

‘They will never become European!’: Perceptions of Europe and Europeanness through Othering processes in Greece

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The paper draws on data collected in project, which investigated issues of Turkish-Greek relations from an identity perspective. The data collection process regarded attitudes towards the Turkish TV series on Greek television and included the distribution of 100 questionnaires and the conduction of 10 semi-structured interviews with permanent residents of the city of Thessaloniki, in Greece. In this paper I present only a part of the qualitative part of the study, which was analysed thematically. More specifically, I focus on the way participants perceive ‘Europe’ and the terms under which they negotiate their belonging to it. The findings demonstrate that Europe is associated to notions like education, democracy, Christianity and open-mindedness. At the same time, Europe is constructed in the minds of the participants as the positive pole in the binary opposition Europe-East. Their position though in terms of Europe-East lies somewhere in the middle.

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Introduction

Othering processes have been argued to be a mechanism for identity production and maintenance. This applies to both self and group identity. Positioning someone as ‘the other’ is a fundamental part of collective identity construction and of national narratives. This becomes particularly relevant when it comes to countries with troubled past such as Greece and Turkey. Against this backdrop, the paper draws on data collected in 2013-2014 in the context of a project on Greek people’s attitudes towards the Turkish TV series broadcasted in Greece. The analysis focuses on the ways in which the participants constructed the image of Turks through instances of Othering in the interview context. The paper pays special attention to the construction and negotiation of European identity and ‘Europeanness’.

Turkish-Greek background

During the twentieth century crucial historical facts resulted to strained relations for the Greek and Turkish populations. The takeover, or catastrophe and disaster (depending on who’s view is cited), of the city of Smyrna by Turkish forces in 1922 with the following exchange of Greek and Turkish populations under the terms of the Lausanne Convention had as a result a huge migratory wave that settled in Greece with huge effects in socioeconomic level (Hirschon 2003;Kontogiorgi 2003). The pogrom against Greeks of Istanbul in 1955 and the final deportation of 13.000 of them in 1964 after tensions in Cyprus worsened the situation and transformed Turkish - Greek relations to a sensitive topic to touch (Oran 2003; Vryonis 2005). During the 1990’s the conflicts over the Aegean islet of Imia, the Greek support to Cyprus in the installment of S-300 anti-aircraft ballistic missiles and the revelation of the fact that Abdulah Ocalan had found refuge in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi had only worsened relations (Grigoriadis 2012: 120). The climate between the two countries during the last century, thus, was especially hostile and turbulent.

Towards the end of 1990s, however, the picture began to change and the relations between Turkey and Greece entered into a “period of rapprochement” (Rumelili 2007:107). In 1999, the Kosovo war constituted the reason for the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, George Papandreou and Ismail Cem respectively, to co-operate and institute steps for the improvement of the two countries’ relations (Grigoriadis 2012:121). This attempt of rapprochement was further facilitated by a natural disaster, the earthquakes that hit Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999 respectively, which gave the opportunity to the two countries to show mutual sympathy and compassion, acknowledging the fact that they share common risks (Ganapati *et al.* 2010). The change of Greek policy on EU-Turkey relations, announced at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, was a “milestone” (Grigoriadis 2012:121) for the further enhancement of Turkish-Greek relations. Despite the still two unresolved issues of Cyprus and the Aegean, the rapprochement of Turkish- Greek relations is a fact; that is indicated also by the signing of 33 bilateral agreements between the two countries during the last decade (Ganapati *et al.* 2010; Rumelili 2007).

The choice of Turkish TV series

The presence of Turkish TV series in Greek television was chosen as a stimulus for the initiation of discussion around Turkish-Greek relations. The choice of Turkish TV series served the purposes of the research for a number of reasons. First of all, the phenomenon of the Turkish TV series broadcasting in Greece was at the time recent and powerful. The series started being massively imported in 2010 and entered the Greek television with remarkable success causing debates in social media and every-day discourses on the interests they serve (Moore 2013). But they also brought to the foreground the recognition of similarities and differences of the two populations, making relevant the common and troubled past of the two countries (Papailias 2005). Turkish TV series thus seems a well suited stimulus for a project that investigates identity construction in the given context.

Theoretical premises

In the present paper I am going to focus on part of the results which refer to the conceptualisation of European identity and ‘Europeanness’ of the participants. Identity is understood under social constructionist terms, as something constructed and negotiated in discourse (Angouri and Marra 2011; De Fina 2011). It is conceived as dynamic, multiple and multi-faceted (Wodak 1999) and as constructed along multiple complementary relations (Bucholtz and Hall 2005).

