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Athanasios Grammenos,
PhD Candidate, University of Macedonia

"Diasporas and foreign policy: the Greek Americans"

The U.S. political system is unique for permitting access to organized pressure groups, through lobbying. What is a taboo for the rest of the globe, in America it is a legitimate process. Among these groups are the ethnic lobbies consisted of american citizens of a certain ethnic descent who try influence the Congress to support politically their country of origin.

The greek lobby arose for the first time in 1974, to impose the rule of law against the illegal use of american arms by turkish forces that invaded Cyprus. For many scholars it is considered to be among the most influential ones. The Greek Americans enjoy a high social status and despite the assimilation to the american society they still have a diverse ethnic consciousness.

This paper, as a part of the author's PhD thesis to be submitted to the University of Macedonia, examines the role and the impact of the greek americans on the foreign policy of their host land, analyzing the motives, the means and the methods of such involvement. The case study is limited to the 1975-1978 arms embargo and not to more recent occasions due to the limited space and the need for further research on the last thirty years.

In order to better understand the role of lobbies, the paper begins with a critical review of the American political nature, the constitutional framework and the reasons why lobbies are an acceptable and normal phenomenon. Next, it is of great importance to assess the historical context in which the Cyprus crisis took place in order to evaluate accurately the efforts of the Greek lobby. The decline of the 'imperial presidency' at the aftermath of the Vietnam war along with the Watergate scandal, weakened dramatically the Executive,

provoking a new culture from Congress not only to check and balance, but even more to co determine Foreign Policy.

The turkish invasion in Cyprus, erupted in a momentous turn in American politics, because of the Executive-Legislative opposition, and it gave the opportunity to a brand new but impetuous ethnic interest group to educate, press and influence Congress on its positions, so as to help the situation in the country of origin.

The members of that lobby were of Greek descent, however they are too American citizens. The matter of loyalty is another aspect of the general dialogue on ethnic lobbies. In the present paradigm, the Greek lobby did comply with the American tradition, asking to apply the rule of law which was trespassed by Turkey. Showing such a sensitivity, the Greek Americans had to confront Secretary Kissinger's implications for dubious loyalty, a criticism often referred thereafter from many politicians and scholars. Last, the lifting of the embargo, it was the result of America's new foreign policy approach and Greece's indifference, but although disappointing for the members of the lobby. ended a difficult struggle leaving behind a legacy for the next years.

The academic significance of the topic relies on the introduction of a recent foreign policy actor, diaspora as an ethnic lobby. Diasporas as international actors constitute a field still unexplored, primarily because of the theoretical hegemony of Realism who insist in 'national interest' to explain international relations. However, in US, interest groups have become so ubiquitous that it is impossible to understand american politics without understanding the power of these groups and someone could hardly define what 'national interest', policy decisions serve after all.

The paper argues that foreign policy could be better understood if realism arguments were enriched with constructivist tools, with emphasis in identities. The states do not act merely according to rationality but as human unions, may follow collective emotion, and foreign policy is not always shaped behind walls but in the streets, after protests or before political elections.

The structure of this paper is split to three tasks. The first task is to explore the American political system and to trace the position and the scope for action of the ethnic lobbies. The second task is to assess the economic, political and social status of the Greek Americans so as to answer why and how they get involved in political action. The third aspect is to examine the historical facts and using the tools of Constructivism to export important theoretical generalizations.

The American political system is presidential which means that the leader is not just the Prime Minister but also the Head of State. With reference to foreign policy among President's most important roles are those of commander in chief, chief diplomat, chief administrator, chief of state, chief legislator, voice of the people, and chief judicial officer. The Congress, on the other side, holds the "power of the purse", which is to withhold funding, or putting stipulations on the use of funds. The Constitution allocates responsibilities in the realm of foreign affairs, although in a way that the limits of powers are not absolutely defined and the two branches claim their authority on different provisions. Theoretically, the initiative falls necessarily on the Executive, and the Legislative has the authority to check if the selected policies will benefit the people and make it a law; in short, "President proposes, Congress disposes" (Arvanitopoulos 2009). Obviously, this relationship has not always been characterized of harmony and both bodies seek occasionally to "impose" their will to one another.

