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**The 2013 Cypriot Banking Crisis and Blame Attribution:  
survey evidence from the first application of a bail-in in the  
Eurozone**

**Agni Poullikka**

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# The 2013 Cypriot Banking Crisis and Blame Attribution: survey evidence from the first application of a bail-in in the Eurozone

Agni Poullikka<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

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The policy responses to the Eurozone crisis were mainly driven by taxpayer funded bail-outs and austerity packages, with the exception of Cyprus where a bail-out was supplemented with a bank bail-in for the first time in the Eurozone. This paper examines how voters assign blame for the 2013 Cypriot banking crisis. The results of an original public opinion survey that was conducted in Cyprus show that neither the incumbent government at the time of the bail-in nor the previous one are assigned primary responsibility. Instead, blame is dispersed towards two non-elected actors; the national central bank and the banking sector. The findings carry implications for democratic accountability at the domestic and European Union level.

Keywords: European Union; Eurozone crisis; Cyprus; small states; public opinion

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## 1. Introduction

According to the representative model of democracy, voters should be able to hold the government accountable at the ballot box for the state of the economy in their country, either by pushing them out of office if the economy is not performing well or by voting for them again if the economy is performing well (Anderson, 2007). In practice however, there are numerous factors which blur the clarity of responsibility for policymaking and complicate this economic voting decision (Powell and Whitten, 1993). One such factor is the European Union's (EU) Multi-Level Governance (MLG) structure, where responsibility for policy decisions which impact Member States (MS) is dispersed across numerous institutions, bodies, agencies as well as domestic and supranational levels of governance (Kosmidis, 2014).

Other factors include non-elected actors whose actions impact the economy, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), banks and central banks (Alcañiz and Hellwig, 2011; Duch and Stevenson, 2008). Personal predispositions can also matter, such as support for the incumbent government or support towards the EU (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014a). For instance, partisans of the government might be less likely to hold it responsible compared to non-partisans.

Several studies have used evidence from the Eurozone crisis to empirically test these economic voting and blame attribution mechanisms. During the Eurozone crisis numerous MS suffered from declining economic performance, whilst the locus of decision-making for their economic fate shifted from the national level towards EU institutions to a large extent. Existing research explores crisis-ridden countries such as Greece (Kosmidis, 2014; Nezi, 2012), Ireland (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2012) and Portugal (Magalhães, 2014). Although there are no similar studies looking at Cyprus, I argue that the 2013 Cypriot banking crisis constitutes a unique case study to measure blame attribution attitudes for two reasons.

First, it was the first time in the Eurozone that a bail-in tool was implemented in an EU MS. Following Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, Cyprus became the fifth country to enter into a borrowing agreement with the Troika, which is the triumvirate of lenders comprising of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB)

and the IMF. In a comparative perspective, the Cyprus programme differed from the rest, as it was the first country where a bail-out was supplemented with a bail-in. Bail-outs are defined as the injection of public funds into failing financial institutions and the economy, thus putting the crisis burden onto taxpayers (Lucchini et al., 2017).

Conversely, bail-ins shift the burden onto bank depositors, who contribute to the crisis resolution through a 'haircut' of their bank deposits, bonds or equity (European Stability Mechanism, 2019). The bail-in tool is one of the foundations of the EU's banking union. By transferring responsibility for bank supervision and resolution for systemically important banks from the national to the EU-level, the banking union deepens European integration. According to Dijsselbloem (2018), the Cyprus bail-in experience provides a template for how future crises should be handled in the Eurozone by de-emphasising the contribution of taxpayers. Therefore, insights about public opinion in the context of a bail-in can be informative for future applications of this measure.

Second, the electoral dynamics that played out in Cyprus during and after the crisis period create an empirical puzzle. As a result of the February 2013 presidential elections, which were conducted against the backdrop of the economic crisis, the incumbent left-wing President Dimitris Christofias lost to the right-wing contender Nicos Anastasiades. At his inaugural speech in parliament, President Anastasiades made a promise that he would not accept a depositor haircut, which he broke just a few weeks later by accepting the bail-in. Responding to the Investigation Committee examining the crisis, President Anastasiades claimed that the Eurogroup had put a gun to his head (Pikis, Kramvis and Nicolaou, 2013). This phrase crystallises the blurring of responsibility that the EU's MLG is conducive to, as the President could shift blame away from the government and towards an external actor.

The fact that President Anastasiades was re-elected in 2018, with his right-wing party Democratic Rally (DISY) remaining in government for another five-year term, creates a puzzle which can be explored by looking at responsibility attribution attitudes for the crisis. This paper contributes to an understanding of public opinion and blame attribution attitudes in this unique empirical setting, where a bailout was accompanied

with a bail-in for the first time and there was no major realignment in the political system after the economic crisis.

The aim is to explore how voters attribute blame in the context of the 2013 Cypriot banking crisis using evidence from an original public opinion survey. The focus of the survey is on a blame-ranking exercise where respondents rank six targets in order of how much they blame them for the crisis. These targets are selected based on the actors that were prominent during the crisis in the public debate. These include domestic elected actors such as the two governments that were in power during the period of the crisis; the Christofias government (in power until February 2013) and the Anastasiades government (in power from February 2013 onwards). The blame targets also include domestic non-elected actors, namely the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) and the domestic banking sector. Lastly, they include the two non-domestic non-elected actors which were key decision-makers for the bail-in; the Eurogroup and the Troika.

Two main insights arise from the public opinion survey results. First, elected actors do not get primary responsibility for the crisis. Rather, blame is dispersed amongst the six targets, with the CBC and the domestic banking sector receiving most of the blame. Second, the regression analyses show that personal predispositions matter in blame attribution as government supporters are less likely to blame the Anastasiades government and EU supporters less likely to blame the Troika. Those indirectly affected by the crisis are more likely to blame the Troika, whilst perceptions of high EU responsibility for the economy appear to have limited explanatory power. The findings cast light on public opinion regarding bail-ins and banking crises. They can also carry implications for the functioning of democracy. As voters assign blame to non-elected actors, the democratic accountability chain breaks since there is no direct way to hold the central bank or the banking sector accountable at the ballot box.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. I begin by situating the paper against the backdrop of the economic voting and blame attribution literatures. Then, I outline my theoretical expectations and present a set of testable hypotheses. I provide an overview of the public opinion survey, before presenting the statistical analyses and results. I conclude with a discussion of the main findings and their implications.

