

EUROPEAN SECURITY 2030

The Results of the Dahrendorf Foresight Project



Editors: Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed

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PIVOTAL SHIFT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY?

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

By Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed

Lifting the gaze beyond and within Europe's borders reveals a world of uncertainty. As Wolfgang Ischinger argued on the eve of the Munich Security Conference 2019: "the global security situation is more dangerous today than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We are experiencing an epochal shift; an era is ending, and the rough outlines of a new political age are only beginning to emerge" (Ischinger, 2019).

This view seems to be shared by leading policymakers who claim that the global order is under pressure and may fray (Coats, 2018, p. 4; Mogherini, 2018; Stoltenberg, 2019). In the same vein, the European Union's Global Strategy (EUGS) published in June 2016 claimed that "We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption" (EEAS, 2016, p. 7). Academics and experts also argue that the world is transforming into a multi-order one, presenting the European Union with considerable impetus to adapt (Creutz et al., 2019; Flockhart, 2016; Stephen, 2018).

The shift of power from the West to multiple poles around the world, and the threat to the rule-based global order are related to an array of challenges, among which the US-China relationship seems to be one of the most important. The unfolding of the competition between the US as the established power and China as the rising power has been hotly debated (Creutz et al., 2019; Huotari et al., 2017; Morrison, 2018; Walt, 2019). There is disagreement between those who argue that these countries are trapped in 'Thucydides' Trap' (the US continuing to decline while China continues to rise until it can claim the global power status and challenge the US position) (Allison, 2017) and those who question the inevitability of a power transition, noting that while China is rising, it is doubtful whether it will outdo the US in the near future (Christiansen, 2016). Moreover, developments in both countries have

direct security implications for Europe: a disturbed transatlantic relationship shaped by the growing rift between European and American interests and values is posing a threat to NATO (Pazzanese, 2019; Walt, 2019); and China's growing geopolitical and economic ambitions in and towards Europe in the form of hi-tech takeovers, cyber-operations, and big data capture is a further destabilising factor (Huotari et al., 2017). Another challenger to the global rule-based order is Russia, which has invested massively in defence—Russian defence spending was more than 60 percent higher in real terms in 2015 as compared to 2010 (Christie, 2016). Moscow continues to modernise, develop, and field a wide range of advanced nuclear, conventional, and asymmetric capabilities (Coats, 2018, p. 24), and has exported hybrid warfare in its neighbourhood and beyond (Galeotti, 2018), including via cyber-attacks on US and European politics (Matishak, 2018; Meister, 2016).

Iran poses another challenge and has become a cause of a recent disagreement between the EU and the US. The latter decided to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the so-called 'Iran Deal') due to alleged violations of the agreement by Iran, while the EU decided to honour the deal—a common approach to Iran is thereby a thing of the past (Mogherini et al., 2018). Both Iran and Russia play, in turn, crucial roles in the ongoing military conflict in Syria, alongside the US and Turkey. The four parties have divergent views on Syria's future—simply put: Russia and Iran, despite their differences, want to keep Assad's regime in power; the US focuses on supporting the Syrian democratic forces; and Turkey fights against Kurdish forces. Yet the prime interest of all four players is to secure their own political and economic influence in the region (Vatanka, 2017). The conflict, which has been going on since 2011, is still destabilising the Middle East. It produced over 10 million internally displaced Syrian citizens, posing an immense humanitarian and political challenge, and prompted the EU to agree a refugee deal that contradicts its own core values with an increasingly authoritarian Turkey (Garavoglia, 2016).

Armed conflicts and social unrest continue in Libya, Yemen, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq (Smith, 2018).

Another source of global disorder comes from India, as the decades-long struggle with Pakistan has recently been reopened and the risk of a serious military confrontation between these nuclear-armed neighbours has increased (Slater & Constable, 2019). Also, the security situation in Africa remains perilous, as civil war (Libya, South Sudan), terrorism (Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt), violence (Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo), and instability (Mali, Burundi) continue to ravage the continent (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).

Furthermore, today's challenges go far beyond the power politics of single actors and involve global risks that are shared by many of the international actors. One is the growing threat posed to cyber-security. The number of countries capable of setting up a cyber-attack has grown from 10 in 2011 to over 30 in 2017, and Russia, Iran, and North Korea have been testing aggressive cyber-attacks that pose growing threats to the Western world (Coats, 2018, p. 5). Another global risk is presented by weapons of mass destruction—such as the chemical weapons used in Iraq and Syria—and their proliferation. Due to the Russian violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and concerns about China's unconstrained arsenal of INF Treaty-range missiles, the US announced its suspension of and declared its withdrawal from the INF Treaty in February 2019, bringing back the risk of a global missile arms race (Kimball, 2018). The INF Treaty has been the most far-reaching and successful nuclear arms reduction agreement in history, leading to the verifiable elimination of Soviet weapons, and missiles based in Europe (Kimball, 2019).

Another global risk is terrorism. Notwithstanding the decreasing number of terrorist attacks worldwide (Taylor, 2018), 67 countries have experienced at least one fatality from terrorism in 2017 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018). Despite the territorial defeat of ISIS, the MENA region, as well as Sub-

Saharan Africa remain a hotbed for violent extremist terrorists (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018). Within the EU, Europol counted a total of 205 foiled, failed, or completed terrorist attacks in nine member states in 2017 (as compared to 142 in 2016), killing 68 people and injuring 844 (Europol, 2018).¹

Moreover, environmental degradation and climate change constitute both direct and indirect threats to human life and security. According to the European Environment Agency (2018), exposure to air pollutants (PM_{2.5}, NO₂, and O₃) was responsible for over half a million premature deaths. Indirect security threats emanate from the negative impact of climate change on water and food security and infrastructure, caused by extreme weather events, such as droughts and floods, storms, and wildfires (Coats, 2019).

Finally, human rights are also at risk. In 2018 alone, we faced large-scale atrocities, such as Syria's war on civilians in areas held by anti-government forces, the Saudi-led coalition's killing and starving of Yemeni civilians, and the Myanmar army's mass murder of Rohingya Muslims (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Powerful autocrats such as Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, or the Philippines' President Rodrigo Duterte—to name just a few—continue their disregard for basic rights, posing an ongoing danger to their citizens (*ibid.*, p. 3-4).

To sum up this brief and far from exhaustive overview of today's global challenges: "No matter where you look, there are countless conflicts and crises—crises that greatly affect us Europeans" (Ischinger, 2019). The EU is the world's largest market, the second largest economy, the first trade partner for most countries in the world, and invests more in development co-operation and humanitarian aid than the rest of the world combined (Mogherini, 2019). Yet the status quo of the European security environment is disturbed by external insecurities linked to the above-mentioned global risks. In response to these threats, the EUGS set in motion the Implementation Plan on Security

and Defence (Council of the European Union, 2016), which introduced the four major initiatives in this policy area aimed at countering the insecurities:

- permanent structured co-operation (PESCO) within which groups of like-minded and capable member states can put forward more advanced projects in defence and security (Council of the European Union, 2017, 2018);
- the European Defence Fund (EDF), marking the historic decision by the European Commission to directly engage in the field of security and defence;
- the Co-ordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) carried out by the European Defence Agency and aimed at monitoring national defence spending in order to identify possibilities for co-operation and pooling resources; and
- the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as the permanent military headquarters for missions and operations.

Yet these instruments have only recently been adopted, and not enough time has passed to assess their actual contribution to the development of security in Europe. We will refer to them in the Conclusions of this publication, specifically linking them to the results of this foresight project.

At the same time, the European Union is also being challenged from within: Brexit is turning into a political and economic mess; illiberal tendencies in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) threaten to undermine the Union's core values (Pech & Scheppele, 2017); and the eurozone and migration crisis have fuelled Euroscepticism across the whole European continent (Conti, 2018; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016; Pirro et al., 2018). The European elections of 2019 have seen the traditional powerhouses lose significant vote shares: the European People's Party lost 36 seats—down from 221 to 180; while the Socialists and Democrats lost 45 seats—down from 191 to 146. At the same time, the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct

Democracy grew their faction by six seats (European Parliament, 2019a). This increase came despite the establishment in 2015 of another Eurosceptic faction, the Europe of Nations and Freedom, which in turn could also increase its seats by 22. Liberal and pro-European factions were also successful, with the liberal ALDE gaining 42 seats, incorporating President Macron's *République en Marche* and the Greens/European Free Alliance gaining 19 seats. The 2019 European election results thus reflect an increasing politicisation of European party politics along the GAL/TAN divide.²

For the Dahrendorf Forum, in its fourth research cycle dealing with "the Future of Europe: Strategic options for an era of uncertainties", taking stock of these challenges to Europe is a natural fit. The Dahrendorf Foresight Project aimed at developing scenarios for European security in 2030. This introduction proceeds as follows: first, we introduce the scenario approach that was applied in the project and show its advantages and drawbacks. Then, we present the rationale behind the Dahrendorf Foresight Project, and next we go into details of the methodological process discussing its course and concepts. Finally, we briefly present the developed scenarios.

Scenario Approach: Advantages and limitations

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO General Secretary, argues that in light of the uncertainty brought by the global disorder "it is therefore needed not only to try to predict the future, but to develop strategies to deal with uncertainty, to be prepared for the unexpected" (2019). While the former is in the domain of forecasting,³ the latter—countering uncertainty and preparing for the unexpected—is the central aim of scenario building. The scenario approach is a prime technique of future studies⁴ and has long been used by policy planners, corporate managers, and military analysts as a tool to aid in decision-making in the face of uncertainty by increasing capacity for anticipatory governance and informed decision-making (Mietzner & Reger, 2005).

The origin of scenario planning goes back to the Second World War when the approach was used for military planning. Over time it has been adapted to the policy world, by among others the US State Department and the Ministry of Defence (ibid.). Business has also started to apply the scenario approach—one of the most well-known examples is Royal Dutch Shell, which integrated the scenario approach into its decision-making process as early as the 1970s and became a benchmark for corporate scenario planning (Bentham, 2014). Other companies, governments, and non-governmental organisations followed, and scenario approaches as well as other techniques of future studies have been gaining interest across the world over the last few decades (e.g. Bell, 2002; Barma et al., 2016; Wilkinson & Kupers, 2016; Babst, 2018).

Peter Schwartz, one of the leading futurists worldwide, defines scenarios as "stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow, stories that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our present environment" (Schwartz, 1996, p. 3). An important characteristic of scenarios is that they are not intended to represent a full description of the future, but rather to highlight central elements of a possible future and to draw attention to the key factors that will drive future developments. Additionally, according to Ratcliffe (2002, p. 4), scenarios present alternative images instead of extrapolating trends from the present. They embrace qualitative perspectives as well as quantitative data, and allow for sharp discontinuities to be evaluated. They require decision-makers to question their basic assumptions as well as create a learning organisation possessing a common vocabulary and an effective basis for communicating complex options.

Scenario development can fulfil different functions. One of the goals of generating scenarios is to deliver a set of alternative futures based on systematic analyses of global trends, common assumptions, and key drivers of a given issue, and thereby widen the perspective of policymakers (explorative function). At the same time, as the world will remain a place of high uncertainty, scenario methodology helps to

keep strategic surprises to a minimum and is to be preferred over waiting passively for future events to unfold (decision-making or strategy-forming function). Moreover, scenarios, along with other foresight methods, aim at identifying weak signals of change. Depending on their interplay, their dynamics, and their influence on the system at stake, they may lead into completely different kinds of futures (scenarios). These alternative futures may hold risks and dangers but they also contain chances, opportunities, and leeway for action (goal-setting). Finally, scenarios can also contribute to the stimulation of discourse about a specific topic and the understanding of this topic (communication function). As Kosow and Gaßner note, scenario exercises rarely develop alternative futures that fulfil all four functions (2008, p. 19). The Dahrendorf Foresight Project focuses mostly on the explorative function of scenarios, as the guiding research question was to identify the key driving forces that might impact European security in 2030. Moreover, the project also aims at contributing to decision-making—it not only seeks to present alternative futures for European security in 2030, but also to offer some policy recommendations for European leaders.

Currently, scenario methodology is considered a technique to link theories with data in order to understand future world events more fully, as it combines in-depth analysis with policy-relevant implications or even recommendations (Barma et al., 2016). The number of scholars who apply scenario approaches to examine a variety of topics such as foreign and security policy, global governance, or economic development is growing (e.g. Sus, 2018; Barma et al., 2016; Vicente Oliva & Martinez-Sanchez, 2018; Kunstein & Wessels, 2012; Cruz, 2015; Pourezzat et al., 2018).

Despite the advantages of the scenario approach, such as the possibility to include a number of factors with a high degree of uncertainty, the stimulation of creative thinking and a wide range of alternative futures, the technique has its limitations. The challenge lies in the cognitive limitation in thinking about the unknown and the uncertain: even though scenarios

should break through old thought structures, human beings nevertheless often tend to follow and extend well-beaten paths (Kosow & Gaßner, 2008, p. 21). Hence, truly innovative scenarios are difficult to develop. Another inherent limitation of this approach is groupthink—the desire for harmony or conformity in the group that results in a downplaying of alternative viewpoints and weakened critical evaluation of one’s assumptions. Also, the perceived power differences among participants (based on various factors such as gender, academic title, language skills, age, etc.) may interfere with the process of scenario development. Lastly, it is important to note that scenarios can be mistaken for predictions or forecasts of the future, which they are not—scenarios do not seek to establish the most probable course of events. Rather, as mentioned above, they seek to envision plausible futures that are consistent and robust in the interactions with described trends.

Bearing in mind these goals and limitations, the Dahrendorf Foresight Project employed one of the scenario methods (Heuer & Pherson, 2010) which has proven useful in cases of great uncertainty—the Multiple Scenario Generation (MSG) (Pherson, 2008, pp. 34-40; Popper, 2008). The details of this project are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The Dahrendorf Foresight Project

The Dahrendorf Foresight Project⁵ aimed at mapping out key political, socio-economic, and international trends that might impact European security in 2030 in order to identify potential triggers of change and concrete risks. The title reflects the particular salience and dynamic of this policy area, which is affected by developments in the socio-economic, environmental, migratory, and technological realms.

This view on security is shared by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who argued at the recent Munich Security Conference that “[t]he nature of the security threats that we all face is completely different today from even a few years ago: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, new arms races, terrorist

fighters, but also the impact of climate change, or the challenges posed by the use of new technologies, for instance artificial intelligence. These are all security issues, probably the most pressing ones of our times. And yet, they all go beyond the traditional domains of security and defence policy” (Mogherini, 2019). The already-mentioned EUGS also put forward a similar broad approach to security, and moreover the increased impact of non-traditional security risks on international security seems to be recognised by academia (Dijkstra et al., 2018).


Some recent scenario publications on European security have focused on specific regions, such as relations with the Balkans (Emini et al., 2018), Turkey (Tocci, 2016), and the UK (Ham, 2016). Others have focused on non-military challenges such as socio-economic divergence within the EU (Schemmel et al., 2015), and several took a narrow look at defence capabilities (Andersson et al., 2016; European Commission, 2017). The Dahrendorf Foresight Project, by taking a wide array of societal domains and relating them to European security, is—to our knowledge—a unicum, and constitutes this exercise’s unique characteristic.

In order to ensure the broad expertise needed to

cover this non-traditional conception of security and to overcome cognitive limitations and biases of individual analysts, 21 experts from 12 countries, including seven EU member states, the United Kingdom,⁶ Russia, the US, Qatar, and Japan were invited to participate in the scenario workshop.⁷ They were invited based on the aim of not only covering conventional issue areas, such as the EU’s strategic autonomy, NATO, cyber-security, or non-proliferation, but also bringing in adjacent fields such as migration, technology, democracy, and social cohesion. Coming from academia, think-tanks, public office, consulting, and international organisations, this diverse group was familiar with the different logics and viewpoints of all stakeholders involved in governance. Together, the group pooled its expertise to devise possible trajectories for European security a decade from now, and to put forward policy recommendations highlighting the risks entailed in the scenarios and suggesting what European policymakers can do to avoid their coming into being. The workshop and the developed scenarios thus benefitted from the diverse geographical and institutional backgrounds of its participants.

We decided to focus on 2030 for two reasons.


Field of Expertise




First, 11 years is a long enough period to allow for the emergence and interaction of significant changes in global and European affairs. Second, 2030 is not so far in the future as to be completely detached from current developments. It may seem as a comparatively short timeframe for a foresight

project, but with complexity as a constitutive feature of today's world and changes happening at a quicker pace than only 30 years ago (Kurzweil, 2005; Ribeiro & Zamparutti, 2015), trajectories beyond 2030 may run the risk that their invalidity becomes greater.

Country of Origin




Professional Sector



Methodology:
Multiple Scenario Generation

The scenario development was a multi-step process, as elaborated in the following graph.

Graph 1: Multiple Scenario Generation as a multi-step process



Source: Own compilation based on the materials of the Dahrendorf Foresight Project.

The centrepiece of the Dahrendorf Foresight Project was a two-day workshop in Berlin, yet the preparatory work had begun earlier. A survey carried out among participants,⁹ developed by the workshop facilitators, and conducted before the workshop, yielded a set of key assumptions about major future developments (step 1). At the workshop, a key assumptions check—a critical review of presumptions that are taken for granted regarding the topic—followed (step 2). This stage served for workshop participants to clarify which assumptions they were unlikely to challenge in the remainder of the foresight process. Only those to which no challenges were expected were deemed ‘solid’ and carried over to the next step.

The survey also yielded a set of drivers⁹ arising from the question “What are the main internal/external trends, factors, and drivers that might influence the security of Europe until 2030?” (step 3). These were discussed at the workshop and clustered in affinity groups. The drivers were then developed along the STEMPLE+ framework, being categorised into S-social, T-technological, E-economic, M-military/security, P-political, L-legal, E-ecological, and +-other factors (e.g. cultural, psychological) and reviewed. Twelve drivers, that were felt to best capture the greatest uncertainties in the evolution of the topic over the coming years and that encompass a comprehensive set of drivers, have been selected. The resulting morphological box,¹⁰ which was constructed using the EIDOS software,¹¹ listed the 12 drivers, their current status quo (SQ), and directions in which they could develop.

Next, in a group discussion under moderation of the facilitators, participants reduced the number of the drivers to the seven (see next section) that in their opinion will have most critical impact on European Security in 2030 (step 4). After defining the key drivers selected by the participants and putting forward the most extreme but plausible ends of their future development and the current status quo, these seven drivers became the basis for the scenario

generation (step 5). The group split into smaller groups, each deciding on a combination of drivers to guide their scenario. Their choices were based on the groups' expertise and judgement of the significance of particular drivers. The facilitators, with the help of the EIDOS software, provided a cross-consistency check, ensuring that the chosen drivers and their directions were not mutually exclusive, thus offering a plausible basis for the scenarios (step 6).

Finally, the narratives for the scenarios were developed, including relevant key drivers, a brief summary of the alternative future in 2030, a short chronology of events, implications of the scenario for European security, and policy recommendations (step 7). The scenario drafts that resulted from the workshop underwent a twofold peer-reviewing process (step 8). The first revision of the drafted scenarios took place at the end of the workshop—six experienced policymakers and experts¹² validated the drafted scenarios based on three criteria: plausibility, coherence, and innovation. Plausibility concerns the question of whether or not a scenario could happen (Mietzner & Reger, 2005) and thus speaks to the premise of the scenario itself. Coherence deals

with the internal logics of the scenario. Drivers and trends depicted within it must not contradict each other, as they would otherwise render the scenario incredible (*ibid.*).

Lastly, innovation determines the value of the scenario for decision-makers. Precisely because scenarios are built around plausibility, not probability, they offer the possibility for 'outside the box' thinking and can thus widen our perspectives by pointing to unlikely, yet possible future events and developments. As a result of the validation process at the workshop, two scenarios were dropped as not sufficiently innovative and plausible. Six scenarios got positive feedback and recommendations for further development. After the workshop, the authors advanced the scenario narratives. Once these were completed, the second validation phase followed, whereby external professionals, mainly academic scholars and think-tank experts,¹³ were asked to peer-review the developed scenarios. Each scenario was validated by at least two, sometimes three, experts.

The next section elaborates on the seven key drivers of the scenarios.¹⁴


Seven Key Drivers

Migration from the MENA region¹⁵

The migration and refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016, when more than 1.3 million people arrived in Europe (UNHCR, 2016b, 2016a), driven by a deteriorating security and economic situation in the MENA region, subsequently triggered a political crisis across the Continent. These events showed that existing political frameworks¹⁶ were unable to cope, and the European Commission’s relocation plan aimed at rebalancing the burden-sharing among the member states failed to be implemented (Nielsen, 2016). In order to reduce the numbers of refugees and migrants, the EU struck deals with Turkey to prevent sea-crossings from its shores, and with Libyan local authorities, tribal leaders, and armed groups to stop the smuggling of people and to increase border controls. Numbers have indeed decreased—in 2018 around 580,800 first-time asylum seekers applied for protection, less than half the number of the peak year 2015 (European Commission, 2019). Yet critics argue that Europe compromised itself by making deals with authoritarian regimes.

