

Greece and the ‘new Middle East’: risks and opportunities

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Abstract

This paper examines Greece’s foreign policy in the ‘new Middle East’ as the latter has been shaped since the Arab uprisings. Firstly, it studies the massive political developments in the Middle East and explains its new political reality. The purpose of this paper is to identify potential risks along with economic and political opportunities for the Greek foreign policy in the Middle East. Secondly, it assesses the Greek foreign policy after the Arab uprisings to identify Greece’s missed opportunities in the Middle East. Finally, this paper makes specific policy recommendations for a multidimensional foreign policy that will enhance the effort of Greece to increase its strategic importance in the Middle East. Overall, this work tries to fill the gap in the existing literature about the role of Greece in the Middle East.

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Introduction

As a number of scholars (Athanasopoulou 2010; Grigoriadis 2012) have argued there is a paradox in Greece’s relationship with the Middle East region. Although Greece is geographically placed in proximity to the Middle East and has long-lasting historical and cultural ties with the region, it has adopted a ‘distant policy’ especially during the last decades. Greece receded from the Middle East in the early 1990s, which resulted in its minimized involvement in the regional affairs. For years the Greek policy-makers seem to have reached an implicit consensus that the Middle East does not benefit the Greek foreign policy and, therefore a ‘distant relationship’ with this region emerged as a proper political decision. Even more the new reality in the broader Middle East especially after the Arab uprisings in 2010-11 seems to make this consensus to sound as a logical and wise decision. The main purpose of this study is to examine whether Greece should maintain its ‘distant-policy’ or should pursue a new strategy in the Middle East to upgrade its geostrategic position in regional and international level. As there is a scarcity in literature regarding the Middle East –this is another paradox- this paper aims to contribute significantly to the advance of research in Greek foreign policy on its eastern neighborhood.

In order to provide more substantial answers to this question this paper examines the main political developments in the Middle East during the last decade, trying to identify the trends and the dynamics of regional politics that have shaped and are still shaping what a number of scholars call the ‘new Middle East’ (Byman 2014; Gerges 2013). Based on this analysis, this paper aims to evaluate the risks, challenges and opportunities for the Greek foreign policy in the region. The assessment of the main risks and the potential opportunities for Greece in the ‘new Middle East’ will lead to the assumption that Greece’s active political involvement in the Middle East would create important political, economic, and diplomatic gains. However, in order to achieve such benefits, Greek policy-makers should create a new pro- active, inclusive, and multidimensional foreign policy in the Middle East.

The ‘new Middle East’

Although a number of scholars refer to the ‘new Middle East’ as the new reality in the region since 2012 and mainly as the product of the Arab uprisings, in truth the ‘new Middle East’ has been shaped by multidimensional, interrelated, and simultaneous regional and international processes during the last decade.

While the extensive analysis of the origins of the ‘new Middle East’ goes beyond the scope of this paper, this study highlights the three interrelated, mutually reinforced phenomena that changed the character of the region since the early 2000s; the Iraq War, the Arab uprisings and the Sectarianism. Firstly, the US ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq war in 2003 have significantly affected not only the Iraqi state and society, but also the balance of power in the Middle East. Secondly, the Arab uprisings have led to

the overthrow of the old regimes in the Arab world, and have changed Middle East irreversibly (McLaughlin 2015: 3). Thirdly, as a result of the previous phenomena, and also as a separate emerging one, sectarianism in the region comes once again to the fore consisting a key characteristic of the ‘new Middle East’.

The Iraq War

The US-driven invasion in Iraq in 2003 and the ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime led to the decline of Iraq in the regional politics and turned it into an object of influence for the regional and international actors. In parallel, the US invasion had tremendous impact on the dynamics within Iraqi society. Precisely, the invasion and the occupation of Iraq have led to the destruction of the state’s central power, governing capacity and institutions. The collapse of the state and the power gap that has been created, especially, after the deployment of US troops from Iraq, allowed centrifuges powers to come to the fore (Ayoob 2012: 90).

Iraq became the object of a twofold antagonism. In external level, the major regional powers such as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia along with the United States attempted to maximize their interests on the disintegration of the Iraqi state (Ayoob 2012:90). Internally, the ongoing antagonism among the Shia Iraqi Government, the Sunni community and the Kurds created new societal dynamics within Iraq. In Northern Iraq, Kurds established the Kurdish Regional Government to compete with the central Shia Iraqi government. In addition, the latter’s repression on the Sunni community resulted in an emerging Sunni- Shia antagonism within Iraq. Domestic violence and its dynamics along with the external actors’ encouragement led to the emergence of Islamist extremist groups (Malmvig 2013:9). Therefore, the Iraq War and the collapse of the state’s central power triggered an external and internal battle for the economic and political power in Iraq.

