

Endnotes on the European *Heimat*

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This paper takes its point of departure from an article in which I critically explore Denys Hay's book *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea* (Glendinning, 'The Formation of European Studies', 2026). First written in the 1950s and then revised in the 1960s, Hay's book argues for the view that the idea that we have of Europe today is of a relatively recent vintage. Indeed, it is only since the Second World War that it emerges with the kind of spatial and cultural unity that would make it fit for a distinctive form of regional studies. Hay conceived such studies as having their centre of gravity in concrete problems that, since the War, have stood in the way of intensifying that unity; concrete problems in, especially, politics, economics, and law, which closer union would raise. The conception of the proper formation of European studies advanced by Hay – with its focus on politics, economics, and law – is the conception that was to become mainstream. It is a conception in which regional studies of Europe do not centrally require any sort of contribution from the humanities. My original article explores Hay's argument for that view, and offers a counterargument to the effect that, in light of the fundamental changes in the humanities since the 1960s, European Studies today would in fact significantly benefit from incorporating humanities elements and approaches into its formation.

In the present text, the central claims of my original article are presented (mostly) independently of Hay's book. However, to this significantly reduced text, I have added something entirely new: endnotes. The original article was not without notes, but they were kept to a minimum so as not to obscure the key line of argument. However, the notes grew significantly following a reading of that argument by the referee for this working paper series – and they now stand as a continuous line of argument in their own right.

Perhaps rather perversely, I recommend that, having read these introductory remarks, you now simply put the main text to one side and *just read the endnotes*. What is attempted

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there is something more than I was able to do in the original article: I explore the possibility of undertaking studies of Europe worthy of the name.

The text to which these endnotes are attached, ostensibly the main text, presents merely the bare bones of the argument of my original article. If you want to read this very short version of my original article, please do. I begin it here as I do in the original article with a somewhat baffling pair of observations, observations which together form what I hazard to call 'the paradox of European Studies'.

The Paradox of European Studies

With regard to academic texts in which Europe comes centrally into view, we might venture two summary observations. Each is striking, but taken together they appear to form two lemmas of a paradox:

Lemma 1: Conceived as studies of human universality, scholarship in the traditional humanities should not be focused on Europe, but it is.

Lemma 2: Conceived as studies of European integration, academic research on Europe should be focused on Europe, but it is not.

The first lemma results from the fact that studies of humanity shaped by the humanist universalism of the traditional humanities consistently fail to acknowledge that their approach to their object is marked by a pervasive Euronormativity. (A set of assumptions concerning the comparative superiority of European humanity.) In the name of cultivating (what is called) a 'more refined humanity', studies in the traditional humanities actually only pursue studies of historico-cultural Europe: very little interest is shown in the ways of life of non-Europeans. 'They talked of "humanity" but instead of taking the whole planet into their field of vision they stared fixedly at a few European countries.' (Spengler, *The Hour of Decision*: p. 150). Hence Lemma 1.

The second lemma results from the fact that studies of Europe shaped by the empirical methods of the modern social sciences consistently fail to acknowledge that the object of their approach is marked by exactly the same pervasive Euronormativity. (The same set of

assumptions concerning the comparative superiority of European humanity.) In the name of pursuing research into (what is called) 'Europe', work in the modern social sciences actually only pursues studies of a geographical region: very little interest is shown in the cultural history through which 'European humanity' comes to be. And absent that, there is not much left. 'They refer to "Europe" as it is understood geographically, as on a map, as if thereby the group of people that live together in this territory could define European humanity.' (Husserl, 'The Vienna Lecture': p. 27). Hence Lemma 2.

If they both hold, the two lemmas together would generate a paradoxical conclusion:

When studies of Europe are not undertaken as studies of Europe they are, and when they are undertaken as studies of Europe they are not.

