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The Paradoxes and Mixed Record of Culture Wars in Contemporary Greece

Sokratis Koniordos and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos

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Sokratis Koniordos¹ and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos²

ABSTRACT

In this research report we analyze four recent culture wars in today's Greece. These were wars over vaccination against Covid-19; challenges to Greek identity by the inflow of migrants and refugees; emerging non-conventional family relations and gender identities which have provoked reactions; and national identity challenges posed by Greece's foreign relations, including the 2018 Prespes Agreement and EU-Greece relations. Our research was based on available sample surveys, official documents and four focus groups, one per culture war. We claim that cultural conflicts in contemporary Greece have not grown into all-consuming culture wars. They have remained at the level of soft conflicts or tensions. Despite voicing traditional views, Greeks adopt a pragmatist stance on cultural conflict. Moreover, in contemporary Greece such wars have started after initiatives primarily taken "from above", i.e., by state authorities. In addition, from their outset culture wars in Greece have been interwoven with on-going, political party conflict.

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1. Introduction

Our project's overall purpose has been to study culture wars in the contemporary Greek context. For this purpose, we have addressed four specific issues/culture wars, which constitute our case studies. We have surveyed already available data and conducted focus group research on four cases, which are the following:

- a. Conflict over personal freedom challenged by the state's requirement for vaccination against Covid-19 (including other cases of vaccination). The first focus group involved lay persons rejecting vaccines, and the aim was to understand the reasoning of opposition specific to Covid-19 vaccination.
- b. Conflict over the challenges posed to Greek national identity by migrants and refugees. The second focus group explored whether participants felt that their identity was threatened by the inflow of migrants and refugees.
- c. Conflict over traditional family vs. modern forms of gender identity and partnership. The third focus group investigated how participants interpreted challenges to "traditional" family forms and the emergence of new gender identities.
- d. Conflict over the Greek national identity in opposition to the European one. The starting point for the fourth focus group is to understand how participants view the Prespes Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia (2018). We would also like to see what participants understand as challenges to national identity and how they counter them.

We start by presenting our research design and data collection. We then discuss culture wars and cultural identities in a short theoretical section. We hypothesize a tripartite distinction among traditional, modern, and post-modern cultural universes, respectively corresponding to values associated with honor, achievement, and joy (Basáñez 2016). For this purpose, we shall examine the prevalence and distribution of ethical values and norms that relate to the cases under study, registered in the Greek version of World Values Survey (WVS-7) of 2017. These responses may have relevance for culture wars in Greece, as they refer to tensions between traditional and modern (open) values and norms, as well as post-modern ones. By utilizing Ronald

Inglehart's post-materialist index (1997), we obtain an insight into the value-based profile of the Greek population, and its value proclivities, that inform the context of cultural wars in Greece.

This is followed, by an introduction to the idea of culture wars, as they are played out in the contemporary Greek context. To this effect, we present a brief but critical review of the literature. Specifically, we look into the relevance, if any, of alternative theoretical approaches - six of which are identified - to the research paper's topic. The Greek values context is then brought in. We analyze this context on the basis of the seventh wave of World Values Survey (WVS-7) survey data. We thus provide the contextual background for some of the culture wars under exploration (attitudes towards others, trust of others, family values and appreciation of family forms). We then move to an analysis of general and specific findings, drawn on the focus group research which we conducted in Athens in 2022.

After discussing findings of our focus group research, we conclude with an assessment of how culture wars are conducted in Greece, considering patterns of political conflict. And we try to explain the paradoxes which we have found. Relevant recommendations on how to manage culture wars in Greece are placed in a separate policy paper.

2. Research design and data collection

To contextualize each of the above four case studies, we investigated: (a) the minutes of relevant parliamentary debates held at the plenum of the Greek parliament, (b) opinion articles and reports from two national-circulation Athens-based dailies, for a set period, and (c) selected academic literature on culture in today's Greece. Our idea was to map the sides taking part in each culture war and register their main arguments.

We then conducted field research via four focus groups. Each focus group session consisted of 5 to 9 participants and lasted for up to two hours.

Focus groups organization

We have utilized the focus groups approach, a method pioneered by Robert K. Merton. We thought that it is quite suitable for our purposes, while keeping in mind that it does not reflect the viewpoints of any given population as a whole; it is not a representative sampling method.

Several potential participants in each of the focus groups were identified. Those were individuals who had participated in public debates in relation to the issue at hand or plain citizens that had, however, expressed a view or preference.

Our purpose has been to explore and interpret the internal logic of those sides in culture wars who feel threatened as far as their cultural identity is concerned. To elaborate, we did not invite focus groups participants who held opposing views. While the composition of each of the four focus groups varied a lot, all focus groups also had a common trait. We approached prospective focus group participants, men and women of different age-groups and professional profile, who however held conventional worldviews. In other words, focus group participants included anti-vaccinationists or people reluctant to obtain the Covid-19 vaccine (first group); conservatives regarding migration and refugee issues (second group); traditionalists regarding family and gender roles (third group); and ethnocentric citizens regarding national identity (fourth group).

We have selected focus group participants belonging to the more conventional or traditional side of each of the four culture wars. The purpose of this selection bias was to discuss challenges to the cultural identities of focus group participants, whom past research on Greece may have not yet studied enough. We assumed that if some focus group participants belonged to one side of the culture war under study, while other participants to the other side, we would have witnessed a usual, if not also tense, exchange of well-known or expected, flat arguments. We would not have been able to shed enough light on the nuances of participants' views. This is because, we hypothesized, focus group participants may have wanted to save face in a context of tensions within their focus group. They may have wanted to preserve a social façade of civility and modesty. To put it otherwise, in this project participants in each of our focus groups were by and large likely-minded.

Thus, in our research, the composition of focus groups was on purpose more or less homogeneous, in order to allow researchers to discern variations on the identities of Greeks who feel challenged by contemporary developments in medical health care, population movements, gender issues and Greece's foreign relations.

A letter (in the form of an e-mail message) was sent out to would-be participants. Those who agreed to participate were given some additional information about the purpose of the focus group meeting. The people initially contacted/invited to participate were about three times over the number of actual participants. Most refusals to participate were not directly negative, but indirectly, i.e., invitees maintained that they were unavailable since they were out of town.

Both authors of this paper attended each focus group session, while a volunteer ELIAMEP intern helped with note-keeping and the transcription of the recorded discussion. Participants were given aliases to protect their identity and each session was recorded with the participants' consent. Focus group participants were informed that once the necessary processing was completed, the recordings would be destroyed. All focus group sessions, except for the first one, lasted for a little more than one and a half hours; the first one lasted a little more than two hours.

In terms of participants, the first focus group ("Conflict over personal freedom from compulsory vaccination"), involved nine persons other than the researchers and the research assistant and was conducted via an internet-based platform (Zoom); the meeting was set up by ELIAMEP staff members. The other three focus group sessions took place in a face-to-face mode at the ELIAMEP offices in Athens in the spring and the summer of 2022. The invited participants that contributed to the second, third and fourth focus group sessions were, respectively, six, five and again five people.

Each focus group session started with our opening statement about the culture war under discussion and brief introductions of the participants to one another. A paper brief was also distributed to each focus group participants outlining the specific culture war and the questions we wanted to ask them.

3. Culture identities and culture wars

From the outset we have hypothesized that at least two of these conflicts (the second and the fourth) would relate to ongoing perceptions about national identity. It is necessary then to briefly explain what we perceive as a central notion in our research, i.e., that of *identity* and specifically of *national identity*.

The notion of identity, as is often the case in the social sciences, has several meanings; indeed, it is a multidimensional concept. Identity “presumes continuity across time and space”, and a capacity to keep a particular narrative going (Giddens 1991: 54-55). Imagine for a second that we and the readers of this paper form a nation. It would be vital to have a notion of national identity, of who we are. It is essential to have an idea of how we have become the nation that we are, what is the common ground on which we stand, and where are we heading to.

Patently, national identity is extended to include a definite language, sentiments, a territory or political entity and common symbolic features. These are elements that are interrelated, have certain functions, and generate a sense of fraternity. Overall, any given national identity is imbued with meaning for the groups and individuals alike that adhere to it. Identity forms a significant collective identifier (Smith 1991).

The culture wars idea is that the major social or political cleavages are no longer exhausted in the “objective” structural social divisions, such as social class, race/ethnicity, or gender. These to be sure are usually recognized to have their own bearing and impact, although there has been some doubting of the continuing (or not) importance of social class divisions. In addition to objective social divisions, as those just referred to, there are cleavages at the socio-cultural level. These entail and relate to a variable mix of values *cum* attitudes at the symbolic level, including ethical/cultural codes, and lifestyles.

We do not assume that cultural differences necessarily lead to the formation of solid identities. There is a long process through which individuals begin to close ranks after perceiving their situation to be quite similar with that of other individuals (Lianos 2019). To the extent that individuals perceive their differences with others as sharp, they join groups that may engage in

conflicts over identity. Cultural differences, in particular, have the potential to become contentious, dividing any given population.

Itself, the notion of “culture war(s)” was developed by the sociologist James Hunter (1991). For Hunter, culture wars are attempts to designate, determine, and shape the US public life (Barker *et al.* 2008, Chapman and Ciment 2014, Haglund 2019). Comparable cultural wars have erupted in other countries too (Busbridge *et al.* 2020). Patently the word “war” is an excess expression, a hyperbole, intended to show that what is at play is a profound and divisive dispute or conflict that may have adverse, and severe (and in this sense war-like) effects or consequences. Imprecise as it may be the notion has caught up. It is applied to imply conflicts that erupt variably, depending on the social/cultural field.

In fact, a major conflict occurs when two broadly identifiable cultures that are antithetical to one another, pursue their own sense of right and wrong and establish opposing borders of moral communities. The two broad cultures could (in Hunter’s account) be respectively dubbed “progressive” and “orthodox”, while each one, value laden as it is, follows its own internal logic. It is a logic leading away from moderation and the bridging of differences and towards intense disagreement. The appeal that culture wars have for the media, only funnels further intransigence and bellicosity that in turn furthers divisiveness. Past cultural wars in Europe were waged on traditional dividing lines, such as religion vs. secularism (Clark and Kaiser 2003) or reflected the contrast between modernity and tradition.

