

CITIZEN ReCONNECT, CULTURAL BIASES AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS

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Paolo Belardinelli¹ and Martin Lodge²

Abstract

The administrative state's effort to reduce errors in identifying 'deserving' individual claimants is associated with administrative burdens. Burden tolerance can be understood in terms of preferences regarding welfare state generosity and the balance between inclusion and exclusion from its benefits. Drawing from grid-group cultural theory, we investigate the relationship between citizens' attitudes toward administrative burden, their worldviews, and variations in administrative errors. In a survey experiment involving 2,329 participants from the UK, we manipulate information about errors that could result from changes in administrative burden, particularly regarding the exclusion of eligible subjects and the inclusion of non-eligible subjects in the programmes. We find that support for burdens is not influenced by whether administrative errors increase or decrease the share of 'deserving' recipients; support decreases when any type of error increases. Additionally, worldviews help explain variation in support for burdens, whereas party affiliation loses most of its explanatory power once worldviews are considered.

Keywords

administrative errors; administrative burden; welfare state; cultural theory

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Introduction

Who deserves what, when and how (with apologies to Harold Laswell) is the central question to the welfare state. Who is deemed ‘deserving’ defines the degree of generosity of welfare programmes, and it expresses itself in the substantive terms of policies, and in the level of ‘oppression’ in its implementation. Street-level bureaucrats use their discretion to favour deserving individuals (Zacka 2017) to the extent that scholars have observed a deservingness heuristic employed by these bureaucrats to manage the complexity of their job demands (Guul et al. 2021). Indeed, public support for welfare programmes is said to be based on considerations of whether specific subgroups of the population, or individuals perceived as outsiders, are deemed deserving of particular benefits (e.g. Petersen 2012; Petersen et al. 2011; Van Oorschot 2006).

Such efforts to categorise ‘deservingness’ place a demand on administrative judgment. Welfare should be available to those ‘deserving’ (which might be defined in highly specific or in ‘at large’ terms). Such error correction inevitably involves administrative burdens (Herd and Moynihan 2019). A fundamental question arises as to whether a welfare state programme defines deservingness with a ‘innocent until proven guilty’ assumption (inherently therefore being biased towards a generous assumption of accepting some ‘waste’ in terms of over-payment and over-inclusion to ensure deserving individuals are reached) or a ‘guilty until proven innocent’ setting that provides support only where eligibility has been exhaustively proven. Administrative processes and burdens play a central role in these decisions.

A reliance on administrative processes – burdens – may be seen as a device to reduce the likelihood of perceived ‘non-deserving’ individuals receiving benefits. In contrast, reducing burdens can help ensure that deserving individuals are not unfairly excluded. Research on administrative burden has covered a variety of topics, including its antecedents, experiences by citizens, and consequences (Baekgaard and Tankink 2022). It is suggested that this form of ‘policymaking by other means’, through intricate and onerous procedures, can be deliberately designed to enforce systematic administrative exclusion (Brodkin and Majmundar 2010; Burden et al. 2012; Herd and Moynihan 2019; Moynihan et al. 2015).

An emerging set of studies have explored the impact of such burdens on public support for specific policy programmes (Keiser and Miller 2020; Nicholson-Crotty et al. 2021). This paper adds to more recent research that has started to directly investigate support for or opposition to particular administrative burdens. The rise of such questions has even prompted the creation of a measurement instrument for ‘burden tolerance’ (Baekgaard et al. 2025). In trying to understand what can explain variation in support for burdens, studies primarily focus on political ideology and prior experience with welfare programmes. A common pattern observed in these studies is that conservatives are generally more supportive of administrative burdens (Halling et al. 2023; Stenderup and Pedersen 2024; Haeder and Moynihan 2025), while prior experience with welfare programmes is associated with lower tolerance for burdens (Halling et al. 2023; Stenderup and Pedersen 2024). Nonetheless, perhaps unsurprisingly, the specific policy context has been shown to affect these dynamics (Stenderup and Pedersen 2024).

Given the importance of broad political attitudes in shaping preferences towards welfare programmes’ design and generosity (Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), this paper goes beyond political affiliation and utilises grid group cultural theory (Douglas 1982, 2002) to assess the effects of broader worldview orientations – systems of beliefs that

shape public policy preferences (Ripberger et al. 2014; Wildavsky 1987) – on such preferences. We investigate public support for administrative burdens in view of reducing or increasing administrative error in terms of greater or reduced generosity. Furthermore, we explore how citizens weight different types of errors that could result from an increase or a reduction in administrative burden, particularly regarding the exclusion of eligible subjects and the inclusion of non-eligible subjects into the programme.

To do so, we administer a pre-registered online survey³ on a sample of 2,329 participants from the UK that includes two main parts. Firstly, an observational part aims to capture individual worldviews derived from cultural theory (Douglas 1982, 2002). Secondly, an experimental design aims to test citizens' preferences towards administrative burden (Moynihan et al. 2015; Herd and Moynihan 2019). In the experiment, participants are presented with different scenarios in which we manipulate information about potential errors resulting from altering the levels of administrative burden in two actual British welfare programmes: Universal Credit, designed to give citizens an integrated system of benefit support to encourage a return to the workforce, and Legal Aid, a system which traditionally supported citizens to meet the costs of legal advice, family mediation, and representation in a court or tribunal. These two policy areas are central to the UK welfare state but have received different levels of public attention, with Universal Credit being beset by a range of high salience problems, while Legal Aid has undergone reforms said to be driven by concerns about efficient 'case management'.

In our scenarios, we find that party affiliation loses most of its explanatory power when underlying cultural views are taken into account. Egalitarianism is associated with lower burden tolerance, while hierarchy and individualism correlate with higher levels of burden tolerance, even when controlling for party affiliation. Furthermore, we do not observe any differences in perceptions of administrative errors – specifically, wrongful exclusion and wrongful inclusion. Providing information about a potential increase in any type of administrative error reduces support for any type of change to administrative burdens. Nonetheless, additional information about the potential reduction of other errors does not offset the negative effects of increasing errors.

Theoretical background

Administrative judgements regarding the 'what, when and how' require formal and informal methods to evaluate suitability or categorisation. In doing so, efforts at error minimisation seeks to ensure that the deserving do not fall through the proverbial welfare net, while reducing the number of 'undeserving' recipients. Such error minimisation seeks to achieve a range of (partly conflicting) goals. In the first goal, procedures are put in place to reduce generosity due to malversation by welfare claimants and officials alike – concerns with false information, corrupt behaviours and such like. The second goal is efficiency, in terms of minimising the administrative cost in identifying deserving individuals. Erring on the side of parsimony may lead to under-inclusion as deserving candidates are deemed ineligible because of a lack of bespoke attention. Moreover, the goal of efficiency also stands in direct conflict with the goal of reduced generosity through malversation as adding layers of information increases administrative cost to a point that outweighs potential savings from reducing the number of 'undeserving' recipients.

