Multiple Deprivation in Athens: a legacy of persisting and deepening spatial divisions

Vassilis Arapoglou, Nikos Karadimitriou, Thomas Maloutas and John Sayas
Multiple Deprivation in Athens: a legacy of persisting and deepening spatial divisions

Vassilis Arapoglou, Nikos Karadimitriou, Thomas Maloutas and John Sayas

GreeSE Paper No. 157
Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe
## Contents

1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2
2. The political construction of inequality in the social space of Athens ................................ 3
3. Measuring deprivation in the Athenian context ................................................................. 9
4. Mapping Deprivation and its persistence in Athens .......................................................... 12
5. Urban regeneration policies: redistribution and misrecognition ....................................... 17
6. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 20
References ................................................................................................................................ 22
Multiple Deprivation in Athens: a legacy of persisting and deepening spatial divisions

Vassilis Arapoglou*, Nikos Karadimitriou†, Thomas Maloutas‡ and †John Sayas§

ABSTRACT

This paper, first time in the Greek literature, measures and maps multiple deprivation in Athens in 2001 and three years into the economic crisis, in 2011, capturing the effects of two decades of urban development. We find that the spatial distribution of multiple deprivation in Athens, follows a centre-periphery as well as an east-west division that has persisted through time, and deepened during the decade of the 2000s. These divisions are linked to the political construction of the Athenian space, the way that the state has historically shaped how the city developed during the post-war period and has responded to the sovereign debt crisis since 2009. We argue that given the scale and persistency of multiple deprivation it is about time to reconsider the role of Greek urban regeneration policies that are implemented within a politically controlled and fragmented field of planning, without openly addressing redistribution and equity concerns.

Keywords: Multiple deprivation, social disadvantage, urban development, Athens, Greece

Acknowledgements: This paper is dedicated to the memory of our friend and research collaborator John Sayas (Professor at National Technical University of Athens, Deputy Greek Ombudsman for the Quality of Life, and LSE graduate) who passed away in July 2020. John has contributed to the writing of this paper but sadly we had to compile the current version in his absence. Vassilis Arapoglou acknowledges his fellowship at the Hellenic Observatory LSE during the Michaelmas term in 2019 and the presentation given to the LSE sociology department for sharpening the theoretical arguments of the paper.

* University of Crete, email: arapov@uoc.gr
† Bartlett School of Planning, UCL, email: n.karadimitriou@ucl.ac.uk
‡ Harokopion University, email: maloutas@hua.gr
§ National Technical University of Athens
1. Introduction

The urban development model of Athens, based on simultaneous expansion and intensification, has arguably reached a turning point. Even before the onset of the public debt crisis in 2008/09 and the economic depression that ensued, the evident economic and environmental externalities, the difficulties to deal with the emerging problems of dereliction and social deprivation in several areas of the city and often to accommodate the settlement and integration of migrants had been cause for concern for the central and local state – even though this concern was seldom translated into a concerted policy effort.

From the beginning of the post-WWII expansion and up to the early 1980s, strategic planning in the city was focused on managing growth and at the same time on promoting a more polycentric structure in what was perceived to be a very centripetal city dynamic. Such ideas can be witnessed in the early plans of the 1950s and 60s which evolved into the Athens Regulatory Plan of 1985 (President of the Hellenic Republic 1985). That planning approach was in line with the rapid population growth of Athens from the end of the Second World War to the early 1980s. Since then and throughout the 1990s and 2000s the population of the city stabilised but its outward development continued, certain central areas have entered a spiral of abandonment and decline, other parts of the city witnessed a renaissance and parts of the historical city centre attracted new interest, a trend which posed its own social and economic stresses and policy challenges.

Within the current context of rapidly deteriorating living standards for the large majority of the population, the ‘return to the city centre’, urban deprivation and urban regeneration is the order of the day so far as central and local government are concerned. Central government have launched several initiatives during the last few years, amongst other things a ‘green fund’ aimed at financing environmentally sustainable urban projects, a bundle of area-specific tax incentives and subsidies combined with broad-brush policing measures aimed at undocumented immigration and petty crime, as well as urban design-oriented interventions on public space (in Greek: anaplaseis).

The concepts of urban regeneration and sustainability have been influenced by the requirements and funding of EU initiatives, such as the URBAN or more recently the JESSICA initiative. Their adaptation into the Greek context by the local and central state reflected an idiosyncratic market-based urban development model of the city underpinned by implicit urban and social policy priorities. Despite the rhetoric of planning reforms, fragmented, physically focused, incentive-based and policing-oriented approaches to urban deprivation have been impressively consistent irrespective of the party in power at least since the 1970s. Instead of forging policies which would address the socio-economic root causes of urban problems in the long run, policy responses gravitated towards politically speculative, short term measures. These were reinforced by the guild-like structure of the built environment professions and thus reflected a civil engineering-oriented understanding of the city.
It is against this backdrop, which will be covered mainly by reviewing and expanding on existing literature, that the main argument of the paper will be developed. The paper will focus on devising a methodology to measuring, analysing and mapping deprivation in Metropolitan Athens. It will do this whilst taking into account the political shaping of the urban development model of the city and the changing social welfare context of Greece.