In contradistinction however, and this is a position that this research paper advocates, today’s cultural wars are not merely linked to a realignment of older ethical codes and dividing lines that used to be based on religion and tradition. Indeed, a shift has taken place under the impact of secularism and democratization.

Today, culture wars are related to the multiplication of individual and collective freedoms, and to their maturing. This is expressed above all in the enhanced possibility for expressing one’s views, for making choices and authoring one’s own biography (Giddens 1992, 1996, 2006). Overall, there is a radical break and conflict that such developments bring about in relation to earlier established views.

The Greek context of cultural wars

When the culture wars analogy is transferred to the Greek context, the conflicting aspect is expanded and more accentuated, reflecting what in Marxist terms could be called, ideological struggle, i.e., conflicts over the dominance and interpretation of specific as well as more general values, beliefs, and practices.

While culture wars on religion and gender issues have flourished in the United States and have increasingly fueled socio-political debates in various parts of Europe, in contemporary Greece they have been interwoven, almost from the outset, with ideological and political conflicts. Material and ideal interests, in the Weberian sense of the term, were at play in such conflicts. Historical legacies of the Left vs. Right divide and polarized political party conflict have overshadowed any other social cleavages at least since the 1974 transition to democracy (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2020, Sotiropoulos 1996 and 2020) and may be largely independent from social structural divisions. Two paradoxes are associated with such an over-politicized context.

First, in Greece cultural wars did not emerge from “below”, i.e., from among social movements or networks reflecting identity politics, but erupted when governing elites attempted to introduce new regulations on human rights, often to streamline and adapt national legislature to the European *acquis*.

One such example was the Greek government’s decision in 1999 to abolish the requirement to have a citizen’s church affiliation registered on the police-issued identity card which every Greek carries on with him or her from the age of 14 years old. A second example was the government’s bill of law in 2017 which granted Greeks the right to self-identify as male or female from the age of 15. A third example was the temporary abolition of the citizenship rights for second-generation migrants which had been granted to them by law in 2010 but were considered unconstitutional by Greece’s supreme administrative court in 2013 (and were eventually re-instituted by another law in 2015). Such government initiatives have consistently run against a wall of opposition. Politicized culture wars erupted.

A second paradox was that participants in culture wars were not groups of citizens rallying around a cause (e.g., citizenship, gender politics), but political and administrative institutions which either initiated a cultural change or fought against it. In a first instance (identity cards), the state-funded Greek Orthodox Church openly challenged the government. In a second instance (integration of migrants), the supreme administrative court gave its own interpretation of who should be included in the Greek nation and annulled a law adopted in parliament. In a third instance (gender identity), the parliamentary opposition and other actors opposed the legislation. A brief survey of the dominant value system in Greece may be helpful to understand the cases of culture wars mentioned above.

4. Post materialist index for Greece

R. Inglehart (1997) has argued that an irreversible change has occurred in the priorities of values in contemporary Western societies, that are often designated as post-industrial societies. Post-materialist issues have emerged. These relate to issues of quality of life and expression/self-actualization. Such issues do not negate the importance of the more tangible material dimensions of political and social life, but rather have their own significance. Relevant examples of issues include human rights, the environment, democracy, openness to choose life-styles, and what Anthony Giddens refers to as the present-day possibility, if not contemporary demand, for distinct individuals to write their own biography (Giddens 1991). In a sense, the post-materialist dimension stands in contrast to issues related to the materialist dimension, which focuses on issues such as security or economic development/growth.³

³ Inglehart has formulated a post-materialist index with which he attempts to determine whether the values he associates with the post-materialist dimension have been consolidated. What should be noted here in connection with the questions and answers given is that four possible designations emerge: a “post-materialist”, a “rather post-materialist”, a “rather materialist” or a “materialist” position. If post-materialist elements are selected as the first and second choices, then the designation “post-materialist” is assigned. If a post-materialist selection is given as the first choice and a materialist as the second, then it is identified as “rather post-materialist”. If again a materialist option is chosen as the first choice and a post-materialist as the second choice, then it is identified as “rather materialist”. If, finally, materialistic

Inglehart's distinction between materialist and post-materialist values has stimulated comparative survey research and his themes are included in surveys, such as the European Values Survey (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS) which are periodically conducted in many countries, including Greece.

In the latest measurement of such values in Greece, in 2017, it appears that a shift has been underway when compared to the earlier measurement in 2008. While the Greek value system was categorized as “rather post-materialist” in 2008, i.e., more akin to the post-modern condition according to the survey's classificatory scheme (see footnote 1), in 2017 it was categorized as “rather materialistic”. The shift may be considered as a regression from post-materialist back to materialist values. Table 1 (below) shows a rise in the selection of materialist items among Greek respondents and a reduction in their selecting post-materialist ones between 2008-2017. Yet, in both time points most Greek respondents identified with a mix of materialist and post-materialist values.

Table A' – Post-Materialist index 4-item – 2017 & 2008, Greece – Crosstabulation

	Materialist		Mixed		Post-materialist		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Greece (2017) EVS-4	465	39.4	633	56.6	82	6.9	1180	100,0
Greece (2008) WVS-7	406	27.6	827	56.3	234	15.9	1467	100,0

Source: EVS-4 and WVS-7, which stand for the 4th wave of EVS and the 7th wave of WVS respectively.

So, nine years after the EVS-4 2008 measurement, in 2017, having suffered an acute economic and social crisis, Greece displays a sort of regression in terms of the values its population aspires to. It occupies a position that can be characterized as rather materialist, as shown above. In this specific respect, Greek society appears to become less modern in value system terms. This is an issue that needs to be considered in relation to the historical and cultural

items are selected as first and second choices, then the “materialistic” determination is in effect. For further details see, Koniordos 2018: 66-71.

development of Greece, as interpreted by alternative theoretical approaches; (also see Nagopoulos *et al.* 2021).

For purposes of contextualising our investigation, it is worth mentioning two trends: the heightening over the last 20 years of Greek national pride (Stratoudaki 2021), and the accelerated value secularization of those Greeks that nominally declare themselves as believers (Sakellariou 2021). However, we are not examining in this paper these developments and their linkages, complex as they are, to the above-mentioned shift of the post-materialist index.

5. Review of the academic literature on Greece: the relevance of alternative theoretical approaches to the research paper's topic

To understand the multiple facets of culture wars and development of cultural identities over time in Greece, it is useful to put such wars into a suitable social and historical perspective. Collective identities in Greece may be interpreted in the context of the birth of the Modern Greek state (1830), which was facilitated and monitored by Western powers, and the context of nation-building in the 19th and 20th centuries. In our times, more recent transformations of cultural identities may be linked to Greece's accession to the European Communities (EC) in 1981, the post-1991 developments in Southeast Europe, the Greek and Eurozone crises, and migration movements towards Europe, which are owed to conditions of war, poverty, economic underdevelopment and environmental degradation in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

Very briefly, in the early 1980s Greece was admitted to the EC. The process of Europeanization, that started then and continued as the EC was transformed into the European Union (EU), had an impact not only on the Greek economy but also on cultural identity. A fluctuating majority of Greeks gradually came to accept that they bear more than one identity, namely a national and a European one (Koniordos 2018, Nezi, Sotiropoulos and Toka 2010). This was not a smooth identity shift. It was tested at historical conjunctures in which Greece became an outlier in the universe of EU Member-States, for instance, during the onset and peak of the dispute over the name and national symbols of neighbouring North Macedonia in the mid-1990s. It was tested also during the Greek economic crisis and the Eurozone crisis in the early 2010s.

The economic crisis provoked extensive self-reflection in Greece, including reflection on the crisis' cultural roots (Marangudakis and Chadjipadelis 2019). It touched upon, not only the country's economic performance, but also its lifestyle, i.e., its culture, including values, customs, and mores, as well as the feeling of belonging to a nation going through periodic crises. In other words, national identity was thrown into crisis too, as different groups of Greeks experienced mixed feelings of victimization, bitterness and later on perhaps also relief, regarding relations between Greece and Europe, in the wake of the EU's rescuing of the indebted country on stringent economic terms.

The Greek identity was also put to test by the successive inflows of migrants, initially from the post-communist Balkan countries in the 1990s, and subsequently, from poverty-ridden and war-torn regions of the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa in the 2010s.

Bearing in mind this domestic and international context, analysts have suggested different theoretical approaches to Greek cultural identity, six of which are summarized and assessed below. What are the main themes of each theoretical approach and how could they be useful for the analysis of the four case studies, which are empirically investigated in this paper?

A *first* approach to cultural identities in Greece is related to a contrast between a national identity and segmented identities. The former is related to nation-building, while the latter to lingering attachments of Greeks to regional and local communities. Very briefly, after the birth of the Modern Greek state, authorities made a long and concerted effort to create national homogeneity out of the varied population groups living in Greek territory.

Greece was a segmented society (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002; for segmented societies, see Gellner 1981). Particularly in rural Greece there were and to an extent still are strong local identities based on traditions of village communities and traditional extended families (Campbell 1964). Apart from the majority of Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians, there were small minority religious or ethnic groups. Examples were groups of Muslims, Roma, and Jews. There were also minority linguistic groups of Albanian-, Vlach- and Slav-speakers. After the Asia Minor catastrophe (1922), there were tensions between indigenous Greeks and the incoming of approximately 1,5 million refugees who were forced out of Greek communities in Turkey.

Faced with such a diverse social reality, the Greek state assumed a major role in crafting a national identity. State-driven political socialization moulded cultural differences into a national -more or less- homogenous social body. The public administration, schools, church authorities, the army, the mass media, and civic associations monitored and contributed to the project of nation building.

