

MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND COVID-19 EMERGENCY COORDINATION

Emergency Governance for Cities and Regions

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INTRODUCING ANALYTICS NOTE #04

This Analytics Note focuses on multilevel governance and emergency coordination during the COVID-19 pandemic. Section 1 draws on case study analysis of 15 national-level responses, to assesses the position of subnational governments within the pandemic response structure. The remainder of the Analytics Note draws on desktop research and workshops conducted by the Emergency Governance Initiative (EGI) between April and June 2021. Additional details of these workshops are contained in [Policy Brief 04 - Multilevel Emergency Governance: Enabling Adaptive and Agile Responses](#).

This publication is the fourth in the series of Analytics Notes by the Emergency Governance initiative. The data-focused Notes are published alongside Policy Briefs which present forward-looking propositions, reform agendas, governance innovations and critical perspectives.

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Main findings

- While complex emergencies may be formally declared, rhetorical or simply practised at different levels of government, a typical distribution of responsibilities assigns strategic roles to higher level government and operational remits to local government.
- All areas of emergency governance are affected by multi-level governance. However, coordination and integration across government units, administrative capacity and organisational resilience, as well as local response and strategic direction, are particularly affected by power shifts and coordination requirements.
- The ability of subnational governments to influence the emergency response strategy is largely determined by pre-existing patterns of decentralisation. Federal countries, and particularly those with high levels of autonomy for cities and regions, tend to maintain a stronger decentralised approach when addressing complex emergencies.
- Complex emergencies can lead to centralising or decentralising power shifts. During COVID-19, there is evidence to suggest that there was a global trend towards centralisation in health, and there have been instances of centralisation in the economic development and utilities sectors in some countries. On the other hand, decentralisation shifts took place in relation to security and environment sectors while urban transport included shifts in both directions. The impact of the pandemic on the vertical distribution of political oversight has been heterogenous both across sectors and countries, and often included indirect effects as a result of constrained budgets.
- COVID-19 has activated a range of coordination mechanisms, above all those related to establishing central emergency strategies, information and communication technology and the concentration of executive powers.

1. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

1.1 EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS AND POWERS

There are four ways in which emergencies are managed and communicated by government bodies:

1. Formal emergency declarations: These are declarations of extraordinary situations (e.g. emergency, disaster, catastrophe) formally declared in line with legal and constitutional frameworks for emergency governance. At the most extreme end of the scale, many countries have constitutional provisions for states of emergency. These often trigger certain emergency powers, usually at the executive level of government. States of emergency have been historically associated with authoritarianism and violations of civil liberties, and so the use of this form of emergency legislation is generally quite rare. For less extreme events, most countries also have frameworks whereby emergency declarations can be made by national or subnational governments without the activation of emergency powers. Formal emergency declarations are most commonly declared in response to short-term routine or non-routine emergencies.

2. Political emergency declarations: These are declarations by the political leadership, parliaments and/or other governing bodies and are a political statement and call to action rather than a new legal framework for government intervention. Many climate emergency declarations fall into this category. Besides the expression of a political will and commitment, political emergency declarations can lead to the publication of an agenda for action, a green or white paper, and/or the setting-up of commissions or assemblies to develop more specific emergency strategies.

3. Rhetorical emergency declarations: These are emergencies that are declared without the activation of emergency legislation or a formal political emergency declaration. Emergencies are referenced as part of public statements and an expression of urgency. Rhetorical references to emergencies might be chosen in situations where wide-ranging emergency powers are not appropriate, particularly for emergencies with long response time frames or where the political process does not allow for any form of political declaration.

4. Actioned emergencies: These are emergencies that are conveyed through rapid and radical government action. They do not necessarily need to be declared through formal mechanisms and may not even be declared politically or through speech as is the case with rhetorical emergencies. Instead, the emergency response and action are apparent through the scope and speed of response measures. For example, while many Scandinavian municipalities are taking bold action to address the climate crisis, only a handful have declared a climate emergency. Furthermore, [Sweden's constitution](#) does not even allow for government to declare a state of emergency in peacetime. As a result, many COVID-19 measures in the country were based on recommendations by national agencies rather than strict regulation and enforcement.