Following this introduction, section 2 elaborates on Athens’ urban development trajectory and its welfare provision implications, section 3 discusses the methodological issues surrounding the measurement of deprivation in Athens whereas section 4 maps the findings of this analysis and section 5 describes the limited scope of urban regeneration policies in Greece and the significance of land and property interests in shaping them. Finally, section 6 is dedicated to concluding remarks and directions for future policy.

2. The political construction of inequality in the social space of Athens

In one of her famous comparative studies Silver (1994) distinguishes between three paradigms in understanding social disadvantages and in analysing urban and social policies to address them. Each paradigm attributes social disadvantage to a different cause and views the role of the state for social integration through a distinct political philosophy. First, the ‘Solidarity’ paradigm, whose origins can be traced to Durkheim and French Republican philosophy, examines the state’s capacity to preserve the social bonds through social protection, employment security, and adherence to social norms. Second, the ‘Specialization’ paradigm, mainly influenced by Anglo-American liberal thinking and the Chicago school, according to which social links are interpreted as voluntary exchange contracts between competing individuals. In this context, the state’s role is to ensure that these interactions take place within a pluralist context removing group barriers to exchanges and individual freedom. A conservative variety of the ‘specialization’ paradigm emphasises the role of the State in maintaining order and discouraging welfare dependence. Third, the ‘Monopoly’ paradigm, draws on conflict theories, after Weber and Marx, to explore how the state enforces and legitimates unequal access to material and cultural resources. The monopoly serves the common interests among otherwise unequal insiders and perpetuates the domination of the outsiders. In that approach, the challenge is to scrutinize the role of the State as an instrument of domination, to expand social rights and to support the participation of the disadvantaged and the outsiders.

The work of Peter Townsend and Pierre Bourdieu, which conceptually and methodologically orientate the analysis in the present paper, are exemplary of how deprivation has been analyzed within the ‘Monopoly paradigm’ (Silver 1994). Despite significant differences, the two thinkers agree that deprivation has multiple
dimensions, material and symbolic, it grows amid affluence or enhanced inequality, and is disproportionately concentrated within some social groups and geographic areas. We mainly draw upon Townsend to devise our methodology of capturing and mapping deprivation in Athens, and upon Bourdieu to enhance the existing Greek literature, and explain why the political status quo fails to address the deepening of deprivation, through fragmented, short-sighted regeneration policies.

Bourdieu sought to bring to light not only the forces that give shape to material poverty (“La grandemisère” Bourdieu 1999a, p.4) but also to the multiplication of various kinds of ordinary suffering (“La petite misère” Bourdieu 1999a, p.4). He coined the term “positional suffering” (Bourdieu 1999a, p.4) to capture both the objective conditions and the disillusionment and frustration that these generate to the marginalized poor and to the declining middle classes.

The following extract from the ‘Weight of the World’ where Bourdieu and his collaborators, compared urban poverty in the US and France, can serve to revive and update the discussion of the 1980’s and the 1990s and to clarify how social divisions are the effect of political domination, according to the monopoly paradigm.

“The ultimate stake for the most decisive of these struggles is governmental policy, which wields an immense power over space through its capacity to give value to land, housing and also, to a large extent, to work and education. So the confrontation and collusion between high state officials (divided among themselves), members of the financial institutions directly involved in construction credit operations, and representatives of local municipalities and public services have brought about a housing policy which, through taxation policy and particularly through construction subsidies, has effected a veritable political construction of space” (Bourdieu 1999b, p. 129, our underlining).

The role of the housing field for the political construction of space was elaborated in a full length book (Bourdieu 2005), which, however, is less often cited by sociologists, who find housing issues less attractive, and by planners, who find Bourdieu’s concepts too difficult to be applied in everyday practice.

The influence of the Monopoly paradigm can be detected in some prominent explanations for the persistence of urban and social inequalities in Greece, drawing upon a variety of neo-marxist or neo-weberian theories to explain why the state facilitated the construction industry to boost the economy and ensure political gains for the ruling parties.

Tsoulouvis (1996) highlighted the role of the State in creating and distributing value and in determining planning priorities independently from both market operations and social policy concerns. These arrangements favoured the ownership of land and property in multiple ways: the legitimization of illegally constructed buildings and the incorporation of new territories in urban plans, as well as its valorisation via the allocation of development rights and public investment which served the coalition of
economically powerful strata with broader ones. Political coalitions and centralized control allowed little space for planning agencies and public deliberation.

