

The Cyprus conflict: Evidence of institutionalized securitization¹

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Abstract:

This paper examines the possibility that in ethnic conflicts the securitization process could develop into a more institutionalized form, which in turn opens up the possibility for the process to be expanded, as securitization is no longer limited to the typical unidirectional top-down (i.e. elite-driven) path, but rather it becomes subject to bottom-up and horizontal forces, creating what is termed in this paper ‘horizontal and ‘bottom-up securitization’. Thus, the ‘creation’ of threats is no longer ‘left’ solely to elite, as the public has a more active role in the creation and perpetuation of security narratives and subsequently threats. The Cyprus conflict, as one of the most intractable ethnic conflicts, is used to test the abovementioned arguments (i.e. institutionalized, bottom-up and horizontal securitization and underlying forces) and the role they play in the intractability of the specific conflict as well as ethnic conflicts in general. As the case study indicates, more institutionalized securitization is, the more rigid the ethnic groups’ relations are, which reduces significantly the chances for resolution or settlement of the conflict.

Introduction

This paper explores an under-examined area in the literature of securitization and proposes a number of ways to fill the gap. It then draws empirical evidence from the Cyprus conflict to *partially* test the proposed theoretical arguments.² What is argued specifically is that ethnic conflict environments create a fertile environment for the process of securitization to become institutionalized. This, in turn, opens up the possibility for an expanded view of the process, as it is no longer limited to the typical unidirectional top-down (i.e. elite-driven) path, but rather it becomes subject to bottom-

¹ This is a draft. Please do *not* cite without the author’s consent.

² The word ‘partially’ is specifically emphasized, as the field research is still work in progress. That said, there seems to be sufficient evidence to support the theoretical claims made in this paper.

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up and horizontal forces; hence the introduction of two new terms, namely ‘horizontal and ‘bottom-up securitization’. The second part of the paper uses the Cyprus conflict and specifically just the Greek Cypriot side,³ to draw evidence that supports the theoretical claims made in the first part.

Securitization: a brief overview

Securitization – what is it?

In order to understand the theoretical claims of the paper it is important first to clarify (very briefly) the main premises of securitization. What must be emphasized in advance is that securitization, as a theory, is essentially a mechanism to help us analyze political practice, and more specifically, as Buzan et al. state, ‘[w]ho can “do” or “speak” security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects’ (1998: 27). Said otherwise, securitization is an analysis tool more than anything else.

The essence of securitization lies in the idea that security is a speech act,⁴ thus, by labeling something as a security issue, something is done. In other words, ‘the utterance *itself* is the act’; ‘the *word* “security” is the *act*’ (Wæver 1995: 55, *emphasis in original*). The actual utterance of the word *security*, however, is not a necessary prerequisite for a security speech act, as security and the need for emergency measures (i.e. appeal for urgency) could be connoted or inferred with the use of other words or terms (Buzan et al. 1998).

How does it work?

A securitizing actor performs the act by claiming that a particular referent object (e.g. identity, economy, environment, etc.) faces an existential threat. The actor is a specific someone, or a group, who performs the security speech acts, with some of the most obvious actors being political elite, bureaucrats, lobbyists and pressure groups (ibid). As the argument goes, if these (alleged) threats are not dealt with immediately, then everything else will become irrelevant (Wæver 1996). Thus the need arises for ‘special handling’ and emergency measures to tackle the threats. In extreme cases, such as the September 11 attacks in the United States, the requested extraordinary measures asked for the complete breaking free of normal politics and the use of emergency and extreme actions, which included, inter alia, military interventions in foreign states. In the less loose approach to the theory and subsequently in less extreme cases, the requested measures could be, for instance, change of leadership or change of laws to handle better any potential threats (e.g. to tackle immigration threats). For a securitizing act to be

³ It must be noted that the choice of just the Greek Cypriot side is solely based on the fact that the author has done empirical research within the Greek Cypriot community and not on any other factors – e.g. that Turkish Cypriots do not have internalized perceptions of threats. On the contrary, an argument could be made that the situation is very similar on both sides of the Green Line; an argument which, however, still lacks the necessary empirical support.

⁴ For speech acts see J.L. Austin (1967)

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successful the securitizing actor must convince a significant audience – e.g. public, international community, etc. – in order to gain access to the required measures and break free of the realm of ‘normal politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998). This ‘convincing’ is essentially an intersubjective process, or a negotiation between the securitizing actor and the audience.

Overall, if one follows the mainstream reading of the process of securitization, the focus will be on (a) speech acts, (b) securitizing actors and specifically political elite or people of influence and (c) the audience. This approach, therefore, connotes two things: that the process is essentially *ad hoc* and for an issue to become a threat it must be first securitized by the securitizing actor, meaning that it is a top-down process as it is the elite, (including governments, organizations, etc.) that attempt to influence the public and not the other way around.

Hypotheses

The theoretical arguments of the paper revolve around the idea that the process of securitization, under certain conditions, could be significantly different; it is these conditions and the different modes of securitization that the paper explores. With this in mind, the paper’s main arguments/hypotheses could be summarized as follows:

- I. It is possible, under some conditions, for securitization to become institutionalized
- II. Securitization need not be always a top-down process, but could also be bottom-up and/or horizontal
- III. The institutionalization of securitization ‘forces’ actors and audience alike to engage in involuntary actions

Institutionalizing securitization

Buzan et al. mention briefly that ‘securitization can be either *ad hoc* or institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized (1998: 27)’. They also acknowledge that issues that are already defined as security issues may not be dramatized or prioritized (*ibid*: 28). This is as far as Buzan et al. have developed the notion of institutionalized securitization. There is neither empirical proof nor any theoretical ‘depth’ that supports this view. Similarly, there is no examination of the underlying factors that play a role in the development of this institutionalization, or why certain issues are persistently defined as security issues, or even what the role of speech acts is in such environments. More importantly however, they do not examine how the process of securitization changes in the event that securitization becomes institutionalized.

With this in mind it becomes obvious that neither the term nor the notion of institutionalized securitization is clearly defined. In this paper, institutionalized securitization goes beyond the persistence of threats and also refers to cases where

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the entire *process* of securitization (including the referent objects, the source of threats, the securitizing actors and the audience, and even speech acts) has evolved into something diachronic (or almost permanent) and has become part of the society's political and social routines. As discussed further later, in these environments – usually found in conflict and/or post-conflict areas - the entire process of securitization differs from the mainstream process, not least because the audience many times actually expects issues to be (or remain) securitized and because the 'normal' securitizing actors are many times left without the option of desecuritization or no-securitization.⁵ This understanding of institutionalized securitization is significantly different from Buzan et al.'s (under-developed) argument that issues may not need to be dramatized.

The institutionalization of securitization is not something that could 'simply take place' or, in other words, be the outcome of a speech act and a brief intersubjective process. On the contrary, some conditions must be present and a specific process is required. This process is similar to that of the 3-stage life cycle of norms: the birth (i.e. creation) of norms, the growing (i.e. spreading or expanding) stage, and lastly the internalization of norms (Kowert and Legro 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the case of securitization to reach the third stage (i.e. institutionalization), there must also be the birth stage, which takes place (primarily) after pivotal events. But unlike the case of norms where the 'birth' takes place mainly because of the role of 'norm entrepreneurs' (agents with strong beliefs of what is appropriate or desirable within a community (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998)), the pivotal events could be so dramatizing that no specific actors (entrepreneurs) are required to argue what is appropriate or desirable, or what is a threat for that matter. Using Cyprus as an example, such pivotal events could be for instance the 1974 Turkish invasion. The second stage in securitization would be the unchallenged period. This is the period during which any perceptions regarding threats that derive directly from the pivotal event (e.g. Turkey) remain unchallenged. During this period the prospects for internalization of certain perceptions is particularly high, not only because certain perceptions remain unchallenged by elite and public alike, but also because after pivotal events these perceptions are usually holistic (i.e. they affect the entire population and not just parts it). But for institutionalization to really take place (i.e. 3rd stage) there needs to be an 'active' and repetitive discourse on security issues on an elite and public level. The key to institutionalization is the repetition of securitizing acts, or in other words, routinized securitization. Said otherwise, securitizing acts become part of the elite's political routines, and the process of accepting or rejecting them becomes part of the audience's social routines. All of these ingredients are usually found in conflict and post-conflict cases, and more specifically in ethno-national conflicts, not least because in such conflicts the struggles revolve around the competing identities, which could make the issues of threats (i.e. to one's identity)

⁵ It is usually assumed that the securitizing acts (and thus the process of securitization) are conscious political choices (see for example, Williams 2007), which means that there is the choice to either engage in a securitizing act or not. As I explain later, in some cases, where securitization is institutionalized this choice no longer exists and the option of 'no-securitization', (i.e. option not to securitize an issue) is not available to the actors. Similarly, the option of *not* accepting a securitizing act becomes unavailable.

