2.5 The Communist Left and Greek Democracy

Chair: Konstantina Maragkou (LSE) & Sotiris Zartaloudis (University of Birmingham)

Dimopoulos Konstantinos National and Kapodistrian University of Athens	Bringing Class Back in: reflections around the Greek Bourgeoisie
Kokalari Alsena European University Institute	Seeds of Indoctrination: political exile and the unintended consequences of repression
Panagiotidis Charalambos University of the Peloponnese	Greek Communists' Struggle for Democracy: from Junta to Metapolitefsi

Bringing Class Back in: Reflections around the Greek Bourgeoisie

Abstract: *The uneasy return of class analysis to the academic forefront faces two historical challenges: first, it must make up for its substantial absence during the past two decades of neoliberal hegemony; second, it must learn from its defeat - bring back classes, yes, but not dogmatically, not by reverting to orthodoxies old and new or by suffocating the individual and its other social features. Instead, the new class analysis must be rooted in time and space, applied to specific classes and societies and, thus, elude the trap of grand - and self-fulfilling - narratives. To this extent, Greece and, more particularly, the Greek bourgeoisie provide the perfect case study. The historical absence of any systematic class analysis has been stark. Carried away by more burning questions, Greek researchers have either skipped the bourgeoisie altogether, or have treated it peripherally and as a byproduct. In this sense, the analysis of the Greek bourgeoisie, shrouded in mystery as it is, has much to offer to the broader methodological effort in which it partakes. The revival of a class analysis worthy of its name and the deeper understanding of Greek social reality may very well be in dialectical interdependence. In the analysis of a long-neglected class that has fallen prey to all kinds of journalistic distortions, one that defies any prosaic, black-and-white understanding, the minimalist task of understanding a class and the maximalist aim of rebooting class analysis seem to intersect.*

Key words: *class, class analysis, bourgeoisie, Greece, neoliberalism*

Konstantinos S. Dimopoulos
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

1. Introduction

To this day, there has been no systematic analysis of the Greek bourgeoisie. This is all the more surprising given the mass of archives, statistics and reports that *enumerate* a class otherwise shrouded in mystery.

The exceptions to this norm are few and unidimensional: whenever the Greek capitalists are thrust into the academic spotlight, they are analyzed from an economic, legal or political-scientific perspective. Indeed, this partiality is at the core of K. Tsoukalas' (2005: 13) self-reflexive apologia: "Despite the overabundance of facts, the supersufficiency of data and the plethora of noteworthy studies, we are still missing a *total* theorization of the evolution of [Greek] social dynamics". Such a feat is more challenging than it seems for, it goes without saying, a meticulous addition of relevant writings - chapters, paragraphs, sentences - will simply not do: the in-depth understanding of any class cannot be but historical and sociological, as holistic and as interdisciplinary as possible, a *synthesis* rather than an arithmetic. To this extent, we can reaffirm: *there has been no systematic analysis of the Greek bourgeoisie*.

Any effort to make do with this omission is first and foremost methodological. On the one hand, the researcher must deconstruct decades of economic, political and legal jargon into its living and historical subjects: the entrepreneurs, their strategies and their dynamic interrelation into a socioeconomic class. To be clear, the reification of the Greek bourgeoisie is not solely the fault of more quantitative-oriented scientists. Such a reification would have hardly been possible had the sociologists done their work, had they not "repelled or unsuspectingly passed by any question marks regarding the [Greek] bourgeoisie" (Vaxevanoglou 1994: 33). On the other hand, neither are the sociologists fully to blame: the past generations have worked tirelessly to map out a rather complex social panorama under increasingly adverse international conditions.

Today, anyone attempting to analyze the Greek bourgeoisie - or any other class for that matter - must first prove his or her right to do so, as well as its usefulness. Class analysis cannot be applied in an academic vacuum: we must first bring class back in.

Starting from this imperative, the first part of this essay will explore the neoliberal assault on class-based research as well as its rather easy success in the case of Greece. The second part will shift focus from theory to reality, documenting the de facto return of *class* in the everyday experience of modern (Greek) society, as well as the distortionary representations through which it is understood in the absence of any systematic analysis. Finally, picking up on a - still marginal - trend of our times, the third part will critically respond to the uneasy revival of *class analysis*, the dangers it must overcome and the opportunities it should exploit.

The task of understanding the Greek bourgeoisie is a momentous one. The following notes are only a blueprint of *why* and, to some extent, *how* this could be done. For reasons implied throughout these theoretical preliminaries and made obvious in their conclusion, the constant back-and-forth from the bourgeoisie to Class - and from Greece to the centers of western academia - is an inevitable necessity which, though constructive, reflects the great deal of work that has not yet been attempted.

2. The retreat of class analysis

2a. Internationally

To a big extent, modern Greek society emerged through the postwar years and only achieved a more or less consistent form in the late 1970s-early 1980s. As a result, when the

time became ripe for a retrospective look, class analysis was already being dislocated as an international norm. To understand this asymmetry is to reconstruct the unfavorable *background* against which sociologists in Greece were pitted.

And this is a background that is usually underestimated. Following our tendency of chopping up and rearranging time in a neatly intelligible way, we have *identified* the retreat of class analysis with the neoliberal moment: a shift in economic conditions led to a reversal of policies which in turn produced new behaviors and discourses (Holloway 2011). As suspiciously linear as it is, this narrative is often considered natural, *automatic*. Is it really? Shouldn't the aggressive rise of a post-class politics and ideology in the heart of the continent that invented classes instead spawn an equally aggressive *reaffirmation of class* as a social reality and as a tool for its analysis? The fact that it did not or, better, that the few voices raised remained isolated, is the byproduct of a deep-rooted hegemony that goes quite beyond any timeline or policies.

Essentially, if neoliberalism is to be considered a history-making moment, we cannot but relate it to the history that made it.

Starting by its *past*, we must enquire about the social-democratic consensus that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Here we are dealing with nothing less than an entirely new class equilibrium in which, slowly but surely - and through the mediation of the State - the barriers between classes, both in terms of distance and rigidity, were loosened. Quite logically, political confrontation followed suit: the generals of class conflict mutated into the spokespeople of different classes - or class combinations - cohabitating in the same system and, eventually, into rival interpreters of *the system's* future wellbeing. As long as all was good, there was no problem. Yet, as socioeconomic crisis exposed the artificiality, fragility and half-heartedness of this somewhat top-down arrangement, the myth of social unity was dealt a lethal blow. As such, when the neoliberals actually took the mantle, they took power not in the name of a capitalist avant-guard, but in that of a mass of déclassé individuals. Exaggerating the horizontalizing tendencies of the postwar in theory, they dismantled them in practice.

Moving on to capitalism's historically-defined *Other*, the decline and collapse of the Soviet Union and its network of existing socialism completed the foundation of hegemonic neoliberalism. Put simply, the disappearance of the strongest institutionalized agent and embodiment of class analysis, however disputed, shifted the entire framework of western social thought. On the most superficial level, the cost-benefit analysis of the western style of life was boosted by the wholesale retreat of an existing alternative. But more importantly, beneath this surface, modern academia lost its traditional reference point, the historical Other which it *had to take into consideration*, if only to criticize and oppose. In the words of J. Rancière (2004: 3), this amounted to a kind of "double détente": "formal democracy" was proclaimed dominant without having to do absolutely anything to prove its substantial credentials. In what regards, finally, Europe's radical academics, their work was no longer negative, the task of repairing an unfinished or distorted model, of humanizing and Europeanizing socialism. Instead, they were faced with a far greater challenge: the *positive* reassertion of class analysis and, eventually, the re-envisioning of class in a society violently deconstructed into its individual units - the proof of something which was once considered obvious and whose force was embodied by a concrete and counter-hegemonical Bloc.

All the above is not to say that the emergence of neoliberalism was inevitable, just not as shocking: neoliberalism proper was an exogenous ideology that took hold of a not-so-unprepared social body.

In terms of the actual impact of neoliberalism on class analysis, we can afford to be brief. Much has been said about privatization, deregulation, marketization and their common denominator, the individualization of society and of our lives. For K. Doxiadis (2021: 58-59), these processes involve a complete restructuring of the citizen into a "human-enterprise", a competitive, fully-responsible and self-advertising economic agent burdened with all sorts of negative rights: free from regulations and free from the State, he is also free from Class.

Much has also been said about the mechanics of this "restructuring". Far from being an objective playing field in which modern subjects find themselves stranded - a set of rules to which they must adapt -, the neoliberal mindset hopes to prevail *from within*. In this sense, neoliberalism truly is "a specific logic, a specific way of producing subjects, a behavior of behaviors and a system of evaluation" - a *rationality* radiated by the market, the State, the media and so on (Brown 2017: 25).

This last point is crucial for the retreat of class analysis. To begin with, if neoliberal individualism is much more than a set of policies, then it can adapt besides, beyond and *against* these policies themselves. Keeping with W. Brown (2017: 308), and barring the emergence of a counter-hegemonical rationality, "neoliberal economic policies could very well be interrupted or overturned" without challenging neoliberalism itself. Paraphrasing to our context, this means that the retreat-or-not of class analysis does not directly depend on the socioeconomic health and discursive solidity of the neoliberal project. What is more, if neoliberalism has a tendency to entrench itself into the individual's mentality, *to participate in its subjectivation*, then no one is exempt: to some extent or another, the academic is also battling with his inner 'homo economicus' - our learned perspective on classes and neoliberalism may very well be informed by neoliberalism's dismissal of classes.

Finally, it is perhaps useful to point out that the disintegrative effects of neoliberalism on class analysis are no-where more evident than in the case of the bourgeoisie. Completely abstracted from his own background and the social relations in which he partakes, the modern entrepreneur is a success story of putting neoliberalism to task: hard-working, self-made and cosmopolitan, he is most definitely supra-class, eager to spread his example and show that, in essence, he is just one of us only - much - more successful.