Land and the distribution of rights over it underpinned the citizen-State relationship in Greece ever since the Greek state was founded and never ceased to be a key ingredient in the efforts of the state to legitimise its existence and assert its authority (Maloutas 1990). The response of the Government in every major crisis since the founding of the Greek state was to create the conditions that would allow citizens to solve their problems by themselves and simultaneously generate tax revenues for the public coffers and rent-extraction opportunities for ‘insider’ social groups whose allegiance or acquiescence would guarantee the survival of the political regime (Leontidou 1990, Maloutas 1990). The belated development of the welfare state was unbalanced in a double sense: it promoted the growth of some sectors, as education, at the expense of others, as housing, and the interests of the middle classes at the expense of the working class (Arapoglou 2002). In Greece public housing for rent has never been developed and is still completely absent. The facilitation from the state extended to gearing up Higher Education towards the provision of suitably skilled construction professionals (architects, civil engineers etc.) and in creating a favourable tax regime for building companies and homeowners.

During the post war period the transformation of Athens was fuelled by internal migration which simultaneously provided demand for housing and cheap construction labour. It relied on the abundant supply of land through simultaneous expansion and densification of the city and was able to provide dwellings extremely quickly by mainly two systems. Self-promotion of housing on the city outskirts (Kalfa 2019), which benefitted big landowners who segmented their properties into tiny lots and sold them to the new settlers who then built their own houses outside the city plans (Maloutas, Siatitsa, Balampanidis 2020). Moreover, “antiparochi”, a land for flats exchange system contributed to the densification of the inner city and inner suburbs as extreme margins of profit were given to small building companies via tax-relief and substantial increase of the construction coefficients (Tsoulouvis 1996; Leontidou 1990). Within three decades, 34,000 apartment blocks sprung up in Athens, as did in most other Greek cities (Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001). Athens doubled its population between 1950 and 1970 and its stock of neoclassical buildings that typified the city centre was almost entirely replaced by 5-7 storey, modernist blocks of flats (Figure 1). Thereafter, the official population appears to have stabilised somewhat, but the spatial expansion of the city continued apace (Figure 2). This intensive and extensive model of urban development and the rent extraction mechanisms associated with it remained largely intact until the 1990s. During the 1990s the unleashing of the mortgage market and the boosting of real estate complemented the centrally and politically controlled construction and use of the Olympic Games infrastructures (Souliotis, Maloutas and Sayas 2014; Maloutas, Siatitsa, and Balamanidis 2020). Centralized decision over the location of infrastructures benefited a handful of mostly already privileged areas, reinforced the middle class flight from the inner city and urban sprawl (also depicted on Figure 2).
Figure 1. Percentage of residents in apartment blocks by Urban Analysis Unit (URANU) in the Athens metropolitan area (2011)

Source: EKKE-ELSTAT (2015)
Maloutas and Economou (cf. 1988) advanced the view that the underdevelopment of the welfare state in Greece was due to the development of a Land-ownership Housing System (LHS), which served the interests of the middle classes. By taking a comparative approach they concluded that the LHS should be understood as the ‘equivalent’ of the welfare state in Western Fordist economies. However, the flip side of such an implicit social policy approach was the residual role given to formal urban planning policies and institutions. Planning policy lacked any explicit value generating or redistributive agenda and thus formal planning was reduced to a technical-managerial process that was often ignored by the State apparatus and the population alike. We extend and qualify the argument to suggest that planning regained some of its symbolic significance in the ex-post legitimizing of land use violations or changes and in the design of regeneration areas.
Apart from the political benefits already discussed, the population satisfied an urgent housing need, in quantitative terms and the country witnessed several decades of growth in part fuelled by the construction sector (Economou 1987, 1988). The resulting housing stock comprises a wide variety of flats that can accommodate the needs of households of various sizes and incomes at various stages in their lives. Notwithstanding an apparent East-West division, Athens also has lower levels of social segregation compared to Western European capitals (Leontidou 1990; Maloutas 2007) in part because of the flexibility of the dwelling stock that allowed for a variety of uses to be accommodated and for a variety of households and social strata to be cohoused in close proximity to each other and in part due to the locational effect that the family-centered welfare system has on household location choices (see Allen et al, 2004).

As Allen et. al (2004) argue, Athenian households choose to do this because the family-centered character of welfare provision influences locational preferences thus incentivising different generations of the same family to live close to each other. The city’s stock of multi storey apartment blocks also offers an extremely versatile entry point to the housing market which the waves of internal and foreign immigrants used in order to facilitate their socio-economic integration (Maloutas, 2007). In the same way that the rural Greek migrants of the 50s and 60s triggered one wave of expansion, the inflow of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s gave a new lease of life to Athens’ urban growth model as it allowed the sub-standard dwelling stock in the more central areas of the city to be repopulated (Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001) and thus revalorised.

