

Title:**Political logics and the emergence of the policies of discrimination against the Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace**

In this paper tells an untold story, exploring the emergence of a secret project intended to intervene in the power-relations in Greek Thrace, to increase control over minority groups and institutions, and even to alter the ethnic composition of the region. We do that by exploring the archive of a secret institution that operated in Thrace during the 1960's subjected to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. This institution – named the 'Coordination Council of Thrace' - was constituted by high rank political, military, police and intelligence authorities and had the authority to “transfer from the central administration to Thrace, but also to listen and transfer from Thrace to the central administration”.¹

This project this institutions applied, tried for the first time since 1923 in such an organized way to disrupt the expansion of Turkish national discourse among minority members and to shift their identification from a religious-based one to a national Turkish-based one. It also opened a dreadful period in relations between the minority and the Greek state, which was marked by the measures of administrative harassment that characterized Greek policy towards the minority until the 1990s.

The policies that were developed by the Greek administration pointed in two directions at the same time. Within the principle of reciprocity, on the one hand the policies were characterized by efforts to introduce a frontier against the part of the minority that had accepted Turkish national discourse, trying to limit its operation and influence. Therefore, Kemalist teachers were restricted and disciplinary actions against them were increased, signs or teaching material in Turkish were banned, control of “Turkish” unions was increased, areas with a declared Turkish population lost its benefits and by the end, all purchases of land or buildings were banned for the “Turks”. These were followed by expropriation or occupation of their lands, restrictions of their economic activity and other measures.

On the other hand, the Greek administration tried to promote alternative subjectivities and increase its links with them, albeit with little success. One of those alternatives was the traditional Islamism that had deep roots among the minority members going right back to the Ottoman past. However, during the 1960s, traditional Islamism was in deep decline so efforts were focused on the “Pomak policy”. As a result, for the first time a coherent policy to construct a “Pomak identity” and to separate ethnic Pomaks from the minority was applied. Moreover, Islamic identification was promoted amongst both Turkish and Pomak speakers, treating them as one group, through the support of religion in minority education – for example, by the promotion of the Arabic alphabet, the fostering of graduates from religious schools, the building of mosques and the funding of Islamic unions.

¹ Original emphasis. Minister of Foreign Affairs (Averof), Confidential Order D.940-16, Athens 16 May 1962, 'Archive of Foreign and Minority Schools', G.A.K. “Kavala, F.10”. In this role, the chair of the CCT had regular contact with the MFA, receiving orders and guidance or giving information. Coordination Council of Thrace, 24th session, 11 June 1962, 'Archive of Foreign and Minority Schools', G.A.K. (Kavala), F.10, p.8.

From all the policies that the Greek administration put forward in the post-war period we see a clear quantitative and qualitative shift in the years after 1965. This was both in the amount of money allocated to the various areas of its intervention and in the areas where its projects were expanded. This shift can be explained by a variety of factors that have to do not only with the development of the hegemonic battle inside Thrace but also with ethnic homogenization processes inside Turkey and Greek-Turkish relations. In the first case, the numerical boost of the minority population in Thrace and the increased influence of the Modernist camp – supported by Turkey - alarmed the Greek authorities, who responded with more exclusionary policies. At the same time, Turkish repressive policies against the Greek-Orthodox minorities were met with the application of counter-measures in Thrace and with debates about the autonomous character of the minority issue in Thrace as one of “national security”.

The shift of 1964-66 and the program of land purchasing

The new feature that appears in the secret discourse of the secret council operating in Thrace is the program “of colonization of Thrace and of increasing the Greek element”. The project was conceived in the autumn of 1965 and started being applied during the next period. This shift and the conception of the new project came during a period when, on one hand the Turkish government received a series of repressive measures against its Greek-Orthodox minorities, while at the same time a secret census in Thrace showed a considerable increase of the local Muslim population.