In the given Turkish-Greek context, a concept that becomes prominent for the understanding of the practices participants follow is that of Orientalism. Said defines Orientalism as ‘a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the “Orient” and most of the time “the Occident”’ (1978:2). Said implies that the notion of Orient played a significant role in the formation of a European collective identity, by defining the ‘us’ the Europeans against ‘them’, all non-Europeans (Said 1978). Orientalism constitutes an essentialist concept as it views all the members of a society under simplistic labels as if they were an undifferentiated mass (Holliday 2011). The term raises issues of power too. It implies a ‘flexible positional superiority’ of Westerners upon the subjugated Orient world (Said 1978:4) that waits for them to be liberated (Holliday 2011). Orientals are constructed as the European uncivilized Other and become the vehicle for confirming the rational European identity as ‘irrational’ Other presupposes (and is presupposed by) the ‘rational self’ (Edgar and Sedwick 1999: 266).

The ‘us/them’ or ‘self/other’ distinction referred to above, seems to consist a common mechanism for creating identity according to relevant literature (see Angouri and Efthymiadou, forthcoming, for a detailed overview) and is employed by participants of this study too, as the findings will show. The constructive power of self/other distinction for identity formation processes is better understood when placed in a wider framework of categorization. Categorization works as a strong tool in the understanding of the world, in first place, and, consequently, in the building of a sense of self. Its strength derives from the fact that ‘it satisfies a basic human need for cognitive parsimony’ (Abrams and Hogg 2006). Identity scholars have acknowledged the concept’s robustness in relation to identity and have drew on it in the development of their theories. Indeed, some of the most influential identity theories, like Social Identity Theory, encompass the concept of categorization.

According to Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979) the social identity of an individual derives from his knowledge of belonging to a certain social group or category and from the value and emotional significance that results from this group membership (Tajfel 1972; 1978). People grow up in families and communities and come to identify with the groups in which they are socially located (Fligstein et al. 2012). Every social group to which one belongs provides a definition of one's self, a prescription of the way he is supposed to think, feel and behave (Tajfel and Turner 1979). A core concept of the theory is the social categorization process. Individuals through psychological processes and in an attempt to make life simpler tend to organise the environment into categories, groups of persons, objects, according to their common shared features (Tajfel 1972). Each element of every category is characterized by the features shared by all the subjects of that category. Categorization implies an emphasis on differences between categories and similarities within the same category.

Methodology

The project applied a mixed-methods approach. The distribution of 100 questionnaires and the conduction of 10 semi-structured interviews with permanent residents of Thessaloniki in Greece, were combined for the elicitation of data. The main research question of the project was: How do the participants construct the image of Turks? Here I present part of the qualitative part of the study, the interviews, which were analysed thematically (Brawn and Clarke 2006).

Discussion

The first stage of the thematic analysis of interviews led to the emergence of four themes in relation to the perception of Turks (for an overview of the themes see appendix); here I will discuss only one of the emerged themes (Turks as non-Europeans), which refers to the non-European character of Turks. The specific theme reflects the practice of participants to present Turks as different to Europeans, or in other terms to Otherise them when compared to European citizens. The specific practice apart from revealing the way participants perceive Turkish people, it is also insightful for the way participants perceive Europe and 'Europeanness'. Throughout the data set there is an obvious tendency to differentiate Turkey from Europe in many aspects. Participants construct Turkey and Europe as a binary opposition, and they ascribe negative and positive traits to each of them respectively. Europe is related to notions of democracy, freedom, respect of human-rights, modernity, a place of enlightenment, while Turkey is given the label of a backwarded and uncivilized place, where women are not treated equally to men and where Islamic religion has the first say towards all aspects of life. Some representative quotes of the above categories are the following:

'They abstain from Europe from every aspect: religious, economic, cultural, whatever you can imagine.... The economic development alone does not make them equal. I don't believe for example that they have the same culture with the Dutch people' (Transcription 2, excerpt 109, 113, 117)

'There is not freedom of speaking. They haven't shown that they want to walk towards the European culture. This is the one. And the other is that I am very concerned about the Islamic issue and the way they practice their religion, the way their religious beliefs affect their standing as political beings. How could a society that is so fanatically man-based and undermines woman be considered European considering that Europe promotes the equity of the two sexes, the right of the woman to work, to be politically active, to evolve professionally and in the


social level. These things are unconceivable for their society. I don't believe it could work.' (transcription 9, excerpt 24)

The above examples, which are quite representative of the whole data set, consist a clear case of othering.

