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*D. Glinos vs. “Archive of Philosophy” [Arxeion Filosofias]: Appropriating  
Technology and Science within Interwar Crisis*

***Introduction***

This paper, which is mainly based on an extensive archival work, is concerned with the intellectual appropriation of scientific ideology and technology by leading public figures during the Greek interwar period. Especially, it is focused on the controversy during the 1930s between the leading Marxist thinker Dimitrios Glinos and the idealist intellectuals Panayiotis Kanellopoulos and Constantinos Tsatsos, editors of the philosophical journal “Archive of Philosophy” [Arxeion Filosofias]. It basically argues two things: on the one hand, that even in countries, as Greece, where the industrial development was not widely seen as the steam-engine of socioeconomic progress, the technology issue was strongly involved in the political conflict and ideological struggle provoking tensions; on the other hand, that the debates on scientific ideology and technology stamp the Greek road to, with, and within modernity. I approach this debate using the following analytical tools: Peter Wagner’s (1994, 1998, 2008), Karl Mannheim’s (1997) and Science and Technology Studies’ theories, and especially the very notion of “intellectual appropriation of technology” which was recently developed by M. Hard and A. Jamison (Hard, Jamison eds, 1998). All these approaches provide the conceptual frame in order to treat the Greek debate within the comparative context of the interwar European developments. They focus, especially, on the discussions about technology during the period that Peter Wagner calls the “*first crisis of modernity*”, when the subject of debate was the project, rather than the products, of technological change. Not only did economic liberalism come under attack; so did the ideas of democracy and science. The growing power of the working class opened the way for far-reaching collective initiatives and ideas, and political instability opened up the possibility for radical authoritarian solutions (Hard, Jamison 1998: 7).

***Historical context and actors’ theoretical principles***

In the 1930s decade Greece faced complex problems, which were further magnified by the deterioration of social conditions following the Depression. The sharpening of the social conflicts came along with an expanded ideological crisis. The raising

ideological void and the increasing worry about the communist danger were combined with the extended distrust of the liberal values. Especially after the Depression, and in spite of the fast recovery (Mazower 2002), the obvious dissatisfaction against the parliamentary rule provoked the intense quest for authoritarian political solutions (Kyrtis 1996; Marketos 2006; Papadimitriou 2006). The three coups d' état between 1933 and 1936 are indicative of the political disturbance of the period (Mavrogordatos 1983; Alivizatos <sup>2</sup>1995; Dafnis 1997; Hering 2004). This period was also an era of economic development (Vergopoulos 1993; Veremis-Mazower 1993; Psiroukis 1994), and of the formulation of a modernistic vision based on technological development that was promoted by engineers and industrialists (Antoniou 2006). Thus, during the heyday of the interwar crisis, various modernizers attempt to formulate new ideals, to introduce organized institutions, and at the same time respond to the challenge which the –necessary– techno/scientific development provokes. Scientific ideology was a main theme of their arguments. According to Chalmers (2000: 267) the scientific ideology is based on the controversial notions of *Science* and *Truth* in order to establish political or/and ideological positions. In other words, the involved in the interwar ideological debate intellectuals evoked Science attempting to show the superiority of their opinions.

D. Glinos expressed his trust to Science conceiving it as cognitive authority and foundation of the necessary modernistic attempt. This optimistic view was based in his belief that the scientific theory of historical materialism could find the Laws of History, reveal the –socioeconomic– core of Reality and lead not only to the knowledge, but, also, to the –revolutionary– transformation of the social world (Glinos 1932a). Opposed to such an approach, the conservative thinker P. Kanellopoulos tended to underline the specific elements of History which were not subjected, in his view, to rationalization: the creative powers of an absolute Individual Spirit. Making the distinction between *Kultur* (the “internal” civilization of values, arts and inner powers) and *Zivilisation* (the “external”, mechanical, and technological/scientific one), he concluded that progress could only be observed in the second field: the ethical values which made possible the treatment of the social question remained uninfluenced by techno-economic progress and the correct conception of social conditions required in his opinion not the philosopher’s Reason, but the poet’s Wisdom (Kanellopoulos 1929, 1933). The neokantian philosopher and

conservative liberal thinker C. Tsatsos founded Science on the autonomous Mind which was independent from the empirical –natural or social– reality, and includes the preconditions of the objective knowledge. Scientific activity, Tsatsos argued, led by the freely posed *ideas* of the Mind: given that these ideas bore the scientific methods, they in essence shaped the –natural or social– world. Moreover, in Tsatsos’ thought the free position of ideas was showing that freedom and independence from empirical reality was the Mind’s essence. In this sense, Mind was able to immediately communicate with the unaltered and eternal ethical values, and appropriately shape the social world based on Its Purposes (Tsatsos 1934a, 1934b).

Two were the crucial elements of this debate: the problem of values and the nature of History. For Glinos, the motivating power of History was the class struggle. Social, ethical values and meanings, in this sense, were strongly connected with and determined by the transformations and outcomes of this struggle. So, socio-ethical values could be “scientifically” defined by the historical materialism experts who were able to conceive the historical laws. Believing so Glinos, Kyrtis underlines (*ibid*: 153-154), showed thought as an immediate reflection of economic interests and reproduction of social conditions. On the other hand, Tsatsos and Kanellopoulos considered values and meanings as historical actors’ property; in this context History is viewed through the prism of Value (“Archive of Philosophy” 1933; Tsatsos 1933b): it constitutes the Man’s struggle in order to create Civilization. But, this creature requires the access in the field of eternal values. Declaring the power of the creative Individual –Kanellopoulos– or the independent Mind –Tsatsos– to approach this field they sought to justify, Kyrtis observes (*ibid*: 61-66, 188-214), their autarchic and elitist will to transform the social reality based on transcendental values. Closing this unit it is worth saying that the already presented opinions determine the appropriation of science and technology by each of these leading figures, as also the political solutions that they proposed in transcending the acute interwar socio-political crisis.

***Appropriating Technology and Science, while Searching for a Way-out of the Crisis***

For D. Glinos, technological and scientific development was strongly connected with national progress and the revolutionary transfiguration of Greek society. This belief accompanied his thinking already from the 1920s, when he ideologically belonged to the social-democratic wing of Komma Fileleftheron [Liberal Party]. He argued that

acute interwar problems, as the new role of woman, the education problem or the question of nation's destiny after the Great Idea's collapse, could be solved by scientific means (Glinos 1922a, 1922b, 1923). Moreover, he considered that the treatment of the "Greek *malaise*", as also the social, political and economic recovery would be achieved if there was a plan combining scientific regulation of productive procedure, technological advance and modern education (Glinos 1926). Science conceived through the prism of historical materialism could play another significant role according to Glinos: it could enlighten people about the "real" social conditions revealing the forms of false consciousness which obstructed the social emancipation (Glinos 1927, 1928). In this sense, science, in Glinos' thinking, involved in social struggles playing a crucial role in the procedures of social transformations.

Indeed, Glinos during 1930s interpreted in such a way the scientific developments of the last three centuries. He explicitly correlated the social change with the new scientific discoveries. According to him, new science accompanied the social stratum that strove for liberty against the already established strata; for example, Newtonian physics constituted the ideological weapon of liberal/bourgeois class against monarchy and theocracy. On the other hand, in his epoch, he believed, it was the proletariat which accepted and turned the emancipating heads of the new –social and natural– scientific theories against the bourgeois oppression. This fact was suffice to interpret why the bourgeois intellectuals did not correlate ethical values with scientific knowledge, considered science as only a cognitive attempt without further –social– implications and turned in *instrumentalist* and not *realistic* explanations (Glinos 1932b). This turn was what Glinos called "Reaction". He believed that, as the bourgeois class understood that the working classes were questioning its hegemony, it converted to reaction: it was appealed by fascism, it used violence against social unrest and, finally, it was oriented to autarchic political solutions. This situation was reflected in the intellectual field taking the form of questioning the inherently progressive character of scientific attempt. Glinos explicitly categorized Tsatsos and Kanellopoulos in "*the intellectual forms of Reaction*" (Glinos 1932c). A little later, during the most acute phase of the debate, Glinos will accuse Tsatsos and Kanellopoulos of representing the fascist idealism in Greece (Glinos 1933a, 1933b). The historicization of science and its involution in social debates acutely raised the problem of relativism. But, Glinos trying to avoid this difficulty which could

undermine his ambitions, attributed stable –and positivistic– characteristics in science: objective observation, systematic research, transcendence of preoccupations, creative and composing thinking (Glinos 1922b: 52-53). In doing so he did not worry whether the conclusions of new physics –relativity, quantum physics– posed into question the fundamental axioms of historical materialism or his positions concluded in a kind of “scientific mysticism”.

Based on these ideological foundations and given the historical availabilities of the period, Glinos considered the Soviet paradigm as the only appropriate solution in interwar –and in Greek form of– crisis. Glinos recognized the inherently progressive dynamic of modern technology and recalled the Marxist belief that the combination of revolutionary working class with technology advance sufficed for the social transformation (Wagner 1998). The scientific theory of historical materialism guaranteed, in his concept, the “correct” use of technology advance; this concept led him to the unreserved acceptance of Soviet planned and organized institutions, “*a political form*”, as he put it, “*where science and life are not considered as separated*” (Glinos 1932d). The Soviet paradigm represented in Glinos’ thinking the unity between science and technology, the improvement of life conditions of the big masses, the cancelling of working alienation and, finally, the creation of a New Civilization by “*the vitality of proletariat*” (*ibid*: 47-48).

Kanellopoulos, on the other hand, did not share Glinos’ enthusiasm for science. But, he did so not in order to totally reject the scientific methods. Rather, he cared about its subjection to the “excellent will” and its disconnection from the social research and the study of the relationship between values and social condition (Kyrtis *ibid*: 194-218). In achieving this, Kanellopoulos widened the scientific field in various elements. He argued that the identification of knowledge with logical powers was deceptive. Scientific laboratory was not the only resource of knowledge (Kanellopoulos 1933b: 371-372), because “*sky is not being understandable only by means of observatory, but also by Soul*” (Kanellopoulos 1932: 30). Moreover, according to Kanellopoulos, the restriction of knowledge within the borders of Reason undermined the unity of the Self (1933: 372). The scientific development was strongly influenced by irrational elements. The “*so-called positive sciences*”, Kanellopoulos declared, were founded on alchemy, astrology, magic and fantasy, and not on scientific calculation. The same happened during the birth of social sciences

and especially, of sociology. The irrational element which played the crucial role in this case was the political will about the appropriate social organization (*ibid*: 374-385). He continued his reflections in such a way: if the political will was the main motive for the cognitive attempt, will as such constituted the crucial factor of social transformation. The speculative gaze that came from such a will would conceive the totality of social reality beyond parties' competition and class struggle (Kanellopoulos 1934a). It is worth noting here that many of Kanellopoulos' epistemological observations viewed through the prism of the conclusions of modern epistemology could be characterized as really accurate. Nevertheless, he did not make these observations in order to widen the scientific field, but to undermine every attempt of rational understanding of social reality. Furthermore, he attributed the social crisis to the overestimation of the scientific and technological civilization against the ethical and spiritual one (Kanellopoulos 1932: 14-29). Modern science, in contrast to poetry and religious faith which prevailed in classical antiquity and in Middle Ages respectively, was unable to offer a positive meaning (*ibid*: 60-63), a "sacred canopy", as Griffin puts it (Griffin 2007).