## **2. Literature review**

### ***2.1 Economic voting literature***

This paper builds on the economic voting and blame attribution research streams and subjects them to a new empirical test. The argument behind the economic voting theory is straightforward; voters electorally punish the incumbent government when the economy performs badly and reward it when the economy performs well (Key, 1966). The literature on economic voting is rich, spanning multiple time periods, geographic areas and approaches. Older studies work with aggregate-level data, considering macroeconomic indicators such as unemployment and growth as correlated with electoral outcomes. However, since the 1990s studies use mainly individual-level survey data. In line with more recent studies, this paper uses survey data. Identifying the individual rather than the nation as the analytical unit solves the issue of falsely inferring individual behaviour from aggregate relationships (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2019).

In addition, survey data allow an examination of the factors which drive individual heterogeneity in levels of economic voting. Some studies focus on individual-level preferences, such as partisanship and whether people vote based on pocketbook economic concerns (egotropic voting) or the national economic situation (sociotropic voting). Others look at the impact of political context and institutions, testing the clarity of responsibility argument. This argument suggests that certain factors complicate how clearly voters can attribute responsibility for certain policy outcomes. If voters cannot confidently pinpoint responsibility for the state of the economy on a specific policymaking actor, then this can influence their vote choice since they might be less likely to hold the government accountable at the ballot box. This is problematic for democratic theory, which posits that voters should be able to hold policymakers accountable for their decisions in elections (Anderson, 2007).

The literature identifies two types of clarity of responsibility: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal clarity of responsibility encapsulates any features of domestic political structures such as weak party cohesion, coalition government and minority

governments which make it harder for voters to identify who is responsible for (economic) policy outcomes (Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Hellwig and Samuels, 2008; Anderson, 2000; Whitten and Palmer, 1999; Anderson, 1995; Powell and Whitten, 1993). More relevant for this paper is vertical clarity of responsibility, which suggests that more open economies experience less economic voting. The argument posits that the interconnectedness of an open economy to exogenous economic shocks creates the no room to manoeuvre mechanism. This mechanism creates the perception that the government has limited control over the economy, thereby leading the public to absolve it of policy responsibility, at least to some extent (Fernández-Albertos, 2006; Hellwig, 2001, 2015; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007).

This paper tests the argument by considering Cyprus' membership in the EU and the euro area as factors which impact the vertical clarity of responsibility. Monetary unions represent extreme cases of global economic interdependence, where non-elected supranational actors are implicated in domestic economic policymaking (Duch and Stevenson 2008). In the case of the euro area, economic policy tools such as monetary policy are transferred onto the ECB, thereby leaving euro area MS governments with limited room to manoeuvre their domestic economy. The EU can also exercise power over fiscal policies, as the austerity packages during the Eurozone crisis demonstrate. It could be argued that this shift of responsibility to the EU level makes it harder for voters in EU MS to discern which governance level (domestic or EU) is responsible and as such worthy of punishment or reward for policy outcomes.

## ***2.2 Blame attribution literature***

The economic voting thesis hinges on the following assumption; voters should attribute policy responsibility to the government for economic outcomes in order for economic voting to take place (Rudolph, 2003a). In other words, responsibility attribution can act as a moderating variable which influences vote choice. An extensive body of work demonstrates how clarity of responsibility conditions economic voting, yet relatively few directly examine voters' perception of who is responsible. Studies which focus on

negative events, such as this one, use the terms responsibility attribution and blame attribution interchangeably.

Early conceptualisations include Peffley and Williams (1985) who show that voters might re-elect a government that presided over a bad economy if they do not blame it for policy outcomes. Recent studies confirm the attributional moderation hypothesis in MLG systems which have blurred vertical clarity of responsibility, such as in the United States (Arceneaux, 2006; Rudolph, 2003a, 2003b), Spain (León, 2011) and Canada (Johns, 2011; Cutler, 2004, 2008). Cutler (2004) finds that Canadians who blame two levels of government for healthcare policy problems do not reflect this into their voting decision, whilst those who identify primary responsibility do so.

Shifting the focus from federal systems to how international constraints limit policymakers, Alcañiz and Hellwig (2011) look at Latin America and show that in high international interdependence instances voters blame policy outcomes on international actors (the IMF) and private sector actors (foreign banks). The findings lend support to the argument that voters do not merely evaluate outcomes and assign them or not to incumbents. Rather, they distribute responsibility to various actors, potentially shielding incumbents from electoral sanctioning.

The research on blame attribution views the process of assigning responsibility as not automatic; the way voters interpret the room to manoeuvre is not objective but subject to personal biases. Numerous studies test expectations regarding how personal traits such as political predispositions and political sophistication act as explanatory variables for heterogeneity in responsibility attribution (De Vries and Giger, 2014; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011; Gomez and Wilson, 2008; Marsh and Tilley, 2010; Rudolph 2003a, 2003b). Previous research examining blame attribution in crises, such as the responses to Hurricane Katrina, finds support for the partisanship bias hypothesis, meaning that partisans of the incumbent government are less likely to hold it responsible (Gomez and Wilson, 2008; Maestas et al., 2008; Malhotra and Kuo, 2008). Along the same lines, Hellwig and Coffey (2011) find that partisan preferences in the United Kingdom affect perceptions of responsibility during the 2008 crisis.

In this paper, I develop theoretical expectations regarding individual-level factors that condition blame attribution attitudes within the EU's MLG system. The EU's institutional structure provides voters with a large pool of responsibility targets, as they need to decide which governance level is responsible for policy outcomes. Costa Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) show that the higher the perception of EU responsibility for economic outputs amongst voters, the lower the national economic vote. Hobolt and Tilley (2014b) conceptualise support for the EU as another individual-level bias and find that Eurosceptic individuals are more likely to absolve national governments of responsibility for poor performance. Hobolt, Tilley and Wittrock (2013) reaffirm the persistence of these perceptual biases and consider the effect of varying sources of information as well.