This approach may have been useful in a study of a possible resilience or re-emergence of regional and local cultural identities in Greece (not covered in this research paper). However interestingly, the contrast between a nationwide and segmented identities is not as discernible in Greece today, as it was in previous centuries. Compared to the past, there is a homogenization of Greek identity across the regions of Greece. On that front, no major culture war is in sight.

A *second* approach contrasts a modern Greek national identity to a European one, identifying the historical roots of the Greek identity and the debts it owes to European identity (Tsoucalas 1999). The Greek identity was based on pre-modern roots, such as the achievements of the ancient civilization of the “Hellenes”, bequeathed to modern Europe and Greece through the filter of Enlightenment. The Greek identity also owed a lot to the spread of Greek language into and influence of the Orthodox Church over the Christian groups residing within the Ottoman Empire. These pre-modern sources of national identity were combined in the 19th century with the then dominant romantic variety of nationalism, based on descent and bonds of blood and kinship.

The result was a national identity, based on blood relations, common language, and beliefs of common ancestry, which drew on the glorification of Ancient Greece and the Christian Orthodox creed. Greeks consequently felt that they held a unique identity of universal significance. However, the identity was difficult to bear, as the traditional social structures, weak political institutions, and economic adventures of the modern Greek state, after its birth in 1830, did not measure up to the high standards symbolized by that exceptional ancient identity.

Nor was the Greek national identity subjected to modernizing social and political processes, which were emblematic of Western societies, such as Reformation, urbanization, and industrialization, which were conducive to liberal political ideas. The later were super-imposed

on traditional norms and customs, existing in Greece before the Greek war of independence (1821-1827) and surviving for a long time after its successful completion (Pollis 1977). As a result, both traditional and modern elements can be traced in the Greek national identity, some of which bring it closer to European identity, while other ones diverge from it. For instance, scientific rationality and religious superstition may coexist in a tense mix.

This approach lends itself to analysis useful for this research paper, because it allows for the existence of contradictory elements, co-existing within one and the same cultural identity. The approach may shed light on all four issues, which are discussed in the empirical sections of the paper.

A *third* approach is related to the thesis of cultural dualism (Diamandouros 1994, Mouzelis 2002). The thesis analyzes the value systems of competing social and political forces (social strata, political parties, associations) rather than any solid cultural identities. The thesis suggests that in modern Greece there have been two ideal types of culture: the underdog culture and the modernizing culture. In a nutshell, the former is introverted and nationalist, holds reservations towards modern forms of capitalism and is defensive towards the Western world view. It reflects traditional values and the world view of the Christian Orthodox Church. By contrast, the latter (the modernizing one) is extroverted, open to ideas and influences of the West, and subscribes to modern values, such as the values of political liberalism, secularism, and free-market economy.

The thesis of “cultural dualism” has been influential, but has been contested (Demertzis 1997, Tziovas 2001, Stavrakakis 2002). It is still relevant to a certain extent, as argued below. Admittedly, there is a plausible criticism pointing out that in Greece today Greeks and social groups, in actual practice, may selectively adopt aspects of both types of culture and live with a hybrid mix of the two (Liakos 2004, Xenakis 2013, Triantafyllidou, Gropas and Kouki 2013). However, on a different level of analysis, “cultural dualism” poses a major and still pertinent question. It asks whether there is a common thread linking aborted or stalled reforms in a wide range of policy sectors, including Greece’s economic production model, labour market, education, welfare system and public administration.

Nevertheless, the above thesis may be less relevant for an analysis of cultural identities being in tension, let alone war, which is the topic of this paper. For one thing, the thesis was formulated to analyze political culture rather than cultural identities. Secondly, as already implied above, it is difficult to find individuals or social groups that would identify with only one of the two ideal types of culture. Individuals may be neither “traditionalists” nor “modernizers”, but may bear a mix of both types of culture and respond variably to challenges of modernization (now supporting reform, then resisting it), depending on circumstances and perceived interests. And thirdly, it may be debatable whether a certain reform is modernizing or constitutes a reversal of modernization. The content of a reform that seems modernizing and forward-looking may actually consist of a move backwards. For instance, in labour relations, a trend towards full flexibility of labour contracts and working hours may be a modernizing reaction towards extreme employment rigidity. However, it may also be a return to pre-modern patterns of work, harmful to salaried employees.

More to the point, in Greece today, any tension between the underdog and the modernizing cultures seems subdued. After the long economic crisis of 2010-2018 all sides probably agree that modernizing reforms are overdue in many public policy sectors, but such reforms cannot be rolled out at the expense of the weaker or the more traditional social strata, which are normally associated with the underdog culture.

Nevertheless, the approach of cultural dualism is still useful, not as a comprehensive interpretative schema, but as a legacy and a confining condition to be overcome (Diamandouros 2013: 225). To give an example, it is an approach that illuminates reactions of supporters of traditional cultural identity who resist challenges posed by European integration, liberal political ideas of tolerance towards minorities, and the diffusion of modernizing ideas on family and gender roles. These are issues which are empirically examined in this paper.

A *fourth* approach looks at cultural identities from the political science perspective of political culture and in doing so focuses on nationalism and nationalist identities. The dominant cultural identity in today’s Greece can be traced back to the exclusionary nationalism, prevailing in the country in the 19th century, which has evolved into a set of illiberal orientations that

characterize Greek political culture. It includes intolerance towards religious minorities, identification with the beliefs of the Christian Orthodox Church on issues of morality, public education and culture, a belief in the nation as a community based on descent and blood, exaltation of the organic entity of the nation to a level far above and at the expense of individual rights (e.g., freedom of speech), and uncompromising views towards nations of neighbouring countries. The church, the state and nationalist civic associations have been the pillars of this illiberal national identity (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2020, Koniordos 2021a).

This is an approach useful to understand two of the issues which are empirically researched in this paper, namely, first, challenges to the Greek identity owed to Greece's relations with the EU and neighbouring countries (e.g., North Macedonia) and second, similar challenges owed to the inflow of migrants and refugees. The same approach is also useful to discuss the challenge posed by the anti-vaccination movement to the extent that the latter converges with beliefs of Greek Orthodox priests on managing the Covid-19 pandemic (i.e., to refrain from intervening in a God-sent illness).

A *fifth* approach introduces the concept of the "Other", employed in critical social anthropology. It is a social constructionist approach. The "Other" is produced through a process of production of "cultural difference". The product, i.e., the "Other", differs depending on the historical period under study, but is always subsumed into a social hierarchy, at the top of which there is a self-defined prototype (Papataxiarchis 2006). The prototype is the model of indigenous, Greek-speaking, Christian Orthodox person who claims having a Greek national consciousness. Individuals who do not conform to the model are variations of the "Other".

The "Other" is a non-member of the political community. It is a concept the content of which has changed many times in the development of Modern Greece over time, but is always defined as different from a constructed prototype. As noted above, in previous centuries there were groups which resided in the southern part of the Balkan peninsula (i.e., the territory of today's Greece) whose maternal language was not Greek. For instance, such groups spoke Vlach, Slavic, or Albanian dialects. At that time, they constituted the "Other". Another example of the

“Other” would be Greek-speaking immigrants from Asia Minor who took refuge to Greece in 1922.

The “Other” is accepted as Greek to the extent that she or he is assimilated, i.e., not just integrated, into the social body of Greeks. In the 1990s, for Greek-speakers coming from abroad after East European state socialist regimes collapsed (e.g., members of the Greek speaking minority of Southern Albania and Pontic Greeks of the former Soviet Republics) assimilation has been easier than for the rest of migrants. Original tensions between indigenous Greeks and newcomers may have been acute, but no substantive cultural war occurred. After all, in all cases noted above, the in-coming populations were either indifferent to religion (Albanians after 1991) or Orthodox Christians. Thus, the perceived external threat to Greek national identity was mild.

The perceived threat became more acute and larger in scale with the massive inflow of migrants and refugees into Greece over the last three decades and more specifically after 1991 and again after 2011. Indeed, this fifth approach may be more pertinent to an analysis of Greek society at the dawn of the 21st century. It is an approach related to the social interaction between the indigenous population on the one hand and migrants and refugees on the other.

In the beginning of the 21st century, migrants and refugees from the Middle East, Africa and South Asia came to Greece. A large share among them were Muslims. A refugee crisis occurred in 2015-2016 in the Greek islands of the Aegean Sea and mainland Greece. It was followed later, in 2020-2022, by successive attempts of organized groups, coming from Turkey, to storm the Greek border on the Evros river, in northeastern Greece.

This recurrent pattern of migrant and refugee inflow has provoked the emergence of two strands in Greek public opinion. The first strand considers the inflows of migrants and refugees and their settling down in Greece as a threat to Greek national identity. It advocates preventive and restrictive measures towards inflows of migrants and refugees. Based on social surveys and other research, this negative stance is one of the most popular reactions (Koniordos 2021b, Triandafyllidou 2020). The second strand is receptive to migrants and refugees, advocates their full integration into Greek society and – in its extreme form – supports an “open border” policy

towards migrants and refugee inflows. The two strands of opinion are the two ends of a continuum, with variation between the two.

This is an approach useful to interpret challenges to the Greek cultural identity posed by the incoming migrants and refugees, as well as the tensions between supporters of more restrictive vs. more relaxed measures in migration policy. These are topics which are briefly analyzed on the basis of empirical research, presented further below in our paper.

A *sixth* approach, akin to the previous social constructionist approach, refers to identities of sexual orientation in Greece today (Michos and Figgou 2019). The approach claims that regarding sexual relations, “heteronormativity” reigns supreme. This means that heterosexual orientation is the norm, and that marriage or co-habitation are tolerated only in the case of heterosexual couples. Heteronormativity relies on a constructed Christian-Orthodox and Greek national identity.

On the one hand, this identity is officially promoted (article 3 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Greece recognizes the Christian Orthodox religion as the prevailing religion in Greece); and, on the other hand, it helps construct not only negative stereotypes against homosexuals, but also paints LGBTQI+ identities in a biased, negative manner. Such identities are understood as sinful in religious terms and unworthy in terms of traditional values. The traditional national ideal of the Greek family mission is to breed children to defend the nation. In this context, a non-conforming sexual identity is a threat to the nation. Thus, regarding sexual identities, there is a dominant cultural identity up to which LGBTQI+ identities are measured and are found lacking.