The Arab Uprisings

The Arab uprisings have been a historical moment that signified tremendous changes in multiple levels within the region and the transition towards the ‘new Middle East’. The uprisings’ impact varies across the region (Burgess and Constantinou 2013: 366). Firstly, they left behind a number of states such as Egypt, Tunisia in political, economic and institutional transition. Secondly, they created political chaos in Syria, Libya and Yemen that resulted in civil wars and anarchy (Dodge 2012: 4).

In Tunisia and Egypt the uprisings led to an institutionalized process of transition through elections and proposals for new constitutions. The main challenges in these countries are the institutionalization of competition for political power, the building of governance capacity, and the consolidation of inclusive democracy and sustainable economic management (Lesch 2014: 73-74).

In Syria, Libya and Yemen the uprisings along with external interventions led to state collapse and to unprecedented violence (Malmvig 2013: 14). In Libya the western military intervention and the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi have destroyed the central governance capacity and led the country into anarchy (Lesch 2014: 73-74).

The revolt in Syria ended up into a bloody civil war. The anarchy in Libya, Syria and Iraq allowed extremist religious groups, particularly the Islamic State, to pursue their sectarian economic and political interests (Amanat, 2012: 3; Salamey 2015: 112). Overall, in the cases of Syria and Libya the uprisings unleashed new sectarian dynamics that along with regional and international geostrategic interests have plunged countries into chaos (Guzansky and Berti, 2013; 138-143).

Sectarianism and the emergence of religious radicalism

Sectarianism is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East. However, the Iraq War and the Arab uprisings have reinforced this phenomenon that emerges as one of the main features of the 'new Middle East'. The Iraq War opened the 'wound of sectarianism' as the sectarian war among Sunni and Shia militias in Iraq has spread to the whole region during the last decade (Malmvig 2013:10).

At the same time in Syria and Libya the struggle against the regimes also has drifted toward a sectarian war among the ethnic and religious sects (Salamey 2015:125-6). Sectarianism was also strengthened by other regional states aiming to manipulate the Sunni- Shia antagonism to advance their interests in the emerging regional balance of power (Byman 2014: 82). In this context, the 'new Middle East' seems to be divided in two broad camps; Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the Sunni camp oppose to the Shia camp including Iran, Syria, the Iraqi government, and Hizbullah (Malmvig 2013: 10).

The Islamic State taking advantage of this regional Sunni-Shia antagonism occupied large territories in Syria and Iraq pursuing a *de facto* establishment of 'caliphate' in the region (Mikail 2012: 2; Taheri 2015:347). Sectarianism and the emergence of revisionist Islamist groups are embedded phenomena in the 'new Middle East'. These phenomena destabilize the broader area including North Africa, as well as Eastern Mediterranean.

Greece and the 'new Middle East'

The tremendous changes that shaped the 'new Middle East' during the last decade created a new environment in Greece's eastern neighborhood. This changing Middle East creates risks as well as opportunities for the Greek foreign policy.

Political risks and opportunities

Sectarianism and the emergence of radical Islamist groups, particularly the Islamic State with revisionist aspirations have changed violently the regional balance of power destabilizing Greece's neighborhood (Seib and Spindle 2014). Greece should pursue a policy along with its allies in the regional and international level for the containment of the Islamic State and the maintenance of the existing statehood in the region. However, Greece should avoid participating in potential military operation against the Islamic State or other militias as this would burden even more its broken economy and hurt its image in the Arab and Muslim world.

Except the political risks, the ‘new Middle East’ and the replacement of the old, long-lasting regimes in the Arab World provide opportunities for the Greek government to pursue a new policy in the region through high-level diplomatic visits, signing political and economic Memorandums of Cooperation, and agreements over the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) with Egypt and Libya.

Such a new strategy in the Arab world requires the re-examination of the Greek- Israeli alliance in regards to the military aspect of it. The military alliance with Israel is been perceived as a threat by the Arab world and affects negatively the flexibility and prospects of the Greek foreign policy in the ‘new Middle East’ (Myrodiadis 2014: 8-9).

Greece should maintain its close partnership with Israel aiming at the same time to improve its relations with the Arab states. This policy will diminish potential aggressiveness from the Arab states and will open the path for a new strong diplomatic role of Greece in the regional affairs. Of course Greece has limited capabilities to become the main actor to bring together Israel and the Arabs. However it can facilitate the rapprochement and the negotiations among them.

At the same time Turkey and its stance towards the Middle East during the Arab uprisings has led its relations with the majority of the Middle East states (Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, Syria and Iran) into crisis. Its weakness to maintain its mediating role among different regional players (Israel and Syria, West and Iran), along with its contradictory foreign policy positions and, of course the unpredictable regional political developments have led Turkey to deadlocks in the ‘new Middle East’ (Onis 2012: 49-57). This creates ‘room’ for other actors such as Greece to pursue its own policy in the Middle East politics. Greece relying on its geographical proximity to the Arab world, its European Union status, and its flexibility to make decisions without religious considerations can promote its own agenda facilitating diplomacy and peace in the region. Precisely, Greece should promote initiatives for peace such as disarmament proposals and decrease in military expenses with its neighbor states and also in the broader area of the Middle East. Such an initiative would first and foremost benefit the Greek economy as it would remove a high budget burden and, at the same time it would reinforce peace in the region.