It became increasingly evident that people who wanted to come to Europe are held in detention centres where refugees and migrants are arbitrarily and indefinitely held, and routinely exposed to serious human rights violations including torture (Amnesty International, 2017). The situation remains tense, and even with a controlled influx Europe is facing a problem: how to house asylum seekers waiting for decisions on their cases; how to integrate them into the economy and into society if their applications are approved; and how to deport them if not. Moreover, the deteriorating situation in the EU’s neighbourhood might soon be only one cause for a migration influx to Europe. As the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) warned, desertification alone could force up to 135 million people to migrate by 2030, 60 million of which could migrate from Sub-Saharan Africa towards Europe (UNCCD in Müller et al., 2012). The World Bank Group further points to the increased risk of droughts, floods, and declining crop yields, pushing up to 100 million people into extreme poverty, further increasing incentives to emigrate (Hallegatte et al., 2016).

The driver can take different values positioned between the two extremes.¹⁷




China's global power projection

As early as 2008 G. John Ikenberry claimed that the rise of China due to its “extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy” (Ikenberry, 2008) will impact the Western world in the 21st century. With a population of 1.3 billion, China is the second largest economy after the US, and it noted economic growth in 2017 at 9.7 and 2018 at 6.4 percent (in comparison, the EU’s economy grew by 1.4 percent in 2018) (Morrison, 2018; Trading Economics, 2019). Today, China is expanding its flagship trading and infrastructure projects, notably the Belt and Road Initiative, into the European Union (BBC News, 2019). Furthermore, Beijing applies its economic strength to pursue its security interests and to shape the institutions and norms that guide global security, and thus it challenges European security ambitions (Huotari et al., 2017).

Recent examples that illustrate this trend are the joint naval drills with Russia in the Mediterranean and the Baltic; a missile defence exercise near Moscow; the construction of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti; Chinese security forces operating in Afghanistan; China financing development in the MENA region; and Beijing’s Poly Group aiming at joint arms production with Serbia, one of the EU’s direct neighbours (ibid., pp. 15-16). China is also emerging as a pivotal player in the international human rights system, in particular within the UN framework (Piccone, 2018). Chinese security interactions combined with China’s aggressive policy to popularise its high-tech products and services in Europe are already affecting core European economic, political, and security interests in the immediate and wider European neighbourhood— and this trend will most likely continue.

The driver can take different values positioned between the two extremes:




US role in European security

US involvement in world affairs will play a decisive role for European security in the coming decade. The US remains the biggest guarantor of Europe's hard security, providing more than 67 percent of all NATO funding (NATO, 2017).¹⁸ Through Article 5 it also serves as Europe's largest nuclear deterrent, and remains an indispensable partner in intelligence co-operation. The growing risk of a US retreat from European affairs (Tisdall, 2019), and the need for Europe to emancipate itself militarily from the US by developing its strategic autonomy (Biscop, 2016) have driven recent progress in European defence and were put forward in the already-mentioned Implementation Plan for Security and Defence. But the road is rocky, and EU military power projection capabilities are still a long way off, as current NATO spending figures demonstrate (NATO, 2017a). The average defence expenditure as a share of GDP of the 22 countries that are NATO and EU members decreased from 2.01 percent in 2000 to 1.47 percent in 2016 (NATO, 2017b). Only four countries—Poland, Estonia, Greece, and the UK—meet the 2 percent rule and spend 2 or more percent of GDP on their defence budgets. Germany is often singled out as the worst offender in this regard, since its defence spending (1.2 percent of GDP in 2016) is far below what it ought to be able to contribute based on the size of its economy and population. Looking at the EU28 in 2017, its member states spent €227 billion in total on defence, whereas the US spent €545 billion (European Commission, 2018). Moreover, it is not only the question of how much the Union spends, but how

it spends it. There are 178 different weapon systems in the EU countries and only 30 in the US. Currently, 80 percent of European defence procurement is purely national, and the opportunity cost of defence market fragmentation and the lack of interoperability is estimated at €30 billion at least (ibid.). The EFD and CARD are targeting the right problem, but overcoming this issue will likely take a few decades.

What is more, US engagement in the rest of the world also has implications for European security. As advocates of international law and institutions, the EU and US have traditionally sought out multilateral channels to conduct international relations, particularly the UN and the G20. Not only is the US the largest benefactor of international institutions, but it also carries a strong voice that often converges with European security interests. A pivot away from multilateralism, as indicated by the *ex post* rejection of the Iran nuclear deal or the Paris Accords can significantly weaken the pursuit of European international interests, including in security policy. A foundational paradigm of the transatlantic partnership—the commitment to liberal norms—already seems to be shaking on both sides of the Atlantic. In joint diplomatic practices, we assume the spirit of co-operation, as well as the exchange of information and co-operation to lead to greater cohesion. This implies the potential for a domino effect of failures in transatlantic co-operation: the failure of one joint endeavour can jeopardise subsequent ones.

The driver can take different values positioned between the two extremes:




Challenges to liberal values across Europe

The eurozone and the migration crisis constituted major disruptions that caused societal and political changes in Europe (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016; Hooghe & Marks, 2019). One of their manifestations is the rise of far-right Eurosceptic and populist parties after 2008 which made the “fragility of the EU as a ‘Community of Values’” (Leconte, 2005, p. 1) come to the fore. Between 2008 and 2013, in 22 national elections across the EU, 15 incumbent governments were voted out of office. In 23 national elections in 2015, 2016, and 2017, 31 new parties entered national Parliaments (Weissenbach, 2018). ECFR experts noted that “[a]cross Europe, traditional political elites are being challenged by newer, smaller, and leaner parties from both left and right. The Eurosceptics are winning office—currently holding 1329 seats in 25 countries—and playing a role in government in eight member states” (Dennison & Pardijs, 2016, p. 1)¹⁹. The majority of the newcomers and challenger parties is Eurosceptic—they have become the largest

opposition party (e.g. Germany), junior partners in government (e.g. Austria, Denmark), or are in charge of governing themselves (e.g. Italy, Poland, Hungary). They are capturing the political agenda and forcing mainstream parties to adopt their positions, and they pose a challenge to the previously largely uncontested status quos around support for the European project, liberal democracy, and European values such as pluralism, liberalism, and the rule of law.

The trend towards Euroscepticism poses a threat to European security since Eurosceptic parties oppose further integration, especially of foreign and security policy at the EU level, which is a necessary condition for the EU to be able to project its power. The rise of illiberal parties, in turn, leads to growing ideological differences between the member states, and results in contradictory policy preferences, which decrease the EU’s capability to act, especially in the realm of security and defence where unanimity is obligatory.

The driver can take different values positioned between the two extremes:




Euro: Resilience of the Eurozone

Since the global financial crisis of 2008 the financial stability and resilience of the eurozone has been an often-discussed topic among macroeconomists. In the aftermath of the ensuing sovereign debt crisis, European institutions ramped up their supervisory power to monitor member states’ macroeconomic developments and issue—when needed—warnings and punishments for accruing excessive imbalances in order to manage risks that emanate from one member state to others. Although growth and employment indicators have developed modestly since then, such imbalances in Italy still harbour risks for the entire eurozone. Although emergency funds have been instated to prevent any future national financial crisis from becoming European, there is a wide consensus that they would be insufficient to rescue Italy, which is simply ‘too big to fail’ (e.g. Heinemann, 2018). Would other member states step

in again to bail out others? The vehement German rejection of a common deposit insurance scheme indicates that German perceived ‘generosity’ might be stretched to the maximum.

Apart from these political considerations, the functioning of the common currency is also being challenged more fundamentally. Among those arguing that the eurozone is trying to square the circle are influential American economists, such as Nobel Prize laureates Paul Krugman and Josef Stiglitz, who view the current set-up of the Euro very critically, in the latter case even advocating for its end (Stiglitz, 2017). Even among German researchers, the integrity of the currency union is no longer sacrosanct. Former director of the Max-Planck Institute, Fritz W. Scharpf, for example, argues for the necessity of splitting the Euro in half (Scharpf, 2017).

The driver can take different values positioned between the two extremes:



Trade: Fluctuation and direction of global trade

Trade is at the heart of the EU. The single market has since its inception been a driver of integration and it remains one of the least contested and most comprehensive European projects. As champion of free trade, the EU has recently witnessed the stalling of globalisation since the great recession (Keck et al., 2018). Negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) failed and were put on hold, the WTO’s Doha Round has progressed slowly at best over the last 16 years, and the UK has opted to leave the EU and the single market. Despite the EU having concluded comprehensive trade agreements with Canada, Japan, and Vietnam recently, the future of global trade might not lie in its own hands.

The current trade war between the US and China has already forced the WTO to revise down its trade forecast for 2019 (World Trade Organization, 2018). The effects on investment and economic growth are felt in the EU as well, as Commissioner Moscovici made clear in his interim forecast of 2018 (Moscovici, 2018). Moreover, the EU itself might become a target of protectionist policies set elsewhere—as recent threats by President Trump to slap tariffs on German

car imports to the US indicate (Chambers & Taylor, 2018). Global tariffs constitute a significant risk for European economic growth and employment (Eurofound, 2019).

The EU’s trade policy increasingly serves non-commercial policy goals, such as ensuring adherence to human rights (e.g. Meissner & McKenzie, 2018). Trade embargoes, such as restrictions on arms exports, belong to the strategic arsenal of European foreign policy, making trade a channel for its wider foreign policy. In this context, the direction of trade is another aspect to consider when thinking about its link to security, because it defines economic interests and might further dependencies. For some member states, extra-EU trade has grown stronger than intra-EU trade since 2010—among them Germany and France (Eurostat, 2018). In 2017 Germany’s biggest sales market was the US. China was its third largest market while being the biggest exporter to Germany itself (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018). The effect of trade relations on security thus goes far beyond the direct link in the form of the arms trade.²⁰

The driver can take different values positioned between the two extremes:



Technological progress in the EU

The roll-out of the 5G network across Europe has sparked a public debate on cyber-security. In March 2019 the European Parliament issued a stern warning about the involvement of Chinese companies in the construction of the required digital infrastructure, as it would entail as yet unknown security risks (European Parliament, 2019b). The US ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, had shortly before threatened that the exchange of intelligence between Germany and the US would be impeded should the Germans decide to involve Chinese tech-giant Huawei in the construction of its 5G infrastructure (Atwood & Gaouette, 2019).

The debate brought to the fore the conundrum which the European Union finds itself in with regard to innovation and technological progress: while the Lisbon strategy, launched in 2000, formulated the aspiration of Europe becoming “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”, almost 20 years later the EU seems to be falling behind in the technological race. In the 2018 *Forbes* ‘Top 100 Digital Companies’ ranking, the first European firm ranks 29th (Forbes, 2018), and the world’s largest 10 tech companies come from the US, China, and South-East Asia (Stoller, 2018).

As technological progress encompasses all aspects of modern life (from health to education), global competitiveness has wide-ranging societal implications. The World Intellectual Property Organization reported that in 2017 1.38 million patent applications were received in China, over 600,000 in the US, but only 166,000 in the EU (behind Japan and South Korea) (2018).

However, the impact of technological progress is not necessarily positive. The effects of automation and digitalisation on employment are hotly debated. Frey and Osborne (2017) estimate that 47 percent of US jobs are at high risk of replacement by automation. For Europe, some studies suggest that 45-60 percent of all workers could be replaced before 2030 (Dolphin, 2015). Others see the risk of replacement as significantly lower. Arntz et al. (2017), for example, calculate the automation risk for US jobs at only 9 percent. Analysing the German labour market, Dengler and Matthes (2018) find 15 percent of German jobs at risk. Managing the labour market and the social effects of technological progress will thus be a key determinant of socio-economic cohesion in the future—it will therefore also affect internal security.

The driver can take different values positioned between the two extremes:



Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns, Black Elephants and Black Swans

Beyond defining these seven key driving forces, scenario planning also addresses factors, trends, and occurrences that may not yet be empirically visible. Foresight's stated goal of increasing anticipatory governance necessitates contemplating possible future surprises. The presented scenarios describe *known unknowns*, asking what would happen, if, for example, the US and Russia experienced a period of rapprochement, or if an environmental catastrophe crippled food production in Central Europe.

They also discuss *unknown unknowns*. *Unknown unknowns*—a term coined by Donald Rumsfeld—are contingencies or threats that have not yet been identified. According to Falkner et al. (2017, p. 1283), "an unknown unknown is a gap in knowledge that an individual is not aware of at that time, either because they do not know about that gap in knowledge or because, despite knowing of it, they are unaware of it". Their existence is a major challenge for policymakers, as ignorance of gaps in one's own knowledge prevents us from filling them.

Unknown unknowns identified in the Dahrendorf Foresight Project include a German exit from the eurozone and the ascent of Russia as an agrarian superpower following the effects of global warming. While these developments are not foreseeable, and are consequently absent from current foreign policy debates, they are not so implausible as to reject their future occurrence outright. This justifies contemplating them. Scenario exercises contribute to the identification of so-called Black Swans—events with a low probability but a high impact (Forward Thinking Platform, 2014). Black Swans appear highly implausible, if not impossible, before they happen, but when they do their impact is significant. While the presented scenarios do not identify Black Swans as such, the Conclusions draw attention to their possible occurrence, should manifestations of the drivers go awry.

There is another phenomenon relevant to foresight techniques: Black Elephants. Peter Ho, one of the fathers of strategic foresight, identified Black Elephants as problems that are actually visible to everyone but no one wants to deal with. Thus, although their manifestation should not be surprising, a widespread reaction is one of shock (Ho, 2017). The Dahrendorf Foresight Project has identified multiple Black Elephants, ranging from the EU's technological gap with China and the US, to the consequences of climate change. Their impact on the devised scenarios reinforces calls to urgently adapt policies to confront them—they will be revisited in the Conclusions.

Alternative Futures for European Security 2030

The featured scenarios offer possible trajectories for European Security to 2030 along the lines envisioned by the experts who participated in the scenario workshop: from thriving and flourishing (*The Hour of Europe*) to splintered and tumbling (*Nothing Learnt*). Each scenario starts with a short summary of the world in 2030, continues with the scenario path, and the presentation of the key drivers and their developments over the next decade. Each ends with an analysis of the scenario's implications for European security as well as three policy recommendations for policymakers. The regional focus exemplifies a possible avenue for a more focused approach to foresight, while suggesting a way to build on the insights attained by the Dahrendorf Foresight Project. It awards more space and provides more nuance to one of the key challenges to European Security in 2030 envisioned by the participants of the Dahrendorf Foresight Project: the MENA region.

The first scenario, *The Hour of Europe*, puts forward a strong EU as the result of membership changes, with a new member state joining (Norway) and old ones (Poland, Hungary, Czechia) leaving. All member states have adopted the Euro, and the EU is a political and economic powerhouse. It is competitive or leading

in future technologies, such as space exploration, pharmaceuticals, and environmental protection. As the US and China retreat from global leadership, the EU excels at filling the void, and assumes—for the first time—the role of a global security provider. This new role facilitates the withering away of NATO, which, in turn, necessitates the EU to assume both the strategic and operational capabilities this role requires.

The second scenario, *Cyber-Insecurity*, pays special attention to financial systems which are increasingly driven by algorithmic trading. A technical error suddenly produces a ‘flash crash’, putting global financial markets into a tailspin. The socio-economic fallout compounds a precarious European labour market situation, which is already facing the effects of digitalisation and automation on employment. The ensuing crisis furthers cyber-crimes, political fragmentation, and radicalisation in Europe. Cyber-warfare increasingly becomes a tool for non-state actors, enabling dangerous threats to security and prosperity from an increasingly varied group of actors. Technological backwardness equals both internal and external insecurity, as European cyber-security agencies, overworked and understaffed, fail to contain both foreign and domestic threats.

The third scenario, *Nothing Learnt*, in turn, deals with continuously worsening climate change, which soon becomes a factor in food scarcity, as Central and Eastern Europe is hit with a record drought, leading to severe and widespread crop failures, impeding food security in the region. The situation is even worse in Africa and the Middle East, contributing to a steady flow of migrants towards the EU, overwhelming its willingness and ability to cope with the influx. The EU subsequently breaks up over the question of migration, occasioning CEE member states to reorient towards Russia, seriously diminishing the efficacy of NATO.

The fourth alternative future, *Still Liberal After All These Years*, also takes up the question of values and presents the ‘battle over liberalism’, as a result

of which the EU finally acknowledges that it is overstretched, leading to Hungary’s exit. The EU flourishes thanks to intensified trade relations with China, improving living standards under progressive social policies while the US and Russia *rapprocher* under illiberal regimes, accepting their respective spheres of influence. Consequently, the international and European security architectures crumble, as the EU and the G2 realign.

The fifth scenario, *Disruption made in China*, puts the fragility of the eurozone in the limelight, as the Euro is dissolved. Subsequent political and economic realignments weaken the EU’s soft power. Germany leaves the eurozone and engages in a deeper trading relationship with an increasingly active and assertive China. The rest of the EU, led by a strong France, continues to count on partnership with the US but suffers from recession and high unemployment. This division prevents a coherent foreign policy, and the economic fallout impinges also on hard military capabilities.

The regional focus, *MENA Spring 3.0*, draws attention to the socio-political situation in one of Europe’s neighbouring regions. It depicts the Middle East and North Africa experiencing turmoil. Political repression, economic stagnation, and ecological degradation shape the lives of increasingly discontented peoples who are struggling to wrestle prosperity and freedom from the counter-revolutionary forces still dominating the political decision-making process. With an international community fragmented, responsibility to support this struggle increasingly falls to the EU, which must rise to the occasion.

Taken together, the five alternative futures form an overview of key trends and their unfolding that may impact European Security in 2030. The regional focus takes a deeper dive into one issue area or particular pertinence. The scenarios are meant to serve as thought-provoking impulses and inducements to widen our own perspectives when thinking about the future. ■

From the very beginning, the Dahrendorf Foresight Project was intended to be a collective learning exercise. Thus, our aim was to involve in the scenario workshop a great variety of people from academia, think-tanks, and institutions, both on the European and the national level. Moreover, since the non-European perspective is crucial to the Dahrendorf Forum, we invited several experts from outside Europe to join us in generating or reviewing the scenarios. Altogether, over 40 people took part in the project, as facilitators, participants, scenario authors, or reviewers. All authors were involved in the project in their personal capacities and their opinions do not reflect the views of the institutions they work for. We would like to express our sincere thanks and acknowledgement to all who contributed to the project and allowed us to step out of the box and glimpse an array of possible futures.

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Notes

- 1 Note that terrorism was not selected as key driver by the participants of the foresight exercise. It thus features only marginally in the scenarios.
- 2 The GAL/TAN divide describes the political cleavage between party positions oriented towards green/alternative/libertarian and traditionalism/authority/nationalism (Hooghe & Marks, 2009)
- 3 For more about forecasting, see: (Makridakis, Wheelwright, & Hyndman, 1996) the third edition of this authoritative text has adopted a new approach-one that is as new as the la
- 4 For an overview on various future studies approaches, see: (Georgiou, Harper, Keenan, Miles, & Rafael Popper, 2009; Pherson, 2008)
- 5 The Dahrendorf Foresight Project draws on the experience of the previous foresight exercise carried out within the Dahrendorf Forum in 2015-2017 and aimed at reflecting of European Union 2025 and its relations with neighbours and strategic partners. The outcomes of the project are to be found at https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Dahrendorf_Analysis_European-Union-in-the-World-2025.pdf and <https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/futures/vol/97/suppl/C>.
- 6 As the time of writing, UK was to leave the EU by October 30.
- 7 See: Appendix No 1. List of Workshop Participants.
- 8 See: Appendix No. 2. Online survey distributed among participants.
- 9 See: Appendix No. 3. List of internal and external drivers resulting from the online survey.
- 10 See: Appendix No 4. The morphological box
- 11 Software geared towards strategic decision-making, offering the visual pairing of drivers to compare their mutual compatibility, enabling the filtering out of incompatible manifestations of drivers, <https://www.parmenides-eidos.com/eidos9/us/>
- 12 See: Appendix No 5. The list of the validators at the workshop
- 13 See: Appendix No. 6. List of external scenario validators
- 14 The scenario focusing on the MENA region has different drivers, as it offers a deeper look into the constitutive components of the driver migration from the MENA region.
- 15 The participants decided to develop this key driver by combining two drivers they found crucial in their brainstorming process: Stability in MENA and Migration Policies and Politics. In their opinion, Migration from the MENA region will have critical impact on European Security 2030.
- 16 Such as the Common European Asylum System, and the Dublin III Regulation (see: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/whatwe-do/policies/asylum_en and <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:en:PDF>)
- 17 All status quos and "extremes" were defined by workshop participants.
- 18 Note that NATO is not prominently discussed in the scenarios, although its decay is noted in several of them. The issue will be revisited in the conclusion.
- 19 National Rally in France, the Danish People's Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the German AfD, the Austrian FPÖ, the Finnish Finns Party, the Polish Law and Justice, the Hungarian Fidesz and Jobbik, the Czech Platform of Dissatisfied Citizens, the Sweden Democrats and Italian Five Star Movements are examples of Eurosceptic parties that entered national parliaments or formed the government after 2008. The illiberal tendencies are mostly prominent in Hungary and Poland.
- 20 Currently, various distinct debates about arms control are ongoing. These include the current discussion in the US Congress on banning weapons exports to Saudi Arabia; German-French discussions on export controls for weapon systems that are developed in cooperation, and the ongoing debate about non-proliferation, among others of nuclear weapons.