Tsoulouvis (1996) recognised that the environmental consequences of Athens’ urban development were severe at least since the early 1980s. Natural resources were degraded and depleted and the quality of life dropped dramatically within relatively short periods of time as areas quickly became saturated and overbuilt, without adequate provision of infrastructures and services. This is in spite of the benefits that high density could in theory accrue in terms of public transport and social infrastructure. In physical terms, the outcome of this process was the under-provision of public spaces and amenities, especially in working class areas, as well as under-provision of all forms of infrastructure. This was combined with a very densely built urban fabric albeit comparatively less densely built suburbs, which meant that a significant proportion of the population lives in blocks of flats even further out from the city core. Indicatively, in some areas of the city centre the plot coverage ratio exceeds 95% and the building coefficient is more than 7.

The development trajectory of Athens could thus be viewed as the result of a peculiarly unregulated, growth-oriented, market-based system, which was quite successful in achieving quantitative goals (i.e. adequate housing provision in terms of units) but rather less capable in resolving collective action issues, for example creating and maintaining high quality urban environments for a great breadth of social strata. A contradiction of this politically dominated model of urban development was that it opened up access to homeownership for a variety of social groups while at the same time enhancing social polarisation through its regressive redistributive function. This would be in line with the assumptions of the ‘monopoly’ approach.
In a system which utilises land ownership as a vehicle of indirect social policy, urban planning and state intervention in the urban fabric very often play a regressive redistributive role by channelling funding to urban projects (mainly ‘anaplaseis’) without value capturing mechanisms in place, therefore redistributing value from those taxpayers who have limited or no rights over land and property to those taxpayers who do (Economou 1987). As a result, the current development model does provide large quantities of dwellings but it does not explicitly address issues like overcrowding and poor dwelling standards and allows significant disparities in quality of life standards between neighbourhoods to arise.

The economic crisis means that main pillars of the Athenian growth model are now being dismantled as the State is no longer willing to, or capable of, indirectly subsidizing housing costs and, in spite of recent changes, is implementing a property tax policy which favours some forms of corporate ownership of property assets but is substantially increasing the tax burden on most other types of owners and especially on households. It is therefore a combination of domestic political factors and external contextual changes that are forcing a change in the urban development policies: the old and tested solution to growth with centrally controlled and indirect redistribution seems to be unfeasible.

3. Measuring deprivation in the Athenian context

This paper uses the 2001 and 2011 national Census data to map deprivation as a combination of several material and social factors that overlap spatially. This mapping reveals the complex interaction between the social and spatial dynamics in Athens. The Census is the most comprehensive if not the only dataset available that covers the Athens Metropolitan Area in detail. Our goal is to promote a multidimensional understanding of the nature and causes of the spatial concentration of multiple deprivation in Athens and at the same time to highlight its linkages to the urban development model of the city which in the case of Athens is inextricably linked to the role of the State in (re)allocating resources between social groups.

This paper is therefore pioneering the measurement of multiple deprivation within the Greek urban development and social welfare context. We chose to use a multivariate method as it has plenty to offer in enhancing our understanding of the nature and causes of deprivation and thus for policy making. Apart from this innovative methodological and academic contribution the paper also contextualises the urban initiatives of the Greek State and argues that within a context of increasingly unattractive and unaffordable property ownership which in any case is less widespread to immigrants, the poor and the young, the role of the State in
performing its implicit land and property-based redistributive function may well undermine its capacity to enhance equity and social inclusion.

Our approach is based on Townsend’s conceptualisation of relative deprivation as a facet of poverty, a consequence of lack of resources such as income that covers a wide range of living standards (Townsend 1979, Townsend and Gordon 1993). Having been trained as an anthropologist and undertaken his first pieces of research in the Institute of Community Studies, Townsend was always sensitive to how the local conditions shape people’s lives (Charlesworth and Fink 2001; Townsend 2004). In subsequent work (Townsend 1987) he further developed the methods for measuring multiple area deprivation and distinguished between the dimensions of material deprivation (dietary, clothing, housing, home facilities, environment, location, work) and social deprivation (family activities, integration into community, formal participation in social institutions, recreation, education). He also intervened (Townsend 1989, 1993) to the discussion about the ‘cycle of deprivation’ and the ‘underclass’ to stress the importance of objective factors and of the policies widening social and spatial gaps in the perpetuation of deprivation, and highlighted the significance of recognizing how different kinds of people, in terms of age, ethnicity and family type, experience deprivation. One of his main concerns was to detect how local deprivation influenced health inequalities and to inform health policies to address them adequately (Townsend, Phillimore and Beattie 1988; Morris and Carstairs 1991).