The pool of responsibility targets for economic policymaking in EU MS has become even larger in light of policy responses to the Eurozone crisis; both the EU and other international institutions such as the IMF were involved in the crisis management to a large extent. Several studies explore responsibility in the context of the Eurozone crisis, finding mixed evidence (Karyotis and Rüdiger, 2015; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014a; Bellucci, 2014). On the one hand, economic voting is found in single-country case studies on Southern European and periphery countries such as Portugal (Magalhães, 2014), Ireland (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2012) and Greece (Kosmidis, 2014; Nezi, 2012). Although the EU and IMF dominated crisis management, it appears that this was not reflected in voting decisions in the periphery. Kosmidis (2018) conducts a survey experiment in Greece and finds that international constraints do not influence the size of economic voting, as it is strong and does not vary across treatments which test for the room to manoeuvre mechanism. The finding that economic voting is prevalent could signal that responsibility is being attributed to the government rather than to EU actors.

On the other hand, Fernández-Albertos, Kuo and Balcells (2013) conduct an experimental survey in Spain and show that citizens are willing to blame external factors for the crisis such as European governments more and blame the domestic government less. More research is needed in order to understand the dynamics of blame attribution in the context of the Eurozone crisis. Cyprus is absent from the literature on

responsibility attribution in general and in relation to the Eurozone crisis in particular; it is not included in comparative pieces on Southern Europe and there are no single-country case studies. There are two relevant academic papers. Katsourides (2014) offers a descriptive analysis of the 2013 presidential election which took place against the backdrop of the economic crisis, whilst Charalambous, Papageorgiou and Pegasiou (2015) examine Cypriot voting patterns during the 2014 EP elections.

This discussion shows that blame attribution for economic policymaking can be more complicated compared to what the economic voting thesis posits. Existing literature delineates the factors that make voters less or more likely to blame the government for an adverse economic situation across two dimensions. First, the blurring of the vertical clarity for responsibility, conceptualised as EU and/or euro area membership, expands the number of potential blame targets. If voters do not perceive the government as responsible for the economic situation, then they might be more likely to shift blame to external EU targets.

Second, individual-level predispositions such as partisanship and support for European integration can influence the distribution of blame across domestic and external targets. For instance, supporters of the incumbent government who are also Eurosceptic might be more likely to shift responsibility to the EU in order to absolve the government of responsibility. I expand existing research by testing hypotheses explaining variation in voters' blame attribution attitudes based on these two dimensions using novel empirical evidence from the 2013 Cypriot banking crisis.

### **3. Theoretical expectations**

This paper presents a theoretical model explaining the dynamics of blame attribution in the context of EU economic crisis management. The dependent variable is blame attribution for the 2013 Cypriot banking crisis. Building on clarity of responsibility arguments, the model emphasises the diversity of potential targets of responsibility and distinguishes between domestic versus non-domestic and elected versus non-elected targets. The model also draws from the blame attribution literature to develop expectations for how the individual-level characteristics of political ideology and

support towards European integration influence the distribution of blame amongst the targets. The type of crisis exposure is also considered as a moderating variable, measured by whether an individual was directly affected by the bail-in policy response.

### ***3.1 Democratic theory assumptions***

Attribution of responsibility for political outcomes is central to the study of democracy. The key assumptions in the model of representative democracy are that citizens can choose between competing political elites with alternative political agendas and that they can hold decision-makers accountable for their actions in the ballot box (Anderson, 2007). The economic voting theory posits that the determining factor of this vote choice is the economic situation of the country. Drawing from Anderson (2007), I present the conditions that need to be fulfilled for the main assumption of representative democracy to hold. First, it is presumed that such a thing as the objective economy exists and that voters can perceive it accurately. The next condition is that these perceptions can be translated into negative or positive evaluations which can then be transformed into voting decisions.

Accurate perceptions and evaluations of the economy are necessary but not sufficient for economic voting; they require attribution of responsibility to be meaningful. Therefore, for the latter condition to be fulfilled, voters need to hold responsible the incumbent government for the economic situation. If a link in this chain of conditions is broken, democratic accountability is compromised (Anderson, 2007). The theoretical framework of this paper considers how several factors can perplex clarity of responsibility and enable the dispersion of blame beyond elected actors. If voters do not assign responsibility for economic policy decisions to the incumbent government, then they cannot express them directly into the ballot box. As a result, democratic accountability can be side-lined.

### ***3.2 Responsibility targets***

The target of responsibility that is assumed by standard models of electoral accountability is the incumbent government. The Eurozone crisis is illustrative for examining responsibility dispersion beyond the government, as it was a crisis in the

context of a monetary union. Several non-domestic, non-elected actors were implicated in the propagation and management of economic crises in individual MS, making decisions that impacted economies, both at the domestic and at the euro area level. I develop a typology of blame targets in the context of an economic crisis in the EU, focusing on a two-dimensional classification. This list of blame targets is not exhaustive, but rather tailored to the Cypriot case study.

The first dimension concerns target type and is based on Duch and Stevenson's (2008) distinction between elected and non-elected actors implicated in the economy. According to the authors, elected actors include the domestic government, whilst non-elected actors refer to those whose decisions influence the domestic economy but are not susceptible to electoral punishment by voters of that country. These can be perceived as external actors, in the sense that they are external from democratic accountability. The second dimension of targets concerns the target location. Whilst elected actors are domestic, non-elected actors can be domestic or non-domestic.<sup>2</sup> In the Cypriot banking crisis, the domestic non-elected blame targets are the CBC and the banking sector. Non-domestic targets refer to actors which are involved in domestic policymaking but originate from outside the polity. These can include the IMF, other MS governments and EU institutions. The Eurogroup and the Troika are selected as the most pertinent EU-level actors in this case, as they were key decision-makers for the bail-in. This diversity of actors points to the complicated decision that voters face when assigning policy responsibility.