³ Pre-registration link: https://osf.io/g3u2f/?view_only=0ec2775301064200b240e6c2807af1a3

At the core of such error minimisation efforts are questions of deservingness ‘for what’ (more generally, see Goodin 1985; Schneider and Ingram 1997; Mashaw 2018). For example, the history of the UK unemployment benefit system is said to consist of competing ideas regarding deservingness: unemployment offices have invariably been organised as places of ‘hope’ (to support individual claimant’s lives), places of a labour exchange to facilitate employment (in view of information asymmetry issues on supply and demand sides), or places of ‘benefit control’ to ensure that only parsimonious levels of support were granted (‘relieving without relieving unnecessarily’ as the intellectual founder of the UK welfare state, William Beveridge, put it, see Price 2000). Among these multiple institutional logics that inform administrative judgements, we also observe changing public support for welfare states at large, but also levels of generosity: overall generosity levels of welfare programmes are said to depend on public support (as measured in opinion polls) (e.g. Petersen 2012; Petersen et al. 2011; Van Oorschot 2006). Ideas regarding deservingness and their immediate linkages to wider political values and ideologies have been central to studies regarding attitudes towards welfare state policies (e.g. Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001).

Central to any debate about administrative burdens is not just the burden to the individual claimants themselves, but also the support for administrative processes that seek to reduce error either through the imposition of burdens (to reduce perceived non-deserving from receiving benefits) or through the reduction of burdens (by ensuring that the deserving are not being unfairly excluded) (see Wincott 2011; Price 2000). The extent to which the public and policymakers are willing to accept these errors often hinges on their views about the deservingness of potential welfare recipients. As a result, the design and implementation of welfare programmes, including criteria and requirements defined to identify eligible individuals and the level of scrutiny applied to those criteria, are closely linked to societal attitudes about who is deserving of assistance and who is not.

This paper therefore looks at the linkage between perceptions of deservingness and tolerance for administrative burdens to reduce error. Much of the contemporary literature on administrative burdens has focused on the ways in which burdens are introduced as undercover politics: complicated and cumbersome procedures are said to be introduced so as to achieve systematic administrative exclusion (Brodkin and Majmundar 2010; Burden et al. 2012; Moynihan et al. 2015; Herd and Moynihan 2019). According to Herd and Moynihan (2019), administrative burdens include learning, psychological, and compliance costs experienced by citizens when interacting with the government. For instance, administrative burdens are created by complex documentation requirements to apply for public programmes. A recurring theme and empirical finding are that burden imposition can lead to the (politically or otherwise intended and unintended) exclusion of specific groups from benefiting from public services (e.g. Barnes 2023; Chudnovsky and Peeters 2022; Compton et al. 2023).

While most research in this area tends to be favourably disposed to the reduction in administrative burden – or at least a shift of administrative burden from citizens to the government (Herd et al. 2013) – little is known about citizens’ tolerance towards the imposition of administrative burdens. Politicians, after all, may be viewed as responsive to (at least, some pockets of) public opinion. With respect to this, Baekgaard, Moynihan, and Thomsen (2021) investigate the extent to which and the reasons why politicians are willing to accept and impose burdens on social welfare recipients, finding that politicians are less willing to impose burdens on a welfare claimant perceived as being more deserving. Additionally, right-wing politicians are seen as more tolerant of burdens, while those with personal experience of receiving welfare benefits themselves were less tolerant. Early attempts to

study citizens' attitudes towards administrative burden focused on personality traits (Aarøe et al. 2021) and emotions (Bell et al. 2022) as potential explanatory variables.

As the question of who is more willing to accept burdens has gained attention, research has focused on developing an instrument to measure generic attitude towards burden tolerance across contexts (Baekgaard et al. 2025). More recently, scholars have explored the role of political ideology and prior experience with welfare programmes as potential determinants of citizens' support for or opposition to specific administrative burdens, consistent with the study on politicians by Baekgaard et al. (2021). For example, Stenderup and Pedersen (2024) examine the Danish context and find that people generally favour reductions in administrative requirements across social programmes, although right-wing participants are more supportive of adding them. Additionally, experience with these programmes appears to increase individuals' support for reducing administrative requirements. Halling, Herd, and Moynihan (2023) draw from a US national representative sample to investigate attitudes towards burdens in Medicaid and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and conclude that conservatives are more tolerant of burdens in social policies, while those who have personal experience of welfare policies are less tolerant of burdens. Haeder and Moynihan (2025) study burden tolerance in the context of the Medicaid US programme, finding that conservatives are more supportive of burdens, although their evidence does not support the hypothesis that Medicaid recipients are less burden tolerant.

Our aim is to directly investigate public support for administrative burdens in view of reducing or increasing administrative error in terms of greater or reduced generosity. Given the importance of broad political attitudes in shaping preferences towards welfare programmes' design and generosity (Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), we utilise grid group cultural theory (Douglas 1982, 2002) to assess the effects of broader worldview orientations on such preferences, similarly to what has been done in other contexts (Rabovsky et al. forthcoming). Exploring such underlying worldviews rather than relying on party identification is critical for a number of reasons: party loyalty effects in surveys may displace individual 'unease' at certain policy options. More importantly, parties themselves are assemblies of often competing ideological worldviews (see, for example, the traditional characterisation of European Christian-Democrat parties as consisting of economic liberals, Catholic-social thought inspired 'socialists' and 'law and order' factions). Indeed, as noted by Riker (1986), the 'heresthetic' playbook of political change includes the framing of different policy dimensions so as to build new coalitions. We therefore expect that changes in administrative burdens on welfare programmes will be received differently by individuals given their individual worldviews: different worldviews will express variation in their support as to the desirability of increases or reductions to administrative burden.

To explore underlying worldviews, we draw on the wider literature utilising so-called grid-group cultural theory. This theory, emerging from anthropology, has been used to explore competing worldviews in a range of policy and administrative settings, including the study of risk perceptions. By deploying cultural theory, we capture individuals' attitudes towards rules and structures ('grid') and individuals' embeddedness in social groups ('group'). Durkheim-inspired cultural theory assumes the existence of four worldviews that are present in any social system and underpin core beliefs that shape public policy preferences (Ripberger et al. 2014; Wildavsky 1987): hierarchist (high grid/high group), individualist (low grid/low group), egalitarian (high group/low grid), and fatalists (low group/high grid). In particular, we would expect individualists to be more 'burden tolerant' as this would fit associated concerns about unintended consequences of welfare state generosity, whereas egalitarians

are expected to be more concerned at ensuring ‘generosity’ in terms of avoiding wrongful exclusion (therefore being less burden tolerant).

Looking at public perceptions of administrative burdens in this way offers some advantages over the more traditional measurement via partisan support. Firstly, as noted, welfare policies are usually associated with levels of partisanship, without telling us much why individuals support a particular intervention. Secondly, support for parties is ultimately a product of coalitions of worldviews. This paper is interested in exploring the extent to which different worldviews (that cut across partisan lines) respond in (non-)supportive ways to changes in administrative burden.

Furthermore, focusing on administrative error, we expect that explicit information about the potential consequences of administrative burden on welfare claimants impacts the level of public support for it. For example, when administrative burdens increase, the consequences in terms of errors are potentially twofold: the additional requirements and criteria can make wrongful exclusion more likely (as the administrative burden literature would highlight), while potentially reducing wrongful inclusion. By contrast, when administrative burden decreases, wrongful exclusion is less likely and wrongful inclusion becomes more likely.