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and much more personal problem (compared to, for example, terrorism or environmental degradation). It is precisely for this reason that a distinction between securitization in conflict and non-conflict environments is of particular importance; a distinction that is not yet examined in the literature.

Post-institutionalization impact

When the securitization is institutionalized, it means that it becomes part of the routines and more importantly part of the society's norms. Before examining what this means for the process of securitization it is worth noting how norms influence a society. Norms are legitimate social variables that are both accepted and created by the community (Kowert and Legro 1996). Moreover, because norms create collective expectations, they also set the proper behavior of actors within a given identity (Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 1996; Legro 1997); they create in other words, certain expectations of behavior. Thus, with the same token, if securitization becomes part of the norms, it means that securitization is both accepted (i.e. it is legitimate to present certain issues as threats) and/or is created by the community. The former leads to an environment where threats are easily perpetuated, especially within a given identity, while the latter connotes that the public (i.e. 'bottom' part of the process) has a bigger role to play than currently assumed in the securitization literature.

Once the securitization is institutionalized, therefore, the process per se changes significantly. The first change is in regards to the role of speech acts, whose importance diminishes. This is because the public already internalized and subsequently accepted some issues as threats. Thus, the role of speech acts shifts from *convincing* an audience that a specific issue is a threat, to *reminding* them. Reminding them, essentially, that the expected behavior, the norm, is to accept certain issues as threats unquestionably. Another important difference is that the 'reminders' need not come from individuals with significant political capital, but also from 'ordinary' non-elite individuals. Moreover, the 'reminding' could very easily be done without influential speech acts, but, but also with the use of visual images (e.g. ads on billboards), as is many times the case in specific periods such as elections or referenda.

The second change in regards to securitization processes in an institutionalized environment, has to do with the prospects of horizontal forces. In environments where threats have been internalized there are instances where the audience (i.e. the public) either engages in the securitization process as the securitizing actor, or it pressures the usual securitizing actors (e.g. political elite) to securitize a specific issue. For the public to become an actor, a number of individuals must come together and form a group so as to speak in one voice, with the aim to influence the rest of the public and/or specific elite. In this case the public becomes both an 'actor' and an 'audience'. That said, an argument could be made that once a group is formed, then the group changes 'status' and becomes more of a mainstream securitizing actor. The difference from the usual actors is that these groups are usually formed opportunistically or only when the need arises (e.g. prior to specific

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events such as elections or referenda) and then they dissolve and enter again the realm of 'audience'.

Alternatively, the audience, or rather individuals that comprise the audience could potentially become securitizing actors, albeit this time their aim is not to influence a big group of people, but rather other individuals in their immediate periphery (e.g. co-workers, family members, friends, etc.). In both cases, while securitization takes place at the bottom (i.e. by the public), the forces are applied on a horizontal level (i.e. peer to peer). This is what I term 'horizontal securitization'. Especially in ethnic conflicts, such as the one in Cyprus, where the people's (ethnic) ideologies and identities are many times particularly strong, the horizontal securitization plays a very important role in influencing opinions and actions. This is done either by supporting the mainstream top-down acts or by working 'independently' through 'micro-securitization'. The latter refers to cases where the threats are the existing ones, but the audience is much smaller. It refers to cases where one peer attempts to securitize an issue to his peer.

The second scenario has to do with bottom-up or upward forces, and not just horizontal. In these cases, the bottom (i.e. public) does not change the process of securitization, meaning it does not become an actor itself, but rather influences the mainstream process, namely the top-down process. This is done when the public applies pressure on elite to present certain issues as threats, because they (public) wants certain issues to be maintained as threats. These expectations are maintained because the existence of threats and the subsequent expected behavior on how to handle them, are part of the society's norms. I term this process as 'expected securitization': cases where the audience expects (and desires) the securitization – by their elite - of certain issues or referent objects. This demand for securitization derives from the need for ontological security, or one's identity that, in ethnic conflicts, is inevitably linked to the 'enemy other'. Said otherwise, the perpetuation of the conflict becomes important for the perpetuation of one's identity, making thus the conflict a desirable option (Mitzen 2006). With this in mind, to perpetuate a conflict, especially a comfortable one such as the one in Cyprus (Adamides and Constantinou, forthcoming) there is a need to maintain specific threats and an enemy other; hence the expectation for securitization, which contributes towards the perpetuation of the threats and thus the conflict.

This brings us to the last issue, namely that in cases where there is expected securitization, the securitizing actors' options as well as those of the audience may be very limited. Specifically, the actors may have no choice *but* to securitize certain issues – in order to satisfy the public feelings and safeguard their political power – while members of the audience may not have a choice *but* to accept certain securitizing acts because of the horizontal pressures they face. I discuss these issues in the next section using the Cyprus conflict as an example.

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Evidence from Cyprus

It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide the historical background of the Cyprus conflict. Suffice to say that it is unquestionably an intractable conflict that revolves around two distinct ethnic identities (see e.g. Papadakis et. al. 2006). Cyprus is also a securitized environment, in the sense that many issues are deeply internalized as threats, making it thus a prime case study to test the aforementioned theoretical hypotheses.

Testing the institutionalization process

As mentioned above the first stage of institutionalization is the ‘birth’, which takes place after pivotal events. There have been several pivotal events on both sides of the Buffer Zone, but because the empirical research focuses only on the Greek Cypriot side, I will only focus on the most important one for Greek Cypriots, namely the Turkish invasion in 1974.⁶ The latter has been by far the most dramatizing event for Greek Cypriots, creating almost automatically an unchallenged and unquestionable perception of what constitutes the biggest threat. This was none-other than Turkey and more specifically the Turkish military. After the invasion there was no need for any securitizing actor or political entrepreneur to securitize any issues, or to argue what the source of the threat was, or what the referent objects under the threat were (e.g. Greek Cypriot identity, sovereignty, security, etc.). The public was very well aware of the source of threat and the endangered referent objects and regardless of what any local or international agent said, the perceptions for Greek Cypriots were crystal clear.

The second stage is the unchallenged period. Indeed, since 1974, and even though several Greek Cypriot political parties or individual politicians have lately softened their position vis-à-vis Turkey, nobody ever ‘dared’ to argue the conflict is not the outcome of the Turkish invasion and occupation. Indeed, the perceptions regarding the source of threats (i.e. Turkey), especially the first few decades, were completely unchallenged.

Inevitably the unchallenged period allowed for some issues to become part of the daily political routines of elite, parties and even the society (e.g. in education). This has led to the internalization of specific threats. It is no coincidence that in every single opinion poll the first concern of Greek Cypriots is the Cyprus problem, and their first fear regarding the potential settlement of the problem is not the economy or the governance aspect of the solution, but rather that of security.⁷ Similarly, the withdrawal of the Turkish army and the elimination of Turkish intervention guarantees remains the most deciding factor for accepting or rejecting a settlement plan. Unsurprisingly, the Turkish Cypriots are in the exact opposite side, with their primary red line being the perpetuation of the Turkish guarantees.⁸

⁶ It must be emphasized that it would be easy to identify some pivotal events for the Turkish Cypriot community as well, especially during the period 1963-1967

⁷ See for examples opinion polls by Lordos et al. 2004, 2005, 2006; Cyprus2015 2009

⁸ *ibid*

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There is little doubt that securitization in Cyprus is deeply institutionalized. Hence, there is no need for any political elite to convince the public about the Turkish army or the guarantees. The threats are so internalized that the vast majority is already convinced that these are indeed threats. What elite do, every now and then – primarily in a framework of political power struggles – is remind the people of these threats and emphasize how they (or their party) is more suitable to handle these threats.

Horizontal and bottom-up securitization

In an attempt to examine the prospects and problems of cooperation between people and organizations across the divide, the author has conducted a series of *bi-communal* roundtable discussions with individuals from different sectors of the society (e.g. artists, academics, NGOs, business people, students, etc.), followed by a series of interviews with some of those individuals as well as other individuals in key positions (e.g. Greek and Turkish Cypriot presidents of the Chambers of Commerce). The results were particularly interesting and pointed out towards very ‘heavy’ pressures that either led to horizontal securitization or to forces that supported the perpetuation of the securitized environment. Specifically, individuals who attempted to escape the ‘norm’ (i.e. disagree as to what constitutes a threat) faced significant pressure from peers and family, forcing them either to conform to the norms or to minimize any interaction with the ‘other’ side. The pressures had many forms and ranged from name-calling to social exclusion. It is worth noting that this was the case for students as well, which indicates that the securitized environment is deeply institutionalized that even the younger generation, born decades after the division, are still part of the existing security norms. This form of pressure took place among students (i.e. peer-to-peer) or between students and teachers, which was, obviously, an environment of asymmetric power.