### ***3.3 Hypotheses***

I identify four variables that could influence target selection: EU membership, partisanship, support for European integration and crisis exposure. The first variable captures the fact that Cyprus is an EU MS. The expectation is that the EU's MLG structure blurs the vertical clarity of responsibility. The EU's involvement in the crisis could exonerate elected actors (including the incumbent and previous government at the time

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2. The European Parliament, the only EU institution with directly elected representatives, was not a dominant player during Eurozone crisis management (Schmidt, 2015).

of the crisis) from primary blame, as responsibility is directed towards domestic and non-domestic unelected actors. The following expectation can be formulated:

**H1:** Elected actors are not the primary responsibility targets.

Whilst the hypothesis above is based on a general assumption that the EU's MLG structure makes elected actors appear as less responsible for the economy, the next hypothesis directly tests for this. I draw from studies such as Costa Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012), who show that the higher the perception of EU responsibility for economic outputs, the lower the national economic vote. I hypothesise that if an individual perceives the EU as responsible for the economy, then they are less likely to blame government actors:

**H2:** Individuals who consider the EU as responsible for the national economy are less likely to blame domestic actors.

There is a general agreement that responsibility attribution is a complex process, with voters relying on partisan cues as a heuristic (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014b; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011; Marsh and Tilley, 2010; Arceneaux, 2006; Rudolph, 2003a, 2003). Partisanship can be the result of group-serving attribution bias, whereby individuals attribute perceived successes to the party they support and perceived failures to the party they oppose. There is empirical evidence that blame attribution for a crisis follows partisan cues (Malhorta and Kuo, 2008; Malhorta and Margalit, 2010). Using experimental survey data from the Eurozone crisis in Spain, Fernández-Albertos, Kuo and Balcells (2013) find that partisanship matters; government partisans are more likely to accept framings of the crisis as stemming from external factors and absolve the government of blame. I focus on government support and expect the following:

**H3:** Individuals who support the incumbent government are less likely to blame it and more likely to blame other actors.

The support of an individual towards EU integration can serve as another group-serving bias. In forming judgments about which level is responsible for policy outcomes, individuals do not necessarily rely on information about divisions of power, but also on predispositions about each level of governance (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014a). Hobolt and Tilley (2014a) find evidence that individual Euroscepticism can act as a perceptual screen. I predict that individual-level EU predispositions influence blame attribution attitudes:

**H4:** Individuals who are less supportive of the EU are more likely to blame EU-level actors.

I introduce another variable which can influence blame attribution attitudes for the crisis; type of crisis exposure, measured by how an individual is financially affected by the crisis. This draws from research on the role of economic self-interest and personal economic evaluations in determining preferences. Early studies of this pocketbook model include Abramowitz, Lanoue and Ramesh (1998) who find that evaluations of presidential candidates are affected by perceived changes in personal economic well-being and are more pronounced during economic downturns, but only among individuals who hold the government responsible for these changes. Tilley, Neundorf and Hobolt (2018) also demonstrate that the ability to attribute responsibility to the government for changes in finances is a moderator of pocketbook voting.

Bail-in provides a compelling policy measure to test crisis exposure pocketbook arguments, since it affects some individuals differently than others. The reasoning behind the introduction of bail-ins in the Eurozone is that they result in fairer burden-sharing compared to bailouts by setting a dividing line between private and public financing (Laitenberger, 2016). Bail-ins can be perceived as fairer because they ensure that losses are absorbed by bank creditors, i.e. those who have made an ex-ante decision to purchase bank claims and not by taxpayers who have made no such decision (Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2015).

I distinguish between two types of crisis exposure. The first is direct and includes financial losses from the application of the bail-in and the second is indirect, referring to any financial losses incurred due to the broader crisis climate such as from austerity policies in conditionality programmes. Whilst bailed-in individuals incur direct and potentially indirect losses, the rest are susceptible only to indirect losses. Following the bail-in rationale and consistent with pocketbook expectations, there should be variation in blame attribution depending on how an individual is financially affected by the bail-in. This leads to the following hypothesis:

**H5a:** An individual's type of crisis exposure affects which targets they blame.

Direct crisis exposure does not necessarily entail higher crisis exposure. The distinction between direct and indirect forms of exposure is qualitative rather than quantitative; indirect losses due to the crisis environment can be higher in financial value. The aim of this distinction is to see whether individuals acknowledged that the bail-in was intended to protect taxpayers, thus observing different blame patterns between those who underwent a bail-in and those who did not. The economic theory behind bail-ins can be used to derive further blame attribution hypotheses through the notion of private penalties. By ensuring that shareholders and creditors of a bank bear the costs of failures, bail-in internalises losses and reasserts direct liability on banks (Chennells and Wingfield, 2015). This makes domestic non-elected targets (the banks and central bank) more explicit. I anticipate this effect to be more pronounced amongst individuals directly affected by the bail-in as they must bear the costs of bank resolution:

**H5b:** Individuals directly affected from the bail-in are more likely to blame domestic non-elected actors.

Overall, this theoretical framework leads to six hypotheses which explore how voters attribute blame to a range of actors in the context of an EU economic crisis.

#### 4. Survey design and fielding

To test theoretical expectations, I designed a public opinion survey questionnaire in Greek<sup>3</sup> which was fielded by *Prime Market Research & Consulting*, a Cypriot survey firm in 2020. Although the survey was fielded seven years after the events, the crisis constituted a watershed moment for Cyprus' political system, its economy as well as its relationship with the EU. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that respondents will remember the events that took place in 2013 concerning the banking crisis. Moreover, Cyprus was under an adjustment programme for three years after the crisis, meaning that the impact of the crisis was present up until at least 2017. Nevertheless, when interpreting the results of the survey it is important to keep in mind this time lag and the fact that more recent events could have had an impact on public opinion.

I divide the questionnaire into five parts. Part 1 includes close-ended questions with categorical response options capturing demographic variables, whilst Part 2 questions measure the political attitudes of survey respondents using scalar response options. Part 3 offers a mixture of closed and open-ended branched questions to measure the type of crisis exposure. Part 4 presents respondents with a blame ranking exercise. The ranking exercise has been used in previous studies to measure blame attribution attitudes, including regarding the Eurozone crisis, such as in Fernández-Albertos, Kuo and Balcells (2013). Part 5 ends the survey with sensitive questions.<sup>4</sup> The Appendix offers the survey protocol as well as the survey questionnaire translated in English. Choices regarding the design of the survey such as questionnaire structure and question wording are informed by popular surveys<sup>5</sup> and the survey methodology literature (Lohr, 2009; Groves et al., 2004).