This approach is helpful in analyzing challenges posed by the emergence of new types of family/partnerships and new gender roles to the Greek cultural identity, to the extent that the latter is associated with the traditional family types and gender roles. In the section that follows, we present some data on Greek values context, within which the different culture identities unfold.

6. A values context

The culture wars surveyed in this research paper occur in a value-laden social context. Accordingly, we place culture wars in Greece in perspective by providing some attitudinal evidence.

We use available sets of perceptions of Greeks, based on the World Value Survey-wave seven (WVS-7), which took place in 2017 and included a national representative sample of respondents of 1200 persons. Among the issues touched upon, respondents were asked a set of questions on whether they would *not* like to have as neighbours people belonging to specific social groups.⁴ These groups include the following that are of concern to two of the culture wars under examination: first, the perceived challenge which immigrants pose to the identity of indigenous Greeks and, second, possible resentment over non-traditional forms of family such as, for instance, same-sex couples.

Accordingly, response options to questions about whom respondents do not wish having as neighbours included: “people of a different race”, “immigrants/foreign workers”, “people of a different religion”, and “people who speak a different language”, which relate to the first of the two culture wars noted above. Responses to questions about “people who have AIDS” (that has been associated to stereotypes about male homosexuality), “homosexuals”, and “unmarried couples living together”, relate to the second.

From the set of four questions and answers that relay to the first issue (migrants perceived as identity challengers to indigenous Greeks), it emerges that a contingent of 25% or less of respondents do not wish to have as neighbours any persons that are of a different “race”

⁴ This set of questions asked “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” (WVS-7 2017; Master Questionnaire).

The survey was conducted in the fall of 2017 over a representative sample of 1200 respondents, virtually all of them ethnic Greeks – save 73 (6.1%) that self-identified they are not. This also emerges when considering that 91.0% of the sample adheres to Eastern (Greek) Orthodoxy, while in ethnic group self-identification, 99.3% said they belong to the “Caucasian white” category, i.e., categorizations that partly echo a Greek identity.

(see Appendix 5, Table 1).⁵ Likewise, a quarter of respondents do not wish to have “immigrants/foreign workers” as neighbors (see Appendix 5, Table 2). Just over one-fifth do not want “people of a different religion” as neighbours. While the observed rates are not negligible, it emerges that by far most respondents (i.e., 3/4ths or more) do not report having a problem with residing next to someone identified as a foreign/immigrant.

A set of three questions (and answers) relate to the second culture war, i.e., possible resentment over non-traditional forms of family. Of course, the designation “non-traditional forms of family” is wide-ranging. That term may include dissimilar family forms as, for instance, single-parent ones, cohabiting unmarried couples/families, or same-sex couples, among others. Accordingly, it is necessary to draw distinctions among family forms tagged as “non-traditional”.

The first question referred to whether respondents would want to have as neighbours people suffering from AIDS. The idea behind the question is that this condition has been largely associated in the popular mind to male same-sex sexual practices. The question may serve as a proxy for same-sex non-traditional families. In fact, it emerges that 35.1% of respondents do not wish to have such persons as neighbours (see Appendix 5, Table 5). When directly asked about residing close to “homosexuals”, a very similar figure, i.e., 33.3% of respondents, expressed an aversion in having “homosexuals” as neighbours (see Appendix 5, Table 6). On the other hand, a small share of 8% of respondents were expressly against “unmarried couples living together” as neighbours, which indicates that such an arrangement does not provoke a substantial moral indignation as is the case with same-sex couples and families. Thus, regarding non-traditional families, the values of Greeks are not uniform, but are significantly differentiated on a type-by-type basis.

Under the caption “How would you feel about the following statements? Do you agree or disagree with them?” the following values questions were posed:

⁵ Admittedly, “race” is notoriously vague and thus an unfound category – here it refers to those perceived to be visually different to respondents’ own physical outlook.

- “When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants”
- “Homosexual couples are as good parents as other couples”
- “It is a duty towards society to have children”.

Regarding the question on whether job scarcity should lead to a prioritization of Greeks in securing employment over migrants, a very sizeable 70.5% agreed that this is the route to follow, whilst negative responses were given by 15.5% (see Appendix 5, Table 8).

As for views on the value of raising children, 41.1% are in consort considering it a societal duty, 32.9% disagree, while 26.4%, stand in-between (see Appendix 5, Table 9). Raising children therefore is far from being a universal or major value. This finding is not associated with an acceptance of homosexuals as equally good parents as heterosexuals. Negative attitudes predominate, with 65.5% of respondents disagreeing with the statement that homosexuals could be equally good parents, just 8.7% agreeing and a sizeable 25% avoiding taking sides (see Appendix 5, Table 10).

a. Trust and trust levels

Respondents in the WVS-7 survey were asked about the trust extended to various social groups in Greece, a country already identified as exhibiting notoriously low-trust levels (Tsiganou 2010, Sotiropoulos 2007 and 2017). Respondents indicated that they are not trustful of others and certainly of non-Greeks. The sampled said that they trust, in descending order, the following: their family members/close kin, persons known to them, and other Greeks. Inversely, they are distrustful of non-family members, persons they meet for the first time, persons of other creeds or nationality. It is evident that Greeks are particularly mistrustful of anybody else, save for their close family-members (see Appendix 5, Tables 11 and 12)⁶. This, to be fair, is not a Greek

⁶ The question read: “I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each, whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all?”.

exception and in fact is much in alignment with the WVS-7 outcomes for other South and East European countries too.

Next, respondents were asked about trusting individuals whom they know personally. Three quarters of respondents said that they trust them to a significant extent with a good measure of reservation, i.e., not unequivocally (see Appendix 5, Table 13). Neighbours whom respondents know of, are trusted by over 60%, but again only in part and in a guarded fashion (see Appendix 5, Table 14). People one meets for the first time, i.e., basically unknown, are universally not trusted (see Appendix 5, Table 15). People of another religion are not trusted either (by approximately 75%) and only with reservations (see Appendix 5, Table 16). Respondents express very low trust towards people of another nationality (20.4% acknowledging a positive trust level vs. 76.7% that do not trust them; see Appendix 5, Table 17).

Therefore, a preeminent value feature is the prevalence of mistrust rather than trust towards those that do not belong to a Greek respondent's in-group of strong personal ties.

b. Views on migration and migrants

Several questions in WVS-7 have directly touched on issues pertaining to migration and migrants. The issues were addressed by a set of ten questions through which the survey documented respondents' views on migrants. Initially and in overall terms the sampled respondents were asked to evaluate migrants' impact on the country's development. Almost half of the respondents appraised such an impact negatively; about 35% were neutral, and only about 14% expressed a positive view (see Appendix 5, Table 18).

Subsequently, a cluster (batch) of eight questions were posed on the perceived effects of migration into Greece, followed by another question on the perceived role of migrants in relation to job opportunities. Thus, respondents in roughly equal numbers disagree (40% approx.) as well as agree (37% approx.) that migrants tend to fill important job vacancies (see Appendix 5, Table 19). Respondents were asked whether migration strengthens cultural diversity. Among the

respondents a sizable 46% agreed that this is indeed the case, while a considerable minority disagreed (33% approx.) (see Appendix 5, Table 20).

In relation to the possibility that migration increases the crime rate, approximately 67% agree that there is a linkage, while approximately 13% disagree (see, Appendix 5, Table 21). Migration facilitates the granting of asylum to political refugees who are persecuted elsewhere (77% approx. of survey participants – see Appendix 5, Table 22). At the same time and by a wide margin (i.e., approximately 64%), migration is perceived to increase risks associated with terrorism (see Appendix 5, Table 23). In brief, there is an overall negative assessment of the impact of migration to Greece.

Furthermore, most respondents (68%) feel that migrants from poor countries are offered better living conditions in Greece (see Appendix 5, Table 24). Most respondents (63.5 %) feel that migration increases (Greek) unemployment, with a further 17.3% being unsure about such a link (see Appendix 5, Table 25). A sizeable group of respondents (57%) feel that migration leads to social conflict, but 20.3% of respondents feel that they cannot pass judgment, while 19.6% disagree with such a connection (see Appendix 5, Table 26).

As regards the attitudes towards people from other countries who come to Greece to work, a small share of respondents (16.6%) is flatly against their arrival. The majority (55.3%) feels that strict limits should be imposed on migrants. That also means that they implicitly accept a restricted or more controlled migration for work purposes. A quarter of respondents (25.2%) accepts migrants if jobs are available – the implication being that migration for work purposes is acceptable to them but should be more controlled (see Appendix 5, Table 27).

To sum up, firstly, the overall picture is that Greeks do not welcome “Others” that are dissimilar to them. Accordingly, migrants are not welcome, as most respondents find flaws in or even feel threatened by their presence and activities. Greeks also keep their distance from them, even though there is a pragmatic appreciation of migrants’ role as labourers.

Secondly, in relation to family types and gender roles, there are indications that traditional family forms as well as non-traditional variants (for instance, cohabitation), are unequivocally acceptable. This does not apply for same-sex couples and families. Homosexual

couples/families are definitely not regarded positively, while the idea that they might raise children is seen in most negative terms.

Thirdly, the issue of trust is telling of societal modes. Greece remains a low trust country with Greeks trusting only their (very) close relations and virtually no one else.

We now shift to a presentation and analysis of relevant findings, based on political party positions, research on Greek media and parliamentary minutes, but primarily relying on our focus group research.

7. Key findings of the focus group research

The findings of this research are general and specific. The former findings pertain to all four contested issues noted above. There are also specific findings for each of the issues. The general findings, summarized below, concern the wider theoretical discussion on culture wars, whereas the rest, i.e., our specific findings, are related to each of the four culture wars in contemporary Greece.

a. General findings

As already noted in the beginning of our paper, culture wars, in the strictest sense of the term, occurred in the past, when disputes emerged on the grounds of religion and tradition. Today culture wars continue in some of the most economically and technologically advanced societies of the world, but they vary from one society to the other. For instance, the American society may be divided on women's civil rights and the citizens' right to bear weapons, but West European societies are not. Within Europe, the French society may periodically be shaken by disputes over the social integration of Muslim minorities, but other European societies are not.