Technology was also being included in the field of *Zivilisation*. Kanellopoulos recognized its inescapable influence on the formation of every part of social life. But, like the "reactionary modernists" (Herf 1984; Hard 1998), he conceived the technological advance as provocation. As for various intellectuals and modernizers in other western countries (Hard, Jamison 1998: 1-3), so for Kanellopoulos the main question was either to assimilate technology into existing values or to adjust culture to the intrinsic demands posed by technology; sometimes, these two options were combined. *Kultur* ought to imbue *Zivilisation*, so that Crisis could be transcended. Kanellopoulos pointed out that the adjustment of the societies to the technological progress was not mechanical but creative, because of the various factors which intervened. This adjustment constituted a new social reality; it was a product of social conflict and a result of controversial influences. Yet, these influences were not contrasted to the necessity of technological advance. Based on this concept, Kanellopoulos showed that such an appropriation of technology beyond the liberal ideal –identification of technology and progress– and the communistic "prophecy" – technology progress inexorably leads to the classless society– was possible (Kanellopoulos 1934b: 135-199). Moreover, he considered as the best evidence for

his arguments the fact that even within the stratum of engineers pre-modern – conservative– elements were surviving (Kanellopoulos 1932: 122-123).

The political solutions proposed by Kanellopoulos were intertwined with the already presented positions. Underlining the priority of –an elitist and “total”– will in the spheres of science and politics he turned against liberal parliamentary institution and communism, because they deteriorated the social debates. The sociologist who, according to Kanellopoulos, represented the non-aligned to parties Individual ought to carry on his historical and political mission within the most crucial historical period, “*the Time of the Times*” (Kanellopoulos 1934a: 329-330). He believed that a lot of factors facilitated the success of this mission: the existence of absolute individual whose action was not subjected to rationalization precluded the deterministic historical explanations (Kanellopoulos 1931a). This was evident in the case of “class apostate”. On the other hand, History was not motivated by class struggle; the *virtu* of the leaders was the decisive historical factor for significant social changes. In this context he thought that “*the historical mission of fascisms*” should not be neglected (1934b: 99-190, 200-219). What is more, Kanellopoulos attacked all the aspects of liberal –*restricted* in terms of Wagner– modernity. He rejected the idea of liberal economy, because it detached economy from the political regulation, thus provoking crisis (Kanellopoulos 1931b); the society of his time because lacked poetry, religious faith and respect to the State in contrast to Antiquity, Middle Ages and Renaissance which respectively had these elements; the liberal nationalism because substituted the “*organic soul*” of the nation with rational ideas; the liberal individualism because substituted the “*heroic and great individual*” with the conciliatory man of everyday life; and finally, communism which pushed to an edge all the presented negatives of liberal modernity simply constituting its alternative aspect (Kanellopoulos 1932). In replacing the under attack liberal institutions and its alternatives, Kanellopoulos promoted the ideal of a Powerful and Organic State against the mechanical liberal one. It was a State which emphasized on social policy in order to calm the social unrest, clearly rejected the formal parliamentary representation –which was more preferable than communism– and led by the charismatic leader whose will created laws (*ibid*: 48-57, 62-95, 142-182). The inclusive ideological scheme within which this solution would be placed was the notion of “*organic Nation*” against the –

rational and for this reason— dissolving liberal and communist ideals (*ibid*: 62-87; Kanellopoulos 1933a).

Tsatsos, with other intellectuals like George Theotokas and George Economidis, argued in the editorial texts of journal *He Idea* [*The Idea*] that modern physics reinforced idealism against materialism and positivism. They clearly distinguished between science and philosophy of science; the second one was in their concept simply interpretation of scientific research without raising claims of truth. In this sense, historical materialism was not science. But, at the same time they declared that science had not a superior cognitive status: it was simply a method, a single cognitive attempt which was totally disconnected from the ethical values question (*He Idea* 1933a, 1933b, 1933c). Tsatsos followed this strategy in his debate with Glinos and under the pressure of his opponent he tried to formulate the appropriate political solution in the interwar no way-out. He undermined the claim of historical materialism to be considered as a science, while at the same time he accepted its political goals: political and economic equality. Yet, detaching them from the communist context, he transformed them in ethical postulata. In other words, political and economic equality were not concluded by the historical necessity and the class struggle, but constituted ethical demands based on eternal values. The accusation against communism was obvious; on the one hand, as it was not recognizing the consciousness' autonomy, communism could not formulate ethical rules with universal validity. On the other hand, its dependence on a certain social stratum made itself unable to formulate universal and general accepted social purposes. It was only an alternative to capitalism, Tsatsos concluded (Tsatsos 1933a).

In such a way Tsatsos disconnected the ethical values question from its reduction to social question within certain place and time. In this concept, the appropriate political solutions would only come from the eternal and timeless values and their representatives. It is obvious that this unhistorical deontologism had autarchic and totalitarian dimensions. Indeed, Tsatsos believed that the liberal idea about the State's organization was insufficient. The order of law as a simple complement of ethical order, the absolute social freedom and the self-restriction of the State had to be replaced by “*creative*” elements. This argument was based on the concept that State and Law were not only “*means*”, but “*ultimate purposes, Ideas*”. So, the State that Tsatsos dreamed of would not only be a regulator of the external human behavior; it

would be an educational institution which would moralized the citizens under its rule. It would compensate the human nothingness by transferring the spiritual and cultural heritage of the Past. Enrolling its citizens in a timeless and glorious Past it would secure their immortality offering them a “sky shelter”, “a new sacred canopy”, as Griffin puts it (Griffin: *ibid*). Material prosperity and violence were conceived as means and not as purposes of this ethical State. The main purpose of it would be the “*cultural creature*”. History, according to Tsatsos, indicated the necessity of the State and its priority over the single individual. So, since the State constituted an “*absolute Idea*”, the historical mission of idealism, Tsatsos declared, was to reinforce it in its struggle against communism and historical materialism. This ethical and creative State was expected to imbue the “neutral” technology with ethical values. The inclusive ideological scheme within which this solution would be placed was the notion of the “*Hellenic Idea*”, an essentialist definition of the Nation (Tsatsos 1933c), and resultant of Tsatsos’ German culture (Tziovas 1989). A recapitalization is here necessary: turn to social question; clear distance from fundamental aspects of liberal modernity; unhistorical consideration of social developments; conception of capitalism and communism as alternative aspects of the same phenomenon; formulation of political solution relative to the concept of “*the Nation*”: it is obvious that Tsatsos is found in the borders of fascism.

### ***Conclusions***

In the Greek ideological debate during the interwar crisis of modernity the questions of technology and scientific ideology played a major role provoking tensions. In this context, all the intellectuals who were involved in the controversy took seriously into account the notion of science and the “scientific foundation” of their argumentation. They connected it, in different between them ways, with plans of national rebirth, social transformation and paligenesis. Glinos historicized science enrolling it in the social struggles of each era. New science, in his concept, in every time connected with the claims of the stratum which struggle for freedom against the established order; he tried to justify in this way the claims of historical materialism to be conceived as a science and he proposed as a way-out of the crisis the unity of science and life under the communist hegemony. Kanellopoulos did not recognize the priority of rational factors in scientific field. He replaced them with fantasy, will, political ideology and

desire of involving in political conflicts. But, he made this in order to justify an elitist will which was superior to rationality and had totalitarian political claims. Tsatsos subjected science to the values which were sourced from Mind. This fact obligated, in his concept, philosophy and science to take part in the ideological debate having the mission to undermine the communist claims. It is worth noting that from the early 1930s the more the communist intellectuals were sliding towards an unquestioned “scientific mysticism”, the more the liberal and conservative intellectuals expressed their reserve against science. Yet, their anti-positivistic orientation did not purpose to the widening of the field, but to the overestimation of irrational factors.

Also, they did not reject technology. In spite of this they searched for the appropriate context of its reception. Kanellopoulos and Tsatsos appropriated technology through the distinction between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*: the neutrality or the uncontrolled character of the second imposed its impregnation by the first. For Glinos, on the other hand, the distinction between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation* constituted an illusion; since the inherently progressive powers of technology would be led by the proletariat, the coincidence of the two spheres would be, as the Soviet paradigm indicated, inevitable. All of them were characterized by the modernist ethos of the revolt against decadence. Also, they explicitly connected the appropriation of science and technology with organized institutional nets which expected to transcend the long past parliamentary order. They sought to establish “State-Gardeners”, as Baumann puts it, which took on major modernist plans and educated new and healthy men and women. Glinos dreamed of a State which would create the universal communist unity, while Kanellopoulos focused on the “poetic elites” that would lead the Nation to its destinies; Tsatsos from his part placed emphasis on the State which transcended Time and individual life, was prior of individual liberties and rights, moralized its citizens and established the real communism.

A closing remark is here necessary. Given that the discussion on science and technology in modern Greece takes place in the terms of the already presented debate, it is useful to reflect on the implications either of the distinction between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation* or the unquestioned acceptance of “science” and “technology”. Moreover, since the ideological positions of these intellectuals are evoked in the modern debates, some reminding is needed. The communist humanism of Glinos was strongly connected with new forms of mystification based on the conception of the

historical laws by the experts. The priority of ethical freedom, in which Tsatsos attributed major significance, over the social one, had autarchic dimensions, since a powerful ethical State was being conceived as superior to mere individuals. Finally, Kanellopoulos' praising of prophetic and poetic element was identified with totalitarian political solutions which sourced from an elitist will.

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# The Impact of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration on the Economies of Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace (1881-1912): A Preliminary Approach

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## Abstract

On 6 October 1875, the Ottoman Government declared the reduction of payments of interest on the foreign debt of the Empire by half. This decision led, six years later, to the imposition of international financial control on the Ottoman Empire, in order to secure the payment of the external debt. Sultan Abdulhamit II. proclaimed the Decree of Mouharrem of the 20th December 1881 by which the *Ottoman Public Debt Administration* (OPDA) was created. According to the Decree of Mouharrem, many sources of revenue were entrusted to the OPDA, including those from the salt monopoly, the silk tithe and the indirect taxes (from stamps, fishing, and spirits). The exploitation of the tobacco revenue, was also ceded to the OPDA, and was farmed to the *Société de la Régie cointéressée des tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman*, according to the 1883 agreement between the OPDA and the Ottoman Government. By the end of the 19th century, the OPDA controlled approximately 30 per cent of the Ottoman revenues. In order to achieve its goals, the OPDA tried to intensify the production of various agricultural products such as tobacco, cocoons, salt, and grapes. In addition, attempts were made to boost the trade of these products not only within the Empire but also in the international markets. The subject of this paper is to estimate the impact of the OPDA on the economies of the European provinces of the Empire, i.e. the *vilayets* of Yannina and Edirne as well as the three Macedonian *vilayets* (Thessaloniki, Monastir/Bitola, and Kosovo). In particular, it presents data on the agricultural production and the relevant manufacturing, since such products were partly used as raw material for industrial enterprises (tobacco factories, silk reeling enterprises, and wine factories), which operated in Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Data on the export trade from all these *vilayets* will also be provided to substantiate the argument that the involvement of the OPDA contributed not only to the intensification of agricultural production but also to cover part of the trade deficit.

