The Economic Consequences of Major Tax Cuts For the Rich

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Hope & Limberg

Tax Cuts for the Rich

Tax Cuts for the Rich

• A summary of our findings in Twitter memes:

Tax Cuts for the Rich

• A summary of our findings in Twitter memes:



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Taxes

Fifty Years of Tax Cuts for Rich Didn't Trickle Down, Study Says

By Craig Stirling 15 December 2020, 16:01 GMT-8

- Paper looks at fiscal policies in 18 countries over 50 years
- Governments shouldn't worry about taxes on rich, author says



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Tax Cuts for the Rich

• A summary of our findings in Twitter memes:



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Amy, 2022 Mothman Festival Queen

@cableknitjumper



Fifty Years of Tax Cuts for Rich Didn't Trickle Down, Study Says

By <u>Craig Stirling</u> 15 December 2020, 16:01 GMT-8

- Paper looks at fiscal policies in 18 countries over 50 years
- Governments shouldn't worry about taxes on rich, author says



5:52 PM · Dec 16, 2020 · Twitter for Android

23.4K Retweets 1.5K Quote Tweets 163.3K Likes

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Nicholas Kaldor 1983, p. 9

However much Ministers may try to revive incentives through tax reductions, they can never hope to achieve the Victorian or Edwardian peaks in fiscal incentives, when income tax was not progressive and it was seven old pence in the pound or 3 percent instead of the present 33 percent. Yet with all those incentives, the economy was stagnating.

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Our Study

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Research Question

What are the economic effects of major tax cuts for the rich?

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 - 2) Hard to make causal claims with observational data (and political science literature tells us reverse causality likely to be an issue).
 - 3) Existing causal evidence limited to effects of single tax reforms (Rubolino and Waldenström, 2020).

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 Models were run with normal diffuse priors, three Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo chains and 1000 burnin iterations.
- Indicators:
 - Top Incomes: Top marginal income tax rates, tax burden on the top 1% of wage earners.
 - Capital: Statutory corporate income tax rate, top marginal tax rate on dividends, effective average tax rate on capital.
 - Assets: Top inheritance tax rate, tax revenue from assets (inheritance/estates/net wealth/immovable property, as % of GDP).

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- Advantage: Robust to missing values for some indicators.

Our Comprehensive Measure of Taxes on the Rich



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- We code major tax cuts as years in which the index fell by over 2 standard deviations.
- Threshold often used in empirical literature in macroeconomics (Dell' Erba et al., 2015; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015) – but we use 1 standard deviation as an alternative threshold as well.

Major Tax Cuts for the Rich in the OECD Since 1965

United States -United Kingdom-Sweden -New Zealand -Italy -Netherlands -Germany-Canada-Australia-Norway-Japan -Ireland -Finland -Denmark -Belgium-Austria-Switzerland -France-

2 Standard Deviations Threshold

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1 Standard Deviation Threshold



Hope & Limberg

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- Most countries cut taxes on the rich substantially. Hence, focusing on effects of single reforms might be misleading.
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- Three main ideas:
 - 1) We compare countries (with similar pre-treatment treatment trajectories) that cut taxes on the rich to those that didn't in a given time period. We repeat this for all major reforms.
 - 2) We calculate the difference-in-differences estimator for different lags and leads. Lags allow us to estimate the development of the effect over time. Leads allow us to check whether the parallel trends assumption holds.
 - 3) We use Mahalanobis distance matching to compare countries with similar covariate trajectories.

- Three main dependent variables:
 - Effects of tax cuts for the rich on inequality (top 1% income shares (Alvaredo et al., 2018))
 - Effects of tax cuts for the rich on economic growth (Real GDP pc in 2011 US Dollars, logged values (Feenstra et al., 2015))
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- Battery of time-varying variables to match upon e.g. capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006), left vote share in last election (Brady et al., 2020), government expenditure as % of GDP (OECD, 2019).

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- Block-bootstrap procedure to calculate standard errors (Imai et al., 2020).



Inequality





Unemployment

Effect on Top 1% Income Share -5 -2 -3 -1 2 3 5 -4 Ò 4 Years Relative to Tax Cut

Inequality (1SD Threshold)

Growth (1SD Threshold)





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- Growth and unemployment is neither statistically nor substantively significantly different after tax cuts for the rich.
- Main effect: Inequality increases.

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- However, the idea of such 'trickle-down' effects persists why?
- Survey experiments to shed light on this question we are currently in the design phase.
- Potential book project on 'The Trickle-Down Myth'.

Thank you for your attention. Any questions?