The bottom-up pressure was much more evident during the period of the Annan Plan referenda, and especially in the leftist circles, when large numbers of people gathered together and warned the party authorities not to support the Plan (as the Plan-related threats were perceived to be too great), forcing thus specific elite and parties to reconsider their views.⁹ Other forms of bottom-up forces appeared only after elite expressed specific views that were outside the established norms (e.g. in regards to the number of settlers that could remain in Cyprus in case of a settlement, or on the governance structure of the settlement – e.g. rotating presidency). In those cases the public reaction was so ‘loud’ that forced elite to amend their positions so as to be much more in line with the norms.

Option not to securitize? Not really...

⁹ For instance, there are unctodal stories, which the author has heard from several different sources, referring to stories when members of the political party AKEL (leftist), applied pressure to their party to reject the Annan Plan by telling them that they would never again vote for AKEL (and to emphasize their position they even took with them their electoral books which they threatened to leave at the premises, as evidence that they would indeed not vote again for them).

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The last argument has to do with the lack of options for securitizing actors and audience alike, and is directly linked to the two aforementioned points. The severe horizontal and bottom-up pressures, which are almost always directly linked to historical experiences, have created an environment where the elite are not in a position to desecuritize certain issues or even not securitize them, without at least severe political costs. Elite are, in other words, expected to re-affirm that some issues are indeed existential threats, regardless of what they really believe. In Cyprus this is particularly the case when it comes to a number of issues, the most important of which are the Turkish guarantees, the military presence in the island and the Turkish settlers. Similarly, individuals who might disagree with the securitization of certain issues are not in a position to easily express their disagreement as they face peer pressure, or even top-down pressure, while labeling (e.g. traitor) and character assassinations are quite frequent.

Conclusion

Overall, when the presentation of certain issues as threats becomes part of the political and social routines of a society, the process of securitization becomes deeply institutionalized. Securitizing acts are thus no longer *ad hoc*. Elite simply need to re-affirm the existing security-threat discourse, many times without the option not to do so, while there is no real intersubjective process between actors and audience, as the latter is already convinced. This is especially the case in ethnic conflict environments where the 'enemy other' is clearly defined, while its existence becomes necessary for the other side to perpetuate its identity. This leads to conflict-perpetuating routines, making thus desecuritization or no-securitization a difficult task; on the contrary it makes securitization necessary. It is perhaps this fear for the loss of identity that leads to the severe horizontal pressures in Cyprus. Similarly, because the perpetuation of threats is important for the public, elite are forced to engage in mild securitizing acts but not in an attempt to convince the audience that a specific issue is indeed a threat (as this is really irrelevant), but rather to remind them that this is indeed the case and convince them that they (i.e. specific elite or party) is the most suitable agent to handle the threat. This seems to be the case in regards to the numerous internalized threats in Cyprus; a constant political party power struggle through continuous securitizing acts, which seem to have become part of everyone's routines. It is not surprising therefore that lately the Greek Cypriot elite have discovered the word «κινδυνολογία» (scaremongering) and accuse each other of using it for political purposes.

Acknowledgement: *This work was co-funded by the European Regional Development Funds and the Republic of Cyprus through the Research Promotion Foundation (Project PENEK 0609/80)*

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Abstract

The main objective of this paper is to present the conflicting interpretations of the two Cypriot communities regarding the 1960 Constitution which established the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, this paper will attempt to illustrate how these conflicting interpretations exacerbated the differences of the two communities and how these differences impacted on their negotiating positions during the inter-communal talks of 1968-1974. Eventually, this essay will endeavor to highlight the two communities' perceptions towards the concept of federalism and its evolution from the genesis of the Republic until nowadays.

1960 Cyprus Constitution: Conflicting Interpretations and their Repercussions on Future Negotiations

On February 1959 in Zurich, Greece and Turkey reached an agreement by which they set up the basic constitutional framework of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and guaranteed its independence. Few days later, on 19 February at Lancaster House in London, the above-mentioned countries along with the United Kingdom and the representatives of the two Cypriot communities, Makarios for the Greek-Cypriots and Kuchuk for the Turkish-Cypriots, signed the Zurich Agreements and agreed on the terms of the establishment of the independent RoC. Eventually, on 16 August 1960 this agreement came into existence. One notable thing about the birth of the RoC was the absence of celebration on all sides, due to the fact that neither the aim of *partition* for the Turkish-Cypriots nor *enosis* for the Greek-Cypriots was achieved. Due to the unclear provisions and articles of the Constitution, there has been much dispute over it since its very inception. The situation was undermined by the Greek-Cypriot community's ardent protest regarding the provisions on the disproportionate representation of the two communities in the government. In fact, Makarios' proposal for the amendment of the Constitution in 1963 led to inter-communal violence and eventually to the constitutional breakdown. Ever since, numerous diplomatic efforts have been made in order to reconcile the two communities, but the wide gap that existed between their respective objectives and ideologies has never been narrowed. Moreover, the diametrically opposed aims and perceptions were further exacerbated after the 1974 events and the *de facto* separation of the island, as well as in 1977, when the terms 'bizonal, bicomunal federation' were first adopted as the basis for a future settlement.

1960 Constitution and its interpretation:

Greek Cypriots

After fifty-one years of independence there is still a common belief among Greek-Cypriots that the creation of the independent state of Cyprus in 1959 with the London-Zurich Agreements was an imposed solution, which Makarios having no other alternative, was forced to accept (Clerides, 1989). The Greek-Cypriot interpretation of the Constitution is one based on the premise that it had been proven as one posing problems of implementation since, in their view, it established a political and constitutional division between the two communities, while the communal minority rights of the Turkish-Cypriots were raised to a disproportionately exalted status (Poliviou, 1980). Moreover, the Greek-Cypriot community holds the belief that the Constitution denied the privileges normally accorded to majorities and instead allocated unchallengeable and obstructive powers to a minority (ibid.). This view is held by several scholars as well, who claim that the Constitution was an unjust settlement which subjugated majority rule under the Turkish-Cypriot minority. For instance, Perry

Anderson asserts that the Zurich agreements had inflated the Turkish position in the state far beyond of what a minority of its size could in normal circumstances have claimed (2009:26). Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis seem to share the same opinion, as according to them the 1960 Constitution intensified and institutionalized ethnic cleavages and gave rise to further mistrust between the two communities (1993:243). Regarding the nature of the constitution, the Greek-Cypriots emphasize the strong bicomunal character of the agreements that prevented the development of a common ethnic identity. Even though according to the Greek-Cypriot Attorney General of the RoC, Criton Tornaritis, the 1960 Constitution created a unitary state, it also recognized the existence of two communities, which could only co-exist peacefully in an independent state through the political communal separation in every aspect of their new constitution (1974:6; Clerides 1989). Hence, the notion of dualism is believed to be the most distinct feature of the Zurich Constitution by the Greek-Cypriot community. Kyriakides asserts that even though the Constitution cannot be explicitly characterized as being a dualistic one, dualism comes in effect implicitly (1968:61). Eventually, it becomes apparent that Greek-Cypriots take the view that the Constitution's nature is one depending on dualism both politically and legalistically, through the dichotomy of all of the Constitution's functions, executive, judiciary and legislative. Tornaritis however, in the course of arguing about the rigid character of the constitution and the lack of any provision for the amendment of its unworkable and divisive elements, claims that the 13 points of Makarios through which he proposed some amendments of the constitution, were measures to facilitate the smooth functioning of the State by removing its separatist provisions (1980:67).

Turkish Cypriots

In contrast to the Greek-Cypriot reactions, the 1960 Constitution was more welcomed by the Turkish-Cypriot community, both because it secured its rights and gave it unprecedented constitutional prerogatives. As Kyriakides argues, for the Turkish-Cypriots, the Constitution was seen as a mean of securing absolutely minimum guarantees for their effective participation in government (1968:75). From its very inception there was much tension regarding the recognized status of the Turkish-Cypriot community. For the Turkish-Cypriots the Constitution was a just settlement which reflected the existence of two distinct communities on the island with equal footing in all political affairs. Consequently, this co-founder status as recognized by the Zurich-London Agreements, created a partnership in Cyprus (Necatigil, 1989). Specifically, according to some Turkish declarations "these arrangements were based on the equality and partnership of Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots in the independence and the sovereignty of the island. The legitimacy of the 1960 partnership Republic lay in the joint presence and effective participation of both sides in all of the organs of the state. Neither party had the right to rule the other, nor could one of the partners claim to be the government of the other" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey). Necatigil sticks to this view and further claims that the 1960 Constitution did not establish a unitary state (1989:15). The Turkish-Cypriots attach several other characterizations to the 1960 Constitution which they tend to associate with the term partnership. For instance, Ertokun regards the political system established in Cyprus in 1960, as a functional federation (1977:10). Furthermore, Sozen claims that the constitution was based upon the premises of consociational democracy, which he states, was another expression for functional federation (2003:2). Consequently, as Adams asserts, the Turkish-Cypriots regard that the state of Cyprus was established on the federated principle of two separate political entities with equal rights, not on a majority-minority basis (1966:489). In addition, the Turkish-Cypriot

leadership emphasizes that the 13 points raised by Makarios were a clear indication of the Greek-Cypriot intention to curtail their political power, which was embodied in the basic articles of the Constitution, with the long-term aim being that of their complete domination (Ertekun, 1984).