Between the summers of 1964 and 1965 in Greek-Orthodox minority schools in Istanbul any distribution of Greek books or the celebration of any religious holidays was forbidden, as was the import of any Greek newspapers. Moreover applications for building a new school were turned down, a number of directors and teachers were fired and the appointment of new teachers who had studied in Greece was stopped. Finally, with the law passed in 1967, the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate had far less autonomy for managing its religious properties.²

These events caused a major disruption in the established order that had been formulated in the four-pole relation between the two states and the two respective minorities. This had major implications for the application of *reciprocity* as the regulatory pattern for the treatment of the minority in Thrace. As the chair of the Council put it in one of the meetings,

With the reasons that might have justified our tactics up today vanishing – at least in a great extend -, and further due to reasons of national security, there is a need to draw a new line, and this is a decision by the Government.³

At the time when the Greek-Orthodox minority in Istanbul was significantly decreasing, a secret census in Thrace revealed that the minority population was increasing so that in some areas (like the region of Rhodope) it constituted more than half the total population. It was this rapid change in the numerical balance between

² Alexandris, "To Istoriko plaisio", 513-14.

³ Chairman of the Coordination Council of Thrace (Koukourides), 42nd Session, 4 February 1966, 'Archive of Foreign and Minority Schools', G.A.K. (Kavala), F.10.

the two minorities (upon which the 'principle of reciprocity' was grounded) that gave the inspiration for the program of land purchases begun in the autumn of 1965.⁴

One result of this disruption was that in 1967 the secret Council directed more than half of its significantly increased budget to the "Program of land purchases" while local state services had been secretly receiving financial support for the application of the same program for the previous year. The decisions that were taken in the summer of 1966 - reflecting debates started during the previous year - aimed to "assist the Greek element" of Thrace and to drive the local Muslim population into emigrating from Thrace.

A large amount of money was allocated in the 1967 budget for individuals funded by the state to buy land owned by local Muslims. At the same time the program anticipated that in the new settlements of ethnic Greeks created after purchase, and in mixed villages where Muslims and Christians co-existed, new schools and churches would be built with funds secretly given by the Greek administration. By 1969 the program had been extended to houses for Greek teachers in minority schools and included grants for different kinds of cultural activities and associations, with the anticipation that "Greekness" would be promoted.

The areas of the Pomaks - located in the mountain areas of Xanthi and Rhodope and therefore geographically separated from the rest of the minority areas - were explicitly excluded from this project. At the same time as restrictive policies against the majority of the minority were being developed, a specific "Pomak policy" was formulated for the Pomak areas. The traditional Muslims who were cooperating with the Greek authorities, such as those in the Union of Muslim Teachers, were also excluded from any negative measure and assistance for them was maintained. Therefore, the focus of the program was the vast majority of the minority population who were regarded as 'Turks'.

The main purpose of the program was to reduce the minority population in Thrace by giving them no other option than to emigrate, while increasing the numbers of ethnic Greeks, giving them assistance to take over the economic life of the region and strengthening their patriotism. In other words, the program aimed at 'ethnic cleansing' without the use of violence. The Cyprus conflict and the existence of several thousand Greeks in Istanbul, together with the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate should be viewed as reasons why the effort to reduce the minority population in Thrace did not use more violent means.

This effort - approved by the Prime Minister and the members of the Cabinet - included administrative measures against minority members, such as long delays in application procedures for buying new property, or for building or repairing houses, etc. At the same time local ethnic Greeks would be given state-funded loans to enable them to purchase properties owned by minority members, since the administrative measures were expected to boost sales. It was expected that these measures would increase the already high rates of emigration by minority members to Turkey or to North Europe and that their numbers in Thrace would thereby be reduced. At the same time, ethnic Greeks would 'mix' the areas with pure minority population and they would be encouraged to dominate the economic and social life of Thrace. The

⁴ Coordination Council of Thrace, 41st session, 29 October 1965, 'Archive of Foreign and Minority Schools', G.A.K. (Kavala), F.10. For the decrease of the Greeks in Turkey and the Turkish measures, Aarbakke, *The Muslim Minority*, 103-107 and Alexandris, "To Istoriko plaisio", 511-513.

chairman of the CCT put it clearly when he declared that “Turks will leave when we buy their land by any necessary means”.⁵

According to the program, this effort to reduce the minority population would go hand-in-hand with efforts to assist Thracian ethnic Greeks and settlers to develop their areas and dominate the economic life of the region. Therefore, at the same time that bureaucratic obstacles were raised from local ethnic Turks, they were removed for ethnic Greeks. Moreover, investment programs were developed for this reason and professionals such as merchants or shop holders were offered financial assistance to give them an advantage in competition with the local minority members. This would both reduce migration of ethnic Greeks to the countries of northern Europe and force local Muslims to leave Thrace.⁶