After WWII, Congress largely acquiesced to presidential initiative understanding that global leadership required a more flexible policy, accepting for itself the role for legitimizing presidential decision. The situation changed dramatically as long as cold war presidential policies could no more successfully contain communist threat resulting in Congress to challenge the President on foreign policy. The key point for this change is the Vietnam War and the fall of President Nixon after the Watergate scandal. The war in Vietnam was never declared officially by the Congress, and it was going on due the appropriation of funds for the execution of war acts in time of peace. Demanding codetermination in foreign policy, in a moment that the President was remarkably weak, Congress passed in 1973 the War Powers Act, in order to constrain the Executive's capacity to wage "presidential" wars without authorization. Although, many things have changed since then, it is obvious in what environment did the Greek lobby acted.

As far as it concerns interest groups, in this vague ambience, what bibliography suggest is that they exist because of the very intricate nature of American politics. Contending bodies, as shown above, various levels of power, the need of legislators for special knowledge along with ignorance from the major part of society provide the arguments for citizens to unite and apply their influence. Besides, unions are neither illegal nor unethical, that is why there are trade, labour and other unions. Interest groups as free associations, serve political ends, and "check the tyrannies of class, party and police" (Latham 1965). As put by Almond and Powell, interest groups play a vital role for the political system as they expose certain interests which later, the political parties will "harmonize" (Almond and Powell 1966). Therefore, interest groups are as necessary as the political parties and sustain a democratic system.

Because of the lobbies' growth of power, not everyone has positive views on their influence. The famous book on Israel lobby by Mearsheimer and Walt, emphasized the power of that lobby even to the candidates for the Presidency: "Each candidate will emphasize that he or she fully appreciates the multitude of threats facing Israel...none of the candidates is likely to criticize Israel" (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007).

This book somehow shocked the American society, because it was the first serious approach to set scientifically a subject that until then was only food to conspiracy theories. Even more, it was recognizing the influence on the political system, not simply by a lobby, but by a foreign lobby that may use American supremacy to benefit another state.

That is, in Davidson's words, factocracy. (Davidson 2009) He recognizes the major role of groups in the nation's political life, he challenges the notion that the U.S. is a democracy of individuals and he suggests that it is a democracy of competing interest groups or lobbies. "a nation of competing factions". Tony Smith is more critical; he believes that the negative consequences of ethnic involvement may well outweigh the undoubted benefits this activism confers on America in world affairs and embraces those nationalists who are concerned that the potentials for serious divisiveness is contained in many hard multiculturalist demands. His basic objection is that an interest group is asking the entire

country to serve its purpose when the policy it seeks may not serve the common good or may endanger it.

An ethnic lobby requires a diasporic presence. However, a diaspora does not necessarily constitute an ethnic lobby. It can be active for civil rights, against discrimination or for any particular value. It becomes an ethnic lobby when it uses political means to have an impact on homeland. For this paper, diaspora is an organized immigrant ethnic group that despite living abroad it reserves a permanent and active interest and involvement in homeland affairs. To become an ethnic lobby, it must have a higher economic and social status, so they exert important influence to the ruling class.

For the Greek diaspora in the U.S., the early years in America were difficult, and associating was inevitable to provide protection to all, and assistance to those who could not afford to find not even the basics. The first and the most important association is AHEPA (American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association) and it was established in 1922, in Georgia, to promote successful assimilation of Greeks in American society. The American Hellenic Institute (AHI) and the American Hellenic Institute Political Action Committee (AHI-PAC) is another important organization, founded on August 1, 1974, following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus condemning the illegal use of American-supplied arms in violation of U.S. laws and agreements and it the only Greek American organization registered with the Congress under the Lobbying Act. Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH), furthermore, is a loose lobbying institution consisted of the leaders of other political organizations, such as UHAC (United Hellenic American Congress), PSEKA (International Coordinating Committee-Justice for Cyprus), and Manatos & Manatos, an experienced government relations and public policy company managed by the Greek American Andy Manatos, President Carter's Assistant Secretary of Commerce. Last, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America (former Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America), with 540 parishes and 1,5 million faithful is the greatest institutional reference of Greek Orthodox Americans. The Archdiocese was first established in 1922 and it is an Eparchy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Istanbul); in other words the Archbishop is a subordinate to the Patriarch, which is very important in the sense that the Patriarchate is a Turkish institution.