Yet, in other 21st societies of the West, including Greece, individuals are less prone to belong to warring moral communities. They enjoy opportunities to make individual choices about their lives, including the possibility to construct their own identities. An individual is relatively

free to author his or her biography (Giddens 2006). This is the result of secularization and democratization, particularly in societies in which these two processes were belated.

The spread of civil, political, and social rights in the wake of Greece's democratic transition (1974) has contributed to the emergence of variable cultural identities, but has not led to the formation of tight moral communities at war with each other. A first finding of our research is that while in Greece today cultural divisions "naturally" exist, they do necessarily develop into cultural conflicts. There are divergences of opinion and tensions, but not all-out culture wars. Adherents of specific views in Greek debates do not usually identify with other similar-thinking people. They do not wholeheartedly commit to one of the warring sides. They often adopt a pragmatic, down-to-earth stance. Seen in the perspective of frequently passionate political conflicts in Greece, this is an interesting paradox.

A second general finding, related to the above, is that despite the existence of civic associations with a strong agenda on cultural identities, Greeks do not usually rally around a cultural identity project or take sides in cultural tensions in an organized fashion. There are of course, pro-Church and nationalist associations, as there are associations mobilizing for the rights of minorities and the rights of LGBTQI+. To be sure, Greeks rarely join civic associations anyway (Sotiropoulos 2017). In addition, Greeks subscribe to a multitude of fragmented cultural identities which do not necessarily overlap. They do not form a solid basis of distinct moral communities, ready to wage cultural wars. Greeks have European, national, and local identities at the same time. And in contrast to formed camps of progressives and conservatives at war in other countries (Hunter 1991), in Greece there is a mixed record of cultural identifications. Greeks who take a "progressive" stance on one issue (for example, on same-sex marriage) may side with a "conservative" camp on another issue, for example, on the name dispute regarding Macedonia)

A third finding is that in Greece cultural issues become politicized in the sense of becoming an arena for political party competition. Yet, the politicized dimension of cultural tensions sometimes stems from a party's ideological profile, whereas other times from the party's status as government or opposition party. For instance, in 2015 on the issue of granting

rights to foreign migrants and their dependents and on the issue of building a mosque in central Athens, parties of the Right and Center-Right, namely, New Democracy (ND), the Golden Dawn (GD) and even the Independent Greeks (the Anel, partner of the coalition government of Syriza/Anel at the time) voted against. By contrast, parties of the Center-Left and the Left, namely PASOK, the River party, Syriza and KKE, voted in favour.

On other occasions, political party choices on cultural issues were not guided by a party's ideological profile, but by their position in government or opposition. Thus, in 2019 the New Democracy projected a strong nationalist identity and voted against the Prespes Agreement on the Macedonian name dispute, but did not attempt to overturn it after rising to government in the same year. On the same instance, a party of the Left, the KKE, which was in opposition, also voted against the Prespes Agreement, investing its political stance not with a nationalist, but with an anti-American veil. The KKE claimed that the Agreement served NATO's priorities. Further on and in conjunction with the first finding of our research, political party positions are not solid. Depending on the issue, there is room for individual variation among party officials. Political parties formulate a party line on issues of cultural identity, but depending on the circumstances, Members of Parliament (MPs) may not toe the line of their party, without necessarily being sanctioned by party leadership.

And a fourth general finding is that in Greece to the extent that cultural wars take place, these are initiated or waged, not so much by social groups or currents of public opinion, but by institutions. More concretely, participants in Greek culture wars have been not so much identity groups, but political and administrative institutions, including ministries, the courts and official church authorities. In other words, such wars have taken place among institutions, such as the Greek Orthodox Church and the government, among others. For example, in 1999 the Church campaigned against the government's decision to eliminate the field "religious affiliation" from the list of items recorded on Greek identity cards. The government was able to implement its decision. Another example is the Greek Ombudsman, an independent state authority, mediating between citizens and public administrations. The Ombudsman regularly intervenes to uphold the rights of minority identity groups, such as the Roma, in their interaction with Greek authorities.

To sum up this section, this research project points to the existence of culture conflicts or tensions rather than outright culture wars in Greece today. There are discernible sides in each cultural conflict, but their behaviour is moderate rather than fanatical. Anti-vaccinationists, nationalists, racist/xenophobic people, and traditionalists with regard to family forms and gender roles seem to hold a detached stance. They do not form an identifiable group. Thus, it is debatable whether consolidated cultural identities at war have emerged. Groups partaking in culture conflicts do not necessarily overlap and have their own distinct characteristics, as summarized below.

b. Specific findings

i. Conflict over compulsory vaccination

In Greece in 2020-2022 Covid-19 vaccination was compulsory for specific professions (e.g., doctors, nurses, emergency relief (“EMAK”) units, etc. Vaccination was strongly recommended for vulnerable groups (e.g., people over 60 years old and selected categories of patients) and recommended for the rest of the adult population. The government implemented measures to restrict movement, including lockdowns, closures of schools and businesses and restrictions in sport and other activities. It also enforced the use of masks in selected settings (for instance, in public transportation). The government and also businesses required frequent Covid-19 rapid tests or self-tests from employees not vaccinated for any reason. A fluctuating minority of the population did not conform either to vaccination recommendations or to the requirement to wear masks (Gkenzi et al., 2021; Chalari 2022).

Reactions to vaccination were particularly vocal in the new social media and were associated with a pre-Covid 19 social movement against all vaccinations (e.g., a movement among parents against measles vaccination for young children). Such negative reactions were couched in a discourse of defending personal freedom, understood, in this instance, as a right to avoid any unwanted intrusion into one’s body.

Our research, based on a focus group of anti-vaccinationists, shows that there is a variety of causes underlying the refusal to be vaccinated. The use of vaccines is taken to serve financial and political interests, including those of large pharmaceutical companies which allegedly exert undue influence on decision-makers.

For instance, in our focus group, participants made the claim that “science serves political and economic interests” and “the media misinforms us”. This is a view that reflects a wider anti-business mentality. This view is compatible with a mistrust of traditional printed and electronic media and a tendency to seek information in alternative sources, mostly on the internet. This is a tendency that goes hand-in-hand with a general mistrust of the scientific community and a curiosity about alternative medicine. Followers of such views are “strong” anti-vaccinationists who opt for an alternative lifestyle, i.e., a culture divergent from mainstream culture.

Regarding, more specifically, responses to Covid-19, there is strong doubt whether the available vaccines have been adequately tested. For example, in our focus group, participants stated that “the side effects of vaccines are not known”, “the vaccines were produced too fast”, and “vaccine control mechanisms were by-passed” during the production stage. In other words, some anti-vaccinationists do not reject all vaccines, but doubt the vaccines against Covid-19. They may be called “soft” anti-vaccinationists.

In practice, however, as our focus group research shows, the behaviour of individuals in principle rejecting or specifically doubting the Covid-19 vaccines, does not vary so much from mainstream behaviour, as one would have thought. As a focus group participant put it: “Lockdowns are not necessary”, but “I wear a mask”.

Anti-vaccinationists were pragmatists. The pandemic lasted too long for anti-vaccinationists to staunchly refrain from working, doing business or engaging in other social interaction. Greece’s public health system administered vaccines freely and efficiently, whereas those not vaccinated had to bear the cost of rapid tests in medical clinics or pharmacies. Private businesses too preferred to press their employees coming in contact with customers to become vaccinated than lose clientele or close down.

Eventually, under the Covid-19 pandemic, the views and behaviour of anti-vaccinationists may have been more moderate than originally thought. The specific case of rejecting the Covid-19 vaccines may reflect two currents of opinion bearing wider significance for a better understanding of contemporary Greek culture. The first is a supra-democratic or pan-democratic conception of a citizen's rights and responsibilities in contemporary democracies. This conception entails that there are almost no limits to a citizen's rights, whereas her or his responsibilities are far fewer and narrower. Primarily, if not exclusively, they are responsibilities towards a person's "inner circle" of family members and friends. Of course, this is a conception that is not supported by contemporary democratic constitutions, including the Greek one, posing limits to the abuse of rights and specifying citizens' responsibilities. It is also a conception that, if adopted by a majority, would undermine the bases of social solidarity.

The second is a conception according to which all views on any topic are of equal value and should be paid equal attention. As focus participants told us, "Everyone has a different approach" and "people attach annoying labels; I respect equally vaccinated and non-vaccinated people".

Accordingly, laypeople and experts should have comparable influence in decision-making, even on issues requiring technical expertise. This second conception says that, at the very least, the views of laypeople and also opinion makers, such as, for instance, priests, should be included in debates that normally fall in the jurisdiction of scientific community.

It is a conception that reflects the low status of science and research in contemporary Greece. It also reflects the continuing large-scale influence of the Church. In terms of political culture, it is a conception that allows a feeling of political exclusion to surface; that is, a sense that political and scientific elites intentionally marginalize non-elite members of society who thus feel excluded. This is a theme that has surfaced in other culture conflicts, such the conflict over the inflow of migrants and refugees into Greece.

ii. Conflict over challenges to national identity by migrants and refugees

This conflict has risen since the early 1990s as a result of successive waves of migrants and refugees into Greece (Triantafyllidou 2020). The collapse of state socialist regimes in 1989 in Eastern Europe, poverty in South Asia and Africa in the decades that followed, and wars in the Middle East, including the crisis in Syria, in the 2010s triggered large inflows of migrants and refugees into Greece (Dallal and Dimitriadi 2019).