In practice, very little of the plan succeeded in achieving its aims, and its application can be broadly regarded as a failure. Despite the problems created during the implementation of the project, its basic features characterized Greek minority policy for Thrace over the coming decades. It could be that efforts to buy land owned by the minority members were soon abandoned, however much land was expropriated in order to build agrarian prisons and university campuses, based on the way the Turkish state expropriated land belonging to the ethnic Greeks in Imvros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada). At the same time all the existing negative practices and obstacles which occurred in any transaction between the local Muslims and the Greek state persisted, and tension continued to increase right up until the 1990s. We further develop these issues in the following chapter.

The emergence of a “logic of Hellenization”

The effort to drive local Muslims to emigration while promoting Christian Greeks signifies the emergence of a new *political logic* in the discourse on minority issues in Thrace. This constituted a ‘logic of Hellenization’, as while previously the focus of the intervention was to introduce a frontier against minority Turks and disrupt the reproduction of both their identity and influence in minority institutions, the new project introduced a new frontier, one between the Christian Greeks and the minority Turks. This new logic can be characterized as a shift from efforts to ‘de-Turkify’ the identification of the minority population, to efforts to ‘de-Turkify’ the geographical space of Thrace.

In other words, while before the emergence of the project of “land purchase”, the intervention of the Greek administration in Thrace was focused both on promoting alternative identities - religious or ethnic - and increasing control, the focus afterwards shifted. Intervention now focused on assistance to the Greek Orthodox majority, together with efforts to force the minority Turks to leave Thrace.

Furthermore, this new logic signified the beginning of the abandonment of the battle over the identification of the minority and for influence over minority

⁵ Chairman of the Coordination Council of Thrace (Koukourides), 51st Session, 27 March 1967, ‘Archive of Foreign and Minority Schools’, G.A.K. (Kavala), F.11.

⁶ Part of this wider plan was the effort to cover all needs in schools and churches for the ‘Greeks’, “especially in mixed villages” as the prefect of Rhodope introduced. The CCT accepted it “taking into account the national expediency of the measure”, according to its decision. Coordination Council of Thrace, 51st Session, 27 March 1967 and Coordination Council of Thrace, 57th Session, 2 March 1968, ‘Archive of Foreign and Minority Schools’, G.A.K. (Kavala), F.11.

institutions. Perhaps with the exception of the isolated Pomak areas, the Greek authorities indirectly accepted that their hegemonic project had *failed*. Minority Turks could neither abandon their identification with Turkism nor be excluded from running minority affairs, therefore they had to leave. The failure of this project, together with the anti-minority measures in Istanbul were the main reasons for the application of a coherent policy of discrimination against the minority through the policy of administrative harassment, a policy that would characterize Greek policy in Thrace until the early 1990s.

Another central issue was the role of the principle of reciprocity in the establishment of political frontiers in Thrace and in the policies of inclusion and exclusion. Although reciprocity was officially established as a principle to deal with the respective minorities in Greece and Turkey in 1968, it was already the principle on which intervention in Thrace was based. Except for its role in deterring Turkey from applying anti-minority measures to its Greek-Orthodox minorities, reciprocity also had the character of a political logic which aimed to introduce a frontier against Turkism in Thrace; as such it justified both inclusive and exclusive strategies towards different minority groups.

Moreover, as we have seen, the events of 1964-66 showed that the application of reciprocity in Thrace failed to deter measures of homogenization in Turkey regarding ethnic Greeks. At the same time, "reciprocity" was replaced by "counter-measures" in the terminology used by Greek officials; voices for the abandonment of reciprocity were raised within the Greek administration, while the project of land purchase showed that reciprocity was questioned as the prominent principle for dealing with minority issues in Thrace.