We follow the logic of Townsend’s classification, which has influenced many contemporary applications distinguishing between distinct domains of deprivation and synthesising them into a composite index, e.g. the UK Communities and Local Government Index of Multiple Deprivation (CLG 2011: 12). Our approach for the purposes of this paper uses a simplified multivariate analysis based on calculating the values of indicators (Table 1) classified into 3 dimensions (employment, housing, education) and 7 sub-dimensions for 2969 Urban Analysis Units (URANU), using Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) population census data for 2001 and 2011.
Table 1. Deprivation Dimensions and Sub-dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions/ sub-dimensions</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment environment</td>
<td>% Active population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Housekeepers aged 20-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to employment</td>
<td>% Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Employment</td>
<td>% Unskilled routine workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% In part-time work (&lt;14h/week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to housing</td>
<td>% Tenants (private rent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Residents in households with 20sq.m. per head or less available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing quality</td>
<td>% Living in irregular housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Living in unheated dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>% 20-64 year olds with compulsory education only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 20-64 year olds with university education or higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of Education</td>
<td>15-18 year-olds not in education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18-29 year-olds not in education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The estimated indicator values per URANU for each year were standardised by assigning:

- a value of 1 for values below average for that indicator, towards lower deprivation
- a value of 2 for indicator values between the average and the average plus one standard deviation (higher values in all variables indicate more deprivation),
- a value of 3 for indicator values more than one standard deviation above average, towards higher deprivation

The standardised indicator values were averaged for each sub-dimension then added together for each URANU in order to estimate the value of the ‘Deprivation Indicator’ per URANU. All URANUs were then grouped into percentiles for 2001 and 2011. The three dimensions correspond to Townsend’s most significant dimensions of material deprivation (work, housing) and social deprivation (Education). It is noteworthy that the links between the insecurity of work, housing and education, appear in Bourdieu’s discussion of economic and cultural capital, whose lack has been recently confirmed to contribute to the precarization of the working class in the UK (Savage 2015). The lack of an equivalent to the PSE Survey or the UKLHS (Gordon and Pantazis 1997; Levitas et. al. 2007; Pantazis et. al. 2006) or PSENi (Hillyard et. al. 2003) did not allow us to include an assessment over what people view as necessities. However, despite data limitations we were able to expand the analysis to include 1991 data in another paper (Karadimitriou, Maloutas, Arapoglou, Sayas, 2021).
4. Mapping Deprivation and its persistence in Athens

Our analysis shows that deprivation in Athens is a much more widespread phenomenon than previously thought, at least in terms of areas affected. The spatial pattern of deprivation reflects the traditional West-East division of the city (Figures 3 and 4). A large proportion of the city’s densely built-up core, areas at the old industrial core between Athens and Piraeus and working class areas around the bay of Elefsina as well as in North-Western Athens are included in the most deprived quintiles for both 2001 and 2011. Four more clusters of deprivation are noticeable in areas of peri-urban sprawl: first in the old industrial port of Lavrion (South-East), a second in the Mesogeia plain, which was an epicentre of transformations in the pre-Olympic era, a third around Marathonas in the North-East, where vegetable agriculture attracts large numbers of migrant workers, and a fourth along the 2nd home/holiday home zone in North-Eastern Attica.

Figure 3. Deprivation in Athens-Attica in 2001

Source: Authors’ elaboration from EKKE-ELSTAT 2015
Figures 5 and 6 depict those areas where the deprivation score increased between 2001 and 2011. The deprivation score increased in inner city areas and peripheral working class areas and not in inner suburban working class areas. Especially affected are the areas in the center and to the west and south of the Municipality of Athens. The conditions have also deteriorated in peri-urban areas of sprawl, indicating the negative effects of unplanned growth (Arapoglou and Sayas 2009, Chorianopoulos et al 2014, Salvati and Zitti 2017).
Figure 5. Areas with increased deprivation from 2001 to 2011 in Athens-Attica

Source: Authors’ elaboration from EKKE-ELSTAT 2015
Furthermore, what is most striking is the fact that during the 2000s the most deprived areas have become even more deprived in contrast to least deprived ones, where the living conditions have improved. This is depicted in Figure 7, which reports the mean deprivation score for 2001 across deciles in dark grey shading and the difference in the deprivation score between 2011 and 2001 in light grey shading. The decline in the mean scores of deprivation (i.e. the betterment of material and social conditions) concerned the 70% of areas in our study (7 deciles). For the twenty percent, and especially the ten percent, most deprived areas an increase in the mean score of deprivation (i.e. worsening of material and social conditions) is evident.
Figure 7. Mean of deprivation score per percentile in 2001 and difference from 2011

Figure 7 depicts a process of deepening inequality and, more specifically, of widening the gap between the most and the least deprived areas, which can be attributed to two effects. A ‘crisis effect’: the disruption of economic growth resulted to the rise of unemployment in peripheral working-class areas, areas of mixed sprawl, and in central areas of Athens accommodating younger aged groups outside nuclear households, and migrants. An ‘unequal growth effect’ that is depicted in the sluggish improvement in the housing conditions and educational opportunities for those residing in deprived areas in contrast to the significant improvement in the housing conditions and educational qualifications for those residing in the least deprived areas. Such an ‘unequal growth effect’ captures longer term processes in operation after 2001, and before the debt crisis. Regarding housing it is related to the booming of real estate and economic changes induced by the centrally planned restructuring of the city in the preparation for the Olympics, which favored the already privileged city areas as noted in section 3 above. Regarding education, it may be considered a mix of social class and place positioning. Improved access to secondary education in most deprived areas could not counter-balance the expansive access to higher education in least deprived ones (a similar pattern confirmed by Maloutas, Spyrellis, and Capella 2019).