While it seems reasonable to expect more opposition to changes in administrative burden when information indicates a higher likelihood of administrative errors, and more support for changes when information suggests such administrative errors are less likely, we explore how citizens weight different types of errors. We expect these effects to be also related to prior experience with a particular welfare programme.

To summarise our expectations:

1. Based on the underlying assumptions of grid-group cultural theory, we expect that underlying worldviews explain more variation in burden tolerance than party identification.
2. We expect distinct individualist and egalitarian patterns towards burden tolerance in terms of ‘support’ for burdens increasing parsimony (individualists) and ‘opposition’ so as to enable generosity (egalitarians).
3. We expect that experience of welfare programmes accentuate observed effects.

Methods

We pre-registered our study on the Open Science Framework registry prior to data collection, on 3 January 2024. Ethical approval was obtained on 20 December 2023, from the LSE Research Ethics Committee. We recruited a sample of 2,329 UK citizens through the *Prolific* professional service company between January and February 2024. We selected the representative sample option based on census data, which stratifies the sample across three demographics, namely, age, sex, and ethnicity, so that it resembles the underlying population along those dimensions.

The online survey includes two main parts. Firstly, an observational part aims to capture individual worldviews derived from the cultural theory informed, validated scale developed by Jenkins-Smith and colleagues (Jenkins-Smith and Smith 2019; Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006; Ripberger et al. 2011, building on Wildavsky and Dake 1990). For each worldview, there are three statements, whose order is randomised in the survey. Participants are asked to express their agreement with such statements on

a 5-point scale. Examples of statements include ‘we are all better off when we compete as individuals’ (individualism), ‘society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority’ (hierarchy), ‘society works best if power is shared equally’ (egalitarianism), and ‘the most important things that take place in life happen by chance’ (fatalism). Whereas some limitations have been observed relating to face and construct validity, these measures have been found to have good predictive validity with respect to policy beliefs (Swedlow et al. 2020).

Following this observational part, we run an experiment to test citizens’ preferences towards administrative burden (Moynihan et al. 2015; Herd and Moynihan 2019) under different conditions. Worldviews’ measures, the text of experimental vignettes, and the items measuring our outcomes are included in the Appendix.

Experimental design

The experimental part of this survey focuses on two different UK welfare programmes. On the one hand, Universal Credit, designed to assist UK citizens with living costs, is used to test citizens’ attitudes towards a potential increase in administrative burden planned by the government. On the other hand, Legal Aid, which can help UK citizens meet the costs of legal advice, family mediation, and representation in a court or tribunal, serves as a case to study a potential reduction in administrative burden planned by the government. More specifically, the reduction in administrative burden relates to Legal Aid Means Tests on divorces and domestic abuse cases. These two policy areas are central to the UK welfare state.

The system of universal credit represents a high profile attempt over the past decade to integrate different employment and benefit systems, with the original aim being to facilitate re-entry into the labour force. The introduction of universal credit has been beset by a range of high salience problems, even though, overall, its budget was protected from budget cuts. In contrast, the sphere of legal aid has witnessed considerable budgetary cuts since 2010, with consequences enjoying less visibility. In the wider public discourse, the idea of deservingness was central to universal pay (especially in terms of restrictive conditionality requirements); in contrast, in the Legal Aid case, the main object of political contempt were lawyers (a claim supported by interviews conducted as part of the project). Welfare state reforms in the case of universal credit were oriented at individuals, whereas the reforms in Legal Aid were said to be largely driven by concerns about efficient case management.

We adopt a between-subjects design, so that each participant is randomly assigned to only one scenario. Within each welfare programme, the main variable that we manipulate is the information related to potential consequences of changing administrative burden. We randomly assign explicit information provided to subjects regarding the potential consequences of reducing or increasing administrative burdens, particularly regarding the exclusion of eligible subjects and the inclusion of non-eligible subjects into the programme.

In the Universal Credit case, after being told about the existing application process, participants are informed that the government is considering adding requirements for citizens to apply for Universal Credit (i.e. increasing administrative burden). The control group does not receive any information about potential consequences of this change. In a second experimental group, participants are told that applying the change will reduce the number of claimants who are not entitled to these benefits. Participants assigned to a third experimental group read that applying the change will exclude a number of eligible claimants from these benefits. Finally, a fourth experimental group is informed that

applying the change will reduce the number of claimants who are not entitled for these benefits and that it will also exclude a number of eligible claimants from these benefits.

In the Legal Aid case, participants learn about how Legal Aid Means Tests are used to determine who is eligible for financial support. Given that the current system is not error-free (some people benefiting from Legal Aid do not meet the criteria and some who meet the criteria do not receive Legal Aid), participants are informed that the government is considering removing the means test for all divorces and domestic abuse victims, which are particularly problematic, as they often involve financial control, disputed assets, or assets in the control of an abusive partner. As it is the case with Universal Credit, the control group does not receive any information about potential consequences of this change. A second experimental group reads that applying this change will reduce the number of eligible claimants who are excluded from these benefits. In a third experimental group, participants read that applying this change will increase the number of wealthy claimants who will get these benefits. Participants in the fourth experimental group are informed that applying this change will reduce the number of eligible claimants who are excluded Legal Aid and it will also increase the number of wealthy claimants who will get Legal Aid.

Outcomes

After providing participants with information about the welfare programme, we measure our outcome variables.

- *Support for burdens* – Participants are asked to indicate, on a scale from one to five, to what extent they would approve or disapprove the hypothetical changes to the application process to the programme described in the scenario.
- *Perceived effectiveness* – On a scale from one to five, we measure perceived effectiveness of the hypothetical changes to the application process in reducing error in distributing benefits from the programme described in the scenario.

1.

Following the *support for burdens* outcome, an open-ended question asks participants to explain their choice. This is meant to provide additional evidence of the rationale behind citizens' attitudes towards administrative burden and errors.

Control variables and manipulation checks

We measure a series of control variables: gender, age, education, ethnicity, income, and party affiliation. In addition, at the end of the survey, participants are invited to respond to a few manipulation checks. To complete the survey, they are asked to indicate whether they have ever had experience with the Universal Credit and Legal Aid programmes.

Results

Respondents are 52 percent female. As far as age is concerned, about 29 percent are younger than 35, 36 percent are between 35 and 54, and 35 percent older than 54. In terms of highest level of education achieved by respondents, 2 percent have less than high school, 17 percent have a high school degree or lower, 18 percent some college degree, 7 percent a 2-year degree, 36 percent a 4-year degree, 19 percent a professional degree, and the remaining 2 percent have a doctorate. As for ethnicity, 87 percent of respondents self-identify as white, 7 percent as Asian/Asian British, 3 percent as Black/African/Caribbean/Black British, 1 percent indicate having multiple ethnic groups, and the remaining 1 percent either have another ethnic group or prefer not to say. In terms of political party

affiliation, 21 percent feel closest to the Conservative Party, 38 percent to the Labour Party, 3 percent to the Scottish National Party, 10 percent to Liberal Democrats, 9 percent to the Green Party, 4 percent to Reform UK, 5 percent indicate ‘Other’ as the party they feel closest to, and the remaining 9 percent prefer not to say.⁴ Complete information about our sample is reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.