THE EUROPEAN UNION BECOMES A GLOBAL POWER

By Mai'a K. Davis Cross

DRIVERS

- Technological progress in the EU
- Challenges to liberal values across the EU
- US role in European security

The world in 2030

In 2030 Europe is a major world power economically and technologically, and is on its way to becoming stronger and more integrated militarily. A more hostile and competitive international environment, and the continuing drift away from the US, causes Europe to integrate further. The EU is highly competitive in space technology, and is the world leader in the fields of environmental protection, artificial intelligence, and pharmaceuticals, among others. Some member states are well on their way to withdrawing from the inner core of the EU—Hungary, Poland, Czechia—while Norway has joined.

The 2030 composition of the EU is stronger and more cohesive due to the institutionalisation of a two-speed Europe: core and periphery. There is a stronger sense of common identity and all core member states have adopted the Euro, constituting an important dimension of integration. Continued divergence with the US has led to the decay of NATO, facilitating a strong European Defence Union. Taken together, Permanent Structured Co-operation, the Co-ordinated Annual Review of Defence, the European Defence Fund, and the European Defence Agency create another complex integrationist project. The third dimension is created by the reformed and deepened Schengen Area. Participation in the core of this triangle forms the 'heart' of the EU. The periphery of the EU is on a slower integrative track for the foreseeable future.

Unfolding of developments

Major key drivers

The main driving force of this scenario is US and Chinese decline in global leadership, which leaves a gap on the world stage. The more the US looks inward, the more others in the world feel emboldened to take the lead on international issues. China is unable to fill this void as its authoritarianism finally backfires domestically. The growing uncertainty in the world prompts the EU to invest in common defence in the pursuit

of military independence and strategic autonomy. These two developments open up greater acceptance of a multi-speed Europe. For Europe, the choice becomes simple: either consolidate or collapse. US protectionism also weakens the US dollar in global markets. This favours the Euro, which is more and more used by countries as the preferred foreign reserve currency. While trade wars with the US in 2019–20 lead to a temporary setback in the European and global economy, they also strengthen the determination of EU decision-makers to put momentum behind the integration project.

Although left- and right-wing populism persists over the next few years (albeit with declining vigour), its successes are rather limited—particularly in the eastern and southern European periphery. In particular, right-wing populism has declined since one of its main driving forces—uncontrolled migration from the MENA—has dropped due to the decreasing number of conflicts in the region. Populists change the political discourse, but discover that the EU is still preferable to the alternative—a political void. Simultaneously with populist movements, there is a resurgence of pro-European progressive forces across Europe, finally giving the EU the clear public support and trust that it needs. In short, liberalism prevails despite political setbacks.

A strong Europe of two speeds

This political updraft allows the EU to seek stronger integration among core countries that adopt the Euro, and a two-speed Europe becomes a reality. In particular, the EU creates a sizeable budget for eurozone countries, strengthens co-operation on migration and border controls, and takes steps to complete the social dimension of the eurozone. This new border-free area is even more seamless than the Schengen system: welfare, pension, health, education, and job benefits are now immediately shared throughout this new area. In essence, the core EU has taken the first step towards Social and Fiscal Union (SFU). This is intended as a reaction

against those member states that have illiberal qualities, and is perceived as such. The separate Euro budget results in non-Euro member states having fewer funds to draw upon—fuelling anti-EU sentiments in those member states. The Union splits into the core—the SFU—and the remaining non-Euro countries with illiberal tendencies. The latter accept the SFU arrangement as it spares them from deeper integration indefinitely. In return, the core EU decides not to trigger Article 7 against the illiberal states, allowing them to stay in the outer circle of EU integration.

The institutionalisation of two-speed Europe sparks a controversial and somewhat messy sorting process whereby certain Central and Eastern European member states have to decide where they stand on EU integration. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are *de facto* on the EU periphery, while Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia take action to join the eurozone as quickly as possible. In light of this sorting process, and prompted by US- and Chinese-induced global economic volatility as well as the more hostile and competitive environment, Norway decides to join the EU and the eurozone.

The EU's global role

The reconfiguration of the eurozone strengthens the European economy. Once the dust settles, the Euro becomes stronger, and by 2030 it competes with the dollar as the primary global reserve currency. The new core EU also finds it easier to share policy goals: it prioritises investments and collaboration on defence-related technology as part of the European Defence Union. It invests far more in science and technology from the common budget, especially in the cyber, drone, and AI realms. This allows the EU to increase its efforts to engage and pacify the Space Race 2.0—which was initiated by Trump's new Space Force—that has emerged among major powers and private corporations. With a growing *common* defence budget, duplication of defence spending is dramatically reduced, making the EU's foray into

space affordable. Moreover, its leading edge in the production of micro-satellites produces economic profits as well.

The more Europe is seen as a global player at the cutting edge of science and human advancements, the more its citizens identify as a common people. Daily images and live-streams of European astronauts create galvanising moments for a European society centred on science, exploration, and the importance of a peaceful existence. The dual-use nature of space technology and breakthroughs in AI and robotics contribute to advances in health, infrastructure, and the environment.

Reconfiguration of the multipolar world

The more the EU pulls ahead in global achievements, the bigger the divergence with the US becomes. US-European competition eventually leads to the erosion of NATO. The fractured transatlantic alliance is faced with another challenge: a post-Putin Russia. Although Putin clearly remains the leader behind the scenes, he decides to run in the 2024 presidential elections, and his later abdication greatly increases geopolitical uncertainty. The future course of Russia, again, becomes an open question. China's increasing authoritarianism leads to domestic unrest, and forces the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to shift its attention away from global affairs and towards the consolidation of domestic control. Due to the power vacuum, the EU thus increasingly finds itself as a regulative international actor.

Even though the EU faces unprecedented challenges in the lead-up to 2030, common political will, resilience, and aspiration remain strong. The EU not only weathers the storm, but thrives as a more cohesive and influential global actor—although this is at the expense of those member states unwilling to advance integration. While EU leaders could have responded very differently to these challenges—and in the process undermined foundational ideas and norms of the project—they were able to adjust to a changing reality.

Implications for European security

The major implication of the above-described developments for the EU is that it must have a strong willingness and preparedness to take on global responsibility as the sole international power. The role that has been, for decades, fulfilled by the US is now to be accomplished by the Union, as NATO decays. Hence, Europe must be not only in possession of a significant defence budget, advanced weapon systems, and a speedy decision-making process; it has also to be willing to act as an international security provider, via both civilian and military missions, and to fill the vacuum left by the US. Thus, a common strategic culture becomes a necessity for the EU as well as the full integration of the national defence capacities into a merged military force.

Policy recommendations

The scenario depicts a differentiated two-speed EU, capable of acting swiftly and decisively. Its strengths are in research and innovation, contributing to the build-up of significant state-of-the-art military capabilities, underpinned by commitments to its core values. The following policy recommendations can promote the realisation of this scenario.

1. Adapt decision-making procedures to the challenges of the 21st century

The changing nature of transatlantic relations, demographic pressure and migration from the south, and competition in technological development are some of the key interrelated areas where the EU needs robust responses. Strategically, it is a matter of EU survival. However, these areas demand not just simple intergovernmental co-operation but a strong institutional setting. EU decision-makers must rethink how they perceive sovereignty. Economic rationality makes a strong case for creating common solutions for defence, migration, and technological development via majority voting in the Council. As does the continued divergence from the US.

Thus, a Defence Council should be created within the Council, and significant steps should be taken towards integrated procurement as the only way to enhance the EU's military capabilities in the context of the decay of NATO.

2. Create an actionable and meaningful eurozone budget

The European Monetary Union (and its social dimension) and the single market face an increasing need to be competitive. However, the advancement of these two areas goes hand-in-hand with the need to make them much more binding on member states. Therefore, it is true that the Euro should be a currency of the whole EU. If this is the case, a Euro area budget seems to be an obvious consequence. This budget must be large enough to act as a macroeconomic stabiliser, as well as spur investments in infrastructure and innovation. Only by outfitting it with the resources appropriate to the tasks at hand can a eurozone budget contribute to future prosperity and security.

3. Enforcement of core values

The development of such advanced forms of integration as the SFU, as well as the European Defence Union, demands trust between member states. Trust is also a matter of shared values. Those countries which breach the rule of law and curtail democracy on their own soil should not be part of the core EU. However, the EU should be open if they decide to change track. This necessitates functioning enforcement mechanisms, for example by reforming Article 7 procedures to ensure adherence to qualified majority voting and prevent small groups of states that flaunt core values from protecting each other. At the same time, leaving the core EU open to those states reverting back to core values requires defining, setting, and monitoring of corresponding indicators, as is done in the accession process. ■

The opinions expressed in this scenario are entirely those of the author and do not represent the positions of the Dahrendorf Forum or its hosts Hertie School and London School of Economics or its funder Stiftung Mercator.

THE FINANCIAL CRASH BROADENS THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP BETWEEN EUROPE, THE US, AND CHINA

By Nicole Koenig and Jiro Minier

DRIVERS

- Technological progress in the EU
- Challenges to liberal values across the EU
- China's global power projection
- US role in European security

The world in 2030

In the absence of the expected breakthroughs—nuclear fusion, quantum computing—more mundane technologies define the next decade. Algorithmic trading triggers a new global financial crash in 2025, ultimately broadening Europe's technological and innovation gap vis-à-vis the US and China. As a consequence of the crash, Europe is increasingly split into political factions and regions. While the superpowers vie for influence, technology is weaponised across society in the form of cyber-crime and drone terrorism. Political moderates return to the European Parliament in 2029 with the promise to strengthen the EU's mandate in cyber-security and law enforcement. However, the inheritance of fragmentation and decline inevitably presents a formidable challenge for the future.

Unfolding of developments

The 'Great Flash Crash'

In the early 2020s Europe's economic future is uncertain. It is facing rising inequality and unemployment, driven by increasing automation and its inability to compete on a global technological stage. Strong fundamentals and investment in future technologies such as AI by the two superpowers see the world increasingly shaped by their bipolar technological competition. Europe is struggling to catch up, with the existing gap only widening in most crucial fields such as nanotechnology and energy storage. The uncertainty reaches a nadir following the US algorithmic trading crisis of 2025. In what comes to be known as the 'Great Flash Crash', a severe error crash in US markets is seized on by automated trading systems elsewhere before circuit breaker mechanisms can kick in. Negative market sentiments seize on the downturn, with contagion spreading rapidly due to the high level of small-scale private involvement in stock markets. The Great Flash Crash has a considerable knock-on effect across the world, including the EU. The subsequent economic decline, including the collapse of

what is labelled a 'second dot-com bubble', allows a slowing China to reach technological parity with the US once more, and for Chinese multinationals such as Alibaba and Tencent to emerge again as viable counterparts to Google and Amazon. The EU's fledgling high-tech industries, on the other hand, tank significantly, in the absence of significant venture capital and institutional support.

Consequences of the Crash: Rising insecurities and political polarisation

In the aftermath of the Great Flash Crash, it becomes evident just how integral technology has become for internal and external security, technologising both concepts. New security threats emanate from coders and programmers, who, hit by the dot-com bubble's collapse, learn from their successful counterparts in Russia and organise into loose cyber-crime conglomerates that prove impossible to police for overworked cyber-security agencies. The scarce 'jobs of future Europe' increasingly involve assembly line maintenance or care for the elderly; those in search of lucrative careers must turn to foreign multinationals, or to crime.

Old ideological rivalries give way to the new socio-economic reality. Rising social imbalances and a strong desire to restore order push voters towards parties of the extreme right, which seek to combine ethno-nationalism and protectionism with a generous welfare state. Their traditional opponents on the left are forced onto the political margins. The fringes of neo-anarchist groups, defined by vehement anti-corporatism and anti-authoritarianism, resort to violence. Within a few years, transnational terrorist groups become notorious for their use of mass-market drones for 'suicide' bombings and their relentless probing of critical infrastructure over cyberspace in their struggle against authority and the far-right.

These political dividing lines are compounded by rising regionalism. The EU is incapable of addressing the consequences of the Crash, and the socio-

economic gap between regions broadens. Regionalist movements form alliances to either reverse the nationalist drive towards centralisation or push back against economic deprivation. Scottish, Catalan, Corsican, and Flemish nationalists begin to form a pan-European 'Alliance of Independent Regions'. Meanwhile, southern Spanish and southern Italian groupings form an 'anti-establishment' alliance with occasional links to transnational terrorist movements.

Superpower games amidst Europe's political and economic divides

Fragmentation, violence, and regionalism foster political and economic divergence. Europe comes to a low point in 2027 as the pro-security and pro-welfare Rassemblement National comes to power in France. Its leader announces a new 'social pact' for the nation as well as a 'war on hackers' conducted by national law enforcement and military agencies.

A weakened Europe is gradually splitting into disparate spheres of influence. Larger states such as Germany and the UK are torn between the economic benefits of ties with China and their security obligations to the US. Some countries, such as Poland and the Nordic and Benelux states, align themselves closer with the US, but a pro-Chinese sphere emerges across various southern and eastern European countries, including post-election France. Superpower battles for influence play out across Europe down to the domestic level. Both the US and China exploit the political volatility that follows the opening of socio-economic gulfs within European states in their attempts to gain an edge. Discussions concerning Europe's potential fragmentation are ongoing, as some start questioning the viability of the single market and the common currency.

The decline of the far-right and the 'new promise'

By the end of the 2020s, however, a cautious optimism returns to Europe. The Rassemblement National's policies to restore order—eagerly adopted

as blueprints for populist programmes across the Continent—are soon panned as failures. A poorly targeted welfare policy and imbalanced tax cuts severely limit the resources available for internal security. Overstretched and understaffed national agencies are unable to prevent the surge of cyber-crime and ideological violence. French citizens are furious as the government refuses to participate in EU-wide initiatives addressing the upsurge of transnational security threats.

The visible failure of the French far-right leads to a decline in support for reactionary parties. A 'grand alliance' of moderate and progressive parties is able to regain a solid majority in the 2029 European Parliament elections with a 'new promise' to reunify weakened nation states through transnational initiatives addressing regional socio-economic disparities as well as cross-border crime and terrorism. Despite the cautious optimism, it is clear that enormous challenges lie ahead. Europe's inheritance of technological gaps and social disparities cannot be overcome in a fortnight and will demand extensive foresight and co-operation over the coming years.

Implications for European security

These developments have important implications for Europe's security. The EU struggles to agree on joint initiatives as the US and China are playing divide and conquer in their respective economic spheres of influence. The EU's dependence on both superpowers grows, rendering its foreign policy subservient to foreign wants. Moreover, falling further behind in the technological race not only weakens Europe's competitiveness and resilience to external shocks, but also its susceptibility to cyber-crime. As tomorrow's security threats are asymmetric, and in some cases require even fewer resources than today, technological backwardness directly undermines security. Against the backdrop of Europe's economic and political fragmentation, especially in the aftermath of the Great Flash Crash, the EU's basic integrity is threatened.

Policy recommendations

The scenario depicts a technologically backward EU that is susceptible to cyber-attacks and unable to cope with the socio-economic fallout of technological disruptions. The following policy recommendations are intended to address the contributing factors driving this scenario.

1. Recapturing the technological agenda

Europe must take action to address its technology and innovation gaps. Collaborative research, development, and procurement initiatives should thus be fostered. A key issue will be addressing Europe's gap between high-level scientific research and investable projects. This is the declared aim of the European Innovation Council, which is to receive around €10 billion under the EU's next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (2021–27). This body should be modelled on the example of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) or the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) in the US. This would imply substantially increasing the proposed financial envelope, defining concrete missions, and providing targeted funding to high-level and high-risk research projects less likely to receive private sector funding. The European Innovation Council could thus foster disruptive innovation in fields such as AI and biotechnology.

Meanwhile, European research initiatives in high-sensitivity fields, such as the Horizon 2020-funded ALADDIN drone countermeasures project or the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) component of the European Defence Fund (EDF), could be a framework for further joint R&D in sensitive fields such as cyber-offensive capabilities and quantum computing. The outcomes of this high-level research could be further assisted in their everyday realisation through EU forums that bring together reliable sources of venture capital funding with promising technologies, similar to the US Department of Defense's proposed

Trusted Capital Marketplace, ensuring that high-level research investments are provided with use-cases and avenues to everyday implementation.

2. Preparing for asymmetrical technological security threats

The internal threats of the future will likely leverage technological advancements in diverse fields and transcend borders. During the campaign for the European Parliament elections several voices advocated turning the EU's law enforcement agency Europol into a 'European FBI' with executive rights. However, obstacles include sovereignty and legitimacy concerns as well as a lack of trust. To foster trust, mutual learning, and a common law enforcement culture the EU should establish an 'Erasmus Pol' initiative that would allow law enforcement professionals to work in a neighbouring country for a period of around six months. This initiative could build and expand on the existing one-week exchange programme organised by the European Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL).

State-to-state EU initiatives such as the PESCO Cyber Rapid Response Teams should be expanded to other EU nations and closely interlinked with NATO efforts in cyber-security, ensuring compatibility between Europe's two major security undertakings via collaborative exercises, better civil-military co-ordination, and a possible joint pool of experts.

Meanwhile, in order to address the fundamentally asymmetrical character of such threats, cross-border and cross-sector co-operative structures should be defined: in areas such as cybersecurity, these could take the form of public-private taskforces designated at the EU level to address specific threats and incidents in cyberspace working with multinational military forces, and might see law enforcement

and the private sector sharing access to classified material for operational purposes. In particular, expanding the Information Sharing & Analysis Centre (ISAC) model beyond European energy utilities (EE-ISAC), and empowering them with better access to information and integration into threat response structures would act as a first step towards cross-sector and cross-border co-operation in key European sectors. This should be coupled with funding for local level law enforcement training programmes and information-sharing structures, to ensure that the benefits of better co-ordinated responses to asymmetric security threats are effectively distributed across civil society and not merely centralised.

3. Regulating the societal impact of technological progress

European institutions must play a greater role in the setting of standards for the responsible management of socially defining technologies such as cyber-security, digital participation, and social credit systems. Powerful pan-European directives such as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) should be implemented as baselines for the responsible shaping of such systems in Europe, placing hard boundaries on the cross-border use of personal data and ensuring that, even in the face of socially disruptive technologies, socio-economic agency will remain in the hands of European citizens. Meanwhile, EU-wide cyber-security and drone regulation standards, building on the work done by European agencies such as the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), should be introduced to supplement the local level law enforcement initiatives described above with enforceable rules and regulations that are relevant and applicable to the technological challenges of the future. ■

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ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND UNCONTROLLED MIGRATION BREAK THE EUROPEAN UNION

By Hallie Detrick and Benjamin Martill

DRIVERS

- Migration from MENA region
- Challenges to liberal values in the EU

The world in 2030

In 2030, after a series of disagreements regarding common policies coupled with low economic growth sours relations between EU member states and environmental degradation accelerates across the globe, compounding the economic and socio-political crises in large parts of the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA), the EU breaks up. Unwilling to accept their share of migrants, and shaken by agricultural collapse due to environmental degradation, a group of mostly Central Eastern European (CEE) member states decides to exit from the EU. This coalition of more or less authoritarian regimes tries to maintain friendly relations with the EU and the US, while intensifying its collaboration with Russia. The latter, becoming one of the region's most important providers of foodstuff, exploits this turn of events to strengthen its grip on the post-Soviet space, and the US, in turn, acquiesces, hoping to turn Moscow into an ally in its rivalry with China.

Unfolding of developments

Destabilisation of the European neighbourhood

Instability in the MENA region is growing. A number of states in the region are plagued with violent conflicts over resources and power. The effects of climate change, meanwhile, are contributing to worsening living conditions and harming agricultural activities. Migration to the EU is on the rise, owing in part to the continued inability of the Libyan state apparatus to control migratory flows from the region and a civil war in Egypt—beginning in 2020—which followed the intensification of conflict between the country's authoritarian state and its Islamist groupings. Turkey has permitted large groups of migrants from the Middle East to enter Europe, abrogating previous agreements allowing such individuals to be returned; this is just one facet of deteriorating relations with the Union.

