dominate at the recruitment of apprentices, there is a reverse trend in the composition of the higher bodies of governance in the Company. With the current data, only hypotheses can be provided to explain such a pattern. Kinship relationships are very modest in our sample and slightly higher for the Bankers. Both groups of Craftsmen and Bankers nevertheless displayed only low guild identity. Donations to the charities of the Company or to friends who were members of the Company were modest for both Bankers and Craftsmen.

The group of Bankers as a professional group is atypical in the guild of the Goldsmiths'. It displays extremely high internal mobility. Quinn¹¹⁵ has suggested that filtering procedures among the goldsmiths were necessary to their trade. It is also noteworthy that they may have had higher connections and social capital outside their trades through their loans or jewellery sales to the gentry. Bankers participated more to

¹¹⁵ Stephen Quinn, "Balances and Goldsmith-Bankers: The Co-Ordination and Control of Inter-Banker Debt Clearing in Seventeenth-Century London," in *Goldsmiths, Silversmiths and Bankers: Innovation and the Transfer of Skill, 1550 to 1750*, ed. David Mitchell (Stroud, 1995). p. 414.

the civic life as Alderman, which could bring them “dignity”¹¹⁶ but also other advantages such as cheap borrowing from the Chamber, the Orphans’ Fund, beneficial leases as well as insider’s information¹¹⁷.

Conclusion

The guilds in the seventeenth century have often been pictured as persisting through strong social ties because of the exclusionary regulations on apprenticeship, mastership and quality regulations. They have also been perceived as displaying strong oligarchic tendencies, especially with the closing of the century. Kinship has been deemed to cement the bonds of this closed community. The most recent literature has, however, emphasized mobility and openness in English society and the deep migratory movements associated with the apprenticeship system. Nevertheless, only a few studies have yet contributed to determine how and when internal mobility in the guilds occurred and on what kinds of networks social capital rested in the guilds.

By asking who could become a goldsmith in the second half of the seventeenth century in London, this study addresses both the issues of the openness of an English guild and internal mobility. This study suggests that the role of social capital in the so-called pre-industrial world must be nuanced.

The use of social capital to enter the guild of the Goldsmiths’ was analyzed through the lens of mobility and social ties, following scholars such as Bourdieu and Loury. High levels of geographical mobility in our study suggest that social capital acquired through geographical proximity was not decisive for an apprentice to enter a guild. Occupational

¹¹⁶ Earle, *The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660-1730*. p. 248.

¹¹⁷ Grassby, *The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England*. p. 229.

selectivity is more noticeable in the nearly complete absence of sons of husbandmen. The gentry and artisanry were both overrepresented. Women are only indirectly detected as participating to the workshop and training activity.

Within the Goldsmiths' Company, geographical origin or a high socio-economic status did not play a role in the rise to power at the top of the guild. The gentry or groups with higher status are not dominant any more at the level of Wardenship, on the contrary, sons of craftsmen and traders are the most represented. Explanations for such a reversal require further research to analyze the opportunities that opened to the different groups, when they were taken and to what extent they were the result of social capital.

The role of the kin relationship is also put into question. Very few goldsmiths had a father in that trade and if so, they were also trained by fellow masters, possibly to secure the acquisition of different skills. Conversely we observe that only modest numbers of masters' children became involved in the Goldsmiths' Company a generation later after our sample. In that respect, members of the Livery did not fare better in placing sons into apprenticeship within the Company.

The integrative capacity of the company is jeopardized when analyzing transfers of wealth and charity in the goldsmiths' wills. A small number of Bankers gave to the fraternity and the poor of the Goldsmiths' Company. Bequests to family members and friends who were from the Goldsmiths' Company were more common in both groups.

Nonetheless, the Goldsmiths' Company cannot be considered as one homogeneous group. It was divided across wealth and social status lines. The group of Bankers that emerged in the second half of the seventeenth century entertained strong ties with each other, probably in part because of the risks and necessities of their occupation. However, they did not gain powerful positions within the guild mainly through the

social capital that they inherited from their families. They were hardly any more likely to have been from London than the Craftsmen and retailers in the sample. Furthermore those who eventually reached power in the Company were not overrepresented in the gentry or categories with higher social status. The social capital created during the period of the apprenticeship and then in the Livery must have been crucial. Differences of internal mobility are relative at the Livery level but dramatic at the Wardenship level. Wealth is another potential candidate to explain such differences of internal mobility and could have complemented social capital. They had a small advantage in terms of family relationships over other groups of goldsmiths at the Company even if their trade continuity over several generations was also quite low and similar to the Craftsmen.