Inter-communal Talks 1968-1974

The wide gap that existed regarding the interpretation of the 1960 Constitution and the status of the two communities in the RoC, had an inevitable impact on the negotiating positions each community had during the inter-communal talks, initiated in 1968. In particular, there was a disagreement upon the very basis of the talks. According to Glafkos Clerides, the Greek-Cypriot negotiator, the divisive elements of the 1960 Constitution exacerbated the differences of the two communities, while the constitutional impasse of 1963 proved that it was not functional; thus 'a fresh start was needed' (in Poliviou 1980, 91). On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, by emphasizing that the Zurich Agreements acknowledged and protected their community's rights, declared that the 1960 Constitution 'would continue to stand subject to such minor adjustments necessitated in the light of agreement on the package deal' (Denktash in Clerides 1989, 60). Noteworthy is also the fact that the main objective in these negotiations for the Greek-Cypriots was the strengthening of the unitary character of the state. According to the Turkish-Cypriot negotiator, Rauf Denktash, his community would not give up the partnership and the co-founder status which he insisted they had gained with the Zurich Agreements (in Necatigil 1981, 41). However, they agreed on giving up some of the privileges they had within the central government in exchange for a genuine local autonomy on their communal affairs; this autonomy would still emphasize the existence of a partnership in Cyprus (ibid.). At last, the Greek-Cypriots agreed to give local autonomy to the Turkish-Cypriots but not in a way that would contravene the accepted principles of a unitary state (Poliviou, 1980). However, every Turkish-Cypriot proposal for local autonomy that was consolidated in the constitution, based on communal criteria and with limited supervision from the state was not accepted by the Greek-Cypriots, who claimed that these would lead to the cantonization of the island (ibid.). Although this view was publicly denied by the Turkish-Cypriots, they also openly insisted that the partnership status and the workability of the Republic could only be assured through a genuine communal separation (Denktash 1969).

Federation and its Interpretation

On 12 February 1977 under the auspices of the then United Nations' Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, Makarios and Rauf Denktash reached an agreement calling for an independent, non-aligned, bicomunal (f)ederal Republic. The territory under the administration of each community would be determined in the light of economic viability, productivity and land ownership. Moreover, this agreement made clear that questions of principles like freedom of movement, settlement and other major issues would be open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bicomunal federal system and the security and needs of the Turkish-Cypriot community. In concluding, this agreement

stated that the powers and functions of the central federal government would be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State. Although the so-called High-Level Agreements promised to be a major breakthrough towards finding a solution, the diverse interpretation of their four guidelines by the two communities has generated a contested process which has ever since been tantamount to deadlock. The two communities agreed upon a solution based on a federal republic, but the first major difference regarding their interpretation of the issue derived from the fact that even though the Greek-Cypriots placed in their text the word federal in a lower case, thus demonstrating their quest for a genuine federation, the Turkish-Cypriots texted it in an upper case, to emphasize their desire for stronger bicomunal elements. In fact, the Turkish-Cypriots claimed that the word bicomunal was in essence synonymous to bizonal. Hence, as Wolfe argues, the different style each side used in the text, demonstrates the opposing perception the two communities have of the issue (1988:79). Furthermore, the political gap between the two communities deepened during the talks which took place in Vienna on 31 March 1977. During these talks, the main Greek-Cypriot proposal regarded the devolution of governmental functions to subnational political entities, thus asking for the establishment of a unitary state with federative elements. More accurately, the popular position of the Greek-Cypriot community was that the unity of the state would be safeguarded by the federal system, by assigning governmental functions to smaller political units. Moreover, individual rights and liberties were of major importance. In contrast, the Turkish-Cypriot proposals focused on the limited functions of the federal authority and the enhanced sovereignty of the provinces (ibid., 81). In other words, the Turkish-Cypriot community was asking for a confederation, which would later on evolve into a federal system. As Necatigil argues, this process would take place through the growth of mutual trust and confidence (1977:31). This envisaged political system was termed by the Turkish-Cypriot community as a “federation by evolution” (Camp, 1980). Overall the Turkish-Cypriots held the view that a strong federal government would undermine the ‘independent’ status of the RoC, thus asking for a political system which would provide for a federated structure composed of two constituent states supported by their respective motherlands, Greece and Turkey (Theophanous, 2002). It is apparent, that even though the two sides have agreed that the island should have a federal system, a compromising solution has not been found yet. The most reasonable explanation for this occurrence is the profoundly different interpretation that each side attaches to the very concept of federalism. Both sides tend to define federalism in accordance with their own desired solution scheme. Hence, as Bahcelli asserts, the Greek-Cypriot definition of federation is one where the authority of the central government would extend all over the island, whereas the Turkish-Cypriot one is closely associated with their desire of either having a state of their own or alternatively settling for an arrangement that creates two sovereign albeit loosely connected states (2000: 207).

Epilogue

During the ensuing thirty-six year stalemate, six different UN Secretary-Generals and many more special representatives were given the task to promote a negotiated settlement in Cyprus. None of these efforts however, bore fruits. While in 1960 a power-sharing constitution created hopes for a lasting solution, the outbreak of fighting between the two communities falsified them all. Forty years later, however, the formation of the most comprehensive proposal for settlement since 1960, the so-called Annan Plan, proposed a

solution based on bizonal, bicomunal Federation. This proposal failed to produce a functional, alternative choice to the *status quo*, acceptable to both communities. All these failed diplomatic efforts raise a question of whether it is time to acknowledge and accept that the Cyprus problem must be considered as an intractable (although non-violent) and unsolvable conflict. A great number of academics have argued that the Cyprus problem could be dealt with either with acceptance of a federation - maybe of a loose form- or with a confederation scheme. Others choose partition and they go even further suggesting the continuation of the *status quo*, a solution which seems the most improbable due its unfavourable implications both on an emotional and economic level.

Some people claim that the *de facto* partition of the island and its consequences might mean that a confederation would prove to be the most viable solution. A confederation might reduce the need for compromises and the political costs for both communities, especially as far as the central government is concerned. Additionally, there would be two equal constituent states, while their separate national identities would be maintained. Even though this solution is viewed as the most appropriate by the Turkish-Cypriots, it is totally unacceptable to the Greek-Cypriots, who demand a genuine federated solution, with a strong central government with one sovereignty, a common citizenship and the respect of the three principal freedoms - that of movement, residence and property. Although federation might appear to be the most ideal solution for the Greek-Cypriots, it is still a solution that could be functional and viable only if other major problems were effectively tackled. Even if there was a much greater degree of convergence on issues of governance, there could still be no agreement that would deal effectively with non-constitutional matters such as the refugees, settlers and maybe guarantees. Thus, policies of substantial rapprochement would definitely become the stepping stone towards a more comprehensive and viable federated settlement. In concluding, either federation, confederation, partition or any other settlement, should derive directly from the will of both communities to find a solution, and not as a result of external pressure.

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POSTGRADUATE PROGRAM OF STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA

THESIS

(Summary of presentation)

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SUBJECT: *THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN CONFLICT-RESOLUTION:
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)*¹

Thessaloniki, 2011



¹ *Original language [Greek]: Ο ΡΟΛΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑΚΩΝ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΩΝ
ΣΤΗΝ ΕΠΙΛΥΣΗ ΣΥΓΚΡΟΥΣΕΩΝ:*

Ο ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΒΟΡΕΙΟ-ΑΤΛΑΝΤΙΚΟΥ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΥ (NATO)

Original Research Proposal at the PRIO Cyprus Center: A comparative study of the Cyprus Problem and the Kosovo Issue and their potential relation with a NATO-safety (security) provision solution.