Within the EU, member states remain at odds on migration policy, institutional reforms, and budgetary priorities. Migration continues to be regarded as an external problem, and no new agreements on the internal dimensions of migration emerge, meaning burden sharing remains a salient issue. The new 2021–27 Multi-Annual Financial Framework entails substantial cuts in cohesion policy and is accepted only reluctantly by the CEE states. Poland, Hungary, and Romania, moreover, see a greater share of their structural funds withdrawn owing to concern at the rule of law in these countries.

Discontent is compounded by ever-more violent weather phenomena. Dry and hot summers cripple harvest yields, making food insecurity a new and urgent concern in the region. Pleas with Brussels to step in are ignored, as the European Commission insists on a 'solidarity for solidarity' approach: without burden sharing on migration, no burden sharing on agriculture. Moreover, European sanctions on Russia—persisting from the Ukraine crisis of 2014—complicate trade relations and hinder agricultural imports from there. Russia, meanwhile, is gradually becoming an agricultural exporter, modernising its agri-industrial sector as it benefits from global warming that gradually makes agricultural production across vast swathes of land—including southern Siberia—possible.

As a result, popular disenchantment with the EU rises in these countries and encourages the ruling parties to adopt more nationalist and Eurosceptic positions. Russia, for its part, intensifies its misinformation and propaganda activities vis-à-vis Europe, mainly in the cyber-domain, to encourage rapprochement with the post-Soviet sphere. The EU responds by expanding the list of banned imports from Russia to include agricultural products, which results in increasing food prices in the Central European countries.

The crisis years: migration-induced disintegration

When the second migration crisis strikes in the mid-2020s, the EU is thus deeply divided along a number of lines. Faced with a deadlock regarding the redistribution of a large number of migrants, a group of states led by France and Germany decides to settle the issue through bilateral intergovernmental agreements. In an attempt to penalise the (mostly Central European) states that have not signed up to the agreement, border controls are reintroduced, essentially ending Schengen.

Unwilling to accept large quotas of migrants, the governments of Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia express their intention to withdraw from the EU, predicting that the threat will be met by Franco-German concessions. Referenda are held in Czechia and Hungary to reinforce the threat of withdrawal. Faced with such an ultimatum, France and Germany refuse to back down, leaving the three Visegrád states no option but to deliver on their promise of exit, irrespective of the political and economic fallout. Despite the fear of migrants and the demand for Russian and other non-EU agricultural products, Poland remains reluctant to withdraw from the EU, since it still perceives Russia as the biggest threat to its security. Germany, for which relations with Poland have been of great importance, promises concessionary treatment regarding the quotas of migrants.

In turn, Bulgaria and Romania follow Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia, since the operation of the single market for these countries has been subjected to irreparable disruption by the withdrawal of the three Visegrád states, and their populations regard them as having been subjected to unfair treatment at the hands of France and Germany. Moreover, since Brexit has demonstrated that exit from the Union occasions only a short-term dip in economic

productivity—owing to the UK’s decision to engage in competitive deregulation after exit—the societies in the CEE states broadly welcome the decision to withdraw. While negotiating withdrawal agreements with the EU, the departing member states establish among themselves a Union of Sovereign Nations (USN), designed to facilitate common border protection and economic co-operation, but lacking the centralised institutions and legal architecture of the EU. Co-operation within the USN is strictly intergovernmental.

The aftermath of disintegration

The USN concludes an interim free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU, which does not include freedom of movement in labour and services, and remains patchy in its initial implementation. Deprived of access to EU funds and capital from Western Europe, some countries of the USN, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, seek to attract Chinese investment through participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), greatly increasing their dependence on China, and making them more dependent on investment from Asia than from the US.

With the EU engaged in internal strife and increasingly keen to distance itself from the smaller, quarrelsome countries in its eastern neighbourhood, Russia’s influence in the region increases: pro-Russian political forces win elections in Moldova, while a more independent government comes to power in Ukraine, leading both countries to suspend their association agreements with the EU to preclude Russian displeasure.

The countries of the USN remain in NATO, and the alliance thus survives. However, the US continues to focus its attention on the Pacific, and comes to regard détente with Russia as a strategic priority in order to balance a rising China. Washington therefore accepts the growing Russian influence in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics as the price of obtaining Russia’s support. NATO becomes less relevant as a result.

The UK is closely allied with the American stance vis-à-vis Russia. It sees little other choice, since it is linked economically to America through the bilateral US-UK FTA of 2022, and since its political relations with Europe have soured in the immediate post-Brexit years. While both sides narrowly agreed the Withdrawal Agreement in 2019, progress in negotiating a comprehensive UK-EU FTA was made more difficult by the British insistence on pushing forward with the agreement with the US. The UK cautiously allies itself with the USN, owing to its independent stature in Europe post-Brexit and its strong historical and cultural ties with the region.

Implication for European security

The EU has shown remarkable resilience in recent years, but growing internal divisions threaten to destabilise the Union, making it vulnerable to external threats. The greatest danger for the EU comes not from foreign powers directly but from the threat of disintegration. The potential for considerable societal changes, and thus for institutional adjustments, in Europe is thus quite significant. The EU institutions and member states, meanwhile, have few instruments with which to confront a potential turn towards illiberalism, and this may well force the Union into a problematic situation. Moreover, migration policy is the EU’s Achilles heel. The EU relies on third countries to act as ‘gatekeepers’. Should these societies be subjected to civil wars, social dislocation, severe environmental degradation, or political instability, the EU will be faced with another migration crisis that could lead to the emergence of serious discord between the member states.

Policy recommendations

The scenario identifies three distinct threats: political division, brought to the fore by the failure to manage migration, which in turn is exacerbated by an ecological crisis in the EU and MENA region. The following policy recommendations can assist in the prevention of this scenario.

1. Act now against illiberal backsliding

The EU institutions must remain vigilant and act swiftly against cases in which deficiencies in the rule of law arise among member states, since their inaction will only encourage greater discrepancies in the future. There is a complex balance to be struck between punitive measures and diplomatic engagement, however. Whilst it may discourage illiberal governments if sanctions are imposed, such an act may also contribute to strengthening anti-EU sentiments. Peer pressure and ‘naming-and-shaming’ by EU institutions and member states may, in the end, prove a more effective remedy. More helpful still would be the establishment of a specific fund to support civil society mobilisation in countries that are backsliding, since the example of Poland suggests that this is one of the only effective means of opposing illiberal changes.

2. Increase soft and hard power support to stabilise the MENA region

Externally, the Union must do all in its power to reinforce the effective governing capacity of third countries whose populations would likely seek refuge in Europe at times of crisis. The attention of the EU’s military missions needs to shift from high-profile CSR operations in the Mediterranean to civilian state-building in northern Africa and the Sahel in order to stem the flow of migrants from these regions. Greater

development aid must be deployed in service of this goal, which would require an increase in the share of the EU’s development budget allocation to Africa. Together, reorienting the Union’s focus away from the Mediterranean and towards supply countries will result in morally and politically better outcomes.

3. Take bold action to reduce carbon emissions

The effects of climate change are beginning to be felt and time is running out to deal with the problem. Member states must act decisively and allocate more resources—individually and on the supranational level—to decarbonise their economies and mitigate the worst effects of climate change. This need is most acute with a view to the MENA region, where climate change can make an already unstable socio-economic situation untenable. Significant migratory flows are as likely as they could be devastating to European unity. Additionally, funds need to be allocated for the possible consequences of climate change, such as prolonged droughts and extreme weather phenomena, for example in the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF). The EU’s LIFE programme—which is dwarfed by contributions to agriculture and rural development—should be bolstered by a factor of several if the EU is to demonstrate its credibility as a climate actor and effect real change outside its borders. ■

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Still Liberal After All These Years?

THE EU NEEDS TO COMBINE POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE AT HOME WITH PRAGMATISM ABROAD

By Benjamin Tallis, Inger-Luise Heilmann and An Jacobs

DRIVERS

- Challenges to liberal values across the EU
- US role in European security
- Trade: fluctuation and direction of global trade

The world in 2030

The battle for liberalism continues to rage within the EU and around the globe. Doubling down on liberalism internally, while taking a pragmatic approach externally, has made the EU more secure in many ways, but less so in others. Europe remains the world's leading provider and protector of rights and opportunities, but its political future as a liberal force is fragile. Europe's hard security situation is precarious but not perilous: the split with the US and the decline of NATO left the EU lacking military capacity. Its relationship with China has deterred hostile great powers, but whether this truly extends to hard security has yet to be tested. China is, nonetheless, now the EU's closest partner, which has greatly enhanced economic security, especially through the Sino-European Trade Area (SETA) and the productivity and connectivity boost from linking up to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Raising productivity and redistributing prosperity have strengthened societal and individual security. The 'Universal European Income' (UEI) facilitated more equitable and inclusive automation, digitalisation, **and** increased inward migration without undermining social cohesion, which also helped Europe to resist hybrid destabilisation.

The road to 2030

The battle for liberalism

The contest between liberal and illiberal forces that defined the 2020s impacted Europe's security in several ways, altering the constitution of the EU—in terms of its rules and institutions but also its membership. The 'hardcore' liberal EU that emerged became less compatible politically and economically with the increasingly illiberal US, which in turn found more common ground with Russia. This shift undermined NATO, as the US and Russia co-operated to balance China, carved out compatible

spheres of influence, and cut EU states out of key decision-making on European security issues. The fracturing of the Western alliance, the need to balance against the US-Russia axis, and mutual interest in maintaining trade relations drove the EU and China into each other's arms. This marriage of convenience brought benefits, but also contradictions between economic and political liberalism and between the EU's domestic and foreign policy.

Within Europe, the now infamous 'Macron-Orbán deal' of 2021, that paved the way for the renegotiation of the EU treaty base (in 2023), was the key political moment as both progressives and populists saw a chance to advance their agendas. The illiberal forces led by Victor Orbán had sought to repatriate powers and end what they claimed was the EU's undemocratic, legalistic imposition of liberalism on them by reopening the treaties. They had overestimated their support, however, and were outmanoeuvred by Emmanuel Macron and the liberals, who used the opening instead to strengthen compliance mechanisms and enforce liberal governance while marginalising illiberal 'troublemakers'. The deal and renegotiation had the effect of repoliticising liberalism in Europe, affirming that membership of a liberal EU with all its benefits and obligations was a choice—and one that could be reversed should it no longer be seen to be in a country's interest. Under pressure from the new compliance mechanisms, with wounded national pride, and consistently in a minority in the EU, Hungary exited the Union in 2025.

However, it was not followed by others, who calculated that overall they were better off in than out. Poland and Czechia remained in the EU but stalled on joining the Euro and left the Schengen system in 2026—in protest against encouragement for increased inward migration and enforcement of refugee relocation quotas. Italy clung on, precariously, in both Schengen and the Euro, but, consistently governed by populist forces, Rome acted as a ringleader for illiberal forces inside the EU, while still just about toeing the line.

A changed global environment

The mainstreaming of Trumpism by the Republican Party (while ditching Trump himself after his bribery conviction) was key to the 2024 election of President Kirstjen Nielsen, who found considerable domestic support for her strongly illiberal line on both trade and foreign policy. Increasing US protectionism and escalating trade wars with China and the EU split the West and further undermined NATO, which the US had increasingly claimed was benefitting free-riding Europeans at America's cost. This retreat from multilateralism, embrace of great power politics, and a shared reactionary social outlook led to closer US co-operation with Russia to undercut the wider rule-based order, including the WTO. Russia seized the opportunity to leverage its political influence and compensate for its structurally deficient economy. However, Russia's influence remained limited and it focused on disruption, including by supporting illiberal forces in Europe.

This changing international environment led the EU to adopt a highly pragmatic approach towards China, which itself remained largely authoritarian. However, China somewhat opportunistically positioned itself as an advocate of free trade, especially with the EU. EU-China co-operation developed on joint naval protection along Indo-Pacific trade routes as well as in the ambit of the BRI. The creation of SETA in 2025 had massive economic benefits for both sides. It delivered rapid and sustained growth in prosperity that was amplified in Europe by the maintenance of the EU single market and social model, as well as from upgraded infrastructure from linking to and extending the BRI further into Europe and on into the MENA region. China was keen to protect its market, the EU to safeguard its prosperity, and both parties needed a strong ally in the increasingly multipolar yet decreasingly multilateral world, but their marriage of convenience ran into political difficulties in the late 2020s.

Contradictions and achievements

Europe's hardcore liberalism at home and pragmatism abroad started to reach the limits of its own contradictions: from regulating tech companies to the way that Chinese migrants (among others) began to demand more than the 'Denizenship' programme (which allowed free entry and exit but offered fewer rights than to citizens) provided. Without an effective multilateral forum and beholden to China economically, the EU lacked the leverage to challenge Beijing's domestic rights abuses, aggressive approach in the South China Sea, and threats to Taiwan in the late 2020s. Attempts to push China towards the creation and enforcement of new international (even liberal) rules were boosted by President Jack Ma's surprise accession to power in 2024 (amid a crisis of state planning), but ultimately failed to deliver.

The internal consolidation of liberal Europe was, by contrast, a significant progressive achievement, facilitating bold social security policies. President Macron's (2022) UEI initiative (the core of his re-election campaign) accelerated but also compensated for changes brought by digitalisation and automation. UEI liberated millions of Europeans from monotonous jobs and catalysed the knowledge economy—making it liberalism in both practice and pocket. The additional exodus of European workers from care and construction jobs boosted demand for migrant labour, which was supplied through the 'triple approach': improved border security, increased legal routes into the EU, and the extensive Denizenship programme. Along with UEI, this undermined support for xenophobic populists. Chinese labour helped to upgrade European infrastructure in order to link it to the BRI. However, as migrant numbers increased, stretching housing stocks and public services, the liberal consensus again began to fray. Populists, playing the nativist card, surged in the 2029 European elections.

Implications for European security

The growing illiberalism of the US and the American-Russian rapprochement resulted in the decline of NATO and deprived Europe of its security umbrella. The troubled transatlantic relationship and the crumbling of the liberal order left the EU short on hard power capabilities as well as global influence. The world of 2030 offers few liberal partners to work with, yet the EU needs partners to protect itself—and the sources of prosperity that underwrite its internal liberalism. This liberalism remained a source of socio-economic security and societal resilience. However, it had to be politically emboldened to mitigate the effects of automation and digitalisation as well as to see off the populist challenge in Europe. The EU's partnership with China showcased the principled pragmatism advocated in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, protecting prosperity and allowing for strengthened liberalism in Europe in a less liberal world.

The following policy recommendations are aimed at preventing the negative aspects and promoting the positive aspects of this scenario.

Policy recommendations:

1. Repoliticise liberalism in Europe

Protecting Europeans' security depends on protecting Europe's liberal identity. Technocratic and legalistic means can no longer defend democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms from populists. Europe needs a political approach that provides more opportunities for more people, as socio-economic insecurity (along with other factors) feeds illiberal populism and undermines the resilience of our societies. If Europe is to remain a liberal force, the EU must make liberalism mean something politically as well as institutionally. It needs to articulate an inspiring liberal vision and reaffirm membership of

and participation in a liberal EU as a political choice rather than a legal fait accompli. This should be accompanied by stronger and more equitably applied enforcement mechanisms—and a smoother exit process.

2. Be pragmatic in effectively pursuing liberalism outside Europe

The EU should defend the transatlantic link, and its members should contribute more in capabilities as well as cash, but should NATO erode it will need new allies to compensate for its capability gaps and vulnerabilities. Ideally, these allies would be multilateralists, and the EU would have a rules-based format for co-operation with China, but this is not guaranteed. It should leverage (including economically), not lecture, to push its foreign partnerships towards liberal rules, norms, and outcomes. In external policy, some liberalism remains better than none.

3. Dare to introduce bold progressive social policies

UEI would reduce inequalities and, accompanied by digital skills training, would encourage participation in the knowledge and gig economies and slash redundant bureaucracy without increasing precariousness. A Denizenship programme, to encourage legal inward mobility (with limited rights and obligations), could change attitudes to regular migration if combined with improved border management. But long-term planning (of e.g. housing stocks and school places) is needed for increased migrant numbers as well as the changing patterns of work and leisure. ■

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Disruption made in China

THE CHINESE ROAD INTO A SPLINTERED EU

By Sergey Utkin and Marcel Hadeed

The world in 2030

By 2030 China has established itself as a true global superpower. The US' attempts to counter China's growth in Asia fail after a limited violent clash over Taiwan. The American-Chinese power struggle thus shifts to Europe, which is already in a state of disintegration. A looming Italian sovereign default induces Germany to leave the eurozone, which cascades into its complete dissolution. Rifts between Germany and the rest of the EU deepen further, as Sino-German trade and technological exchange intensifies. The US, in response, concludes trade agreements with the UK, France, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), but socio-economic benefits remain meagre. The EU in 2030 is politically splintered, internationally invisible, and socio-economically heterogeneous.

DRIVERS

- China's global power projection
- Resilience of the eurozone
- Fluctuation and direction of global trade

Unfolding of developments

Sino-American escalation in Asia

In the decade prior to 2030 the Chinese government massively invests in science, technology, and the military, reaching true technological autonomy. It becomes a source of innovation and the standard-setter for Eurasia and Africa. The Belt and Road Initiative facilitates trade and the integration of natural resources and foreign talent into Chinese production chains. President Xi Jinping soon pushes for the long-promised reunification of China with Taiwan. Fearing to miss its last chance to oppose China in Taiwan, the US intensifies the CIA and Special Forces' activities around the island. President Xi uses this meddling as a pretext for military intervention. Limited military defeat forces the US to withdraw, but only after humiliating negotiations in which it agrees to end any form of military presence in Asia beyond the territory of Japan. The Taiwan crisis ends any ambiguity in Sino-American relations. The US administration now openly likens the tensions with China to the cold war, proclaims increases in the defence budget, and tariff barriers vis-à-vis China, while seeking new military alliances on

the African continent to oppose Chinese incursions there. With Asia sliding deeper into Beijing's grasp, the Sino-American conflict shifts to Europe.

China's unlikely European ally

The EU is in no condition for a unified response to the Taiwan crisis, as Euroscepticism flares up in Germany. Although traditionally staunchly pro-European, mounting financial obligations gradually soured the mood of German taxpayers, translating onto the political stage. They were occasioned by a French-German agreement in the wake of Brexit. French president Emanuel Macron had long pushed for 'renewing Europe', and Germany, the 'reluctant hegemon' could not resist French calls forever, especially in the context of growing disillusion with the EU across the Continent. So it was decided to increase the EU budget, introduce a common eurozone budget, and a common deposit insurance scheme for the banking union. For some conservative circles in Germany, this heralded the eurozone's transformation into a true fiscal union—with Germany becoming its biggest contributor. German angst over a transfer union thus materialises, provoking harsh dissent from significant parts of the populace, who felt that their tax contributions would unduly benefit people elsewhere. Fears of moral hazard, still fresh from the sovereign debt crisis of the 2010s, flared up again and were readily exploited by Eurosceptics.

Moreover, the single market becomes gradually less important for German exports, which have continuously shifted towards the US and especially China since the 2010s. As growth continues to slump in the EU but accelerates in South-East Asia, German industry see its own future in a 'pivot towards Asia'. This is motivated not least by massive Chinese foreign direct investments in the German *Mittelstand* (SMEs), which become an important driver for economic growth and high-tech development.

This pivot of the all-important German export sector silences a powerful pro-European voice in Germany, as calls for a 'Global Germany' become louder in

conservative circles. The campaigns for the 2025 federal elections make European integration an issue of hitherto unseen contestation. The right-wing AfD, as well as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) which has undergone a 'conservative revolution', champion the idea of 'rethinking' Europe, implying that national governments have to reclaim leadership over the integration process. Pointing to the failure to advance key political dossiers, particularly in migration, they lament the ineffectiveness of the European Union as it is. The surging Green Party offers a passionate plea for a progressive and supranationalised EU. Change is thus imminent, regardless of who wins the election. In the end, the 2025 federal elections witness a slim victory for conservative forces, as the future coalition of the CDU and AfD claims a narrow electoral majority.

The coalition agreement between the CDU and the AfD stipulates fundamentally reforming the eurozone and intensifying technological co-operation and trade with China. While other European countries openly express their fears of China's dominance, Germany points to signs of gradual liberalisation in China as encouraging: the abolition of the death penalty, the decrease in tampering with its currency, and efforts to increase gender equality. Believing in the power of trade for societal change, Germany successfully prevents any united EU action to restrict trade relations.

The German ambition to reform the eurozone is also motivated by fears of being called upon—once again—to bail out southern European member states suffering from excessive sovereign debt, particularly Italy. In order to prevent the need for future bailouts, so the argument goes, a mechanism to manage the debt of financially distressed member states is needed. However, negotiations break down over the question of how to finance such an instrument, as the newly established European Monetary Fund simply lacks the necessary resources. When market sentiments towards Italy worsen in 2026—provoked by the government's announcement to introduce a new and generous welfare package—the Union is

again caught unprepared. Italy is deemed 'too big to fail', and the subsequent spread of contagion to other debt-ridden member states makes the situation utterly uncontrollable. All eyes turn to Germany.