While emergency powers are usually reserved for national-level government, subnational governments in some federal countries do have access to emergency powers. In [Ethiopia](#) and the [United States](#), for example, states can impose a state of emergency allowing for an expansion of executive power. More commonly, however, subnational governments can make formal emergency or disaster declarations under emergency frameworks such as the [Disaster Management Act in South Africa](#) or [India](#), or the [Civil Contingency Act](#) in the United Kingdom. These declarations may unlock certain emergency powers such as the authority to order evacuations or to circumvent ordinary procurement processes, but these powers are pre-determined and limited and therefore distinct from the broad expansion of executive power under a national state of emergency.

1.2 LOCAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ROLES

In conventional emergency management frameworks for routine and non-routine emergencies (see [Policy Brief #02](#)), local governments are typically designated as critical first responders, tasked with assessing the situation, containing destruction, and providing immediate care to those affected.

Where an emergency overwhelms the response capacity of local governments, national responders are positioned to step in and take over the coordination of the response. In the most extreme situations, national governments typically hold legal authority to declare a 'state of emergency', granting the executive sweeping powers to take immediate action which can sometimes involve the circumvention of the legislature, derogations from basic rights and freedoms, and, significantly, the recentralisation of power at the national level until the emergency is under control.

1.3 EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE DOMAINS AFFECTED BY MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE

Table 1 establishes a general picture of the relationship between emergency governance domains (defined and detailed in [Policy Brief #01](#)) and multilevel governance in the context of responding to complex emergencies. This overview is based on general and reasoned judgements by the EGI research team on the level of influence between different emergency governance domains on the one hand, and two dimensions of multilevel governance on the other: shifting powers (political, fiscal, and administrative) between different levels of government and the coordination of emergency responses (vertically, sectorally and territorially).

By definition, the emergency governance domain most impacted by multilevel governance arrangements is coordination and integration across governmental units. Complex emergencies such as COVID-19 have illustrated the degree to which vertical, sectoral and territorial coordination are [undergoing stress tests](#) as part of the emergency response, due to inherent tensions between urgency and efficiency, and dialogue and multi-actor engagement. Other domains that have an influence on – and are influenced by – multilevel governance include administrative capacity and organisational resilience, local response and strategic direction, and authority and leadership.

Table 1: Multilevel governance and selected emergency governance domains

The strength of influence between different emergency governance domains and shifting powers and coordination as part of multilevel emergency governance. Based on reasoned judgements by EGI research team.

	POWER SHIFTS			COORDINATION		
	Political	Fiscal	Administrative	Vertical	Sectoral	Teritorial
Coordination and integration across governmental units	3	3	3	3	3	3
Administrative capacity and organisational resilience	3	2	2	3	3	2
Local response and strategic direction	3	2	2	3	3	3
Authority and leadership	3	2	2	2	2	2
Legal frameworks and constitutional arrangements	3	2	3	3	1	2
Democracy and representation	3	2	2	3	1	2
Information technology and data management	1	1	2	3	3	2
Cooperation and collaboration across key stakeholders	2	1	1	2	3	3
Communication and Consultation	3	1	1	2	3	2
Gender and governance	3	1	1	2	2	2
Transparency, accountability and integrity	2	1	2	1	1	1

1 indirect impact 2 direct impact in some cases 3 direct impact in many cases

In the following sections, this Analytics Note provides a review of COVID-19 emergency responses to illustrate the role of different governance levels in strategic decision-making and the adoption of vertical coordination mechanisms.

2. INFLUENCE OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

A total of 14 case studies were reviewed from a sample of federal, unitary, and quasi-federal states in order to analyse the influence subnational governments had within national COVID-19 response structures. The full list of countries and an assessment of their multilevel emergency response systems is outlined in Table 2. Sources and a more detailed analysis are contained in the Annex.

As expected, the ability of subnational governments to influence and direct the COVID-19 response in their jurisdictions largely followed pre-existing patterns of decentralisation. Subnational governments in federal countries were more likely to have a formal degree of influence over emergency strategy decision-making at the national level, and much more likely to have autonomy to impose lockdowns and other infection control measures within their jurisdictions.

All the federal countries sampled had significant autonomy to direct the emergency response within their jurisdictions, but the level of involvement of national government in guiding and coordinating these subnational responses varied. In Germany for example, [regular conferences](#) were held between the Länder government and federal authorities to discuss and coordinate strategy. Länder governments and local governments were also in regular contact. In Australia, state and territory leaders were represented on the [National Council](#), a forum founded by the Prime Minister to determine the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In these cases, there was a relative coherence between regional pandemic restrictions and open and formalised channels through which horizontal and vertical coordination could take place.