Turning to cultural theory constructs, we use these measures in two different ways. Firstly, consistent with a significant amount of work relying on these measures (e.g. Nowlin and Rabovsky 2020; Swedlow et al. 2020), we create indices that measure the degree of agreement with each worldview. Cronbach’s alphas suggest that the indices are internally consistent ($\alpha = 0.78$ for the egalitarianism index, 0.64 for fatalism, 0.73 for hierarchy, 0.72 for individualism). Secondly, to align with the concept of ‘dominant’ worldviews and to facilitate easier interpretation of our analyses, we identify each respondent as a hierarchist, egalitarian, individualist, or fatalist, based on the highest value observed across the four indices.⁵

Table 1. Worldviews’ descriptives, by operationalisation

N = 2,294

<i>Operationalisation 1 - Indices</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	3.68	0.913	1	5
<i>Hierarchy</i>	2.98	0.945	1	5
<i>Individualism</i>	2.86	0.881	1	5
<i>Fatalism</i>	2.73	0.804	1	5
<i>Operationalisation 2 - Dominating WVs</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Proportion</i>		
<i>Egalitarians</i>	1,194	0.51		
<i>Hierarchist</i>	371	0.16		
<i>Individualist</i>	276	0.12		
<i>Fatalist</i>	90	0.04		
<i>None</i>	398	0.17		

Table 1 above reports both these operationalisations, showing that the Egalitarianism index has the highest value, while Fatalism has the lowest. Additionally, the largest proportion of respondents can be identified as Egalitarians (51 percent), while Fatalists represent the smallest group (4 percent). The distribution of worldviews in the UK context is markedly different from the US context, where hierarchy appears to be the dominant worldview, followed by individualism and egalitarianism (Rabovsky et al. forthcoming).

⁴ The distribution was relatively similar to wider polling at the time of our study. The subsequent general election in July 2024 led to a much higher result for the Reform UK party.

⁵ This operationalisation resulted in dropping about 17 percent of respondents (398 individuals) who did not report a unique highest value among the four worldviews, as they scored equally high on two or more worldviews.

Table 2 reports how dominant worldviews interact with political preferences. For example, hierarchists make up the largest group among Conservatives (about 34 percent), while Egalitarians are by far the largest group among those who feel closest to the Labour Party (about 66 percent). The uneven distributions within each party demonstrates that cultural theory worldviews have explanatory power for policy preferences beyond mere political affiliation.

Table 2. Dominant worldviews and political party preferences

	<i>Hierarchist</i>	<i>Individualist</i>	<i>Egalitarian</i>	<i>Fatalist</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>Total</i>	
<i>Conservative</i>	162	95	95	15	114	481	20.7%
	33.7%	19.8%	18.8%	3.1%	23.7%		
<i>Labour</i>	84	42	594	29	146	895	38.4%
	9.4%	4.7%	66.4%	3.2%	16.3%		
<i>SNP</i>	5	4	58	2	7	76	3.3%
	6.6%	5.3%	76.3%	2.6%	9.2%		
<i>LibDem</i>	34	35	132	9	22	232	10.0%
	14.7%	15.1%	56.9%	3.9%	9.5%		
<i>Green</i>	15	14	149	11	24	213	9.1%
	7.0%	6.6%	70.0%	5.2%	11.3%		
<i>Reform UK</i>	20	33	20	4	20	97	4.2%
	20.6%	34.0%	20.6%	4.1%	20.6%		
<i>Other</i>	51	52	146	20	65	334	14.3%
	15.3%	15.6%	43.7%	6.0%	19.5%		
<i>Total</i>	371	275	1194	90	398	2328	100.0%
	15.9%	11.8%	51.3%	3.9%	17.1%		

Table 3 focuses on approval of the changes to the application processes and reports results from linear regression models with robust standard errors, separately for Universal Credit and Legal Aid programmes. For each model, we report results based on the common operationalisation of worldviews, i.e. indices. As far as Universal Credit is concerned, higher scores on hierarchy and individualism are significantly associated with higher levels of approval of the changes to the application process, while egalitarianism and fatalism are significantly associated with lower levels of support. Compared to Conservatives, individuals feeling closest to all other parties, including the Labour Party, SNP, LibDem, Green, and Reform UK, report lower levels of approval. However, when running a model with both worldviews indexes and party affiliation (model 3), the latter lose most of its explanatory power while results on the former remain unchanged. The same applies when

controlling for experience with the programme (model 4) and other demographic variables (model 5). It should be noted that experience with the programme is negatively associated with approval of burden increases.

In the Legal Aid case, hierarchy and individualism are negatively and significantly associated with approval of burden reductions in the application process. Egalitarianism is positively associated with approval of burden reduction, while fatalism shows no significant association with approval levels. Respondents identifying as supporters of the Labour and Green parties favour burden reduction compared to Conservatives. However, party affiliation coefficients lose significance when included alongside worldviews (model 8), whereas the latter maintain the same pattern of results, even when controlling for experience with the programme (model 9). In this case, however, experience with the programme does not have any significant effect on approval. A full model with demographic variables (model 10) confirms the results for egalitarianism, while individualism becomes non-significant and hierarchy remains only marginally significant at the 10 per cent level.

As a robustness check, we report results from the operationalisation capturing the dominant worldviews in the Appendix (table A3), which confirms our findings. Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix present the same models as table 3 and table A3, using perceived effectiveness of changes to burdens in reducing administrative errors as the outcome variable. The overall pattern of results does not change. Within Universal Credit, higher values on the egalitarianism index decrease participants' perceived effectiveness of an increase in administrative burden, while higher values on the hierarchy and individualism indices make them perceive higher effectiveness in reducing errors. By contrast, within Legal Aid, higher values on the hierarchy index make respondents perceive lower effectiveness of a decrease in administrative burden, while a higher value on the egalitarianism index decreases perceived effectiveness in reducing administrative errors. Variation in the individualism index does not seem to be related to support for administrative burden reduction. Higher values on fatalism decrease perceptions of effectiveness of any type of changes do burdens.