First of all, from the above positions it becomes evident that Turkey in the minds of the participants fulfils the role of the European Other. That seems to validate previous results of identity studies on the construction of the image of Turkey in Europe. Numerous studies like those of Hulsse (2000), Schneeberger (2009), Aydin-Duzgit Senem (2009), Morozov and Rumelili (2012), Azrout et al. (2010) and Arcan (2012) used as reference point the Turkish membership to the E.U. and found Turkey to be constructed across several European countries as Europe's Other. That common practice could be best understood through theorising identity as a relational process. According to Hall, any term can be defined only through its relation to what it is not, to an other (Hall 1996). As Schneeberger (2009) argues in her paper on European identity construction, the existence of an Other is of crucial importance in all identity processes, both in personal and in collective level. Drawing on Orientalism, in the case of European identity formation, the defining Other is East (Delanty 1995; Hay 1957). The Orient (or East) has contributed to the definition of Europe (or the West, or the Occident) as its contrasting image (Said 2003). In the present case Turkey represents the Orient in the minds of the participants and is positioned vis a vis Europe, as Europe's Other, contributing actively to its definition. Europe and Turkey, hence, become mutually exclusive. Furthermore, it could be argued that this juxtaposition implicitly contributes to the definition of Greece and 'Greeknness' too, given that Greece constitutes part of Europe. The above discussion could be depicted in the following way:



In their comments participants also underlined the Christian character of Europe. Europe is conceptualised as a purely Christian space and this acts as a means of legitimization for their opposition against Turkish European membership. That seems to correspond with Hay's (1957) old argument that Islam formed the Other against the Imperium Christianum in the construction of a European identity in the past. From the analysis it becomes prevalent though that the opposition between Islam/Christian Europe is still valid today. The data seem to confirm Cardini's argument (2001:1) that the relationship between Europe and Islam is "a kind of continuation or renewal of the (historical) clashes between Christianity and Islam". Islam and Christianity are presented thus as another binary opposition in the data set. Islam is negatively connoted and is related to Turkey, while Christianity is positively connoted and is associated with Europe and Greece. The above discussion could be depicted as following:



The conceptualisation of Turkey/Europe as a binary opposition offers many insights on the way Europe and European Union are constructed by the participants as well. First of all, Europe is presented as a homogeneous entity, as a uniform actor that is facing Turkey. Going a step further, considering the fact that opposites in binary oppositions are categories of the same level, it becomes apparent that Europe is conceptualised as a nation-state entity that goes beyond a supranational organization. Furthermore, with regards to the conceptualisation of European Union (EU), one could argue that European Union is equated with Europe in the above discourse. Thus, EU seems to be defined in geographical-cultural terms than in mere political ones. These results correspond with those of Hulsse (2000) in his paper on the othering of Turkey in the German discourse in relation to Turkey's possible EU accession.

The data set offers insights also on the way participants construct their own identity in relation to Europe. Despite the fact that participants seem to follow relatively similar patterns when conceiving of Europe, their own position in relation to Europe seems to not reach a consensus. Due to space restrictions, I cannot offer a data view here (for a more detailed overview look at (Angouri and Efthymiadou, forthcoming)). In brief, participants position themselves in different ways in relation Europe. Interestingly, there are two contradictory main claims: that Greece is a core European country and that Greece has never actually become a European country, but it has preserved instead its Balkan character. Participants thus seem to follow different identity trajectories. Multitude identifications co-exist offering several identity choices. Participants seem to navigate around them in their talk and negotiate their belonging to them in different ways.

Conclusion

As evidenced from the above discussion, Turkey is conceptualized as Europe's Other in the data, contributing to the construction of the European identity. Europeaness is related to notions of democracy, peace, respect towards human rights, education and Christianity. Participants do otherise Turkey in relation to Europe, however, they do not ascribe unanimously themselves a European identity. Instead, different conceptualisations of their Europeaness co-exist, revealing the multi-faceted character of identity construction processes. Evidently, these findings are drawn from a small symptomatic sample of 10 participants. However I consider the findings important as they capture the protean character of positioning processes and identity formation.