Our findings are only indicative of the destabilizing consequences of the crisis and its aftermath (for a detailed account see Maloutas, Siatitsa and Balampanidis 2020;
Arapoglou and Gounis 2017). The crisis was harder on those without resources from family and social networks, the usual outsiders, excluded from political bargaining like the Roma, longer term resident migrants to whom formal and social citizenship has been consistently denied for decades, and also migrant newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers since 2015. Economic and social policy reforms induced by Greece’s lenders and the EU imposed a crisis management and anti-poverty policies to tackle only some of the immediate and urgent effects of the crisis. Moreover, increase of homeowner’s taxation and mortgage arrears have contributed to the increase of the housing costs. Homeownership became even more unaffordable for lower income groups after the sharp rise of prices since the 1990s following the rapid growth of mortgage lending (Emmanuel 2004; 2014). Since 2018, and after the end of the third memorandum agreement, the policies adopted by the newly elected government abandon even those measures, which were taken as emergency relief. Positive changes are expected from reviving real-estate markets and touris demand, without considering that these may sustain the recovery only in a limited number of areas and only for some social groups. Not only the scant income support to the poor and subsidization of low-income tenants has been reduced but also policing, and clean-up operations for entrapped asylum seekers and their supporters became the flag-ship of law-and-order operations in the city center.

5. Urban regeneration policies: redistribution and misrecognition

For Bourdieu, economy and culture also take expression in two forms of injustice, that policies produce, namely redistribution to the interests of dominant classes and misrecognition of the needs of the dominated (for a summary on Bourdieu’s use of the two concepts, Calhun 2003 and Lovell 2007). Misrecognition does not simply concern the neglect of the sentiments and misfortunes of the poor and the excluded. It is a form of symbolic power, naturalizing the existing social order (Bourdieu 1999b; Bourdieu 2005, 1979). It is structuring the possibilities of thinking and acting according to the dominant way, and penetrates the ways the dominated understand their own experiences, trajectories and prospects. In this section we comment on the combined effects of misrecognition and redistribution within piecemeal and fragmented regeneration policies in Athens by pointing to three nuanced forms of misrecognition related to the ostensible absence of the state.

The post 1990s pan-European urban policy push towards urban regeneration and city containment (EC Green Paper) was meant to address concerns over urban deprivation and sustainability, as for example the inefficiencies in the use of land and energy resources inherent in city expansion. As such, in principle, urban regeneration programmes in most western European countries are trying to address urban problems through integrated physical, environmental and socio-economic interventions (Karadimitriou et. al. 2013). Yet, the priorities of urban
competitiveness overshadow social cohesion and give a distinctive market-oriented brand to sustainability (Chorianopoulos and Iosifides 2006).

Greek planning law moved to some extent towards the European directions in the late 1990s as Laws 2508/97 and 2742/99 introduced the concept of Integrated Urban Intervention Plans (ΣΟΑΠ) as a means to address problems of urban deprivation clusters. However, in practice their provisions had remained inactive until very recently while at the same time beautification-oriented, urban design-based interventions (anaplaseis) have been promoted apace by successive Greek governments. Traditionally, the main elements of the ‘anaplaseis’ usually have to do with street pedestrianisation and consequently the de facto ban of car use as well as tree planting, new street furniture and occasionally art installations. Investment by the state in transport infrastructure or public realm improvements often mitigates some of the negative externalities thus reversing the process of abandonment.

Nonetheless, the effort to revalorise abandoned spaces also involves wealth redistribution using property ownership and market speculation as a vehicle. In many cases shifts in the land use mix in the areas of intervention towards leisure and entertainment, replace one negative environmental externality for another (for example car noise is replaced with bar noise). We could mention that several such interventions in the city centre have facilitated the exodus of the small businesses (mainly warehouses and workshops that were typically located in the areas of the historical urban core) and catalysed its conversion to an entertainment pole of metropolitan significance (Marougkas 2020). This switch in uses was also seen as an opportunity by the municipal authorities to collect higher business rates not only by attracting more and higher turnover businesses but also by renting out the newly pedestrianised ‘public’ spaces to them. The most recent project of the municipality of Athens, the “Great Walk”, a plan to eventually develop major paths for pedestrians and cyclists across the city centre, is emblematic of this old-fashioned approach, in spite of its ambitious goals.