Finally, Greece has the opportunity to become the key actor in European Union’s agenda aiming to support democratization and reforms in states that undergo transition such as Tunisia and Egypt (Bauer 2015: 30). The political transition in these states requires the turning over the remnant of the old regimes such as authoritarianism through democratization process and, particularly the adoption of new democratic constitutions, the building of democratic institutions, and the establishment of free and fair elections (European Commission 2013). Greece should take advantage of this opportunity supporting the European Union’s agenda for the ‘new Middle East’ to enhance its geostrategic importance within the Union.

Economic prospects

Except the political opportunities, the Arab World can also provide notable economic dynamics and prospects for the Greek economy. The Middle East has a constantly growing population and the countries in the region depend on food imports for at least 50 percent of domestic consumption (World Bank 2012). Consequently, Greece’s promoting trade and exports with the Middle East have the potential to

rejuvenate its economy. For instance, Turkey has managed to boost its trade with the Middle East countries from \$4,4 billion in 2002 to \$26 billion in 2010 and at the same time has attracted high investments from the broader Middle East (Onis 2012:56). Although the Greek economy is weak and less competitive, Greece has the opportunity to take advantage of regional economic dynamics, especially through trade and investments in infrastructure, transportation, telecommunications and tourism sectors.

Energy security

In the energy security level, the anarchy in Libya and Syria along with the unstable Sisi regime in Egypt pose major obstacles to the sustainable and long-term cooperation in the region and jeopardize Greece's aspiration to become a key player in gas resources exploration and exploitation in Eastern Mediterranean (Μανιάτης 2013).

Political instability in the 'new Middle East' undermines the long-term energy agreements among states and makes investors reluctant to fund gas exploitation projects in the region. Therefore, Greece's strategy for agreements with Libya and Egypt regarding the declaration of EEZ in Eastern Mediterranean is threatened under the newly shaped circumstances in the Middle East.

Greece can play a key role as a stability and cooperation facilitator for the gas exploitation pressuring within the European Union and in international level for the implementation of the pipeline transporting gas through its territory to the European markets. Such a prospect would upgrade Greece's role as a key transit state and it would increase its importance in the European Union's energy security in this turbulent region (Bauer 2015:31).

Conclusion

The Middle East has been under political, economic and social transformation during the last decades. The Iraq War and the Arab uprisings have recently changed dramatically the face of the region. In the 'new Middle East' the emerging sectarianism and the competition for regional power have reshaped the map of the region changing the *status quo* and also undermining statehood, social integrity and cohesion.

This constantly changing Middle East created a new environment in Greece's neighborhood. The 'new Middle East' generates risks and also provides opportunities for Greek foreign policy. For years Greece has maintained a phobic, 'inactive observer' stance in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East following simply its European Union and NATO conventional obligations. As a result Greece became inactive and isolated in the broader region.

In this context, the 'new Middle East' requires Greece to re-orient its strategy to pursue an active and effective role for its own benefit that will also foster regional de-escalation and stability. A pro-active and multidimensional Greek foreign policy will improve its diplomatic role, it will provide economic and energy gains, and

overall will increase Greece's geostrategic importance in Eastern Mediterranean and the 'new Middle East'.

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Public Diplomacy and the Republic of Cyprus: Potentials and Perils

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Abstract

This paper examines the history, practice, possibilities and problems associated with the use of public diplomacy in the Republic of Cyprus. First, I present the links among public diplomacy, soft power and competitive identity. In particular, I assert public diplomacy is a collaborative process between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and/or the citizens of a country as well as the international audience. This approach provides a better mutual understanding and re-brands a nation. Using Cyprus as a case study, I argue public diplomacy is an essential tool in the modern age, especially for small-sized states or places which experience economic and political crises and have few resources. Given Cyprus' European identity, large diaspora compared to its size and celebrities of Cypriot origin, I posit small-sized states may benefit from the use of innovative practices of public diplomacy. However, they must be mindful of the potential dangers of such.

Introduction

The study of public diplomacy is a fast emerging field in the theory of international relations and foreign policy. As a practice, it is a continuous adoptive tool used by many states regardless of their size and strength. A large body of work has been written on the definition of public diplomacy. Despite the amount of research, scholars have not reached a common definition of the practice. A widely accepted definition is one presented by Nicholas Cull which defines public diplomacy as:

the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications (Cull 2009a: 19).

Public diplomacy is connected with soft power. This term was coined by Nye (2004). According to Nye's definition, soft power is the ability to influence the behaviour of other states to get the outcomes you want through a state's culture and political values. Nye (2011: 21) extends the traditional definition to include 'the ability to affect other through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction to obtain preferred outcomes'. Public diplomacy and soft power are also connected with the concept of nation branding or otherwise the competitive identity of Simon Anholt (2007). Nation branding refers to how a state is perceived by foreign countries and audiences. Public Diplomacy is a sub-category of the nation brand, promoting the political brand of a state.