After long negotiations at an emergency European summit the German Chancellor in an attempt to keep his fragile coalition government together declares the hitherto unthinkable: "the German taxpayer is unwilling to step in again". Instead, the Chancellor argues, the EU must return to the European Exchange Rate Mechanism to provide a modicum of stability for intra-European trade, and allow member states to better manage their debt. This spells the end for the common currency. After two years of preparation, Germany reinstates the Deutsche Mark. Fearing instant appreciation, the Bundesbank declares it would peg the Mark against the Renminbi, further encouraging Sino-German trade. Indeed, this decision by the Bundesbank proves to be decisive, as German business flourishes under the intensive economic and technological exchange with China. The rest of the eurozone, on the other hand, is thrust into the turbulence of global financial markets and struggles to fend off speculative attacks on individual member states' currencies—recession and unemployment ensue swiftly.

The US responds

These developments are followed carefully in the US. After having lost its foothold in Asia, it is now worried about this new Sino-German intimacy. It turns to its traditional allies in the UK, France, and CEE with renewed interest. A strong EU might have prevented such bilateral overtures, but the splintering of the eurozone has left the European Council ineffective and the European Commission a paper tiger. Warnings and infringement procedures have little prospect of success.

Soon, France and Central Eastern Europe conclude wide-ranging exchange agreements on dual-use technology with the US, and the first US military base in Poland is inaugurated in 2029. Already set back by suspicions over extensive technology exchange

between China and Germany, ambitions for an independent European security umbrella are now buried. The disintegrative dynamic is interrupted shortly by the re-accession of the UK, which after years of unsuccessful attempts to establish itself as a standalone power, rejoins the now less integrated EU.

However, socio-economic and concomitant political divergence continue to ripple through the EU, as technological exchange with the US proves to be less fruitful than that between China and Germany. China has become the standard-setter for Eurasia by the late 2020s, leading to substantial compatibility issues with US technology. Living standards in the rest of the EU thus remain lower than before the eurozone's splintering. While CEE initially declares its faith in co-operation with the US, the German success soon piques interest in closer relations with China. This reorientation eventually brings about the end of the European ambition for an 'ever-closer Union' and of being a global actor. Instead, the European Union finds itself in the midst of falling apart completely.

Implications for European security

The developments described above have severe implications for Europe's security. Soft security is hampered not only by the inability to conduct international relations with a unified voice but also by the dissolution of the Euro—previously an increasingly used reserve currency. Hard security is most affected by the new European allegiances to the great powers, and the subsequent end to the Union's ambitions to be a unified global security actor featuring its own security capabilities. This translates not only into the inability of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs to speak for a united Europe, but also puts member states themselves at odds over questions of European security. Moreover, disagreement spills into NATO, as Berlin's intimacy with Washington's strategic rival paralyses strategic adjustment efforts. Lastly, budgetary constraints due to the economic recession caused by the eurozone collapse also affect defence budgets.

Policy recommendations

The scenario depicts the EU as vulnerable to the actions of China and the US, and is predicated upon technological inferiority and macroeconomic instability. In the absence of strong economic performance built on technological progress, political divisions deepen, depriving the EU of its agency. The following policy recommendations can assist in the prevention of this scenario.

1. Close the technological gap with the superpowers

In order to avoid dependence on foreign interests, the EU must rely on its own strength. With a view to 2030, this will depend increasingly on the establishment of strong and innovative technological development, allowing the EU's technological autonomy to rise with it thereby becoming a global standard-setter. To this end, the EU should significantly increase its investments in R&D. This requires more allocation for R&D, both in member states' national budgets as well as in the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework, which is much less prone to duplicate spending. Additionally, European anti-trust law should be revisited with a view to facilitating mergers of European companies operating in strategically important sectors, such as renewable energies. This would allow the blossoming of 'European champions' endowed with the resources to compete with their American and Chinese counterparts.

2. Devise a comprehensive and coherent policy towards China

The rise of China seems to be a key trend of the 21st century. So far, its integration into the liberal world order has yielded mixed results. Its engagement with the EU and its member states has equally been subject to praise and criticism. What is evident is that a unified policy towards China has been absent so far. As Chinese influence in global affairs increases, the need to engage with it with a single voice will

only increase. In order to engage with China on an equal footing, and effectively oppose those activities harmful to the EU—from corporate espionage to human rights violations—it must devise and agree on principles of engagement. In March 2019 HR/VP Mogherini proposed just such principles that build on stronger co-operation on the multilateral agenda—e.g. reform of the WTO and the fight against climate change, as well as protecting European interests and values more ardently. These guidelines should be taken seriously in European capitals. To this end, unified decision-making in the realm of foreign affairs, which often has a silencing effect on European foreign policy, should be abandoned. Furthermore, *ex ante* impact assessments on foreign direct investment in high-tech companies should be introduced, subject to supranational jurisdiction. This could ensure Europe's technological edge (subject to Recommendation 1) and secure strategic independence of sectors pertinent to European security, such as in dual-use technologies.

3. Stabilise the eurozone without permanent major transfers

The EU must find ways to stabilise the eurozone without the instalment of significant permanent transfer mechanisms in order to prevent another crisis or the alienation of net contributors. Rather, transfer mechanisms should be oriented towards performance in relation to long-term growth projections, thus directing funds towards those member states underperforming on their growth trend, and ensuring every member state (irrespective of its contribution balance) can benefit from transfer schemes. Such arrangements would alleviate German anxieties about becoming the eurozone's paymaster. Ambitious proposals such as a common investment budget or a European unemployment (re-)insurance scheme are already being discussed in the policy world, and they should be implemented as soon as possible. ■

The opinions expressed in this scenario are entirely those of the author and do not represent the positions of the Dahrendorf Forum or its hosts Hertie School and London School of Economics or its funder Stiftung Mercator.

MENA Spring 3.0

THE PERSISTENT 'TRIPLE CRISIS' IN EUROPE'S NEIGHBOURHOOD

By Anja Palm and Ali Fathollah-Nejad

The world in 2030

In 2030 the 'long-term revolutionary process' in the Arab world (Gilbert Achcar)—which started with the 2010–11 uprisings, and relapsed into a phase dominated by counter-revolutionary forces before experiencing another revolutionary phase with the 2019 anti-regime demonstrations in Algeria and Sudan ('Arab Spring 2.0')—not only experiences another peak but now encompasses another major country, namely Iran. The media dubs it the 'Middle Eastern Spring 3.0', reminding Europeans that their neighbours have not ceased to struggle for the same values, yet bringing with it an arc surrounding the old Continent marked by ongoing instability and turmoil. Political exclusion and socio-economic hardship were now coupled with a widening ecological crisis affecting the livelihood of hundreds of thousands all across the region.

The political responsibilities and the securitisation behind the environmental degradation has not only driven protest but has also made governments reluctant to seek international support to deal with the crisis. Meanwhile, MENA remains the world's playground for the clashing security interests of major international actors and the most militarised region on the globe, with record arms purchases per capita and the accelerating establishment of military bases by a number of non-regional Western and non-Western great powers. Against this backdrop, the international system is fragmented: while multilateralism and international co-operation are still in crisis, there is also growing awareness by key international actors of the need to revive them, given the transnational character and sheer dimension of the conflicts at hand. Within this international environment, the EU has taken centre stage as a global co-ordinator of multilateral initiatives among world powers.

DRIVERS

- Political authoritarianism
- Socio-economic malaise
- Environmental degradation

Unfolding of developments

A long looming crisis

Throughout the 2020s the region's rulers have been unable or unwilling to address their respective countries' deep-rooted crises—be they political, socio-economic, or ecological. Politically, the regimes maintain an iron fist to grip their populations—with ongoing repression, human rights violations, and authoritarian rule excluding the vast majority. Economically, the situation, even in hydrocarbon-rich countries, remains very tense, with state budgets strained and even on the brink of collapse. The regimes only survive due to the financial aid provided by Western and increasingly non-Western actors, which in turn expand their military presence on the ground. Socio-economic indicators deteriorate, unemployment rates, above all among women and youth (among the latter now reaching almost 40 percent in many key countries), and precarious working conditions rise in the face of heightening demographic pressure.

Against this backdrop, the regimes fail to offer an overdue 'new social contract' allowing for more political and economic participation to their increasingly disenfranchised citizens. Corruption, social inequality, and lack of democratic polities—the highest among all world regions—provide a mix for breeding discontent and eventually revolts. Over the latter half of the 2020s, tens of millions of people in Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran take to the streets to voice their anger and frustration with autocratic polities and widespread corruption, calling for the downfall of their regimes. The slogans echo those chanted during the 2010–11 Arab Spring, the 2017–18 Iranian Uprising, and the 2019 'Arab Spring 2.0'—'bread, freedom, and social justice'.

This time around, a new generation of young revolutionary activists from almost all MENA countries is successful in addressing one of the key shortcomings of national social movements, namely their ability to co-ordinate and collaborate

region-wide. To create such trans-border solidarity, they form a transnational council to exchange ideas and experiences aimed towards advancing popular demands, and to appeal to international bodies with a single voice. The Council for Middle East Future, mostly organised online, also establishes a board featuring international celebrities, from politics to popular culture, thus making it hard for global media and policymakers to ignore their statements and calls. They also announce region-wide days of protest, an effective means to attract international attention.

Environmental degradation accelerating the cataclysm

The Middle East Spring 3.0 includes a new dimension of regional crisis that radically reshapes many parts of the region over the 2020s, namely a drastic degradation of entire ecosystems. For instance, half of Iran's provinces have become uninhabitable, causing a massive migration into major cities. This development, with its ongoing politicised protests by farmers over the 2020s, nurtures the Grand Iranian Revolt between 2025 and 2028, fuelled by the sustained triad of mutually reinforcing political, socio-economic, and ecological crises. The post-Khamenei politico-military regime can only respond with harsh repression, indirectly supported by China and Russia. Calls from the Council on Middle East Future to condemn state repression are echoed by liberal-democratic sections of the EU and US establishments, which turn out to be effective in helping to avoid a bloodbath.

Despite heavy repression, the Grand Iranian Revolt perseveres as it succeeds in combining the social classes driving the 2009 Green Movement (the middle class) and the 2010–11 Iranian Uprising (the lower classes), turning it into a genuine threat to the regime. After the long-expected demise of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2023, Iran comes to be ruled by a leadership council dominated by figures associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. In a move intended to absorb popular anger, the latter adopts a more nationalist and a much less religious

tone, while allowing for less restrictive social norms. Meanwhile, an increasing number of Iranians leave the country, either as part of a brain drain or as refugees, mostly to Europe.

In parallel, unprecedented climatic challenges, above all water shortages and desertification, put the region under stress, causing massive numbers of internally displaced people. For instance, Egypt, the region's most populous country, witnesses an acceleration in migration from rural areas to urban centres leading to a demographic explosion in Cairo and Alexandria, and dramatic under-supply in basic services. Exacerbated socio-economic conditions accompanied by repression at a higher level than experienced in the Hosni Mubarak era, including a complete shutdown of social media in 2028, result in a series of large-scale protests in 2028–29. To reverse this situation, which pushes Egypt to the brink, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) announces early elections slated for 2030, this time including a more pluralistic pool of political figures, including some liberals and parts of the Muslim Brotherhood tolerated by the state. The role of the EU and US is fundamental in ensuring a military-led transition to a more open system.

Notwithstanding Egypt's political transition, the Maghreb remains in a fragile situation: the war raging in Libya since 2019 has become a playground for great-power competition in the broader region, contributing to regional instability. Maghreb countries are put under further pressure by migration from sub-Saharan Africa northwards, due to climatic challenges coupled with demographic growth, ongoing instability, and the economic collapse of numerous African countries which have to hand over state assets to China to compensate for debt insolvency. The EU's relations with African countries have deteriorated substantially since the Union's insistence on enhanced border controls and the stopping of migratory flows.

The EU and the Middle East in an Asian-centred international system

By 2030 the EU finds itself in a difficult position, with increasing migratory and security challenges arising from its neighbourhood. Despite the international system's centre of gravity now lying in the Pacific, with the US acting and competing within a multipolar order in Asia, the EU still has leverage in assembling international support for ad hoc initiatives dealing with Middle East crises—after all, the wider Persian Gulf region remains vital for Asian energy security. Although overshadowed by a host of other regional developments, the Middle East still grapples with its longest-standing modern conflict: while a two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine question remains elusive, no formula for a one-state solution that satisfies both sides has been found.

The EU itself has opted for a two-speed solution to its own problems, envisaging a core of liberal and pro-European countries, and a large group of countries whose right-wing nationalist governments engage merely on a functional basis. But a renewed momentum is created for the EU when, 10 years after the 2019 no-deal Brexit which has resulted in an economic recession and public backlash, a new referendum in the UK overwhelmingly expresses support for the 're-join' option. The return of the UK elevates the EU's international standing in changing and volatile international environments.

Implications for European security

The MENA region remains a political hotbed for the foreseeable future, posing direct and indirect security threats. These are connected to the severity of the crises affecting it, the enduring collapse of regional order highlighting the role of great-power interference and competition as well as that of non-state actors, and concomitantly irregular migration, which all pose formidable challenges for European security. Socio-economic and political instability also facilitate radicalisation, enabling the emergence of

new and hostile non-state actors, and increasing the danger of asymmetric warfare, including that of terrorist attacks on European soil.

The following policy recommendations can help prevent this scenario, marked by constant crisis and turmoil, from materialising:

Policy recommendations

1. Take a comprehensive approach to MENA's interrelated crises

Conceptually, MENA's political, socio-economic, and ecological trajectory must be comprehended as being intertwined with that of Europe. Towards that end, a long overdue *Conference for Security and Co-operation in the Middle East*, involving local, regional, and global players, must be launched by the EU, with financial support from Asian powers; such a conference should systematically address the host of cross-border 'soft' and 'hard' issues involving both state and civil-society actors, as well as the need to scale down the militarisation of the region by external actors.

To help alleviate MENA's world-record youth unemployment, the EU should invest in job creation by facilitating bilateral EU–MENA SME co-operation and assisting MENA states to set the stage for inclusive economic growth, and by extension a new social contract. Another top priority should be taking serious action to confront the detrimental effects ecological degradation is already having and will continue to have in the future, by strengthening local communities' role in water, waste, and resource management.

2. End the 'authoritarian stability' paradigm, making support for a free and diverse society the main pillar of engagement

Politically, the persistence of authoritarian rule must be understood as a salient source for future instability, creating conditions for popular revolts if not in the short then certainly the medium or longer terms. Thus, the 'authoritarian stability' paradigm driving the EU's neighbourhood policies for decades and outliving the 'Arab Spring' must be replaced with one that more clearly advocates and supports free and pluralistic societies. In this paradigm shift, state–society relations in MENA would constitute the main pillar of the EU's sustainable security approach that goes beyond myopic support for authoritarianism with the aim of preserving merely short-term stability.

3. Abandon unanimity requirement in favour of functional coalitions in CFSP and build international alliances

Operationally, in the EU, the unrealistic search for unanimity has to be abandoned in favour of functional coalitions on the basis of thematic and geographic priorities. The aim must be complementarity instead of full-fledged engagement of all EU member-states in all dossiers. Long-term preventive action to address the underlying drivers of crisis, rooted in political exclusion, socio-economic malaise, and ecological degradation, has to be put at the top of the foreign-policy agenda. Alliances with like-minded actors must be struck to move from the current fragmented and interest-based engagement of external players in the region towards a common agreement on the steps forward to strengthen local resilience and ownership. ■

CONCLUSIONS

By Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed

The broad approach to security used in the development of the scenarios complements that of the European Union's Global Strategy (EUGS) that was discussed in the introduction to this collection. The EUGS called for the application of a "comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises through a coherent use of all policies at the EU's disposal" (EEAS, 2016, p. 10). By applying the STEMPLE+ framework, the presented scenarios took into account economic (*Still Liberal After All These Years, Disruption made in China*), technological (*Cyber-Insecurity, The Hour of Europe*), and environmental (*Nothing Learnt, MENA Spring 3.0*) factors and drivers.

This concluding chapter first presents common patterns across the scenarios, compares them to the EUGS and current debates on the EU's security and defence more broadly, and points to security aspects that have not been taken up in the EUGS process. Next, the chapter addresses the question of Black Elephants and Black Swans. Lastly, it reviews the policy recommendations put forward in the five¹ scenarios and reflects on their implications. In light of the new institutional opening in Brussels—the European Parliament has just been constituted, and the new European Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen will start its work in November 2019—policy recommendations seem to come at the right moment.

Scenarios—takeaways in light of current security debates

Table 1 (next page) summarises the five scenarios and key drivers. It allows for contrasting the scenarios and identifying their common patterns.

We can identify four common patterns that appear in almost every scenario, albeit not always as drivers: migration to Europe from the MENA region and Africa; a trend towards illiberalism within the EU; a rising power projection of China; and an inward-looking US. These trends will present the Union with new challenges and opportunities, making global strategic realignment necessary—it should, at the very least, be a topic of public debate.

Migration has dominated the European agenda since 2014 (e.g. European Council, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018), but sustainable solutions have remained elusive. The political fallout of the EU's inability to resolve the issue has already been evident and much discussed. The EUGS called for the need to develop an "effective migration policy" by supporting transit countries to improve reception and asylum capabilities, by stemming irregular flows, etc. (EEAS, 2016, pp. 28-29). And as we presented in the introduction, European leaders cut highly controversial deals with countries such as Turkey and Libya to limit the number of people crossing Europe's borders.

Yet the Union still seems ill-prepared should these deals be broken and the influx of irregular migrants rise again. And this, the scenarios *Nothing Learnt* and *Disruption made in China* tell us, could happen. They assume that the MENA region will remain a source of political instability and sectarian strife, and a variety of causes, from environmental degradation to civil war, could trigger renewed migration towards Europe. The security implications of continued instability in the MENA region and concomitant migration flows to Europe are manifold. Instability breeds radicalisation, encouraging terrorist acts. Irregular migrants are often victims of human traffickers and used to finance organised crime.

Lastly, as the crisis of 2015–16 has shown, the inability to manage migration can have severe political repercussions and promote political instability. The Implementation Plan on Security and Defence acknowledges the security dimension of migration, situating it at the ‘internal-external nexus’ (Council of the European Union, 2016) and calling for capacity-building to manage irregular migration. Indeed, all three strategic priorities identified in the document² are applicable to migration.

The turn towards illiberalism within the EU is viewed as likely to persist: in none of the scenarios do liberal forces recapture the majority in those countries in the CEE currently under fire for illiberal turns. On the contrary, four of the five scenarios depict the illiberal turn as a catalyst for further disintegrative tendencies, going as far as rupturing Schengen or even breaking apart the EU itself. An existential crisis is thus, according to the scenarios, still very much in the realm of possibilities. Successful pushbacks by European liberals are envisioned in *The Hour of Europe*, and to a lesser extent in *Still Liberal After All These Years* and *Cyber-Insecurity*.

The EUGS spoke about safeguarding the quality of our democracies (EEAS, 2016, p. 15) and put forward the notion of resilience perceived as living up to liberal values and the rule of law, as discussed in *Still Liberal After All These Years*. It also recognised that the resilience of democracies determines the Union’s external credibility and influence (ibid., p. 8). And yet the EU’s capabilities to counter the internal illiberal trend remain fairly limited (Schlipphak & Treib, 2017; Verhofstadt, 2018). The recent idea to make cohesion funds conditional upon abiding by the rule

Table 1. Scenarios on European Security 2030

Scenario	Key drivers						
	<i>Technological progress in the EU</i>	<i>Challenges to liberal values across the EU</i>	<i>US role in European security</i>	<i>Migration from the MENA region</i>	<i>China's global power projection</i>	<i>Euro: resilience of the eurozone</i>	<i>Trade: fluctuation and direction of global trade</i>
<i>The Hour of Europe</i>	X	X	X				
<i>Cyber-Insecurity</i>	X	X	X		X		
<i>Nothing Learnt</i>		X		X			
<i>Still Liberal After All These Years</i>		X	X				X
<i>Disruptions made in China</i>					X	X	X

of law could be a step in the right direction,³ yet its implementation is still uncertain as some member states are against this idea (Gotev, 2018; Zalan, 2018).

The link between the commitment to liberal values, such as the rule of law, and security, is of an indirect nature and relates primarily to the EU's approach to international co-operation. The strengthening of liberal values lies at the heart of the EU's conduct of foreign policy. Losing the consensus about the necessity of media freedom and the rule of law at home hurts credibility abroad, thereby diminishing the EU's soft power capabilities. Moreover, such diverging positions can make finding agreement in the Foreign Affairs Council more difficult, for example in questions of preconditions for international partnerships. This would come at the detriment of the EU's capacity to act.