2b. In Greece

A small country like Greece could have hardly resisted such a great, western-wide methodological watershed. Reductionism, however, is always the easy way out. Following the advice of N. Svoronos (1999: 339), we must shift our perspective away from the unilinear impact of "Great Power processes" upon Greek society and towards "the internal structures of the Greek economy and society" that allow for such processes to take root and flourish. Accordingly, this sub-section will deal with the belated development of sociology in Greece, the diverse focuses of indigenous social science and its interactions with - imported - foreign models.

As already noted, Greece largely skipped the class-based era of European sociology. To a big extent, this is because social science in modern Greece was from its birth infused with the dual aim of building a bridge towards the nation's legendary 'past', as well as towards a patriotic future in which Hellenism would be united and strong. For Lambiri-Dimaki (1996: 124), early Greek social scientists thus "preferred laography to sociology", a hierarchy which was, of course, deeply political.

The - few - outliers that chose to talk about class, capitalism and development had to do so against the current, with all the dangers that this entails. Indeed, as Greek society aged through semi-democratic politics, coups, the Civil War, a solid two-decades of right-wing

authoritarianism and, of course, the colonels' junta of 1967-1974, sociology became a frowned-upon endeavor, "by definition suspect" (Tsoukalas 1984: 590). Not only was sociology a potential threat to the chimera of a 'Great Greece', it could also detract *the Greece of its time*. To be fair, the pioneers of Greek sociology were indeed on the radical-liberal spectrum, but their state-sponsored stigmatization only reinforced this predisposition. As a result, though it did survive institutionally, sociology was a uniquely precarious discipline operating under a set of 'informal' preconditions: that the mirror put up against society be either skewed or blurry.

As a result, the possibility for any serious class analysis in Greece that included - let alone prioritized - the bourgeoisie, only really emerged in the early 1980s. Yet this was no ordinary decade: for many leading academics, the explosive events of the time were simply too explosive to ignore. We are referring, of course, to the country's rapid transition to democracy, its bid for modernization, the project of Europeanization and, last but not least, PASOK's wildcard variant of Mediterranean social-democracy. This was all much to take in and, unsurprisingly, exhausted a great deal of academic energy. Indicatively, in a detailed list covering the period 1950-1998, N. Kokosalakis (1998: 336-337) grouped the focuses of Greek sociology as such: politics, education, work, immigration, the family and the European Union. Class here is absent, however loudly.

Moving on, as decades went by, and while class analysis retreated on an international level, Greek academia steadily succumbed to the neoliberal consensus, albeit one with Greek characteristics. Let us not forget that the 1990s and early 2000s were, for many, an era of relative prosperity and national maturing. This golden age, for all its latent contradictions, disadvantaged any effort for serious class analysis. And though there were exceptions, those were violently interrupted by the Great Recession and its especially hard hit on the Greek social formation. The Crisis, the Memoranda, political polarization, European uncertainty and tense foreign relations produced a series of new key-words that obliged and enticed a whole generation of researchers.

In this sense, the analysis of the bourgeoisie - and class in general - has been hampered by the *quasi-permanent state of emergency* with which Greek academia had - and still has - to deal.

Nevertheless, even if the sociological focus was more or less monopolized by flagship processes and events, a critical exposition of their underlying reality was still essential for *their* understanding. The fact that such an exposition rarely took place cannot be pinned on the quality of a sociology which probably overperformed given the size and problems of its country of origin. Instead, the answer must be sought in its relation to foreign models and norms.

"Greece, a probably unimportant country of the periphery, could be as little self-sufficient in terms of ideology as it could in terms of politics or economics […] [T]heories and ideological forms came from outside like pre-made vessels in which local problems were poured, taking the corresponding theoretical and ideological shapes". This pioneering aphorism of P. Kondilis (2007: 15), however on point, needs to be further elaborated. And so it has been. In most overviews, the dependency of Greek sociology is directly linked to the post-junta hegemony of (neo-)Marxist approaches which, despite producing some "very important studies", were heavily burdened by political ambitions and a historical attachment to the social structures of the 'advanced' West (Kokosalakis 1998: 333). However, as Mouzelis (2005) has pointed out, this deficiency is not unique to historical-materialism: non-Marxists, whose pre-eminence came with that of neoliberalism, also took the country's capitalist and European credentials for granted, interpreting any differences from the West as either chronological dissimilarities, or a cultural backwardness rooted in certain national peculiarities.

Bypassing the trap of socio-historical determinism, it is perhaps more useful to understand the undigested importation of foreign models as an instance of *uneven and*

combined theoretical development. Owing to Greek sociology's delayed institutionalization, as well as the burning questions with which it immediately had to deal, theorists took several leaps that sidestepped the more nitty-gritty task of a holistic social analysis. This allowed - some of - them to jump to the vanguard of European sociology. In doing so, however, they often took leaps too great for them to relate back to the minute realities they left behind.

In terms of class, this meant either a reification of capitalist class relations and an arbitrary focus on modernity's up-and-coming formations (e.g. the bureaucracy, the middle classes, finance capital and, more recently, the precariat); or an embracing of post-modern and post-class schemas to analyze a society still characterized by more overt forms of class inequality. Needless to say, the second tendency is by now dominant, yet both contributed to the astounding ambiguousness of Greek social classes and especially of the bourgeoisie. To this day, the latter has almost exclusively been analyzed indirectly and as a byproduct of some other class.

3. The de facto return of inequality, class and their representations

For all the above reasons, class analysis in Greece *retreated before it even became entrenched.* Today, newer processes and realities appeal for its return and entrenchment. This section will focus on the most important two: the increase of inequality in favor of the (very) wealthy, and the gross insufficiency of the way in which this increase is explained and communicated.

The zig-zags of neoliberalism, the Great Recession and the spirals of austerity that ravaged economies like that of Greece, demonstrated that the individuals comprising 'post-class' societies do indeed have some common and opposing interests. The economists, shying away from any political implications, have otherwise made this abundantly clear: according to one study, sensitive indexes record a rise of poverty in Greece between 2007 and 2014 of as much as 200% (Andriopoulou *et al.* 2007); according to yet another, the same period witnessed a reversion of the total income captured by the top decile to the high levels of 1974 - the final year of the military dictatorship and half-a-decade *before* the legislation of the country's welfare state (Koutentakis and Chrissis 2022). One can only imagine how such percentages are bound to mutate in the aftermath of the current neoliberal government's drive for marketization, laying as it is the field for an unprecedent wave of accumulation-by-dispossession.

Top-income statistics - like the latter - are of more interest here. They reveal a concentration of wealth among the already (very) wealthy, a process that is relative as well as *absolute*. Moreover, they follow the lead of S.R. Khan (2012) in interpreting inequality *via wealth*. By going beyond the exclusive focus on poverty and impoverishment, they ditch what could be called the tradition of *epistemological workerism* - an analysis of exploitative social phenomena exclusively centered on those bearing the brunt of exploitation.

Today, more and more researchers seem to accept Khan's positional shift. Talk of a rising, 'hyper-wealthy class' is more and more frequent and popular (see Savage 2014). Though it is useful, it can very well be misleading. On the one hand, it targets head on the proliferation of millionaires across the globe, as well as the changing composition *within* the wealth of the super-rich in favor of services, finance and rents. On the other hand, it focuses too rigidly on the top 1% or even 0.1% of the population, while often disjoining extreme wealth and its reproduction from older and superlated forms of capitalist relations. Foreshadowing the rationale to be explored in the following sections, the analysis of the Greek bourgeoisie, i.e. the wealth elite of a non-dominant, understudied economy, could altogether avoid risks such

as the above by requiring an approach that is as *holistic* as it is *historical*. In a nutshell, the understanding of the 'newness' of the Greek bourgeoisie is put into perspective by the lack of knowledge concerning its older variants.

For the time being, however, such research does not seem forthcoming. Class is being *experienced* every day, and so is extreme wealth in the midst of anachronistic want and poverty. At the same time, academics and their platforms can set the agenda only to some extent. What they do not analyze can still be *talked about* prolifically.

This is evidenced by the most cursory glance at the Greek media. The bourgeoisie has not been properly studied, yet opinions abound. Although further empirical research is still pending, an unsurprising obsession with wealth seems to combine with the lack of theory to produce all sorts of popular misrepresentations. It is perhaps easier to visualize them as part of a dialectic. On the one hand, the Greek bourgeoisie is demonized as lumpen, comprador, opportunist, even non-existent, a "loose and heterogeneous grouping" completely devoid of the "promethean element" that still provides western capitalists with an aura of progress and innovation (Kondilis 2007: 11-19). On the other hand, idealizations portray the Greek entrepreneur as a typically Veblenian captain of industry, a self-made, risk-taking, on-the-field *leader*. In the words of Thanopoulou *et al* (2010: 200), the "[p]rimary motivation for [the shipowning] entrepreneur's actions has more do with the joy of creativity and the challenge of being self-created, self-sustained and completely independent than with potential monetary gains per se". To be fair, in everyday language, these discourses tend to be diluted; more often than not, they coexist and intermingle, blending their parts into synthetic approaches that are invariably crude.

Ironically, the ultimate winner of this mess is the bourgeoisie itself. When demonized, it is understood as the vile byproduct of a backwards, dysfunctional society, a group of *stereotypical Greeks just with money*. When idealized, the bourgeoisie is a heroic avant-guard sabotaged by an ungrateful society and an inhospitable State. When demonized-idealized in any combination, it still remains understudied, it still is deprived of the agency it really has, of the consciousness of its choices and the responsibilities that ensue. We saw this during the years of the previous Crisis. Greece was portrayed as either profligate or duped, either united and universally at fault or betrayed by its internal enemies, either dragged down by the overconsuming many or stripped naked by the corrupt few (Panageotou 2017). All in all, very rarely was Greece talked about as a modern social formation, comprised of many classes, some of which were (supposed to be) dominant or, at least, certainly more influential than others, and should have been interrogated as such.

To sum up, as long as class analysis does not pick up the pace, the de facto return of class is bound to create such quasi-scientific monsters. Analyzing the Greek bourgeoisie is key to understanding reality, but it is also necessary in dispelling its most influential misunderstandings.