Table 3. Worldviews and policy approval – OLS models with robust SE

	Universal Credit					Legal Aid				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
<i>N</i>	1,155	1,173	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,139	1,155	1,139	1,139	1,139
Egalitarianism	-0.26*** (0.045)		-0.23*** (0.046)	-0.23*** (0.046)	-0.22*** (0.046)	0.15** (0.048)		0.14** (0.052)	0.14** (0.052)	0.15** (0.051)
Hierarchy	0.44*** (0.041)		0.42*** (0.042)	0.42*** (0.042)	0.43*** (0.043)	-0.10* (0.046)		-0.10* (0.047)	-0.10* (0.047)	-0.09^ (0.048)
Individualism	0.32*** (0.048)		0.31*** (0.047)	0.31*** (0.047)	0.31*** (0.047)	-0.11* (0.053)		-0.10* (0.054)	-0.10* (0.053)	-0.08 (0.053)
Fatalism	-0.25*** (0.045)		-0.24*** (0.045)	-0.23*** (0.045)	-0.23*** (0.045)	0.02 (0.048)		0.02 (0.049)	0.02 (0.049)	0.05 (0.049)
Labour		-1.03*** (0.094)	-0.28** (0.095)	-0.26** (0.095)	-0.31*** (0.096)		0.38*** (0.101)	0.10 (0.116)	0.10 (0.116)	0.08 (0.118)
SNP		-1.31*** (0.268)	-0.36 (0.232)	-0.36 (0.231)	-0.36 (0.226)		0.22 (0.216)	-0.14 (0.223)	-0.15 (0.223)	-0.11 (0.220)
LibDem		-0.61*** (0.135)	-0.06 (0.120)	-0.07 (0.119)	-0.09 (0.118)		0.18 (0.144)	-0.03 (0.150)	-0.04 (0.150)	-0.11 (0.149)
Green		-1.20*** (0.157)	-0.24 (0.146)	-0.19 (0.145)	-0.23 (0.149)		0.39* (0.152)	0.07 (0.163)	0.06 (0.163)	0.03 (0.164)
Reform UK		-0.52* (0.217)	-0.36 (0.221)	-0.31 (0.218)	-0.24 (0.221)		-0.07 (0.203)	-0.06 (0.207)	-0.06 (0.206)	-0.01 (0.208)
Other political party		-0.57*** (0.120)	-0.08 (0.113)	-0.05 (0.112)	-0.05 (0.118)		0.11 (0.121)	-0.05 (0.127)	-0.05 (0.127)	-0.03 (0.129)
Experience with programme				-0.30** (0.099)	-0.26** (0.100)				-0.19 (0.160)	-0.15 (0.157)
Controls (gender, age, ethnicity, education, income)	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	2.93*** (0.280)	4.19*** (0.066)	3.04*** (0.283)	3.01*** (0.280)	2.80*** (0.362)	3.28*** (0.292)	3.07*** (0.080)	3.29*** (0.299)	3.29*** (0.298)	2.36*** (0.400)

Robust standard errors between parentheses. ^ p -value < 0.1; * p -value < 0.05; ** p -value < 0.01; *** p -value < 0.001.

In sum, under both welfare programmes, worldviews contribute to explain variation in policy support, even when accounting for variation in political preferences, prior experiences with the programmes’ administrative intricacies, and other demographics, which is consistent with what has been observed in the US context (Rabovsky et al. forthcoming). Egalitarianism is positively (negatively) correlated with support for decreases (increases) in administrative burden under the Legal Aid (Universal Credit) programme. Hierarchy and individualism, instead, are associated with higher (lower) support for increases (decreases) in administrative burden under the Universal Credit (Legal Aid) programme.


Additionally, despite the cumulated evidence on the role of party affiliation in shaping preferences over different levels of administrative burdens (Halling et al. 2023; Stenderup and Pedersen 2024; Haeder and Moynihan 2025), we show that taking into account underlying worldviews makes party affiliation largely ineffective in explaining variation.

Experimental results

Turning to the experimental part of the survey, we firstly perform balance tests to assess the randomisation process. As expected, experimental groups within each of the two welfare programmes did not statistically differ at the 0.05 level in terms of our observed demographic variables, with a few exceptions reported in table A2.

In terms of policy preferences, as shown in Figure 1, respondents report higher levels of approval ($p < 0.001$) for the proposed increase in administrative burden to the Universal Credit programme (Mean = 3.49, SD = 1.38) compared to the proposed decrease in burden to the Legal Aid programme (Mean = 3.29, SD = 1.28). Interestingly, however, perceptions of effectiveness in reducing error in the allocation of benefits are not significantly different between the two groups (Mean = 3.34 and 3.33, SD = 1.25 and 1.09, respectively, $p = 0.834$).

Figure 1. Approval and perceived effectiveness, by change to burdens under different welfare programmes



We now turn to the effects of our manipulations related to information on potential consequences of changes in administrative burden. Table 4 provides an overview of the eight experimental arms to which participants were randomly assigned. For each experimental arm, the table separately reports the number of subjects, details about our manipulations of information on potential consequences of changing administrative burden, and the average outcomes in terms of support and perceived effectiveness, along with the associated standard deviations.

Focusing on approval first, when administrative burden increases under the Universal Credit programme, providing information on wrongful inclusion from the programme being less likely does not significantly increase support for the intervention (Mean = 3.66, SD = 1.318, $p = 1.000$), compared to control group in which no explicit information on administrative errors is provided (Mean = 3.57, SD = 1.429). Likewise, information on wrongful exclusion being more likely does not trigger significantly lower levels of approval (Mean = 3.38, SD = 1.381, $p = 0.620$). When both pieces of information are provided, the negative piece of information seems to prevail, as levels of support are lower on average (Mean = 3.3, SD = 1.389, $p = 0.119$), compared to the control group. However, the effect is not significant.

As for perceived effectiveness in reducing administrative error, we observe no significant differences between experimental groups receiving no information (Mean = 3.33, SD = 1.243), information on wrongful exclusion being more likely (Mean = 3.21, SD = 1.294, $p = 0.100$), and both pieces of information (Mean = 3.3, SD = 1.256, $p = 1.000$). Citizens exposed to the piece of information on wrongful inclusion being less likely report, albeit non-significant, higher levels of perceived effectiveness in reducing administrative error (Mean = 3.51, SD = 1.191, $p = 0.378$), compared to the control group.

When administrative burden is reduced under the Legal Aid programme, providing information on wrongful exclusion from the programme being less likely does not significantly increase support for the intervention (Mean = 3.60, SD = 1.248, $p = 0.717$), compared to the control group of participants exposed to no explicit information on administrative errors (Mean = 3.44, SD = 1.213). However, support for the intervention significantly decreases when exposed to information on wrongful inclusion being more likely (Mean = 2.94, SD = 1.298, $p < 0.001$). When both pieces of information are provided, the latter (negative) effect seems to prevail again, as the average level of support is significantly lower (Mean = 3.17, SD = 1.262, $p = 0.069$), compared to the control group. We observe the same pattern of results for perceived effectiveness in reducing error. Perceived effectiveness is significantly lower among citizens who are told that wrongful inclusion is more likely to happen (Mean = 3.13, SD = 1.115, $p = 0.002$) and among citizens who receive both pieces of information (Mean = 3.24, SD = 1.114, $p = 0.091$), compared to control group (Mean = 3.46, SD = 1.085). Informing citizens that wrongful exclusion is less likely to happen does not trigger significantly different levels of perceived effectiveness (Mean = 3.50, SD = 1.019, $p = 1.000$).