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Appendix

Themes that emerged in relation to participants' perception of Turks

Perceptions of the Turks

- Turks and Greeks look alike (co-existence, language, corruption, Balkan traits, cuisine, reminiscence of a lost identity)
- “The Turk can never become friend”-Turks as Greeks' other (perennial enemies, Ottoman oppressors, mistrustful, provocative, barbarian)
- The 2 facets of Turkey: Western and Eastern (development, Europeanisation, woman, everyday people)
- “They will never become Europeans”: Turks as non-Europeans (culture, old-fashioned, Orientals, geopolitics, Islam, human rights)

Constructing nationals: building national identities within schools in Greece

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Abstract

The study aims to explore if and why young people form national attachments within a school context. It is believed that in a country like Greece people have strong affiliations to the nations which might be described by the glorified perspective in which citizens view the country. These manifestations of national identity might be seen through a nationalist lens. These affiliations are not implying political movements but are shaped through different practices. Two theoretical ideas will be tested. One is Billig's banal nationalism and the powerful impact of everyday practices – through symbols, rituals and well-crafted curricula - and the other is the irrationality of national attachments as explored by Connor and Stavrakakis – the idea of shared ancestry.

Introduction

Nationalism is usually distanced from national identity in scholarly theories. Normally associated with 'darker' forces linked with xenophobia, irrational pride for one's nation and little understanding for the 'Other' – whether this is manifested in other cultures, religions or labour movements. This paper wants to show that nationalism in its extreme yet mild form of strongly identifying with your country and believing in its superiority is not only a political manifestation but something more banal and as a result, more closely linked to national identities, as manifested in everyday practices.

One of the most prominent theories of nation formations has been suggested by Anderson (1982), whereby nations are imagined communities. The bond people develop in order to sustain their connection is imagined, felt only through their willingness to sacrifice their existence for compatriots they will never meet. Balibar extends this argument suggesting that *'[e]very social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is imaginary*, that is, it is based on the projection of individual existence into the web of a collective narrative, on the recognition of a common *name* and on traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past (1990: 346, italics in the original). Even though describing ethnic attachments as 'imaginary' presupposes a more negative link with one's attachments and it is not always the case, there are other elements in Balibar's theory which hold true – *'All identity is individual*, but there is no individual identity that is not historical, or, in other words, constructed within a field of social values, norms of behavior, and collective symbols' (1990: 346). The ethnic base of nations is nationalized through social formations – communities are formed through a 'common identity of origins, culture, and interests' (ibid.). An imagined bond cannot sustain identities for so long and cannot ensure that people will develop a strong national identity – an identity which, in countries like Greece, plays a central role in peoples' identifications.

Therefore, it is suggested that other elements have a part in sustaining this bond to the nation and contribute to the development of a national identity. There are elements of commonality and a link with the past which are far more influential than has been discussed in the literature. It is proposed that more sentimental and irrational reasons might be at play in order for national identities to be formed. Two main theoretical strands are explored in order to understand these formations and provide an initial theoretical framework for the empirical work which will be carried out. First, Billig's idea of banal nationalism: how national identities are reproduced through everyday unnoticed practices and second, the point that the appeal of nationalism cannot be described through rational socioeconomic processes but largely depends on irrational bonds, promising that the nation will provide people with the enjoyment other relationships fail to give.

The participants

The research will be qualitative, conducted comparatively in two countries: Greece (Thessaloniki) and England (London). Two schools have been selected, both of which mainly comprise of white middle class students. The participants will be 16 to 18 year-old students. The main methods for collecting the data will be interviews and observations. Interviews will be conducted with at least twenty students and four teachers in each school. All students will be observed over lunch breaks, communal free time, and during some classes (such as Literature, Citizenship, History, etc.).

The project aims to explore the idea of the national habitus (as discussed by Bourdieu (1990) and Elias (1978)) and national identifications that the participants develop in a relational manner (Kuipers 2012) – not what it is but how it comes into being and how it is affected by and within social processes; in this case what factors influence national identity formations and how they are manifested in a school setting.

The reason that Greece is one of the two countries that this study focuses on is because national identity is rather prescriptive and schools have always played a major role in shaping pupils' understandings of how they (should) see their nation. An important emphasis on praising the country's achievements and glorious past has always shaped how young people identify with their nation and view 'others'. As Zahos (2013) has argued educational contexts have always dealt with the national narrative in such a way so as to establish ideas of national superiority and the textbooks have been infiltrated with negative depictions of the 'enemies' of the nation, while glorifying national achievements. All these elements point to a more nationalistic discourse within schools with a positive bias towards the nation and a negative one towards anyone not Greek. Whereas in the past it was cultural difference which jeopardised the cohesions of the nation, at present, these enemies are seen in institutions such as the EU, IMF and all those who control the economy of the country from outside. Schools are depicting a national identity which reinforces stereotypes and a loyalty to unchallenged national accomplishments – something which ultimately shapes young peoples' understandings of their national identity.