Security, Migration and Culture: the case of Athens

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I will begin with saying what I do in this chapter. I begin with a very commonplace catchphrase “the ‘problem’ of Athens”. From a Foucauldian perspective I try to understand how this problem is related to the security–migration apparatus and how migration poses a question to urban security. How migration forms part of a “problem” for which different responses and solutions are devised, let us say, depending on the ‘framing’ of the problem. This paper sets out to explore the nature of this ‘problem’, how it emerged and what it means for those whose position in the social allows them to make authoritative and/or effective statements and perpetuate unequally structured social relations and oppressive practices. It further seeks to see how this ‘problem’ might be better understood in relation to a security discourse and how and with what effects the latter re-articulates ‘cultural’ identities. It appears that the ‘problem of the city centre’ is a complex one and that it has linkages to broader socio–political contexts. But what is this ‘problem’ really? *Who defines what the ‘problem’ is and how different conceptualizations of the ‘problem’ constitute political subjectivity and competing visions of what Greek society is and should be?*

I complexify conventional understandings of security by foregrounding **the ‘cultural’ dimension** and the **heterogeneous character of security practices**, while I explore the role that these play in sustaining the configurations of the migration–security nexus. This chapter **does not tackle the question of security from the viewpoint of how state institutions deal with real threats;** rather, the problematization I advance aims to capture how the problem of ‘foreigners’ in the city centre of Athens was brought into being and has been articulated through different practices and demands in different but related contexts. These demands could be seen to emerge through political practices of contesting the instituted ways of dealing with things (among which security as a top–down domain of politics). For example, Greek governments’ recent pressures towards EU for ‘burden–sharing’ in dealing with illegal migration could not be seen separately from the question of the micro–context of urban Athens and the ‘evidence’ of growing ‘societal’

insecurities. In fact, as I will try to show, they would not have emerged unless community and racial tensions in Athens had become a problem for the government of the city.

What I am interested in is **the characterization of a discourse** that soon gained visibility and 'voice' in the local public sphere. How to characterize it? In the first place in its own terms. "The Citizens' Committee" of Agios Panteleimon and their mobilization in the period 2008–2010. The empirical evidence of their words and deeds in particular events have been captured mostly by documentary and social media representations of racism in Athens. One may object: But these are not "citizens'" committees; these are "racists". But there is no priori justification for imposing our own normative distinctions.

The identity of the 'locals' can be seen to be blocked by two interrelated phenomena. The 'occupation', as they have often characterized it, of Athens by foreigners and the hegemony of what they describe as the 'new-order' elites. It could be argued that for this assemblage of citizens the terms 'foreigners' and 'new order' substitute for each other, they are equivalent. They do not represent anything other than the homogeneous society's impossibility of being and returning to a supposedly harmonious past. Their argument reduces social division to the Greek people against those who threaten it, insiders and outsiders alike. It is a kind of militant nationalist populism. And to reinforce this point we need only notice the use of "*I Ellada stous Ellines*" by LAOS and Xrysi Aygi. Only that the enemy is in the present context the foreigner as a migrant.

In the printed material of *Xrysi Aygi* candidature for the 2010 local elections, the problem becomes clear:

'Today the central neighborhoods of the city have become strongholds of crime and corruption, where you don't hear Greek anymore. Guilty for this are the exousiastes [those in power] of our country. [...] Let us say that we want our Polis back, we want our homeland back, we want Athens to become GREEK anew. [...] Your vote shall give us power, a power that will transform into a struggle in every square, neighborhood and street of Athens, where Greeks live under a regime of terror'

'You came to Greece uninvited. We Greeks, being hospitable and charitable, accepted you, with affection, giving you food, clothes, hospital care, shelter. [...] You did not respect our hospitality, our principles and customs, insulting all us Greeks, all Greek Women, our Christian religion, our civilization, our pride, our LIVES. [...] We are

angry with this government and all politicians that brought you and support you and defend you AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO PUNISH THEM AND YOU' (Printed Material from a demonstration against crime 'infestation' in Athens, 24-07-09)

A particularly polemical stance towards migrants characterizes this text handed out by the organizers during the demonstration of the 'native' citizens in November 2008 in the square of Agios Panteleimonas. It can be objected that security is a different thing from those local moments of the discourse of the far right. But the incidence of **racist violence** resulting from the actions of loosely organized groups or individuals can best be interpreted through the lens of an intensification of a "continuum of security", to use Bigo's category. It can also be objected that its meaning is so localized that it lacks any real social relevance. That it is too marginal a case. It could be argued that it is not representative of any other more 'structured' political discourse. But the discourse of Xrysi Augi which represents some 10000 voters only in this constituency, as well as the recent events we witnessed, do not point to a socially or politically irrelevant phenomenon.