In other federal countries, national governments did not play a strong coordination role. In [Brazil](#) and the [United States](#), for example, there was little national coordination of state level responses, and state and local governments had a weak degree of influence on emergency strategy at the national level – due in part to the polarised political climates in both countries. The pandemic response in both Brazil and the US was highly politicised, with [President Trump](#) and [President Bolsonaro](#) resistant to the introduction of restrictive infection control measures and opposed to lockdown measures and mask mandates introduced

at the state level. Given this situation, some states convened independently to coordinate restrictions between their jurisdictions. The states of California, Washington and Oregon, for example, [created a pact](#) in April 2020 to coordinate and collaborate on their emergency responses, whilst in Brazil state governors came together to [lobby the President](#) to introduce a national lockdown.

In contrast, subnational governments in most of the unitary countries sampled had a weak level of control over the pandemic response within their jurisdictions, with infection control measures and lockdowns decided almost exclusively at the national level.

However, there was variation in the level of subnational government influence on national pandemic strategy in unitary countries. While subnational governments in the [United Kingdom](#)

and Egypt were left out of national-level advisory committees and decision-making bodies, municipalities in Chile were represented on the national [Social Committee for COVID-19](#), and in South Korea, districts and regions were represented at daily meetings of the [Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters](#) at the height of the pandemic.

While the position of subnational governments in pandemic response structures was primarily impacted by pre-existing levels of decentralisation, political rivalries and commitments at the national level were also major influencing factors. Despite having a unitary structure, subnational governments in South Korea, for example, could be said to have had more of a formal influence on the national level strategic responses than states in the US.

Table 2: Influence and autonomy of subnational governments in the COVID-19 emergency response

Governance structure	Country	Emergency 'command centre' coordination body at national level	Level of subnational influence at national level	Level of subnational autonomy on response within their jurisdictions
Federal	United States	Federal Emergency Management Agency, Centre for Disease Control	Weak degree of influence [1]	Significant degree of autonomy
	Switzerland	Federal Council Coronavirus Crisis Unit (March – June 2020) [2]	Significant degree of influence [3]	Significant degree of autonomy
	Germany	The Federal Ministry of Health [4]	Significant degree of influence [5],[6]	Significant degree of autonomy [7]
	India	National Disaster Management Authority [8]	Medium degree of influence [9]	Significant degree of autonomy [10]
	Ethiopia	COVID-19 National Ministerial Committee	Weak degree of influence [11]	Significant degree of autonomy [12]
	Brazil	Inter-ministerial Executive Group on Public Health Emergency of National and International Importance [13]	Weak degree of influence [14]	Significant degree of autonomy [15]
	Australia	National Cabinet	Significant degree of influence [16]	Significant degree of autonomy [17]
Unitary	France	Inter-ministerial Crisis Unit	Weak degree of influence [18]	Medium degree of autonomy [19]
	United Kingdom	UK Health Security Agency [20]	Weak degree of influence [21]	Weak degree of autonomy [22]
	Chile	Oficina Nacional de Emergencia del Ministerio del Interior (ONEMI)	Medium degree of influence [23]	Weak degree of autonomy [24]
	South Korea	Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters	Medium degree of influence [25]	Weak degree of autonomy [26]
	Egypt	The Higher Committee for Novel Coronavirus Crisis Management	Weak degree of influence [27]	Weak degree of autonomy
Quasi-Federal	Spain	Ministry of Health and other national ministries	Medium degree of influence [23]	Medium degree of autonomy [29]
	South Africa	National Coronavirus Command Council [30]	Weak degree of influence [27]	Weak degree of autonomy [32]

3. SHIFTING POWER BY GOVERNMENT SECTOR

The broad impact of emergencies on multilevel governance is often multifaceted and dynamic, with some sectors affected more or less than others, and powers and responsibilities sometimes shifting back and forth between government levels throughout the emergency period.

Table 3 presents examples of COVID-19 related shifts towards centralisation or decentralisation for key government sectors. Many of these effects are indirect and may take years to develop fully. Lockdowns, for example, have typically been decided at the national level and could potentially have a significant impact on the future spatial organisation of cities if patterns of remote working and localisation prove durable. While this does not represent a formal centralisation of responsibility for spatial planning (typically at the subnational level), the legacy of national lockdowns is likely to influence spatial planning considerably in the future. This can be seen as indirect centralisation in the sense that future choices of subnational governments in this sector may be constrained.