The importance of banal practices

Felski has pointed out how the everyday is 'everywhere, yet nowhere' (2000:15). It is defined by the ordinary and the mundane, but it is so elusive that we find hard to understand how powerful it is. Billig (1995) has developed the idea of banality when it comes to nationhood. Although nationalism is usually associated with extreme behaviours, it does not always have political associations. The people who care about the importance of the nation are usually termed as 'patriots', in order to disengage from negative connotations. However, nationhood has links with nationalism in that they both attribute great importance to the existence of a nation. The difference lies with the fact that once nations have been established nationalism remains unnoticed and benign, until some crisis makes it remerge. In the meantime, nationhood is subtly reminded through national symbols and signs. These discreet reminders are far more important in maintaining national identifications, as they are there to showcase the firm establishment of nation-state and only a few more pronounced manifestations through the year are enough to sustain the attachment. This is why Billig places more emphasis on the unwaved flags which are hung from public buildings and in balconies, rather than national celebrations. National symbols are products of mass consumption and as such they need certain spaces where they can be bought and sold extensively (Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008) – schools play this role most effectively.

Schools are one of the most important institutions for the continuation of such ideas. National identities need to exist in certain social contexts, as they cannot be built in isolation (Motyl 2010). The school as a social context provides this solidarity. It highlights the importance space has in the creation of the nation – through the teaching of certain subjects, such as History – and reinforces the idea of spatial boundaries among nations. This is particularly important as collective identities are primarily spatially defined (Rembold 2011). Schools are also where the content and contours of the nation are transmitted through sanctioned curricula, displayed in

national emblems and performed in ritual practices (Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008: 550). Through these crafted discourses the social experiences change and people are positioned against 'others'. Through identifying national symbols and through the processes of learning national interactions, pupils learn to identify 'others' and be identified by 'them'; therefore, the notion of the 'other' as seen through the curricula is important in understanding one's nation (Farrell 2010).

Apart from the importance of everyday practices which partly ensure loyalty to the nation, Billig also talked about nationhood through its psychological aspects (1995). The need of people to have an identity which can be manifested through attachment to a society. This need is seen on a more unconscious level, as people rarely consciously talk about construction of an identity. This unconscious act will be discussed in the text section.

The irrationality of ethnic attachments

Often social scientists are looking for rational reasons to justify why people become attached to their nations in ways which might include sacrificing themselves for it. Although Gellner's, Hobsbawm's and other modernists' theories about nation formations hold true they discuss only partly the reasons why nationhood forms such a strong bond. Economic and social reasons or factors such as the widespread use of a vernacular are undoubtedly strong arguments as to why nations were formed and why people feel the need to have allegiance to them – they serve institutional purposes, which in modern societies help maintain the balance of everyday existence. However, there is something more subtle and less pronounced which provides a framework for this identification.

Connor (1993) has described ethnopsychology: the sense of shared blood, an appeal which leaders make to common descent. Most of the times these ties are imagined and do not correspond to historical facts. However, they are strong enough to sustain nations and national loyalty. As an example, the Greek ancestral narrative is infiltrated with ideas that modern Greeks come directly from their ancient ancestors. Naturally, the glory of a place where democracy and philosophy blossomed is an era which most people would aspire to relate to. However, this linkage ignores four hundred years of Ottoman rule and large migrations from the Balkans. It is true that the intelligentsia of the newly formed independent Greek state looked upon the classical past with a reverence which could only be matched with the contempt they felt for the Ottoman rule (Clogg 2013). However, the Ottoman era shaped the Modern Greek society at a large extent. Very few of the influences that shaped the rest of Europe (such as the Reformation or the Renaissance) reached occupied Greece. Therefore, the narrative which is largely encouraged at school textbooks – one which promotes the superiority of Greece – should be reconfigured in order to include other times which markedly shaped its present state. This does not mean that the current ideologies will shift much; such identifications are shaped at an irrational level – as Freud has suggested national identity defies articulation in rational terms (Connor 1993).

As Stavrakakis (2007) has noted we should examine the bond between people and the nation as a psychic investment. The irrationality of ethnonational bonds is described as something of the order of affective libidinal bonds, some kind of Eros. Stavrakakis draws from Lacan discussing the idea of *jouissance* – the idea that we get some satisfaction from this bond but also through the identification and exclusion of the 'Other'. In a country like Greece, demonization of the 'Other' has always been

present both in political and social discourses. The superiority of the pure Greek (identified by birth and language) has always excluded those not seen as part of the ingroup. Perhaps this can be attributed to the dichotomy described by jouissance – the relationship between love and hate – the recipient of our hate need not be the same through the years but it needs to be there in order to sustain the ingroup.

