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Addressing Statelessness in Greece under EU law.

Abstract

In Greece, there are still stateless persons who face a number of problems due to the lack of nationality and the absence of legal protection. EU legislation on the rights of citizens could have an impact on the regulation of access to nationality in Member States. This paper attempts to shed light on the development of Greece's legislation on statelessness within the EU constitutional order.

1. Introduction

"Everyone has the right to citizenship"[1], the international conventions proclaim, but many people have been deprived of this right since they have no citizenship. UNHCR estimated that the total number of stateless persons in Europe reaches almost 600.000 individuals and 12 million worldwide[2].

Nationality issues, including reduction of statelessness are primarily regulated through nationality laws, which are within the competence of the Member States. The Greek legislation about nationality is a sensitive issue[3] and therefore, there is no willingness to address the phenomenon of statelessness in depth. However, Member States are bound by the general principles of the European Union (EU) law when creating law and policy relating to nationality.

Under these circumstances, the following lines will draw a picture on the legal system of statelessness in Europe and particularly in Greece and then, on the relative statelessness EU legislation and the transposition of this in the Greek legal system.

2. An overview of statelessness

According to the article 1 of the Convention of Statelessness, a stateless person is someone who is *"not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law"*. Stateless people lack access to even basic rights. Because of their legal status, these individuals often live in conditions of protracted marginalization and discrimination, facing numerous difficulties, such as the inability to receive medical assistance, travel, enroll in educational programs, acquire property, obtain legal employment, marry or open a bank account and arbitrarily detention[4] (Mandy, 2017).

The most common causes of statelessness include state succession, discriminatory nationality laws, arbitrary deprivation of nationality, displacement and forced migration, lack of birth registration or inability to satisfy certain requirements for the acquisition of nationality. Statelessness could also be the result of immigration; unable or unwilling to return to their countries of origin, whether for fear of persecution or because their country of origin refuses to readmit them or for economic reasons, they have to become eventual stateless. (Berenyi 2016; Sawyer & Blitz, 2011 ; Papasiopi-Passa 2012;)

The problem of statelessness is not new. Especially after the Second World War there was a big challenge to find a solution to the remained stateless people. For the first time, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the rights to nationality and the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of nationality were included. In 1951, the Convention on the Status of Refugees dealt with stateless refugees. However, the cornerstone was the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons in 1954[5] which is still now the only international Convention

1 Article 15, Universal Declaration of Human Rights

2 https://www.statelessness.eu/

3 In past, there were discourses about who is Greek and belongs to the nation. Further analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.

4 Kim v Russia – The unlawful detention of stateless persons in immigration proceedings, European Network on Statelessness Blog

5 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 28 September 1954 entered into force 6 June 1960.

dealing with this issue. As a follow up the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was established in 1961 [6], which prescribe safeguards that will enable statelessness to be avoided.

Twenty four (24) Member States of EU are State Parties to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954 Convention)[7] and 19 Member States are State Parties to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961 Convention). However, there is no homogeneity among Member States as regards the procedures they use to determine statelessness, as the 1954 Convention is silent on such matters. [8]

3. Statelessness in Greece

There is no a valid number of stateless persons in Greece due to the lack of an official research or registration of these people. There are only some statistical references in academic papers by individual researchers or UNCHR.[9] Without a procedure in place, it is impossible to arrive at accurate statistics revealing the real number of stateless persons.

The reason for stateless persons is that Greek citizenship legislation traditionally included a double distinction between natives and foreigners and foreigners in themselves (Christopoulos 2012; Mavromatis 2017; Vogli 2007;). Especially, the natives (minorities, communists) were considered as an enemy and the state should be protected by the possible threats. Thus, there were provisions through which Greek citizens such as Muslims and political dissidents withdrew their citizenship[10] (Anagnostou 2011; Christopoulos 2013). There are also Roma people who do not follow the birth registration process and are unwilling to acquire a citizenship[11]. After 1990s, due to the Soviet Union collapse and the huge immigration flows into the country, the number of stateless but refugees in Greece has increased[12].

Greece enacted the Statelessness Convention by ratification by Law 139/1975. Since then, there has been no other legislation in the Greek law that refers solely to stateless persons, but only to provisions on citizenship or immigration laws that define stateless persons as those who meet the conditions set out in Article 1 of the Statelessness Convention. However, this law does not include a special procedure for recognizing stateless people. It had only transposed the Convention without adding more explanations.