The role of regional and international organizations in conflict resolution:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Vasilis KILIARIS

Abstract: The current Thesis main concept is to investigate the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) role in Conflict-Resolution. Furthermore it is sought to demonstrate the effect that International Regional Organizations have, and more specifically the one that the NATO has, in guaranteeing the Security pillar in the inquiry conflict case studies. The adopted methodology of this research work follows the hypothesis of *hegemonic norm* in the framework of the *international society of states* based on the approach of the English school of International Relations scientific paradigm as a suitable theory which can better explain the past and potentially the future. NATO evolved its strategy from a Transatlantic-European to a Global dimension. The legal/compatible status of the NATO with the United Nations Organization (UNO) is based on its inclusion in the collective self-defense system. Therefore, any forceful actions without a justification under Chapter VII of the Charter are prohibited, according to the international compulsory / mandatory law (*jus cogens*). The so called UN "franchising system" is located at the top of the crisis-management pyramid of armed conflicts, and a prominent position in its gallery is occupied by the NATO. The multilateral diplomacy takes place in a controlled environment based on a set of rules where the consensual decision-making at the highest administrative body of the Alliance, merges Great Powers' RealPolitik with the Idealistic equivalence of each member-state of the Covenant. Hence, whenever NATO reaches agreement, this is an expression of the collective will of twenty eight sovereign states. Implementing the NATO decision-making "method" is intended to bridle Hobbes' Leviathan imposing momentum, in the absence of a "global social contract", in the hegemony's military campaigns. Further analyzing the aforementioned teleology, of reconciling Realism with Idealism, we acknowledge the transformation of NATO, as a consequence of the collapse of communism and the USSR, from an organization / covenant of collective defense into an international society system of states of collective security and defense. This international society of 28 states is theoretically fulfilling the desirable Order of the English School of International Relations' scientific field. The NATO manages international high power political issues primarily in two ways in relation to the allegorical pendulum of the international society. In the first case either by consolidating an *ex ante* or *ex post* legitimate jurisdiction of international law, otherwise its member states are acting individually, out of any context of international law.

Key words *Security, NATO-led Peace Keeping Operations, intervention, Responsibility to Protect, sovereignty, conflict, pillars, franchising system, consensus, treaty, pact, UN Charter, jus cogens, international law, international society, English School, pendulum, spectrum, hegemony, order, peace.*

2491 Words

On NATO:

Foundation

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)² was founded on April 4, 1949 with the Washington Treaty³ and is consisted of 28 member states from North America and Europe. The origins of the Alliance are identified in the East-Soviet bloc threat against the security and the sovereignty of the mainly western European states as well as versus Greece and Turkey.⁴ The risk of expansion of the Communist Iron Curtain (Churchill, 1946)⁵ at the start of the Cold War was visible and real. During the period 1946-49 the civil war was raging in Greece while the communist guerillas were pursuing its absorption within the soviet sphere of influence at first and on the autonomy of a Macedonian communist state at the later.⁶ In Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) postulated to establish military bases in the Strait of Bosphorus.⁷ In Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia communist regimes had had been recently established.⁸

As a western diversion, the Brussels Treaty,⁹ which led to the founding of the Western European Union (WEU),¹⁰ was the initial step in the creation of the NATO in the following year.¹¹ While the strategy of containment of Soviet expansionism had the European continent as the main strategic priority area, at the peak of the Cold War and the West-East confrontation on the Korean peninsula and the namesake War of the period 1950-53, as a consequence this strategy evolved from a Transatlantic-European to a Global dimension.¹²

² The terms Covenant, Treaty, Organization and Alliance appear in rotation at the text with exactly the same meaning and they referred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, i.e. the NATO.

³ The North-Atlantic Treaty came into force on August 24, 1949 following the deposit of the signatories' ratifications. In Greece it was ratified by the Law 2001/1952, Government's Journal A' 45. For the official text of the Treaty:

Naskou-Perraki, P. (2005). *International (Law) Practice Texts*, v. 13, 2nd ed. Athina: Ant. N. Sakkoula. [In Greek]. pp. 707-712

⁴ NATO. (c2006). *NATO Handbook*. Brussels, BE: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, pp. 16-17.

⁵ The neologism "Iron Curtain" was first introduced by Winston Churchill in 1946 in his famous speech "Sinews of Peace" on March 5, 1946 where he was referring to the destruction of the sovereignty of the countries of Eastern Europe that were under the influence of the USSR. <http://www.hpil.org/churchill/> [19 December 2010]

⁶ Clogg, R. (2003). *A Concise History of Greece: 1770-2000*, 2nd ed. Athina: Katoptro. [In Greek]. pp. 167-169.

⁷ Zürcher, E. J. (2004). *Turkey: a modern history*, ed. Petmezaz, S., Athina: Alexandria. [In Greek]. pp. 277-279.

⁸ Veremis, T. (2004). *Balkans: from the 19th to the 21st century: construction and deconstruction of states*, Athina: Pataki. [In Greek]. pp. 75-76.

⁹ The Brussels Treaty on the Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation and Collective Self-Defence was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom on March 17, 1948 [came into force on August 25, 1948].

In Greece it was ratified by the Law 2179/1994, Government's Journal A' 7. For the official text of the Treaty: Naskou-Perraki, P. (2005). *Ibid* pp. 671-680.

¹⁰ The Brussels Treaty originally provided only to "Cooperation" between the signatory parties, through the consultative "Council of Western Union", and did not establish an international organization. The WEU was its transformation which is also referred to as the Brussels Treaty Organization. Today, its vast majority of powers have been transferred to the NATO and the EU.

Naskou-Perraki, P. (b2005). *The Law of International Organizations: its institutional dimension*, 4th ed., Athina: Ant. N. Sakkoula. [In Greek]. pp. 330-333 & 338-342.

¹¹ Korean war caused a leading rift between these two coalitions of states and ideologies.

NATO. (c2006). *Ibid* p. 17

¹² Calvocoressi, P. (2004). *International Politics: 1945-2000*, Athina: Touriki, K. [In Greek]. p. 54.

Legality/Compatibility NATO: UNO

The legal/compatible status of the NATO with the United Nations Organization (UNO) is based on its inclusion in the collective self-defense system under Chapter VII, Article 51¹³ of the Charter of the United Nations (UN).¹⁴ The reference in this article on the inherent right of collective self-defense is the legal basis of the Washington Treaty to which Article 5 of the NATO Treaty explicitly leaves the legality of its substance.¹⁵

Article 51 even though the initial deliberations of the UN conference in San Francisco for the international organization had been intended to fall within Chapter VIII under the relevant title ***Local Agreements***, eventually it was split "by this group of provisions and included in the previous Chapter VII [...] precisely in order to gain some autonomy".¹⁶ Falling under the relevant heading ***Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression***, article 51 get one absolute use of the "natural" right of individual or collective self-defense by the Member States of the Organization in all cases of *armed attack* against them, with a right of implementation that lasts forever, i.e. the exercise of the right of defense is continuous, regardless of whether or not other provisions of the UN Charter exist for the same reason at all.¹⁷

¹³ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, ***Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression***, Article 51:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml> [11 December 2010]

¹⁴ The Charter of the UN was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945 [came into force on October 24, 1945] in the end of the united nations-states' conference for the "international organization". Initially it was founded by 51 countries. At the time compiling these lines, the UNO is consisted by 192 member-states, thus underlining the UN as the only truly global organization, both conceptually and factually. In Greece it was ratified by the Law 585/1945, Government's Journal A' 242 & 286 and the Ministerial Decision 5.3.1973, Government's Journal A' 77. For the official text of the Treaty: Naskou-Perraki, P. (2005). Ibid pp. 19-53.

¹⁵ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, Article 5:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [11 December 2010]

¹⁶ Koufa, K. K. (1975). *On Regional Form of Organization of the International Society*, PhD Dissertation, Thessaloniki. [In Greek]. p. 91.

¹⁷ Stone, J. (1952). International Law and International Society, *The Canadian Bar Review*, v. 30, p. 244, ref. in Koufa, K. K. (1975). Ibid p. 127.

The reference of the aforementioned article in an *armed attack* is underlined to avoid any misinterpretations. The lessons of the past, with a focus on the inertia and inability of the League of Nations during the interwar period (1919-1939) which led to the Second World War (1939-1945) with the millions of victims' massacre,¹⁸ in principle of the content of Article 51 are heard. Nevertheless, the predominantly paralysis of the functionality of the Security Council (SC) of the UN during the Cold War period (1945-1989)¹⁹ and the potential conversion of a sui generis case, where a state or group of states have the right of self-defense with the use of military force, into a general rule of international law is essential to clarify. Therefore, any forceful actions without a justification under Chapter VII of the Charter are prohibited, according to the international compulsory / mandatory law (*jus cogens*).²⁰

Ideally, the UN under the customarily procedure of Mandates assign, as a rule, on ad hoc coalitions of states or via International Regional Organizations (IRO), the implementation of any necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. These enforcement measures invoked whenever acts against peace and acts of aggression occur against a member-state of the organization. This so called UN "franchising system",²¹ based on the principles of the Charter, the Resolutions of the SC and the Resolutions of the General Assembly (GA) of the UN, is located at the top of the crisis-management pyramid of armed conflicts, and a prominent position in its gallery is occupied by the NATO.

The NATO is categorized as an IRO having the nature of a *Local Agreement* for the geographical region of the north Atlantic. The NATO's main objective is to maintain the international peace and security in consistent with the three Purposes and the seven Principles of the UN.²² Any activity undertaken is required to comply with

¹⁸ Carr. E. (2001). *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Athina: Piotita, pp. 285-287.