*Keywords:* Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, Kosovo, Ottoman Empire, Agriculture, Industry, Public Debt.

*Work in progress. Not to be cited without the author's prior permission.*

## 1. Introduction

The Ottoman Empire, following its participation in the Crimean War, entered into loan contracts with London banks in 1854 and 1855.<sup>1</sup> On 6 October 1875, the Sublime Porte decided to default unilaterally on interest payments on its foreign debts due to a

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<sup>1</sup> Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire. A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1929, pp. 27-8.

number of loans that had been contracted under unfavourable conditions in the European stock markets as well as their irrational management. That payment default was due to the fact that, in 1874, the foreign debt alone took in approximately 55% of the total annual income of the Ottoman government. Indeed, in March 1876 the Ottoman Empire had declared bankruptcy since it was unable to pay the instalments.<sup>2</sup> Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Sultan came to an agreement with his Ottoman creditors, mainly Galata Bankers from Constantinople/ Istanbul (the most important of them being George Zariphes), and the Imperial Ottoman Bank which was of British and French interests. In particular, with the Decree of 10th November 1879, the Imperial Government ceded six sources of revenue to the bankers: tobacco and salt monopolies in the empire (for a ten years period), stamp tax, spirits tax, fish tax and silk tithe in certain districts. To this end, the Administration of the Six Indirect Contributions was established.<sup>3</sup> Hamilton Lang was appointed Head Administrator and organized a network with branches all over the Ottoman Empire in order to collect payments.<sup>4</sup> The arrangement proved to be successful and, already from the first year, the collected payments were adequate.

Later, and following severe pressure exercised by European creditors, mainly British and French, the Sultan was forced to compromise. Thus, on 20 December 1881, the Sultan issued the Decree of Mouharrem (so called from the Muslim month of the same name). That Decree regulated the internal and external debt of the Ottoman Empire and created also an institution, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA hereafter).<sup>5</sup>

OPDA has been the main instrument of European financial control over the Ottoman Empire. Although the Administration was a department of the Ottoman Ministry of Finance, it practically functioned as an independent section. The executive committee of the Administration, the Council of Administration, was based at Istanbul, and was constituted by seven representatives of the bondholders. One member represented the British, Dutch and Belgian bondholders, while five others represented the French, the German, the Austrian, the Italian, and the Ottoman holders, respectively. The seventh member was assigned by the Ottoman Bank so as to represent the holders of Priority Bonds. The revenues ceded to the bondholders were those from the tobacco and salt monopolies within the Ottoman Empire, the silk tithe from the districts of Istanbul, Adrianople/ Edirne, Broussa/ Bursa, and Samsun, the tax on fishing in Istanbul, and the stamp and spirits taxes.<sup>6</sup> The most important sources of revenue, as far as the income is concerned, were those coming from tobacco and salt monopolies.<sup>7</sup> On 27 May 1883, OPDA farmed the tobacco revenue to the *Société de la Régie cointéressée des tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman (Régie hereafter)*,

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<sup>2</sup> Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, p. 38, 80-1, Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914*, London and New York: Methuen, 1987, p. 108-10, Edhem Eldem, "Ottoman financial integration with Europe: foreign loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman public debt", *European Review*, 13:3 (2005), 431-445.

<sup>3</sup> Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, p. 97, Haris Exertzoglou, "The Development of a Greek Ottoman Bourgeoisie: Investment Patterns in the Ottoman Empire, 1850-1914", pp. 89-114, in Dimitri Gondicas, and Charles Issawi, *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Nineteenth Century*, Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1999, p. 93.

<sup>4</sup> Hamilton Lang was also the first director of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1882. Charles Morawitz, *Die Türkei im Spiegel ihrer Finanzen*, Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1903, p. 256.

<sup>5</sup> Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-99, Eldem, *op. cit.*, pp. 441-3, *Décret impérial rendu de 28 Mouharrem 1299 (soit le 8/20 décembre 1881) réglant le service de la dette publique consolidée de l'Empire Ottoman*, Constantinople: Levant Herald, 1894.

<sup>6</sup> Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 108-14, Morawitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-354, Owen, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-3.

<sup>7</sup> Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

for an annual rental of 17,000,000 French francs (£T 750,000) and profit share over a period of 30 years.<sup>8</sup>

In the course of time, OPDA and *Régie*, tried to boost the sections of agricultural economy and industry that were the source of their income. Thus, they took measures for the production of cocoons and silk industry, viniculture, winery, distillery, brewery, production and processing of tobacco and the production of salt.

The aim of this paper is to show how OPDA and *Régie* influenced the agricultural economy and industry of Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace, namely the European territories that were part of the Ottoman Empire from 1881 until 1912, the year that Balkan Wars started and eventually changed the map. Our analysis will be based on data from the annual financial reports issued by the consuls of Austria-Hungary and Britain mainly on the capitals of the *vilayets* (provinces).<sup>9</sup> The annual reports issued by OPDA have also been taken into account in this paper. However, these reports offer scant information on each *vilayet* individually since they present the general situation in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>10</sup>

The regions under consideration here are the *vilayet* of Yannina, the three Macedonian *vilayets* (Thessaloniki, Monastir/ Bitola, and Kosovo), and the *vilayet* of Edirne, that is all western and eastern Thrace except the regions of Çatalca and Istanbul. According to M. Palairet's estimates, these regions presented the following demographic picture:<sup>11</sup>

<i>Vilayet</i>	1885	1906
Edirne	903.000	1.441.000
Thessaloniki	1.069.000	995.000
Kosovo	931.000	949.000
Monastir/ Bitola	717.000	891.000
Yannina	557.000	611.000
<i>Total</i>	<i>4.177.000</i>	<i>4.887.000</i>

## 2. OPDA and *Régie*

OPDA and the Administration of the Six Indirect Contributions (in 1880-1881) operated a number of Local Control Offices and branch offices as well all over the Ottoman Empire. In Macedonia in 1881, the Administration of the Six Indirect Contributions was based in Thessaloniki and employed 608 persons (582 Muslims, 15

<sup>8</sup> Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-4, Morawitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-4, George Young, *Corps de droit Ottoman*, vol. 5, Oxford: 1906, pp. 189-247. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, one Turkish gold lira (£T) was worth approximately 22.8 French francs, or 0.91 British pounds sterling (£), Justin McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks. An Introductory History to 1923*, London & New York: Longman, 1997, p. 309.

<sup>9</sup> *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers (P.P.A.P.): 1880-1913, Commerzielle Berichte der kais. und kön. österreichisch-ungarischen Consular-Ämter. Beilage zur Wochenschrift "Das Handels-Museum" (Commerzielle Berichte): 1891-1899, Jahresberichte der k. und k. österreichisch-ungarischen Consularsbehörden - Nachrichten über Industrie, Handel und Verkehr aus dem Statistischen Department im K.K. Handels-Ministerium (Jahresberichte): 1880-1899, and Berichte der k. und k. österr.-ung. Consular-Ämter (Berichte): 1901-1912.*

<sup>10</sup> Vincent Caillard, *The Ottoman Public Debt, Special Report on the Ottoman Public Debt for the twelfth financial period (13<sup>th</sup> March, 1893, to 12<sup>th</sup> March, 1894)*, followed by the Translation of the *Annual Report for the same Year of the Council of Administration*, London, 1894.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Palairet, *The Balkan economies c. 1800-1914. Evolution without development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 13.

Greeks, 2 Jews and 9 foreigners). Oscar Edwards, a British subject,<sup>12</sup> was the Head Administrator. After 1881, Public Debt Collection Offices<sup>13</sup> were established in all cities and nearly in every large town and, in 1893-94 the permanent personnel of OPDA amounted to 4.835 (4.446 Muslims, 332 Non-Muslims, and 57 Foreigners) while temporary personnel amounted to 2.689 persons.<sup>14</sup>

In 1892, Riza Bey, a Turk, was the Director-General of the OPDA at Thessaloniki, while Oscar Edwards acted as Chief Comptroller. The personnel under their jurisdiction (in the *vilayets* of Thessaloniki, Monastir and Kosovo, and the *sanjak* (sub-province) of Komotene) amounted to 255 officials (12 directors, 46 sub-directors, 101 clerks, and 96 guards), of whom 246 were Muslims, 4 Greeks, 2 Bulgarians, and 3 Foreigners.<sup>15</sup> Even though the *sanjak* of Komotene (where Xanthe is also situated) fell under the administration of the *vilayet* of Edirne, it was under the direction of OPDA in Thessaloniki. In 1892, a French subject, Mr. Marechal, was the director of *Régie* at Thessaloniki. The *Régie* employed 87 inspectors, comptrollers and clerks (11 foreigners and 76 Ottomans), and 480 Muslims as guards for the prevention of tobacco smuggling which was extensively carried on in Macedonia and Thrace and particularly in Upper Albania.<sup>16</sup>

OPDA was closely cooperating with the Imperial Ottoman Bank in order to fulfill its mission. The amount collected by the officers of the OPDA was deposited to the local branch offices of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. In this manner, branch offices of the Imperial Ottoman Bank had no problems related to liquid resources and were thus much more competitive in comparison to other banks which were forced to take cash from their central branch in Thessaloniki or elsewhere. Likewise, no corruption phenomena have been mentioned during the collection of taxes (as it was the case before the operation of OPDA) since OPDA paid regularly the personnel's salaries.<sup>17</sup>

### 3. Agricultural production

#### 3.1. Sericulture

Sericulture has been one of the sectors of agricultural production that was greatly influenced by OPDA. Sericulture has been one of the most important cash crops in Thrace and in Macedonia during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. During the 1820s, Thrace exported silk to England,<sup>18</sup> while in 1830 there were silk workshops in Thessaloniki that were processing cocoons produced in the region.<sup>19</sup>

However, sericulture of these regions and of the entire Ottoman Empire suffered two major blows after the mid of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In 1858 silkworms were attacked by the epidemic *disease pébrine* that resulted in the rapid reduction of

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<sup>12</sup> PPAP, 1883, vol. LXXII, p. 102.

<sup>13</sup> McCarthy, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

<sup>14</sup> Caillard, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

<sup>15</sup> PPAP, 1893-94, vol. XCVII, 216.