Until last year, there was not any intention to introduce new national legislation for stateless persons (Mavromatis 2017). The fact that Greece is obliged to implement EU legislation may lead to a new era but has EU tackled this negative phenomenon?

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6 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 30 August 1961 entered into force on 13 Dec. 1975.

7 Only four have not acceded the Convention , Cyprus, Malta, Estonia and Poland

8 France, Italy, Spain, Latvia, Hungary, United Kingdom, Slovakia and Belgium have special procedures.

9 See Christopoulos , Tsitselikis & https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/5a8ee0387/unhcr-statistical-yearbook-2016-16th-edition.html

10 Resolution of LZ/1947 and Article 19 Code of Nationality

11 Legislative Order 3370/55 and C.L. 481/1968 opportunity to access nationality but not effective

12 www.hellenicpolice.gr

4. Statelessness and EU legislation: Implementation in Greece

Over the past ten years, EU has introduced enforceable human rights instruments but they often offer little to Europe's stateless people. Some argue that EU does not have the competence to legislate about this issue taking into account that granting nationality is state's responsibility (Morje 2009; Papasiopi-Passa 2012). On the other hand, others argue that there is legislative competence under Articles 352 & 67 (2) of the TFEU that gives the Union the competence to pass legislation concerning the rights of stateless persons (Berenyik 2018; Molnar 2010).

It is interesting that since 2009, the concept **'stateless persons'** has been assimilated with TCN, in line with Article 67(2) TFEU, which states that legislation based on Chapter V concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice applies equally to stateless persons, ***'stateless shall be treated as third-country nationals'.*** This provision is the first in primary EU law mentioning stateless persons specifically and has been characterized as an important step towards the creation of a proper legal framework for statelessness in the Union (Molnar 2010; Ermolaeva and Faltinat and Tentere 2017).

The reference in stateless persons within EU secondary Law is more often but there is lack of clarity. The second part of Article 2(d) of the Recast Qualification Directive 2011/95 defines *'a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above (...).'*. However, it should be mentioned that the first Qualification Directive 2004/83 in Article 11 (1) (f) stipulated that *'[a] third country national or a stateless person shall cease to be a refugee, if, while being a stateless person with no nationality'* , a term (no nationality) which creates ambiguity and for this reason it was later omitted from the Recast Directive. Whereas both the Qualification and its Recast mention the 1951 Refugee Convention, there is no reference to the 1954 Statelessness Convention, despite the fact the stateless persons come expressly within Directives' scope of application. The general reference to *'other relevant treaties'* does not include treaties to which not all Member States are party, as this would bind the Union to obligations, which those States have not themselves undertaken (Molnar 2010).

This Directive is transposed in the Greek legislation with the Presidential Decree 141/13 (21-10-2013) without analyzing more the term of stateless. The article 2 of the Directive is just translated in Greek. However, this Decree has an Article 3, which states that the implementation of this Decree should be according to the Geneva Convention and other International Conventions that protect human rights and have been ratified by Greece. This last provision does not refer to Statelessness Convention, though it should be included in the term "other international Convention".

Moreover, in Article 2(b) of the Recast Reception Directive 2013/33 the term applicant is defined as *'a third country national or a stateless person who has made an application for international protection in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken.'* Thus, again. the term 'applicant' does not shed any light on the definition of a 'stateless person.'

In other article, such as Article 8(3)(a) of the same Directive states that an applicant may be detained only in order to determine or verify his or her identity or nationality. However, the paradox is that nationality could be impossible to be proved for a stateless person.

This Directive transposed to the Greek legislation system with the Laws 4375/16 and 4540/18. Once again, the Greek legislator just copied the Directive and failed to further analyze the terms of stateless persons. And once again, there is an article that this law should be implemented according to the Conventions that Greece has ratified without special mention to the Statelessness Convention.

In the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC, the explicit reference to *'stateless persons'* in Articles 2 (b) and (f) of the Directive, points to the conclusion that this category was not intended to be included in the scope of Articles 1 and 2(a) of the Directive. Greece does not differentiate from the Directive in its related legislative orders.