At this stage, the research only hints at how or why Bankers acquired, used or developed social capital. Banking practices were still extremely risky as the several crises that punctuated the century show. Information on the financial situations of colleagues or customers was scarce. Establishing strong ties with apprentices who would be future colleagues or partners was advantageous for monitoring them. As for any specialization, apprenticeship introduced the novice to skills, techniques and lucrative practices, as well as to customers. It provided insider's information. The networks of the Bankers may also have been more diverse than those of the Craftsmen. The customers of the goldsmiths were likely to have been relatively well off to buy plate and jewellery. The Bankers were however more likely to provide financial services for merchants, traders and royal authorities, additional networks through which they could draw social capital. They participated more often to local politics which was time consuming but could bring its benefits.

All in all, this case study has confirmed the general pattern of socio-economic mobility in the guilds and their openness to immigrants within England. With specialization and hierarchical stratification, interests of

guildsmen's groups were likely to coalesce and social capital to develop. In this regard, apprenticeship seems to be an important phase of social capital formation for guildsmen to further evolve within the guild.

Appendix

List of the Names of the Goldsmiths in the Two Samples:

Craftsmen		Court of Orphans reference number	"s": shop "w" workhouse "b": shop and workhouse "u" : unknown	Will Reference	Identified in the Poll Tax 1692
John	Austen	CLA/002/02/01/0711	B		
Thomas	Ash	CLA/002/02/01/2999	S		Yes
Lancelot	Baker	CLA/002/02/01/2411	S		Yes
Christopher	Canner	CLA/002/02/01/2782	S	Prob 11/499	Yes
Oliver	Chadwell	CLA/002/02/01/0844	S		
William	Coleman	CLA/002/02/01/1994	S		
Leonard	Collard	CLA/002/02/01/1138	S	Prob 11/337	
Samuel	Day	CLA/002/02/01/2708	W	Prob 11/486	Yes
Robert	Fincham	CLA/002/02/01/1079	B		
Thomas	Folkingham	CLA/002/02/01/3330/A	S	Prob 11/633	
William	Grant	CLA/002/02/01/1200	B		
Francis	Grevill	CLA/002/02/01/2587	S	Prob 11/471	Yes
Robert	Hill	CLA/002/02/01/2233	S	Prob 11/429	Yes
Edward	Horne	CLA/002/02/01/2004	S	Prob 11/381	
Thomas	Issod	CLA/002/02/01/2296	S		Yes
Simon	Knight	CLA/002/02/01/2830	S	Prob 11/503	
John	Latham	CLA/002/02/01/1398	S	Prob 11/357	
Thomas	Loveday	CLA/002/02/01/2042	B	CLA/002/03/005	Yes
Daniel	Madox	CLA/002/02/01/0690	S	Prob 11/333	
John	Marlow	CLA/002/02/01/0812	S		Yes
Arthur	Morgan	CLA/002/02/01/0962	S		
Thomas	Prince	CLA/002/02/01/0491	S		
John	Rusden	CLA/002/02/01/2903	S	Prob 11/517	
Thomas	Sadler	CLA/002/02/01/3156	S		
Philip	Treherne	CLA/002/02/01/1526	S		

Bankers		Court of Orphans reference number	"s": shop "W" workhouse "b": shop and workhouse "u" : unknown	Will Reference	Identified in the 1692 Poll Tax
John	Addis	CLA/002/02/01/2198/A	S	Prob 11/461	Yes
John	Ballard				
Robert	Blanchard			Prob 11/366	
John	Bolitho				
Abraham	Chambers			Prob 11/414	
Francis	Child				
John	Coggs				
Thomas	Cooke				
Charles	Duncombe				
Stephen	Evance				
Charles	Everard	CLA/002/02/01/0333	S		Yes
Thomas	Fowles				
Benjamin	Hinton				
Joseph	Hornby				
Francis	Kenton				
Thomas	Kirwood				
Henry	Lamb				
James	Lapley				
John	Mawson				
Francis	Meynell	CLA/002/02/01/0405	U	Prob 11/528	
Henry	Nelthrope				
Benjamin	Norrington				
Thomas	Pardo				
Peter	Percival			Prob 11/417	
Thomas	Rowe				
Michael	Scrimshire				
Humphrey	Stockes			Prob 11/410	
John	Sweetaple				
John	Thursby			Prob 11/460	
John	Townley				
Bernard	Turner				
Robert	Ward				

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