I use Cyprus as a case study to emphasize the importance of public diplomacy of small-sized states. Additionally, I assert there is a need of de-Americanization of the study of public diplomacy, moving from the study of larger states to small states. However, there is no widely accepted definition of a small state and scholars disagree on what kind of criteria such as population, land area and income are most appropriate to characterize the small state. In any case, small states should be further studied as they are the majority in the system and due to importance of supranational organizations such as the UN and the EU. Another area in need of research is how the relationships among actors influence policies. Institutions and policies may be investigated not only as the outcome of great-power bargains, but also in terms of the actors' relations (Neumann and Gstohl 2004).

Cyprus, regardless of the criteria used, is considered a small-sized state in the Eastern Mediterranean at the crossroads of three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa. It has a population of about a million and limited economic resources. Moreover, it is a semi-occupied country as a result of the Turkish invasion in 1974. However, Cyprus remains a fully recognized state member of the UN and from 2004 has become member of the EU. In the following sections, I discuss the possibilities and dangers that may result if Cyprus engages further in public diplomacy. In his discussion, I

focus on the island's European identity, the Greek-Cypriot diaspora and celebrities of Cypriot origin.

The European Identity of Cyprus as a Tool of Public Diplomacy

The main argument of the paper is the practice of public diplomacy by small states holds opportunities and dangers as evidenced by the Cyprus case. One opportunity stems from the country's participation in the EU since 2004. The membership has strengthened Cyprus' global image and reputation. If properly used, it may continue to enhance the state in the eyes of the international arena. Few studies published examine Cyprus' position within a European public diplomacy context. Probably, due to its restricted strength, limited capabilities and lack of special groundwork, Cyprus risks of staying out of competition in terms of public diplomacy, within a European and a global context.

Cyprus repeatedly uses its European identity to demonstrate it is a force of stability and peace in its region. This is a point that almost all Cypriot statesmen underline in their public speeches (Famagusta Gazette 2014). However, for a successful public diplomacy words must be followed by actions. Otherwise, the state risks being accused of spreading propaganda.

Cyprus uses traditional and modern means to present its European identity. The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC), a semi-governmental service, broadcasts internationally in Greek, Turkish and English, via radio and satellite television. Targeted regions are the rest of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. CyBC contributes regularly to EuroNews and the CNN World report. As common practice for all EU member states, Cyprus has a dedicated information centre to promote the mobility of European students. The government administers a few scholarships, but these education opportunities are not widely promoted. Moreover, the country also lacks a dedicated cultural relations agency (Fiske de Gouvela and Plumridge 2005). This is the reason why Cyprus participates in the European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC) with its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

In addition to traditional means of promotion, the Cyprus MFA holds pages on the most popular social media networks, such as Facebook and Twitter. These social media outlets are used to promote its European identity and image. However, there is very little interaction between the Cyprus MFA and its followers. Thus, Cyprus runs the risk of simply distributing information without building long-term relationships. (Cull 2009).

Cypriot Diaspora as an Instrument of Public Diplomacy

Diaspora is considered as an instrument of public diplomacy as it reaffirms the view of the people-to-people approach. Cyprus has experienced a large Greek-Cypriot diaspora. Its people are dispersed over the world: The US and Canada, Europe and especially the UK, Australia and Africa. According to unofficial estimates more than half of Cypriots live abroad (Paroikiaki 2014). The reach of the Greek-Cypriot diaspora is broader and deeper than that of the official diplomats as they are themselves the image of their country of origin abroad. However, as not all the expatriates speak and act alike, the state may be misrepresented.

The Greek-Cypriot diaspora is an untapped foreign policy resource for the Cypriot government in its policy formation. They are a resource due to their dual experience and balanced political critique. Consequently, the community's knowledge and views could be used to improve the international relations of Cyprus through the promotion of its policies and interests. Many countries, including the US and China have realized the unique role of their expatriates and have engaged them with several initiatives (Trent 2012; Hongmei 2012; Ding 2014).

However, the Cyprus MFA implements an anachronistic practice of engagement of its diaspora movement through its Service for Overseas and Repatriated Cypriots. The division states it 'ensures continuous and close contact with overseas Cypriots and the preservation of their cultural heritage and identity. The division helps the overseas Cypriots to maintain their links with Cyprus and assists them with any problems or needs that may arise' (MFA 2014). In particular, it assists Cypriots worldwide, including assistance pertaining to education. To remain connected with the community, it organizes conferences and exhibitions on matters relating to overseas Cypriots and their links with Cyprus. Additionally, it supports the publication of a magazine entitled 'Our Cyprus' targeting overseas and repatriated Cypriots. The maintenance of Cypriot culture is an important focus. To facilitate the retention of their native culture, the division provides assistance to overseas Cypriot communities support for language programs, youth programs and visits to Cyprus. Cypriot entrepreneurs are encouraged to invest in Cyprus. Moreover, it encourages research regarding the history of the Cypriot diaspora. Lastly, it provides material about Cypriot history and culture to associations of overseas Cypriots (MFA 2014). However, the division does not mention the need to support the Cypriot diaspora to act as everyday diplomats and mediators. Thereby, improving the image of the country abroad and ultimately enhancing the island's bilateral relations.