As to the continuation of the US retreat from global and particularly European affairs (Tisdall, 2019), the scenarios foreshadow this trend to last and affect post-Trump administrations; *The Hour of Europe*, *Cyber-Insecurity*, and *Still Liberal After All These Years* identify this as a key driver of European security in 2030. This points to the necessity to rethink the EU's engagement with the US, especially the quest for technological parity and strategic autonomy. Strategic autonomy, understood as the capability of the EU to act on its own if necessary (Biscop, 2016), has recently become a fashionable term, since "more than ever, today, Europe needs to take greater responsibility for its own security" (EEAS, 2018, p. 6).

The efforts to emancipate itself militarily from the US have driven recent progress in European defence co-operation. But the road is rocky and EU military power projection capabilities are still a long way off, as current NATO spending figures demonstrate (NATO, 2017). The security implications of the US being no longer willing to act as provider for European security would thus be significant, as the EU would lose not only most of the military assets it can access today but also the bulk of its nuclear deterrent. The possible decay of NATO due to the continuation of a

US retreat from European affairs has been picked up by *The Hour of Europe*, but it has not been discussed extensively by the scenario authors. Their choice was to focus on the European Union's answers to the weakening of NATO.

China's rise is similarly pervasive across the scenarios—except in *The Hour of Europe*—as the US retreat. Relations with China present a complex challenge for the EU, as Beijing maintains a balance of competition and co-operation (Mogherini, 2019a). China nurtures both the promise of prosperity through trade with the world's biggest market, and fears of nefarious policy goals underpinning its investments—as experienced in parts of Africa and South-East Asia.

Two scenarios identified China's global power projection as key driver. According to the authors of these scenarios, Sino-European relations in trade and technological exchange will continue to become economically indispensable. Yet whether this influence on the EU is positive or negative is judged very differently. Whereas *Still Liberal After All These Years* views Sino-European co-operation as the engine for economic growth and socio-economic liberalism, *Disruption made in China* describes its influence as breaking European cohesion, as Germany moves towards closer trade with China while the rest of the EU moves towards the US.

Three scenarios, *Disruption made in China*, *Cyber-Insecurity*, and *Still Liberal After All These Years*, suggest that China will become ever-more important for technological progress and prosperity, and thus the socio-economic well-being of the Union, either as a negative or positive factor. The technological race will determine the efficacy of hard military capabilities, while prosperity is necessary for internal stability and cohesion, affecting security more indirectly. The key driver—China's global power projection—has proven to be so persistent during the Dahrendorf Foresight Project that we decided to contemplate the implications of a Sino-European Trade Agreement, the signing of which we consider a Black Swan event (see below).

The wider security implications associated with a rising China relate, on one hand, to the build-up of its military capabilities, and, on the other hand (and more concretely), to technological exchange and leadership. This has been acknowledged by High Representative Mogherini, who stated in her Strategic Outlook of 2019 that “China’s increasing military capabilities coupled with its comprehensive vision and ambition to have the technologically most advanced armed forces by 2050 present security issues for the EU, already in a short to mid-term perspective. Cross-sectoral hybrid threats including information operations, and large military exercises not only undermine trust, but also challenge the EU’s security and must be addressed in the context of our mutual relationship” (Mogherini, 2019a).

Technological progress in itself has a security dimension, as elaborated in the introduction. Two scenarios identified it as a key driver. In *The Hour of Europe*, European competitiveness in technological industries enables a prosperity boost instrumental to the blossoming of a European identity. In *Cyber-Insecurity*, on the other hand, a further falling behind the US and China in the technological race opens the EU to cyber-crime, socio-economic, and political devastation. These scenarios thus draw the conclusion that technological progress is vital for European security in 2030, affecting societal cohesion and resilience as much as defensive capabilities against 21st-century warfare. Furthermore, the EU has acknowledged that innovation and technological progress are essential for the adequacy of its defensive capabilities (Council of the European Union, 2016). Yet the EU seems to be ill-prepared, as national and European budgets for R&D remain below those of its main competitors, as do private venture capital investments. Indeed, we consider the EU claiming technological leadership by 2030 so unlikely that we modelled a Black Swan around it (see below).

Black Elephants and Black Swans

Now that the common patterns have been discussed, let us focus on the Black Elephants which the scenarios identified. The first problem that is actually visible to everyone but no one wants to deal with is the growing technological gap between Europe and the US and China, and the necessity for Europe to recapture the technological agenda. Starting from the shared (and undeniable, see below) assumption of Europe lagging behind the US and China in technological development, the scenarios sketched very divergent paths forward. In *Cyber-Insecurity*, the EU fails to close the technological gap with the US and China, and is economically devastated by an algorithm-induced stock market crash. *The Hour of Europe*, on the other hand, suggests that technological breakthroughs power European innovation, and ultimately contribute to the establishment of a European identity and cohesion.

Today, Europe has been left far behind, a situation caused by insufficient investment in R&D. According to the OECD, in 2017 \$464 billion were invested in R&D in the US (2.79 percent of GDP), while \$410 billion were invested in China (2.37 percent of GDP). In the EU, on the other hand, it amounted to ‘only’ \$350 billion (1.93 percent of GDP) (OECD, 2019). It is hard to imagine the EU catching up technologically without significantly increasing the resources it makes available for R&D. At least the problem seems to be partly recognised by European leaders.

As mentioned in the introductory remarks, the European Commission decided in 2017 to launch the European Defence Fund and spend the joint EU budget for direct security expenditures (Council of the European Union, 2016). From 2020 onwards, the Commission will spend €500 million a year on defence research, which would make the EU the fourth biggest funder of defence research in Europe, after the UK, France, and Germany. To test

the waters, the Commission plans to spend a total of €90 million between 2017 and 2020 to finance collaborative research projects and to co-fund capability development; €25 million was allocated for this purpose in 2017 (Besch, 2017). It is a first step in the right direction, yet there is much more to be done in Europe in order to recapture the technological agenda.⁴

Another Black Elephant seems to be the reconfiguration of the European Union towards more flexible forms of integration. The question of variable geometry is discussed very differently in *Nothing Learnt* and *The Hour of Europe*. In the former, the exit of some CEE member states considerably weakens the Union's security, whereas the latter views it as the catalyst for strengthening integrative measures. Multi-speed Europe is already a reality, as only some members participate in the eurozone and the Schengen Area. Yet the concept of a multi-speed process implies that all member states will eventually achieve the same level of integration, which seems not to be the case anymore.

Moreover, the institutional reshuffling envisioned in the scenarios happens along the lines of fundamental values. This contrasts the sometimes technical criteria along which circles of integration or 'clubs' are suggested elsewhere (e.g. Demertzis et al., 2018). The scenarios suggest that the EU might profit from a more flexible form of integration. Variable geometry is suggested as a way to avoid further disintegration. More flexible forms of co-operation would, for example, make it possible for a post-Brexit UK to participate in a common foreign and security policy. This would be of great benefit to the Union due to the unique assets at the UK's disposal that cannot be replaced with the assets of the EU27 (Martill and Sus, 2018).

As mentioned in the introduction, an important task of strategic foresight is to think the unthinkable and to model events with a low probability but a high impact once they occur. Black Swans were not developed during the foresight workshop, as the

development of consistent and convincing narratives for the alternative futures the participants put forward took precedent. However, revisiting the scenarios allows us to extrapolate two possible Black Swans by escalating trends of drivers that have been modelled during the scenario process. One potential Black Swan is an EU-wide cyber-attack on critical infrastructure causing massive power outages and communication systems breakdown (such attacks—albeit on a smaller scale—have already happened, as for example the WannaCry, NotPetya, and Bad Rabbit attacks in 2017 (Europol, 2018)). However, the scale and complexity of a co-ordinated, EU-wide attack and its limited strategic value make such an event highly unlikely. Energy providers' and grids' IT-infrastructure differs from company to company, and critical infrastructure is usually not connected to the Internet. These factors make accessing critical infrastructure extremely complicated. Modern energy systems can also compensate for failures of individual energy sources and sections of grids, rendering targeted attacks ineffective. Important infrastructure, such as hospitals and government ministries, have back-up generators to respond to power outages. Dealing with large-scale cyber-attacks is also time- and labour-intensive and costly. These sorts of attacks also require IT expertise that currently only very few actors, such as the US or Israel, have. After gaining access, attackers still need to overcome defensive capabilities provided by IT and cyber-security experts. In the EU, the protection of critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks formed part of the Cybersecurity Act that was adopted by the European Parliament in March 2019 (European Parliament, 2019a), and even constitutes a component of the strategic outlook towards China (Mogherini, 2019a). Moreover, the protection of critical infrastructure and its future is already an established sub-field of cyber-security studies (Tabansky, 2011; Martin, 2013; Wilner, 2017; e.g. Gluschke & Çaşın, 2018). Therefore, we decided to shed light on two other Black Swans that can be developed once one amplifies trends put forward in the scenarios.

Another potential Black Swan is a devastating environmental catastrophe in Europe, which is not much talked about as a security threat. Yet in 2017, 200 people died from natural disasters in Europe (European Commission, 2017), almost three times as many as from terrorist attacks (Europol, 2018). Climate change is only increasing the likelihood of devastating natural disasters. Since the late 1990s the number of recorded natural disasters has markedly increased. 1999 was the first year ever recorded in which the total number of natural disasters exceeded 300. Since then, this mark has only been missed twice—in 2017 and 2018 (Ritchie & Roser, 2019). Natural disasters have wide-ranging consequences for the security of human beings: they can in themselves be deadly, displacing people by making their homes uninhabitable. They can damage and destroy critical infrastructure, such as energy and water grids, hospitals, and communication systems. Since 2010 the global costs of dealing with natural disasters have exceeded \$1.35 trillion worldwide (Ritchie & Roser, 2019). Although the EU has been significantly less affected than other regions of the world, such as South-East Asia, in 2016 alone it still cost EU member states close to €10 billion (European Environment Agency, 2019). This damage can have deadly consequences, hampering the state's capacities to respond as well as deliver basic public services.

However, we decided against envisioning a Black Swan event related to climate change-induced, European-wide natural disasters. Despite the EU having currently limited capacity to deal with it, the issue is actually high on the contemporary political agenda. A reform of the rescEU mechanism, foreseeing significantly increased resources, is currently pending approval by the Council, and the proposal for the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) foresees a budget hike of 169 percent compared to the virtual EU27 MFF for 2014–20 (Parry & Sapala, 2018). When and where a natural disaster hits cannot be reasonably foreseen, but

preparedness is a policy issue. The ongoing efforts by the EU to enhance preparedness reduce the utility of drawing attention to this potential risk, which is why we focus on other potential Black Swans instead.

Finally, yet another Black Swan could be the US withdrawal from NATO. Both the re-orientation of the US to being a more inward-looking power, and the growing American pressure on Europe to stop exploiting the US security umbrella and to start spending more money on defence, have already been discussed in three scenarios: *The Hour of Europe*, *Cyber-Insecurity*, and *Still Liberal After All These Years*. If one overdraws the inward-looking US trend, the question of the potential US withdrawal from NATO comes into the picture. Many times over the last three years, President Trump has talked about his willingness to exit the alliance (Stracqualursi & Acosta, 2019). His main argument was the EU's free-riding on American defence capabilities—the US still provides roughly two-thirds of all NATO expenditure (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2019).

President Trump's scepticism towards multilateral security co-operation is well documented: the unexpected announcements of the US withdrawal from the Iran deal, from the INF Treaty, and from the Paris climate agreement offer illustrative examples. They took Europeans by surprise and led to the questioning of the US commitment to the transatlantic relationship.

At the same time, the vast majority of the American political class, both Republicans and Democrats, strongly support NATO membership (Tama et al., 2019), which makes the American withdrawal from the alliance very improbable. But should it happen, it would have profound consequences for European security. By definition, this makes the US withdrawal from NATO a perfect Black Swan. Yet we decided not to fully develop this Black Swan, since there is already an ongoing debate about it among journalists and experts (e.g. Harding, 2019; Soesanto, 2016; *The Economist*, 2019). Also, the awareness of the

Europeans about the necessity to spend more on defence has been increasing, as the growing defence budgets and the new instruments in EU security and defence (both discussed earlier) show. Thus, we decided to focus on other potential Black Swans that are less present in the public debate: European leadership in technological progress and a potential Sino-European Trade Agreement.

European leadership in technological progress

The question of European technological progress was identified as one of the key drivers and picked up in the scenarios *The Hour of Europe* and *Cyber-Insecurity*, where opposing variations were discussed. The need to close the technological gap vis-à-vis the US and China was further identified as a Black Elephant—a problem that everyone sees but nobody is willing to confront. This was evidenced by the relative lack of European R&D funding, which exacerbates the already existing deficits. The effect of the lack of funds is worsened by low levels of venture capital investments—€6.5 billion in the EU as compared to €39.4 billion in the US in 2016 (European Commission, 2018b).

As a result, few European start-ups are as successful as their Asian or US counterparts. Currently, Europe is home to only 11.5 percent of ‘unicorns’—start-ups reaching \$1 billion in valuation (Trajkovska, 2019). The

market will likely shrink significantly after Brexit, as about a quarter of all EU venture capital is invested in the UK (Signore, 2016).

Compounding the issue of market size is the problem of market fragmentation, which contributes to an inefficient allocation of resources. About 90 percent of venture capital is invested in just eight member states (European Commission, 2018b), and domestic investments are still more than twice as high as cross-border investments (Mueller et al., 2019).

Furthermore, the EU lacks a dedicated agency to make new technologies fit for defensive purposes, something comparable to the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which has contributed significantly to technological advancement in both civilian and military industries. Recent calls for the establishment of such an agency by the French president Emmanuel Macron have been rejected by the Commission (Tefer, 2018). This puts the EU at a further disadvantage vis-à-vis its global competitors. Taken together, these factors make it highly unlikely that the EU will become a global technological leader.

Nonetheless, it is not impossible. Technological progress is non-linear, at times even disruptive. Many future technologies, from quantum computing to AI, are awaiting breakthroughs, which could catalyse further progress. The EU has a highly skilled labour force, with some member states ranking among the world’s most digitally advanced societies (European Commission, 2018a) despite a widespread shortage of ICT professionals (CEDEFOP, 2016).

In order to capture the technological agenda, the EU would need to facilitate private venture capital investment by expanding co-financing activity, simplifying regulations for cross-border investments, and completing the digital single market. Moreover, it would need to scale up its own funding facilities and continue to invest in the digital skills of the labour force. Achieving technological leadership would not only safeguard and further European prosperity—it would also contribute positively to cyber-security. Technological advancements are also essential to ensure the adequacy of conventional defensive capabilities.

A Sino-European Trade Agreement

A second Black Swan could be modelled by building on the Sino-European Trade Agreement (SETA) that was developed in the scenario *Still Liberal After All These Years*. It constitutes one possible manifestation of the extreme development of three key drivers

identified by the project: the rise of China, a shift in the direction of global trade towards it, and a diminished role of the US in European security. Given these developments, a SETA could become a reality, and its security implications would have to be considered and acted upon.

A SETA seems today to be a long way off, as trade with China presents the Union with both great promise and great challenges. China is already the EU's second most important trading partner (Mogherini, 2019a). Should its economic ascent and US protectionism continue, China would be poised to become an even more important trading partner for Europe. However, arriving at a trade agreement presupposed a shift of the current cost-benefit analysis for both actors and subsequent policy shifts on a paradigmatic scale.

On the Chinese side, this includes trade and economic policy. One key criticism against China is that its economic policy prevents competition on a level playing field (Mogherini, 2019a). The use of state-backed loans to underpin foreign direct investments, disregard for socio-economic and financial sustainability of investments, and ignoring labour, safety, and environmental regulations all give Chinese contractors (e.g. in procurement) a price-competitive edge over European competitors. At the same time, they exert heavy costs on the trading partner, and undermine the larger strategic goals of the EU. In the western Balkans, for example, the EU is interested in economic resilience and the adherence to European norms and values—clearly not priorities for China (Mogherini, 2019a).

Concerns about fairness also pertain to access to the Chinese market, from which European firms are obstructed through discriminatory procedures, forced joint ventures, and technology exchange, among other practices. The latter in particular points at direct security implications, especially in the realm of dual-use technology, such as chemicals, electronics, or software (Friends of Europe, 2015), and critical infrastructure, such as 5G technology (European Parliament, 2019b). Expanding trade also opens

gateways to intellectual property theft and corporate espionage. Human rights are also a contentious issue, as the European Union ties its trading activities to the adherence to them. China, however, is continuously violating human rights and prosecuting its advocates, most famously the artist Ai Wei Wei. Currently, human rights abuses committed against the minorities in the Xinjiang region are of particularly grave concern to the EU (Mogherini, 2019b).

In order to alleviate these concerns China would have to significantly shift its policies in key areas, from human rights to state subsidies, amounting to no less than a complete restructuring of its governance model. The EU, on the other hand, would have to continue its shift towards 'principled pragmatism' put forward in the EUGS (EEAS, 2016) in the engagement with international partners, and lower its preconditions for co-operation with China. Doing so could yield significant economic benefits, especially if global trade continues to shift towards China. Assuming China's continued technological ascent, it could also propel the EU in its quest for technological supremacy. It would also fundamentally alter the current liberal world order, as well as the European security architecture—both of which depend on US-European harmony. Binding itself economically so intimately with the US' biggest strategic rival would facilitate and catalyse a rift between the US and the EU.

Such a rift would significantly weaken the EU's hard power capabilities. European defence today still heavily relies on NATO, which in turn is reliant on the US shouldering roughly two-thirds of all its expenditure (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2019). Strategic autonomy, a key ambition of the EUGS, is still a long way off.

Should these two Black Swans—no matter how improbable—indeed materialise, they would affect European security in major ways. Thus, the EU would be well advised to closely monitor both general technological progress and China's global power projection.

Implications

Collectively, the presented scenarios draw a quite pessimistic outlook on European security in 2030. Only one of the five (*The Hour of Europe*) envisions the EU to be more prosperous, cohesive, and secure. The EU's capacity to act, the scenarios tell us, is in peril, as political and socio-economic divergence perpetuate, and global politics shifts. Each scenario offers policy recommendations linked to key drivers and the envisioned developments. In some cases, these recommendations suggest ways to avoid the unfolding of some aspects of the scenario, in others, they offer advice to policymakers on how to confront the depicted security threats and take advantage of opportunities.

We can identify three groups of policy recommendations. (See Table 2 on the next page.) The first group (blue boxes) refers to the existing technological gap between the EU and both the US and China. Two scenarios put forward recommendations on what should be done in order to recapture the technological agenda: increase investments in R&D; model the European Innovation Council after the American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (increase funding, develop concrete mission, targeted funding for high-risk research projects); and prepare for asymmetric technological threats via the establishment of EUROPOL-Erasmus and a better cyber-security link to NATO.

An important part of the technological agenda deals with cyber-security, which has been defined by the EUGS as one of the priorities for EU external action (EEAS, 2016, pp. 21-22). Since 2016 the EU has introduced a number of steps directed towards the enhancement of its resistance to cyber-threats. The annual report of the implementation of the EUGS in 2017 refers to the introduction of the European Commission's cyber-security package that is aimed at improving resilience, detection, and response to threats.

A 'cyber diplomacy toolbox' has also been adopted which should contribute to conflict prevention, the mitigation of cyber-security threats, and greater stability in international relations. Since 2016 the EU has put forward several cyber exercises, such as PACE17, CyberEurope, as well as the CYBRID exercise, and strengthened its cyber dialogues with the US, Japan, India, South Korea, Brazil, and China, as well as with NATO and the OSCE (EEAS, 2018, p. 15). Moreover, in 2017 the Helsinki-based European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats was launched following the Joint Declaration of the EU and NATO signed in December 2016. It is an inter-governmental think-tank that focuses on working on the responses to hybrid threats.⁶ Finally, the European Defence Fund discussed above constitutes another tool to enhance technological advancement by the member states. Looking at the number of initiatives, the EU has definitely achieved some progress in this respect. And yet the trend of spending more money on R&D has to continue, and the member states have to commit to it.

European institutions can play a crucial role in raising investment levels for R&D. The European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), initiated by President Juncker in 2014, would be an appropriate financial vehicle to spur private R&D investments as it is specifically geared towards realising high-risk projects. In its current iteration (EFSI 2.0) it aims at leveraging a total of €500 billion until the end of 2020. Policy priorities are set to sustainability and geographical balance. The negotiations about the next MFF are an opportunity to make R&D investments a priority of a third iteration of the EFSI. Following the European Court of Auditors' assessment of the multiplier effect of 5x (European Court of Auditors, 2019, p. 32), surpassing the US and China would require endowing an R&D-focused EFSI with at least €100 billion.