However, what should be noted is the reaction of people when this promise of enjoyment is not fulfilled by the nation. As Ahmed (2014) has pointed out love for the nation is even more important when these promises fail to deliver. Devoted citizens do not give up because it will only be harder for them to admit that their nation has failed them. They persist with their devotion and the love is transformed into a form of nostalgia and hope for what the nation could have been. In the case of Greece this is more relevant than ever. The socioeconomic implications of political mismanagements have barely left any people unscathed. However, the national loyalty is still holding very strong. Devotion to the state has been lost almost entirely; however, people are still proud to be Greek and showcase their love and enthusiasm.

Conclusion

This paper has only very briefly explored the two ideas of banality and irrationality when it comes to people developing a sense of the nation. These two hypotheses will be tested through qualitative interviews in a school in order to understand if they have a role to play in young peoples' identifications with the nation. Whatever the findings are they are only there to describe the situation at a particular school at a particular city and further research is needed in order to draw more generalised conclusions.

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**Twice a Sacrificial Lamb? Comparing the politics of anti-communism and austerity
through the Greek crises of the 1940s and the present**

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Abstract

Which values do governments hold most dear, what or whom are they prepared to sacrifice in order to serve those values, and what role does fear play in securing support for the demanded sacrifices? The introduction to the paper lays out the theoretical groundwork asking if the word 'sacrifice' can even be used, and if so, what implications does its use entail? This paper then proposes to apply an interdisciplinary framework and vocabulary through which the Greek crises and the politics affected and generated by them, can be compared. These are the overriding theoretical questions of this paper in its attempt to compare the politics in relation to the Greek Civil War with politics of the financial crises of the present. The proposed paper is interdisciplinary, based in International History, but including theories from Legal philosophy, Political Science and Sociology to apply another vocabulary and theoretical perspective.

Sacrifice. The sacred. The profane. Redemption. Corruption.

Terms that are easily recognized and applied to supernaturally-based religious practice. What would occur however, if one were to remove the supernatural connotation associated with them (if possible) and apply them to an analysis of policy generation and implementation in the history of contemporary Europe? Could these terms provide another type of vocabulary for a historian to more precisely identify the motivations behind certain policy decisions? Using Greece as a case study, is it possible to decode the true motivations for following policies, even when evidence countering them may indicate a more effective course of action? In so doing, can an apparent underlying need of society in general to maintain sacred values be identified, whatever they may be? Can they then be used to justify bringing others to the same way of belief, in what may be considered an act of redemption? What happens when these notions are no longer being applied to individuals and instead begin to be applied to collectives? These are the underlying questions that this paper will address.

This paper will summarize first of all the theoretical background of using the above listed terminology, and will then briefly outline the crises of the 1940s and present in Greece, using the afore mentioned vocabulary. The presentation will expand on the statements made in the following sections, using concrete examples from both periods to support the use of the proposed terminology, and will conclude by asking whether or not its use is appropriate for such an analysis and comparison, and whether or not it be said that twice in the in the past 70 years, Greece has been sacrificed in support of policies designed and implemented from abroad?

The use of the Terminology

The argument centers on the use the word of 'sacrifice' as a way to describe what has happened to Greece during crises in the 1940s and today, and the ways in which 'solutions' were and are implemented and justified according to notions about 'the sacred' or 'the profane.' Woven into the analysis are theories about the 'sacred' and the 'profane,' and how the politics relating to the Greek Crises have been publicized and supported /opposed based on their connection with one or the other. Authors like Gordon Lynch and Roberto Esposito have written extensively about the role that the sacred and the profane continue to play in what has been described as a

world in which 'sacred forms of communication' have not 'dried out' with modern society.¹ As a result of this, and of the tendency to overlook the sacred in by 'relegating' it to theology or sociology, it is argued that modern society has a 'blind spot intellectually' looking at the sacred as being a fundamental part of modern life.² In other words, not only are these policies not passed from a rational perspective, but they arise from a profoundly subjective point of view. Taking this theory as a starting point, this paper deals with theological concepts such as sacred, profane, heresy, redemption and corruption, and examines the role that they play in the development of international policy, specifically in relation to notions of sovereignty. Related to the use of 'sacrifice,' are the terms 'sacred' and 'profane.'