4. The uneasy return of class analysis

4a. Dangers to be overcome

As we saw, the de facto return of class, coupled with the growing ripples in the neoliberal status quo, has led to an uneasy revival of class analysis, at least internationally. Today, we are living in a "period in which inequalities are extended and deepened, while the rhetorics of the end of history and of nonstop social mobility […] are placed into doubt by

reality"; V. Aranitou (2019: 29) is thus absolutely right to declare that the "discussion about social classes has re-emerged into the spotlight". The debate has, indeed, reopened.

However, neither the revival of class analysis nor its *quality* should be taken for granted. We have already implied sociology's insistence on the proletariat and its liminal subgroups that blend with the middle classes, as well the minimal cross-fertilization taking place between class analysis and the other social sciences, notably political economy. Even if we accept that these - older - defects will be remedied, newer ones are already clouding the academic horizon. This section will codify the very modern dangers to be overcome if class analysis is to be worthy of its name: the possibility of its re-dogmatization and the contrary threat of talking about classes in an a priori neoliberalized way.

The dogmatization of class analysis is likely under two interrelated circumstances. First, should class analysts greet the re-valorization of their method and work with a revanchist mindset. Second, should the most - acclaimed - bulk of sociologists keep shying away from class analysis, thus identifying the task with the work of either revanchist or more politically-oriented analysts.

In these cases, the result could very well be the creeping return of old orthodoxies coupled with the formation of *new ones*. Let us not forget that, especially when dealing with a concept as complicated as that of class, the latter scenario is always possible. In his postscript to *The Making of the English Working Class*, E.P. Thompson (2013: 16) reacted to the reception of his widely-read book with a tongue-in-cheek warning: "the major theses of this book still stand as hypotheses which, in their turn, *must never be petrified into orthodoxies*". A radical re-reading of a class, whether historical or current, can thus lay the foundations of a new orthodoxy, even if it does so in the name of unorthodox and critical thinking. In our case, this would mean a return to *modernized social aggregates*, a 21st century class nominalism that "slots individuals into detailed maps" of a rigidly pre-defined and ostensibly universal "structure" (Grusky and Galescu 2005: 51). The fact that such a map would be modern in its evidence and terminology makes it no less static, no less vulnerable to be criticized by opponents and surpassed by events.

Importantly, such a dogmatization would not necessarily - or even likely - be Marxist. Despite their long legacy of reified science, modern strands of Marxism are still too stigmatized and unpopular to afford such methodological arbitrariness. At the same time, more influential sociological approaches are not immune to ossification by virtue of their having contested Marxism's universalist appeals. One simply does not lead to the other. Can we really not envision a neo-Weberian orthodoxy underestimating class as a major independent variable; a neo-Bourdieusian tradition obsessing over cultural capital and the norms set by the super-rich; or a neo-Durkheimian canon focusing too minutely on micro-classes that lack any serious comparability? Dogma often emerges where it is least expected; all those working for the return of class analysis should be on a constant lookout.

Of course, the pendulum could very well stop on the other side. We have already dispelled the myth of neoliberalism as just another set of policies, a minor blimp in the ongoing trajectory of market economics. Instead, we have probed into the neoliberal phenomenon as nothing less than a whole new restructuring of human behavior and consciousness, one geared around a series of "assumptions so deep that the very fact that they *are* assumptions is only rarely brought to light" (Hall, Massey and Rustin 2013: 13). Again, this does not mean that neoliberalism is all-powerful, only that its potential reach is *all-pervasive*. Indeed, if resistance has often been corroded by political individualism, so can theoretical defiance be informed by the latter's methodological counterpart.

On a first level, this would mean *talking* about classes but really *meaning* groups of individuals. This is characteristic of neoliberalism: for K. Tsoukalas (1984: 260-261), our era's "dominant individualist approach" reads all "intermediate social groupings […] that operate between the social unit-individual and society as a whole" as "sets of individuals". This makes class as a category *internally descriptive*; it pinpoints individuals with similar circumstances without allowing such circumstances to be key engines of collective lifestyles, consciousness, action and so on.

On a second level, we have the tendency of isolating classes either from each other or from society as a totality. If the former dims the relations of interdependence and exploitation between one class and another, the latter negates the possibility that class may be explanatory of social processes and realities that go quite beyond class itself. In essence, classes are here understood *as individuals* and are used as a tool that is *externally descriptive*: it targets a part (a class) of a much bigger, not necessarily - innately - connected whole (society). Once again, the challenging of Marxist system-making has led to what K. Doxiadis (2021: 179-180) identifies as an equally barren and destructive "anti-holistic" fundamentalism that could very well saturate class analysis from within.

4b. Opportunities to be exploited

By now, it will be hopefully clear enough that the reasons of the retreat of class analysis and the dangers of its return are intimately connected. The retrospective reading of this interconnection is indeed a rare opportunity: we are aware not only of the weakest points of class analysis, but also of how they were capitalized by an opponent that has not radically changed. Indeed, much more than a strategic condition for its return, the experience-based fortification of class analysis is also the key for its effective application.

Today, the exploitation of this opportunity becomes all the more likely given the shrinking of class analysis as a tradition. The divisive legacy of the past is to some extent counterbalanced by the poor results of the present. Class-themed in-fighting is thus expected to give way to a more concerted mobilization against a mainstream that either denies the importance of class, or treats it peripherally and as a byproduct.

A long-overdue self-criticism is the starting point of any comeback.

First and foremost, modern class analysis must be *(I) plural.* During their heyday, the theoretical purity of different class-based approaches produced rival classifications of the same society that were less and less in touch with the way it was actually experienced. More often than not, the emergence of academic orthodoxies occurred not out of conviction of one's analysis of social reality, but out of an intransigence towards the theoretical deviations of the other. And the defeat of a caricature is always easier than that of its original form.

We can envision a non-dogmatic class analysis as operating on three levels. An internal plurality is accomplished when a method, say Marxism, is applied in an open and critical way, accepting its case-specific conclusions regardless of their relationship to the method's pre-existing Theory. An external plurality, in turn, implies the *organic* cross-fertilization of different methods. Following N. Mouzelis (2005: 357), what is advocated here is "not some eclectic, ad hoc mixture of the ideas" of different schools, but the "serious elaboration of *new conceptual tools* that can prove their usefulness by solving actual theoretical and methodological difficulties". Hence the emphasis on 'organic': by opening a method (like Marxism), we reveal the formerly-blocked nodes that already connect it to different theories, approaches and levels of analysis. By borrowing and taking advantage of the work done by other schools of thought, we value the research produced by social scientists struggling for the same broader goal, as well as, quite cynically, saving a lot of time.

A good - but dated - example of the above is the work of C. Lyrintzis (1991) on the southern Greek bourgeoisie of the 19th Century. Applying an unbiased method that is in essence Marxist, he comes to the conclusion that the name of the game at the time was political rather than economic, however much the former was informed by the latter. Political clout, influence and favor-giving was proven to be so paramount that a reading of society through the lens of means and relations of production would most certainly miss the point. It was the control of the *political means of production* that instead powered the major divisions and inequalities of this quasi-capitalist economy. Such a hypothesis is most certainly unorthodox in its theoretical and methodological implications. To all those who could not care less about orthodoxy, the take-away is this: there is nothing un-Marxist about any possible conclusions of the Marxist method; by its capability for still further originality, Marxism is actually *reaffirmed*.

A third and final route to plurality is that of inter-disciplinarity. This is keeping true to what is most living in sociology. In the words of M. Savage (2014), "sociology has always been at its critical best when innovating energetically to uncover emerging social trends which are associated with the emergence of fundamental social forces" and which "generate their own methodological repertoires". This is achieved by cutting across disciplines which, in our instance, most urgently means challenging the monopoly of the economists over political economy that has allowed "the rich to hide in the middle classes" (Slayer 2014). Furthermore, it implies a methodological boldness that identifies untapped sources of historical and current insight regarding the class under examination. In the case of the Greek bourgeoisie, lacking as it is any serious corpus of research and knowledge, resources out of the ordinary may include biographies, interviews, as well as more 'informal' texts such as novels or autobiographies penned by the entrepreneurs themselves.

Moving on, the non-dogmatic turn of class analysis includes some imperatives that are better analyzed individually. One of them is the relationship between class and the individual which, often hierarchic, is more conducive when *(II) dialectical*. In the past decades, it was exactly the suffocation of the individual to the point of disappearance that allowed its neoliberal glorification - however double-edged - to seem like an enticing breath of fresh air.

This is not an easy task. K. Tsoukalas (2005: 313) has proclaimed it "the dramatic and insolvable dilemma of class analysis": when talking exclusively of abstract social aggregates, we risk "severing our discourse from the lived and common experience of social reality"; on the other hand, by hyper-focusing on the endless plurality of this reality we end up with a "positivist and non-critical redistribution or reconstruction of everyday classifications and commonplace representations". The "dilemma" might very well be "insolvable", yet its solution is perhaps beside the point: we are better off *rooting ourselves* in the rich area of dialectical tension that it encloses. Only thus will we talk about the individual without ever forgetting class and vice versa.

Tsoukalas, for one, has acted upon his advice. In his study of the postwar Greek social formation, he mobilizes class as a key category only to constantly expand its pre-defined meaning (2013). Talking about the bourgeoisie, for example, he looks beyond traditional strategies of producing and profiting, arguing that the bourgeois subject, especially in Greece, behaves in ways that supersede a singular - let alone stereotypical - class location. Enterprise often cross-cuts inheritance, corruption, tax-evasion, rents and intimate relations with the State and the political system. Moreover, these are all strategies that can combine or rotate - as well as succeed or fail - at a breakneck speed, making the unidimensional and static classification of the Greek capitalist notoriously elusive.