In the Long-Term Residents Directive 2003/109/EC there is no explicit reference to stateless persons in Article 2, which sets out the definitions used for the purposes of the Long-Term Residence Directive. Greece transposed the Directive as it is in P.D. 150/06 (now abolished) and 4251/14.

EU Directives	**Greek legislation**
Recast Qualification Directive 2011/95	Presidential Decree (P.D.) 141/13
Recast Reception Directive 2013/33	Law 4375/16 and 4540/18
Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC	▪ Presidential Decree 131/06 for refugees, amended by P.D.167/08 , ▪ Presidential Decree (P.D.) 113/13 ▪ Law 4251/14 for TCN
Long-Term Residents Directive 2003/ 109	▪ Presidential Decree (P.D.) 150/06 (now abolished) ▪ Law 4251/14

Table with EU Directives and their transposition into Greek legal system

As far as the Regulations of EU are concerned, the field is different. It should be noted that the Regulation is a binding legislative act, which is self-executing and must be applied in its entirety across the EU. On the contrary, the Directives allow a measure of margin to individual Member States to transpose them into their national legislation, with aim to reach the goals of Directives. Thus, it is interesting that by adopting a Regulation, which refers to the definition of *'stateless person'* according 1954 Statelessness Convention, MS should accept and implement its provision, irrespective of whether they have ratified the 1954 Statelessness Convention. In particular:

The **Visa Regulation No 539/2001** as it was amended, stated that '*Member States may exempt from the visa requirement recognized refugees, all stateless persons, both those under the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 28 September 1954 and those outside of the scope of that Convention'*. It was the first time that the related Convention is been mentioned in an EU provision. The new **Visa Regulation (EU) 2018/1806** did not change this provision.

Another Regulation with reference to the Statelessness Convention is the **Coordination of Social Security Regulation No 883/2004** which mentions that this Regulation is to apply to *"nationals of a Member State, stateless persons and refugee residents in the territory of a Member State who are or have been subject to the social security legislation of one or more Member States (...).*' and in Article 1(h) contains a reference to the Statelessness Convention, noting that a "stateless person" shall have the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.

Meanwhile, the **Dublin Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (Recast)** makes a distinction between third-country nationals and stateless persons, despite their assimilation under Article 67 (2) of the TFEU. According to Article 2 (a) of the Regulation, the term 'third-country national' means '*any person who is not a citizen of the Union within the meaning of Article 20(1) of the TFEU and*

who is not a national of a State which participates in this Regulation by virtue of an agreement with the European Union'.

A special reference should also be made in the **Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union** (2016/C202/02) which has become a pillar of reference used in the development of nearly all EU policies. The Charter includes provisions that apply indiscriminately, namely: • Right to human dignity (Article 1) • Right to life (Article 2) and to physical integrity (Article 3) • Prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 4) • Right to liberty and security (Article 6) • Right to respect for private and family life (Article 7) • Non-discrimination (Article 21) • Rights of the child (Article 24) • Right to health care (Article 35) (subject to restrictions in national law). However, considering the most common difficulties faced by stateless persons, the above-mentioned basic human rights cannot be enforced to stateless people if there is not a specific recognition procedure. This last failure of enforcing the Chapter should sound an alarm bell.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the European Commission has also started raising awareness and putting this issue on the political agenda with many recommendations and reports about statelessness[13] (EMN 2016). Some jurisprudence has also been developed concerning status of the stateless such as Khalil and others case (C- 95/99) and Rottman Case (C- 135/08)[14] (Cardoso 2015). In all cases, the Court does not provide any further explanation of stateless terms or obligation of MS to recognize stateless persons. Until now, there is no Greek case in the Court of Justice pending justice as regard the stateless status.

5. Conclusion

Over the last years, it seems that the phenomenon of statelessness has attracted particular attention, perhaps, in the light of the awareness of the strong connection between statelessness and irregular immigration. However, there are still grey areas of statelessness in Europe due to lack of clarity. Some legal texts assimilate them with third-country nationals and some grant them rights under EU law similar to EU citizens (e.g. the EU social security legislation).

The protection of stateless persons might be regulated through migration law where the EU has competence, established by Article 67(2) in conjunction with Article 352 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as primary source of EU law providing that stateless persons must be treated equally as third country nationals. Nevertheless, EU law does not have a specific definition and also does not provide explicit procedure on how to address statelessness. What is more, references to the definition of Article 1 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention are inchoate with the exception of Regulations. Besides, the secondary EU law assessed does not defer from the national law of EU Member States.