I will not seek to provide a way of escaping this paradox. This is because only the second lemma still holds today. What I am calling Euronormativity (what is often called European ethnocentrism or Eurocentrism) has been strongly and widely criticised by humanities scholars since at least the late 1960s.¹ As a result, the humanities have undergone a profound reformation: humanist universalism is no longer its mainstream formation. While I have many reservations about its new mainstream formation, I think developments in the contemporary humanities can helpfully contribute to making it so that studies of Europe today can keep in touch with what remains of a distinctively European cultural identity. And hence are better placed to become studies of Europe that really are studies of Europe.²

The Formation of European Studies

While the name 'Europe' obviously has a long history, it is only since the Second World War that a self-consciousness began to emerge which saw academics beginning to imagine the development of regional studies of Europe.³ What the new researchers wanted to avoid, however, were fantasies where Europe as a regional culture imagines itself the head of a universal process of the civilisation of 'Man'. One of the basic convictions of European humanism, the celebrated humanism of the humanities, is the idea that European humanity embodies an exemplary and universalizable model for 'Man' conceived as the uniquely rational animal. This kind of approach to studies of Europe was something the post-war social

scientists clearly wanted to rein back. Europe should become in its self-consciousness what it was anyway fast becoming in reality: one regional culture among others.

There was something overwhelmingly welcome in this effort. And yet these new regional studies of Europe have to confront a peculiarly challenging feature of their research object as a historico-cultural formation. The distinctively European cultural unity that should be one comparably regional culture among others came to be such a cultural unity only by way of comparisons through which it absolutely did not conceive itself as one regional culture among others. That is, the very view of the world that shaped the way of life of the emerging peoples of Europe is not independent from these newly self-conscious Europeans supposing themselves to have an attained superiority over all others, all non-Europeans.

It is not obvious that the evaluative assessments of qualitative differences between Europeans and non-Europeans that gave rise to the sense of Europe's comprising a distinctive cultural unity would or could simply disappear just because Europe had become self-consciously regional. On the contrary, one might suppose. In any case, there is no question that what originally gave it the sense of cultural unity that it came to have as a region, was 'Europe' emerging for itself as what had been conceived as '*the sole home*' of those civilisational attributes which, as it was put, 'distinguish man from brute creation' (Hay: p. 121, emphasis mine).

Western metaphysics profoundly informs this European self-understanding. The metaphysics of the European West has its ground in a conception of the human being that affirms a radical break between what that metaphysics calls 'Man' (the uniquely rational animal) and what it calls brute (non-rational) animals. This conception has also underpinned the sense of European comparative superiority in relation to this universally human condition. Of all rational creatures, 'we, the Europeans' are, we have liked to think, the most rationally advanced, the most civilised, the least beastly of all. Europeans supposing themselves superior to non-Europeans was decisive to the formation of the very cultural unity that the new researchers in post-War European studies wanted to explore.

That sense of the culture of Europe as the *avant-garde* in the progress of 'Man' towards full rational perfection was hard-wired into the humanism of the traditional humanities – hence the first lemma – and the social scientists rightly recoil from it. But it was not only hard-

wired into that. It was hard-wired into Europe's modern cultural identity quite generally, and that is a different order of problem for academic studies that have their focus on specifically European places. The attained coherence of Europe as a regional unity had been historically inseparable from a European conviction concerning its overall cultural superiority. It is not obvious that a project of regional studies of Europe (if that is what it is) can escape that historically constitutive condition.

The challenge is clear if troubling. Can the historico-cultural content that had given to 'Europe' a meaning that would make it suitable for regional studies be inherited without thereby inheriting its sense of the *cultural* exemplarity of European humanity – and even more problematically some sense of its *racial* supremacy?

Through a renewed attention to the Myth of Europa, I believe it can.⁴ For with that myth in view, we can come to see that at the origin of 'Europe' we find the idea of the departure-from-the-origin. In other words, the only settled condition for those who have called themselves (to be) 'European' is the (traumatic) experience of the possibility of making a break with every settled condition.⁵ And with that we also find the idea of a break with every nativism. Indeed, we see the chance for a distinctively European calling: the call for a way to be in which people are connected, above all, by '*elective affinities*', by a feeling of 'being at home' that, however 'natural' it may be experienced, remains 'voluntary', and hence, let's be clear, has nothing whatsoever to do with 'today's [zoological] belief in race' (Spengler: p. 59).⁶