<sup>16</sup> PPAP, 1893-94, vol. XCVII, 219.

<sup>17</sup> Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

<sup>18</sup> Michalis Riginos, "The Economic History of Silk. From the Periphery of Europe to the Periphery of Greece", in P. Gagoulia et al. (eds.), *Sericulture at Soufli*, Athens: ETBA, 1992, p. 35 (in Greek).

<sup>19</sup> David Urquhart, *Turkey and its Resources: Its Municipal Organization and Free Trade; The State and Prospects of English Commerce in the East, the New Administration of Greece, its Revenue and National Possessions*, London: Saunders and Otley, 1833, pp. 180-1.

cocoons production in Thrace from 900 tones in 1857 to 250 in 1868.<sup>20</sup> Secondly, in 1869 the Suez Canal was constructed and thus Chinese and Japanese silk started to reach the European market faster and cheaper.<sup>21</sup> These two events resulted in the rapid reduction of the Macedonian and Thracian cocoon prices while production remained in the lowest level until the early 1880s.

At the beginning, OPDA was responsible for the collection of silk tithes at the *vilayets* of Bursa, Edirne, Samsoun and the regions around Istanbul. For some other *vilayets*, among which Thessaloniki, OPDA was in charge of the collection of silk revenues in 1888 when it was so assigned by the Deutsche Bank within the frame of an agreement between the bank and the Ottoman government.<sup>22</sup>

At the mid 1880s and in order to boost sericulture, OPDA imported from France and Italy yellow silkworm eggs that were produced under the Pasteur method and were resistant to the disease.<sup>23</sup> Then, OPDA took care of the sericulturists' training with Pasteur's method so they could be able to produce their own seeds. Indeed, in 1897 and 1902, 75% of the seeds that Thracian sericulturists were using, came from the local producers (from the areas of Soufli and Myriofyto), and only 25% came from France.<sup>24</sup> Also, OPDA set up laboratories in Edirne and Soufli that were controlling seeds, while from 1898 it awarded special prizes to the best silk-rearers.<sup>25</sup> In cooperation with the Ottoman government, OPDA supported the cultivation of mulberry trees so that there would be sufficient numbers of mulberry leaves in low prices. OPDA and the Ottoman government gave free plants (mulberry saplings) to farmers and agriculturists, and thus, from 1890 to 1910 approximately 60,000,000 mulberry trees were planted in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>26</sup>

In Macedonia, the OPDA and the Ottoman government supported sericulture in various ways. From 1891 to 1892 the farmers of Thessaloniki were supplied with 29,000 mulberry saplings and cultivators were exempted of taxes for three years. This policy of boosting sericulture continued in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century when "Farme modèle" (the governmental model farm) in Thessaloniki, gave each year 40,000 to 50,000 saplings to farmers for free.<sup>27</sup>

Besides measurements that aimed at increasing the production of cocoons, OPDA participated in the cocoons sales by organizing public auctions at the main sericulture centers so that cultivators could sell their products at the best possible prices. In 1905, in the *vilayet* of Edirne auctions took place at Edirne, Soufli, Didymoteicho/ Demotika, Svilengrad/ Mustapha Pasha, Ivailovgrad/ Ortaköy, and Tekir Dag/ Rodosto.<sup>28</sup> That auctions were useful for the cultivators also because the calculation of the tax was made on the basis of the sale price and thus, cultivators were protected by the high-handed actions of the councils of the *sanjaks* and *kazas*, which otherwise, would be responsible to define the value of products. The tax amounted in total 12.1% out of which 10% for OPDA and 2.1% for various

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<sup>20</sup> Riginos, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>21</sup> Donald Quataert, "The silk industry of Bursa, 1880-1914", in Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, Cambridge, and Paris: 1987, p. 286-287.

<sup>22</sup> Morawitz, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

<sup>23</sup> *Jahresberichte*, 64. See also Ahmet O. Akarlı, "Growth and retardation in Ottoman Macedonia, 1880-1910", in Ş. Pamuk, and J. Williamson (eds.), *The Mediterranean Response to Globalization before 1950*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 119.

<sup>24</sup> *Jahresberichte*, 27 (1899), 280, *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1902, 3.

<sup>25</sup> *Jahresberichte*, 27 (1899), 275, *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1905, 3.

<sup>26</sup> Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

<sup>27</sup> *Berichte*, Salonich, 1906, 53.

<sup>28</sup> *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1905, 3.

governmental services.<sup>29</sup> In the *vilayet* of Edirne, the measures taken by OPDA increased the production of fresh cocoons in 1901 in amounts similar to those before the appearance of the epidemic disease (804.8 tons). At the end of the decade, the production had doubled (see table 2).

From 1888 onwards, the production of cocoons had progressed also in Macedonia. In only four years, from 1888 to 1892, OPDA increased its incomes from the tax from 205,200 fr. (9,000 £) to 501,000 fr. (20,000 £).<sup>30</sup> The sericulture center of Macedonia was the region of Gevgeli. In 1906 this region gave the majority of the annual cocoon production (approximately 770 tons) that came up to more than 1,282 tons.<sup>31</sup> Cocoons were exported from the region of Macedonia mainly to Italy and less to France or Bursa, the sericulture center of the Ottoman Empire. Exports from Thessaloniki tripled in the period from 1891 to 1906 (see table 1). Small quantities of cocoons stayed in the region for cottage industries and the silk workshop of Gevgeli. The cocoons of the region of Macedonia were so strongly depended on the Italian market that exports to Italy continued even after the beginning of the Italo-Turkish War on 29 September 1911.

Even though Italy imposed duties 30 Centimes/kg and later 60 Centimes/kg on the cocoons coming from the Ottoman Empire that were duty-free in the past, and although cocoon prices dropped 25-30% in relation to the previous year, the Macedonian merchants continued to send their products to Italy.<sup>32</sup> The exports from Thrace were heading to Italy, France and, mainly, to Bursa even though an important part of the production remained at the local silk industries.<sup>33</sup>

### 3.2. Tobacco cultivation

The cultivation of tobacco was also one of the most important cash crops in Macedonia and Thrace from the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century when the distinguished tobacco variety was Yenidje (Xanthe) and Vardar.<sup>34</sup> By contrast with the income from the silk, income from the tobacco monopoly was important when OPDA, and *Régie* afterwards, were responsible for the collection of tobacco returns. Two main goals of *Régie* were to increase the tobacco production in Macedonia, Thrace and Epirus but also to buy the said production from tobacco growers in relatively low prices. The third goal of *Régie* was to fight tobacco smuggling that was taking place in many regions of the Ottoman Empire (Arabia, Anatolia, Albania and north Macedonia). This is why *Régie* employed a great number of guards. In the fight against tobacco smuggling, *Régie* was not always assisted by the government. Thus, in 1895 *Régie* reclaimed lands with illegal tobacco cultivations and confiscated undeclared tobacco bulks. In return, farmers in all the Ottoman Empire reacted strongly and the government, in fear of eminent riots, did not support the work of *Régie*.<sup>35</sup>

In its effort to encourage tobacco growers to be engaged in tobacco cultivation, and to reduce tobacco smuggling, *Régie* announced that growers who wished to be recorded in its registers had to present cultivable region covering an area of only 455,5 sq. meters (namely, the half of one dönüm that was equivalent to 911

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<sup>29</sup> Morawitz, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

<sup>30</sup> PPAP, 1893-94, vol. XCVII, 215.

<sup>31</sup> *Berichte*, Salonich, 1906, 53.

<sup>32</sup> *Berichte*, Salonich, 1911, 11.

<sup>33</sup> *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1902, 3.

<sup>34</sup> Morawitz, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 329.

sq. meters).<sup>36</sup> The said policy that aimed at encouraging the tobacco cultivation continued during 1880 and 1890 and resulted in an increase of the registered tobacco producers. From 1890 to 1897 the number of tobacco growers increased approximately 2,5 times in the *sanjak* of Edirne (from 5,666 to 13,685) while the total cultivation area increased from 10,575 dönüms to 26,710.<sup>37</sup> As far as the number of tobacco growers is concerned in *vilayets* of Monastir and Kosovo, see tables 4 and 6.

However, the tobacco production in Epirus was not important.<sup>38</sup> This is why *Régie* took measures to boost tobacco cultivation in the area of Preveza in 1890, unsuccessfully since farmers thought that the price suggested by *Régie* was not profitable.<sup>39</sup>

At the *vilayet* of Kosovo, tobacco cultivation was particularly developed as well as the tobacco smuggling and thus, the produced tobacco quantities that were registered were less than the real ones. It is estimated that until 1890, approximately the 50% of the tobacco produced in the *vilayet* of Kosovo, mostly from the Albanian regions and mainly the best quality tobacco from the Elbasan area, was canalized to smugglers. During the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the said percentage dropped to approximately 35% (570,000 fr. or 25,000 £T in 1905).<sup>40</sup>

*Régie* has not been the unique buyer of tobacco from the producers. In 1893-94, *Régie* shared two thirds of the export trade in Macedonia with the Italian firm *Fratelli Allatini*, and the Austro-Hungarian firm *Herzog and Company*.<sup>41</sup> Local traders bought the rest of the production so as to sell it abroad. Thus, in 1885 in Xanthe and Porto Lagos the tobacco trade involved not only the Fratelli Allatini & Friedrich Charnaud, but also several Greeks and Ottomans such as Mehmet Choukri Effendi, Mehmet Effendi Molah Zadè, Halil Pacha, Haggi Haffus Effendi, D.A. Condopulo, P. Stallio, Z. Stallio & Comp., G. Portocalloglu, Fratelli Papasoglu, Haggi Stavro Hekimoglu, A. Hristides, Th. Allagidis and C. Enfiegioglu.<sup>42</sup>

Tobacco growers could either sell their product to *Régie* or to licensed private traders. In fact, if tobacco growers had not been able to sell their product within two years, *Régie* had to buy their tobacco in a fixed price.<sup>43</sup> *Régie* usually bought large quantities of low quality tobacco in order to process them in its tobacco factories in Thessaloniki, Smyrna and elsewhere. The question that was related to the processing of high quality tobacco was laid for the first time in 1892-93 with the aim of producing cigarettes for the ottoman market.<sup>44</sup>

Due to the obligation of *Régie* to buy the whole tobacco crop, disputes between tobacco growers and the *Régie* officials occurred from time to time. Such a dispute was recorded in 1892 (?) in Xanthe when tobacco growers relying on the “Cahier des Charges” of the *Régie* tried to force their tobacco production to *Régie*, which was already overstocked. *Régie* officials refused to buy more quantity of the expensive tobaccos. Before being quieted by promises, tobacco growers threatened

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<sup>36</sup> J. Frh. von Schwegel, “Das türkische Tabakmonopol”, *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, 10 (1884), 66, Morawitz, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

<sup>37</sup> *Jahresberichte*, 26 (1898), 134.