The latter inflows coincided with the Greek economic crisis and provoked an anti-immigration movement in Greece. It took the form of racist and xenophobic opinion and sentiments. They found political expression in the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn (GD) which obtained representation in the Greek parliament (Ellinas 2013). The party elected MPs in the general elections of 2012 and 2015. It was very active for a while (2012-2019), before the party's leadership was rounded up by Greek authorities and convicted in 2020 to imprisonment for managing a criminal organization and for complicity in assassinations, among other criminal acts.

However, the sphere of influence of anti-migration ideas by far exceeded the radius of electoral influence of the GD party (Georgiadou 2020). At crucial time points, at which policy measures regulating migration were debated, culture tensions, if not wars, erupted in Greek society. One such occasion was the passage of legislation in 2015 (Law 4332/2015) that relaxed previous restrictions on conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in Greece and also expanded the political rights of second-generation migrants. Another occasion was the building of a mosque in a central Athens in 2016-2019, based on legislation passed in 2006 (Law 3512/2006) which, however, had never been implemented.

On these and other similar occasions, the culture conflict partly overlapped with political party competition. Parties of the Right and the Center-Right rejected the above initiatives, while parties of the Center-Left and the Left supported them. The former political parties subscribed to a traditional Greek identity which they considered being under threat. Center-Left and Left parties did not agree and carried the day, as the legislation was adopted, and the mosque was built.

The politicization of these issues does not tell the whole story of challenges to national identity. Racist and xenophobic attitudes, with a particular emphasis on anti-migration themes, regularly emerge in the printed press, the new social media, and repeated social surveys.

Nevertheless, a conclusion of prevalence of fanatical attachment to a traditional national identity among Greeks and of fear of migrant- and refugee-driven threats to their identity would not be warranted. Such a conclusion and fear may be modified in view of realism and pragmatism that practically prevail today in Greece. As a focus group participant observed: the issue is a “real situation and as such cannot be treated ideologically”. Another participant added “realism is the only way to approach” the issue, while another one noted that “the issue should be addressed by looking only at its practical side”.

After all, as interviewees pointed out, migrants have been working in the Greek agricultural and construction sectors for almost three decades now. Second-generation migrants, i.e., children born of migrant families residing in the country, have progressed up all levels of the Greek education system.

In our research, focus group participants have voiced pragmatic opinions. In their view, Greece unavoidably is an entry point for migrants and refugees heading towards Western Europe. According to our focus group, migrants are acceptable in Greece to the extent that they contribute to economic growth. Obviously, highly skilled migrants are most welcome.

Anyway, migrants and refugees, as interviewees noted, are not perceived as competitors to Greeks seeking work, as they belong to different segments of the labour market. They take jobs which Greek nationals would not take. Not all migrants and refugees may be treated the same, i.e., those who want to stay in the country and become integrated in the labour market are preferable to the rest. Similarly, there are migrants and refugees who respect the legal framework and authorities of Greece, while others do not. There is little resistance, in other words, to migrants and refugees who work or seek work and obey the laws of the country.

Focus group participants have recognized that migrants and refugees have met with the indifference and disorganization of Greek authorities which sometimes mistreat not only foreigners, but Greek citizens too. A stricter view was that there should be a threshold of

receiving refugees and offering them housing, health care and social services too because, compared to other EU countries, Greece itself is poorly resourced. As a focus group participant remarked, a “more active EU role” is anticipated.

Focus group participants admitted that not only Greek authorities, but citizens too have treated migrants and refugees as “morally inferior”. In view of all this, migrants, and refugees themselves may not want to become integrated into the hosting country. Many did not want to settle down in Greece which is one of the less advanced economies of Europe anyway. If stranded in Greece, they may have preferred to live a secluded life rather than immerse themselves into Greek society. A view expressed in our focus group was that it may be migrants and refugees who resist living side-by-side with Greeks rather than the other way around.

A more traditional view, voiced in the focus group, was that migrants and refugees should respect the values of the hosting country and that a differentiation should be made between Muslims and the rest. Muslims and particularly radical Islamists among them would be difficult to integrate in Greek society. Tolerance towards them should be limited. A similar view was voiced regarding African migrants and refugees, as their lifestyle, i.e., culture, was deemed too different from the Greek one.

In brief, national identity is considered to be solid in Greece or at least it is not threatened by incoming migrants and refugees. The latter do not so much pose a threat to erode Greek culture, as they present a problem of mutual adaption. In our focus group, one person remarked that “the large waves of immigration do not pose a threat to our national identity”. Another one said that “national identity is not affected by any amount of immigration, if it is well-founded and stable”.

Now that it has become evident that the migration crisis will not go away, Greeks have to adapt to the different lifestyles of migrants and refugees, and vice versa. Greeks are pragmatists enough to accept living with migrants and refugees to the extent that the latter do not violate laws and do not challenge the values and customs of the hosting country.

Variations of cultural difference and the limits of tolerance were themes echoed in another conflict. This is the conflict arising from challenges posed to traditional family and gender roles by new types of sexual relations and non-traditional couples.

iii. Conflict over challenges to traditional family and gender roles

In Greece the traditional two parent-family and its extended, rather than nuclear, form that includes close relatives, remain the typical family case. Yet, particularly in urban (rather than in rural) areas, there are single-parent families, heterosexual couples who cohabit and same-sex couples. These non-typical types of families do not necessarily bear a social stigma, but have for a long time remained unregulated. There were large loopholes in family laws which were to an extent covered through legislation passed in recent years.

Two examples were the law passed in 2017 (Law 4491/2017) to regulate legal issues related to gender identity, gender dysphoria and gender change and the law passed in 2018 (Law 4538/2018) to regulate same-sex marriage and child adoption. (There had been earlier legislation equating marriage with cohabitation agreement out of wedlock.)

As argued above, culture conflicts in Greece become politicized in an atmosphere of constant mistrust among political parties. While parliamentary debates on the corresponding two bills of law followed the familiar pattern of government and opposition parties taking opposite sides, the division was not the usual Left vs. Right one. It was a division along a conservative vs. libertarian line. Thus, four parties of the Right and the Left, namely DG, ND, the Center Union (that had won parliamentary representation only in 2015-2019) and the KKE, voted against both bills. On the other hand, Syriza and center-left parties (Pasok, Dimar, the River) voted in favour of the bill on gender identity. Regarding same sex marriage, Syriza and center-left parties voted in favour, but Anel, the government coalition partner of Syriza in 2015-2019, which had supported the first of the two bills (on gender identity) voted against the second one (on same-sex marriage).

Our research on two national circulation newspapers, the *Kathimerini* and *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, representing correspondingly the Center-Right and the Left of the political spectrum,

has pointed to the same conclusion. Traditional divisions in political ideology were curbed by more updated differences of opinion on gender and family issues.

Despite variations of opinion, focus groups participants exercised pragmatism. Regarding the cohabitation agreement, for instance, all sides recognized that legislation on cohabitation corresponded to a relevant social demand and that the rights of those cohabitating should be regulated (e.g., with regard to one cohabiting person inheriting the other).

With regard to non-married heterosexual couples' bearing children out of wedlock and with regard to single-parent families, the range of opinions was wider. For some focus group participants, offering a more traditional view, marriage is a pre-requirement for having children, as marriage shows commitment of one person to another. For others, cohabitation is enough for the decision to have children. Some participants fully accepted the existence of single-parent families, while other ones claimed that the traditional two parent environment is the most secure for children. They argued that single parenthood goes against the legacy and symbolism of two people bringing up one younger member of society.

One focus group participant remarked: "I have the feeling that the symbolic and ancient element that every human being comes from two parents disappears from the child's horizon". Another one added "In terms of parenting and how children grow up ..., if one of the two parents is gone, there is a piece that is missing".

Nevertheless, in our focus group, participants converged on the following idea: In practice, single-parenthood should be protected, while no disincentives should be introduced against single-parent families.

Pragmatism also permeated focus group discussions on same-sex marriage and the adoption or creation of children, through non-conventional ways, by same-sex couples. Regarding the first issue, a more traditional view was expressed. It claimed that, while same-sex marriage should be tolerated, the propensity to create new types of family outside the traditional wedlock is indicative of pervasive individualism in society. Individual lifestyles and preferences can take extreme forms. If such forms are sanctioned by state authority, there may be a challenge to the family-related symbols and shared meanings holding members of society together.

Other opinions varied from this one and stressed that regardless of sexual preferences, if two people want to be together, there must be a legal opportunity to officially recognize their choice. As explained by a focus group member: “Today there are same-sex couples who live together, and their rights must be secured”.

Regarding the adoption or assisted creation of children by same-sex couples, focus group participants differed. A focus group member was adamant that “in a couple, the function that the woman has and the function that the man has are different from their very creation. We just cannot nullify nature”. By contrast, another one claimed that “children who have both heterosexual parents are better raised, but this does not at all rule out that same-sex parents can raise their children well”.

Eventually, however, a realistic appreciation of the desire of same-sex couples to have children, coupled with the argument that is better for children to be adopted than be left over in orphanages, carried the day.

In sum, despite the prevalence of traditional ideas regarding family forms and gender roles in Greece, our research has pointed to the readiness of Greeks to discuss non-traditional types of gender identity, sexual preferences, families, and childbearing. On that front, there may be no strong challenge to traditional cultural identity, which for Greeks probably has national rather than social connotations, as the last case study shows below.

iv. Conflict over national and European identity

In the most recent period of Greek political history the conflict over the national and European identity of Greeks was recurrent and spanned at least half a century. An old instance of such a debate on identity occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at the time of Greece’ accession to the European Communities (1981). A more recent instance was the period of the Greek economic crisis, when the EU prevented Greece’s sovereign default in exchange for very strict conditionalities, outlined in the three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) of 2010, 2012 and 2015.

Both in the first and second instance, there were negative reactions against Greece's coming closer to Europe. Some of the strongest reactions stemmed mostly from conservative and traditionalist sources (media, circles of intellectuals, the Church, etc.). The latter claimed that in addition to the doubtful benefits of EU's impact on the Greek economy, national identity was at stake. The purity of Greek national tradition, values and customs was at peril. Couched in such terms, Greece's integration into the European Communities in the 1980s and Greece's externally conditioned relations with the EU in the 2010s consisted of a challenge to the essence of being Greek, i.e., a challenge to national identity perceived in symbolic and essentialist terms.