But with the history and identity of European culture shunted to the side in the mainstream of European Studies as it developed after the Second World War, Europe appears there as an essentially geographical concept: any residual interest in European humanity is reduced to empirical studies of an aggregate of human beings, who are currently present at hand in a particular spatial region of the global totality (even if each are credited with their personal identities, values, community feelings, opinions, preferences and wishes, but without further sense of a distinctive European identity, whether cultural or otherwise). This is of course the essence of the second lemma – and it should not be left intact. We need to recover an interest in the culture and identity of European humanity within European Studies. Indeed, unless we do so, ideas of what is distinctive about Europeans, ideas based on supposedly present-at-hand 'realities' of these people, can seem explicable only in terms of

supposedly objective differentiating characteristics: racial characteristics,⁷ and with that the politics of 'race purity' emerges in forms that can become very hard to dislodge.⁸ Let's return then to Europe's cultural history and identity and consider how we might rethink the formation of European Studies.

The Reformation of European Studies

It is perhaps uncontroversial that understanding the emergence of modern Europe cannot ignore the profound significance of the reformation schism in Western Christianity that gets underway in the 14th and 15th centuries. The growing division in the unity of Christendom had a powerful role in giving rise to an emerging idea of a 'Europe' that might yet overcome divisions. Christendom, home of the 'universal church', is fundamental here since Christendom's territorial limits were conceived by Christian scholars as also Europe's. With that in view, a movement could get underway where the latter came to usurp the weakened unity of the former, and not merely territorially. Over time the idea of the one simply merged with the idea of the other.⁹

We should be clear about the idea of Europe that emerges in this merger. It is precisely in a cultural context marked by the Christian appropriation of Greek metaphysics that, to be a Christian had meant to possess 'full humanity in opposition to the brute beasts' (Hay: 56). And it was not only the brute beasts. 'Barbarians', non-Christians were excluded from full humanity too because 'the barbarians [...] live in a brutish fashion' (Hay: p. 33). The humanism central to the traditional humanities is already fully installed here. But not only in the humanities: it is fully installed everywhere in Europe, at the heart of the emerging idea of Europe itself. And it stays fully installed in European conceptions, religious or secular, of a universal history of human perfectibility and progress that would announce the future attainment of a civilised condition of 'full humanity' for all humanity, however beastly non-Europeans (or even some Europeans 'in our very midst') may currently be. For now, however, 'Europe' is 'the sole home' of anything like that attained condition. Once again, the only thing that would give a sense of a cultural unity in relation to regional studies of Europe might be coherently conducted, is a cultural history of Eurocentric supremacy.

The retrenchment of Europe since the Second World War led to a shrinking back from the old colonial form of its cultural self-understanding. But it was not the end of that vision. The promise of the Christian religious character of a globally attained universality was increasingly conceived in terms of the exemplary rational character of its politics and especially the cosmopolitics of its regionally attained pacific union. Indeed, the Euronormativity of its missionary and colonial modernity still readable in conceptions of contemporary Europe as, precisely, a normative power.

It is of course true to say that the decade after the Second World War marked a crucial turning point Europe's cultural history. The missionary and colonial model of European world-wide-isation became increasingly visible, and increasingly unacceptable, as it always had been for non-Europeans. It was becoming clear too that what the dinosaurs in the traditional humanities were still doing just 'made explicit' what had been tacitly the case 'for centuries': the humanism, the presumed universalism of the humanities was European through and through. It was the ethnocentric, androcentric and Eurocentric study of 'Dead White European Males', as we might now say, in light of more recent studies...in the humanities.

And there's the rub. It is undeniable that, in the European West, it has primarily been scholarship in the humanities, and first in that respect, scholarship in European philosophy, that has taken up the challenge of cultivating a very critical attitude towards Europe's long-dominant humanist metaphysics and the humanism of the humanities that characterises the first lemma. Indeed, for the last 50 years reflecting on and calling into question the presumed universalism of the humanities became *the* central theme of academic research in the humanities.