The dependent variable is the blame ranking assigned to each blame target by the respondent in Part 4. Respondents are asked 'Thinking about the 2013 Cypriot economic crisis...which of the following actors, according to you, should be blamed the

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3. Greek is one of the official languages of Cyprus.

4. Defined as intrusive or embarrassing questions (Groves et al., 2004).

5. Particularly the Eurobarometer, European Social Survey (ESS) and American National Election Studies.

most for the development of the crisis in March 2013?', followed by a list of six possible targets whose order is randomised for each respondent to eliminate the risk of ballot-order effects.<sup>6</sup> The target list follows the theoretical distinction between domestic/ non-domestic and elected/non-elected actors.

The governments of President Anastasiades and President Christofias constitute the domestic elected actors, the banking sector and the CBC the domestic non-elected actors and the Eurogroup and Troika the non-domestic non-elected actors. After selecting an answer, respondents are asked 'Who...should be blamed the second most...' Five questions are asked until respondents rank all six options. Rankings are coded to lie between 1 (least blame) and 6 (most blame), with higher values of the dependent variable representing more blame. Given the salient public debate regarding the crisis in the media, it is reasonable to assume that respondents are familiar with the role of the targets in the crisis.

I also include political attitude variables capturing in-group/out-group dynamics, referring to partisanship and EU support. To test H3, I operationalise government support as self-reported vote choice in the 2018 elections, taking a value of 1 if the respondent votes for Anastasiades and 0 otherwise. I include variables capturing political ideology and hypothetical vote choice to ensure the results are robust to alternative operationalisations. To test H4, I code low support for the EU as taking a value of 1 if the respondent reports that EU integration has gone too far, and 0 otherwise. Regarding perceptions of EU responsibility in the domestic economy (H2), 1 signals high responsibility and 0 low responsibility.

The sample covers individuals who were clients of the resolved banks with varying levels of bank claims and individuals who were not clients to test H5a-H5b. I operationalise this as a dummy variable measuring direct crisis exposure, taking a value of 1 if the respondent suffered any form of bail-in (haircut on deposits, bonds or loss of equity) and 0 if they were a client of the resolved banks but not bailed-in (Part 3). Two further questions measure the level of indirect crisis exposure, allowing to isolate the

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6. Previous research finds that candidates listed higher on the ballot receive electoral benefit (Ho and Imai, 2004).

impact of the underlying crisis from the effect of being personally exposed to the banks' resolution, i.e. the direct effect of bail-in.

If a respondent suffered any losses beyond bail-in, I code it as 1 and 0 otherwise. Controlling for the impact of the underlying crisis is theoretically and substantively meaningful as it can influence blame attribution attitudes. It is plausible that the individuals who experienced a direct financial loss display different socioeconomic attributes than the rest of the sample which can influence attitudes. I include variables measuring demographic and socioeconomic characteristics as controls.<sup>7</sup> Unless otherwise noted, I re-code all variables to lie between 0 and 1, so that variables measured on different scales have the same range.

I pre-tested the questionnaire on members of the target population and improved its final version according to feedback (Details in the Appendix). A total of 2003 people were contacted and the final sample size consists of 369 Cypriot citizens, reaching a response rate of 18.4%.<sup>8</sup> The sampling method was Random Digit Dialling, using high quality probability sampling techniques to ensure representativeness. The survey was interviewer-administered using Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) with a Pancyprian coverage.<sup>9 10</sup>

## 5. Results

Before getting into the results of the regression analysis, I present some descriptive statistics. Figure 1 shows how respondents distribute responsibility across targets, where the targets are categorised according to how much they are blamed. The 'most blamed' category sums up the percentage of respondents out of total respondents who hold a target as one of the top three to blame out of the six targets. The 'least blamed'

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7. The Appendix compares the means of socioeconomic and demographic variables between the sample of this survey and the latest publicly available ESS (2018) Cypriot sample at the time of fielding the survey.
  8. The sample size is comparable to the most recent Eurobarometer (92) at the time of fielding the survey, with 505 interviews conducted in Cyprus (European Commission, 2020).
  9. The most recent official estimate of the Greek Cypriot population at the time of fielding the survey was 713.500 people (Ministry of Finance, 2018).
  10. Recruiting large samples through CATI is the preferred method of data collection by domestic market research companies.

category sums up the percentage of respondents who hold a target as one of the three less likely to be blamed out of the six targets.




Figure 1. Distribution of blame across targets

The results lend face validity to H1, which purports that elected actors do not get primary responsibility for the crisis. Instead, blame is directed towards domestic non-elected actors; the CBC and the banking sector are the most top-ranked actors. Conversely, the Eurogroup and Troika are the most low-ranked. Although the EU was involved in the Cypriot crisis, both as a crisis manager and in the broader Eurozone crisis context, respondents did not view actors related to it as the main culprits.

Figures 2, 3 and 4 break down the results by government support, political ideology and support towards the EU respectively. The figures present the percentages of respondents with a certain political preference who consider an actor as one of the top three to blame out of the total respondents with that preference.<sup>11</sup> The key finding remains the same, as non-elected domestic actors receive overall the most blame across all figures. For instance, 88% of government supporters and 72% of non-government supporters apportion the most blame to the CBC.

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11. Given that the results present the sum of respondents who consider an actor as either the first, second, or third most blameworthy, the percentages for each group add up to more than 100.

There are some differences with respect to personal predispositions, but these are small compared to other blame targets where perceptual screens have a larger effect. Supporters of the incumbent Anastasiades are less likely to hold his government responsible for the crisis, as are right-leaning respondents. The opposite picture is the case for left-leaning supporters, as they are less likely to blame the Christofias government and more likely to blame the Anastasiades government compared to right-leaning individuals. Looking at preferences towards the EU, EU supporters are less likely to hold EU actors such as the Troika responsible, yet personal predispositions do not affect the likelihood of blaming the Eurogroup; 30% of those with high EU support and 31% of those with low EU support consider it as one of the top three targets.




