# MARTIN HAUS

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## EDUCATION

**London School of Economics and Political Science, UK**　　　*September 2021 -*
PhD Political Science

**London School of Economics and Political Science, UK**　*September 2020 - September 2021*
MRes Political Science　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Classification: Distinction

**London School of Economics and Political Science, UK**　*September 2018 - September 2019*
MSc Development Studies　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Classification: Distinction

**Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences, Germany**　　　　*April 2014 - March 2018*
BA Transnational Social Work　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Grade: 1.4

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

**Associate Lecturer (Teaching) in Public Policy (PG)**　　*January 2025 - June 2025*
UCL, Department of Political Science. PUBL0008 - Public Management: Theories and Innovations

**PP4J5E - GTA Fiscal Governance and Budgeting (Executive Master)**　　*2024, 2025*
LSE, course conveners: Joachim Wehner, Paolo de Renzio

**IR214 - GTA Public Policy Analysis (Summer School)**　　　*July - August 2023*
LSE, course convener: Michael Lerner

**GV263 - GTA Public Policy Analysis (UG)**　　　*September 2021 - June 2022*
LSE, course conveners: Edward Page, Daniel Berliner

## RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

**Head Tutor, Public Policy Transformation, LSE**　　　　　*February 2024 -*
Online certificate course Public Policy Transformation: AI, Innovation, and Technology; overseeing course delivery, grading, student support

**Consultant, International Budget Partnership (IBP)**　*August 2021 - January 2022*
Reviewing the evidence on the impacts of fiscal openness, with Joachim Wehner and Paolo de Renzio

**Course Content Designer, LSE**　　　　　　　　　　*July 2021 - January 2022*
LSE online certificate course on Public Policy Transformation: AI, Innovation, and Technology, led by Daniel Berliner. Online Course

## WORK IN PROGRESS

**Haus, Martin: Breaking Out of Low-Effort Traps: Bureaucratic Leadership by Persuasion**
This paper tests if bureaucratic leadership impacts the quality of service provision of a difficult-to-monitor task: learning in public schools. Using the empirical case of rural India, it exploits an administrative setup mimicking a natural experiment with two types of bureaucrats for the same spatial unit, the district, that either have more authority or more ability to engage in time-intensive persuasion. Utilising blocked randomisation inference and bias-corrected variance decomposition on bureaucratic postings linked to independent learning data from household surveys across ten years, it shows that only those bureaucrats with less authority but more ability to engage in persuasion impact learning. Drawing on novel interview data, it illustrates how bureaucratic leaders can increase effort levels of subordinates through persuasion to overcome collective action problems rather than relying on orders and monitoring as principal-agent frameworks would suggest. The findings illustrate that for difficult-to-monitor tasks managerial intensity and persistence trump formal authority.

Preprint

Presented at LSE, King's Business School.

**Haus, Martin, Ashmita Gupta, and Daniel Berliner: Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Citizen Claim-making: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Bihar, India**

How do government officials prioritize citizen complaints about local service provision? Citizens frequently approach bureaucrats tasked with policy implementation with complaints, and bureaucrats show varying levels of responsiveness. We focus on four service delivery domains in India's poorest state, Bihar (130 million people), and deploy a conjoint experiment to test whether who approaches the state and how (whether confrontational or collaborative) affects complaint prioritisation. We find that officials, irrespective of their own gender or caste identity and across different levels of state capacity, prioritise complaints by women, citizens from Scheduled Caste backgrounds, and those without local brokers. This suggests pro-marginalised potential among those who staff the state, but without necessarily translating into bureaucratic action. Our results also indicate that confrontational approaches might lead to backlash as complaints accompanied by threats are de-prioritised and offers of collaboration yield null-effects. Our findings indicate that bureaucrats, even in difficult places, often hold more pro-marginalised preferences than widely believed, and that putting more trust in bureaucrats tasked with implementation might yield pro-marginalised dividends.

Pre-analysis plan

Presented at London Public Policy Workshop, EPSA

**Haus, Martin: Should they stay or should they go? The impact of local bureaucrats on learning in public schools across rural India**

Investigates the impact of local embeddedness of elite civil servants on learning outcomes across public schools in rural Indian districts exploiting a quasi-random assignment mechanism for causal inference.
Presented at EPSA, PMRC, GLD, LSE.

## WORKING PAPERS

Berliner, Daniel, Martin Haus and Joachim Wehner (**2023**): Do ministers matter for audit performance? Evidence from cabinet appointments during South Africa's 'State of Capture'.
ODI working paper

Haus, Martin, Joachim Wehner, and Paolo de Renzio (**2022**): (When) Do Open Budgets Transform Lives? Progress and Next Steps in Fiscal Openness Research.
Background paper for the Skeptic's Guide to Open Government (2022 Edition)

## NON-ACADEMIC ARTICLES (SELECTION)

- The Hindu: The World Bank's STARS project needs an overhaul (with Kiran Bhatty (CPR India); available here)

- Hindustan Times: Is the push for foundational numeracy and literacy pro-poor? (with Abhinav Ghosh (Harvard University); available here)

- Ideas for India: कोविड−19: संकटग्रस्त स्कूली शिक्षा और व्याप्त शैक्षणिक विषमता में अप्रत्याशित वृद्धि [COVID-19: Unprecedented increase of the schooling crisis and prevailing educational disparity] (with Abhishek Anand; available here)

## SKILLS

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| **Quantitative** | Quantitative text analysis, applied regression analysis, causal inference |
| **Programming** | Python, R, Stata, MATLAB (basics) |
| **Languages** | German (mother tongue), English, Latin (Latinum), Hindi (basics) |

## AWARDS AND GRANTS

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| **2025** | Sir Patrick Gillam Scholarship Fund - £9,608 workshop grant |
| **2023** | Sir Patrick Gillam Scholarship Fund - £5,000 fieldwork grant |
| **2021** | Harold Laski Prize for the best overall performance in the MRes in Political Science for the 2020/21 session - London School of Economics and Political Science |
| **2020 -** | ESRC Doctoral Training Partnership Studentship |

## PRESENTATIONS

Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Citizen Claim-making: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Bihar, India. Presented June 2025. European Political Science Association Annual Conference, Madrid (Spain).

Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Citizen Claim-making: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Bihar, India. Presented June 2025. London Public Policy Workshop, London (UK).

Public sector leadership beyond compliance: Evidence from bureaucrats in rural India. Presented May 2024. Politics of the Global South (POGS). LSE, London (UK).

Public sector leadership beyond compliance: Evidence from bureaucrats in rural India. Presented May 2024. London PhD Colloqium for Public Management. King's Business School, London (UK).

Local Realities Matter: The Contrasting Impact of Embedded Bureaucrats on Learning in Public Schools across Rural India. Presented June 2023. European Political Science Association Annual Conference, Glasgow (UK).

Should they stay or should they go? The impact of local bureaucrats on learning in public schools across rural India. Presented June 2023. Public Management Research Conference 2023, Utrecht (Netherlands).

Should they stay or should they go? The impact of local bureaucrats on learning in public schools across rural India. Presented May 2023. Governance and Local Development Institute's 6th Annual Conference, Tollered (Sweden).