What is sacred? That which communicates to us or represents an unalterable truth about our existence. In this context, sacrifice is what is required in order to bring someone or something into this context. The sacred and the profane therefore become intrinsically related, but, they must not be thought of in terms of good and evil, but rather simply as on being the other's opposite. Additionally, 'far from entering an age of rational enlightenment, society remains profoundly shaped by compelling moral, emotional identifications, with symbolic representations of the sacred.'³ Indeed, the words 'sacred' and 'religious' are often confused to be synonyms, when in fact they are very distinct concepts, that if properly defined can rectify the false assumption of the 'secular individual as someone solely guided by reason and not prey to the unreflective passions of sacred commitment.' On the other hand, those who say that only the religious contain anything sacred are also mistaken. The sacred means a way of communicating that which individuals claim to be 'absolute realities that exert a profound moral claim over their lives.' These 'forms' (or in the language of semiotics, 'signs') generate their own version of evil (the "profane") and set 'moral boundaries beyond which lie people who are regarded as "inhuman" or "animals."⁴ Therefore, the sacred is 'a way of communicating about what people take to be absolute realities, that exert a profound moral claim over their lives...generating their own visions of evil "the profane" and establishing moral boundaries beyond which lie people who are regarded as inhuman or animals.' Additionally, 'sacred forms of communication' have not 'dried out' with modern society, and as a result of this, and of the tendency to overlook the

¹ Gordon Lynch, On the Sacred, (Durham: Acumen Publishing Ltd., 2012), pp.11

² Ibid., pp.11-13.

³ Ibid, pp. 9, 11.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

sacred in the ways he describes it relating it to theology or sociology, and that modern society has a 'blind spot intellectually' looking at the sacred in this way. This is the case because anything labeled as sacred is often seen as primitive.⁵ However, the sense of 'timeless and universal moral weight attached to these Sacred Commitments' fades and becomes uncomfortable if we begin to see that they are in fact modern. Modern societies consider themselves as 'secular and modern thinkers' and as a result are objective, but this is not the case. The theory holds that we must acknowledge that our sacred commitments can 'justify horrific violence and repression challenges our sense that these commitments are not simply good, but the way things must be.'⁶

This last point is crucial, since the notion of Sacrifice was to make something holy (redeemed) but to do so necessitated not only separation, but also death. In pre-Christian times, animals were sacrificed 'crossing over a threshold of 'indistinguishability' between the preservation of life and the production of death. To make an animal sacred, it must be cut off from the world of the living, it has to cross the threshold which separates these two universes; this is the point of putting it to death.'⁷ Translated to the secular, it can be argued that this principle still exists and can be seen in the ongoing economic programs being applied in Greece. Though people are not being put to death to be sanctified, in many respects a way of life is. A state is being remade in a foreign-designed image⁸, I.e; in order to be worthy of redemption, sacrifices had (or today have) to be made.

Anti-Communism

During the early years of the Cold War, Greece was used as a symbol of the 'sacred' notions of Western Democracy and Liberal Capitalism, versus the 'profane / obscene' notions of Communism and Dictatorship. From 1946 to 1950, the United States poured millions of dollars into Greece, to prevent it from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. The religious character of the language used to explain and justify the West's commitment to a non-communist Greece,

⁵ Ibid., pp.11-13.

⁶ Ibid., pp.13-14.

⁷ Esposito, Roberto, *Immunitas*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013) p. 57.

⁸ Although the changes are being made with consent, how the consent is sought and the degree to which it is accepted are up for debate.

even at the expense of fair and representative democracy within the country itself, were used to support very non-democratic practices within the country.⁹ Furthermore, in return for following the West, 'gifts' were made to Greece in the form of reconstruction loans, and membership in NATO, but at the sacrifice of domestic freedoms and independent Greek foreign policy.¹⁰ Where in the 1940s the sacred and profane notions woven into the laws, treaties and policies made for and directed to Greece, were centered on the competing ideologies of Capitalism and Communism, today these ideas of the Sacred and Profane are centered on the word 'austerity.' Embedded in this word are deep seeded cultural and political values which are revealed by the laws passed and implemented in support or in opposition to it. How the sacred motivations behind these policies are uncovered, also indicates what they can tell us about the role they play in the development of economic policy and theories about sovereignty.¹¹