Figure 2. Percentage of respondents ranking target as top 3 to blame by government support




Figure 3. Percentage of respondents ranking target as top 3 to blame by ideology




Figure 4. Percentage of respondents ranking target as top 3 to blame by EU support

To estimate the determinants of blame attribution attitudes, I evaluate six logistic regression models. I operationalise the dependent variable in each of the models as a different dummy variable, taking a value of one and signalling ‘most blame’ if the blame target under investigation is ranked as a top three factor for the development of the crisis and zero otherwise. In the first model the dependent variable is whether the

Anastasiades government target is ranked as a top three factor for the crisis. The dependent variable is operationalised in the same manner in the second model for the Christofias government target, in the third for the Troika, in the fourth for the Eurogroup, in the fifth for the CBC and in the sixth for the domestic banking sector.

Given that the dependent variable in each of the models is binary, I use logistic regression to conduct the analysis. Logit is based on the Principle of Maximum Likelihood and estimates the probability of an event happening, i.e. of the dependent variables being one (Burger, 2018; James et al., 2013). For robustness, in the Appendix I estimate the results with Ordinary Least Regression (OLS) models as well. The findings regarding the theoretical expectations remain the same. In line with the theoretical expectations, I include independent variables to estimate their effect on blame attribution attitudes. These include support for the incumbent (Anastasiades) government, EU support, perceptions of EU responsibility on the national economy and crisis exposure. I also control for demographic and socioeconomic variables (education, occupation, gender, income, age and area of residence).

To facilitate interpretation, I transform the log of odds results into marginal effects. Table 1 presents the marginal effects, with six variations of the logit model that account for the different blame targets. The standard errors are clustered at the individual-level to tackle heteroskedasticity issues. In each model, besides the Christofias government and Eurogroup ones, the coefficients for government support are statistically significant. The results lend further support to H3 and the partisan rationalization mechanism, as those who support the right-wing Anastasiades government are less likely to blame his government by -0.28 compared to non-supporters.<sup>12</sup> Conversely, there is a positive relationship between being a supporter of the Anastasiades government and blaming the Christofias government.

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12. I operationalise government support as self-reported vote choice in the 2018 elections and replicate the analyses with different operationalisations (2013 self-reported vote choice and political ideology). The results remain the same.

	Anastasiades government	Christofias government	Troika	Eurogroup	CBC	Banks
Government support	-0.28*** (0.07)	0.14 (0.08)	-0.15* (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.12* (0.06)	0.17* (0.07)
Low EU support	0.10 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)	0.22* (0.09)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.15* (0.08)
Direct crisis exposure	0.03 (0.09)	0.08 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.08)
Indirect crisis exposure	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.19** (0.07)	0.17* (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)
EU responsibility	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)
Education	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.26*** (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.22** (0.07)
Occupation	-0.04 (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)
Gender	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.15* (0.07)	0.24*** (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)
Income	0.00 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Age	0.07* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)
Residence	0.02 (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
McFadden's Pseudo-R2	0.09	0.09	0.17	0.06	0.09	0.09

Table 1. Logistic regression results (marginal effects)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

(\*\*\*p <0.001, \*\*p <0.01, \*p<0.05)

Turning to the effect of EU predispositions, individuals who report low EU support are more likely to consider the Troika as blameworthy by 0.22. Evidence of this negative relationship partly supports H4, which suggests that individuals who do not support the EU are more likely to blame EU-level actors. However, this is not the case for the Eurogroup. In fact, none of the variables predict variation in blame attribution attitudes in relation to this target. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics results. Combining this with the observation that the Eurogroup is the least top-blamed target, leaves room to argue that respondents, regardless of individual characteristics, did not perceive the Eurogroup as responsible for the development of the crisis.

Whilst in-group/out-group considerations regarding the EU have an impact on blame attribution for some blame targets, perceptions of high EU influence in the domestic economy do not. The effect size of this variable is low and statistically insignificant in all the models, against the predictions of H2. The rejection of this hypothesis speaks to Kosmidis' (2018) finding that perceptions of manoeuvrability do not influence the size of economic voting. This also ties in with empirical analyses by Hobolt and Tilley (2014a, 2014b) who demonstrate how support for the EU acts as a perceptual screen; evaluations of responsibility are not only the product of institutional differences in responsibility but can be also driven by personal predispositions towards the EU.

In the case of crisis exposure (H5a and H5b), it appears that indirect crisis exposure has more explanatory power in predicting blame attribution attitudes compared to direct crisis exposure in the form of being bailed-in. Individuals who indirectly suffered financial losses from the crisis were less likely to blame either of the domestic government actors (marginal effects of -0.19 for Christofias and -0.07 for Anastasiades), but more likely to blame the Troika. This finding points to an externalization of responsibility specifically for the policy response, away from elected actors. There is no statistically significant effect of being bailed-in on blame attribution attitudes, despite the fact that the policy response targeted some individuals as opposed to the entire population, like bail-outs do. This finding allows to isolate the effect of the

bail-in as a crisis policy response and contributes to the currently limited research on public opinion regarding bail-ins.

Overall, there are two main insights from the public opinion survey results. First, they present evidence as to who Cypriot voters blame for the development of the crisis. A key takeaway is that elected actors do not get primary responsibility for the crisis. Rather, blame is dispersed amongst the six targets, with the CBC receiving most of the blame. Second, the regression analyses show how Cypriot voters attribute blame. Personal predispositions matter; government supporters are less likely to blame the Anastasiades government and EU supporters less likely to blame the Troika. Meanwhile, those indirectly affected by the crisis are more likely to blame the Troika. Perceptions of EU responsibility appear to have limited explanatory power, casting doubt on the manoeuvrability mechanism as it is presented in the literature.

## **6. Concluding remarks**

This paper expands our understanding of public opinion dynamics during banking crises in general and more specifically during the application of a bail-in. It also informs the blame attribution literature by providing the empirical evidence from an under-studied country, namely Cyprus. Nevertheless, it has limitations which pave the way forward for future research. The public opinion survey does not allow us to untangle the causal micro-mechanism explaining the variation in attitudes. A survey experiment could present respondents with vignettes including different framings of the crisis, endorsed by the different blame targets in a randomized way. This would allow for instance to isolate the effect of EU predispositions, by examining whether EU supporters are less likely to blame it, even if the framing explicitly blames the EU.