Most regeneration projects of this kind depended 100% on public funding and thus were financed almost exclusively by EU and national funds (via the European Regional Development Fund). They amounted therefore to a direct transfer of value from the Greek and European taxpayer to the property owners of affected areas, a boost for the construction sector and related professions (mainly civil engineers and architects/urban designers) and an indirect subsidy for the Greek leisure and entertainment sector.

Consequently, the allocation of resources in regeneration schemes does beg two questions: a) how does the State recover any of those investment costs? and b) whether other forms of intervention targeting for example local economic growth, upgrading of health and education infrastructures, public transport, and vacant dwellings would have been more effective in addressing deprivation, especially for those areas and groups experiencing its most severe manifestations (see section 4). Misrecognition as we shall now turn to argue, involves multiple ways to either avoid these questions or give those answers that perpetuate the status quo.
First, misrecognition is built into the categories of official knowledge (area classifications, policy targets, etc), the ways policy advisers, think tanks and the media establish a dominant perception and judgement over poor and disadvantaged localities. Neglect of documentation over the economic impact of land use changes in the Greek projects of regeneration is striking. Furthermore, with the exception of a handful of purpose-specific studies, there is little statistical evidence and data available to policy makers and the wider public with regard to the parameters of urban social deprivation and the socioeconomic effects that urban interventions and other initiatives have on it. Even, in the “Integrated Urban Intervention Plan of Athens”, which included a socio-economic assessment of the planned interventions in the city centre, the emphasis was not laid on deprivation but on restoring security, and priority was given to actions tackling “delinquency”, “problems related to the operation of houses of prostitution”, and “concentration of illicit migrants” (LD 1397/2015).

Second, the focus on design and aesthetic terms symbolically legitimates some forms of land use changes and economic transformations already in operation in regenerated areas. Beautification has more recently been used as complement to ephemeral artistic interventions in crisis hit Athens (for example the 2015 “Documenta” failed to get its cultural agenda into a true dialogue with the needs of the local audiences and instead remained a public spectacle, Stavrides 2017, Tramboulis and Tzirtzilakis 2018). Beautification of some public spaces also complemented the temporary recovery from the crisis in touristified and gentrified inner-city areas, such as Kypseli and Metaxourgio, giving expression to the revived aspirations of overtaxed homeowners and to the tastes of city visitors but not to the anxieties of the unemployed and precariously housed, young people and minorities there (Alexandri 2018, Balabanidis et al 2020). “Iconic architecture” in the plans of “fast-track”, but still pending, large scale investments is another means of attracting attention away from public land disposals as in the case of the waterfront redevelopment of the Hellinikon former airport (Hadjimichalis 2014).

Third, territorial stigmatization and place defamation are internationally known to be the most visible exercise of symbolic violence (Wacquant 2008, Wacquant, Slater and Pereira 2014, Slater and Harrigan 2017). In Athens, territorial stigmatization was evident since the late 2000s in the ghettoization discourse orchestrated by the media, the national and local governments over the conditions and prospects of ethnically diverse, and social mixed Athenian neighborhoods (Vradis 2019, Koutrolikou 2015, Arapoglou and Maloutas 2011). It could be noted that a nuanced form of stigmatization may not concern the whole area but mingle and scapegoat its symbolic polluters. In the case of Greece, the resurgence of the conservative party in power in 2019 was accompanied by a political rhetoric, which associated the presence of migrant newcomers and dissenting youth voices in the centre of Athens with “extremism”, “terrorism”, “anarchy”, and “criminality”. The old recipe of public order has been aggressively reused since 2019 in the cleansing of squats and refugee hospices across the neighborhoods (Kypseli, Exarchia, Pagrati), where touristification has spread. This is not only an example of authoritarian governance but also an illustration of the prime importance that private property rights and homeownership have in Greece and of the reluctance to institutionalize other forms
of property rights and social housing. It should be noted that, many of such solidarity organizations and grassroots initiatives operated for more than a decade, substituted state welfare for citizens mostly affected by the austerity driven adjustments since the early 2010s, and pioneered in advancing inclusive housing schemes for the reception of refugees (Mantanika and Arapoglou forthcoming, Lafazani 2018, Leontidou 2014, Stavrides 2016, Vaiou and Kalandides 2017).