Greece, where the statelessness still exists and new cases emerge, has adopted the EU Directives and implements the Regulations without differentiating the term of stateless persons. Although it has ratified the Statelessness Convention and has the competence to change its laws, Greece shows no intention to move further in this issue.

Last but not least, it is possible for the Union to regulate an area completely, even though the competence is shared. A Directive related to determination procedure of 'statelessness' could

[13] European Migration Network (EMN) was entrusted by JHA Council Conclusions of 3 and 4 December 2015 with the creation of a platform to exchange information and good practices in the field of statelessness.

[14] The cases in ECHR are much more than in ECJ.

positively influence Greece where statelessness is a sensitive issue and will support the effet utile of EU law[15] (Berenyik 2016; Molnar 2010; Meijers Committee 2014; Swider 2014) .

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PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 131/06 for the facilitation of family reunification

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No 150/2006 on long term residents

The Curious Case of the *Meta-Securitization* of the European Refugee Crisis in Greece after 2015

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Abstract
The theory of securitization, as developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, constitutes the main analytical framework used by scholars to investigate non-traditional security issues. Inspired by the securitization theory, scientists developed sub-theories such as the *a-securitization*, *de-securitization* and *humanitarian securitization*. In spite of the great analytical potential of all of these sub-theories, none of them may adequately explain the approach of SYRIZA's coalition government towards the European refugee crisis. This paper argues that after winning the 2015's elections, SYRIZA applied a novel mode of securitization: the securitization of the predecessor's securitizing measures. This paper identifies this form of securitization as *meta-securitization*. By applying a deductive method of reasoning, this paper explains why the sub-theories of securitization fail to explain SYRIZA's approach towards the European refugee crisis and describes how SYRIZA meta-securitized successfully the securitization measures implemented by the *Nea Dimokratia*-led government.

Introduction

In 2015, Greece was in the centre-stage of the biggest refugee crisis experienced by Europe since World War II. In the same year, the Greek voters elected twice SYRIZA, a left-wing political party. This paper applies the theory of securitization developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (Copenhagen School), on SYRIZA's approach to immigration and suggests that SYRIZA performed neither a securitization, nor a de-securitization, nor a humanitarian securitization, nor an a-securitization of the refugee crisis. SYRIZA conducted a new form of securitization: a *meta-securitization*. The Modified Securitization Analytical Framework (MSAF) and the use of evidence from official governmental communications, semi-structured interviews with leading Greek politicians, and findings of publicly available surveys and opinion polls support the findings of this paper.

In the following paragraphs, I present the theoretical and methodological framework of this paper. Then, I apply the MSAF on the immigration approaches of the Greek governments from 2012 to 2016. After explaining how the sub-theories of securitization do not constitute appropriate theoretical bases for SYRIZA's approach, I develop my arguments on the 'matching' of the *meta-securitization* sub-theory with SYRIZA's immigration policy and I conclude this paper.

Theoretical Framework

When a non-traditional security issue such as immigration is presented and treated as a traditional security matter then we deal with a case of securitization. The first researchers who attempted to comprehensively explain and define securitisation were the scholars from the Copenhagen School. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde argued "we are witnessing a case of securitization" when "by means of an argument about the priority of an existential threat the securitizing actor [manages] to break free of procedures or rules he should otherwise be bound by" (1998:25). To further facilitate the study of the securitization process, Buzan *et al*. outlined three elements of a successful securitization: (1) the designation of the existential threats, (2) the emergency measures, and (3) the audience acceptance (1998:26). Despite the apparent importance of the audience acceptance element within the securitization process, most of the securitization scholars focus on the existential threats and the emergency measures. To counter this gap in the current securitization literature and to enhance the analytical potential of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, I develop the Modified Securitization Analytical Framework (MSAF; Table 1). The MSAF catalogues various modes of securitization depending on the existence or absence of any of the three main securitization elements and subject to the position of the audience acceptance within the securitization temporal context.

Buzan *et al.* also argued that when the securitized issues "shift out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere" then we talk about a de-securitization (Buzan *et al*.,1998:74). Hansen classified four form of de-securitization: (1) change through stabilization, (2) replacement, (3) re-articulation, and (4) silencing (2006:529).