¹⁹ The UN Peacekeeping Missions-Operations (UN PKO) of the period 1948-88 were 15; on the contrary from 1988 up to date there has been a dramatic increase from five (5) ongoing classical-traditional type of PKO in 1988 to 17 in 1994, of which eight (8) falls under the new Multi-Dimension Missions (M-D PKO) doctrine of the UN PKO. Today the UN is folding along the globe with 15 PKO, including the five classical, among which is the United Nations peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In the modern M-D PKO dimension is included the United Nations interim administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Ghali, B. B. (1995). "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations", 3 January 1995, SC Doc A/50/60 - S/1995/1, in *An Agenda for Peace*, 2nd ed., New York, United Nations, p. (11)

& Appendix I: *List of UN Peace-Keeping Operations 1948-2010*

²⁰ On the "obligation" dimension, *jus cogens* refers to an international legal rule – generally one of customary law, though perhaps one codified in treaty form – that creates an especially strong legal obligation, such that it cannot be overridden even by explicit agreement among states.

Abbott, K. W. et al. (c2006). "The Concept of Legalization" in Simmons, B.A. & Steinberg, R.H., *International law and international relations*, Cambridge, England ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p.116n.2

²¹ Simma, B. (1999). "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects", *European Journal of International Law*, v. 10, p. 4.

²² Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, *Purposes and Principles*, Article 1:

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. *To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;*

the obligations of its member-states to the UN, with the later, beyond the general principle of hierarchy, prevailing also on a basis of its statute and rules on any local agreement such as the NATO. In any case, a SC Resolution is sine qua non for any *coercive measures* taken in any hierarchical level, with the solitary valid exception concerning the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense, which was analyzed in article 51 afore.²³ As such we refer to any legitimate coercion, including collective self-defense, measures of *demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations*.²⁴

A prominent principal-agent case study is the SC Resolution 1973/2011²⁵ on the basis of which the NATO is implementing an ongoing air exclusion zone in Libya. This is an air force coercive operation that has its origins on the neologism Responsibility to Protect.²⁶

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2. *To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;*
 3. *To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and*

To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends

Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, **Purposes and Principles**, Article 2:

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. *The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.*
2. *All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.*
3. *All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.*
4. *All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*
5. *All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.*
6. *The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.*
7. *Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.*

<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> [12 December 2010]

²³ Koufa, K. K. (1975). Ibid pp. 111-116.

²⁴ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 42:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> [12 December 2010]

²⁵ S/RES/1973 (2011), §4, 8, 9, on 17 March 2011

²⁶ *If the "humanitarian intervention" is indeed an unacceptable abuse of the (state) sovereignty, (then) how should we react to a (potential new) Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - against flagrant and systematic violations of human rights that offend every sense of our common human nature?*

Furthermore, the solely case ever a NATO member state invoked Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty was on the post-mark of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America (USA) soil, prompted by the fundamentalist Islamic Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda's terrorist network which had its core there. The Allies expressed their political and military solidarity towards the USA, culminating the formation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission led by the NATO in Afghanistan.²⁷ In contrast, it was only in 2003 with the UN SC Resolution 1510 that the United States-United Kingdom (US-UK) led mission with the code name *Operation Enduring Freedom* was legitimated with a clause in paragraph 2 where a *cooperation and further interaction with the ISAF* is being called.²⁸

Leveraging NATO's dogmatic past

Leveraging the recent past, on the aftermath of the abolition of the Soviet threat, hence eliminating the ontological cause of existence of the NATO, we acknowledge the origins of the ongoing debate on the new doctrine / agenda of the Alliance. Restating the main concept and the purposes for a continuation of the existence of the Organization became a necessity, and for that reason with the "London Declaration in 1990, the NATO transformed".²⁹ In principle of article 5 of its founding treaty, the NATO continues providing for the common defense of its member-states. Furthermore, with the accession in the NATO's core [North Atlantic Council (NAC)] and peripheral structure [Partnership for Peace (PfP)] of the former totalitarian regimes in eastern and southeastern Europe, NATO is becoming a stakeholder of the *New Europe* construction. Moreover, the NATO is seeking a democratic deepening and further expansions of the well established western bourgeois liberal democracy. The political pillar as well as the individual dimension of security advanced with the Washington Declaration in April 1999, where the new NATO doctrine was announced. Human security and asymmetric threats were the new terms included in this dogma, while the international terrorism enrolled in the fields of actions of the Alliance, producing into a self-fulfilling prophecy the air-jacked terrorist attacks on the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington two years later. Moreover, in the last summit for the new dogma of the NATO in 2010 in Lisbon, a focus on the micro level of security of the Alliance was re-introduced, i.e. Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation becomes a vital priority in the new strategic concept, and a re-opening to the east, i.e. Russia through the upgraded NATO-Russia council, and generally strengthening the ties, cooperation and enhanced liaison with other International Organizations such as the European Union (EU) as well as the UN is urged.³⁰ The opportunities and threats of the new Alliance doctrine, inter alia France's re-accession in the military branch and the evolving gapping between the USA and her European allies in utilizing effectively IT

Kofi Annan UN G-S statement in 2000, ref. in Evans, J. G. (2008). *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All*, Massachusetts: The Brookings Institution, p. 31.

²⁷ ISAF was formatted on the basis of the UN SC Resolutions: S/RES/1386 (2001), S/RES/1413 (2002), S/RES/1444 (2002)

²⁸ S/RES/1510 (2003), §2

²⁹ Naskou-Perraki, P. (b2005). Ibid pp. 342-346.

³⁰ Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon on November 20, 2010.

technology and new rapid reaction forces along with maneuver war tactics in the battle field are addressed.³¹

Internal Multilateral diplomacy

The multilateral diplomacy takes place in a controlled environment based on a set of rules where the consensual decision-making at the highest administrative body of the Alliance, i.e. the NAC, merges Great Powers' RealPolitik, e.g. USA, UK, France and Germany, with the Idealistic equivalence of each member-state of the Covenant. Hence, whenever NATO reaches agreement, this is an expression of the collective will of twenty eight sovereign states.³² Thus, the causes of the US invasion in Iraq in February 2003, that was contacted unilaterally and not under the NATO auspices, tend to be more transparent.³³ Nevertheless, the American leadership managed to accomplish its *raison d'Etat* in the region of the Gulf by decapitating Saddam Hussein's regime only after organizing a so called Coalition of the Willing.³⁴ This military campaign, that is well known as the second Gulf War with the synonymous code-name "Operation Iraqi Freedom", was a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, a fact though that has no affect in any way NATO itself as a distinct international organization (IO).³⁵

³¹ Farrell, T. and Rynning, S. (2010). "NATO's Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences and the War in Afghanistan", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33: 5, pp. 695-697.

³² NATO. (c2006). Ibid p. 33

³³ France and Belgium raised a threat of veto in the Military Committee, in the process of the tacit approval for military aid to Turkey pending an attack against Iraq, a position which Germany supported as well.

Archick, K. & Gallis, P. (2004). RL32342 Report for Congress, *NATO and the European Union*, Congressional Research Service-The Library of (the USA) Congress (CRS), April 6, 2004, p. 7[CRS-4] http://www.policyalmanac.org/world/archive/nato_and_european_union.pdf [17 December 2010]

³⁴ The Coalition of the Willing according to the White House during Bush presidency was comprised by 48 UN member-states.

<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327-10.html> [17 December 2010]

IN addition: Appendix II: *Coalition of the Willing – Iraqi invasion, March 2003*

³⁵ In September, 2004, ex-General Secretary of the UN Kofi Annan stated "(Yes), [the War] I have indicated it is not in conformity with the UN Charter, from our point of view, and from the Charter point of view it was illegal." UN News Center, *Lessons of Iraq war underscore importance of UN Charter*, 16 September 2004.

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=11953&Cr=iraq&Cr1> [17 December 2010]

Regional international system of collective security and defense

International society system of states

Implementing the previous described NATO decision-making “method” is intended to bridle Hobbes’ Leviathan imposing momentum,³⁶ in the absence of a “global social contract”,³⁷ in the hegemony’s military campaigns. According to the theory of *hegemonic stability*, in the context of global and regional multilateral organization and the structures of diplomacy³⁸ (UNO & NATO), medium-size allies (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain) surrounding one major power (U.S.A.) “may [...] achieve acting their counterweight role or critical alert position better, without which the unipolar structure of the international system is endangering to lead to unilateralism, especially when the great power has not yet chosen isolationism”.³⁹ On the contrary, as demonstrated previously in the case of Iraq, whenever a consensus is not possible to achieve, the hegemonic power is acting unilaterally and not in the framework of the system of collective security, thus in NATO.