Table 4. Means and standard deviations of approval and perceived effectiveness, by experimental condition

Welfare programme	Explicit information on potential errors following change		N	Outcome	Mean	SD
	Less wrongful inclusion	More wrongful exclusion				
Universal Credit (Burden increase)	No	No	306	Approval	3.57	1.429
				Perceived Effectiveness	3.33	1.243

	Yes	No	316	Approval	3.66	1.318
				Perceived Effectiveness	3.51	1.191
	No	Yes	282	Approval	3.38	1.381
				Perceived Effectiveness	3.21	1.294
	Yes	Yes	270	Approval	3.30	1.389
				Perceived Effectiveness	3.30	1.256
	Less wrongful exclusion	More wrongful inclusion				
Legal Aid (Burden decrease)	No	No	290	Approval	3.44	1.213
				Perceived Effectiveness	3.46	1.085
	Yes	No	288	Approval	3.60	1.248
				Perceived Effectiveness	3.50	1.019
	No	Yes	289	Approval	2.94	1.298
				Perceived Effectiveness	3.13	1.115
	Yes	Yes	288	Approval	3.17	1.262
				Perceived Effectiveness	3.24	1.114

In sum, therefore, whether administrative errors can increase or decrease the share of ‘deserving’ recipients of welfare benefits does not seem to be that relevant in shaping support for change in administrative burden, for interventions receive less support when any type of error increases. The effect is particularly strong for the Legal Aid programme. Under Universal Credit, while the direction of the effects suggests that even in this case ‘negative’ information about increased error may have a stronger impact than ‘positive’ information, the effect of additional information about potential errors is not statistically significant. We observe a similar pattern of results when it comes to the perceived effectiveness in reducing error.

Discussion

Literatures on the welfare state and on administrative burdens have both been centrally concerned with the bureaucratic encounter at the frontline. Whereas the former literature has explored how different understandings of deservingness leads to judgements regarding the generosity (or not) of state-citizen encounters, the latter has been centrally concerned about the ways in which the impositions of burdens lead to deliberate exclusion of deserving claimants – and how the imposition of such burdens can be traced back to the burden tolerance of the wider population. This study has brought these two literatures together by exploring the extent to which different individual worldviews respond to proposals to increase or reduce administrative burdens.

In doing so, the analysis in the previous section revealed considerable support among some worldviews (rather than others) for the imposition of administrative burden so as to reduce administrative error in the welfare state being too generous. In particular, the focus on individual worldviews highlighted the diversity of support for increased or decreased burdens so as to reduce or expand generosity. Such variation was accompanied by different perceptions on the real effectiveness of such measures in error correction. More specifically, respondents with higher scores in hierarchy and individualism were more supportive of increasing burdens, whereas those with higher scores in egalitarianism reported lower burden tolerance and favoured burden-reducing policy changes.

Exploring the open-ended responses in the survey responses corroborate quantitative results. One key point is that egalitarians appear more concerned with wrongful exclusion than with wrongful inclusion – and therefore more supportive for burden decreases and less for burden increases. For example, egalitarians who strongly disapprove of increased burdens in the Universal Credit case highlight differences in capacity that may affect fairness in benefit distribution. They argue, for instance, that ‘the system is already loaded against those least able to navigate through it’, that ‘it is unfair to exclude people’, and that such changes ‘will just lead to a bigger divide in society’. One respondent suggested that ‘this would be unnecessary additional burden for those who are genuinely receiving Universal Credit.’ Some also note that ‘there should be a universal basic income for everybody.’

Concern with wrongful exclusion is evident in the Legal Aid case as well, as they emphasise that ‘everybody should have equal access to the law and to justice’ and that ‘people should have the opportunity of easily getting out of disruptive relationships.’ Hierarchists and individualists seem to focus more on wrongful inclusion. Under Universal Credit, for example, a representative hierarchist response observes that procedures make sure that deserving claimants are identified and fraud is avoided – ‘if you are a genuine claimant, those changes should be easy to comply with’ or ‘fraud needs to be eliminated and people need to be encouraged to work and not rely on state payments’ or ‘it would help to minimise fraud and errors’. Individualists emphasise that several claimants do not deserve the benefits, as ‘some people take universal credit just to sit on their bums’ or ‘there are too many people for who being on credit is easier than working.’

Treatment effects from our experimental manipulations also played a significant role in shaping preferences towards actions aimed at correcting administrative errors. On average, providing explicit information about the potential increase in administrative errors, either in the form of wrongful exclusion following an increase in burden or in the form of wrongful inclusion following a decrease in burden, reduced support for such efforts. Providing information on potential decrease in administrative errors did not compensate the negative effects. These experimental results seem to be consistent with

observed behavioral tendencies to weight negative information more than positive information, also called negativity bias (e.g. James and John 2007; Olsen 2015; Nielsen and Moynihan 2017; Hong 2019, 2020; James et al. 2020). It should be noted that, for the Universal Credit programme, providing additional information produced smaller – and non-significant – effects, compared to Legal Aid. This may be because UK citizens have stronger and more stable prior opinions about Universal Credit than about Legal Aid, given also the extensive media coverage it has received over the years. In this respect, it is unsurprising that average levels of support for Universal Credit were lower compared to Legal Aid. Future research could investigate these dynamics across additional policy programmes.

Conclusion

This study offers a range of broader contributions. Firstly, its focus on worldviews highlights that research should entertain moving beyond short-hand party loyalty measures to explore the underlying worldviews or core beliefs that shape individuals' perspectives as to 'who deserves what when and how'.

The second contribution is to suggest that utilising grid-group cultural theory with its existing frameworks for exploring underlying worldviews offers a promising way to explore such underlying worldviews. Any form of organisation is likely to consist of coalitions of different worldviews – just as institutions (such as welfare state policies). We should therefore embrace such underlying differences. Of course, our findings – a high degree of egalitarianism in the UK –deserves further research, namely, whether this finding was particular to this study alone, or whether the survey questions themselves might be biased to a particular US audience.

The third contribution is that these worldviews matter in expected directions. Hierarchists, individuals and egalitarians respond in their support levels of administrative burden imposition or reduction in expected directions.

Of course, this study is limited to two policy areas in the UK welfare state. We also restricted our attention to increasing generosity in the case of Legal Aid, and to reducing generosity in the case of Universal Credit. However, our study was designed to explore most likely responses; in other words, adding burden reduction to Universal Credit and burden imposition to the Legal Aid case is unlikely to have produced countervailing evidence.

Perceptions of deservingness are central to the welfare state. Whether the welfare state should err on the side of generosity or not is therefore a central question for the study of how the state interacts with its citizens. This study's focus on individual worldviews has highlighted the diverse nature in which individuals respond to information regarding administrative burdens and their consequences. Administrative burdens may reflect low visibility politics to achieve selective exclusion, but they also reflect any system's need to establish categorisation and they can build on support, in particular from hierarchical and individualist worldviews.

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Appendix

Observational part of the survey – Cultural theory worldviews' measures

Egalitarianism

- What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.
 - Society works best if power is shared equally.
 - It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor.
- 2.

Hierarchy

- The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard to do what you are told to do.
 - Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority.
 - Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those who break the rules.
- 3.

Individualism

- Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people succeed or fail on their own.
 - Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world.
 - We are all better off when we compete as individuals.
- 4.

Fatalism

- The most important things that take place in life happen by random chance.
- No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces beyond our control.
- For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance.