<sup>38</sup> Tobacco production in Albania and Epirus in 1882 amounted to 1,025 tons. Von Schwegel, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>39</sup> PPAP, 1892, vol. LXXXIV, 460.

<sup>40</sup> *Commercielle Berichte*, 5.5.1892, 274, *Berichte*, Ueskub, 1906, 4.

<sup>41</sup> PPAP, 1896, vol. LXXXIX, 65-6.

<sup>42</sup> Nicolaus Gergomilla, “Lagos-Xanthi”, *Jahresberichte*, 1885, 765.

<sup>43</sup> Morawitz, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 327.

*Régie* officials and sent telegrams to the Sultan.<sup>45</sup> Disputes also have taken place between tobacco merchants and the *Régie*. Such has been a case in Kavala in the mid-1880s when export firms appealed to the Embassies at Istanbul complaining about the custom-house formalities which have been enforced by the agents of *Régie* with regard to the exported tobacco.<sup>46</sup>

Of course there have been occasions where *Régie* was trying to come to an agreement with private merchants so as to keep the tobacco prices in low levels. This was the case in 1904 and 1910 at the *vilayet* of Kosovo. Indeed in 1910, *Régie* and private merchants agreed to pay no more than 8 silver piastres for each tobacco oka (1.282 kgr). Tobacco growers reacted and claimed that only the production expenses came up to 10-12 piastres. Thus, they refused to sell their production. Then the Istanbul government was forced to examine this issue so as to find a fruitful solution in a critical era after the rising of the Albanians and the reappearance of the first Bulgarian guerilla bands in the region.<sup>47</sup> It seems that the tax issue for tobacco preoccupied the Albanians. On 20 May 1912, thousands of Albanian rebels were gathered in Junik (a region of Peć) and demanded from the government, among other things, to dispose the income from the tobacco and alcohol tax for the financial development of Albanian regions.<sup>48</sup>

Depending on their quality, tobaccos that were produced in Eastern Macedonia (and in Western Thrace), were divided into four categories: the best quality was the so-called Giubek, followed by the Kir, Prosotsani, and Drama qualities.<sup>49</sup> The high quality of the Xanthe tobacco attracted foreign tobacco growers who tried to transport this variety in their homelands. The Russians came first in 1887, bought tobacco seeds from Kavala and Xanthe in order to grow these varieties in the area of Caucasus.<sup>50</sup> Later on, shortly after 1900, an American company unsuccessfully tried to grow Xanthe tobacco seeds in the United States.<sup>51</sup> In 1908, the British have tried to grow tobacco similar to the one of Xanthe to Rhodesia.<sup>52</sup>

The important development of tobacco cultivation in Macedonia and Thrace from 1902 onwards, is mainly due to the involvement of the American Tobacco Co. in the local tobacco market. This company, in an effort to take a large portion of the market from its competitors, bought in 1902 large tobacco quantities in very high prices by the tobacco growers of Thrace and Macedonia and paid high advances for the next year crop.<sup>53</sup> Thus, tobacco prices have raised and the number of cultivated fields in Macedonia and Thrace has increased.<sup>54</sup> A distinctive example of the aforesaid is that while in 1902 and 1903 the ports of Alexandroupolis and Porto Lagos

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<sup>45</sup> PPAP, 1893-94, vol. XCVII, 241.

<sup>46</sup> PPAP, 1887, vol. LXXXVI, 465.

<sup>47</sup> *Berichte*, Uesküb, 1904, 7, *Berichte*, Uesküb, 1910, 2.

<sup>48</sup> Peter Bartl, *Albanien. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1995, σ. 131.

<sup>49</sup> See comparative prices table, Basil C. Gounaris, *Steam over Macedonia, 1870-1912. Socio-economic Change and the Railway Factor*, Boulder: East European Monographs, 1993, p. 114-5.

<sup>50</sup> *Commerzielle Berichte*, 9.6.1892, 394.

<sup>51</sup> *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1906, 3.

<sup>52</sup> Sir Robert Graves, *Storm Centers of the Near East. Personal Memories 1879-1929*, London, 1933, p. 230, "In the train which took me back [from Drama] to Salonika [March 1908] I made the acquaintance of a tobacco merchant of Xanthi, who was able to tell me that twelve tobacco growers of that district had been successfully got out of the country and sent to Rhodesia, thanks to Madame Kathi's discreet handling of the matter."

<sup>53</sup> *Berichte*, Salonich, 1902, 19.

<sup>54</sup> "Tabakanbau und Tabakausfuhr der europäischen Türkei", *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, 33 (1907), 44.

exported equal quantities of tobacco (2,415 tons in 1902 and 2,343.6 tons in 1903), their value in 1903 was 41% higher than the previous year, namely from 9,433,500 francs to 13,346,115.<sup>55</sup>

In many districts in 1903 tobacco had been grown in regions with double-size in comparison to 1902.<sup>56</sup> Although the coming years the price increases were irrelative to the years of 1902 and 1903, prices remained up afterwards.<sup>57</sup> As a result, farmers abandoned the cultivation of cereals and grapes (in Thrace), poppy and cannabis (Florina and Perlepe) in order to grow tobacco.<sup>58</sup> Tobacco exports from the port of Thessaloniki tripled from 1903 to 1910 (table 5). Between 1905 and 1910 in the *vilayet* of Monastir land given to tobacco had increased more than 100% (table 6). In the *vilayet* of Edirne (*sanjak* of Komotene included) annual tobacco production amounted during the second half of the 1900s from 4,000 tons to 5,000 tons (table 8). At the end of the 1900s, farmers of the *vilayet* of Kosovo abandoned the cultivation of cereals and started to grow tobacco. Thus, tobacco production increased from 1.200 tons in 1908 to 3.000 tons the coming year and to 4.000 tons in 1910 (table 4),<sup>59</sup> and tobacco exports tripled from 1900 to 1908 (table 3). According to estimations,<sup>60</sup> the annual production of tobacco in Macedonia and Thrace in the mid-1900s came up to 11,800 tons (see table 9). *Régie*, in response, tried from 1905 and onwards, to prevent the additional expansion of tobacco cultivation in regions such as those which were located near Edirne where there were low quality tobaccos and there the risk of smuggling was evident due to the overproduction of tobacco.<sup>61</sup>

### 3.3. Viticulture

OPDA was assigned with the collection of taxes for alcoholic drinks; thus, it was only natural to engage in viticulture, one of the most important branches of agricultural economy in Macedonia, Thrace and Epirus. Viticulture offered raw material for the preparation of wine and raki, drinks largely consumed in the Ottoman Empire, as well as export products. Most vineyards were small in size and were being exploited by individual families. Farmers used part of the production of grapes to produce wine or raki for their own needs, while the produce surplus was directed to the local or international market either as grapes or as wine or raki. In fact, each producer had the right to keep 256.4 krgs (200 okas) of the annual wine produce tax-free.<sup>62</sup>

Viticulture was also especially developed in Macedonia and mainly in Thrace from the beginning of the 1880s up to the end of the 1890s, when demand for local wines was great in the French market. This was due to the fact that phylloxera had struck the French vineyards and their production was reduced up to around 1895.

The fact that at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century there were no significant vine diseases contributed to the development of viticulture in Macedonia and Thrace during this period, in contrast to the vineyards in the region of Istanbul and Smyrna, where phylloxera appeared in 1884. This way, the performance of the vineyards of

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<sup>55</sup> *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1903, 22.

<sup>56</sup> "Tabakanbau und Tabakausfuhr der europäischen Türkei", *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, 33 (1907), 44.

<sup>57</sup> Gounaris, *op. cit.*, pp. 113 and 126.

<sup>58</sup> *Berichte*, Monastir, 1903, 4, *Berichte*, Monastir, 1907, 3. See also Akarlı, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

<sup>59</sup> *Berichte*, Uesküb, 1909, 4-5, *Berichte*, Uesküb, 1910, 2.

<sup>60</sup> "Tabakanbau und Tabakausfuhr der europäischen Türkei", *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, 33 (1907), 43.

<sup>61</sup> *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1905, 2.

<sup>62</sup> Morawitz, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

Macedonia and Thrace continued being high at least up to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Nevertheless, when, immediately after 1900, peronospora was causing farmers severe problems in the *vilayets* of Monastir, Kosovo and Edirne, OPDA supported the vine growers and provided -under favourable financial conditions- the farmers with machinery and materials to fight the disease.<sup>63</sup>

## 4. Manufacturing

### 4.1. Silk industry

Although great part of the cocoon production of Macedonia and Thrace was exported either in other *vilayets*, mainly in Bursa, or abroad, a part of it made up the raw material for the numerous cottage industries running in cities and villages in all cocoon producing areas. Abundance in cocoon raw material gradually led to the increase in silk thread quantities produced by local silk workshops. In Edirne, where two silk workshops were operating since 1864 and 1865, there were four silk workshops by 1902.<sup>64</sup> All four were situated close to the city's railway station, in Karagac, and employed around 600 girls, while the first silk workshop that operated in Soufli in 1903 employed 80 girls with a day wage of 2 to 5 piastres.

In 1903, all five silk workshops in Edirne and Soufli produced 52 tons silk threads. During the same period, in 1905 and in the same areas the cottage industry total production was barely 500 kgrs.<sup>65</sup> In 1902 the three silk workshops in Edirne absorbed 30% (241 tons) of the *vilayet's* total cocoon production. In fact, in order not to have a problem with providing raw material, a quantity of cocoons was imported tax free from Bulgaria.<sup>66</sup> The rest of the *vilayet's* production was exported to Bursa and France. The development of silk industry was such as to attract fund investments from Italy in 1909. Ceriano Fratelli company from Milan set up a silk workshop to process cocoons and produce threads that were exported to Italy. However, at the end of 1911, the Italian company suspended production due to the Italo-Turkish war.<sup>67</sup>

In Thessaloniki, in the early 1870s, there were 18 silk factories that employed 950 workers<sup>68</sup> and at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century OPDA was managing a silk workshop in Gevgeli. In 1906, that silk workshop was leased to a French company and annually processed 15,000 to 20,000 kgrs of cocoons, producing 6,000 to 7,000 kgrs fine quality silk threads, which were exported to Vienna, America and Australia. But in 1910, the silk workshop closed down due to high day wages that had been increased primarily after 1908.<sup>69</sup>

### 4.2. Tobacco factories

*Régie* kept a cigarette factory in Thessaloniki, where in 1884 250 persons were employed, most of them Jewish girls, and turned out 100,000 machine-made

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<sup>63</sup> *Berichte*, Uesküb, 1901, 3, *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1902, 2, and *Berichte*, Monastir, 1904, 4.

<sup>64</sup> Riginos, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-6.

<sup>65</sup> *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1905, 5 and *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1906, 5.

<sup>66</sup> *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1902, 5.

<sup>67</sup> Riginos, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-7.