The second group of recommendations (yellow boxes) concerns responding to the trend of illiberalism by repoliticising liberalism, acting against backsliding,

Table 2. Policy recommendations in the scenarios⁵

Scenario	Policy recommendations		
<i>The Hour of Europe</i>	Adapt decision-making procedures to the challenges of the 21st century	Create actionable and meaningful eurozone budget of sufficient size	Enforce core values within the EU member states by reforming Article 7 to ensure adherence to qualified majority voting
<i>Cyber-Insecurity</i>	Recapture technological agenda via increased investments and joined R&D projects	Prepare for asymmetrical technological threats	Manage societal impact of technological progress
<i>Nothing Learnt</i>	Act against illiberal backsliding by peer pressure and 'naming-and-shaming'	Increase support for the MENA region	Reduce carbon emissions
<i>Still Liberal After All These Years</i>	Repoliticise liberalism in the EU by stronger and more equitably applied enforcement mechanisms	Effectively pursue liberalism abroad with economic levers	Introduce bold social policies by putting forward a Universal European Income
<i>Disruptions made in China</i>	Close technological gap via increased R&D investment	Devise coherent and comprehensive EU policy towards China	Stabilise eurozone via counter-cyclical transfers

	closing the technological gap
	responding to illiberalism
	strengthen Eurozone resilience

and enforcing core values. Three scenarios refer to the necessity of adapting procedures such as Article 7 in order to effectively face the illiberal changes in member states and to develop stronger and more equitably applied enforcement mechanisms. The EUGS recognises the problem and claims that “The EU will foster the resilience of its democracies. Consistently living up to our values will determine our external credibility and influence” (EEAS, 2016, p. 8).

Yet it remains vague regarding concrete steps that should be taken in order to foster the resilience of democratic systems in the member states, and both implementation reports of the EUGS do not tackle this

issue (EEAS, 2017, 2018). As mentioned above, the mechanisms applied by the European Commission in order to counter the illiberal reforms in Hungary and also in Poland have proved to be insufficient. Thus, countering such developments seems to be one of the crucial problems for European security since the credibility of the Union is at stake.

In order to better counter illiberal trends, we propose a twofold approach. Firstly, the European Commission should introduce a mechanism for regular monitoring of the functioning of democracy and the rule of law in every member state along well-defined benchmarks—the Democracy Monitor.

As the European Semester monitors the economic governance of the countries, the Democracy Monitor would annually screen the state of democracy and rule of law, and by detecting irregularities at an early stage it would prevent countries from embarking on an illiberal path. The Democracy Monitor could be developed on the basis of the already existing Rule of Law Framework.⁷ Yet it should be carried out in every EU country on a regular basis, and it should be equipped with workable enforcement measures in case a country scores poorly and does not implement reforms required by the Democracy Monitor. For instance, the compliance of a member state with recommendations from the Democracy Monitor should be linked with cohesion funds: in case of non-compliance, the cohesion funds would be cut.

Secondly, the European Union should open the existing European Endowment for Democracy (EED)⁸ to non-governmental organisations from the member states that work on capacity-building of civil society and protect the rule of law and fundamental rights. The budget of the EDD should be increased accordingly. This twofold approach would allow the European Union to both prevent governments from introducing illiberal reforms and build resilience and support for democracy among European societies.

The third group (green boxes) refers to the resilience of the eurozone. Recommendations from four scenarios relate to safeguarding European prosperity and social cohesion, calling for the creation of an actionable and meaningful eurozone budget; stabilising the eurozone via counter-cyclical transfers; introducing bold progressive social policies; or managing the societal impact of technological progress. One set of recommendations thus aims at improving the eurozone's resilience by enabling the EU to stabilise European economies in the event of external shocks. Many reforms have been put in place to stabilise the currency union since the financial and sovereign debt crisis, but key proposals remain unimplemented to date, leaving the question about European financial stability open to dispute.

A dedicated eurozone budget or counter-cyclical transfers would serve to dampen the effects of sudden asymmetric economic downturns. Moreover, a eurozone budget could spur investments where they make most sense from a Union perspective, contributing to social and economic cohesion between member states. The other set of recommendations is more forward looking in that it relates to managing transformational trends that are only just starting to change the European economic landscape. Technological progress will increasingly change the production of goods and delivery of services, shifting the demand for unskilled and skilled labour significantly, and necessitating a restructuring of European welfare models.

As with foreign policy strategy, the EUGS does not discuss the resilience of the eurozone extensively, but it acknowledges economic volatility as a threat to Europeans (EEAS, 2016). In the context of the European neighbourhood policy, it describes resilience, highlighting the fact that economic resilience and security are mutually reinforcing (*ibid.*). There is no reason to believe that this link does not exist inside the EU. The resilience of the eurozone is thus connected to the internal security of the Union. Moreover, economic diplomacy, for which the economic well-being of the eurozone is a prerequisite, is one of the policy tools employed in the EEAS' comprehensive approach.

Taking into account these dual requirements for improving the eurozone's resilience leads to two conclusions: first, the European labour force needs to be equipped with the skills necessary to thrive in a digitalised economy; and secondly, social security systems need to be prepared for the possibility of significant job losses due to automation and thus detached from employment status. The current proposal for the next MFF foresees a meagre €700 million for digital upskilling (European Parliament, 2019c). The programme should be significantly scaled up, considering that 35 percent of the European labour force does not have at least basic digital skills (European Commission, 2019). Financing for such

an upscaling could partially come from the proceeds of the common digital services tax which is currently being discussed. Concerning the adaptation of social security systems to the possibility of automation-induced unemployment, the EU should support member states in testing alternative social security systems, such as the UBI. A recent experiment in Finland has garnered international attention, and has produced new insights into the feasibility of this particular social security alternative (Hiilamo, 2019). The EU should encourage the testing of any such innovative concepts, as well as best-practice exchange between member states, for example by creating a forum on social policy, and regular reporting on ongoing member-state initiatives.

Apart from the three groups, there are several other policy recommendations tackling various issues (white boxes). One recommendation put by the *Hour of Europe* calls for the adaptation of the decision-making procedures in defence policy. This issue has already been debated by scholars (Blockmans, 2017; Haroche, 2018) and experts (EUISS, 2016), and has been picked up by policymakers. In September 2018 Jean-Claude Juncker presented a proposal to introduce qualified-majority voting in three areas of security policy: EU positions in the field of human rights issues in international forums, decisions on sanctions, and on EU civilian missions. The idea behind this change is to speed up the decision-making process and to counter situations in which one country blocks consensus.

The changes do not require a revision of the treaties and can be introduced by a unanimous decision of the member states. So far, there is no agreement among them and the debate has been postponed until the autumn. Given that the European security environment is being disturbed by external insecurities, as the introduction to this special collection argues, adapting to the challenges by introducing QMV in security and defence policy (in general and not only in the three areas mentioned by Juncker) seems to be urgently needed. Also, the scenario recommends the establishment of a new formation within the Council,

which would be dedicated to defence. A Defence Council chaired by the High Representative would indeed be helpful in bringing more effectiveness to the decision-making process within security and defence policy. It would intensify co-operation between defence ministers of the member states and facilitate co-ordination between various EU security actors (e.g. EDA, EEAS, EC) and NATO.

Beyond the policy recommendations put forward by the scenarios, there is a more general point to make: given the diverse nature of today's and tomorrow's security threats, confronting them requires a broad understanding of security. Informed by this approach, all of the authors viewed tomorrow's security as hybrid. Security vulnerabilities can pertain to technology, politics, trade, currency issues, and environmental degradation, among other things. Security, in this broad view, is a comprehensive undertaking, spanning a diverse field of civilian and military policy areas. Such an approach finds confirmation in the EUGS, which states that: "[s]ecurity and defence are essential components for a credible EU role in the world. But the full strength and value of such instruments are fulfilled only when they are deployed alongside other external policies—such as enlargement, development and trade—or policies with external aspects, including on migration, energy, climate, environment, culture and more. This unique mix of actions is the European way to foreign and security policy" (EEAS, 2017, p. 4).

While hypothetical in nature, scenarios are nonetheless informative. The added value of scenario development is to bring us closer to identifying not only the common patterns, the Black Swans or the Black Elephants, but also to shed light on the *unknown unknowns* and thereby increase policymakers' capacity for anticipatory governance. Scenarios do not always provide solutions, but they can at least inform policy debates, and we hope to contribute with this collection of alternative futures. As leading NATO strategic analyst Stefanie Babst recently said: "We may not find all the answers to these and other questions but at least we should try to pose them as smartly as possible" (Babst, 2018). ■

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Notes

- 1 Note that the regional focus *MENA Spring 3.0* is excluded from this comparison. As opposed to the other scenarios, it does not discuss the EU as primary actor, and is not comparable to the other, broader scenarios.
- 2 Responding to external conflicts and crises when they arise; building the capacities of partners; protecting the European Union and its citizens through external action.
- 3 The Commission tabled a proposal for introducing a rule of law conditionality clause to the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework (European Commission, 2018b).
- 4 See the discussion of the Black Swan and of the policy recommendations below.
- 5 Note that the regional focus *MENA Spring 3.0* is excluded from this comparison, because it is by design not comparable to the other, broader scenarios.
- 6 For more, see the website: <https://www.hybridcoe.fi>.
- 7 For more, see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/rule-law/rule-law-framework_en
- 8 For more, see: <https://democracyendowment.eu/en>

Appendices

Appendix No. 1. List of Workshop Participants

Appendix No. 2. Online survey distributed among participants

Appendix No. 3. List of internal and external drivers resulting from the online survey

Appendix No. 4. The morphological box

Appendix No. 5. The list of the validators at the workshop

Appendix No. 6. List of external scenario validators

Appendix No 1

List of Participants at the Dahrendorf Foresight Workshop

Iulian Berdila, Planning Directorate, Romanian Defence Staff, Bukarest

Mai'a K. Davis Cross, Northeastern University, Boston

Hallie Detrick, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

Denis Destrebecq, Frontex, Warsaw

Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Brookings, Doha

Josefin Graef, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin

Jonathan Hackenbroich, European Council on Foreign Relations, London

Inger-Luise Heilmann, German Parliament, Office of Andreas Nick MP, Berlin

An Jacobs, Faculty for the Study of Leadership, Security and Warfare, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Sandhurst

Nicole Koenig, Jacques Delors Institute Berlin – Centre for European Affairs at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin

Helene Kuchta, Bundeswehr Consulting, Berlin

Alena Kudzko, Globsec, Bratislava

Benjamin Martill, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

Jiro Minier, German Cybersecurity Organisation, Berlin

Bartłomiej Nowak, Vistula University, Warsaw

Janka Örtel, German Marshall Fund, Berlin

Anja Palm, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Eva Pejsova, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Melchior Szczepanik, Polish Institute for International Relations, Warsaw

Benjamin Tallis, Institute of International Relations, Prague

Sergey Utkin, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Appendix No 2

Online Survey

The Future of European Security 2030

Welcome to the online process for the preparation of the Dahrendorf Forum 2018 scenario workshop on the future of European security viewed from the year 2030.

Why this workshop?

While the global order and international relations have changed considerably since the end of the Cold War, Europe's security architecture is a relic of the past. And even though Europe faces uncountable new security threats and finds itself surrounded by "a ring of fire" (Carl Bildt), it has failed to develop a European security framework worth the word.

At the same time, we witness tectonic shifts that will impact societies' security and stability in a much wider sense: international cooperation and the liberal world order are being tested not only by authoritarian regimes but also from within; the rise of new powers - first and foremost China - leads to a new dynamic in world affairs that comes with competition, tensions and instability; Russia's new assertiveness has ended the Cold Peace that characterized the last 25 years; and the implosion of the MENA region has created a power vacuum that can neither be filled by old nor by new powers.

On a completely different level, societies feel that their lives will soon be disrupted by technological change, breakthrough innovations and other global trends such as climate change, population growths, mass migration or the depletion of natural resources. For the first time since the end of World War II, the younger generations might face a life that is less prosperous and less secure than that of the previous generation.

So the key questions for the Dahrendorf Forum 2018 scenario workshop are: What are the threats and the security environment we have to prepare ourselves for until 2030? How will global trends, key drivers of change and Black Swans affect European security? How could a future European security architecture look like that effectively addresses new challenges?

To prepare for the workshop, we would like to ask you to take part in this online survey. We kindly ask you to submit your questionnaire by **Friday, 19 October 2018**.

Thanks for your support.
We look forward to meeting you in person soon.

Monika Sus & Marcel Hadeed (Dahrendorf Forum)
Thomas Mehlhausen & Oliver Gnad (Moderators)

Online-Preparation Process

To prepare for the workshop from 24 to 25 October 2018 in Berlin, we like to engage you in an online preparatory process. We ask you to share with us your views, expertise and perceptions about what drives security in Europe until 2030. This collaborative preparation is crucial as it helps us to channel your ideas and positions in the exercise early on.

How will it work?

Umbuzoo is a survey platform that allows for secure online polls and group work. Simply click yourself through the sheets and punch in your answers. Your work will be saved automatically (and anonymously) on a secure server once you have reached the end of the survey.

The online exercise will take approximately 30 to 45 minutes.

We kindly ask you to complete the survey by Friday, 19 October 2018.

Analytical foresight as 'Anticipatory Governance'

A few introductory words: Today, Strategic Foresight and Scenario Planning is being applied in strategy design and policy planning processes throughout the private and public sector. It plays an increasingly important role in assessing risks and unintended consequences of decisions in a highly volatile and uncertain environment.

Strategic Foresight aims at identifying weak signals of change that have the potential to develop into key drivers of systemic transformation at an early stage. Depending on their interplay, their dynamics and their influence on the system at stake, such 'weak signals' and upcoming trends may lead into completely different kinds of futures (scenarios). These alternative futures may hold risks and dangers but also chances, opportunities and leeway for action.

The more decision-makers have thought through such alternative narratives of change, the better they are prepared in case of their emergence. US Policy Advisor Leon Fuerth has dubbed the ability to identify tectonic shifts before they actually occur 'anticipatory governance'.

Your experience and expertise

To be better prepared for the trend analysis and later for the foresight workshop, we want to get an impression of your level of experience in the field of foresight analysis and scenario planning. Please tick one of the boxes below:

I often work with methods of analytical foresight. **I would consider myself to be an expert.**

I know what analytical foresight is about and have already taken part in some basic exercises. **I would consider myself to be a learner.**

I have never worked with analytical foresight. **I consider myself to be a beginner.**

Key Drivers of change and transformation

During the survey we will ask you about internal and external factors that have an influence on European security. We will also shed light on so-called 'Black Swans' - i.e. low probability-high impact events. The following questions will be treated:

(1) What are the main *internal* trends, factors, and drivers that might influence the security of Europe until 2030?

(2) What are the main *external* trends, factors, and drivers that might influence the security of Europe in 2030?

(3) Black Swans (low probability-high impact events): Which unexpected (but plausible) events or yet unnoticed trends have the potential to massively accelerate or derail the security of Europe in 2030?

Answering the above mentioned questions, you will have the chance to list up to 5 factors for each question. Please list them according to their importance (most important factors first) and indicate the degree of uncertainty and impact.

Please use the STEMPLE-Plus framework to answer the survey; the STEMPLE-Plus analytic grid has proven to be a useful tool (see explanation below) but is by no means exhaustive.

Information

STEMPLE-Plus analytical framework

As an analytical framework, you might refer to the STEMPLE-Plus methodology (you probably have worked with deviations of it such as STEEP, PEST or PESTLE). The STEMPLE-Plus framework covers a wider analytical horizon than STEEP, PEST or PESTLE. It includes the following drivers of societal change (with a few illustrative examples for each driver):

Social: population & demographic change, vertical and horizontal mobility, ethnicity, youth bulge, (re)migration & brain drain / gain, social cohesion, quality of life, social innovation

Technological: the role of digitalization and automation, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, Industrialization 4.0, Bio technology, Nano technology, breakthroughs in energy supply / transport / health / communication

Economic: macroeconomic structure and performance/economic cycles, investments, capital flows & remittances, (out-/in-/re-) sourcing & funding, global supply and value chains, structural change / sectoral development

Military/Security: internal and interstate conflicts, terrorism, cyber-security, automation of warfare, security architecture, securitization of sectoral policies (such as energy or water security)

Political: regime change, fragility & stability, political culture & participation, political climate, polycentrism, regionalism / regionalization, international/regional order, alliances

Legal/ normative: legislation, regulation, constitutional questions, international law and conventions, habitual and indigenous law

Ecological: public goods, natural resources, climate change, loss of biodiversity, desertification, water scarcity, sustainable consumption & planetary boundaries

Plus other factors: psychological factors (anti-globalization, xenophobia, racism, populism, nationalism, tribalism); cultural factors (values, religion, habits, traditions).

Internal key drivers, trends and factors until 2030

What will be the main *internal* key drivers, trends and factors that might influence the security of Europe in 2030?

You can name up to five factors; please indicate the impact intensity and degree of uncertainty for each listed factor. Please refer to the STEMPLE-Plus analytic framework which you find below for your reference.

Internal factor (1)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (1)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Uncertainty and volatility (1)

Strategic Foresight aims at identifying weak signals of change which have the potential to develop into key drivers of systemic transformation. Some trends are longterm and stable (such as demographics) others are extremely uncertain and volatile (such as patterns of conflict). Decision-makers, therefore, are well-advised to keep an eye on volatile drivers of change instead on those which are more or less stable and predictable.

To gain a better understanding on the degree of uncertainty and volatility within a system (system dynamics), qualifying and quantifying individual drivers of change help to get a common understanding as a group. Therefore, we would like you to answer the following question:

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Internal factor (2)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (2)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Uncertainty and volatility (2)

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Internal factor (3)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (3)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Uncertainty and volatility (3)

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Internal factor (4)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (4)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Uncertainty and volatility (4)

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Internal factor (5)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (5)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Uncertainty and volatility (5)

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Additions & Commentaries

If you would like to add something or leave us a comment, please do not hesitate.

Reminder

STEMPLE-Plus analytical framework

Social: Population & demographic change, vertical and horizontal mobility, ethnicity, youth bulge, (re)migration & brain drain / gain, social cohesion, quality of life, social innovation

Technological: the role of digitalization and automation, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, Industrialization 4.0, Bio technology, Nano technology, breakthroughs in energy supply / transport / health / communication

Economic: macroeconomic structure and performance/economic cycles, investments, capital flows & remittances, (out-/in-/re-) sourcing & funding, global supply and value chains, structural change / sectoral development

Military/Security: internal and interstate conflicts, terrorism, cyber-security, automation of warfare, security architecture, securitization of sectoral policies (such as energy or water security)

Political: regime change, fragility & stability, political culture & participation, political climate, polycentrism, regionalism / regionalization, international/regional order, alliances

Legal/ normative: legislation, regulation, constitutional questions, international law and conventions, habitual and indigenous law

Ecological: public goods, natural resources, climate change, loss of biodiversity, desertification, water scarcity, sustainable consumption & planetary boundaries

Plus other factors: psychological factors (anti-globalization, xenophobia, racism, populism, nationalism, tribalism); Cultural factors (values, religion, habits, traditions).

BACK

External key drivers, trends and factors until 2030

What will be the main external key drivers, trends and factors that might influence the security of Europe in 2030?

To be able to cover regional as well as global trends and factors, you can name up to five factors. Please also indicate the impact intensity and degree of uncertainty for each listed factor.

Please refer to the STEMPLE-Plus analytic framework which you find below for your reference.

External factor (1)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (1)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

Uncertainty and volatility (1)

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low

high

External factor (2)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (2)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low high

Uncertainty and volatility (2)

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low high

External factor (3)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (3)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low high

Uncertainty and volatility (3)

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low high

External factor (4)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (4)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low high

Uncertainty and volatility (4)

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low high

External factor (5)

Please name the STEMPLE-Plus field first and then give a short explanation.

Impact (5)

On a scale from 1 to 5: How intense would its impact be on the security of Europe in 2030.

1 2 3 4 5

low high

Uncertainty and volatility (5)

How high would you estimate the volatility / uncertainty of the above mentioned key driver?

1 2 3 4 5

low high

Additions & Commentaries

If you would like to add something or leave us a comment, please do not hesitate.

Reminder

STEMPLE-Plus analytical framework

- Unlikely (less than 10 percent)
 - Possible (between 10 and 30 percent)
 - Likely (more than 30 percent)
 - Don't know
-

Black Swan #3

Probability

Give an estimate: How likely is it that this Black Swan might occur?

- Unlikely (less than 10 percent)
 - Possible (between 10 and 30 percent)
 - Likely (more than 30 percent)
 - Don't know
-

Additions & Commentaries

If you would like to add something or leave us a comment, please do not hesitate.

BACK

Comments?

Here is the chance to get rid of them...

BACK

Done!

Thank you very much for participating in this survey. The survey's results will lay the groundwork for our scenario workshop on 24-25 October 2018 in Berlin.

If you have questions or suggestions regarding the online process or any other topic concerning the scenario workshop, please feel free to contact us via email (hadeed@hertie-school.org).