What is implied here is that a class remains *a* class despite and, in a way, because of the internal plurality it conceals. Indeed, in a research with more or less specific aims, the analysis must inevitably be more individualized; in order, however, for a broader, class-based

social critique to remain possible, such an individualization must be understood as a deepening of class rather than as its rejection. A more concrete way of practicing this dialectic could be by expanding the scope of materiality (Fox 2019). This has to do less with reaffirming the bourgeoisie despite the plurality of its subjects and more with identifying the bourgeois regardless of his deviations from his class's norm. Certainly, bourgeois status would still depend on its holder's structural - and exploitative - material advantages: yet far more than a job, a house, or an investment portfolio, materiality would also include other parameters such as conditions of work, ease of transport, access to nature, technology, healthcare and so on.

Clearly, multiple courses can be followed under the same guiding principle: to take into consideration the individual, to be investigative and intersectional, strengthens class analysis as much as its protects it.

Combining the above two points, i.e. non-dogmatism and the inclusion of the individual, we arrive at the necessity of time- and place-specific analysis. Whether openly or not, older studies tended to reproduce grand narratives that were in essence deterministic; they were either attacked in toto, or through the specific examples that were bound to disprove them.

Modernization theorists and their sympathizers went as far as predicting and predicating the equalization of countries developed and underdeveloped. G. Voulgaris (2002), concluding his very sharp analysis of Greece's end of century, declared the country "stuck in the middle" in terms of its development. Two decades and a couple of crises after, we are finally way past explaining away the state of a social formation through its relation to its (abstract) point of departure and its (presumed) point of arrival.

(Neo-)Marxists, in their turn, despite acknowledging the structural reasons preventing such an equalization, often fell into a determinism that was simply more discrete. The basic premise that the peripheralization of a country tied it to a trajectory different and subordinate to that of the Center, often yielded specific international positions to which countries were *made* to conform. A country like Greece, for instance, was part of the European Semi-Periphery and, as such, was expected to structurally resemble other countries of the same league. Such an assumption was not necessarily lazy but, more likely than not, a stamp of the time. Take the prolific N. Poulantzas (1976) who, in his admittedly very early and politically-infused classic, analyzed and compared the post-dictatorship social formations of Greece, Spain and Portugal. In all three cases, he identified an archetypically semi-peripheral comprador class, rivaled by an equally semi-peripheral domestic bourgeoisie that was only partially free from the clutches of foreign capital.

Through hindsight, we have learned to be weary of cross-country comparisons that tend to *identify* different societies with each other. Indeed, such an identification, rather than the result of analysis, is most often its self-fulfilling premise. This is not to say that time- and place-specific class analysis excludes any comparability. On the contrary: comparison is fruitful and necessary, but only when the societies - and classes - under examination are understood as different regardless of their similarities. In the occasion, finally, that such similarities warrant grouping some countries into a loosely-defined unit, the researcher must stay aware and open about the strategic level of abstraction underlying his or her research.

A good example, albeit one not focusing on the bourgeoisie per se, is that of N. Mouzelis (2005). In his book's chapters comparing the capitalist classes of Greece, Chile and Argentina, Mouzelis identifies some similarities produced when 'late-late industrialization' is predated by the establishment of a parliamentary regime. Owing to the jargon of his time, the author actually does pin those trends under the label of underdevelopment; however, his analysis is dynamic in time and refuses to deal with the bourgeoisies under comparison either as normative or as a group *anomaly* vis-à-vis the norm. Instead, Mouzelis is at pains to show that, although the three classes are quite different in terms of their fields of operation, their

relation to landed property and to the political system, their comparison is useful for better understanding each one of them *individually*.

5. Conclusion

As foretold in the introduction, the above reflections move somewhat awkwardly between the Greek bourgeoisie and the ups-and-downs of class analysis in general. When talking about the retreat of class analysis and the de facto return of class we can - and should - place Greece under the microscope. However, any discussion regarding the dangers and opportunities of a 'new' class analysis is, for the time being, necessarily quite abstract and theoretical, if not rooted in the experiences of better-analyzed countries.

On the one hand, this inconsistency is indicative of the lack of existing (re)sources and theory; the task of shedding some light on Greece's understudied capitalist class cannot but look for inspiration in the efforts and errors of elsewhere.

On the other hand, such a back-and-forth is precisely the cornerstone of a viable and self-confident method of class analysis. For now, to be sure, the pole of theory and international examples is much more fortified than that of the empirical understanding of the Greek bourgeoisie. However, when balance is hopefully restored, the area of dialectical tension between the two is, once again, the optimal starting point for any serious and modern class analytical endeavor.

To be even clearer, *class analysis in the 21st Century must intersect the minimalist and maximalist aims of the researcher*. The exploration of a specific class is the precondition of expanding the scope, appeal and validity of a class analysis that has learned from its defeat as much as it prepares itself for battle; a stronger class analysis, in turn, is the necessary epistemological framework through which time- and place-specific efforts will become as sharp and instructive as possible.

In our case, the minimalist aim of understanding the Greek bourgeoisie constantly interacts with the maximalist urgency of rebooting class analysis. These two aims are, of course, distinct and, depending on the context, can serve wholly different purposes. However, once we abstract from the specifics of academic work, their unison is clear at its most dynamic - what it reveals is a dialectical interdependence or, to quote J. Holloway (2011: 179), a "tendency towards holism"

6. List of references

In Greek

Aranitou, Valia (2019). *Η Μεσαία Τάξη στην Ελλάδα την Εποχή των Μνημονίων: Μεταξύ Κατάρρευσης και Ανθεκτικότητας*. Athens: Themelio.

Doxiadis, Kirkos (2021). *Νεοφιλελευθερισμός και Νεοτερική Εξουσία: Καπιταλισμός, Βιοπολιτική, Ακροδεξιά*. Athens: Nisos.

Holloway, John. *Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today* (2011). Athens: Themelio.

Iatrides, John O., ed. (1984). *Η Ελλάδα στη Δεκαετία 1940-1950: Ένα Έθνος σε Κρίση*. Athens: Themelio.

Kondilis, Panagiotis. *Η Παρακμή του Αστικού Πολιτισμού: Από τη Μοντέρνα στη Μεταμοντέρνα Εποχή και από το Φιλελευθερισμό στη Μαζική Δημοκρατία* (2007). Athens: Themelio.

Lyrintzis, Christos (1991). *Το Τέλος των 'Τζακιών': Κοινωνία και Πολιτική στην Αχαΐα του 19ου Αιώνα*. Athens: Themelio.

Mouzelis, Nikos P. (2005). *Κοινοβουλευτισμός και Εκβιομηχάνιση στην Ημι-Περιφέρεια: Ελλάδα, Βαλκάνια, Λατινική Αμερική*. Athens: Themelio.

Svoronos, Nikos G. (1999). *Ανάλεκτα της Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας*. Athens: Themelio.

Tsoukalas, Konstantinos (2013). *Η Ελλάδα της Λήθης και της Α Λήθειας*. Athens: Themelio.

Tsoukalas, Konstantinos (2005). *Κράτος, Κοινωνία, Εργασία στην Μεταπολεμική Ελλάδα*. Athens: Themelio.

Vaxevanoglou, Aliki (1994). *Οι Έλληνες Κεφαλαιούχοι 1900-1940: Κοινωνική και Οικονομική Προσέγγιση*. Athens: Themelio.

Voulgaris, Giannis (2002). *Η Ελλάδα της Μεταπολίτευσης, 1974-1990: Σταθερή Δημοκρατία Σημαδεμένη από τη Μεταπολεμική Ιστορία*. Athens: Themelio.

Wendy, Brown (2017). *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution*. Athens: Patakis.

Andriopoulou, Eirini, Karakitsios, Alexandros and Tsakloglou, Panos (2017). 'Inequality and Poverty in Greece: Change in Time of Crisis', *LSE Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe*, 116, 1-28.

Fox, Nick J. (2019). Sociologists Should Stop Talking About Class. New Jersey: Wiley, available at https://www.sociologylens.net/topics/class-stratification/sociologists-should-stop-talking-about-social-class/24460 (accessed 25 April 2013).

Hall, Stuart, Massey, Doreen and Rustin, Michael (2013). 'After Neoliberalism: Analyzing the Present', *Soundings*, 53.

Khan, Shamus Rahman (2012). 'The Sociology of Elites', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38, 361-377.

Kokosalakis, Nikos (1998). 'Politics and Sociology in Greece, 1950-98', *International Sociology*, 13:3, 325-343.

Koutentakis, Franciscos and Chrissis, Kostas (2022). 'Top Income Shares from Dictatorship to Crisis, 1967-2017', *Review of Income and Wealth*, 68:3, 653-666.

Lambiri-Dimaki, Jane (1996). 'Sociology in Greece: Trends and Prospects', *South European Society and Politics*, 1:1, 121-130.

Panageotou, Steven (2017). 'Disciplining Greece: Crisis Management and its Discontents', *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 49:3, 358-374.

Poulantzas, Nicos (1976). *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Spain, Greece*. London: Humanities Press.

Rancière, Jacques (2004). 'Introducing Disagreement', *Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, 9:3, 3-9.

Savage, Michael (2014). 'Social Change in the 21st Century: The New Sociology of "Wealth Elites"', *Discover Society*, 15.

Slayer, Andrew (2014). 'The Rich - The Elephant in the Sociology Room', *Discover Society*, 15.

Thanopoulou, Helen, Theotokas, Ioannis and Constantelou, Anastasia (2010). 'Leading by Following: Innovation and the Postwar Strategies of Greek Shipowners', *International Journal of Maritime History*, 22:2, 199-225.

Thompson, E.P. (2013). *The Making of the English Working Class*. London: Penguin Books.

Wright, Erik Olin, ed. (2005). *Approaches to Class Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Seeds of Indoctrination: Political Exile and the Unintended Consequences of Repression[1]

Alsena Kokalari[2] Elias Dinas[3]

Abstract

Exile is a frequent tool dictators use to mute opposition. Despite its omnipres- ence, however, we know surprisingly little about its long-term implications for new democracies. We fill this gap by focusing on the case of Greece and the exiles to remote islands, instituted against adherents of Communism by two authoritarian regimes and the governments that intervened in between. Using rich archival data, we find that exposure to exiled is associated with a persistent left-leaning inclination of the locals. The effects are neither due to compositional changes in the islands nor due to selection into already left-leaning islands. In- stead, the evidence points to a direct pattern of cultural transmission, built around the formation of a new identity around the experience of political exile. Moreover, as a product of successful contact, the legacy of the exiles is accom- panied by persistently lower levels of outgroup prejudice and reduced support for anti-left parties.