Experimental vignettes [The text in italics displays our experimental manipulations]

Universal Credit – Increasing administrative burden

Universal Credit is a payment designed to assist UK citizens with living costs. It is paid monthly, or twice a month for some people in Scotland. UK citizens may be eligible for Universal Credit if they have a low income, are out of work, or are unable to work.

To apply for the Universal Credit, applicants must prove their identity and provide information about:

- Housing, for example how much rent they pay;
- Earnings, for example payslips;
- Disability or health condition that affects their work;
- Savings and any investments, like shares and properties that they rent out.

The current system does not eliminate the possibility of error in assigning Universal Credit. On the one hand, some citizens benefiting from it do not meet the criteria, while on the other hand, some who meet the criteria do not receive Universal Credit. Presently, around 3.6 per cent (£8.3bn) of total benefit expenditure is overpaid due to fraud and error; while 1.4 per cent (£3.3bn) of total expenditure were underpaid.

Imagine that the government is considering changing the application process for Universal Credit. In addition to the existing requirements, applicants must:

- Provide documentary evidence of actively seeking a job
- Attend more frequent health assessments as to claimant's fitness to work
- Participate in drug screening and show evidence of active engagement in rehabilitation activities

[Applying these changes will reduce the number of claimants who are not entitled for these benefits.]

[Applying these changes will exclude a number of eligible claimants from these benefits.]

[Applying these changes will reduce the number of claimants who are not entitled for these benefits. It will also exclude a number of eligible claimants from these benefits.]

Legal aid – Reducing administrative burden

Legal aid can help meet the costs of legal advice, family mediation, and representation in a court or tribunal. Legal Aid Means Tests are an important tool in determining who is eligible for financial support. These tests require applicants to provide information about their sources of income, income level, assets, and other things, to make sure that applicants are in need of Legal Aid, given their financial situation.

The current system does not eliminate the possibility of error in assigning Legal Aid. On the one hand, some people benefiting from it do not meet the criteria, while on the other hand, some who meet the criteria do not receive Legal Aid.

In this respect, divorces and domestic abuse are particularly problematic, in that they often involve financial control, disputed assets, or assets in the control of an abusive partner.

Imagine that the government is considering removing the means test for all divorces and domestic abuse victims.

[Applying these changes will reduce the number of eligible claimants who are excluded from these benefits.]

[Applying these changes will increase the number of wealthy claimants who will get these benefits.]

[Applying these changes will reduce the number of eligible claimants who are excluded from these benefits. It will also increase the number of wealthy claimants who will get these benefits.]

Outcome variables

Policy support

Do you approve or disapprove of the changes to the application process to *Universal Credit* [Legal Aid Means Tests for all divorces and victims of domestic abuse]?

Please explain your choice

Perceived effectiveness in reducing error

Do you agree or disagree that the hypothetical policy change described in the scenario would help reduce errors in distributing benefits from the programme?

Table A1. Descriptive statistics

	<i>N</i> = 2328
Female	0.52 (0.500)
Age	
18-34 YO	0.29 (0.454)
35-54 YO	0.36 (0.480)
55 or older	0.35 (0.477)
Education	
High school or lower	0.18 (0.388)
Some college or higher	0.82 (0.388)
Ethnicity	
White	0.87 (0.331)
Asian/Asian British	7. (0.261)
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British	3. (0.171)
Multiple ethnic groups	1. (0.113)
Other	1. (0.097)
Party affiliation	
Conservative	21. (0.405)
Labour	38. (0.487)
SNP	3. (0.178)
LibDem	10. (0.300)
Green	9. (0.288)
Reform UK	0.04 (0.200)
Other	14. (0.351)

(Standard deviations between parentheses)

Table A2. Balance tests

	<i>Universal Credit</i>				<i>Legal Aid</i>			
	No info	Less wrongful inclusion	More wrongful exclusion	Both	No info	Less wrongful exclusion	More wrongful inclusion	Both
<i>N</i>	306	316	282	269	290	288	289	288
Female	0.53 (0.500)	0.48 (0.501)	0.52 (0.500)	0.56 (0.498)	0.49 (0.501)	0.49 (0.501)	0.55 (0.498)	0.5 (0.501)
Age	2.99 (0.789)	2.98 (0.783)	3.12 (0.759)	3.07 (0.798)	3.1 (0.821)	3.13 (0.814)	3.07 (0.803)	3.03 (0.815)
Education	4.22 (1.398)	4.46 (1.421)	4.26 (1.537)	4.48 (1.416)	4.15 (1.595)	4.22 (1.644)	4.16 (1.497)	4.09 (1.519)
Ethnicity	1.13 (0.446)	1.24 (0.640)	1.18 (0.602)	1.23 (0.706)	1.21 (0.639)	1.23 (0.777)	1.18 (0.644)	1.32 (0.964)
Party affiliation	3.16 (2.064)	3.13 (2.137)	3.13 (2.016)	3.19 (2.086)	3.2 (2.122)	3.22 (2.155)	3.04 (1.918)	3.42 (2.109)
Worldviews	2.04 (1.237)	1.9 (1.248)	2.16 (1.188)	2.09 (1.267)	2.11 (1.193)	2.13 (1.226)	2.13 (1.199)	2.17 (1.237)

(Standard deviations between parentheses)

Note: Within Universal Credit, participants in the 'more wrongful' group are significantly older compared to their counterparts in the 'less wrongful' and 'no info' groups. Additionally, the average educational level of participants in the 'no info' group is significantly lower compared to the 'less wrongful' and 'both' groups. Within Legal Aid, we did not detect any significant differences.

Table A3. Alternative operationalisation of worldviews and approval of changes in burdens – OLS models with robust SE

	Universal Credit					Legal Aid				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
<i>N</i>	960	959	959	959	959	971	971	971	971	971
Egalitarianist	-0.53*		-0.41^	-0.42^	-0.47*	-0.06		-0.09	-0.08	-0.15
	(0.218)		(0.221)	(0.218)	(0.215)	(0.149)		(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.150)
Hierarchist	0.70**		0.58**	0.57**	0.52*	-0.55***		-0.51**	-0.51**	0.55***
	(0.223)		(0.225)	(0.222)	(0.219)	(0.167)		(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.172)
Individualist	0.62**		0.56*	0.54*	0.48*	-0.48**		-0.41*	-0.41*	0.47**
	(0.230)		(0.231)	(0.228)	(0.227)	(0.175)		(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.177)
Labour		-1.13***	-0.64***	-0.62***	-0.64***		0.37***	0.14	0.14	0.15
		(0.106)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)		(0.114)	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.132)
SNP		-1.41***	-0.85**	-0.86**	-0.85**		0.25	0.03	0.01	0.06
		(0.274)	(0.274)	(0.273)	(0.266)		(0.239)	(0.242)	(0.241)	(0.241)
LibDem		-0.61***	-0.28*	-0.29*	-0.30*		0.21	0.04	0.03	-0.03
		(0.145)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.139)		(0.153)	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.159)
Green		-1.37***	-0.88***	-0.82***	-0.81***		0.43**	0.20	0.18	0.16
		(0.178)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.179)		(0.162)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.173)
Reform UK		-0.66***	-0.59*	-0.53*	-0.41^		-0.17	-0.18	-0.18	-0.10
		(0.249)	(0.245)	(0.239)	(0.244)		(0.225)	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.225)
Other political party		-0.69***	-0.38**	-0.36**	-0.33*		0.15	0.00	0.01	0.04
		(0.136)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.136)		(0.136)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.146)
Experience with programme				-0.31**	-0.26**				-0.24	-0.20
				(0.114)	(0.115)				(0.176)	(0.171)
Controls (gender, age, ethnicity, education, income)	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	3.51***	3.22***	3.94***	3.99***	3.87***	3.51***	3.07***	3.44***	3.45***	2.68***
	(0.211)	(0.076)	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.348)	(0.139)	(0.091)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.295)

Robust standard errors between parentheses. ^ *p*-value < 0.1; * *p*-value < 0.05; ** *p*-value < 0.01; *** *p*-value < 0.001.