In between these two timepoints (the 1980s and the 2010s), there were other challenges to the same identity, not related to economic, but to foreign affairs of the country. The most obvious that immediately springs to mind is the dispute over the name of Macedonia between Greece and its northern neighbour, the country now bearing the name of North Macedonia. The dispute started three decades ago, upon the declaration of independence of Greece's neighbouring country from former Yugoslavia (1991), when that country claimed the name of "Macedonia" for itself, along with symbols of and references to the ancient kingdom of Alexander the Great. Greece rejected any use of that name by its neighbour, let alone its identification with Alexander's reign.

The dispute culminated at various time points, e.g., among others, in 1993-1995 with Greece's economic embargo and in 2007 in the NATO summit in Bucharest with Greece's threatening to veto the neighbouring country's membership in the organization. Tensions between the two countries also rose in 2010-2014 with the "Skopje project" that littered the city of Skopje with buildings, monuments, and sculptures recalling Alexander the Great and his times. The dispute, at least as far as the country's name was concerned, was resolved in June 2018 with the Prespes Agreement between the two countries. The agreement had been facilitated and was praised by both NATO and the EU. The parliament of North Macedonia ratified the agreement in the same year, while its Greek counterpart did so in early 2019.

In the meantime, in Greece a debate erupted between supporters and opponents of the Prespes Agreement. Very briefly, the name on which the two governments agreed was "North

Macedonia". The constitution of North Macedonia was to be amended in order to eliminate references to ancient Macedonia. In the wake of the Agreement culture tensions did not rise as high as in the early 1990s, when large-scale nationalist mobilizations shook Greece. At that time, there was a widespread view in Greece that the symbols used by the neighbouring country (name, flag, etc.) consisted of an assault on the identity of Macedonians who were Greek and by extension to the Greek nation as a whole.

The situation was different three decades later. In 2018-2019 the tensions in Greece were politicized, as was the case with three previous culture conflicts discussed in this research paper. However, overall, in contrast to the fierce political party conflict in the Greek parliament, in the Greek press and society the tone of the relevant debates was subdued. In detail, as our research has confirmed, in 2019 in the Greek parliament parties of the opposition, Right and Left, voted against the government of Syriza/Anel that had signed the Agreement, while the minor government coalition party, the right-wing nationalist Anel, exited the government coalition.

As noted earlier, in Greece today political party competition colours culture conflicts, but different sides in such conflicts do not necessarily identify with cleavages among parties. For example, in the case under study, the national circulation press was not as divided. In June 2018-February 2019 the center-right newspaper *He Kathimerini* and the left-wing newspaper *He Efimerida ton Syntakton*, published articles that usually did not stress concerns over national identity, as a result of the Prespes Agreement. Rather, the relevant arguments referred to the suitability of the Agreement for foreign policy interests and to the implementation risks of the Agreement.

The concerns of participants in the fourth focus group, which we conducted, were similar. This was a focus group on the issue of European vs. national identity and whether it was impacted by the Prespes Agreement. Participants generally were in favour of the Agreement. They did not have reservations owed to the agreed neighbouring country's name, as the term "Macedonia" was accompanied by a geographical term "North" and above all the Skopje government agreed to eliminate references to Alexander the Great's kingdom from official texts and the corresponding symbols (names, monuments) in its territory too.

Pragmatism dominated focus groups discussions. Participants accepted that the Agreement resolved a long-standing dispute, while lingering tensions may be owed to political party competition, i.e., the government vs. opposition conflict, as the Greek national parliamentary elections of 2019 were approaching at the time of the relevant parliamentary debates.

Participants disassociated challenges to national identity from the risks emanating from the Agreement. The risks concerned a possible impasse in issues of intellectual property and commercial law that, among other legal issues, the two countries had agreed to resolve after the Agreement (indeed, more than four years after signing the Agreement, there is little progress, in any, on all these fronts). Nevertheless, in the opinion of our focus group the Prespes Agreement should be honoured by the Greek side. Greece does not have to fear a threat to its national identity, as it perhaps did three decades ago, when the (new) Macedonian Question emerged.

Yet, as focus group participants affirmed, the continuing significance of national identity for Greeks cannot be overestimated. Most political parties assumed nationalist positions at one time or another, while nationalism as an ideology unites Greeks across social class barriers. Compared to the past, however, nationalism today bears negative connotations in Greece to the extent that it is associated with the rise of the Far Right in the 2010s. The GD party exploited nationalist undercurrents in Greek society, in order to win votes, but gave nationalism an unacceptable anti-democratic spin.

Despite Greece's long-time integration into the EU and Europeanization of institutions and processes in many political, economic, and social sectors, Greek national identity is contrasted to the European, while remaining compatible to European identity (Diamandouros 1994, Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002). In the eyes of some focus group participants, who probably echoed the sentiments of a wider community, Greek national identity denotes a belief in and devotion to national language and customs as well as historical and religious traditions, being clearly separate from European identity. As a focus group member underlined, implying that Greeks today are less outspoken about their national identity as they used to be: "We underestimated the Greek elements and overestimated the European ones".

In sum, a culture war between those identifying with national vs. European identity is not at stake, while the risk of revival of staunch nationalism in the wake of the Prespes Agreement has been avoided. There is a diffuse pragmatist view regarding the Agreement, which is generally accepted as beneficial to both involved countries. Nevertheless, there is a long nationalist legacy that continues informing Greek society and may take an ugly turn, as the rise of the GD party has shown.

8. Conclusions

The overall purpose of this research report has been to study culture wars in contemporary Greek society. We have identified four different wars – considered as case studies. These were wars over vaccination against Covid-19; challenges to Greek identity by the inflow of migrants and refugees; emerging non-conventional family relations and gender identities which have provoked reactions; and national identity challenges posed by Greece's foreign relations, including the 2018 Prespes Agreement and EU-Greece relations. Some of these culture wars seem a thing of the past (e.g., issues of national identity). Yet, the volatile political environment of Eastern Mediterranean, in which Greece is located, provides recurrent opportunities, such as upsurges of immigration flows or tensions in the Aegean Sea, that may bring identity issues again to the forefront of Greece's public sphere.

We have thus developed an interest in analyzing multiple aspects of these wars through the study of value and opinion surveys and official documents (parliamentary minutes, press articles) as well as the conduct of four focus groups, one per culture war, in mid-2022. While we realize that we may have raised more questions than we could ever answer in the context of a small research project, we summarize our tentative conclusions.

Surveys confirm that Greeks do not trust but a small circle of people who are relatives or people whom they know well. They tend to be xenophobic of migrants and refugees and intolerant towards non-traditional gender identities and same-sex couples. Moreover, Greeks hold ethnocentric and nationalist views. Yet, focus group research points to a different direction.

In practice, Greeks may hold more pragmatic views, and this has come out from all focus group discussions.

Our research shows that cultural conflicts in contemporary Greece have not grown into all-consuming culture wars of the type encountered in other Western societies. They have remained at the level of soft conflicts or tensions. Despite voicing traditional views, Greeks adopt a pragmatist stance on cultural conflict.

Opinion surveys show that - generally speaking - Greeks do not welcome migrants nor are they ready to live and work in close proximity to migrants. Regarding family types and gender identities, Greeks are tolerant of various modern heterosexual family forms. On other respects, they are traditional. They are not tolerant of homosexual couples, nor do they agree with the raising of children in homosexual families. Greeks are also very traditional with regard to national identity.

However, our research may be a first, tentative reality check on such opinion currents, without disputing that such long-term attitudes and stances are still predominant in today's Greece. Using focus group research, we have found out that in practice, when debating culture wars from a down-to-earth, everyday-life standpoint, Greeks may not be as adamant as shown in social surveys. The results of surveys showing xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments need to be relativized. The same holds for results showing rejection of non-traditional family types.

Despite often holding traditional views on several culture wars, Greeks adopt pragmatist views. In fact, based on our likely-minded, homogenous focus groups, in which participants may have felt free to be more fanatic than more restrained in expressing their views, we have observed that Greeks in practice voice moderate opinions. For instance, Greeks realize that their national identity is in practice not as threatened by inflows of migrants and refugees; nor is that identity in danger because of Greece's foreign policy shifts in relation to the EU and neighbouring countries (e.g., North Macedonia).

More broadly two paradoxes have emerged from our research. First, in contrast to culture wars in other societies, associated with social movements and the formation of identities "from

below”, i.e., within societies, in contemporary Greece such wars have started after initiatives primarily taken “from above”, i.e., by state authorities.

More concretely, participants in Greek culture wars have been not so much identity groups, but political and administrative institutions, including ministries, independent public authorities, the courts, and official church authorities. For instance, such wars have taken place between the Greek Orthodox Church and the government. A possible explanation of this paradox is the fact that, despite outbursts of social protest, Greek civil society is not strong (Huliaras 2020, Sotiropoulos 2004 and 2017). Civic associations exist in different policy sectors, but their capacity to mobilize the population is constrained and their impact on public policy making has been limited.

A second paradox may be that to a large extent in Greece culture wars have been interwoven with on-going, political party conflict. Rarely have culture wars been waged outside the arena of political party competition. Cultural issues have become politicized in other contemporary societies too (e.g., in today’s USA or UK; see Stanton 2021; Anthony 2021). Yet, in Greece politicization of cultural tensions is not a recent trend and has almost always been part and parcel of polarized political party conflict.

A possible explanation of such over-politicization of culture wars has to do with the strength of the Greek political parties. While not able to fully penetrate Greek society in the way they did in the aftermath of Greece’s transition to democracy in 1974, political parties still dominate the public sphere (Featherstone 2005 and 2020). Political party conflict is not exclusively ideological. Parties formulate their stance on various issues depending on their status as government or opposition parties.

In other words, in some culture wars the alignment of parties was not on the Left-Right axis, but on the government-opposition axis. In Greece there is very little tradition of consensus among parties on policy issues (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008). Parties of the opposition reject government policy on cultural identity issues as part of the ongoing political competition for power.