The conferences organised by have a similar agenda year to year. In these conferences the Service for Overseas and Repatriated Cypriots does not tap the potential of every Cypriot emigrant as everyday diplomat. If this perspective changes, we should not ignore the fact that problems might erupt from the democratic nature of the process, as it is neither easy nor legitimate to control the community. Besides, it is necessary to create new organizations to include the diaspora to facilitate the widening of the inter-state relations.

Celebrity Diplomats of Cypriot Origin in the Context of Public Diplomacy

Cypriot public diplomacy can be advanced through celebrity diplomats, a new type of transnational activists widely discussed by Cooper (2007). Surprisingly, several well-public figures and people originate from Cyprus: From the Goddess of love and beauty, Aphrodite, in the ancient times, to President and Archbishop Makarios III, one of the most well-known Cypriots of the recent times. This paper highlights the role of new actors, using celebrities as potential diplomats. I argue the use of these highly-recognized people can help the island re-brand with very little fiscal expense. However, I acknowledge it may be difficult to recruit some people as they may be indifferent towards the promotion of their country's political reputation. Even more hazardous, their ignorance of diplomatic behaviour may have deleterious effect on the state's image.

Goddess of love in Greek mythology, Aphrodite, is the most well-known Cypriot figure of ancient times. The Cyprus Tourism Organisation uses the ancient Greek mythological figure in its tourism promotional campaigns. However, this detail could be further employed for the national brand of Cyprus. Aphrodite's love could be linked with the values of cooperation, mutual respect and peaceful living which the island aspires to promote.

In the modern age, probably the most well-known person originating from Cyprus was President Makarios. For some, Makarios is considered a conventional diplomat but not for others because of his dual role. Makarios stature was larger than his role as a leader of a small-sized state. Many states of the Developing and Nonaligned World saw him as a leader of an anti-colonial movement and as a symbol of resistance towards the bipolar system of the Cold War. Moreover, it was because of Makarios personal views that Cyprus followed a nonalignment policy, even though the Guarantor Powers of Cyprus' independence were NATO members (Λάμπρου 2004).

A series of documentaries presenting Makarios' trips to countries of Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa are portraying the first gestures of a Cypriot public diplomacy. The documentary of Makarios' trip to Latin America in 1966 (Church of Cyprus) shows his visits to Panama, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Equator and Colombia. In Chile, President Makarios opened a dialogue with the wider public of San Diego as he advocated for the foundation of a primary school called 'Republic of Cyprus'. This action led him to be viewed as a hero by the children and people of Chile. Later, Makarios visited the University of San Diego in an attempt to start a dialogue with young adults. The documentary depicts the crowd's fervour the Cypriot leader. In one segment, people fought to obtain an autograph from him. Some years later, in 1971, when Makarios travelled to Sub-Saharan Africa, similar images were captured by another documentary. He was seen as a new Messiah; during this trip he baptized Christian Orthodox approximately 10.000 Africans (Church of Cyprus 1971).

The main question is whether Cyprus could benefit from the contemporary trend of celebrity diplomacy. In an era of economic and political crisis people often display an aversion for politics and politicians. In this context, the public sector could cooperate with the private sector and individuals to fill in the gaps. Cyprus could ask celebrities of Cypriot origin to promote its new image abroad and establish a dialogue with foreign audiences. A potential celebrity diplomat of Greek-Cypriot origin living and

working in London is Tonia Buxton. She is a cook, historian, author and presenter of the successful show 'My Greek Kitchen' broad-casted on the Discovery Channels, Real Time, Travel & Living and Home and Health and the British TLC. Additionally, Buxton has devoted a special series on the Cypriot cuisine, culture, history and customs entitled 'My Cypriot Kitchen' sponsored by the Cyprus Tourism Organization (2012-2013). Her potential as a celebrity diplomat is evident in a video co-produced with the British Company 'Isis Media' entitled 'Cyprus: Warm Welcomes Guaranteed! Do not believe everything you hear' (2013). Buxton's video was an attempt to reshape Cyprus' image abroad. Buxton wanted people not to 'believe everything you hear. It's still my Cyprus!' as there was much negative publicity on Cyprus' economic situation at that particular time. However, Cyprus' government neglected Buxton's initiative, either by ignorance or intentionally, and made no attempt to use her willingness to re-brand the island. Indeed, sometimes personal initiatives do not have the anticipated results and one should acknowledge the specific role of the professional diplomat. Yet, we should appreciate the possibilities emerging from the actions of celebrities as Buxton who can reach where conventional diplomats are unable.