The lobby was mobilized after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the illegal use of American arms, in July 20 and August 14, 1974, ending with Turkey holding in total 37% of the island, turning some 170,000 Greek Cypriots to refugees.

Beyond their relatively small size as an ethnic group, Greek Americans, at that time, enjoyed a high level of income and education compared to the native whites, in the era of transition from a proletarian to a mobilized diaspora. Put differently, the 1970s changed the proletarian newcomers to prominent citizens who run their own business, attended colleges and universities and consequently funded candidates for political offices.

The Greek American community responded to the invasion instinctively and without any preparation. When massive demonstrations occurred in Washington and in other cities, Archbishop Iakovos, a charismatic figure, with known and recognized contribution in human rights issues across the nation, and leader of the Church with great impact on the Greek Americans, was immediately invited to the White House by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger in an attempt to press his clergy to halt demonstrations and to be convinced that the embargo (then about to go in effect) would actually hurt the interests of his communicants.

The Congressmen of Greek descent Brademas, Sarbanes, Yatron and Bafalis visited Under Secretary Sisco to warn him that the US situation provoked Congress to react and on August 15, one day after the second attack, the same team visited Kissinger blaming him for an American foreign policy failure. Simultaneously, hundreds of Greek Americans, used the churches as the lobby's headquarters, to activate people and funds.

In September, Congressman Rosenthal, who supported not only the rule of law in the Turkish arms case, but further the condemnation of Turkish aggression, joined the pro-Greek Caucus. The congressional efforts were accompanied by massive protests such as the one in Washington, September 8. Almost twenty thousand of Greek Americans throughout America, arrived in the Capitol to protest against the Turkish aggression and the Administration's tolerance with the attendance beyond any expectation.

Coordinated efforts of the 'Greek caucus', massive demonstration and impressive grassroots lobbying, based on legal arguments pushed strongly the embargo case. From a political perspective, Nixon's resignation and Ford's inexperience, enhanced Kissinger's role, who had alone to form Foreign Policy, proving the "theory of the Continuity" in U.S. foreign policy towards Cyprus. To do so, Kissinger admitted that "in his view there were times in world history when diplomats had to act outside the law" (Rossides 2007).

Kissinger's obvious neglect of either the law or any opposition, unified more the Greek Americans and his rivals who blocked his policy plans. In spite of being a small group, as shown above, the Greek lobby organized large demonstrations in Washington and many other cities, and they managed to activate many people. After, several votes in Congress, and one Presidential veto (October 15, 1974), the arms embargo became law in October 17 but it came into effect only in February 5, 1975.

Soon after the embargo was imposed, Kissinger and the Executive gave a new struggle to repeal it. Gradually the whole situation created by Vietnam and Watergate scandal begun to fade. The Legislative's revolution had successfully sent the message to the Executive, it managed to determine foreign policy and since it was not in a position to become a single-issue instrument, especially in such a critical moment, was ready to step back, altering the situation in favor of the administration. In addition to Turkey's announcement that its forces would take control of all but one of the US military installations, and use of the biggest NATO air-base, in Incirlik, would be used exclusively for NATO purposes cultivated a new, more realistic mentality in Congress towards national interest and in October 6, Turkey was again eligible to buy arms but was not eligible for grants, after the appropriate law was signed by President Ford.

After a long legislative process with negotiations on "shoulds" to the Cyprus issue, the Resolution was voted in both bodies and finally, on September 26, new President Carter signed the Public Law 95-384 that removed "the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey upon the President's certification to Congress that: (1) it is in the interest of the United States and of NATO to resume full military cooperation with Turkey; and (2) the Government of Turkey is acting in good faith to achieve a just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem, the early peaceable return of refugees to their homes and properties,

continued removal of Turkish military troops from Cyprus, and the early serious resumption of international talks aimed at a just, negotiated settlement”.