A humanitarian securitization occurs when in the process of securitization, humanitarianism is constructed as a new type of security that has powerful effect on generating a sense of urgency and mobilizing security discourses and practices for the purpose of protection of human life and dignity (Watson, 2011:5).

Recently, Sliwinski introduced 'a-securitization'. A-securitization describes a situation where "important social phenomena are declared security irrelevant and consequently [are] treated as such (Sliwinski 2016:25).

Table 1. *Forms of Securitization*[1]

Securitization Elements						Form of Securitization
SA^+	→	EM^+	→	AA^+	→	**Full Securitization**
SA^+	→	AA^+	→	EM^+	→	**CSSS' Successful Securitization**
SA^+	→	EM^+	→	AA^-	→	**Arbitrary Securitization**
SA^+	→	AA^+	→	EM^-	→	**Void Securitization**
SA^+	→	EM^-	→	AA^-	→	**Desired Securitization**
SA^-	←	EM^+	→	AA^-	→	**Unlawful Securitization**
SA^-	←→	EM^+	←→	AA^+	→	**Silent Securitization**
AA^+	←	EM^+	←	SA^+	→	**Bottom-Up Securitization**

SOURCE: Author's own Model.

Methodology

To identify the form of securitization employed by the SYRIZA-led government, I utilize a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. More than 250 immigration related official and unofficial communications of the Greek governments between 2012 and 2016 are scrutinized to discover whether any threats' designations are contained within. I apply critical discourse analysis to the speeches, statements and interviews of key Greek decision-makers. A critical assessment is performed on the emergency measures taken by both SYRIZA and *Nea Dimokratia*. With regards to the audience acceptance I identify the audience and the degree of acceptance. To identify the audience, I use a triangulation method (Graph 1). I test the text of the governmental communications against the contextual framework and the views of the securitizing actors. To get to know the opinion of the securitizing actors, I performed semi-structured interviews with ministers and officials of the Greek governments.

The triangulation method of audience identification reveals that the Greek public was the primary audience of the securitizing actors. To gage the response of the Greek public I consult the findings of Eurobarometer, Pew Research Center and IPSOS surveys. High percentages of Greek public considering immigration as a burden or a threat are interpreted as indicating high probabilities for the same public to accept the securitizing measures suggested, adopted and implemented by the government.

At the discussion part of this paper, I utilize deductive reasoning and I exclude one by one the sub-theories of securitization from being appropriate to explain SYRIZA's approach. At the end, I argue that SYRIZA did perform neither a de-securitization, nor an a-securitization, nor a humanitarian securitization but a *meta-securitization*.

[1] SA stands for the designation of existential threats; EM for the emergency measures and AA for the audience acceptance. The indicators ($^+$) and ($^-$) define the securitization element's existence ($^+$) or absence ($^-$). CSSS stands for the Copenhagen School.

Graph 1. *Triangulation Method to Identify the Targeted Audience(s)*
Method of Primary Audience's Identity Verification.



SOURCE: Author's own Methodological Assessment

Nea Dimokratia and Immigration (2012-2014)

The approach of the *Nea* Dimokratia-led government towards immigration constitutes a typical case of securitization. The Prime-Minister, Samaras, described most of the immigrants from Asia or Africa as *lathrometanastes* (illegal immigrants). During the 2012's election campaign and in front of his supporters, Samaras described the immigration issue as a "dilemma between security and fear" and declared that "in order for [Greece] to return to normality and for the [Greeks] to be safe again, the mass invasion of *lathrometanastes* should be halted and their mass repatriation should begin" (Samaras Election Campaign Speech, 2012). In just one sentence, Samaras designated the immigrants as threats to the security of Greece and proposed an extraordinary and potentially unlawful measure to tackle the perceived threat: the *lathrometanastes*' mass repatriation[2]. Yet, the proposed repatriation was a mild securitization measure if compared with the other immigration restrictive policies adopted by Samaras' government. *Nea Dimokratia* conducted 'illegal push-backs' on the boats carrying immigrants attempting to enter the Greek territorial waters (PRO ASYL, 2013:4). It also raised barbed-wired fences at the Greek-Turkish land borders and conducted 'sweep' operations against immigrants (operation '*Xenios Zeus'*).