Further analyzing the afore mentioned teleology, of reconciling Realism with Idealism, we acknowledge the transformation of NATO, as a consequence of the collapse of communism and the USSR, from an organization / covenant of collective defense into an *international society system of states*⁴⁰ of *collective security and defense*.⁴¹

Attempting to clarify this teleology we incorporate in this analysis the *spectrum of international society of states*⁴² where the international systems through Man’s history are classified, beginning with the 1st Sumerian state system up to the modern uni-multi polar system of states, from “one more integrated imperial [far right] to [...]one more fragmented multi-independence aggregations [far left]”.⁴³

³⁶ Hobbes’ Leviathan justifies the absolute sovereignty of the ONE, i.e. the monarch, who in this analysis potentially is the one and only absolute great power, i.e. the U.S.A.

For a graphical representation of the Biblical monster and its political philosophy mapping

See Appendix III: *Reining Leviathan*

³⁷ Bull, H. (2001). *The anarchic society: a study of order in world politics*, eds. Kouskouvelis, H. I. and P. Ifestos, Athens: Quality. [In Greek]. p. 17.

In Addition: Ifestos, P. (2003). *International Relations as a subject of scientific study in Greece and abroad: route, subject, content and epistemic background*, Athens: Quality. [In Greek]. p. 95.

³⁸ We refer to institutions with the same conceptual meaning of the rule and the mean:

“Like all systems or organizations, collective security is both a rule and a mean”.

Spyropoulos, G. M. (2010). *International relations. Realistic approach. Theory and Practice*, Athina: Quality. [In Greek]. p. 341.

³⁹ Ibid p. 322

⁴⁰ The term “*international society system of states*” refers to the words “state system» (Wight, 1966:35, Butterfield, 1965 ref. in Watson, 2006:24-25) and “international society» (Bull, 1977:11) with the same significance, content and meaning [see footnote 41]. Additionally, in his introductory note to the Anarchic Society, Professor Panayiotis Ifestos states that “[T]he ‘state system’ by Hedley Bull, is developed in an ‘anarchic international society of (sovereign) states’”, see Bull, H. (2001). ref. p. 17

⁴¹ We refer to collective security and defense under the new doctrine / agenda of NATO.

[see footnote 40].

⁴² For a diagrammatic representation of *the spectrum (pendulum) of international society of states* based on the assumption of the hegemonic norm as given in the introductory note of Buzan B. and Little R. in Watson, A. (2009). *The evolution of international society: a comparative historical analysis*, New York: Routledge, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

See Appendix IV: *Allegorical International Society Pendulum*

⁴³ Watson, A. (2006). *The evolution of international society: a comparative historical analysis*, eds. Papatiririou, H. & P. Ifestos (2006). Athens: Quality. [In Greek]. p. 51.

On both ends, the pendulum swings between anarchism and totalitarianism, thus in the middle of the spectrum finds its origins the commonly named hypothesis of the hegemonic norm.⁴⁴ This assumption ranks in the middle of the spectrum of the so called Hegemonic Concert (or multiple hegemonies). This audacious statement implies a natural order of things in world history where the hegemonic type of the international systems tends to be the norm in states' international affairs.⁴⁵

The argument of this case is partly based on the systemic approach of Structural Realism theory of International Relations. According to this theoretical perception, the states in any international system are acknowledged having as their foremost ontological cause of existence to retain their independence and sovereignty.⁴⁶ The states seek to maximize their chances of survival and hypostatic continuity as well as to maintain their relative power.

Further developing this argument is indicated that states major objective is achieved more effectively in a state of affairs of anarchy. This line of reasoning ends with the conclusion that, in addition to independence, these international actors pursues international order which is more effectively achieved under a state of affairs of imperialism. Consequently, the international political units are ambivalent between hammer and anvil. Therefore, aiming on the clarity of this issue of balancing the hegemonic pendulum, the stability of the international system is only achieved when we contextually integrate the concept of international society.⁴⁷

Power-Security-Order

Considering that the idealistic cooperation is reflected on the one side of the coin of international relations, the realistic power is illustrated on the other side. Similarly, while the universal dimension depicts the peaceful conflict resolution process, the realistic approach shines the military intervention for conflict resolution.

It has long been ascertained in great concern that the interstate relations are consumed in wars, rivalries and conflicts as well as to intrastate clashes.⁴⁸ Taking this argument into consideration, military hard power politics is equivalent with the hard currency of international politics. Referring to this strong currency of international relations, having as its crown to ensure peace and security in the area of responsibility of the organization, NATO is located in the right end of the spectrum which brings together the hard-power politics' IRO.⁴⁹

NATO's catalytic role is to produce the required forces to mobilize the necessary political will and genuine military participation of its member-states in the NATO-led Peace Keeping Operations round the globe.

⁴⁴ *Norm* is interpreted with the sense of the model/pattern, the recurrent rule.

⁴⁵ Buzan B. and Little R. In Watson, A. (2009). *Ibid.* p. xxiii

⁴⁶ Waltz, K. N. (2001). *Man, the State and War: a theoretical analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 159-161.

⁴⁷ Watson, A. (2009). *Ibid.* p. xxv

⁴⁸ Kouloumbis, T. (1985). in Kouloumbis, T., Koufa, K., Svolopoulos, *Introduction to the International Society Organization*, Thessaloniki: Sakkoula, pp. 89-91.

⁴⁹ Evans, J. G. (2008). *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All*, Massachusetts: The Brookings Institution, p. 190.

In the opposite direction, to the left of the spectrum, are placed the soft power politics' IRO who are primarily involved with issues such as culture-education-science (UNESCO), migration (IOM), labor (ILO) and process / handling matters (IATA).

Consequently, this international society⁵⁰ of 28 states is theoretically fulfilling the desirable Order of the English School of International Relations' scientific field.⁵¹

As characteristically summarized in the seminal writings of Professor Hedley Bull in "his" *Anarchical Society*:

*Order as opposed to disorder (anarchy⁵²) [...] is defined as an actual or potential condition or state of affairs [...] (focusing) on continuing problems of human's political organization or institutions [...] (considering) order as a situation which could be found and had been existed independently of international law and international organization.*⁵³

Conclusion

In conclusion, as stated earlier about shifting the boundaries of the international management system from one more central to one closer to the right end of the spectrum, the United States, being an authentically superpower through her leadership in the hegemonic concert of the global system of states, in the framework of the common interests and shared values within an international society of twenty-eight international actors member-states of the NATO, manages international high power political issues primarily in two ways in relation to the allegorical pendulum of the international society:

1. In the first case, the American leadership rotates in the vicinity of the hegemonic medium whenever is implementing international military interventions that have either an ex ante or ex post legitimate jurisdiction of international law.
2. Otherwise, the U.S. deviate from the middle of the spectrum with enforcement trends of authoritarianism and acting as an autonomous surrogate of the international system of states out of any context of international law.

⁵⁰ According to Hedley Bull:

A Society of States - International Society – exists, when a group of states being conscious of specific common interests and shared values shape a society in the sense that they perceive themselves to be linked to a common set of rules binding their relations and to participate in the functioning of common institutions.

Bull, H. (2001). *ibid* p. 51

⁵¹ Professor Stanley Hoffman refers, fore wording *The Anarchical Society* as the most representative work of the English school of international relations theory, that "the originality of this approach is that it considers international relations as a complex set of relationships between states that constitute an international society and not only a system of states".

Bull, H. (2001). *ibid* p. 21.

⁵² International Anarchy in the sense of "de-centralized political power"

Spyropoulos. G. M. (2010). p. 195

⁵³ *Ibid* pp. 31-35.

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Executive Summary of the Paper entitled: "European Integration and the Limits of the Realist Paradigm: The Case of Cyprus Membership in the EU"

Cyprus Membership in the EU and its impact on international politics

The aim of this paper is to point out the theoretical challenges that the political and institutional development of the European Union poses to the neo-realist paradigm. The structural realists assumptions that: a) small and militarily weak states are not able to exercise any significant influence on international politics, b) that stable and durable international co-operation is not possible due to the fear of relevant gains and c) that international institutions serve the interests of the most powerful states, do not seem to stand within the context of European integration. By using the example of a small and militarily weak state like the Republic of Cyprus, this paper argues that a small state due to its membership in the complex transnational political system of the EU, can exercise significant influence on international politics. Furthermore, this paper claims that thanks to Cyprus membership in the EU, there is still prospect for a fair and viable resolution of the political problem of the island. In order to support these argument this paper will first present the basic points of the neo-realist theory and its explanation of European integration before moving on to present a short history of the Cyprus issue and an account of Euro-Cypriot relations. Then this paper will outline the most recent developments on the island, as far as the resolution of its problem is concerned, and any prospects for resolution that those developments entail. In the last part, the conclusions of this study will be presented focusing mainly on their theoretical and policy implications.