Universal Credit

Legal Aid

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
<i>N</i>	1,155	1,173	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,139	1,155	1,139	1,139	1,139
Egalitarianism	-0.16*** (0.045)		-	-0.14** (0.046)	-0.13** (0.045)	0.11* (0.044)		0.11* (0.047)	0.11* (0.047)	0.12* (0.047)
Hierarchy	0.35*** (0.042)		0.34*** (0.043)	0.34*** (0.043)	0.35*** (0.043)	-0.08* (0.040)		-0.09* (0.040)	-0.09* (0.040)	-0.09* (0.041)
Individualism	0.24*** (0.046)		0.24*** (0.046)	0.24*** (0.046)	0.215*** (0.046)	-0.03 (0.046)		-0.02 (0.047)	-0.02 (0.047)	-0.01 (0.048)
Fatalism	-0.20*** (0.045)		-0.20*** (0.045)	-0.19*** (0.045)	-0.20*** (0.045)	-0.09* (0.043)		-0.08^ (0.043)	-0.08^ (0.043)	-0.06 (0.044)
Labour		-0.72*** (0.088)	-0.15 (0.091)	-0.12 (0.091)	-0.24** (0.091)		0.13 (0.089)	-0.01 (0.099)	-0.01 (0.099)	-0.02 (0.101)
SNP		-0.91*** (0.231)	-0.19 (0.214)	-0.19 (0.214)	-0.22 (0.206)		-0.01 (0.172)	-0.20 (0.181)	-0.20 (0.181)	-0.18 (0.178)
LibDem		-0.45*** (0.120)	-0.03 (0.113)	-0.03 (0.113)	-0.07 (0.111)		-0.02 (0.127)	-0.15 (0.130)	-0.15 (0.130)	-0.19 (0.130)
Green		-0.78*** (0.144)	-0.06 (0.134)	-0.01 (0.134)	-0.11 (0.136)		0.08 (0.127)	-0.10 (0.135)	-0.11 (0.136)	-0.12 (0.135)
Reform UK		-0.41* (0.204)	-0.28 (0.208)	-0.23 (0.208)	-0.17 (0.206)		-0.30 (0.188)	-0.26 (0.194)	-0.26 (0.194)	-0.24 (0.197)
Other political party		-0.33 (0.112)	-0.06 (0.111)	-0.09 (0.110)	-0.02 (0.112)		-0.08 (0.109)	-0.14 (0.113)	-0.14 (0.113)	-0.11 (0.116)
Experience with programme				-0.27** (0.093)	-0.27** (0.092)				-0.02 (0.131)	0.02 (0.131)
Controls (gender, age, ethnicity, edu, income)	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	2.93*** (0.280)	3.82*** (0.063)	2.82*** (0.277)	2.80*** (0.273)	3.40*** (0.340)	3.48*** (0.266)	3.30*** (0.073)	3.57*** (0.272)	3.57*** (0.272)	3.02*** (0.367)

Robust standard errors between parentheses. ^ p -value < 0.1; * p -value < 0.05; ** p -value < 0.01; *** p -value < 0.001.

Table A4. Worldviews and perceived effectiveness of changes in burdens – OLS models with robust SE

Table A5. Alternative operationalisation of worldviews and perceived effectiveness of changes in burdens – OLS models with robust SE

	Universal Credit					Legal Aid				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
<i>N</i>	960	959	959	959	959	971	971	971	971	971
Egalitarianist	-0.21 (0.200)		-0.12 (0.207)	-0.12 (0.202)	-0.16 (0.198)	0.04 (0.139)		0.01 (0.142)	0.01 (0.141)	-0.01 (0.143)
Hierarchist	0.72** (0.206)		0.64** (0.214)	0.63** (0.210)	0.57** (0.205)	-0.29^ (0.156)		-0.31* (0.158)	-0.31* (0.158)	-0.32* (0.160)
Individualist	0.56** (0.215)		0.54* (0.223)	0.52* (0.218)	0.44* (0.215)	-0.17 (0.160)		-0.14 (0.164)	-0.14 (0.164)	-0.19 (0.165)
Labour		-0.79*** (0.100)	-0.43*** (0.109)	-0.41*** (0.108)	-0.53*** (0.108)		0.18^ (0.102)	0.03 (0.109)	0.03 (0.109)	0.05 (0.112)
SNP		-1.00*** (0.238)	-0.59* (0.237)	-0.60* (0.237)	-0.63** (0.228)		0.07 (0.188)	-0.09 (0.190)	-0.09 (0.190)	-0.04 (0.188)
LibDem		-0.45*** (0.130)	-0.21^ (0.127)	-0.22^ (0.127)	-0.26* (0.127)		0.05 (0.138)	-0.08 (0.139)	-0.08 (0.139)	-0.13 (0.140)
Green		-0.92*** (0.161)	-0.56*** (0.157)	-0.51*** (0.158)	-0.59*** (0.161)		-0.13 (0.137)	-0.03 (0.144)	-0.03 (0.144)	-0.03 (0.145)
Reform UK		-0.58* (0.226)	-0.51* (0.228)	-0.45* (0.226)	-0.42^ (0.225)		-0.19 (0.206)	-0.22 (0.204)	-0.22 (0.204)	-0.16 (0.21)
Other political party		-0.35** (0.127)	-0.14 (0.126)	-0.12 (0.125)	-0.22^ (0.130)		-0.03 (0.124)	-0.13 (0.126)	-0.13 (0.126)	-0.08 (0.131)
Experience with programme				-0.32** (0.105)	-0.31** (0.105)				-0.04 (0.157)	-0.02 (0.157)
Controls (gender, age, ethnicity, education, income)	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	3.20*** (0.193)	3.84*** (0.074)	3.46*** (0.213)	3.52*** (0.210)	4.06*** (0.317)	3.39*** (0.132)	3.27*** (0.085)	3.44*** (0.157)	3.44*** (0.157)	2.93*** (0.255)

Robust standard errors between parentheses. ^ p -value < 0.1; * p -value < 0.05; ** p -value < 0.01; *** p -value < 0.001.

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