The 'New Discourse'

'[...] the essential function of security is to respond to a reality in such way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds - nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it'¹

"[S]ocietal security concerns the ability of the society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats...Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms"²

The 'new discourse' is my own construction, or rather a co-construction with one of my interviewees, a former deputy minister of Public Order. The social antagonism over migration has shaped the local milieu of (in)security and it can be said to have been a problem itself, from the emerging perspective of the 'new discourse' and its characterizing logic of "governmentality". Here, I explore the way in which the official discourse of security on migration departed from 'security', perceived in terms of securitization, mostly in terms of rhetoric, and thus from

¹ Foucault, M. (2007) *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978*. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan. pp. 47.

² (Wæver et al., 1993: 23)

explicit, clearcut exclusion, or 'exceptional' measures. I explore in a sense, how the 'new discourse' responded both to racism and anti-racist direct action, and to migration from a seemingly neutral, technocratic point of view. I thus focus on what may appear as **an anomaly in the binary constitution of self/other in security discourse**, that is to say, an emerging logic of governmentality as constitutive of security discourse. This logic is constructive of security but not of clearcut enemies. I try to show how to make both 'racism' and 'migration' objects of security, a principle was needed which is expressed with the signifier 'illegality' and 'lawlessness', *anomia, paranomia*;

The 'new discourse' appeared as resolutely anti-racist, since for it migration is a phenomenon that takes place anyway, it implies a reality, which cannot merely be dealt with by police measures and strategies of control. However, the **ordering** of that reality would be necessary, in other words, the production of the population as governable, where it appears as differentiated across ethnic, cultural, ideological lines. The archive of statements before and after the election of the new government allows us to point out key elements of the new policy: *First*, the reality to which it responds is a reality of 'lawlessness' which compromises the 'primary good', namely, the 'security of the citizen'. This reality was successfully represented as the outcome of the Conservative Party's inefficiency and incompetence to deal with the complex phenomenon of migration, but would certainly not be reduced to it. *Second*, this reality implied a series of interconnected problems for security and order in the everyday urban life, which range from housing and black market (*para-emporio*) to the mere presence of *lathrometanastes* and constant demonstrations, and to drug-use, crime and prostitution, and it posed questions for economic and societal security. Numerous statements, official letters, public speeches, interviews, campaigns, have iterated those themes.

'A special programme for re-structuring the cities, neighborhoods, especially neighborhoods in danger of ghettoization - by means of planned and all-encompassing interventions, in collaboration with local councils, NGOs, with serious public investments, systematic housing policies for migrants, with the protection of their legal rights and the guarantee for peaceful co-existence and social coherence of our society'.³

³ Eight Measures for a Modern, Effective Migration Policy

Migration is de-securitized in that it is no longer represented as a clearcut threat. Instead, 'illegal migration' is a threat to urban security. Simultaneously, racism becomes one of the objects, equivalent to 'illegal' migration itself, against which the security-migration nexus is articulated. Under this light, 'racism' is equally or more of a 'problem' than 'migration'. In other words, we are dealing with a securitization of racism.

I believe it is crucial to pause for a moment and flesh out in more detail the elements of this 'New Discourse'. Were we to assign a centre to it, were we to say that this discourse is the construction of PASOK we would miss a lot. By opening up the scope of analysis so as to understand and explain this discourse, I address the issue of the role that civil society is called to play in this discourse in dealing with two distinct but interrelated issues, the so-called 'degradation of the historical centre' of Athens and the issue regarding the practice of voluntary repatriation of migrants. Those two issues, in the way they have been addressed and became objects of political intervention, exemplify a key feature of security *qua* 'management', namely that security is a practice that articulates heterogeneous elements and spans across the social. Thus understood security presupposes some notion of Gramsci's 'extended state'.

Representations of the "problem". Socio-historical centre or 'ghetto': From the statements of the 'New Discourse', the question was one of 'modernization' with an emphasis on a better government of the capital city, in terms of policing and regulating the flow of goods and people. When Foucault says that 'police' deals with the urban problem of 'the circulation of men and goods in relation to each other' we should think of all that which constitutes the city, namely, its roads, the buildings, the squares, but also, the religion, the morals, health and sustenance, public peace, commerce and how these can become problematic from the point of view of sustaining urban life. Para-commercial activity and sub-letting style of housing have been central 'problems' around which anti-immigrant discourse was articulated.