Yours sincerely,
Monika Sus & Marcel Hadeed

SUBMIT SURVEY

Appendix No 3a

List of internal drivers resulting from the online survey

Key

E = Economic	Mil = Military	T = Technological
Eco = Ecological	P = Political	PLUS = Other
L = Legal	S = Social	
M = Migration	Sec = Security	

E: Poor macro-economic governance leading to rising inequalities and eroding social cohesion	E: Economic growth reaching its limit > stagnation, growing inequalities and subsequent radicalisation and social unrest undermining political stability
E: Macroeconomic structure and performance/ economic cycles: economic growth and the distribution of the growth is a key factor to the resilience of the societies to security threats.	E: Prospect of GDP growth, esp. inclusive one
E: collapse of the euro, financial crisis that follows, inability to stabilize markets and economy, economic downturn, and consequent social unrest	E: Global supply and value chains
E: financial crashes causing instability	E: Economic cycles / economic crisis could lead to higher economic divergence between European countries as well as within them. In addition, there would be less resources for defense and security.
E: Economic uncertainty	E: Economic crisis
E: Changes to the way we work and are compensated for doing so provide huge opportunities but also strike at the very heart of processes from which individuals and societies draw value and self-worth. Consequences of the gig economy and the 'post-work' world (e.g. Universal Basic Income), how we organize societies, facilitate individual and collective ambitions.	E: Another financial crisis that leads to austerity and declining defense budgets
E: Economic growth. Stagnation makes people look for alternative political recipes.	E/Eco: A variety of ideas regarding economic systems and modes of consumption (e.g. circular economy, universal basic income) can have a beneficial influence on social cohesion, natural resources, etc.

P/Eco: Slow energy transition leading to air pollution and contributing to climate change	Eco: Europeans are not stemming the pace of climate change quickly enough. Doing so would require a major, coordinated political effort - and a lot of unpopular decisions. It would also require rational thinking on the provision of energy ([re-]embracing nuclear, stopping coal and oil, etc.), food production and consumption and transport. Failing to do so will increasingly see effects within Europe as well as beyond and potentially the rise of radical climate politics actors
Eco: the impact of extreme weather conditions as well as loss of biodiversity due to fewer natural habitats and use of chemicals in agriculture on housing and food security, resulting in intensified distribution battles	L: Erosion of rule of law in member states
L: Weakening of rule of law	Sec: Cyber security risks through attacks but also online disinformation campaigns
Mil: Militarization and armament of political groups and consequent national conflicts can be the last point of escalation of migrant ostracization	Sec: Cyber security
Mil: In a period where many nascent issues in the field of security practice, ranging from automation and cybersecurity/warfare to the securitisation of controversial fields such as intra-state problems in some countries, concepts and actual developments in military and security fields will inevitably play an outsized role in defining the relevant fields.	Mil/Sec: Significant increase in terrorist attacks
Sec: Terrorism - failing integration, increased marginalization of certain groups will contribute to radicalization and acts of extreme violence	Sec: Growing importance of cybersecurity Citizens daily lives and the functioning of states can be disrupted in a variety of ways through cyber-attacks ranging from manipulating public opinion on the internet to damaging key elements of cyberinfrastructure (e.g. air traffic control)
Sec. (& S): radicalization, social marginalization with violent outcomes	Sec: Security architecture
Sec: the potential for high-impact terrorist attacks in Europe, in particular in countries with no or little past experiences of such events	Sec: security culture / will privacy still matter a bit?

Mil: Failure to invest in defence capacities; failure of European allies to continue to bind the US to Europe weakens NATO before the EU has been able to develop sufficient capacities to replace those of the alliance. Over-securitisation of issues like migration proceeds apace wasting resources and denying Europe the chance to take the opportunities that come from being a leader in global interconnectedness.	Mil: Failure to establish PESCO
S: the impact of cyber security breaches of sensitive infrastructure (e.g. bank data) that provoke feelings of insecurity among the population, with negative effects on trust in political elites	P: Rise of right-wing populism & the management of multicultural societies
P: Rising populism among our countries, from the left and from the right	P: The manner in which political issues, ranging from tensions between states within 'Europe' at large to the manner in which security burdens are shared and managed across political entities, will fundamentally shape both the dilemmas that arise and the solutions that are developed in response to them.
P: Rise of right-wing extremism as a result of migration flows to Europe can lead to a changing political environment which has a high likelihood of developing the democratic system to an authoritarian one, leading to national disputes (à la Poland, Hungary).	P: Stability of current political regimes. Foreign policy starts at home.
P: European unity	P(&S): Political culture and participation (driven by lack of social cohesion)
P: Certain member states become less democratic over time	P: The terms of British withdrawal from the EU will punctuate the existing equilibrium
P: Distrust of democracy and its institutions > space for propaganda, conspiracy theories, and post-truth politics becoming mainstream	P: Decrease of mainstream parties' popularity in European democracies. Even though the mainstream parties are likely to keep the ability to govern, they adjust their policy lines, when challenged by opponents on far right and far left.

P: Political fragility & stability: fragmentation of political landscape and lack of impact of local and national political decisions erode democracy	Political: fragmentation and responsiveness (a hyper-fragmented national and European political system will either lead to watered-down compromises or paralysis, both mean politics will respond even less to citizens' needs)
P: Political culture and participation	P/Mil: Lobbying by military industries. Producers interest may to an extent define, which arms control and reduction mechanisms will and won't be used.
P: Misinterpretation of Europe's relative decline as being absolute decline causes a loss of faith in liberal democratic governance, undermining the EU and re-creating competitive rather than cooperative governance in Europe. Economic nationalism dominates and people get poorer rather than richer; solution to this is presumed to be more authoritarian populist nationalism. This has the potential to degenerate to conflict within and beyond Europe.	P: Fragility of political centre - weakening of consensus-based politics; decay of traditional system of political parties
Pol: increased nationalism, inward looking domestic politics, skepticism towards EU, empowerment of farther right	Pol: European Parliament elections will introduce greater elements of populism/Euroscepticism
PLUS: Populism preventing European cooperation	PLUS: Nationalism often goes hand in hand with a rejection of multilateral security alliances such as NATO. In addition, nationalism can spark conflict within and between societies.
PLUS: Rise of nationalism	PLUS: individual and collective anxiety (from job loss, competition, pressure + at the same time, the decreasing presence of the human touch)
PLUS: Psychological - rise of anti-globalisation sentiments, racism & xenophobia > identity politics and fear leading to isolationism	PLUS: Anti-globalisation trends would reinforce protectionist and isolationist tendencies, weaken the multilateral order and its institutions.
Unexpected factors, sources of tension and political considerations, and the continued invention and reinvention of identities within societies will continue to exert a considerable effect on societies in broad and unexpected ways for contemporaneous policymakers.	Cultural - rising religious intolerance, conservatism and illiberal values > increasingly divided societies, hate-crimes

Appendix No. 3b

List of external drivers resulting from the online survey

Key

- E = Economic
Eco = Ecological
L = Legal
M = Migration
- Mil = Military
P = Political
S = Social
Sec = Security
- T = Technological
PLUS = Other

E: Trade wars	E: Europe is losing competitiveness, China is rising, US becomes unco-operative and inward-looking, economic growth in Europe will slow down further.
E: US-China decoupling	E: Global value chains/Europe is among the most connected continents, i.e. among most vulnerable to global disruptions
E: Global economic dynamics. Any global economic disruption hits Europe, while an economic boom creates benefits for it.	Eco:Climate change with consequences in terms of access to resources, natural disasters, migration
Eco: Depleting natural resources of countries with limited access to those (e.g. water) has a possibly explosive factor for Europe's internal security	Eco: Climate change driving migration
Eco: Unsustainable modes of consumption (e.g. meat production, fossil fuel dependence) provoke a number of negative phenomena: depletion of natural resources, pollution, climate change which in turn are behind many intra- and interstate conflicts	E: Especially given recent trends that indicate that the use of aggressive political power to meet economic objectives is an increasingly viable strategy between states, the economic considerations of European states and the potential for these precipitating aggressive political action may drive the security agenda in unexpected directions.
E: macroeconomic structure and performance/ economic cycles: strong global growth to lessen security issues, but global downturn will exacerbate security issues	Eco: climate change, deforestation, flooding, etc. elsewhere triggers large migration flows to Europe

E: Capital flows	Eco: Ecological issues outside Europe will inevitably drive the security agenda in highly unpredictable fashions, with knock-on effects from minor shifts and changes in third party countries potentially leading to cascading security issues with implications for Europe.
E: Global economic recession > collapse of markets entailing major crisis (Europe as a trading power most impacted)	Eco: Intense climate change leading to more refugees flowing to Europe
Eco: Loss of livelihood in certain parts of the world and resulting migration movements, with particular challenges not only for migration management in Europe, but also diplomacy and conflict resolution	Eco: Climate change could drive further migratory movements and intensify territorial competition and conflict.
Eco: Fresh water and food resource scarcity > health security; global warming > ecosystem change, proliferation of diseases, extreme weather events, etc. all entailing severe economic, social, political, and security challenges.	Eco: Persuading other regions to act seriously on climate change will be one of the hardest forthcoming challenges (it is hard enough in Europe), but given the borderless nature of climate and the high level of interdependence in this field, this should be a priority. Taking the concerns of other regions affected more acutely by climate change seriously will also be a key challenge for Europe.
L: Collapse of the current rules-based global order and governance institutions leading to chaos, failure of multilateralism > return to 19th-century IR: might over right/'rule of the jungle'	Mil/Sec: Security architecture—will the US be ever less present?
Sec: Russia's hybrid influence and advance into Europe's neighbourhood (conventional security threat, fragmentation of Europe); further unrest in the MENA region > migration wave; China's progressive takeover of Europe's strategic sectors (infrastructure, communication, rare earth materials, etc.> loss of autonomy); cyber-security)	Mil/Sec: Decrease in alliance with US
Sec: Terrorism - demographic trends, youth unemployment, religion, and state fragility are likely to strengthen terrorist groups that will probably target Europe.	Mil/Sec: Disintegration of NATO: disengagement of the US, internal disagreements within members, including about threat perception, deviation of members from established norms and rules (Turkey)

Mil/Sec: End of the US security guarantee	Mil: Terrorism
Mil/Sec: Aggression of Russia and/or China, including cyber attacks	Sec: Inter- and intra-state conflict in the neighbourhood is already felt in Europe. In addition recent efforts to prevent or manage conflicts have been rather unsuccessful.
Mil/Sec: US-China military confrontation	Sec/M: Internal and interstate conflicts driving migration to Europe
Sec: Cyber-attacks will have a growing impact on societies and governments that increasingly rely on digitalisation.	Mil: Security architecture
Mil/Sec: In a volatile period for security populated by nascent concepts and major change on the horizon, the manner in which militaries and security apparatuses mutually negotiate these developments (through existing structures, through conceptual development, through actual conflict) will play a large role in translating these changes into concrete security considerations and policies.	Sec/Mil: Hybrid threats (e.g. cyber warfare)
P: Instability in MENA, both Arab and non-Arab countries, as a result of ongoing popular challenges to the states because of socio-economic, political, and ecological grievances	P: Rising multipolarity and challenges to the international rules-based international order
P: Developments in external politics, but also decision-making concerning how European states will choose to engage with or intervene in these developments, will (again) play a significant role in defining and shaping the security considerations and dilemmas of the period.	P: Collapse of the rules-based international order, decline of liberalism and democracy as well as domestic governance. However, this also presents the opportunity for the reinvention of a liberalism rather than the technocratic, defensive or neoliberalisms of recent years.
P/E: China. As the world's major factory, China is economically vital for Europe. Its political importance is growing too.	P: US foreign policy
P/Mil: The American commitment to Europe is decreasing	P: the rise of an illiberal world order and concomitant shifting European alliances and deepening EU crisis
P: Challenges to the international order structures and multilateralism + evolution of strategic partnerships	P/E/Sec: US The transatlantic link is one of the key factors defining Europe today

P: Russia foreign policy	P/E: China's underlying capabilities and global influence continue to rise
P: Shift of the global balance of power away from the US and Europe/ the West and towards East Asia	P: Inability to create an effective global agreement to target climate change
P: Illiberal authoritarianism as a normative basis for governance is increasing	P: State fragility, governance breakdown in countries that are key for Europe's security environment
P: Regime change away from democracy outside of Europe	P: International and regional order
P/S/E: Global power shift to Asia	P/E: The model of global economic and trade relations that cements the North–South development gap
P: Polycentrism could fuel a renewed grand battle for regional or world hegemony and render multilateral institutions dysfunctional.	P: Developments in the Middle East and Africa
P/Mil: Revisionism of rising powers such as Russia, instability in the Middle East	P: Authoritarian interference in European elections
P: Does Europe benefit from US-Chinese relations or become an arena for them?	P: Balkans
S: Population and demographic change	S: Uncontrolled population growth is a key factor leading to excessive use of natural resources and migration
S: Population and demographic change: population impacts many other factors, including ecological impact, social impact, migration, etc.	S: Population and demographic change: population impacts many other factors, including ecological impact, social impact, migration, etc.
M: Migration flows will increase in the coming years. If Europe does not seize its competitive attractive advantage in this regard, others will take its place.	S: Newly emerging migration patterns due to growing awareness of existing global political and economic inequalities
M: Rather than seeking to keep people in place, embracing a more mobile society and mobile modes of governance is key to thriving in the future world. This means rethinking models of citizenship (and citizenship), residence, work, and play.	M: Migration (both from Africa/Middle East and tech brain drain; interlinkages: climate change, AI tech race)

M: Migration (both from Africa/Middle East and tech brain drain; interlinkages: climate change, AI tech race)	M: Population/demographic growth with intra-regional destabilising effects and possibly Europe-bound migration (part. Africa)
S/E: Ongoing changes in the world of work and the distribution of relatively more and less productive and rewarding activities between different countries and regions will play a key role in driving unrest or stability, as well as contributing to migration and mobility.	S: Africa. The continent in the immediate proximity of Europe is growing demographically and remains unable to fix many of its economic and political challenges.
T: AI	T: Technology
T: Internet of Things	T: On a more positive note. Technological: with an increasing development of communication and transport possibilities, people from different fault-lines can be brought together and thereby prevent an escalation of conflict.
T: Concentration of economic power in the hands of a few highly specialised technological industries results in decreasing the range of maneuver of political leaders.	T: Gradual progress in the realm of energy, especially renewable energy production and energy storage that will hopefully lead to diminished fossil fuel dependence and more effectively fight against climate change.
T: Major cyber-attack > loss of data; new technology used for malicious purposes—IoT smart mobile phone mash-ups, biotechnology	T: Europe cannot compete with infrastructural visions of China, India in the medium-term. Better connectivity on the European continent, supported by ongoing free movement made available to greater proportions of our populations is essential. To compete with emerging models, Europe needs to double down on its approach while having the vision to think big infrastructurally, but also in the physical organisation and digital interconnection of our cities and towns.
T: Health, pandemics	T: Advances in AI, cyber technologies will empower not only state actors, but also non-state ones who will receive access to cheap but impactful weaponised tech

Appendix No 4

Morphological Box: Key drivers beyond European Security 2030

Russia-West Competition	Stability in MENA (SSA)	Changing nature of global governance	CHNs global power project capabilities	Role of US in European Security	Change of Ecol and Health Environment
9	9	9	9	9	9
SQ: geopol rivalry, select engagement	SQ: Authoritarian stability	SQ: Erosion of traditional institutions	SQ1: CHN regional hegemon only	SQ: Low trust, high mil commitment	SQ: Habitat at tipping point; low gov impact
RUS closing ranks with the West	Inter-state cooperation & integration	Existing institutions are reformed and	SQ1 China inward	Renewal of NATO	Bold action to achieve improvement
Détente	MENA Spring 2.0; popular uprising (pos.)	Regionalism	CHN global superpower	Pivot: high trust but lower mil. commitment	Further degradation of livelihoods
Western retreat	Confrontation inter-state + diversionary	Sectoral cooperation multi-level (ad-	Regime collapse	Dissolution of NATO	
Growing tensions	CivWar struggle for resources (pol. socio)	Cooperational anarchy among states			
Open confrontation					

Widening of geostrat. space 7	Challenge to lib. values across Europe 7	Migration Policies + Politics 9	Euro (currency) 9	Trade 7	Soc. impact of tech + sec ramification 7
SQ: Old geo- spacial concept (ENP)	SQ: Liberal europe under siege	SQ: Ad-hoc management (moderate No)	SQ: Muddling through	SQ: EU as a global econ. power	SQ: Europe lags behind
Arctic as new geostrat space	Decline of illiberal sentiment	Effective global + EU compact; successful	Strengthened Euro	Massive econ growth	EU breakthroughs in selected areas
	European liberal resurgence	Uncontrolled massive influx leading to EU	Declining Euro: rising protectionism	Muddling through + trying to survive	Selective Coop in tech breakthroughs
	More illiberal Europe			Effects of 3rd parties trade wars	Tech competition
	Collapse of EU as we know it			Economic Collapse	

Appendix No 5.

List of Validators at the Dahrendorf Foresight Workshop

Thorsten Benner, Global Public Policy Institute

Anna Kuchenbecker, Aspen Institute

Nils Schmid, MdB, SPD Parliamentary group's spokesperson

Nicolai v. Ondarza, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP

Bernd Mützelburg, former Director of Policy Planning at German Chancellery

Pia Fuhrhop, Bureau Omid Nouripour, MdB, Alliance '90/The Greens

Appendix No. 6.

List of External Validators of the Scenarios

Riccardo Alcaro, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

Olivero Angeli, Mercator Forum for Migration and Democracy (MIDEM), Dresden

Ahmed Badawi, Free University Berlin

Sophie Besch, Center for European Reform, London

Sebastian Breuer, Center for International Peace Operations, Berlin

Cornelius Brosche, Westphalia Data Lab, Münster

Andrzej Ceglarz, Technical University of Munich

Tobias Fella, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin

Trine Flockhart, Syddansk University, Odense

Ulrike Franke, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin

Pawel Frankowski, Jagiellonian University, Cracow

Florence Gaub, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Sonia Kaufmann, Aspen Institute, Berlin

Johann Kuchta, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Mathis Lohaus, Free University Berlin

Michal Onderco, Erasmus University Rotterdam & Stanford University

Kimberly Zenz, German Cybersecurity Organisation, Berlin

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Hallie Detrick specialises in bridging the gap between the academic and public spheres. Over the past ten years she has worked as an editor and communications specialist with think-tanks, publishers, and philanthropies in Europe, Africa, and North America. She holds a master's degree in Global Political Economy from City, University of London.

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Oliver Gnad is the co-founder and managing director of the "Bureau für Zeitgeschehen" (Bureau of Current Affairs), a Frankfurt-based think-and-do-tank specialized in strategic foresight and scenario planning. Since 2015, he is also an adjunct faculty member of the Hertie School in Berlin. He is the author of several books and articles on the Cold War, the German party system, sustainable development as well as foreign and security policy issues. He holds a doctoral degree in contemporary history from Goethe University Frankfurt.

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An Jacobs was appointed as Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University in September 2019 after having spent the previous five years at the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst as a Senior Lecturer in Defence and International Affairs. Prior to joining Sandhurst, she worked in Kosovo for two years as a Political Advisor for the EU Rule of Law Mission EULEX, and she was a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zurich in Switzerland. She has a PhD on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and additional research interests in Security Sector Reform in conflict-affected environments, African security issues, and (the EU in) international conflict management.

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Anja Palm is Junior Researcher at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Her main area of expertise is European and Italian foreign policy, focusing on migration and conflict. Beyond her research on external migration policy, she is currently seconded to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European External Action Service in the context of the H2020 project EU-Listco, where she is working on conflict prevention and crisis response, including foresight and early warning systems. Before joining IAI in 2017 she was a trainee at UNHCR and the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA). She graduated in Law from the University of Bologna and holds a Transnational Law LL.M. from King's College London.

Monika Sus has been a fellow at the Hertie School since 2015 and a leader of the Dahrendorf Foresight Project. In 2016-17 she was also a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence. Before coming to Berlin, she held an assistant professor position at the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)-founded Centre for German and European Studies at the University of Wrocław. She has been granted scholarships several scholarships and has been a visiting fellow at the University of Leipzig, at the University of Montreal and at the European Union Centre of Excellence at the University in Pittsburgh. She is the co-director of a project on Poland and Germany in the European Union as well a director of a research project on the entrepreneurship in the EU's foreign and security policy. She published five books and several papers that appeared in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *Geopolitics*, *Global Policy*, *International Politics*, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* as well as *Futures*. The journal of policy, planning and futures studies.

Benjamin Tallis is Senior Researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague and a visiting fellow at IFSH Hamburg. His research focuses on the politics of European security and European culture (especially art and architecture) as well as Europe's relations with the wider world. Tallis edits the academic journal *New Perspectives*, regularly appears in European media and advises a variety of European and North American governments. He previously worked as a civilian security practitioner for the EU and OSCE in the Balkans and former Soviet Union and has also worked in the private sector.

Sergey Utkin since 2016 heads Strategic Assessment Section at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. From 2016 until June 2018 he also headed Foreign and Security Policy Department at the Moscow-based Centre for Strategic Research. He holds a PhD in political science (international relations), which he received at IMEMO in 2006. His research is focused on foreign and security policy of the EU, the EU's relations with Russia and the US, Russia's foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic area. ■

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