Austerity

Today, the economic crisis in Greece (and in Europe by extent) may be seen in a similar way, but by using different terminology, with domestic and foreign freedom (pensions, wages, public services, schools, universities, energy, monetary and foreign policy) being sacrificed in order to 'qualify' for foreign (IMF / EU) loans. Since the Eurozone crisis began in 2009, Greece is again being held out as a sacrifice, but this time for an economic policy inspired by the Ordoliberal school of economics from the 1930s. The word 'austerity' itself has become something of a sacred/profane word in contemporary European politics, being equated with morality and competence, as sacraments in the secular-religious beliefs held about the solutions to the current crisis. "if we just become more disciplined, more austere, less charitable"; these ideals, transformed and applied to 'secular' economics, but no less emotionally charged, with

⁹ For example, support of arbitrary detentions and deportations to Makronissos, and the non-persecution of collaborators. For more examples see: Ed Vulliamy and Helen Smith, ' Athens 1944: Britain's dirty secret,' The Guardian (November 30th 2014) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/athens-1944-britains-dirty-secret?CMP=share_btn_fb

¹⁰ Johan Van Der Walt uses 'gift' in a different way. He describes it as a hypothetical European alternative to austerity, where the exporting members of the Eurozone could establish a non-reciprocal arrangement through which aid was given freely, without (or with far less) restriction, thereby fostering solidarity. See his article "Mandela, Merkel and the courage to give," (2012).

¹¹ The presentation will use concrete examples of policies that were implemented in support of anti-communism to back-up the theoretical arguments made here.

any challenge to them being opposed vocally and passionately by the supporters. 'Austerity' is presented and supported as the 'cure' to Greece's ailments, even as the very forces that could very well destroy liberal democracy in Greece (not to mention a free and open market) rise as a result of these 'sacred' policies. The numerous developments in Greece since the implementation of 'austerity' are largely matters of public record, however, for the purposes of this paper, the important aspects to keep in mind are how these policies were implemented and justified, and whether or not the justification and support for them can be identified as being part of the sacred or profane, and whether or not they can (or are supposed to) lead to redemption.¹² When speaking about austerity, by necessity we must also speak about the current German government, its policies and the other European governments that espouse similar politics.

In Germany, the CDU is a fusion of conservatism and Christian social values. Originally conceived as a way to join Catholic beliefs with democratic ideals, it has grown to incorporate wider 'Christian' and political views. Practically, Christian democracy is economically liberal and socially conservative, and it has retained numerous, if not overt, religious elements, especially in Europe.¹³ Therefore, at its very core, whether admitted as such or not, the 'pound of flesh' mentality, drawn from Catholicism's historical emphasis on worldly punishment for sins, the CDU in Germany has adopted the position that financial mistakes need to be atoned for with harsh financial penalties. Financial packages for Greece, Portugal and Spain have been extended further by the 'bail-in' policy for Cyprus where the government was forced to confiscate people's savings, and to block their ability to withdraw money from banks.

Conclusion

The devotion of certain governments to these principles extend to the people they govern, for, when the programs, implemented by the mentality explained by the sacrifice notion, fail to achieve the expected results, then the fault is not permitted to lie with those who proposed it, but

¹² Again, as stated in note 11 for the sections "anti-communism," the presentation will use concrete examples of policies that were implemented in support of austerity to back-up the theoretical arguments made here.

¹³ A. Heywood, *Political ideologies. An introduction*, (New York, Macmillan, 2003), p. 89, and, Szulc, Tad. "Communists, Socialists and Christian Democrats". [*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*](#), Vol. 360, p. 102.

with those upon whom the 'solution' was imposed. They were not 'austere' (insert devout) enough to warrant salvation, and therefore deserve to be sacrificed. These notions also cut to the very core of Diplomacy and power relations.

What are the solutions then? If we are trapped in a circular reasoning cycle, turning our perceptions into 'perceived reality' using a theologically imbued political terminology which continually places upon ourselves and others a moral (whether overtly stated as such or not) duty to repay either in kindness or in punishment (I sacrificed, ergo you owe me, or I owe you, therefore I will sacrifice). The solution is to consciously place behind us the 'tit for tat' mentality that has proven disastrous thus far in human society, establishing levels of dependency, that while beneficial for a few, keep the vast majority of people 'spinning their wheels' in a hopeless effort to repay a debt that can never be repaid.

The key aspect of the discussion about the terminology used to justify these policies is whether or not Greece can be used an example for other countries; in the 1940s, to show that the methods that were applied in support of anti-communism were effective, today, whether austerity has worked. Did sacrifice lead to redemption, or did indulgence lead to corruption? Did the sacred lead the way, or did the profane lead them astray? The objective being that by highlighting the true motivation behind the policies of both eras, perhaps they can be better identified as such, leading to less rigid attachment to policies like them in the future.

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