I thus focus on technocratic and administrative interventions in making the city of 'Spices and traditional shops', aiming to turn unregulated space into productive zones... 'AP in Aharon: a space of antagonisms and conflict becomes a space of reconciliation and harmonious coexistence between the diverse ethnicities of the area' (Athens- Attica 2014)

In this part I sought to draw out the particularities of the 'new discourse' of security on

migration. I addressed it in its complexity and internal heterogeneity (exploring civic and entrepreneurial responses to the 'problem' of foreigners in Athens), with the logics it attempts to de-legitimate and those that it attempts to institute. The **logic of displacement** that accounted for poor migration management in juxtaposition to inefficient urban security had been targeted by the proponents of the new discourse. My main argument is that the emerging discourse of 'regulating' migration has only been made possible since a territorially 'marginal' problem - permeability of borders - has come to be a central problem for the 'centre' of the capital with all its symbolic weight, that is, when the 'problem' could no longer be *displaced* to the 'margins'. However, what the new discourse did was to contest the logic of displacement by displacing at the same time the political aspect of the inner city 'problem'. While attempting to regulate and govern by means of technocratic, administrative interventions which appear as post-ideological/political, the new discourse has managed to displace the relatively autonomous political and ideological significance of the social antagonism between "natives" and "foreigners". The idea that harmony will prevail by fully instituting an order of celebrating diversity, by eradicating racism and lawlessness, carries traces of a utopian discourse.

One paradox that emerges by scrutinizing this case, the 'problem' of the centre of Athens, as constitutive of the contemporary security-migration nexus, is that although there has clearly been a shift in the 'official', that is, both local and national government level, at the micro-level of analysis things are different. In fact, the very 'fact' of the radical far-right representation in the local municipality council was a new phenomenon in the end of 2010 and it could be evidence for growing securitization. The emergence of the 'new discourse', which has attempted to order things, to regulate illegality and to govern the urban co-existence of natives and foreigners appears to be incommensurable to blatant securitization that involves racism. This discourse can be seen as having acknowledged 'racism' as an obstacle to government and order. At the same time, the case of the nationally vigilant citizens and the articulation of anti-immigrant security discourse, point towards the opposite direction.

This brings me to one of my central arguments: that to characterize security discourse is not as straightforward a business, because of the heterogeneity of subjects involved and because of the difficulty to disentangle analytically and focus on some levels of analysis at the expense of concealing others. Indeed, the articulation of at least two different modalities of security discourse - the ethno-nationalist-for-homogeneity and the governmentality-for-diversity -

around the 'problem' of Athens presents us with difficulties. First, from a point of view it might be argued that the 'citizens' are antagonistic to the 'official' position. In fact, it was shown that the 'official' position was only made possible in opposition to 'incidents of racism'. Second, the representations, visions, assumptions of the 'self' and of 'society', differed significantly between the two securitizers: Although both have invariably been invoking the culture of *filoxenia*, they nevertheless projected different ideal 'pictures' of society (homogeneity/heterogeneity). These differences internal to security discourse - since both differences are only such given their common rendering of migration as a 'problem' for security - reveal that during the period examined, the meaning of security was up for grabs and so was the normative conception of what 'our' local society should be like. Shifting the focus from the traditional emphasis on national security to societal security (from territorial to urban) not only presents us with problems regarding the characterization of a discourse, but it also forces us to think in a historical-genealogical fashion the nature and the 'origins' of 'noble' demands such as the demand for 'burden-sharing' of migration pressures that the Greek Government posed in *another* context, namely, the European. It is thus that an object such as 'urban security' in Athens is inseparable from EU migration and security policy. The analysis of this object introduces contingency in what appears to be solid, top-down domains of politics.

Last, revisiting the concept of societal security from a post-structuralist perspective, opens up the road to exploring the constitution of the 'self' in enacting security, in problematizing migration. The political uses of the language of hospitality (*filoxenia*) have played a catalytic role in sustaining certain problematizations of migration and legitimating particular responses.