Conclusion

Though this paper, I discussed the importance of public diplomacy for small-sized states such as Cyprus. I demonstrated the origins of public diplomacy in Cyprus go back in President's Makarios era. Makarios was enthusiastically welcomed and positively perceived by the public in countries of the Developing World. Moreover, this study has focused on the European identity of Cyprus as a tool for public diplomacy. I conclude, despite the potentials emerging from the theoretical projection of the island's participation in the EU, Cyprus is not participating in some initiatives. Consequently, the state runs the risk of staying out of competition in public diplomacy. Furthermore, the government uses an anachronistic approach towards the Greek-Cypriot Diaspora as an instrument of a successful public diplomacy. Officials ignore the potential role of the group and well-known Cypriots to act as mediators and everyday diplomats. Finally, I asserted the theory of celebrity diplomacy can and should be applied to Cyprus. Small states such as Cyprus should use these new actors to rebrand and promote its desired image internationally.

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The Greek Reaction to the American Intervention in the Cyprus Crisis of 1964¹

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This work deals with the Cyprus crises of 1964, the results of which not only affected the 1967 and 1974 Cyprus crises but also still affects the current deadlock. In particular, the study concentrates on the Greek political reaction to the U.S. mediation efforts during the crisis. By examining this historical process, I propose to analyze the parameters that made Greece not accepting the US proposals to come to an agreement with Turkey. Working on this will help reveal why the Cyprus issue remained unresolved in 1964 and how the Cyprus crisis of 1964 affected the relations between Greece and the US.

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Introduction

This paper is a part of an ongoing Post PhD research project which deals with the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967 and 1974. The paper looks at Greek-American relations during the Cyprus crisis of 1964 and aims in particular at analyzing the Greek political reaction to the American intervention in the Cyprus crisis. In the following pages I will attempt to analyze how and why the US became involved in the Cyprus crisis, what kind of solution they proposed to the crisis, how Greece reacted to these proposals and finally why the Cyprus issue remained unresolved at the end of this process.

Background to the Us Intervention

Beginning as an anti-colonial struggle of the Greek Cypriots against British rule following the Second World War, the Cyprus issue entered the international agenda in 1954. Greece and Turkey soon became entangled and it evolved into a conflict between Turkey, Greece and the UK which threatened both the stability of NATO and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean region. In 1959, with the Zurich and London agreements, under the pressing need to find a solution, all three parties came to an agreement on Cypriot independence. In doing so, Britain sacrificed its sovereignty (but kept two sovereign bases), Greece its *Enosis* (Unification with Greece), and Turkey its *Taksim* (Partition) while keeping their rights as warrantors intact. Consequently, the tension between the parties appeared to have faded and, so far as the US was concerned, a crisis that would have become international had been averted.

However the republic was reluctant (Xydis 1973; Soulioti 2006). Disagreements, particularly concerning the work on the constitution soon came to the fore. At that point, President Makarios, claiming that the constitution was unworkable, proposed to revise it in favor of the Greek Cypriots. Taking the proposals as a step to achieve *Enosis*, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected it firmly. Rapidly thereafter, national sentiments rose, the island became as tense and as volatile as ever and civil war broke out (Packard, 2008; Salih 1978:31).

Following this, Turkey announced that if the violence did not stop it would take military action and Greece declared that in the case of a Turkish intervention that it would respond.

In order to prevent a Turkish move on the island, Britain intervened and succeeded in establishing a neutral zone (Green Line) on 30 December 1964 (Soulioti, 2006:735). With the dispute continuing, a conference was held in London on January 15, 1964 but no agreements between the parties seemed possible. Towards the end of the conference, Britain suggested to the US that an international force should be established on Cyprus. This force would have to include US troops as part of an allied force to Cyprus if it was to be kept under NATO framework. Otherwise the issue would be internationalized through the UN (FRUS 2000:39). Thus, Britain placed the bomb into US hands and that is exactly when the US was officially faced with a dilemma: to get involved or not to get involved?

Nato-fication

According to Under-Secretary of State George Ball the US should involve in the crisis. First of all Turkey was on the verge of intervening and a war between Turkey and Greece was imminent (Ball, 1983). And secondly, if the issue was taken to the UN Makarios would ask the UN to come in and a UN peacekeeping force would have Communist elements in it. (FRUS 2000:42). To prevent war between Turkey and Greece and keep the issue under NATO control the State Department accepted the British proposal and agreed to provide a “token contribution” of 1200 men (FRUS, 2000:40). The total peacekeeping force was to be 10,000 men.

The Anglo-American NATO peace plan was accepted by Greece and Turkey (FRUS, 2000:62; Joseph, 1997:103) but it completely rejected by Cyprus President Makarios. Trying to convince Makarios, Ball revised the plan twice and even held a series of talks with him in Nicosia. However, in the end, he failed to persuade him (FRUS 2000:56-64). Following this, on 15 February 1964, the British Government requested a Security Council meeting to discuss the Cyprus issue.