<sup>68</sup> Gounaris, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

<sup>69</sup> *Berichte*, Salonich, 1906, 38 and 54, *Berichte*, Salonich, 1910, 8. In 1901 a silk factory employed 120 workers in Gevgeli, Gounaris, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

cigarettes per day.<sup>70</sup> The produce of the factory increased between 1888 and 1892 from 10,000,000 to 22,000,000 cigarettes per year and in 1892 it was under the management of Gregory Lucas, a British subject, and employed 15 foremen, 5 Ottomans as guards and 330 manipulators, 270 of whom were Jews (70 men and 200 girls) and 60 Greeks and Bulgarians (10 men and 50 girls).<sup>71</sup> Wages at the *Régie* factory were much higher than 70% compared to the wages of the 640 Jewish workers (160 men and 480 girls) at the two cotton mills at Thessaloniki in the same year.<sup>72</sup>

There were a great number of tobacco workers in Kavala, numbering approximately 12,000 people in 1908. When, during the summer of that year and after the Young Turk movement, many workers in the Ottoman Empire went on strike to claim pay rise and better working conditions, nearly all workers in Kavala went on strike on 14 September. A bit earlier, on 23 August, *Régie's* workers in Thessaloniki had done the same.

#### 4.3. Wine factories, distilleries, breweries

Vine produce abundance and fine quality allowed wine makers to use it as inexpensive and fine raw material for the production of wine. As mentioned above, many farmers produced wine for their families' needs. But there were also wineries that directed their products into local and international markets. In general, it is mentioned that vinification methods used by producers in the areas in question were by far inferior to the methods used by their fellow workers in other parts of Europe. However, given that the grapes were of very fine quality, the wine produced could be directed to international markets, too.

Hence, Macedonian wines were exported to Serbia, Switzerland etc, while Eastern Thrace wines, mainly wines from Kirkklari (Kirk Kilise/ Saranta Ekklisies) and areas like Soufli were even channelled to the French market, where they were blended with French wines with less vivid colour and alcohol content.<sup>73</sup> As mentioned above, the phylloxera spreading in France from the middle of the 1880s to roughly the middle of the next decade was an important factor for the development of viticulture and vinification mainly in Thrace. Even in 1905 when John Foster Fraser visited Kirkklari, from where red wine was exported to France to be blended with French wines, he wrote about Kirkklari in the book he published: "Where the 'Best Bordeaux' comes from".<sup>74</sup> Actually, for a number of years the *vilayet* of Edirne exported the greatest quantities of wine, in relation to the rest *vilayets* of the Empire. Therefore, in 1900 it exported 7,398.3 tons from a total of 17,118.7 tons of the whole country,<sup>75</sup> while from 1899 to 1905 the average annual wine production of the *vilayet* amounted ca 209,000 hl. (see tables 11 and 12).

Macedonia exported smaller quantities since the local market was absorbing major part of the production, while a lot of grapes were being sold as table to the local or international markets or were being exported for vinification to Bulgaria or Serbia. In the beginning of the 1890s, the average annual wine produce in the *vilayet* of

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<sup>70</sup> PPAP, 1887, vol. LXXXVI, p. 399, Gounaris, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>71</sup> PPAP, 1893-94, vol. XCVII, 218-9.

<sup>72</sup> PPAP, 1893-94, vol. XCVII, 219 and 230.

<sup>73</sup> *Jahresberichte*, 20, 1892, 188, *Commercielle Berichte*, 3.6.1897, 423, *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1902, 2.

<sup>74</sup> The chapter in Fraser's book was entitled: "Where the 'Best Bordeaux' comes from", John Foster Fraser, *Pictures from the Balkans*, London, New York, Toronto, and Melbourne: 1912 (1<sup>st</sup> ed. 1906), p. 123-131.

<sup>75</sup> Morawitz, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

Thessaloniki was estimated in 120,000 hl., in Monastir 35,000 hl., in Skopje 60,000 hl., while in Prisen and the *sanjak* of Novi Pazar 50,000 hl., which is a total of 265,000 hl. In 1890 it was 210,000 hl. from which only 3,000 to 4,000 hl. were exported.<sup>76</sup> Wine production in the *vilayet* of Monastir quadrupled between 1891 and 1904 (table 10).

About distillery, we must note that its basic produce was raki, which was largely consumed not only in the Ottoman Empire European but also Asian provinces. Like with wine, the raki produced by local producers was partly consumed by their families, but there was also a surplus that was directed to the local market, in other *vilayets* or even abroad, like in Serbia.

The new alcoholic produce that appeared in the Ottoman Empire's European provinces during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was beer. In the region of Edirne, the consumption of beer was unknown up to around 1870. In Thessaloniki the steam brewery of Misrachi, Fernandez & Cie began work on 11 July 1893 and its annual production amounted to 20,000 hl. (440,000 gallons) of beer.<sup>77</sup> The Thessaloniki brewery provided not only the market in Macedonia (Skopje, Monastir) with its produce, but Edirne and Istanbul as well.

A negative factor on the increase of the production of alcoholic drinks was the high tax percentage imposed by the Ottoman government on the local alcoholic products in relation to the imported ones. Alcoholic drinks produced in the Ottoman Empire were burdened with a high tax percentage, which in the case of wine was, apart from the tithe and the *verghi* tax, a tax to the tune of 15% for OPDA that the producer had to pay within three months after production, regardless of whether he had sold the product or not. *Kaza* or *sanjak* councils, that took many arbitrary decisions, evaluated the worth of production. OPDA returned to the exporters half of the tax of the 15% in order to encourage wine exportation.<sup>78</sup>

But in this way, these products, and especially beer, were facing severe competition by equivalent products imported from abroad. This situation did not favour the further development of brewery, which could also develop in Thrace, where there was plentiful and inexpensive raw material (barley), which was in fact exported abroad to be used in brewery.<sup>79</sup> The situation in the *vilayet* of Monastir was also difficult. The effort made there in 1891 by two breweries in Bukovo and Tyrnovo near Monastir was discontinued.<sup>80</sup> The steam engine brewery "Première fabrique à vapeur de bière Kosovo" with an annual beer produce of 4,000 to 5,000 hl. operated in Skopje only just in autumn 1910.<sup>81</sup>

## 5. Conclusions

The involvement of OPDA in the Ottoman Empire's European provinces agricultural economy after 1881 resulted in the development of sericulture and viticulture, and in the increased production of tobacco (through *Régie*). In sericulture, despite the big problems up to the mid-1880s, OPDA's dynamic interference led to a great increase in the production of cocoons in Macedonia (from where they were being exported to

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<sup>76</sup> *Commercielle Berichte*, 2.5.1892, 303.

<sup>77</sup> PPAP, 1893-94, vol. XCVII, p. 229, Gounaris, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

<sup>78</sup> Morawitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 344-5.

<sup>79</sup> *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1901, 2.

<sup>80</sup> *Commerzielle Berichte*, 9.6.1892, 400.

<sup>81</sup> *Berichte*, 1910, Ueskub, 8.

Italy) and mainly in Thrace, where, in fact, part of the production was being used as raw material for the silk workshops in Edirne and Soufli. As far as tobacco growing is concerned, OPDA initially and *Régie* afterwards did not face any particular problems in their efforts to increase production - with the exception of Epirus - as the tobacco of both Macedonia and Thrace was in great demand in international markets. In fact, after 1902 a lot of farmers in Macedonia and Thrace were abandoning other cultivations, especially cereals, to engage in it, the financial benefit being greater, due to the increase in tobacco prices because of the involvement of American companies in the trade of Macedonian and Thracian tobacco. In many cases, there have been disputes recorded between *Régie* and tobacco merchants or farmers over the issue of the purchase of the crop, while the problem of the smuggling of tobacco, which *Régie* attempted to tackle, was major, mainly in north Macedonia and the Albanian regions. Spirits production is a field in which OPDA made huge efforts to help producers, who were facing severe competition by equivalent products of other countries. The local wine and raki produce fully satisfied the needs of the market in Epirus and Macedonia, while Thrace exported great part of the wine produce in France, mainly up to the first years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when OPDA helped vine growers of Macedonia and Thrace fight vine diseases. The work by OPDA and *Régie* was also favoured by the expansion of the railway network in Macedonia and Thrace, from the beginning of the 1870s up to the middle of the 1890s, as the agricultural products of the area could now be transferred faster and cheaper to the local and international markets. Finally, another factor that supported their work was the fact that, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, other cultivations, like cereals were not profitable and the farmers abandoned them to engage in cocoon, tobacco and vine culture so that they would get more cash and OPDA and *Régie* would increase their profits.

**TABLE 1.** Cocoons Production and Exports (*Vilayet* of Thessaloniki)

Year	Production (Fresh) (Tons)	Exports (Dry) (Tons)	Exports (Fr.)
1891		200	
1902		450-500	4,500,000- 5.000.000
1903			5,000,000 (?)
1904			
1905		450	4,125,000
1906	1,282	641-705	5,250,000
1907	2,201.6	700	6,000,000
1908	2,400	430	4,600,000
1909	1,500	500 (?)	
1910	1,500	550	
1911		572	5,000,000

Sources: *Jahresberichte* 1891, *Berichte*, Salonich 1901 to 1911.

**TABLE 2.** Fresh Cocoon Production in the *Vilayet* of Edirne

Year	Tons
1857	900
1859	665
1869	250
1877	200
1899	700
1900	538.6
1901	804.8
1902	803
1904	1,180
1905	1,320
1906	1,200
1907	1,800
1908	1,300
1910	1,500
1911	1,620

Sources: *Commerzielle Berichte*, 1877 and 1899, *Berichte*, 1901 to 1910, and Riginos, *op. cit.*, p. 35 and 37 for 1857, 1859, 1869, and 1911.

**TABLE 3.** Tobacco Exports from the *Vilayet* of Kosovo

<b>Year</b>	<b>Exports (Tons)</b>	<b>Exports (Fr.)</b>
1891	490.2	380,000
1900	520	525,000
1901	530.6	420,000
1902	1,067	420,000
1903	787	
1904	543	
1905	1,000	
1906	1,417	
1907	1,480	2,651,000
1908	1,768	2,650,000 or 2,782,500
1909	1,187 or 1,700	2,000,000 (?)
1910	2,323	5,610,045

Sources: *Jahresberichte* 1891, *Berichte* Ueskub 1901 to 1910

**TABLE 4.** Tobacco Production in the *Vilayet* of Kosovo

<b>Year</b>	<b>Cultivators</b>	<b>Licences</b>	<b>Sown Land (Dönüms)</b>	<b>Production (Tons)</b>
1891	2,465		7,860	
1900			15,000	573
1901	6,298		14,482	946
1903				1,160
1904			36,500	850
1907	6,341	10,644	26,024	1,098.9
1908	5,976	9,961	24,480	837? (1,200?)
1909				3,000
1910				4,000

Sources: *Jahresberichte* 1891, *Berichte*, Ueskub 1901 to 1911.