Lockdowns and bans on public gatherings instigated at the national level have also had a major impact on the finances of

sectors such as culture and transportation. Where these sectors are under the control of subnational governments, lockdown restrictions can indirectly contribute to the centralisation of these sectors through constraints on finances. In the United Kingdom for example, transport companies were forced to appeal to the national government for [bailouts](#) due to the financial strain of reduced ridership during lockdowns. Bailout funds were granted with policy conditions, effectively centralising control of certain aspects of the transport sector. Indirect centralisation can also take place through national governments mandating action in sectors for which subnational governments have primary responsibility. National requirements impacting staffing or cleaning regimens at care homes or orders to close educational institutions are forms of indirect centralisation.

The strongest form of centralisation in response to the pandemic has generally been in the health sector. As noted in Table 3, according to an [OECD survey](#) recentralisation of health care was more common than decentralisation. Half the countries surveyed altered the division of responsibilities for health care during the pandemic, with the majority centralising health care to some extent. Some countries centralised certain healthcare activities and decentralised others, although exclusive decentralisation of health care was uncommon.

Table 3: Examples of shifting powers between government levels linked to COVID-19 emergency

Sector	Decentralisation /Centralisation effects
Health	Centralisation: According to a survey of 18 countries conducted by the OECD in June 2020, recentralisation of health care was more common than decentralisation. Half of the countries surveyed altered the division of responsibilities for health care during the pandemic, either through decentralisation or recentralisation. Of these countries, the majority responded to the crisis through centralising health care to some extent e.g. in Germany, the Bundestag amended the Infection Protection Act in mid-March to expand the power of the Federal Health Ministry, enabling it to redistribute medical personnel across the Federation, amongst other things. Some countries responded by centralising some health care activities and decentralising others. Exclusively decentralising health care was uncommon.
Culture	Centralisation: Shutdown of cultural venues has been typically decided at the national level. In Belgium, where the cultural sector is highly decentralised , museums and other venues were ordered to close by the national government.
Utilities	Centralisation: In New York State, Governor Cuomo introduced legislation in June 2020 which prevented public and private utility companies from shutting off essential services to residents during the pandemic. This applied to municipal utility companies.
Economic Development	Centralisation: In April 2020, the US Federal Government setup an Emergency Broadband Benefit Program to help lower the cost of internet access for eligible households during the COVID-19 pandemic. Centralisation: National level economic stimulus packages have been the major feature of the economic response to the pandemic. These measures have a significant impact on local economies, and stimulus spending can influence future policy decisions of local governments, for example through national level subsidies for green transitions .
Housing	Centralisation: In September 2020, the federal Centre for Disease Control in the US imposed a national moratorium on rental evictions for non-payment of rent. This was an unprecedented act impacting the housing sector which is typically controlled at state and local levels.
Education	Centralisation: Decisions on whether to close schools and other educational facilities was largely taken by national and state governments. For example, in South Korea, the national government took the decision to close schools in Seoul in response to a rise in cases in August 2020.

Urban Transport

Centralisation: In some countries, national governments established new standards for urban transport operations. For example, in Colombia, the national government ruled that public transport vehicles operate with a maximum of 35 per cent of their capacity.

Centralisation: The pandemic put severe strain on public transport finances and in the UK, for example, transport authorities at the city level were forced to appeal to the national government for bailouts. These funds eventually came with policy conditions, effectively centralising some control of the public transport sector.

Decentralisation: In many countries, local authorities tested new and radical solutions for the re-distribution of urban street space in support of non-motorised transport and place functions of streets. These interventions were tested and mostly confirmed by courts or federal agencies, Germany being a good case study. The UK introduced emergency transport regulations at the national level to empowered local authorities to bypass standard consultation processes for such interventions.

Policing and Security

Decentralisation: In the UK, the Coronavirus Act 2020 granted local authorities emergency powers to test, detain and isolate a person where there are reasonable grounds to think that they may be infected. In Austria, state governments were responsible for implementing quarantine decisions taken at the federal level, but they had some autonomy to apply stricter measures such as imposing quarantine measures on smaller regions with high infection rates.

4. COORDINATION MECHANISMS

This section presents an overview of the prevalence of different types of coordination mechanisms, as observed by the EGI research team in its review of multilevel emergency governance during the COVID-19 response. These mechanisms, detailed in [Policy Brief #04](#), have been used to coordinate the pandemic response vertically, across different levels of government; sectorally, amongst different government sectors within the same government unit; and territorially, between government units at the same level.