Theoretically speaking, Realism remains the most influential theory of International Relations. It is a theory based on anarchy and power. It suggests that international system is anarchical in the sense that there is no central authority to impose order. In such a system, states are the primary units and they are interested mainly in their own survival. This behavior supposes rationality, thus they seek to establish the most effective ways to reach their goals. When talking about diasporas' role in foreign policy making, it comes as no surprise that rationality is not the key word, since their question is not necessarily to host land's (best) interest. Consequently, “the very attribute of diasporas that renders them increasingly relevant to world politics (i.e. their transnational structures) makes them essentially irrelevant to conventional theories such as realism, neorealism, marxism and globalism” (Rosenau 1993, xxii).

In 1974, the Greek Americans have not even been 'transnational actors'. The embargo case highlights that they acted alone, without any contact from Greece, and they did it as American citizens, who motivated from their emotion to Cyprus, they supported the rule of law. They did not suggest a policy against the American interest, in fact they suggested the Congress to apply American Law. Accurately, therefore a constructivist suggestion is that 'national interest' is not given for each state, but it is the product of political process, negotiations and compromises among contrary political rights (Keridis 2008).

Moreover, for constructivist theorists international society is more a constitutive than a strategic realm. Though sustained empirical research suggests that ideas and values come to shape political action, argument and discourse condition outcomes and how identities constitute agents and agency (Reus-Smitt 2005). Diasporas are an exquisite paradigm for Constructivism because of the significance of identity which at the end allow them to see an alternative perception of national interest.

'Turkish-Greek Friendship' reiterated. A discursive approach to rapprochement

By Leonidas Karakatsanis, University of Essex.

lkarak@essex.ac.uk

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Summary of argument

This paper presents a critical genealogy of 'Greek-Turkish friendship'; a motto, a label, a signifier which has been accompanying the uneasy relations of the two states from the very first years of their neighbouring co-existence. 'Friendship', (i.e. *filia* and *dostluk*), emerges in the political vocabulary of 'Turks' and 'Greeks' during the 1920s, initially 'offered' as a rhetorical remedy for the 'wrong doings' of the past and the troubled encounters of the respective ethno-religious communities. In the long course of the 20th century and until today this little word became itself a significant part of an unfolding history of the relations between the two states and their societies, characterized by a sway of a pendulum between crises and reconciliation, feelings of cultural intimacy and aversion, or else, *enmity* and *friendship*.

Oscillating between different registers of discursive production, from the affective rhetorics of E. Venizelos and K. Atatürk, to the dry language of cold-war diplomacy, 'Turkish-Greek friendship' becomes later, since the 1970s, a central point of reference of almost every pro-rapprochement initiative: Translated into claims for peace and disarmament, *performed* during festivals and town twinning projects, turned into a naming and a title for several established associations. Behind these calls for friendship there could be internationalist agendas of radical leftist groups or the institutional left, a liberal post-political pacifism of urban elites, neoliberal projects for the search of common profit or even culturalist ideological frameworks like 'Anatolianism' which would depict Greeks and Turks as destined brothers that did not belong to Europe neither to the 'East'. 'Friendship' was turned into a contested and debated signifier, appraised by some as the absolute *end* of the Greek-Turkish conflict, vehemently criticized by others as an act of treason or ridiculed as an 'empty' discourse.

Drawing from a discourse theory perspective, the underlying argument of this paper is that discursive articulations can provide a rich source of information for exploring socio-political change. In this paper, therefore, I suggest turning *friendship* into a genealogical prism that offers a new perspective for the history of Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Instead of focusing at the distinction between different registers of socio-political action and actors like state/non-state or high/low politics, classifications followed by most of the literature published hitherto on rapprochement, I suggest that a discursive approach can give a clearer picture of the different levels of socio-political processes and the interrelation between them.

In this respect, I argue that the word '*friendship*', as a *denominator of the Greek-Turkish encounters*, carries a certain historical, political but also methodological and even philosophical significance that, if addressed properly—that is in a theoretically informed manner—can enable us to explore a net of complex socio-political practices 'hidden' behind it. Such an approach will try to shed light to the phenomenon of the 'explosion' of the friendship discourse in the post-1999 era and examine it in the light of the shifting Greek-Turkish relations.