The results of this paper demonstrate that responsibility attribution for economic policy outcomes can be more complicated compared to what the economic voting theory posits. Several factors affect how voters attribute responsibility for the 2013 Cypriot banking crisis, with the national central bank and the domestic banking sector receiving the most blame. This finding carries implications for the functioning of democracy, which presupposes that voters should be able to hold accountable the

actors they consider as responsible for adverse economic outcomes by voting them out of office. If voters assign blame to non-elected actors though, then this democratic accountability link breaks. There is no direct way to hold the central bank or the banking sector accountable in the ballot box. The concern is not new, with Anderson (2007) suggesting that the role of central banks in economic policymaking complicates the question of who should be held accountable for economic performance.

A policy implication of this finding would be to enhance other accountability mechanisms in the form of increased oversight and transparency. This argument becomes even more pertinent in the context of the banking union, whereby responsibility for banking supervision and resolution for systemically important banks is transferred to the EU-level. Increasing accountability vis-à-vis the public is a task for both national central banks and the ECB.

#### **Disclosure statement**

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## Appendix

### *A.1 Public opinion survey protocol*

Research question (construct): Examining blame attribution in EU economic crisis management using evidence from the 2013 Cypriot bank bail-in

Survey fielding by: LS Prime Market Research & Consulting Ltd  
([www.primeconsulting.com.cy](http://www.primeconsulting.com.cy))

Survey fielding timeline: 17/02/20 - 28/02/20

Survey type: Quantitative

Questionnaire language: Greek

Data collection method: CATI (phone interviews conducted by LS Prime researchers using a 15-minute structured questionnaire)

Coverage: Pancyprrian

Sampling method: Random Digit Dialling

Target group: Nationally representative sample of Cypriot citizens who were eligible to vote in the 2013 and 2018 presidential elections

Sample size: 369

Margin of error: (+/- ) 3.60% (95%)

## ***A.2 Survey questionnaire***

Please find below the English translation of the survey questionnaire that was administered in Greek. The original version in Greek is available upon request.

### **Part 1: Demographic characteristics questions**

1. What is your gender?
  - a) Female
  - b) Male
  
2. How old are you?
  - a) Up to 25 years old
  - b) 26-35 years old
  - c) 36-45 years old
  - d) 45-55 years old
  - e) 56-65 years old
  - f) 65+ years old
  
3. In which district are you currently residing?
  - a) Nicosia
  - b) Limassol
  - c) Larnaca
  - d) Paphos
  - e) Famagusta

### **Part 2: Political attitudes questions**

4. In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, where 1 means extreme left and 7 means extreme right?
  - a) 1

- b) 2
- c) 3
- d) 4
- e) 5
- f) 6
- g) 7

5. Who did you vote for in the 2013 presidential elections?

- a) Nicos Anastasiades
- b) Stavros Malas
- c) Other
- d) Blank
- e) Abstention
- f) Prefer not to say

6. Who did you vote for in the 2018 presidential elections?

- a) Nicos Anastasiades
- b) Stavros Malas
- c) Other
- d) Blank
- e) Abstention
- f) Prefer not to say

7. If a parliamentary election were held tomorrow, for which party's candidates would you vote for?

- a) DISY
- b) DHKO
- c) EDEK
- d) AKEL
- e) Citizen's Alliance
- f) Solidarity Movement
- g) Green Party

- h) ELAM
  - i) Prefer not to say
8. Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further, whilst others say it has already gone too far. How would you place yourself on a scale where 1 indicates that unification has gone too far and 7 that unification should go further?
- a) 1
  - b) 2
  - c) 3
  - d) 4
  - e) 5
  - f) 6
  - g) 7
9. How much influence do you think that EU institutions have on the Cypriot government's economic policies?
- a) No influence
  - b) Little influence
  - c) Some influence
  - d) A lot of influence

Part 3: Crisis exposure questions

10. During the 2013 Cypriot economic crisis, were you a client of either of the banks (Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank) that were resolved?
- a) Yes
  - b) No

*Instructions for surveyor: If selected option b) in this question then please skip question 11 and go to question 12.*

11. During the 2013 Cypriot economic crisis, did you incur a direct financial loss due to bank resolution?

- a) Bail-in of uninsured deposits (money lost by a haircut incurred on deposits over 100.000 euros)
- b) Bail-in of bonds (money lost by a haircut incurred on bonds/capital securities issued by the bank)
- c) Equity loss (money lost by losing shares in the bank)
- d) Combination of direct financial losses
- e) No direct financial losses

*Instructions for surveyor: If respondent shows confusion, explain what each of the losses mean.*

12. During the 2013 Cypriot economic crisis, did you incur an indirect financial loss beyond bail-in?
- a) Yes
  - b) No

*Instructions for surveyor: If selected option b) in this question then please skip question 13 and go to question 14.*

13. Could you please provide an estimation of % of wealth indirectly lost due to the crisis, besides bail-in?

#### Part 4: Blame attribution attitudes questions

14. Thinking about the 2013 Cypriot economic crisis, we would like to know which of the following actors, according to you, should be blamed the most for the development of the crisis in March 2013? Please note that these actors are being listed in no particular order.
- a) The actions of President Anastasiades
  - b) The action of President Christofias
  - c) The actions of Troika
  - d) The actions of Cyprus Central Bank
  - e) The actions of private actors in the banking sector
  - f) The actions of the Eurogroup

*Instructions for surveyor: please randomise the order of actors for each respondent and ask a series of five questions until respondents rank all six actors. ex. Who should be blamed second most, third most, fourth most, the least.*

Part 5: Questions intended to address sensitive issues

15. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?
- a) Less than a high school diploma
  - b) High school (3 years)
  - c) High School (Lyceum - 6 years)
  - d) Undergraduate university degree
  - e) Master's degree
  - f) Doctorate
  - g) Other
16. Which of the following categories best describes your current occupation?
- a) Public sector
  - b) Private sector
  - c) Self-employed
  - d) Other
17. Which of the following categories best describes your current monthly household income?
- a) Up to 900 euros
  - b) 901-1500 euros
  - c) 1501-2500 euros
  - d) 2501-3500 euros
  - e) 3501-5000 euros
  - f) More than 5001 euros
  - g) Prefer not to say