As shown in Table 4, the most common coordination mechanisms across all sectors was emergency strategies as central references, information and communication technology and the concentration of executive powers. While multi-stakeholder

platforms were a prominent feature of the COVID-19 response, particularly regarding scientific and multi-sectoral advocacy committees guiding responses at national levels, consensus building across a wider group of stakeholders was not necessarily part of this coordination mechanism.

Table 4 also shows which other coordination mechanisms may have been underutilised, for example capacity building of individuals and teams, and adjusting sectoral/geographic boundaries to emergency needs. While knowledge and experience exchange initiatives such as [UCLG's Live Learning Experience](#) and [Metropolis' Cities for Global Health](#) platform has enabled coordination at the territorial level between subnational levels, there are few knowledge exchange initiatives between national and local government levels.

Table 4 : Prevalence of coordination mechanisms

(As observed by the EGI research team in its review of multilevel emergency governance during the COVID-19 response)

COVID-19 Emergency Coordination			
	Vertical	Sectoral	Territorial
Establish emergency strategies as a central reference	3	3	2
Make extensive use of information and communications technology	3	2	2
Expand and concentrate power of the executive (e.g. through a taskforce)	2	2	2
Enhance collaboration of key stakeholders for each emergency nexus	2	2	2
Carefully appoint emergency leadership team based on specific emergency requirements	2	2	1
Incorporate cross-sectoral decision-making in all sectoral decisions	1	2	2
Focus on the management of interrelated tasks and or milestones	1	2	1
Redistribute resources based on multi-criteria assessments	2	1	2
Foster knowledge and experience exchange alongside a collaborative culture	1	2	1
Promote consultation or consensus building through multi-stakeholder councils or platforms	1	1	1
Adjust sectoral/geographical boundaries to emergency needs	1	2	1
Invest in the capacity building of individuals, groups, and society	1	1	1

1 in certain cases 2 prevalent 3 very prevalent

ANNEX

Notes on Table 2

United States

[1] Although states had significant autonomy to impose their own infection control measures, there were little formal influencing channels for states and other subnational authorities to input into federal infection response strategies [COVID-19: A Case Study into American Federalism - FIU Law](#)

Switzerland

[2] The Federal Council Coronavirus Crisis Unit was dissolved at the same time as a decision was taken to shift responsibility for the response from the federal government to the cantons. <https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-79522.html>

[3] The Conference of Cantonal Governments (CdC) held regular special meetings and the Secretary General of the CdC is a member of the Confederation's crisis staff group. <https://rm.coe.int/cddg-2020-20e-final-reportdemocraticgovernancecovid19-for-publication-/1680a0beed>

Germany

[4] <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03003930.2021.1904398>

[5] The Länder governments had primary responsibility for introducing infection control measures. Regular conferences were held to coordinate infection control measures between the federal government and Länder governments. The Länder and local administrations were also in regular contact. <https://rm.coe.int/cddg-2020-20e-final-reportdemocraticgovernance-covid19-for-publication-/1680a0beed>

[6] Joint guidelines to slow down the spread of the coronavirus, adopted in March 2020, represented a convergence in strategy amongst the Länder governments, facilitated by the federal government. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03003930.2021.1904398>

[7] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3637013

India

[8] <https://ndma.gov.in/>

[9] The National Disaster Management Agency does not have formal representation from states. However, during the early days of the pandemic, there were regular video conferences between the prime minister and chief ministers. <http://www.forumfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/IndiaCOVID3.pdf>

[10] The Epidemic Diseases Act 1897 grants states primary responsibility for infection control. They have authority to impose bans on public gathering and close schools and other educational establishments. <http://www.forumfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/IndiaCOVID3.pdf>

Ethiopia

[11] Political divisions in Ethiopia during the COVID-19 pandemic impacted coordination. <http://www.forumfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EthiopiaCOVID-1.pdf>

[12] The national constitution allows states the power to declare a state of emergency in the event of an epidemic if necessary, in order to control infection. <http://www.forumfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EthiopiaCOVID-1.pdf>

Brazil

[13] <https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/5/10/e003549.full.pdf>

[14] The COVID-19 response in Brazil led to repeated disagreements between the president and state governors over strategy. The fragmented political situation led to difficulties in coordinating an emergency response. <https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2410/241066211017/html/>

[15] State governors have authority to impose lockdowns in their jurisdictions. <https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20210304-sao-paulo-locks-down-as-brazil-s-daily-covid-19-deaths-reach-new-high>