On 4 March, 1964, the UN Security Council issued a resolution which gave the responsibility to the Government of Cyprus to restore law and order, invited all members to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Cyprus, approved the formation of a United Nations peace-keeping force and appointed a mediator (UN Security Council Resolution 186; Richmond, 1988:91-92; Bitsios 1975: 147-157).

Enosis

The resolution marked the failure of US efforts to keep the issue under NATO framework. Following this the State Department increased its pressure on the newly elected Georgios Papandreou government to do something towards a solution, to get Makarios in hand, and to fight the communist danger on the island (FRUS, 2000:71-72). According to the American ambassador to Greece, Labouisse, unlike the previous Paraskevopoulos caretaker government “the overwhelming electoral victory [of] Papandreou would be the key to Greece playing a constructive and decisive role in the Cyprus question; his election could well prove a turning point in history as he was probably the only man who could move the problem toward solution”. (FRUS 2000:71).

Although Papandreou agreed with the State Department on those points but achieving it he had his own agenda. Papandreou was of the opinion that the London and Zurich agreements were a “crime” against the nation, that the Cyprus crisis was the “tragic result” of these agreements (Μπήτου 1998:134; Τελεξη, 1971:407). Thus his new policy towards Cyprus was to get rid of these agreements and achieve *Enosis* (Κρανιδιώτη 1985:254). And Papandreou was convinced that the UN resolution would be a perfect opportunity to achieve this. (Παπαγεωργίου, 1980:325; Ριζας, 1997:50-51; Ρηζας, 2000). The resolution would help Makarios to dispose of the London and Zurich agreements and achieve full independence. Afterwards *Enosis* would be announced (FRUS 2000:102-103).

In a meeting which was held in Athens on 11-12 April 1964, Makarios and Papandreou completely agreed on *Enosis* policy. They also agreed that solution to the Cyprus issue will only be sought under the framework of the UN and for the protection of Cyprus Greek troops would be deployed. (Παπανδρέου, 1988:195-196; Παπαγεωργίου, 1980:325-327; Κασκανης 1998:32-33). Within this framework, by July 1964, nearly 1000 soldiers were to be sent to Cyprus (Γαρουφαλιάς, 1982). Following the agreement with Makarios Papandreou proposed enosis as the best option to resolve the Cyprus issue to the State Department.

Papandreou’s new approach “healthy sign” (FRUS, 2000:129) and was taken seriously into account by the State Department, given the ethnic crisis in Cyprus as well as Makarios’ actions which threatened the stability of NATO and acted as a provocation to Turkey to intervene in the

island. According to the American ambassador to Cyprus, Belcher: “*Enosis* would tie Cyprus firmly to West; eliminate the security concerns of Britain, Turkey, Greece and the US; reduce the danger of the growth of communism on the island, end the Makarios’ “neutralist” foreign policy maneuvering and give the US a friendly government with which to negotiate a satisfactory status for the American communications facilities”. (FRUS, 2000:97-98).

The Johnson Letter

But Turkey strongly disagreed with this new approach. After the three months from the UN resolution Turkey concluded that every passing day its position in Cyprus weakening. Therefore Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, who was of the opinion that *Enosis* was just around the corner and that the US was not willing to prevent, decided to move. On 4 June, 1964, the decision was notified to the US. (Ball, 1988:350; Bölükbaşı, 1993:505-525). Fearing that Turkey was serious to intervene and the decision would spark a war between Turkey and Greece, the State Department wrote a letter to Inonu in an attempt to dissuade Turkey from intervening in the island. In his powerful diplomatic note Johnson threatened Inonu saying that “if unilateral Turkish action on the island invited a Soviet attack, then NATO was not obligated to defend Turkey” (FRUS, 2000:152-154). According to Ball the letter was “the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb” (Ball, 350).

Enosis with a compensation to Turkey

The letter worked and Ankara stepped back. But following the letter, The State Department concluded that Turkey cannot be prevented at all time and “their influence would rapidly dissipate and consequences could be terrifying” (FRUS, 2000:206). Therefore, Turkey and Greece had to come to the negotiating table and search for a permanent solution to end the Cyprus crisis on the basis of *Enosis*.

This new approach was explained to Inonu and Papandreou in Washington. Talks with Inonu resulted in full agreement (FRUS, 2000: 211). But Papandreou saw no point in discussing the issue with Ankara. He argued that “On the legal side, the right of intervention was lost when

Cyprus entered the UN.... There was no longer any basis for intervention. A century ago, it [Turkey] sold Cyprus, so what valid right does it have?" (FRUS, 2000:205).