And I believe – if the second lemma is to be overcome – the critical attitude to ethnocentrism, androcentrism and Eurocentrism that has been widely cultivated in the contemporary humanities must now, belatedly, make its way back into the regional studies of Europe too. In short, we need to see a return of the humanities into the academic research on Europe that had quite rightly sought to exclude it in its first formation. What's needed then is a reformation of European studies that promises to carry its mainstream towards a new self-

consciousness, a new condition beyond its presently settled condition. Nothing could be more European.

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Endnotes on an Ending

¹ In the introductory remarks to this paper, I stated that there have been fundamental changes in the humanities since the 1960s – and that European Studies today would significantly benefit from incorporating elements and approaches from these now reformed humanities into its own formation. However, this should not be taken to suggest that the humanities today are now miraculously problem-free. The normative consensus of research in the humanities in the European West today is that ‘Euronormativity’ or ‘Eurocentrism’ is unacceptable, intolerable. I do not demur from that. Indeed, it is because the now reformed humanities does not get caught up in Eurocentric presuppositions that it promises something better overall. However, I want to add that the anti-Eurocentric recoil that marks so much of the mainstream of that contemporary consensus today is *also* intolerable. We need to take seriously that anti-Eurocentrism in the European West is just as problematic as the Eurocentrism it recoils from. I am with Derrida in thinking that ‘we today no longer want either *Eurocentrism* or *anti-Eurocentrism*’ (Derrida, *The Other Heading*, p. 13, emphasis in original. See also Glendinning, *Europe: A Philosophical History, Part 1*, pp. 6-9 and Glendinning, *Europe: A Philosophical History, Part 2*, pp. 33-37).

This is not a merely theoretical issue or an issue for ‘theory’. As Richard Rorty warned as early as 1998, the relentless critique of the European West in the mainstream of the contemporary humanities is potentially catastrophic, leaving the future of democracy in peril. Without the cultural ballast provided by the commitment of intellectuals to the ethos of their own societies, public confidence can simply melt away – and then people wind up ‘looking for a strongman’ instead (Rorty, *Achieving Our Country*, pp. 89-90). Indeed. As a contribution to providing such cultural ballast, the attempt is made in these endnotes to provide a sketch for a standpoint that I consider fitting for a study of Europe worthy of the name. I pursue this idea by attempting to keep what remains of a distinctively European ‘*Heimat*’ – Europe as the site of a distinctive formation of a *situated existence* – in view. The endnotes are continuous, so as I say, you can read this supplementary addition without reading the article to which they are attached. They are standalone endnotes (and can in fact be read as notes on an end) with respect to the article but not with respect to each other. I commend them to you in that form.

² How might we set up the space of inquiry for studies of Europe that might promise something better than we have seen hitherto – a space that promises to go beyond either Eurocentrism or anti-Eurocentrism. A helpful way of stating the challenges facing us here can be expressed in terms of two approaches to the concept of the European ‘home’ or ‘*Heimat*’ that have problems built into them. (For those who are interested, these approaches mirror the structure of the paradox of European studies outlined in the main paper.)

The first approach is one that conducts studies of a culture without reference to a *territorial* home; the second is one that conducts studies of a territory without reference to a home *culture*. Speaking rather roughly, the first would be the approach visible in the traditional humanities (where the intended scholarly focus is ‘human universality’) and the second the approach found in the empirical social sciences (where the intended research focus is European integration).

To say that latter has its focus on territory rather than culture would be misleading if that is taken to suggest that such inquiries are merely an exercise in physical geography. No, at issue here are empirical studies of an aggregate of human beings (each with their personal identities, values, community feelings, opinions, preferences and wishes) who are currently present at hand in a particular spatial region of the global totality. While I cannot pretend to give the last word (barely a first word) on what *studies of Europe that really are studies of Europe* should look like, my basic claim is that studies of Europe that are undertaken in either the ‘cultural’ or the ‘territorial’ way that I have just described, fall short of what one might reasonably expect from first rate studies of what, today, remains of a distinctively European ‘*Heimat*’ – where, as I suggest in the previous note, ‘*Heimat*’ refers here to an original unity of place and life that belongs to human beings living in a condition of at least some degree of a *situated existence*.