**TABLE 5.** Tobacco Exports from the *Vilayet* of Thessaloniki

Year	Thessaloniki		Kavala-Xanthe	
	Tons	Fr.	Tons	Fr.
1891			3,300	
1901	700		10,000	34,000,000
1902	1,300	2,600,000	12,000	50,000,000
1903	1,500	4,000,000	9,000	36,000,000
1904	2,000	4,500,000	10,000	25,000,000
1905	1,500	3,000,000	8,000	16,000,000
1907	1,700	4,000,000	9,000	27,000,000
1908	2,000	5,000,000		
1909	2,000	6,000,000	6,000	20,000,000
1910	4,500	12,000,000	9,500	23,500,000
1911	4,930	16,000,000 (?)		

Sources: *Jahresberichte* 1891, *Berichte*, Salonich 1901 to 1911.

**TABLE 6.** Tobacco Production in the *Vilayet* of Monastir

Year	Cultivators	Sown Land (Dönüms)	Production (Tons)
1891			33.8
1900			145
1901			200
1902			110
1903			356.7
1904			150
1905	2,132	6,211	224.5
1906	2,286	6,981	470.7
1907			141
1910		13,494	1,130

Sources: *Jahresberichte* 1891, *Berichte*, Monastir 1901 to 1911.

**TABLE 7.** Tobacco Production in the *Sanjak* of Edirne

Year	Tons
1882	340.5 (?)
1884	1,000
1885	1,225
1890/91	305
1891/92	419
1897	1,506
1899	1,500
1901	784

Sources: *Commerzielle Berichte*, 1882, 1884-1885, 1890-1891, 1897, and 1899, *Berichte*, 1901.

**TABLE 8.** Tobacco Production in the *Vilayet* of Edirne

Year	Tons
1906	4,000
1907	4,050
1908	5,000
1910	4,000

Sources: *Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1906 to 1910. *Sanjak* of Komotene included (*Berichte*, Adrianopel, 1907, 2).

**TABLE 9.** Tobacco production (tons) in Macedonia and Thrace (early 20<sup>th</sup> century)

East Macedonia		Thrace		Thessaloniki-Skopje	
Serres	1,200	Xanthe-Komotene	2,300	Mayadagh	80
Drama	2,700	Soufli	240	Kilkis	220
Eleutheroupolis	1,000	Kuschu-Kavak	360	Langada	70
Kavala	300	Svilengrad	260	Skopje	1,400
Nevrokop	500	Kirdjali	220	Tsinarli-Dere	180
Djuma	500			Stip	270
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,200</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>3,380</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>2,220</b>

Source: "Tabakanbau und Tabakausfuhr der europäischen Türkei", *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient*, 33 (1907), 43.

**TABLE 10.** Wine production in the *Vilayet* of Monastir

Year	Tons
1891	2,720
1903	9,422.7
1904	11,538
1905	10,256
1906	7,029
1907	7,100
1909	12,000
1910	6,226.8

Sources: *Jahresberichte* 1891, *Berichte*, Monastir 1903 to 1910.

**TABLE 11.** Wine Production (hl) in the *Vilayet* of Edirne

Sanjak	1900	1901
Edirne	40,802	10,720
Kirklaleri	136,032	49,270
Gelibolu / Kallipolis	62,000	37,400
Tekir Dag/ Rodosto	16,943	5,400
Alexandroupolis	21,409	11,300
<b>Total</b>	<b>277,186</b>	<b>114,090</b>

Source: *Berichte*, Adrianopol, 1901. *Sanjak* of Komotene not included.

**TABLE 12.** Wine and Raki Production (hl) in the *Vilayet* of Edirne

Year	Wine	Raki
1885	100,000	
1886	>128,000	
1895	17,948 tons or 21,794 tons	
1899	120,000	
1900	277,186	
1901	114,090	
1902	185,000	8,090
1903	237,300	
1904	310,000	29,000 (?)
1905	220,000	29,000

Sources: *Commerzielle Berichte*, Adrianople and Kirk Kilise (Kirklareli), 1885 to 1899, and *Berichte*, 1901 to 1905. *Sanjak* of Komotene not included.

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## *Elusive Wounds*

### **A problematised snapshot of the *brava gente* myth: ‘good’ Italian and ‘bad’ German occupiers in Greece (1941-44)**

Paper presented at the 4<sup>th</sup> Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium on Contemporary Greece and Cyprus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 25 June 2009

*Captain Corelli's Mandolin*; *Mediterraneo*: these are the stereotypical representations of the international and often Greek impression of the Italian occupation of Greece between 1941 and 1943.<sup>1</sup> And now, *A Song for Argyris* – the documentary about the 1944 German massacre at Distomo – can be found on the shelves of your local Athenian video club.<sup>2</sup> The stereotype is publicly repeated again and again: the Italians were ‘good people’; the Germans, bad. Simple, straightforward; and complete nonsense, if what makes the Italians ‘good’ is that they only burnt to the ground 500 Greek villages compared to the German total of 1,000. It is therefore a welcome relief that the new movement within Italian historiography spearheaded by historians like Filippo Focardi, Davide Rodogno and Lidia Santarelli is gathering momentum and the full story of the Italian occupation and the war crimes committed in Greece, Yugoslavia and Ethiopia is surfacing once more.<sup>3</sup> Hagen Fleischer’s latest and forthcoming publications on public memory and war crimes means that Greek historiography is catching up with these developments but the seminal works on the Occupation (all written during the 1980s and 1990s and gathering obsolescence) reproduce the myth of Italian moderation.<sup>4</sup> It’s worthwhile stressing, therefore, that this wasn’t always the interpretation. In 1946, what the Italian Army had done to Greece was considered criminal. The National Hellenic Office for War Criminals condemned the Italian annexation of Greek territory, the resultant famine in the provinces and numerous acts of torture and massacres in villages such as Domeniko in northern Greece. The Office for War Criminals writes, in fact, that the:

‘destructive mania of the Italians...did not differ at all from the German hordes that succeeded them in September 1943. Domenico, in effect, was nothing but the curtain rise of a tragedy that would continue at an ever faster pace’.<sup>5</sup>

What the Italians did in Greece was barely less savage than German actions; the difference, if any, was quantity. There was no Greek attempt to exculpate the Italians from their crimes in 1946 when the Paris Peace Treaty (concluding the Second World War) was being drafted. And

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<sup>1</sup> Louis de Bernières, *Captain Corelli's Mandolin* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1994); *Mediterraneo*, dir. Gabriele Salvatores (Silvio Berlusconi Communications, et al., 1991).

<sup>2</sup> *A Song for Argyris*, dir. Stefan Haupt (Fontana Film, 2006)

<sup>3</sup> Filippo Focardi and Lutz Klinkhammer, ‘The question of Fascist Italy’s war crimes: the construction of a self-acquitting myth (1943-1948)’ in *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, vol.9, no.3 (2004); Davide Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire: Italian Occupation During the Second World War*, trans. Adrian Belton (2003; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Lidia Santarelli, ‘Muted violence: Italian war crimes in occupied Greece’ in *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, vol.9, no.3 (2004).

<sup>4</sup> Three seminal works of the 1980s and 1990s: John Louis Hondros in *Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony 1941-44* (New York, Pella, 1983) placed ‘primary power’ in German hands and barely granted Italian anti-partisan operations a sentence (p.85). Hagen Fleischer in *Στέμμα και Σβάστικα: Η Ελλάδα της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης 1941-1944* [*Crown and Swastika: Greece in Occupation and Resistance 1941-1944*] (1986; Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, 1988, 1995), discussed the whole tripartite occupation but through an essentially politically-focused event-structured narrative. Mark Mazower’s *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-44* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) very successfully included more social aspects but also repeated the myth of Italian moderation (v. p.146f).

<sup>5</sup> Office National Hellénique des Criminels de Guerre [National Hellenic Office for War Criminals], *Les Atrocités des Quatre Envahisseurs de la Grèce: Allemands, Italiens, Bulgares, Albanais* [*The Atrocities of the Four Invaders of Greece: Germans, Italians, Bulgarians, Albanians*] (Athens: [n.p.], 1946), p.107-8.

yet these wounds inflicted on the collective body of Greece somehow disappeared from the mainstream narrative, whereas, even today, no one has forgotten the German massacre at Kalavryta in December 1943. And not just that, in addition to the film, plaintiffs from the town of Distomo, then fighting a 13-year-old legal suit for German reparations, took their case and won the support of Italian courts! *Where are the elusive Italian wounds?* In the limited time that I have I would like to explore some of the crucial issues surrounding this question and hopefully engage your own analytical powers in trying to find an answer.

If the Greek government clearly recognised Italian crimes, how did the myth of the *brava gente* come about? Well, its provenance wasn't Greek; it was made in Italy, quite deliberately. From the summer of 1944, before the war was even over and following the rapes in Italy by the invading French Army (the so-called *marocchinata*), the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs cunningly compiled a dossier of atrocities suffered by Italians that could be used in the future (and I quote):

‘when it will be necessary to respond concretely to the recurring accusations of violence committed by our soldiers or [to] eventual designations of war criminals’.<sup>6</sup>

As the Paris Peace Treaty was being drafted, Italy lambasted the ‘Italian Holocaust’: the displacement of some 350,000 Italians living in Istria and Dalmatia and the murder of 5,000-15,000 who were thrown into bottomless chasms (the Foibe).<sup>7</sup> The fervently nationalistic political climate encouraged Italian generals, like Mario Roatta, to publish memoirs countering the accusations of war crimes:

‘Italians as war criminals? At most one can admit to soldiers stealing a few chickens (or pigs) during battle without the knowledge of their superiors’.<sup>8</sup>

A ridiculous claim, offensive to those who had endured poisoned gas in Africa or the string of concentration camps in the Balkans. The problem was that none of this equated to Auschwitz. Read Jonathan Steinberg’s work and you’ll be thrown into a well-documented – and quasi-Hollywood account – of the Italian occupation authorities ‘conspiring’ to rescue the Jews from the Germans.<sup>9</sup> Davide Rodogno would argue that this Italian benevolence was really a defence of ‘Fascism’s imaginary domaine réservé’ and that the Jews were guarded as bargaining chips.<sup>10</sup> Irrespectively, it was indisputable, even by the Office for War Criminals, that the Italians (I quote) ‘did not organise the systematic persecution of Israelites in Greece which only stigmatised the Germans’.<sup>11</sup> The Italians did have some ground on which to claim that they were ‘good people’, and they abused it wholeheartedly; as did the Austrians who hid their active complicity in the Final Solution to the Jewish Question behind the 1938 German ‘invasion’ which supposedly made them ‘Hitler’s first victim’.<sup>12</sup> Where the hollow *brava gente* myth was fabricated is now obvious, but why should it take hold in Greece?

Perhaps the Greeks simply *forgot* what the Italians had done? That’s one possibility which emanates from Ioanna Tsatsou’s diary entry of 25 September 1943 (a few weeks after the Italian capitulation). She writes that:

<sup>6</sup> As quoted by Focardi and Klinkhammer, ‘Construction of a self-acquitting myth’, p.341.