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The Paradox of Weak Power and Great Influence: Greece and the European Union's Relations with Turkey - Summary

Skander Nasra, Ghent University

Introduction

While the study of small states¹ has passed its climax in International Relations (IR) studies, the progressive development of the European Union (EU) over the past few decades has given rise to a proliferation of studies on the subject of small states in Europe. The questions scholars aim at answering relate to the difficulties in defining small states, their behavior and their opportunities for influence. Even though several scholars have studied the role of small states in the EU's international activities, their role all too often continues to be downplayed. Several studies have however argued that small states may supersede their limited material resource base and exercise substantial influence in EU foreign policy².

This paper therefore wishes to examine if, to what extent and in what manner small states may influence the EU's relations with third actors. It thus wishes to analyze whether and how small states may use the EU as a platform to pursue their national foreign policy objectives. Without discounting the role of large member states, it is argued that small states are able to play an influential role in EU foreign policy. Influence is defined in terms of the correlation between the initial position of a small state and the outcome of the EU policy process, despite disinterest or opposing positions from other states.

This paper proposes a framework for analysis that is based on a review of the small states literature in both IR and EU studies. It is argued that this may not only add to our understanding of the role of small states in EU foreign policy but also lead to a better understanding of the EU's foreign policy-making system as a whole. The framework is applied on an analysis of the role of Greece in the EU's relations with Turkey.³ Concretely, the paper will look at various topics in the realm of two EU foreign policy dossiers: enlargement policy and justice and home affairs.

¹ A small state is defined as a state that has a limited resource base, characterized by quantifiable factors such as population size, geographical size, economic weight, diplomatic network, military capabilities and institutional weight. On the notion of small states in the EU.

² EU foreign policy is understood in terms of external relations. It thus comprises all (aspects of) policy areas where the EU establishes relations with third actors, including policy areas from all three pre-Lisbon pillars.

³ The choice for Greece and Turkey has been made on the basis of Greece's strong preferences, its long-term bilateral relations with Turkey and its desire to conduct a substantial part of its relations with Turkey through the EU. It can therefore be assumed that it will try to exploit all resources at its disposal to influence EU policies towards Turkey, representing a case that may reveal information about the mechanisms and dynamics of small state influence.

Analytical Framework

The beginning of a genuine school of small state studies can be situated in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. During the Cold War period, early work was foremost preoccupied with the question of the survival of small states among the big powers. Besides definitional issues related to the concept of small states, the bulk of research focused on what has become conventional wisdom to explain small state behavior, namely the system level of analysis. A consensus emerged that, in contrast to big states, small states try to maximize joint actions by targeting regional and international institutions. Subsequent scholars moved their attention to the possible strategies small states might utilize to mitigate the effects of structural constraints, proposing analytical frameworks that differentiate between ‘structurally determined behavior’ and ‘voluntary behavior’ of small states. This differentiation reflects two levels of analysis, namely the systemic and state level respectively. Whereas the former can be referred to as the general environment that is impossible or very difficult for a small state to change, the latter relates to more direct causes of small state behavior.

With the progressive development of the EU, several scholars turned their attention to the position of small states in Europe. In contrast to IR studies, this has resulted in a proliferation of studies which have almost exclusively focused on the strategies of small states. Regarding the systemic level, they do not go beyond the prevailing consensus that the EU is a favorable policy context for small states to pursue their interests and to fend off raw power politics. In the context of the EU, only a few authors link structural factors to state strategies. They emphasize the importance to take the institutional set-up of a given policy area into account when studying the role of small states. The degree of institutionalization, they argue, is positively correlated to the possibilities for influence of small states. Yet, these authors do not specify how and to what degree an institutionalized policy context may be conducive to small state influence. This paper therefore argues that additional insights might be gained when those systemic factors identified in IR studies are linked to factors explaining successful small states’ strategies identified in EU studies.

The role of states is foremost determined by the system in which they operate. In contrast to large states, small states are particularly concerned, as they do not have the capacity to unilaterally determine or influence the system in which they act. They may at best affect the system through alliances or (regional) international organizations. On the basis of a stocktaking exercise, three systemic factors are identified which are particularly relevant for the study of small states in EU foreign policy: the structure of the system, the state of the system and the prevailing norms within a given policy system.