³ In his book *Europe: the Emergence of an Idea*, Denys Hay is keen to recognise the emergence of a self-consciousness of Europe as just such an original unity – and to regard it as a relatively recent development. Indeed, while academic interest in that unity really gets underway only after the Second World War, in both the original and the heavily ‘Revised Edition’ of his book Hay presents the idea as first clearly visible with Edmund Burke giving voice to just such a

unity in 1796, when he announced that ‘no European can be a complete exile in any part of Europe’ (Hay: p. 122).

While tracking the emergence of that idea of a European cultural/regional unity is what Hay wanted his history to contribute to most of all, his polemical intent was rather different. In that regard, his central interest was to underline the recentness of its full emergence, and hence to prepare the ground for a project of studies of Europe in the then post-War context that will have been freed from older legends and capable of countering newer myths about European history and identity. This history that matters for Hay does not reach back much further than the nineteenth century and even on that there is not much to be said. What really matters to him are ‘the severe realities of twentieth-century economic and military power’ (Hay: p. xix)).

The main argument of my original article was to show that the much older ‘transcendental legacies’ that Hay would prefer us to forget (ibid.) must, in fact, be integrated into studies of Europe worthy of the name. I will not rehearse that argument again here. However, the basic thought is nicely expressed in a line from Derrida’s *The Other Heading* with which the original article concludes, stressing that it’s just the thing about transcendental legacies that, even if we wanted to forget them we can’t – ‘since they do not forget us’ (Derrida: p. 13). ‘We, the Europeans’, do not have or receive the legacies that we inherit here. We *are* that inheritance. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding Hay’s commitment to Europe’s recentness as a cultural unity, his approach has just the kind of ambition that I want to encourage too: a study of Europe that concerns itself with Europe as an original unity of place and life. Hay wants to say that any such sense of Europe is relatively recent. I want to see the roots of that idea in the understanding of Europe elaborated in its own origin myth, the myth of Europa. I will explain this via a close consideration of Hay’s effort to incorporate it into his own scheme.

⁴ The inheritance of the Myth of Europa as Hay recalls it in *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea* is fundamentally in line with his overall sense of Europe’s recentness. The basic line of argument in that book is that the ‘Europe’ name begins its history as a merely geographical concept that overtime grows to acquire increasingly affective, social and political meaning (p. 55). So ‘transcendental legacies’ are thin and of minimal significance. Of course, it should be a problem for Hay that the name ‘Europe’ is, from the start, inseparable from the richly

contentful story of the Greek myth. (A related point can be made about the inherited Biblical story of Japheth which I explore at some length in the original article). One of the ways in which Hay attempts to prevent the mere existence of the Europa myth from undermining his semantic growth idea (his overall recentness thesis) is by presenting artistic representations of the myth as undergoing an exactly parallel growth history – so there is really nothing to be seen here. His art-historical account follows the four historical periods that mark the stages on the way of his overall growth story:

1. In the art of *Classical* antiquity, representations of Europa were, he claims, symbols ‘of passion’ but not at all of ‘politics’ (Hay: p. 5).
2. In art from the *Medieval* period, we still do not see ‘Europa as typifying the western world’ (p. 53). Indeed, pictorial representations of Europa at this time ‘lack life even as a mythological figure’ (Hay: p. 53), they are ‘devoid of life’ (Hay: p. 103), just as ‘Europe’ is itself, at this time, a name without significant ‘emotional content’ (Hay: p. 73).
3. In *Renaissance* art what one sees is a putative return to something Classical, in this case a revival of representations of the Europa myth that does have emotional content, now (and significantly), comparatively heightened: Europa representations are depicted with a ‘joyful sensuality’ (Panofsky cited by Hay: p. 103). Nevertheless, Hay will still insist that such artworks make ‘no contribution to the enrichment of a continental awareness’ (Hay: p. 103).
4. In *Modern* art, representations of the figure of Europa finally align with the semantically fully grown ‘Europe’, that had found its voice in Burke’s affirmation of a continental ‘home’ for all Europeans in 1796 (Hay: p. 122). What we find is the appearance of Europa in often suitably ‘domestic’ forms of art, art that has acquired what Hay absurdly calls the ‘charming intimacy’ of homely domesticity, where (goodness me) contemporary images of ‘the Rape of Europa [...] might decorate the boudoir’ (Hay: p. 123).