<sup>7</sup> Χάγκεν Φλάισερ [Hagen Fleischer], *Οι Πόλεμοι της Μνήμης: Ο Β’ Παγκόσμιος Πόλεμος στη Δημόσια Ιστορία* [*Wars of Memory: The Second World War in Public History*], 2nd ed. (Athens: Εκδόσεις Νεφέλη, 2008), p.253.

<sup>8</sup> As quoted by Focardi and Klinkhammer, ‘Construction of a self-acquitting myth’, p.339.

<sup>9</sup> Jonathan Steinberg, *All or Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust, 1941-1943* (1990; London: Routledge, 2002).

<sup>10</sup> Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p.363-4.

<sup>11</sup> ONHCG, *Atrocités des Quatre Envahisseurs*, p.83, n.1.

<sup>12</sup> Φλάισερ, *Πόλεμοι της Μνήμης*, p.58.

‘the Greeks forgot their Italian ordeals; they opened their doors to them, hid them, took care of them. Now the common, primary enemy are the Germans’.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, for the last year of the Occupation, from September 1943 to October 1944, the Germans were the visible face of occupation. What Tsatsou and her fellow Athenians endured might have been enough to bury memories of Italians under the more recent German ordeal. Athens didn’t suffer from the Italians in the same way that Domeniko did. 115 men from Domeniko were executed and the whole village was looted and burnt to the ground.<sup>14</sup> Comparable round-ups in Athens were perpetrated by the Germans and with smaller loss of life.<sup>15</sup> But there are memorials in Domeniko’s town square, so clearly *its* inhabitants haven’t forgotten about Italian war crimes; their memory is set in stone in the physical landscape.

Perhaps the Greeks didn’t actually *forget* Italian war crimes but managed to put them behind them – they *forgave* them – so Italian wounds would have healed whilst German wounds festered. But why would there have been a *selective* forgiveness when we know that there was great similarity between Italian and German actions? A hypothesis arises from the diary entries of Giorgos Theotokas:

‘Even though, for two years now, the whole populace was plotting against the Italians and threatening that once they left they would sort them out, suddenly, as soon as they saw them fallen, they felt sorry for them. No one was harmed; in fact [the Italians] have been helped in every way. It’s as if, once weapons were laid down and the belligerent atmosphere between them and us dissipated, there rose to the surface some hidden solidarity with the “people who resemble us”’.<sup>16</sup>

Theotokas suggests that there was an *instinctive* forgiveness for the Italians born of cultural proximity. Some weeks later – still September 1943 – he expands on this idea. His ‘conclusion on the double occupation’ was the now clichéd dichotomy that the harshness of the Germans was the product of their cold, mechanical nature; whereas the Italians could exhibit greater humanity and warmth towards individual Greeks.<sup>17</sup> Even the Office for War Criminals had discerned two distinctly different natures in their occupiers:

‘if the Italians, by way of their exuberant Mediterranean nature, were capable of a very great individual cruelty in the heat of the moment...they possessed to a lesser degree than the Germans this science of organised barbarity: the methodically-perpetrated crime with imperturbable apathy in cold blood...The Italians remained less organised, less diligent, more frivolous and more superficial than their Teutonic allies when it came to their policy of subjugation’.<sup>18</sup>

There was something less fearsome, more approachable in the Italians. Whatever their differences though, the Office concluded, they were ‘both...criminals. Without doubt’.<sup>19</sup> Would the Italian humanity, however, make others, not charged with the prosecution of war criminals, more prone to forgive? Intuitively, the problem with the forgiveness hypothesis if based on cultural proximity is how foreigners could be forgiven so easily when forgiveness for the war behaviour of fellow compatriots proved so hard during Greece’s Civil War in the late 1940s and

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<sup>13</sup> Ιωάννα Τσάτσου [Ioanna Tsatsou], *Φύλλα Κατοχής* [*Pages from the Occupation*] ([n.d.]; Athens: Εστία, 2007), p.118.

<sup>14</sup> ONHCG, *Atrocités des Quatre Envahisseurs*, p.106-7.

<sup>15</sup> Eg. 1 May 1944, Καισαριανή, Αθήνα: 200 hostages; 7 August 1944, Βύρωνα, Αθήνα: 14 executed, 300 sent to Germany; 17 August 1944, Κοκκινιά, Αθήνα: 90 executed.

<sup>16</sup> Γιώργος Θεοτοκάς [Giorgos Theotokas], *Τετράδια Ημερολογίου, 1939-1953* [*Journals, 1939-1953*] (1987; Athens: Εστία, 2005), p.426 (11 September 1943).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> ONHCG, *Atrocités des Quatre Envahisseurs*, p.82-3, n.1.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

even the former Yugoslavia's in the early 1990s.<sup>20</sup> If we believe in the human capacity to forgive, we shouldn't underestimate the longevity of hatred. Theory aside, if the Italians had been forgiven in 1943, why was the state attempting to prosecute them in 1946? And if the British Foreign Office is to be believed, then in Athens, at the end of 1948, a 'Greco-German honeymoon [was] in full swing' too.<sup>21</sup>

As tempting as the cultural proximity hypothesis might appear, it has problems, especially because, whatever the cultural similarities Greeks could spot, even before the construction of the *brava gente* myth, Greece and Italy had been at loggerheads for decades. The Office for War Criminals itself stated that the Greeks were predisposed to hostility towards the Italians.<sup>22</sup> We all know about the 1940-41 Greco-Italian war in Albania and how it was preceded by the sinking of the *Ellis* on 15 August 1940 which the Office declared showed more 'sacrilegious perfidy' than Pearl Harbour.<sup>23</sup> But what about the 1935 war that never was? Italy's invasion of Ethiopia led to panic within the Greek military in October 1935. Cognizant of the role that Italy had played in their Asia Minor catastrophe in 1922 and Mussolini's gunboat policy in Corfu in 1923, they foresaw a war with Italy and agreed to a 6.1 billion drachma rearmament plan.<sup>24</sup> The war materiel would come from Germany with whom Greece had close cultural links, a flourishing tobacco trade and, at that time, a large credit surplus. So it is very strange that in 1953, King Paul proclaimed to a forum in New York that with Italy 'a sister Mediterranean nation, our former bonds of friendship have been restored, and this is a source of joy to us'.<sup>25</sup> This must have been pure rhetoric because friendship with Italy was skin-deep in the 1930s; and yet, Paul did not mention any friendship with Germany at all, despite the fact that prime ministers Alexandros Papagos and Konrad Adenauer would be making state visits to Bonn and Athens, respectively, within a few months of his speech. By 1953, there is a clear reversal in Greece's relationship with Italy and Germany.

So (to recap), we know that the Italian-made *brava gente* myth took hold in Greece even though the Italians were regarded with hostility before the Second World War and they perpetrated crimes during it, crimes that were remembered by the victims and the government afterwards. Nevertheless, there seems to have been a reconciliation with the Italians on the part of Athens at some point before 1953, something that hadn't happened with the Germans yet, even just officially, even just rhetorically. *How come?* I can only speculate, but, instead of a conclusion, I'd like to advance a hypothesis for what might have happened.

As Greece entered the Cold War era, the geopolitical references changed, and so did the definition of the national enemy from 'Italians' and 'Germans' to 'communists', and

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<sup>20</sup> Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'Red Terror: Leftist Violence during the Occupation' in Mark Mazower (ed.), *After the War was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation and State in Greece, 1943-1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 171ff.

<sup>21</sup> As quoted by Fleischer, *Πολεμοί της Μνήμης*, p.510.

<sup>22</sup> ONHCG, *Atrocités des Quatre Envahisseurs*, p.79.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Mogens Pelt, 'Το ελληνο-γερμανικό εμπόριο καπνού – Συνέχεια και ασυνέχεια κατά το Μεσοπόλεμο και την περίοδο μετά τον πόλεμο' ['The Greco-German tobacco trade – Continuity and discontinuity during the interwar and post-war periods'] in Χάγκεν Φλάισερ [Hagen Fleischer] (ed.), *Η Ελλάδα '36-'49. Από τη Δικτατορία στον Εμφύλιο: Τομές και συνέχειες* [Greece '36-'49: From the Dictatorship to the Civil War: Sections and Continuities], 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Athens: Εκδόσεις Καστανιώτη, 2003), p.379, 381.

<sup>25</sup> 'Address of H.M. The King of the Hellenes to the Calvin Bullock Forum. New York, 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1953' in *Speeches Delivered by H.M. The King of the Hellenes during the State Visit to U.S.A. 28 Oct.-3 Dec. 1953* (Athens: The Greek National Institute, 1954), p.69-70.

communists became the courts' target more than war criminals (domestic or foreign). That might explain Greece's post-war rapprochement with both Italy and Germany; but it doesn't explain why the Italians became 'good' occupiers and the Germans 'bad'. That answer probably lies in something that happened in the late 1940s with Italy which didn't happen with Germany. That must be the peace treaty. By the end of 1947, Greece had gained the Dodecanese and reparations in kind worth \$105,000,000 from Italy. This meant that Greece would make her peace with Italy – quite literally – before Germany even began to regain her sovereignty (1949); but since these reparations totalled barely 0.6% of the \$17.8 billion initially requested by the Greek government, it also meant that Germany had to be pressurised into paying the difference.<sup>26</sup> The *brava gente* myth, concocted by the Italians to minimise their liabilities could now be used quite deliberately by the Greek government to pressurise Germany into plugging Greece's economic hole notwithstanding the 1953 London Treaty which postponed reparations until a 'final settlement' (interpreted as Germany's reunification).<sup>27</sup> The adoption of the myth by Athens might have been a shrewd piece of diplomacy, if a callous dismissal of all that the Italians' victims had suffered. But then moral satisfaction was pretty much irrelevant to government policy, as shown by the release of infamous war criminal Maximilien Merten in 1959 after a brief incarceration. At the risk of upsetting the new Cold War alliance, it must have seemed more worthwhile to exculpate Italy's war criminals in order to press Germany with greater comparative guilt into paying reparations, in the same way that German war criminals were swapped with loans, increased trade, international support and even a trickle of small reparations or aid in lieu.<sup>28</sup> The *brava gente* myth, I think, was never revised because German reparations were never finalised. Alongside the hope of money, the myth just lingered for decades as the dominant narrative, long enough to seep into the heritage of those who had no counter-memories. Thus we keep hearing the refrain of *Captain Corelli's Mandolin* whilst a village called Domeniko lives silently with its memories.

And so we return to where we started: perhaps without an answer but hopefully with something to think about.

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<sup>26</sup> Dimitrios K. Apostolopoulos, 'Greece and Germany in Postwar Europe: The Way towards Reconciliation' in *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, vol.21 (2003), p.228.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Reparations of DM 115 million were received in 1960 which at a rate of DM 4.2: \$1 translated into \$27.4 million.