Keywords: authoritarianism; cultural mutation; transmission; Greece

[1] This study has been inspired by an idea coming from Argyrios Altiparmakis, to whom we are grateful for all his support and help in the early stages of the project.
[2] PhD Candidate, European University Institute, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Villa Sanfelice, San Domenico di Fiesole, 1-50014, Italy. Email: alsena.kokalari@eui.eu.
[3] Swiss Chair in Federalism, Democracy and International Governance, European University Institute, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Villa Sanfelice, San Domenico di Fiesole, 1-50014, Italy. Email: elias.dinas@eui.eu.

From Franco in Spain to Stalin in the Soviet Union, to Pinochet in Chile, and the Dirty War in Argentina, dictators employ exile to suppress opposition. Seen as a substitute to more severe forms of repression, exiles have been used to anticipate dissent, without imperiling the regime's legitimacy (Esberg 2021). Yet, little is known about the long-term consequences of this practice for the host areas. How do the exiled shape the local environment in which they find themselves and how are they shaped by it?

We address this question by looking into a case in which political exiles became a customary form of repression for more than half a century. From the interwar period and until the mid 1970's, Greece experienced two major authoritarian spells: a fascist regime that lasted from 1936 and until the Axis occupation, and a military coup that broke democratic rule from 1967 to 1974. Albeit of different nature, the two regimes shared an important trait: the major source of legitimation for both was the threat of Communism. In the case of the Metaxas' inter-war regime, the Communists were deemed to enter government from the backdoor, via undisclosed negotiations for a coalition government with the liberals, as a way of overcoming the stalemate in the parliament at the time. In the case of the so-called Colonel's regime, the Communists were not even in the picture, already outlawed, but the fear of the left winning the majority in the parliament was enough to mobilize a coup d'etat. Things were not much easier for supporters of Communism in between the two dictatorships, either however. Having fought a civil-war that they lost, the Communist party remained an outcast, while its supporters faced persecution.

Within this context, exiles of individuals suspected as adherents of Communism would begin in the early 1930's and only end in the mid-1970's. Throughout this period, the destination of the exiles would be small, rural, and sparsely populated, Greek islands, conveniently isolated from the mainland. Our research design is based on the fact that the exiled had no say on where to be sent. In fact, as we show in the empirical sections, deportation decisions were practically orthogonal to the ideological profile of the host-areas. Broadly speaking, the exiled were free to move and interact with the inhabitants of the islands.

Our aim is to examine whether exposure to political exiles leaves a persistent imprint on the ideological identity of the inhabitants of the islands that hosted them. Building on previous studies in cultural economics, we see the exiled as agents of intergenerational cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier 2001). The logic governing the argument is sequential. First comes horizontal transmission (Charnysh and Peisakhin 2022), to then be followed by vertical transmission (Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti 2004). Endowed with stronger ideological commitment and higher human capital, the community of exiled acted as ideological "entrepreneurs" (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), transmitting their ideological predispositions to the local population. These newly formed cultural values diffused locally and transcended from one generation to the next, leaving a persistent footprint on locals' ideological predispositions.

To put this idea into the test we need data on the volume of exiles per island. In the absence of systematic data sources, we created our own novel dataset, based primarily on archival material, such as reports, official documents, diaries, and memoirs sent by the exiles to non-governmental and international organizations, as well as declassified records from Greek and British Archives and the Greek Red Cross. We supplemented the missing information with secondary sources, such as historiographic accounts, newspapers, and biographies. Our main treatment variable then becomes the total volume of exiled recorded in a given island throughout this period. We also split our overall treatment into each specific wave of exiles—interwar dictatorship, civil-war, post-war dictatorship.

Exposure to the exiled is expected to have left a persistent inclination towards the left. To test this expectation, we need a proxy for left-wing preferences. We employ two such measures. First, we use the vote share for left-wing political parties in the first elections held after the collapse of the last authoritarian regime. We collect electoral data from the 1974, 1977 and 1981 elections, the first three elections after the last democratic transition. Second, we complement this information with individual-level data coming from a survey conducted across all Greek islands in 2017 (Hangartner et al. 2019). Making use of this unique source of attitudinal information, we examine whether, else equal, the

volume of exiled in the island helps to predict more left-wing positioning among survey respondents.

We find evidence that the political exile left its footprint on the ideological identity of the inhabitants of the islands. Further decomposition of the effects across waves of exiles, suggests that the effects are driven by the wave of exiles that was the most pervasive and abrupt, the one driven by the civil-war. To further gauge the mechanism driving these effects we engage into several additional steps. First, we bring in the analysis an earlier election, that of 1958. Following the first two waves of exiles, those of the inter-war fascist regime and the civil-war, this was the single most successful election during the post-war period and until 1974 for the left, gaining almost 25% of the national vote. We use this election both as a real and as a placebo outcome to examine simultaneously: a) the short- and mid-term effects of horizontal transmission; and b) one of the key concerns in our inference, namely selection into islands with more left-wing sentiments. Consistent with the assumption made throughout the paper that the exiled were not simply sent into areas already ideologically proximate to their cause, we find that although exposure to civil-war exiles predicts stronger support for the left, exposure to the Junta-exiles is, if anything, negatively correlated with support for the left in 1958. We expand on this evidence, by also using elections taking place in the 1920's, prior to the beginning of deportations. We find no selection into islands already leaning towards the left.

Furthermore, to assure that our results are not simply driven by the fact that the exiled ended up settling permanently in the islands, we use census data from 1928 to 2011 to capture the long-term demographic change of the islands we are studying. We also collected information from historical sources about the arrival, life and departure of the exiled from the islands in which they were deported. The two sets of evidence confirm that we do not simply capture compositional effects.

Finally, we implement several analyses that serve as plausibility tests, helping us to gauge, even if indirectly, the mechanism driving the effects. First, we expect effects to be stronger where the exiled invested more effort and resources in their every-day

organization as well as interaction with the locals. We proxy this tendency by looking at the handwritten newspapers that the exiled published on their own in the islands of residence. Indeed, islands with exiled-written newspapers were also more likely to witness more persistent ideological inclination to the left. Second, for horizontal transmission to play out, it means that the contact between new-comers and natives actually worked out. Had it not, exposure to the exiled may have generated an ideological backlash. This means that together with ideological transmission, the experience of the exile may have created a more positive predisposition among the locals towards other groups. We examine this possibility by making use of a vast array of items about migrants, asylum seekers as well as ethnic, religious or national markers, available in the Hangartner et al. (2019) survey. Consistent with the idea that horizontal transmission was accompanied by enhanced intergroup contact and trust, we find that exposure to exiled within the island is correlated with more pro-social attitudes. Third, if transmission implies some sort of ideological indoctrination, pro-left-wing attitudes should be also accompanied by lower levels of support for the radical right. We test this idea by looking into the Golden Dawn, a neo-fascist party that emerged in Greek politics in the early 2010's, committed enemy of "the civil-war defeated" (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). Indeed, both electoral and survey data show that support for the GD is inversely proportional to the volume of exiled in the island.

Our study lies at the intersection of cultural transmission and ideological identity. An important obstacle in the literature studying the learning processes stemming from between-group interactions is that individuals sort into their social environment. This constraint is important because it confounds the role of horizontal transmission with that of vertical transmission. Parents can trade investment into the transmission of their preferred trait by opting into a social environment that promotes the same trait (Bisin and Verdier 2001). Previous work has tried to address this constraint by using instrumental variables techniques—more specifically the shift-share instrument used in migration studies—to examine the independent effect of exposure to groups with different cultural traits (Giuliano and Tabellini 2020). In a study that is closest to ours, Miho,

Jarotschkin and Zhuravskaya (2019) also use forced displacement. In particular, the authors look at the effect of Stalin's deportations on the diffusion of gender norms in the new areas of settlement. Whereas in that case persecution is made on ethnic grounds, in our case the driving force for the exiles is political ideology. Moreover, as the authors acknowledge, the gender norms of the Protestant deportees that drive the effects in the Soviet case were in line with the Communist doctrine of women emancipation. This is far from true here, as the ideological trait of the exiled runs opposite to the official doctrine of the state.

Our work also speaks to the political socialization literature. The key question for the bulk of these studies is the conditions under which parents are more successful in transmitting their partisanship to their offspring (Niemi and Jennings 1991; Westholm 1999; Dinas 2014). We extend this line of work, joining a recent strand in this literature, that goes beyond partisanship to show that transmission can also incorporate more general ideological beliefs (Rico and Jennings 2016). Moreover, we show that transmission can also take place outside the family, at the local community level. Perhaps more importantly, transmission can succeed even when the ideological trait to be transmitted is disincentivized by state authorities and stigmatized by the national propaganda. In this respect, the Greek case allows us to tap on the question about how regimes shield themselves against political ideologies seen as threatening to their constitutional foundations. Rather than targeting specific individuals with alleged potential to challenge the political order, the exiles that took place in Greece throughout that period can be better characterized as one manifestation of a broader phenomenon, namely the penalization of a specific ideology (Davenport 2007). We ask how local interaction can overcome such barriers, leading to the diffusion of the stigmatized trait.

Finally, our work speaks to a growing literature on prejudice reduction. Contact has featured as a key factor conditioning outgroup relationships, when conditions permit (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). None of this work, however, has looked at how such effects transcend over generations. This lacuna comes in contrast to other factors, such as

the experience of violence or forced displacement, the long-term effects of which have been already examined (Dinas, Fouka and Schlapfer 2021; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Szabo, Vollhardt and Meszaros 2020). We bridge the two sets of studies by showing that ideological identity does not travel alone. It is also accompanied by positive contact effects that set a persistent pro-social baseline in the host communities.