### A.3 Operationalisation of variables

Variable name	Definition
Gender	Dummy variable=1 if respondent male, 0 otherwise
Age	Categories=1 (18-26 years), 2 (26-35), 3 (36-45), 4 (46-55), 5 (56-65), 6 (65+)
Area of residence	Categories=1 (Nicosia), 2 (Limassol), 3 (Larnaca), 4 (Paphos), 5 (Famagusta)
Political ideology	For the regression results: Dummy variable=1 for 'right-wing' if respondent identifies from 5-7, 0 otherwise  For the descriptive statistics results: 1-3 categorised as for 'left-wing', 4 as 'center' and 5-7 as 'right-wing'
2013 vote choice	Dummy variable=1 for Anastasiades, 0 otherwise
2018 vote choice	Dummy variable=1 for Anastasiades, 0 otherwise
Vote intention	Dummy variable=1 for DISY, 0 otherwise
EU support	Dummy variable=1 for 'low EU support' if respondent identifies from 1-3, 0 otherwise
EU influence	Dummy variable=1 for 'influence' if respondent selects 3-4, 0 otherwise
Client	Dummy variable=1 for client of either BoC or CPB, 0 otherwise
Bail-in	Dummy variable=1 if respondent was bailed-in, 0 otherwise
Indirect losses	Dummy variable=1 if indirect losses, 0 otherwise

Blame attribution targets (Anastasiades government, Christofias government, Eurogroup, Troika, CBC, domestic banks)	Scale=1 (least blame) to 6 (most blame)
Education	Dummy variable=1 if any university studies, 0 otherwise
Occupation	Categories=1 (Public), 2 (Private), 3 (Self-employed)
Income	Categories=1 (Up to 900 euros), 2 (901-1500 euros), 3 (1501-2500 euros), 4 (2501-3500 euros), 5 (3501-5000 euros), 6 (5001+ euros)

Table A.1. Description of variables

#### ***A.4 Survey pre-test***

The pre-testing of the survey questionnaire took place between November 2019 and January 2020, on a total of 12 members of the target population, i.e. Cypriot citizens.

- It was a participating pre-test, in the sense that all participants were informed that this was a practice run.
- I began by providing respondents with contextual information, explaining the motivation of my research question.
- Whilst administering the questionnaire, I encouraged respondents to report on their reactions to question form/wording/order and flag any issues relating to task difficulty and respondent attention.
- I was interested in addressing a specific issue regarding attention; the blame-ranking exercise is repetitive as it asks the same question five times but with a small variation.
- It was also important to test the perception of the 'target' choices, with all respondents converging in agreeing that the choice of President Anastasiades, President Christofias, the banking sector, the CBC, Eurogroup and Troika were the most appropriate ones.
- Note: Previous versions of the questionnaire, including track changes according to feedback from pre-testing are available upon request.

### ***A.5 Descriptive statistics***

Table 2 presents descriptive on the variables. Wherever possible, I provide a comparison between the survey which LS Prime Market Research & Consulting fielded and the latest publicly available ESS (2018) for Cyprus at the time of fielding the survey. I use the means to compare the distribution of the relevant socioeconomic and demographic variables between the two surveys in instances where the variables are coded in the same way.

Variable	Mean (own survey)	Mean (ESS 2018)	Standard deviation	Number	Item non-response
Gender	0.40	0.53	0.49	368	0
Age	4.13 (46-55)	54.44 (years)	1.41	369	0
Political ideology	4.83	5.39	0.50	302	0.18
EU support	5.24	5.40	0.41	366	0.01
Education	0.56	NA	0.50	369	0
Income	3.08	NA	1.53	344	0.07
Occupation	2.50	NA	1.10	369	0
Vote choice (2013)	0.32	NA	0.47	333	0.10
Vote choice (2018)	0.31	NA	0.46	330	0.11
EU responsibility	0.57	NA	0.50	349	0.05
Client	0.68	NA	0.47	368	0
Bail-in	0.37	NA	0.48	249 (out of clients of CBC and CPB)	0
Indirect losses	0.59	NA	0.49	358	0.03
Area of residence	1.96	NA	1.08	366	0.01

Table A.2. Descriptive statistics

**A.6 Robustness checks: Alternative specification of regression models with OLS**

	Anastasiades government	Christofias government	Troika	Eurogroup	CBC	Banks
Government support	-0.261*** (0.070)	0.117 (0.070)	-0.131* (0.065)	0.021 (0.066)	0.119* (0.061)	0.154** (0.068)
Low EU support	0.086 (0.072)	0.052 (0.072)	0.161** (0.069)	0.072 (0.070)	-0.166*** (0.064)	-0.140* (0.071)
Direct crisis exposure	0.022 (0.074)	0.070 (0.076)	-0.042 (0.070)	-0.003 (0.071)	0.041 (0.066)	-0.006 (0.074)
Indirect crisis exposure	-0.059 (0.067)	-0.165** (0.067)	0.127** (0.063)	0.013 (0.063)	-0.072 (0.058)	0.052 (0.065)
EU responsibility	-0.079 (0.061)	-0.022 (0.062)	0.038 (0.058)	0.024 (0.058)	-0.028 (0.054)	-0.015 (0.060)
Education	-0.0049 (0.071)	-0.036 (0.071)	-0.205*** (0.067)	0.139** (0.069)	-0.043 (0.062)	0.206*** (0.070)
Occupation	-0.038 (0.035)	0.100*** (0.035)	-0.061* (0.033)	-0.048 (0.033)	-0.003 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.034)
Gender	-0.069 (0.065)	-0.135* (0.065)	0.193*** (0.061)	0.018 (0.061)	0.018 (0.056)	-0.065 (0.063)
Income	0.003 (0.023)	0.043 (0.024)	-0.067** (0.022)	-0.057** (0.022)	0.016 (0.020)	0.031 (0.023)
Age	0.060* (0.026)	-0.026 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.025)	0.054* (0.023)	0.001 (0.026)
Residence	0.026 (0.028)	-0.069** (0.029)	0.055* (0.026)	0.019 (0.026)	-0.044* (0.025)	0.009 (0.027)
Constant	0.458*** (0.170)	0.555*** (0.174)	0.781* (0.159)	0.540*** (0.164)	0.648*** (0.149)	0.362** (0.170)

Table A.3. OLS regression results

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses

(\*\*\*p <0.001, \*\*p <0.01, \*p<0.05)

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