The primary targeted audience of *Nea Dimokratia* was the Greek public (Georgiadis 2018; Oikonomou 2018; Syrigos 2018; Voultepsi 2018). The response of the Greek public to these extraordinary measures was positive. In 2011, 46% of Greeks backed the decision of the government to fund the barbed-wire 'fence' at the Greek-Turkish borders (Public Issue, 2011). By November 2012, 78% believed that the presence of economic immigrants in Greece was more damaging than beneficial (Lazaridis and Skleparis 2015:179). Seventy four percent revealed that they developed negative feelings about immigrants from third countries (Standard Eurobarometer 82, November 2014). All these numbers constitute clear indications of the Greek public's negatively predisposition towards immigration and its (potentially) positive attitude towards the extraordinary measures.

[2] Repatriating immigrants in groups constitutes a grave violation of international conventions foreseeing the protection of the refugees' fundamental rights.

Having established that in Greece of 2012-2014 the three elements of securitization (SA^+ & EM^+ & AA^+) were clearly existent, it is safe to conclude that the government of Samaras performed a *Full Securitization* of immigration according to the MSAF. It is precisely this *Full Securitization* of immigration that the next government of SYRIZA attempted to securitize.

SYRIZA and Immigration (2015-2016)

SYRIZA was elected twice in 2015. It followed a diametrically opposite immigration policy from that of its predecessors. The persons entering irregularly the Greek-Turkish sea and land borders were not anymore framed as *lathrometanastes*. They were all 'named' refugees. SYRIZA claimed that refugees did not threaten Greece. It was the manner by which *Nea Dimokratia* and the European Union (EU) managed the refugee crisis that could threaten the existence of the EU herself. The referent object of security was Europe, the European values and principles, the EU's structure, continuity, cohesion and future (Tsipras 26 October 2015; Tsipras 3 March 2016). "We will either adopt a common [immigration] policy, logic of dealing with the crisis or the crisis will 'overtake' us. And it will become an existential threat for the structure, the continuity and the future of the EU" Tsipras argued (26 October 2015). The alleged existential threat was related to the refugee crisis, but it was not the refugee crisis as such. In SYRIZA's perspective, the restrictive, securitizing manner by which the EU dealt with the refugee crisis comprised a vital threat for the EU.

SYRIZA proposed emergency measures that were different from those adopted by *Nea Dimokratia*. To tackle the perceived threat, SYRIZA demanded from the EU a "direct increase of the emergency financial and technical support" (Tsipras 24 April 2015; Tsipras 29 April 2015). Tsipras also insisted on a "fair sharing of responsibilities" among the EU member states (8 February 2015).

Greece received a generous financial assistance and technical support from the EU. Moreover, the EU, by establishing the emergency relocation scheme attempted to activate a fairer sharing of the refugee crisis responsibilities. The EU envisaged the relocation of several thousands of asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to the rest of the EU. However, the implementation of the scheme was far from successful.

With regards to the targeted audience of SYRIZA's rhetoric, a critical discourse analysis of SYRIZA officials' statements would suggest that the primary audience would be the EU's institutions and member states. Yet, the semi-structured interviews with the Minister and the with the Deputy Minister of Migration revealed that their primary audience was the Greek public (Balafas 2018; Mouzalas 2018).

The Greek public seemed to be supportive to SYRIZA's measures. In November 2015, 60,5% estimated that the cooperation between Greece and the EU was necessary for the effective organization of the reception and accommodation of the refugees (KapaResearch, November 2015). More than 50% of Greeks backed SYRIZA's demands for substantial financial and technical support from the EU (Dianeosis, January 2016). With the Greek public opinion standing by the proposed by SYRIZA emergency measures, SYRIZA's rhetoric should be considered successful.

SYRIZA clearly designated existential threats (SA^+) and managed to successfully implement extraordinary measures (EM^+). Its proposed measures had the support of the Greek public's majority (AA^+). But despite the existence of all the three elements of a successful securitization, it looks like SYRIZA did not perform a *Full Securitization* but as argued in the following paragraphs, it conducted a *meta-securitization*.