Case Study

Throughout the first three quarters of 20th century, Greek politics registers multiple manifestations of top-down sanctioning against the public expression of support for Communism. Perceived as "the dangerous citizens" (Panourgia 2009), supporters of the left encountered political exclusion, not always because of their actions, but, more often than not, due to their ideas (Mazower et al. 2000). Such discrimination took various forms, but our focus here lies on a particular outcome of administrative and political control, the political exiles.

Historical and Legal Background

The legal seed for political imprisonment was a "special [illegal] act (or special crime), known as the "Idionymon" Law. Put in place by the liberal Venizelos government in 1929, its mission was revealed by the Prime Minister's introductory speech in the parliamentary session preceding the voting of the law. There, Venizelos explained that with this law, the government tried to combat "the Third International and its Bolshevicks principles" (Apostolakou 1997). In particular, the law punished individuals who aimed at "the implementation of ideas whose manifest purpose is the overthrow of the established social order by violent means or the detachment of part from the whole of the country with six months' imprisonment and banishment for up to two years."[4] Historiographic accounts suggest that during the following years approximately 3000 individuals were convicted under the "Idionymon" Law, but fail to provide concrete information as to how the exiled

[4] Law 4229, Government Gazette, 245, 25 July 1929. Such laws were not rare in Europe during the interwar period, as established political elites were becoming increasingly preoccupied by the rising appeal of Communist ideas among the working class (Vbglis 2002b).

were distributed across the islands.

The Metaxas Wave

Venizelos' "Idionymon" would be further intensified a few years later, giving room to an even larger wave of deportations. Inspired by the fascist model of Italy and Germany, the 4th August Regime was imposed by General loannis Metaxas, ruling Greece from 1936 to 1941. A key feature of the so-called "New State" was its fierce opposition to Communism, officially manifested through the Emergency Law (117/1936), which built on the "Idionymon" to take "measures for the fight against communism and its consequences." This law was complemented by another Emergency Law, 1075/1938, with the goal to put in place "security measures for the protection of the citizens and the regime." That last law provided a more detailed basis for the prosecution of leftists and trade unionists and introduced three important measures: the 'declarations of repentance;'[5] the 'loyalty certificate;'[6] and the establishment of 'concentration camps' for banished individuals.[7]

The exact number of those deported under the Metaxas regime is unknown. Our figures come from a triangulation of archival and historiographic research. One important source estimates the exiled during that period between 1000 and 5000, the vast majority of whom sent to islands Anafi, Folegandros, Gavdos, Agios Efstratios, Amorgos, los, Santorini or imprisoned in the prisons of Akronafplia, Aegina, Pylos, and Corfu. In the data section, we provide more specific information about the distribution of the Metaxas' exiled across each island, including also the corresponding sources accompanying these figures.

The Civl-War Wave

Despite his admiration for Mussolini, Metaxas denied his request to pass through the Greek territory with his army. Doing so initiated Greece's participation in World War II,

[5] The declarations of repentance were official texts with which those accused of promoting Communism declared that they reject its ideas and the Communist Party itself. In most cases, individuals were released after signing the declaration. Declarations of repentance first appeared during the Metaxas' dictatorship, but proliferated during the Civil War. Apart from prisoners and exiles, they were also signed by ordinary citizens. Singing mean automatically expulsion from the Communist party.

[6] Loyalty certificate was another official document that those willing to become civil servants had to submit to the state (Voglis 2002a, 257).

[7] Inspired by Nazi Germany, the term refers to areas gathering political dissidents obliged to take part in intensive manual labour (257).

which started with a military victory against Italy but soon ended with the Axis Occupation, by Germany and its allies—Italy and Bulgaria. Resistance against the Nazi rule emerged already in 1941 and by 1943 it was widely spread across the periphery. Although politically heterogeneous, most of these insurgent groups were organizationally linked to the National People's Liberation Army (ELAS), the military branch of the Communist-led National Liberation Front (EAM). Already by 1943 we find extensive, albeit localized, clashes between ELAS and either anti-Communist insurgent groups or the so-called Security Battalions, collaborationist military groups formed to either protect themselves against Communist violence or to outrightly support the German occupation troops (Kalyvas 2016; latrides 2005).

The country's liberation towards the end of 1944 did not absorb these divisions; instead, it let them loose, giving rise to a full-scale civil war between the Communist-led *Democratic Army* and state-led *National Army*. The civil war initiated the second, this time more widespread and intensive, wave of exiles. The Communist Party and its ancillary organizations were outlawed (Law 509/1947), and many Communists either fled the country or faced persecution. The nationalist side tried to fragment trade unionists and members of left-wing political parties (mainly communists) by deporting them to isolated communities, mostly (even if not exclusively) to Greek islands. The defeat of the Communists in 1949 prolonged the duration of the exiled even after the restoration of political order in 1949. The legal arsenal used to permit the continuation of political detentions was a yet another modification of the "Idionymon law" through a provision against spying (Koundouros 1978).

The UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) reports that there were 3.869 exiles on forty-seven small islands in Greece in 1946, while a few months later their number rose to 5.809 (4.816 men, 853 women and 140 children) (Essay 2013; UNRRA 1947, 234). Amidst mass arrests and deportations in 1947, the Communist Party announced that the number of exiled was 24.000, a figure, however, most likely inflated (Voglis 2002a). In 1948 it was estimated that the number of political exiles was 12,878

people, while in 1949 there are 15.000 people in exile, the majority of whom (12.000) were transferred to the Makronisos camp where they stayed until the camp was closed in 1950.[8] The men were subsequently transported to Agios Efstratios and Ikaria and the women to Trikeri. In 1951, according to British sources, there were 2.807 men in Agios Efstratios and 544 women in Trikeri island (ibid.). Eventually, exiled were released or transferred to different islands (92).

The Junta Wave

The third wave of deportations comes with the short-lived military coup that broke democratic rule from 1967 to 1974. The so-called Junta or Colonels' Regime was a right-wing military dictatorship, with an explicit anti-Communist rhetoric (Kornetis 2013). As such, while it restricted civil liberties across the population, it specifically targeted adherents of the left, who suffered imprisonment and exile.

The figures during the Greek junta are quite controversial. Political exile was still used as a measure of political repression, albeit more moderately compared to the two previous waves. Under the military Junta, political opponents were mostly imprisoned or isolated in concentration camps. Those exiled were mainly deported to the inhabited island of Giaros (known as, Gioura), as well as Leros, Amorgos and Agios Efstratios. The regime would fall on 24 July 1974 under the pressure of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, leading to the democratic transition that gave rise to the "Third Greek Republic". The democratic rule eventually lifted the boundaries of political and social exclusion, thereby restoring the political legitimacy of the left, while recognizing its historical role in the country's *Resistance* (Ifytili 2022).

Life in Exile

Political dissidents could not choose where they would be deported. Instead, the destination was decided either by the court or by an administrative committee formed for this purpose, known as the Security Committee. The only criterion taken into consideration

[8] The Makronisos reformation camp, located in the homonymous non-inhabited, island in the Aegean Sea, served as the epicenter of political imprisonment throughout that period.

was the distance from the administrative Centre (Voglis 2002b).[9] Exiled were deported to remote islands with a relatively loose surveillance regime. They were not allowed to leave their destination and had to report regularly to the police station to verify their physical presence; local police censored their correspondence and informed them about letters, money orders, and parcels received. Contrary to political prisons or deportation camps, political detainees that were displaced in the Aegean Sea were allowed to interact with the local population, even if stricter rules were imposed after 1947.

The living conditions were heavily dependent on the resources of the island, the self-organization of the exiled, and their relations with the locals (Voglis 2002a, 93-95). Upon arrival, deportees had to rent accommodation and farms from the locals. Female deportees and their children were accommodated in separate chambers. In some cases, exiled had to build their accommodation, as most islands had no infrastructure for hosting them. There were no health facilities, as supplies were frequently insufficient even for the native population. Discipline and personal hygiene rules were important, especially in the case of women. Differences in hygiene habits between them became an occasional source of controversy (Voglis 2017, 155).

Both locals and the exiled shared the same shortages—in water, fuel, food supplies, or medical assistance. Based on UNRRA reports mentioned by Voglis (2002a), "the locals and the exiled ended up cooperating in sharing what food was available." In some cases, the exiled managed to revitalize the otherwise neglected islands by repairing damages and improving the existing infrastructure. In places such as Folegandros, the inhabitants were participating in the cultural activities that the exiled organized, while in Ikaria the exiled exchanged gifts and sweets with the inhabitants during Easter or other national celebrations (92-94).

The relatively low number of exiled during the Metaxas regime implied that no distinction was needed between men, women, and children. As numbers began to increase

[9] According to the Article 11 of the Emergency Law No. 117.1936, "Concerning Measures to Combat Communism and Its Consequences," the destination location was defined by the court decision or by the Security Committee.

during the civil war, however, deportees were divided into male and female exile camps. The exiled differed among each other in many dimensions, including education, occupation, political affiliation (although the majority were indeed communists) and place of origin—coming not only from different parts of Greece but sometimes including even non-Greek combatants. Despite this variation in their background, the exiled population was on average more highly educated compared to the local population of the host communities (Voglis 2002a).

The political exiles were often organized in Cohabitation Groups, known as OPSE *('Omada Symviosis Politikon Exoriston,* i.e. "Political Exiles' Cohabitation Group"), or simply "collectives" or "communes." Gritzonas (2001, 123-4) distinguishes two periods in the development of the Cohabitation Groups: the pre-war and the post-war period, with the main difference between the two being the progressive change in the social composition of the exiled. Before the war, the vast majority of the prosecuted belonged to the working class, while some of them were farmers. In the post-war period and later on, the social composition of political detainees changed, with an ever-increasing percentage of middleclass professionals and intellectuals, which gradually constituted the majority among the exiled. This gradual change in their social composition was accompanied by a more discernible variation in the ideological outlook of the detainees.