Neorealism and European Integration

Neorealism assumes that states are sovereign unitary rational actors that interact in an anarchic international system characterised by zero-

sum self-help competition. As a result, they draw a strict division between domestic and international politics and they do not attach any significance to international institutions. International institutions are viewed by neo-realists as mirrors of states' interests. As a consequence, according to neo-realism a powerful state, not to mention a unipolar one, thanks to its position in the structure of the international system, allocated to her by its power accumulation in its effort to achieve security, can interpret international law as it suits itself. This state behavior is due to the anarchical nature of the international system. Within this context, '...realists have noticed that whether institutions have strong or weak effects depends on what states intend. Strong states use institutions, as they interpret laws, in ways that suit them' (Waltz,2000: 24). In other words, in neo-realist international politics there is no a "theory of justice" to be followed. Close interstate cooperation is unlikely in the fear of unequal gains and autarky is the recipe for survival (Waltz, 1979:106). 'What is crucial for the Realist is that the imperatives of power are in some sense objectively given in a way that is not dependent on people's theories about right and wrong' (Frost: 93: 62). As a consequence, states will not voluntarily resort to close co-operation with each other and even more, will never willingly surrender sovereignty to international institutions. Stone notes that: 'neorealism is a theory of why, in international political society, the establishment of stable norms is either unlikely or impossible, why formal institutions do not develop meaningful autonomy, and therefore why a constitutional international regime is unimaginable' (1994:449).

Small states on the other hand, despite their willingness to safeguard their independence they consider wise to transfer aspects of it to international institutions following a cost-benefit analysis (Waltz, 1979:106). They do so in their effort to survive or in order to feel secure. Due to their weakness, small states cannot exert any significant influence on the international political system. Robert Keohane, a liberal who in his later work within the framework of neo-liberalism, accepted many theoretical assumptions of neo-realism, defines a small state as "a state whose leaders consider that it can never acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system" (1969:296). As a result,

small states, despite the fact that they are aware that international institutions serve the interests of the most powerful states, are becoming members of them in order to feel secure or in order to avoid direct attack from bigger states. This bandwagoning policy by small states is the most reasonable route they can take in the anarchical and thus uncertain international system (Walt:2002). As a result, neo-realism would not expect from small EU member states to exercise any influence not only in the EU policy making but also in its external relations. For neo-realism power capabilities determine outcomes.

Neo-Realism and European Integration

For neo-realists, European integration during the Cold War was viewed 'as a mechanism for interstate co-operation that fulfilled the survival imperatives of a group of western European states in the context of an emerging bipolar order' (Rosamond: 2000:133). Waltz alleges that the European great powers refrained from co-operating with each other in the interwar period (1919-1939) because they were afraid of asymmetrical gains. Bipolarity, Waltz argues, ended this problem of mistrust between the western European states. This is not to say that all impediments to co-operation were removed but that an important one was. The fear was that greater advantages for one would be translated into military force to be used against the others. This can be attributed to the fact that 'living in a superpowers shadow', Britain, France, Germany and Italy quickly realised that war among them would be pointless. This was justified on the grounds that the security of all of them came to depend ultimately on the policies of others rather than their own (Waltz: 1979:70-1).

For neo-realists, the disintegration of the Warsaw pact and the resulting power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe was perceived as a preamble to conflict and instability. They expected the disappearance of the super-power rivalry from Europe would make co-operation among the European states difficult since they would begin to view each other with greater fear and suspicion and they would be worry about the imbalances in gains and the loss of autonomy resulting from integration. Consequently, European integration would not move further (Waltz:

1993:69). As a result, Mearsheimer argues that with the end of the Cold War Europe would be multipolar, with four or five major European powers, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Russia, and several minor defining the system (1990:7).

The prospects, therefore, for major crises and war in Europe would be very likely to increase significantly (Mearsheimer 1990:6). Neither the EU, nor any other international institution nor the spread of democracy can avert this situation (1990:47-48). In contrast, EU's rapprochement with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will be perceived by Russia as a relative gain and may foster an arms competition in the region (1990:45). Neo-realists reject the argument put forward since the end of the Cold War that peace can be maintained in a multipolar Europe on the basis of a more powerful EC/EU (Mearsheimer: 1990:48). For them a 'back to pre- Second World War period' is the most likely scenario for the future of European security.

In contrast to the neorealist predictions, however, peace and stability was maintained in post-Cold War Europe, with the exception of the internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Co-operation between the EC/EU and the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe has intensified and many of them applied for EU membership and eventually joined it. Malta and the Republic of Cyprus also joined the EU. Furthermore, the unification of Germany did not have the destabilizing effects on the continent that might have been expected due to the unequal increase of German power in relation to the other European states, contrary to neorealist expectations. Instead, integration among the EC/EU members has been intensified as manifested in 1992 with the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) or the Maastricht Treaty, with its subsequent amendment in 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty (AMT), in 2001 with the Nice Treaty and in 2010 with the Lisbon/Reform Treaty. The fact that post-Cold War relations amongst the European countries have remained peaceful and open, and economic integration and institutionalized co-operation have actually expanded in very important areas has encouraged many scholars to present the EU as a stabilizing force for the continent.

All these developments constitute a theoretical puzzle for neo-realism. Furthermore, this theoretical puzzle becomes more intense if someone considers Cyprus membership in the EU bearing in mind that its population size, its military power and its severe bilateral problems with a very powerful regional power like Turkey would prevent it from making any impact on European Union domestic and external policies and EU international relations in general. Despite these neo-realists expectations, however, what is observed is that Cyprus can still pursue its national interests by evoking international law, human rights and international norms.

“Small” EU Member States and Neo-Realism

These developments are not expected by neo-realists at any point. A small state like the Republic of Cyprus, 38% of the territory of which is illegally occupied by Turkish troops, by becoming a member of the EU, an institution where also neo-realist do not expect to allow the Republic of Cyprus, to exert any influence, has managed to greatly influenced the foreign policy of a major regional military, economic and diplomatic power like Turkey.

The behavior of the Republic of Cyprus over that particular issue is an indication that its foreign policy has more freedom of manoeuvre in relation to its condition before accession to the EU. This is undoubtedly due to “the regulation of interstate relations through EU rules and institutions (that) radically modifying the small states’ traditional security problems (Thorhallson and Wivel, 2008: 651).

At the same time, small states, despite the fact that they face structural disadvantages due to their limited voting and bargaining power, can exert influence in the agenda setting and policy formulating process of the EU (See, Magnet and Nicolaidis, 2005, Tilikainen, 2006). They overcome those structural disadvantages by promoting institutionalized co-ordination on a regional basis and by formulating strategic partnerships with bigger states (Panke, 2008:8).

As a result, “size” asymmetries between states members of the EU do have an impact on politics in Europe but power and size is not the only

determinant of policy outcomes as neo-realism would argue. “Whether and EU member state is “big” or “small” is not always clear – cut. It depends on whether we look at population size, potential or actual influence on the integration process and its institutions, or how the states in question view their own role and influence in the EU (Thorhallson and Wivel, 2008: 653). In other words, neo-realists determinants of state behavior like power capabilities, anarchy and mistrust do not seem to stand within the context of European integration. European integration provides a clear evidence for a diminishing explanatory power of neo-realism not to mention its claim for primacy in the study of European international relations. This fact, confirms Grieco’s claim that “the most powerful way to test a theory is to determine if the propositions derived from it hold in the circumstances in which they are unlikely to do so, and in which comparable but divergent propositions from competing theories very much ought to be validated” (Grieco: 1997)

New Prospects for a Settlement of the Cyprus Issue

Thus, a successful settlement of the Cyprus issue will be for the interest not only for the two communities that live on the island but for the international community as a whole. At the same time, the Republic of Cyprus, despite its size and capabilities, for the first time in its foreign policy history thanks to its participation in the EU, has acquired the ability to exert influence on the international political developments, at least as long as its problem is concerned. In other words, the Republic of Cyprus, is no longer dependent on the balance of power politics of its near abroad and is not afraid in the degree before its accession to the EU, that the invasion of 1974 will continue to the rest of the island by the military and economic giant that still occupies 38% of its territory. This feeling of security will allow her to pursue and negotiate a better solution for its problem that will enable both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to live and prosper in a stable and democratic political environment. In that way none of the composite communities will be overwhelmed by the feeling of an imposed solution and a referendum will not take the form of a safe valve of refusal, but will be turned into

demonstration of the free will of both communities to live together far away from “guarantees” and far away from the fear of intervention from any party. The free democratic choice of both communities will provide the basis of a “social contract” in the form of mutually and voluntarily accepted constitution that will ensure the basis of peaceful and constructive symbiosis between them. To this end, however, some basic prerequisites should be provided. Political determination of all parties concerned, increase of social and economic interactions between the two communities, gradual and symbolic withdrawal of Turkish occupational forces before the new referendum day and a democratic debate and presentation of the proposed constitution for a much longer period than its previous draft.