The Washington talks brought no consensus but the US pressure continued increasingly. On 1 July, 1964 President Johnson, wrote to Papandreou: "The pressure on Turkey for action is extremely strong and they too derive from a deep conviction that Turkish rights are at stake... If there is not such a negotiation, none of us can prevent a disaster for which all of us will be held accountable" FRUS (2000: 219-220). The message was very clear: either "negotiations for a final solution" or "the Turkish military intervention". Disappointed by the letter (FRUS 2000:225), Papandreou said to Labouisse that "...Greece cannot act under pressure of ultimatum. We did not accept an ultimatum from our enemies in 1940 and it is very difficult for us to accept an ultimatum today from our friends" (FRUS 2000:221).

But seeing no other option Papandreou unwillingly accepted the US proposal. Negotiations between the parties began on 9 July, 1964. On 14 July, 1964 The US mediator, Dean Acheson proposed: Cyprus would be unified with Greece and Greece would cede to Turkey a full sovereign area in the Karpas Peninsula. Turkey accepted the proposal but seeing the Turkish sovereign base area as a form of partition Greece rejected. Instead, Papandreou suggested that the island Kastellorizon or a sharing one of the British base areas (FRUS, 2000:242) would be negotiable. (FRUS, 2000: 238-242).

Following the Greek rejection, on 20 August 1964, Acheson came up with a revised version of the plan: A base area in the Karpas Peninsula nearly 200 square miles could be leased to Turkey for 50 years. On 20 August, 1964, Acheson wrote to Papandreou attempting to convince him: "I am prepared to apply the utmost pressure and persuasion to get the Turks to give up any claim for sovereign territory on Cyprus, to reduce the dimensions of their requirements for a military base on the Karpas Peninsula... Specifically, I would urge the Turks to limit their plan to a lease for 50 years for that part of the Karpas Peninsula... (FRUS, 2000:326-327)". Ball instructed Labouisse to tell Papandreou that he just had 48 hours to reach a decision (FRUS 2000:328-329)

During these 48 hours, Papandreou made a risky undertaking. He dispatched the Minister of Defence, Garoufalias to Nicosia and tried to see if "instant *Enosis*" was possible (Γαρουφαλιάς 1982; Μπήτου 1998: 135; Χατζηαντωνίου, 2007:144). But Garoufalias failed to convince

Makarios. He insisted on unconditional enosis (αδέσμευτης ανεξαρτησίας) (Παπαγεωργίου, 1983:249). He was of the opinion that this action would be a “stupid heroism” (Αλεξανδρακης, Θεοδοροπουλος, Λαγακος, 1987:38-39).

Failing to persuade Makarios, Papandreou proposed 99 square miles on the Karpas peninsula claiming that Makarios could not be convinced if he agreed on giving Turkey double area of the British bases (FRUS 2000:330; Παπαδοπουλος 1999:180-182). But this proposal was rejected by the State Department. Ball said “So far as the United States Government is concerned, this is a last major effort and we do not intend to see it fail”. (FRUS, 2000: 342-343). Finally on 22 August, 1964 Papandreou gave his official answer: He rejected the proposals arguing that: “he was not master over the Greek Cypriot community as Inonu is over Turk Cypriots.... [the]Acheson proposal is acceptable to [the] gov[ernment] as [a] way to avoid war and resolve Cyprus question, but that he is helpless because he could not impose this solution on the island.... He finds himself in a serious impasse and does not know where to turn” (FRUS, 2000:344).

Following the “Geneva Failure” on 25 August Papandreou one more time asked the US “he was in death struggle with Makarios and he would be more than delighted if coup d’etat for unconditional enosis would be achieved in which case Makairos would be his captive”. But Ball’s answer was certain: “You can be assured that I have no intention of giving USG agreement to instant enosis without prior agreement with Turks. We are definitely off that ticket” (FRUS, 2000:359)

The leased base idea was also rejected by Turkey and the US decided not to propose any other solution and thus it was with this “Geneva failure” that the “bargaining process” and the six months of US involvement came to an end.

Conclusions

The main American concern during this process was to avoid a war between Greece and Turkey achieving enosis with sufficient compensations to Turkey. Having achieved to avoid a war, the US failed to end the crisis in Cyprus and convince the parties to reach an agreement. Greece insisted on unconditional *Enosis* and Turkey on a territorial concession.

The Acheson proposals, as far as Greece concerned, were perhaps the most important “missed opportunity” to achieve *Enosis*. Papandreou was of the opinion that the advantage was on the Greek side; that the UN supported the Greek position and that the US also would finally come to agree with the Greek thesis. And finally the US would always block the Turkish military intervention on the island and even not Greece had a military buildup on the island which would prevent the Turkish intervention (FRUS 2000:239), In a nutshell, *Enosis* would somehow be achieved, Papandreou believed. But In the end things did not happened the way Papandreou believed.

After the Cyprus crisis of 1964 the unsolved Cyprus issue continued to be main bone of contention between Turkey and Greece and in 1967 and 1974 brought the two countries into the brink of war. At the end of this process the island was divided into two parts. Since then countless negotiations and plans were tried out but none of them was enough to reunite the island. Today, Cyprus as the biggest diving line of Europe continues to be the most important foreign policy issue of both countries, keeping their relations in chain.

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