Australia

[16] Federal, state and territory leaders are all represented on the National Cabinet which coordinates COVID-19 strategy. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/may/29/coag-is-no-more-national-cabinet-here-to-stay-with-focus-on-post-covid-job-creation>

[17] State leaders can impose lockdowns in their jurisdictions. <https://www.nsw.gov.au/covid-19/rules>

France

[18] Subnational authorities are not represented in the Inter-ministerial Crisis Unit. However, decisions are communicated at the local level to the Préfets, which are appointed state representatives at the local level, through the Centre Opérationnel de Gestion Interministérielle de Crise (COGIC) situated in the Ministry of the Interior. <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/building-resilience-to-the-covid-19-pandemic-the-role-of-centres-of-government-883d2961/>

[19] Although Préfectures are not subnational elected entities, but rather deconcentrated institutions, they allowed to some extent territory-based responses to the pandemic (compared to measures that were applied in the whole country). Neither local and regional governments nor the préfets have the power to impose lockdowns, but after May 2020 the latter were given the authority to restrict public gatherings, and make decisions on mask mandates, as well as to impose curfews and lockdown measures decided by the préfets of some French overseas territories in the Caribbean. <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-territorial-impact-of-covid-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-of-government-d3e314e1/>

United Kingdom

[20] <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/containing-and-managing-local-coronavirus-covid-19-outbreaks/covid-19-contain-framework-a-guide-for-local-decision-makers>

[21] COVID-19 strategy was determined by the national cabinet. The mayors of metropolitan regions publicly complained about the lack of consultation <https://www.thebusinessdesk.com/northwest/news/2063177-metro-mayors-joint-plea-to-government-on-vital-coronavirus-testing-data>

[22] Local authorities did not have authority to impose their own infection control measures.

Chile

[23] The national government established a Social Committee for COVID-19, constituted by representatives of municipal associations, government authorities, academics and health professionals. This body meets twice a week. <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-territorial-impact-of-covid-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-of-government-d3e314e1/>

[24] Local lockdowns were imposed in Chile, but these were decided by the national Ministry. <https://www.jogh.org/documents/2021/jogh-11-05002.htm>

South Korea

[25] The strategic body responsible for COVID-19 strategy is the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters. This body met daily during the period when the risk level was Red, and the meetings included the Prime Minister, national ministers and representatives of all cities and districts. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MENA-Covid-19-Survey-South-Korea-Dyer-June-14-2021.pdf>

[26] While there were local lockdowns in South Korea, these were decided by the national Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency. [Seoul heads for lockdown as infections spiral in South Korea | Coronavirus | The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/15/seoul-heads-for-lockdown-as-infections-spiral-in-south-korea-coronavirus)

Egypt

[27] During workshops conducted by the EGI on Multilevel Governance and Coordination in April 2021, participants from Egypt reported that subnational governments had little influence on the national level COVID-19 response policy. For more information on these workshops, see [Policy Brief 04](#).

Spain

[28] The Conference of Presidents, constituted by the Spanish President and the Presidents of the Autonomous Communities and cities of Ceuta and Melilla met regularly via video call at the outset of the pandemic. The Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces was also part of the Security Coordination Centre (CECOR). <https://rm.coe.int/cddg-2020-20e-final-reportdemocraticgovernancecovid19-for-publication-/1680a0beed>

[29] After accusations of recentralisation from Barcelona, President Sánchez offered the option of declaring a regional state of alarm to each of the 17 regions, granting them more discretion

to manage the situation in their jurisdictions directly. Autonomous Communities have the authority to impose curfews. more discretion to manage the situation in their jurisdictions directly. Autonomous Communities have the authority to impose curfews. <https://www.barcelona.cat/covid19/en/measures-combat-covid-19-barcelona>

South Africa

[30] http://www.forumfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Covid-19_Multi-Level_Governance_Transgression_Innovations_SouthAfrica.pdf

[31] There was no subnational representation on the National Coronavirus Command Council, which determined COVID-19 strategy in the early days of the pandemic. The Intergovernmental Committee on Disaster Management, which includes the President and all nine provincial Ministers, was not significantly mobilised during the pandemic response. http://www.forumfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Covid-19_Multi-Level_Governance_Transgression_Innovations_SouthAfrica.pdf

[32] No subnational lockdowns. <https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/514988/its-time-for-south-africa-to-look-at-localised-and-provincial-lockdowns-economists/>