Discussion

Nea Dimokratia, from 2012 to 2014 performed a *Full Securitization* of immigration in Greece. Then, in 2015, SYRIZA followed a diametrically different immigration policy than that of *Nea Dimokratia*. Does SYRIZA's approach fall within the scope of de-securitization or a-securitization? Or considering the intense presence of human rights references in the rhetoric of SYRIZA's officials, SYRIZA conducted a humanitarian securitization? Does the approach of SYRIZA fall within the forms of securitization classified in the MSAF? Or is the term *meta-securitization* more appropriate to explain SYRIZA's approach?

Buzan *et al*. frame de-securitization as the shift of previously securitized issues out of emergency mode (1998:74). Yet, in the case of SYRIZA the refugee crisis did not leave the 'emergency realm' at all. It was still framed as a threat to a different referent object and it still required extraordinary responses.

Departing from the broad definition of de-securitization by Buzan *et al*. and attempting to view SYRIZA's policy from the perspective of Hansen and his (more) detailed description of de-securitization still suggests that SYRIZA did not de-securitize immigration. With regard to the de-securitization through stabilization argument, having tens of thousands of immigrants entering the Greek islands on a daily basis did not 'stabilize' the immigration issue for sure. As for the de-securitization by replacement, the immigration crisis was not replaced by any other issue during the first two years of SYRIZA's government. It remained high among the concerns of Greeks. With regard to the de-securitization by re-articulation, SYRIZA 'articulated' the anti-refugee securitizing measures as threats to the values, structure and future of EU. The 'grammar of security' was still present. Finally, SYRIZA kept the immigration issue high in its agenda, constituting the de-securitization by silencing argument inapplicable.

With reference to the humanitarian securitization, this would occur if SYRIZA had constructed the immigrants' human rights as the referent object of security. But SYRIZA did not claim that the human rights of the immigrants were under threat. It was the future of the EU that it was at stake. Thus, SYRIZA did not conduct any humanitarian securitization either.

Similary, a-securitization would occur if SYRIZA had attempted to present immigration as a security-irrelevant issue. SYRIZA kept presenting immigration as a security-relevant issue and kept approaching as such.

Since none of the potential *sub-theories* of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory may adequately describe SYRIZA's views on the refugee crisis, I argue that a novel *sub-theory* of securitization is needed to explain it: the *meta-securitization*. A *meta-securitization* occurs when an actor by means of a security argument declares the securitizing measures or practices employed by other actors as vital threats to a referent object and proposes the implementation of alternative extraordinary measures to tackle the declared existential threat. If the actor's security argument is accepted by its targeted audience, then we deal with a successful *meta-securitization*.

In the case of SYRIZA, Tsipras, declared that by keeping the 'doors' 'closed' to the immigrants, a practice widely exercised by the previous government of *Nea Dimokratia*, the future and the values of the EU were threatened. To deal with this declared threat, Tsipras proposed a "European" approach supplemented with financial and technical assistance. Not only the proposed by SYRIZA measures were implemented but also SYRIZA's primary targeted audience, the Greek public, supported them. Thus, in the case of SYRIZA's governance of the refugee crisis

between 2015 and 2016 it is very likely that we deal with a successful *meta-securitization*.

Conclusions

Between 2012 and 2016, Greece was governed by two governments diametrically different the one from the other in terms of political ideas and policies. With regards to immigration, *Nea Dimokratia*-led government applied a restrictive and highly securitized immigration policy. Contrary to its predecessors, SYRIZA-led government was in favour of an 'open borders' immigration policy. A brief study of SYRIZA's immigration management makes SYRIZA look like performing either a de-securitization, or a humanitarian securitization, or an a-securitization.

In this paper, by applying deductive reasoning, I rule out the securitization's *sub-theories* from being able to explain SYRIZA's immigration policy. To counter this gap, I introduce the *sub-theory* of *meta-securitization* and I argue that SYRIZA successfully *meta-securitized* the refugee crisis. SYRIZA did so by shifting the referent object of security from the economic, social and personal wellbeing of the Greek people to the future of the EU. SYRIZA also altered the existential threat. The refugee crisis as such, was not presented as a threat any more. The securitizing measures applied by *Nea Dimokratia* and other governments across Europe threatened the EU structure. The majority of the Greek citizens backed SYRIZA's approach. SYRIZA's proposed measures were implemented within a few months after their announcement. All the elements of a successful *meta-securitization* of the refugee crisis are therefore fulfilled. A successful *meta-securitization* of the previous securitization.

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