The role of the OSPE was twofold. First, they organized the day-to-day life during their exile. A central committee was elected to arrange and improve living conditions by collecting money, running a canteen, assigning duties for the cooking, cleaning, and the overall maintenance of the house. Second, they took care of the implementation of various leisure activities. Every group had its own choir, orchestra, or theatre, often performing in the middle of the village for the exiled and the inhabitants of the island (Gritzonas 2001, 95-102). An important activity in the OSPE was the publishing and circulation of handwritten illegal newspapers. The most well-known ones were "Exoristos" (*Exiled),* in Agios Efstartios, and "Antifasistas" (*Anti-fascist*) in Anafi. In those newspapers, the exiled would propagate their political ideas and inform others about the everyday life in

exile. As the examples shown in Online Appendix B indicate (Figures B.l, B.2 and B.3), the articles were mainly devoted to the ideas and history of Communism and the labour movement in Greece and abroad.

During their stay, the exiled were not allowed to create interpersonal or romantic relations with the local population. In his memoir about his personal experience in the island Anafi, Tzamaloukas (2022, 81) explains that the reason for this was twofold: first, because it would create a negative precedent for the other members of the group, putting the survival of the OSPE into risk. Mating with the locals would mean that the exiled had more incentives to sign the "declaration of repentance." More broadly, such relationship would mean less incentives to return to the mainland and join the party. Second, there was a moral dimension underlying the norm to avoid creating romantic relations with the locals. The Exiled believed doing so would not uphold their identity as good Communists and would degrade their self-image as individuals of high moral standards. Those not complying to this unwritten rule were expelled by both the OSPE and the party.

After the Exile

Before being released, political exiles were often transferred from island to island. Reasons varied, but the most common ones were either their further prosecution or the need to cure various diseases not treatable at the existing locations due to the lack of infrastructure. Often, these health-related transfers were used strategically by the exiled to facilitate their escape from the island and join the army (in the case of the civil-war) or emigrate in the case of the Metaxas dictatorship or the Greek Junta (Tzamaloukas 2022, 102).

Primary sources, combined with historiographic accounts indicate the eagerness of the exiled to be released and to return to the mainland. After the completion of their sentence, the exiled feared that a new decision would renew their sentence for another year or so. The exiled demanded "general amnesty" at the end of the civil war. "Being forgotten" in exile, political detainees were seeking to raise awareness by mobilizing the national and international community to support their claim for unconditional release, without the need to sign the declaration of repentance. In the Contemporary Social His-

tory Archives (ASKI)[10] we found the official letters and reports that groups of unreleased political exiled addressed to the state and various national newspapers (e.g. *Kathimerini* and *Vima),* as well as to the Presidents of the United Nations and the International Red Cross.

The Mechanics of Transmission

Geographically isolated from the mainland, local populations in the islands had only sparse communication with the rest of the country. Their connection with the capital was only made via the official transportation line by boat, which used to arrive from the port of Piraeus every one or two weeks. The same boat also brought the post and the press.[11]

Indeed, the exiled and subsequently the guardian police were the only presence of the official state in these islands. For most of them, official institutions, such as hospitals, universities, and the court were absent. Locals had to travel to the closest big island to cover their medical or administrative needs. In terms of education, although there is evidence for the existence of elementary school facilities, lack of teachers prevented schools from opening, which seems to also explain the high illiterate rate among the local population (Tzamaloukas 2022). These conditions undermined locals' trust towards the official state and its institutions, as one could also infer from the diaries and the memoirs of the exiled, who offered rich descriptions about how the locals felt "left behind."[12] This perception is also confirmed by our own archival research in the state archives in Athens and London. Although there is a wealth of historical information about the mainland, there is hardly any information about the islands, which except for the very big islands such as Crete, are treated as a whole.[13]

[10] Contemporary Social History Archives (ASKI): F. 25/5/10 and F. 25/5/17.
[11] Although referring to an earlier historical era, the example described in the memoir of Tzamaloukas (2022, 25) is quite telling: the inhabitants of the Anafi Island were informed that King Othon was overthrown in 1862 with a delay of more than two months.
[12] Indicative in this respect is a quote provided by Tzamaloukas (2022, 111), made by a local during the Metaxas dictatorship: "The official state remembers us only whenever it wants to take our children to fight the war."
[13] For instance, the "Greek Basic Handbook" (W022/181) that we found in the The National Archive in London, devotes only one chapter, Chapter IX, to The Greek Islands. The main page focused on Crete, while the rest of the islands were described all together in the right corner of the same page.

The vacuum left by the official state and its institutions would be gradually filled in by the political exiled. Their surplus in human capital allowed them to translate their interaction with the locals into a more formative socialization experience. Importantly, horizontal transmission was not only the result of successful indoctrination in the form of top-down lecturing. As also argued by (Voglis 2017, 152-153), it often constituted for the locals a more indirect process of overt learning through contact with the newcomers. Let's us try to sketch the means and channels through which such influence materialized.

The exiled would help improve the existing infrastructure. Thanks to the skills they acquired before and during the exile, they were able to take up large-scale reconstruction projects, such as building the bakery and the school of the island; cultivating the land; repairing the clothes and shoes of the detainees and locals. In some cases, locals preferred the exiled as they seemed better skilled and trained compared to the locals (Tzamaloukas 2022).

Within the OSPE, the more highly educated members of the group organized a series of educational classes. Apart from language reading and writing, the curriculum included basic math, history, and philosophy—both through Marxist lens. For example, pupils would learn about Leninism and the Bolshevik party.[14] Day-to-day interaction with the locals would then diffuse these ideas within the local communities. The exact channels through which this interaction would take place varied. In some cases the exiled owned an illegal library with books and newspapers. They also used to have discussion groups. In Chios, elderly exiled women sang together in the church (Theodorou 1976; Voglis 2017). Some exiled studied theatre and organized public events in which the broader audience was involved by following the final rehearsal and the play in the main square of the village. Describing his experience in Anafi, Tzamaloukas (2022), explains that it was the first time that the locals were exposed to a theatrical play. Revealing the theme of most of these plays, the stage was typically decorated with posters from the

[14] For those already literate, there were also lessons in accounting and finance, as the detainees -excluded from the public sector- could only aspire to a professional career in the private sector after the exile.

resistance.

Under these circumstances, the step from sustained contact to political influence was almost inevitable. When ideological indoctrination per se was not sufficient, the glorification of the exiled and their struggle would complement the picture[15]. While co-existence in the island left more room for contingency than co-habitation in the prison, it also provided a greater variety of means through which transmission could take place. Indeed, archival evidence suggests that the Communist party became quickly aware of how successful exiled could be in diffusing support for their cause that it sometimes boycotted attempts made to reduce the number of deportees. For example, as reported by the *Times* correspondent, deportees who wished to present themselves before a commission that would review their case with the possibility of releasing them, would be intimidated by the party. The reason, according to this source, was "to keep as many exiled as possible on the islands as martyrs and as pupils in the schools of intensive Communist indoctrination which the islands have become."[16]

Taking stock, three reasons seem to have converted the exiled into potential agents of ideological transmission. First, they were sent to communities that were bereft of institutions typically also serving as national propaganda instruments, such as national press, schools and bureaucracy (Weber 1976). The absence of state infrastructure facilitated the penetration of the Communist rhetoric, which often echoed locals' resentment with the state. Second, the asymmetry in cultural and human capital could tilt the balance of ideological influence from the exiled to the locals rather than the other way around. Third, it seems that indoctrination was successful because it took place naturally, aided by a loose surveillance scheme, through social interaction between locals and new-comers under next-to-ideal conditions for positive contact effects to emerge (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 1954). In what follows, we bring these factors into the literature of cultural transmission

[15] In this regard it is worth citing the following passage from the report of the British Ambassador to the Foreign Office after his visit to the Averof prison in Athens, on September 27th, 1945: "The entire internal organisation of prisoners is in the hands of a small Communist committee. [...] It was difficult to guess who was to be reforming whom. Many walls were plastered with EAM posters, newspapers, codes of rules and slogans, all excellently reproduced. Thanks to the Government, the Communists have readymade audience which cannot get away from them and which is inclined to hear them, as their message seems to resonate with their grievances. Most of this audience were arrested for being Communists which they were not but soon will be. The ironic fact is that [the] KKE would profit from keeping them in and the Government from letting them out."

[16] The National Archive: FCO 162/924, "Greece: Position of political deportees" (Confidential), R12018/4/19, Copy No.62, September 4, 1947.

to derive expectations about the long-term attitudinal imprint of the exiled.

Theoretical Expectations

To derive expectations about how the exiled shaped the attitudinal outlook of the communities in which they resided, we draw on two strands of literature. First, several studies in historical political economy have investigated the mechanics of cultural transmission, pointing to two different sources, namely *vertical transmission*—taking place through kinship relationships—and *horizontal or oblique transmission*—taking place within society at large via imitation and learning. While vertical transmission is better suited to explain intergenerational continuity of cultural traits (Voigtlander and Voth 2012; Bisin and Verdier 2000), horizontal transmission often features as an intervening factor breaking this vertical linkage, giving room to over-time change (Voigtlander and Voth 2012; Charnysh and Peisakhin 2022).

Here, we try to combine the two paths of transmission, taking them sequentially, in the order in which they are expected to operate. First comes the exposure to the exiled, which operates as mechanism of horizontal transmission. In turn, this influence leaves its scars within the community, thereby allowing for cultural reproduction to play out through vertical transmission.

There are at least two factors that can put this process into question. First, the pioneering work of Bisin and Verdier (2001) suggested that the two paths of transmission may be connected in an inseparable way. If parents, acting as parochial altruists, adjust their investment into the transmission of their preferred cultural trait according to how prevalent this trait is within the community, the pro-left bias disseminated by the exiled might be outweighed by the increased effort within the island to forge strong parent-child ideological ties.