With respect to the content of the myth, not only does Hay not stop to consider the significance of the carrying away of Europa (the 'rapture') but he does not even pause to reflect on the significance of the fact that this is a scene of sexual violence (the 'rape'). Against Hay, we need to see that *all of this* belongs (for better and for worse) to the 'semantic content' of the 'Europe' name, and hence what it means to be European, and it does so from the origin. Indeed, it remains so, still today, as is clear from the Europe-transforming work of feminists and others who have drawn critical attention to the figure of Europa in relation to the androcentrism as well as to the ethnocentrism of the dominant Eurocentric European self-understanding.

On the other hand, even if one were to bracket these more recent developments, it remains altogether obscure how the frighteningly mediocre kitsch that Hay refers to as distinctively modern might be thought to possess greater unity awareness creating content for increasingly self-conscious Europeans than great works of Renaissance art. Surely, it is more credible to suppose that the sense of European unity that comes to *words* in Burke in 1796 and comes to practical *politics* after the Second World War is prefigured in the *art* of the Renaissance – and hence in the cultural world of Western or Gothic Christendom that bore the Renaissance and from which 'Europe' would later emerge? Indeed, wouldn't a more compelling cultural-art-historical view be to suppose that artworks that have represented the myth of Europa from the Renaissance to today have been fundamental to drawing those who are 'becoming-Europeans' into the 'there' (the 'somewhere where we are') of a distinctively European (in that name) '*Heimat*'? Are not such works a sort of illuminating projection of a world that would be originary for the 'home' of human groups that called themselves (to be) 'European'?

Pace Hay, then, one should not suppose that heightened 'emotional content' in representations of the myth – an affective register carried by our bodies – is a mere accretion to a merely geographical and conceptual understanding of 'Europe'. On the contrary, as Winston Churchill recognised, the latter is a residual sense that no longer speaks to what Europeans have known hitherto as 'our continent' (cited in Hay: p. xvii, fn1) – even if it really does mark the way in which Europeans have increasingly come to speak of it. How then might we rethink the myth?

⁵ In contrast to Hay's content-accretion reading, the reading of the myth I want to defend takes its bearings from what I consider to be the only fundamentally continuous feature of it; namely, *the idea of a traumatic break from the origin*. It is this feature – that the origin of Europe is inseparable from the idea and experience of a break with the origin – that enables us to affirm the possibility of a break with the universalist (and hence supremacist and missionary) content that the 'Europe' name has carried hitherto. Indeed, the possibility of breaking with every ethno-nativism is the only 'native' characteristic of what has called itself (to be) 'European' humanity: it is 'born' with it. As I say in the main text of this paper, this means that, from the origin, the only settled condition for those who have called themselves (to be) 'European' is the experience of the possibility of making a break with every settled condition.

This conception answers to one of the most longstanding characteristics of European culture, what one can call its capacity for self-transformation. However, in existentially distressing conditions of the global spread of an originally European modernity and the increasingly global *Heimatlosigkeit* that brings with it, atavistic nativism in Europe, a nostalgic yearning for supposedly lost original home or the biologicistic fantasies of race and race purity can, totally understandably, overtake and overwhelm us. Who's to say that this is not exactly what we see happening in the European West today?

It should be clear, however, that we will betray the very thing we want to save if we give in to attacks of atavistic nativism in this context. The legacy of a distinctively European ethos – and the '*uniquely* European idea of democracy' that belongs so centrally to that (Derrida, p. 78, emphasis in original) – needs lifeguards, vocal 'guardians' (Derrida, p. 29). Once again: without the cultural ballast provided by the commitment of intellectuals to the ethos of their own 'home' culture as theirs, wider public confidence can simply melt away – and then people wind up 'looking for a strongman' instead (Rorty, *Achieving Our Country*, pp. 89-90).