While none of the two paradoxes is an exclusive Greek phenomenon, we suggest that both paradoxes are pronounced and interesting enough to call for further research in comparative perspective. For example, it would be interesting to see in comparative perspective which culture wars (better said, cultural tensions) Greek parties have used as tools in electoral competition. Finally, our research shows that cultural conflicts in contemporary Greece have not grown into all-consuming culture wars of the type encountered in other Western societies. They have remained at the level of softer conflicts or tensions. A hypothesis requiring further research is that in Greek culture wars, no cultural identity groups, separated by hard boundaries, have been formed. We hope that other researchers will pursue these or other similarly interesting lines of research.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1 – Question for the anti-vaccinations panel

- What troubled you about vaccines?
- What are your sources of information?
- What do you think about the protection measures?
- Has anyone changed their mind about the vaccine?
- What do you think about the media? and Covid-19? Are you troubled by the medical community's attitude?
- What unites those with vaccine reservations?

Appendix 2 – Question for the challenges posed to Greek identity by migrants and refugee's panel

- How do you feel about foreigners (refugees and immigrants) who now live in Greece?
- Do you differentiate between them, and if so, how?
- Do you think they are competing with the indigenous people? If "yes", how, in what sense?
- Do you see them as a threat to our national identity? If yes, in what sense, how exactly?
- Do you see them as having a positive role to play? If yes, what role this is.
- What do you think of the authorities' attitude towards them?
- What do you think should be done with refugees and immigrants? What do you recommend?

Appendix 3 – Question about the challenges posed to Greek identity by non-conventional family arrangements/relations panel

- How do you stand against the cohabitation agreement (which has now been in place for 14 years in Greece)? Do you accept it, oppose it, what is your stance?
- Regarding single-parent families (which mainly, but not exclusively, involve a woman living with her children): how are they treated? Do you consider them to be a departure from the 'normal', or is a logic of acceptance adopted - mainly what is the argument(s) that lead you to your point of view?
- With reference to heterosexual couples who live together, sometimes they have children, but they remain out of marriage or living under a cohabitation agreement: how are they treated? Do you see them as a departure from the 'normal', or is a logic of acceptance adopted - mainly what is the argument(s) that lead you to your point of view?

- As for heterosexual couples, is adopting or having children (by IVF, surrogate or otherwise) problematic (as a process) or is this acceptable to you - what is the logic of your answer.
- Regarding same-sex couples who live together, or enter into a cohabitation agreement or even marriage: how are they treated? Do you consider them a departure from the 'normal', or is a logic of acceptance adopted - mainly what is the argument(s) that lead you to your view?
- Is adoption or the creation of children (surrogate or otherwise) in same-sex couples problematic or acceptable - what is the logic of your answer.

Appendix 4 – Question about the challenges posed to Greek identity, in opposition to the European one, by the Prespes agreement panel

- How do you stand in relation to this Agreement? Are you positive, negative and - most importantly - for what reason/s?
- Do you consider that it creates a problem or calls into question the common perception of the Greek national identity? If 'yes' or 'no', how?
- Do you consider the Agreement to be a significant concession – off principle or off limits? If 'yes'/'no', how, in what sense?
- Do you believe that the Greek national identity is threatened because of the Agreement? If yes, how exactly?)
- Do you see positive aspects of the Agreement? What do you think these are?
- How should the Greek position be shaped from now on in relation to the Agreement?
- Do you have anything to suggest regarding the Agreement? E.g., to be maintained, changed, abolished, something else?
- What are the main features of national identity today?
- How much have they changed from the recent past?
- Is nationalism strong today in Greece?
- By whom are they represented in the public space?
- Which categories or strata of the population retain the most traditional elements of national identity?

Appendix 5 – Data from the WVS-7 survey for Greece

Table 1 – (Q19) Not as neighbors - People of a different race

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Mentioned	292	24,4
Not mentioned	899	74,9
DK	5	0,4
NR	3	0,3
Total	1200	100,0

Table 2 – (Q21) Not as neighbors - Immigrants/foreign workers

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Mentioned	309	25,7
Not mentioned	883	73,6
DK	2	0,2
NR	6	0,5
Total	1200	100,0

Table 3 – (Q23) Not as neighbors - People of a different religion

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Mentioned	259	21,6
Not mentioned	935	77,9
DK	2	0,2
NR	4	0,3
Total	1200	100,0

Table 4 – (Q26) Not as neighbors - People who speak a different language

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Mentioned	162	13,5
Not mentioned	1032	86,0
DK	3	0,2
NR	4	0,3
Total	1200	100,0

Table 5 – (Q20) Not as neighbors - People who have AIDS

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Mentioned	421	35,1
Not mentioned	757	63,1
DK	14	1,2
NR	8	0,7
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 6 – (Q22) Not as neighbors - Homosexuals

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Mentioned	400	33,3
Not mentioned	787	65,6
DK	9	0,8
NR	4	0,3
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 7 – (Q25) Not as neighbors - Unmarried couples living together

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Mentioned	96	8,0
Not mentioned	1099	91,6
DK	2	0,2
NR	3	0,3
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 8 – (Q34) Agreement level - When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Strongly agree	478	39,8
Agree	369	30,7
Neither agree nor disagree	165	13,7
Disagree	126	10,5
Strongly disagree	57	4,8
DK	6	0,5
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 9 – (Q37) Agreement level - It is a duty towards society to have children

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Strongly agree	130	10,9
Agree	351	29,2
Neither agree nor disagree	317	26,4
Disagree	315	26,3
Strongly disagree	79	6,6
DK	1	0,1
NR	6	0,5
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 10 – (Q36) Agreement level - Homosexual couples are as good parents as other couples

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Strongly agree	14	1,2
Agree	91	7,5
Neither agree nor disagree	211	17,6
Disagree	372	31,0
Strongly disagree	414	34,5
DK	92	7,7
NR	6	0,5
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 11 – (Q57) Attitudes regarding trust of other people

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Most people can be trusted	101	8,4
Need to be very careful	1088	90,6
DK	10	0,8
NR	2	0,1
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 12 – (Q58) Trust in people from various groups - Your family

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Trust completely	1099	91,5
Trust somewhat	96	8,0
Do not trust very much	4	0,3
Do not trust at all	1	0,1
NR	1	0,1
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 13 – (Q59) Trust in people from various groups - Your neighborhood

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Trust completely	186	15,5
Trust somewhat	552	46,0
Do not trust very much	369	30,8
Do not trust at all	88	7,3
DK	4	0,3
NR	1	0,1
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 14 – (Q60) Trust in people from various groups - People you know personally

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Trust completely	300	25,0
Trust somewhat	691	57,6
Do not trust very much	177	14,7
Do not trust at all	27	2,3
DK	1	0,1
NR	5	0,4
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 15 – (Q61) Trust in people from various groups - People you meet for the first time

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Trust completely	3	0,3
Trust somewhat	113	9,4
Do not trust very much	598	49,8
Do not trust at all	475	39,5
DK	8	0,7
NR	3	0,2
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 16 – (Q62) Trust in people from various groups - People of another religion

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Trust completely	19	1,6
Trust somewhat	230	19,1
Do not trust very much	552	46,0
Do not trust at all	349	29,1
DK	44	3,7
NR	7	0,5
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 17 – (Q63) Trust in people from various groups - People of another nationality

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Trust completely	21	1,8
Trust somewhat	223	18,6
Do not trust very much	565	47,1
Do not trust at all	357	29,7
DK	28	2,3
NR	6	0,5
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 18 – (Q121) Impact of people from other countries who come to live in Greece – Opinion

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Very bad	212	17,6
Quite bad	357	29,8
Neither good, nor bad	424	35,3
Quite good	167	13,9
Very good	27	2,2
DK	10	0,9
NR	4	0,4
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 19 – (Q122) Effects of migration - Fills important jobs vacancies

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Disagree	477	39,8
Hard to say	249	20,7
Agree	439	36,6
DK	33	2,8
NR	1	0,1
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 20 – (Q123) Effects of migration - Strengthens cultural diversity

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Disagree	397	33,1
Hard to say	188	15,7
Agree	552	46,0
DK	57	4,7
NR	6	0,5
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 21 – (Q124) Effects of migration - Increases the crime rate

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Disagree	184	15,3
Hard to say	209	17,4
Agree	801	66,8
DK	5	0,4
NR	1	0,1
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 22 – (Q125) Effects of migration - Gives asylum to political refugees who are persecuted elsewhere

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Disagree	109	9,1
Hard to say	195	16,3
Agree	867	72,2
DK	26	2,1
NR	3	0,3
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 23 – (Q126) Effects of migration - Increases the risks of terrorism

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Disagree	201	16,8
Hard to say	218	18,1
Agree	767	63,9
DK	14	1,2
NR	1	0,1
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 24 – (Q127) Effects of migration - Offers people from poor countries a better living

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Disagree	172	14,3
Hard to say	200	16,6
Agree	816	68,0
DK	9	0,7
NR	4	0,3
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 25 – (Q128) Effects of migration - Increases unemployment

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Disagree	218	18,2
Hard to say	207	17,3
Agree	763	63,5
DK	12	1,0
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 26 – (Q129) Effects of migration - Leads to social conflict

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Disagree	235	19,6
Hard to say	243	20,3
Agree	684	57,0
DK	32	2,7
NR	6	0,5
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 27 – (Q130)⁷ Attitude towards people from other countries coming here to work

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Valid Percent</i>
Let anyone come who wants to	23	1,9
Let people come as long as there are jobs available	302	25,2
Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here	664	55,3
Prohibit people coming here from other countries	199	16,6
DK	8	0,6
NR	4	0,4
<i>Total</i>	<i>1200</i>	<i>100,0</i>

⁷ The formulation of Q130 is as follows: “How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?

1. Let anyone come who wants to
2. Let people come if there are jobs available
3. Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here
4. Prohibit people coming here from other countries”.

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