In a second instance, the paper outlines domestic sources of power to explain small state behavior and influence. On the basis of an overview of the main studies on small states in the EU, this paper proposes four factors for explaining small state influence: commitment, network capital, immaterial resources and the ability to deliberate.

Greece and the European Union’s Relations with Turkey

Whereas instability long reined Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, the rapprochement in the late 1990s preceded a period of relative stability and closer cooperation between the two countries. This evolution reflects a changing Greek attitude within the EU as well. In contrast to the obstructionism and unilateralism that characterized Greek foreign policy during the 1980s and early 1990s, today Greek foreign policy towards Turkey is firmly embedded in the EU's foreign policy framework. Subsequently, Greece has actively aimed at influencing the way EU foreign policy is defined, formulated and produced.

The relations between the EU and Turkey go back to the early days of the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1963, the EEC and Turkey concluded an association agreement which, although tentatively, included the possibility for EU membership. In 1995, the EU and Turkey established a Customs Union. Turkey's application for membership in 1987 was lodged until 1999 when the European Council granted it candidate status. Even if many in the EU continue to consider Turkish membership problematic, member states unanimously agreed to open negotiations in December 2004. To date, twelve out of thirty-five thematic chapters are opened for negotiations, one chapter is provisionally closed, three chapters' opening benchmarks are being negotiated and the remaining chapters have been blocked by Cyprus and France.

Against this background, the following issues in EU-Turkey relations will be looked at: in the framework of accession negotiations: the issues of Greek minorities, the Orthodox Patriarchate and good neighborly relations, i.e. delimitation of territorial waters, continental shelf and airspace; and in the framework of Justice and Home Affairs: the readmission agreement.⁴

The Paradox of Weak Power and Great Influence

This paper seeks to analyze the role of small states in the EU's international activities, balancing the view that large member states dominate EU foreign policy and leave small states no choice other than to play at the margins of the game. It is not contradicted that large states are dominant actors that are able to set the opportunities and to impose the limits of what small states can achieve. As pointed out in IR studies, the success of small states' behavior depends foremost on the existence of a window of opportunity. Whilst the preferences of large member states remain one of the dominating factors that influence the probability for such a window of opportunity to emerge, it is demonstrated that the structure of the policy process and the existence of generally accepted norms of appropriate behavior need to be taken into account as well. The former refers to the institutional characteristics of a given policy area whereas the latter connotes the existence of generally accepted practices and norms that temper the use of material resources by large member states. Even though it remains difficult for small states to influence the systemic opportunities and constraints, it is shown that it is not impossible to affect the system in which they act.

⁴ The empirical material for the case study comes predominantly from semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the author. In total 15 officials have been interviewed in the period autumn 2009 – spring 2010. The selected officials work(ed) for the European Commission, the EU Delegation in Ankara, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Representations to the EU of Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

Besides the likeliness for a window of opportunity to emerge, a small state needs to pursue active national strategies in order to valorize the existence of a window of opportunity. In order for small states to use the EU as a platform for their national foreign policy objectives, it is argued that they ought to direct their national strategies directly at exploiting the systemic features of a given policy area. This paper suggests that such successful national behavior entails four elements: commitment, network capital, immaterial resources and the capacity to deliberate. All four variables are found to a varying yet substantial degree in Greece's activities. Greece is one of the most committed member states, it shares its unmatched expertise and knowledge with other member states, it maneuvers skillfully through Council discussions and it aims at reinvigorating policy debates.

On a more general level, it is argued to include the role of small states in analyses of the EU's foreign policy-making system. Rather than dismissing their role from the outset, the notion of a state should be seen in relation to the power it exercises rather than the power it possesses. Whereas being small is a characteristic of states at a systemic level, i.e. states that are unable to change the conditions for policy-making, the difference between small and big can be significantly reduced when it comes to a state's actions and strategies. This relates to the inherent informational asymmetries that exist in complex policy settings. Whether small or large, it has been shown that states tend to be dependent upon those actors that have extensive informational resources and that use these to match concrete solutions to problems. As shown in the case of Greece and the EU's policies towards Turkey, the subsequent demand for leadership can be filled by large as well as small states.