⁶ 'Ethos' is a key concept here. Indeed, when Spengler speaks of '*elective affinities*' to define the relationship between those who he supposes will live together in what he projects as 'nations of a new order about to arise' in Europe (*Spengler*: p. 58), he is borrowing the term (*Wahlverwandtschaft*) from his beloved Goethe. Of course, Goethe had himself borrowed it from 18th-century chemistry. There, 'elective affinity' had described how certain chemical

substances have a natural tendency to combine with some elements rather than others – a kind of chemical ‘preference’ or selective attraction. For this reason, Spengler’s appeal to it here might be thought yet another form of ethnocentric racism. However, while Goethe preserved the idea of seemingly inevitable or powerful ‘attractions’, he introduced a crucial tension: when applied to human relationships, these affinities become entangled with moral choice and social responsibility. When Spengler draws on Goethe’s concept, he is precisely *rejecting* the idea that the ‘men of race’ he is heralding should be conceived (as he puts it) in terms of ‘zoology’ rather than ‘ethos’ (Spengler: p. 225). It is further worth mentioning that Spengler anticipates that with the ‘nations of a new order’ that he envisages arising from ‘elective affinities’ in the years to come, ‘present-day nationalism will *disappear*’ in Europe (Spengler: p. 230).

⁷ Spengler is right to oppose every form of racial biologism. However, it is worth recalling that in shifting the emphasis to ‘ethos’ rather than ‘zoology’, he nevertheless supposes that there is a plausible contrast position to contemporary talk of ‘race’ that is at least worth considering. Indeed, Spengler develops a counter-conception of race that really is worth following up. It is a conception that starts from the polar opposite to biologism: for Spengler, is something that is strictly irreducible to anything visible in a corpse. I think Spengler is right to regard ‘physiological’ or ‘anatomical’ or otherwise ‘superficial’ conceptions of race, conceptions which produce ‘subdivisions *within the integral race “Man”*’ that are based on differences of skin tone, nose shape, eye shape, skull length, etc., as ‘without exception *worthless*’ (Spengler, *Decline II*, p. 125). Actually, they are worse than worthless, since they invariably end up producing corpses. How might one draw in a renewed thought of race into the thinking of the original unity of life and place that belongs to a *Heimat*.

⁸ I should make it clear that the kind of re-thinking a ‘politics of race’ that I regard as at least worthy of consideration does not only oppose itself to the biologicistic materialisms (and the related ‘blood and soil’ naturalisms and ethno-nationalisms) that made their way to dominance in Europe from the beginning of the eighteenth century and that have not gone away. In another direction, it would also oppose itself to those more contemporary efforts to endorse a variant in which talk of racial or ethnic supremacy is suppressed but is replaced by

a cultural or spiritual counterpart: a shift from zoological or biological racism to cultural or spiritual racism (see Derrida, *Of Spirit*, p. 40).

I am not suggesting, therefore, that we should affirm *racism without races* (disavowing biologism only to maintain the idea of the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others). On the contrary, in view would be the possibility of a conception that affirms the opposite: *races without racism*.

Well, perhaps that is *not* a serious possibility. And for that reason I hesitated to affirm any 'race' talk whatsoever in my original article. However, while the thought of race will doubtless always recall the biologicistic materialisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, perhaps the idea can still be inherited otherwise. Such a development is suggested by Spengler's attempt to outline a conception of race that, as Adorno put it, 'has nothing to do with that of the National Socialists' (Adorno, p. 320). For Spengler, 'race' is not only to be understood as totally invisible in anything 'a corpse displays' (Spengler, *Decline II*, p. 125) but it is also not something 'to which one *belongs*' as an instance of a (natural or cultural) kind (Spengler, *The Hour*, fn1, p. 225). Rather, it concerns the way in which *place* is intimately imbricated in one's *form of life*.

It is quite a step away from the old modern zoologies of race to insist that 'of all expressions of race, the purest is the House' (Spengler, *Decline II*, p. 120). And it is a further step away when this is coupled with the affirmation that there is absolutely nothing 'pure' here either: 'race purity is a grotesque word, [...] all [...] have been mixed [...] and have welcomed a stranger into the family' (Spengler, *The Hour*, p. 219). What I take to be a plausible Spenglerian idea of a 'race without racism' approach is one that would conceive describing a person as 'having race' not as a baldly natural *physiological fact*, nor something attained through *an educative process of cultural formation* but as a way of registering what is 'in the last resort' *a fundamentally individual physiognomic fact* about someone's form of life (Spengler, *Decline II*, p. 131), something the perception of which requires what Spengler calls 'physiognomic tact' (Spengler, *Decline II*, p. 475). This approach implies no comparative hierarchy of races *whatsoever* – only a contrast to a condition of not having it at all or hardly having it at all.