6. Conclusions

Patterns of deprivation seem to be tied to the political construction of the urban development model of Athens and the divisions of its social space. The explosive population growth of the city in the post-war period was tackled through expansion and intensification as a result of political mediation, which shaped a fragmented, weak, and centrally controlling planning regime which facilitated the ‘self-provisioning’ of housing and ‘land-for-flats’ exchanges, compensating the lack of capital and inadequate welfare provisions. This model continued apace through the 1950s, 60s and 70s and its product was a high-density city with a very limited provision of environmental amenity, especially in the areas housing less affluent strata (Western Athens, the wider Elefsina area and part of the densely built central neighbourhoods). It is in those areas, together with the old industrial core along the Athens-Piraeus axis, the port of Lavrion (another old industrial location) and some other peripheral locations in Attica where deprivation is concentrated according to the findings of this paper. The trend towards suburbanisation in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s both exacerbated and modified these pre-existing spatial patterns of deprivation—especially through the decline of inner-city neighbourhoods—as the middle class accelerated its move to the North-Eastern and South-Eastern inner and outer suburbs. Real estate and housing credit growth, as well as public money channelled to the construction of Olympic Games infrastructures in the decade of the 2000s did not accrue benefits to most deprived areas. Moreover, the first years of the debt crisis seem to have increased the distance between the most and the least deprived city areas, as our analysis can only partially capture.

However, a significant part of Western Athens fares relatively well in our measurements, a sign of resilience of the family-based character of welfare, and strength of social capital amongst the established working class in those parts of the metropolis. The fact that some of the industrial city peripheral quarters and Lavrion have persistently been included in the most deprived deciles also stands testament to the effects that de-industrialisation and the most recent debt crisis had to the social and physical fabric of the city. Findings also suggest that in central city areas the young people, long term established and newcomer migrants were disproportionately affected by the economic downturn initiated by the debt crisis.

In past decades, the interventions of the State have been limited to a certain type of urban regeneration policies, ‘anaplaseis’, public investments mainly oriented at the
beautification and functional upgrading of public space. These interventions often have unintended consequences, in terms of their spill-over effects, but even though they rarely are officially evaluated they are often met with approval by citizens as they play an important albeit indirect role in redistributing value across urban space and between social strata. They are also often designed at the expense of most disadvantaged groups which are not only excluded from planning but suffer the exercise of real and symbolic violence by the state.

Given the sequential unravelling of multiple stressors on the city (the “debt crisis”, the “refugee crisis” and the “pandemic”) it would be important for the State to develop new mechanisms that would be able to direct the limited resources available in a much more integrated, equitable and effective way. To emphasize the analytic potentials of our approach should we conclude by reminding that Townsend’s devise of an index of multiple deprivation was used to address the spatial manifestation of health inequalities (Townsend, Phillimore and Beattie 1988) or by recapitulating the most recent evidence (UK Office of National Statistics 2020, Marmot and Allen 2020, Propper, Stoye and Zaranko 2020) that the COVID-19 disproportionately affects the most deprived areas in the UK? This seems to be happening also in Athens where the western part of the metropolitan region is the mostly affected by the pandemic.
References


Arapoglou V. P. and Sayas J. (2009), New facets of urban segregation in southern Europe: Gender, migration and social class change in Athens, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 16(4), pp. 345-362.


Bourdieu P. (2005), The social structures of the economy, Polity.


Karadimitriou N., Maloutas T., Arapoglou V.P., Sayas J (2021), Multiple deprivation and urban development in Athens, Greece: Spatial trends and the role of access to housing, Land (under review)


Legislative Decree 1397 (2015), Integrated Urban Development Plan of Athens, Government Gazette 64, pp. 509-677

Leontidou L. (1990), The Mediterranean City in Transition. Cambridge: CUP


Maloutas T. (1990), Housing and Family in Athens: An Analysis of Post-war Housing Practice. Athens: Exantas (in Greek)


Wacquant L. (2008), Territorial stigmatization in the age of advanced marginality. In Symbolic power in cultural contexts (pp. 43-52). Brill Sense.

Previous Papers in this Series


153. Charalambos Tsekeris, Nicolas Demertzis, Apostolos Linardis, Katerina Iliou, Dimitra Kondyli, Amalia Frangiskou and Olga Papaliou, Investigating the Internet in Greece: findings from the World Internet Project, November 2020

152. George Economides, Dimitris Papageorgiou and Apostolis Philippopoulos, Macroeconomic policy lessons for Greece, October 2020

Special Issue edited by Vassilis Monastiriotis and Philipp Katsinas, The Economic Impact of COVID-19 in Greece, September 2020

151. Sotiris K. Papaioannou, Political Instability and Economic Growth at Different Stages of Economic Development: historical evidence from Greece, August 2020

150. Eirini Andriopoulou, Eleni Kanavitsa, Chrysa Leventi and Panos Tsakloglou, The Distributional Impact of Recurrent Immovable Property Taxation in Greece, July 2020


147. Konstantinos Chisiridis, Costas Mouratidis and Theodore Panagiotidis, The North-South Divide, the Euro and the World, April 2020

146. Georgios Efthyvoulou, Pantelis Kammas and Vassilis Sarantides, Gender voting gap in the dawn of urbanization: Evidence from a quasi-experiment with Greek special elections, March 2020