On the other hand, however, perhaps exactly that contrast is what we need to keep in view since *that* condition ('racelessness' in Spengler's sense) is perhaps inseparable from the increasingly planetary *Heimatlosigkeit* that Yuk Hui explores so well in *Post-Europe* as the (more or less) universal legacy of the global spread of European technological modernity (Hui, pp. 7-29). It would be that legacy which bequeaths Europeans today with an abstractly territorial conception of 'our continent' and bequeaths a 'style' of 'our houses' that threatens to become little more than a set of AI projections.

It is undeniable that classical discourses on race are inseparable from a 'blood and soil' politics that 'was reactionary and dangerous' (Hui, p. 18). In conditions of planetary *Heimatlosigkeit* – where the imbrication of place and life that marks a *situated existence* (the condition attained in life in a '*Heimat*') has been all but lost – it may be that any appeal to race today, Spenglerian or otherwise, will remain troubling, betraying a hopeless nostalgia for a condition of situated existence that almost no one has today. On this view, which I am inclined to accept, even if Spengler is right...he is too late.

⁹ While I have been highly critical of Hay's 'recentness' thesis, I do not want to suggest that his approach to the idea of Europe has nothing to recommend it. On the contrary, and in particular, I think his central claim, namely, that the idea of Europe emerges in modernity with a content that it inherits from Western Christendom is fundamentally correct. My worry is that he does not take his own finding sufficiently seriously. Once again, it is a transcendental legacy that he wants to forget. I do not want to forget it. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten either that Hay's 'merger' story is not entirely uncontroversial. I will close this endnote exergue on the idea of the European *Heimat* with a final reflection on the way Hay's merger account sets its cultural and spatial limits – a reflection that takes off from what, on the face of it, looks like a reasonable objection to Hay's 'emergence' idea.

The objection is that by defining the emerging idea of Europe through the lens of the limits of Western Christianity one thereby creates an Eastern boundary that excludes the Christian civilization that exists within what most would now consider unproblematically European territory, particularly the Balkans, parts of modern-day Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and other southeastern European regions. True enough – but, in my view, Hay's good point here is that it was in the space occupied by Western or Gothic Christianity and not by Eastern

or Byzantine Christianity that internal developments (especially Reformation fragmentation) commence a cultural history in which the old name 'Europe' begins to be used more frequently in public life.

The objection might continue at this point: surely this creates an originally West-leaning understanding of the emergence of the 'Europe' name. Yes, one can only agree. That is, I do not think this is an objection. Look, there is no objective, spatial or self-contained 'continental' region called 'Europe' that includes those now unarguably European places East of the old limits of Western Christendom. So, there is no covenant in reason or fact to include what is being proposed we should include. Of course, part of what I am saying here is precisely that these are now unarguably European places – but that is a European enlargement: there is no doubt that the already available 'Europe' name starts to be used first in relation to that Western space.

All this is, however, utterly secondary to the enlargement challenge that really marks our time: what Heidegger calls 'planetary Europeanisation' (Heidegger, *Vigils and Nocturne*, p. 185). Whether, as Heidegger puts it, 'Europe shelters in its path' something that might one day 'overtake' that planetary process (ibid.) ultimately depends on something I have wanted at least to retain as a possibility: first rate studies of what, today, remains of a distinctively European '*Heimat*'. If that is simply gone, *if such studies are, in fact, no longer possible*, well ('when the whole earth has melted into the European') 'Europe is at an end' and what had hitherto been conceived as studies of things European might make their way without attending unduly on the old cultural-territorial place called 'Europe'. Within the movement of global planetaryisation Heidegger supposed it a place which is, increasingly, 'becoming uninteresting' (ibid.). But if it 'shelters in its path' something to come, that's *very* interesting.