Second, horizontal transmission may not be successful if the experience with the newcomers creates a backlash effect, driving locals away from the traits to which they are exposed. Some studies point to intergroup interactions augmenting instead of ameliorating

animosity between the groups (Enos 2014). More often than not, this pattern is attributed to one or more "Allportian" (1954) conditions for contact not being met (Steinmayr 2021; Hangartner et al. 2019; Paluck and Green 2009; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). If this is the case with the exiled, we should expect no first-stage in the transmission process.

Here is where the source of the cue becomes particularly important. The exiled differed from locals in at least three respects. First, it is reasonable to expect that they were ideologically more committed than their local counterparts. Put differently, the ideological stock of those deported for their ideas is most likely higher than that of the average citizen. If transmission is a function of effort and if effort is in turn a function of how salient the trait is for the cue provider, one would expect the exiled to have an advantage over local providers of opposite political cues. Previous work in political socialization has shown that the salience of the political object facilitates the success of attitudinal reproduction (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009). Similar evidence is provided when one looks into gender norms. Women emancipation was a key feature of the GDR, serving as one of the regime's benchmarks (Bauernschuster and Rainer 2012; Banaszak 2006). The salience of this trait explains why, after reunification, it was the East German migrants that transmitted their gender norms into west Germany rather than the other way round (Schmitz and Weinhardt 2019).

Second, the exiled had more resources available in their attempt to diffuse their ideology. This asymmetry did not only stem from a mismatch in formation and training, but also from an imbalance in the available toolbox from which each side could draw in their political discussions. Unlike right-wing authoritarian regimes, primarily based on the ad-hoc personalized doctrines of their leaders (Linz 2000), Communism enjoyed more articulate and centralized philosophical underpinnings, of which at least some of the exiled were not only well aware, but also eager to draw upon in their day-to-day interactions. In this respect, the exiled acted as "local entrepreneurs" (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), or as Ruggeri (2012) puts it, Gramscian intellectuals or "persuaders", conveying the party's

discourse in a hegemonic way, i.e. not through coercion, but through consent.[17]

Third, the exiled did not only enjoy higher human capital but also registered high levels of social capital. Driven by a shared experience of political persecution, the exiled communities formed in the island achieved in both organizing internally and creating ties with the local population. The marginal presence of the state apparatus meant that attempts made to either prevent or moderate such peer-to-peer interactions between the exiled and the locals failed. The type of relationships formed along this process explains why in this case contact worked. Although often competing with locals for scarce resources, the exiled also contributed in public good provision, which not only increased the overall pie, but also helped to signal cooperative behavior, thereby facilitating inter-group trust.

These differences explain the first part of the process, i.e. how the pro-left sentiments were horizontally transmitted. It leaves, however, open the question as to why and how these effects persist after the end of the exile. After all, political detainees left the islands as soon as they were given the opportunity to do so. What explains their persistent influence despite their absence from the local context?

This is where the second strand of literature becomes of key importance. An ever-increasing volume of studies in historical political economy shows that past events have a persisting effect on present-day behavior, attitudes and preferences (Wittenberg 2006; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Voigtlander and Voth 2015; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017; Beissinger and Kotkin 2014). Importantly for our purposes, norms and attitudes persist even when the conditions associated with those experiences have ceased to operate (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2008; Finseraas, Kotsadam and Polavieja 2020), or the regime that produced them has changed (Luttmer and Singhal 2011; Balcells 2012). This is even more likely when, as in our case, formal institutions are either weak or non-existent (Grosjean 2014).

[17] Unlike the case of Italy, where this role was played by local party elites (Costalli and Ruggeri 2019), the exiled served in this role not due to their embeddedness in the local context but, despite such lack of embeddedness.

Some of this work also helps us arrive to more fine-grained predictions about the reproduction success of the political legacy of the exiled. First, if ideological transmission is the result of the human capital put in place by the exiled, it should be more effective when the exiled organized collectively and put more effort into this task. We try to grasp this idea by looking at the local press produced by the political exiles. We expect the legacy of the exiled to be more persistent where they circulated their own newspapers.

Moreover, successful transmission presupposes successful contact; people are more likely to adopt others' worldviews if they hold them in high esteem (Asch 1956; Kim, Kim and Kim 2021) and if conversation takes place in ways that allows the ingroup to imagine the world from the outgroup's' vantage point (Broockman and Kalla 2016; Kalla and Broockman 2020). Immigration into these islands was practically non-existent prior to the exiled.[18] Given the unexpected, abrupt and often massive inflows of exiled in the islands, the positive interaction between these new-comers and the locals could set in place a pro-social baseline among the local community. To the extent that such a prior has persisted over time, islands that have received exiled should register more positive attitudes towards outgroups, in this case people of different religious or ethnic background.

Second, preaching about Marxism is more than preaching about party identity. For example, although national pride was far from low among the Communist insurgents, adherence to a class-based worldview is likely to have undermined ethnic, religious or other fixed markers of identity vis-a-vis more vertical, class-based categorizations. Accordingly, horizontal transmission should be followed by lower weights attached to ethnicity, religion or even language as demarcation lines of Greek identity.

In what follows, we describe the data we use to put these expectations into the test.

Data and Research Design

Our unit of analysis throughout the paper is the island. In the following passages we

[18] One exception here could be the island of Lesvos which received numerous Asia Minor refugees after the end of the Greco-Turkish war and the compulsory population exchange between the two countries that was decided in 1923 (Dinas, Fouka and Schlapfer 2021).

briefly describe our main variables and the data sources used to construct them.

Treatment: Political exiles

Our key predictor is the inflow of exiles into each island. To collect this information per exile wave and island, we used primarily archival material, such as reports, official documents, diaries and memoirs sent by the exiles to non-governmental and international organizations, their family, friends, and the party. We also used declassified records from Greek and British Archives and the Greek Red Cross. We supplemented the missing information with secondary sources, such as historiographic accounts, newspapers, and biographies of those exiled to different places during the period under study.[19] Using this information, we detect 38 islands that hosted political exiles in either of the three waves under study. In few cases -Leros, Limnos, Agios Efstratios and Ikaria- this information becomes available on a yearly basis. We combine this information and aggregate it by waves of exile to facilitate the analysis, as the outcome of interest, the electoral support for the left after the democratic transition, is materialized after all deportations of a given wave had already taken place.



Figure 1: Islands with and without exiled across all three waves.

[19] See Appendix A for the list of primary sources used in the paper.

Figure 1 distinguishes between Greek islands with and without experiences of exiles. As can be seen, besides the three major islands of the country, Crete, Rhodes, and Corfu, size does not seem to play a role in whether an island served as a host for political detainees, with both mid- and small-scale islands having been used as destinations for deportations.

Table.1 zooms in on each wave showing the number of exiled per island for each historical period. It also includes the sources upon which our figures draw. Our main treatment variable is the total sum of exiles coming to the island throughout the period from 1930's until mid 1970's. We then decompose this encompassing measure into the three constituent waves: *Metaxas*, *civil-war*, and the *Junta*. Clearly, the distribution per island and wave varies considerably, with a range from 9 to 10.000 exiles, the vast majority of exiled was deported to islands such as Anafi, Ikaria, Agios Efstratios Leros, Limnos, Giaros and Makronisos, while islands such Skiathos, Santorini, los and Kimolos seem to have hosted a smaller number of exiled. Since islands also vary in size, we always control for the local population of the island in our analyses. In line with the historical evidence, we see that although political repression during both dictatorships was both frequent and intense, the scale of deportations that took place with the political system that formed after the Greek Civil war, accurately described as a "Cachectic Republic" (Nikolakopoulos 2001), was even higher, high even when compared to other European benchmarks (Mazower et al. 2000, 11).

Outcome: Support for the Left

We use two sets of measures to proxy preferences for the left. First, we employ the electoral support for the left in first three elections that were held right after the collapse of the last authoritarian spell, in 1974. These are the elections that ended up consolidating the Greek party system, transforming it into a two-party system that lasted until its eventual collapse in May 2012, under the weight of the sovereign debt crisis (Παππάς 2001). Within these three elections, from 1974 to 1977, to 1981, the party dynamics would also crystalize within the left, consisting of two main parties, the Communist party and a newly formed socialist party with a radical anti-NATO agenda, called Pan-Hellenic Social

Movement (PASOK). PASOK saw its vote double in two consequent elections, reaching

Table 1: Number of exiled per wave and island.

	Metaxas	Civil-War	Junta	Combined	Source
Agios Efstratios	950	2439	2000	5389	Voglis (2002a, 95); Zervos (2003); ASKI
Alonnisos	0	10	0	10	Kathimerini
Amorgos	200	0	1	201	Kathimerini
Anafi	220	1	0	221	Tzamaloukas (2022); Gritzonas (2001, 28)
Antikythera	0	20	0	20	Zervos (2003); Florakis Archives
Chios	0	1113	0	1113	Voglis (2002a)
Folegandros	200	0	0	200	Gritzonas (2001); Kathimerini
Gavdos	0	50	50	100	Kathimerini
Giaros (Gioura)	0	5004	417	5021	ASKI KKE 421 - F.25/3/38; Gritzonas (2001)
Ikaria	0	10000	0	10000	The National Archive FCO 162/924; Kalampogias (2019); Voglis (2002a)
Ios	16	1	0	17	
Kea (Tzia)	0	75	0	75	Tzamaloukas (2022)
Kythera	0	20	0	20	Florakis Archives
Leros	0	249	621	870	Florakis Archives; Huffington-Post
Lesvos	0	238	0	238	Florakis Archives
Limnos	0	1583	0	1583	Florakis Archives; Greek Red Cross
Makronisos	0	12000	0	12000	Voglis (2002a); History Essay of Communist Party 2012
Samos	0	43	0	43	ASKI KKE 421 - F.25/3/33
Samothraki	0	650	0	650	ASKI KKE 421 - F.25/3/33
Santorini	13	0	0	13	Kathimerini
Sikinos	0	20	0	20	Florakis Archives
Skiathos	0	9	0	9	
Trikeri	0	550	0	550	Voglis (2002a, 107); The National Archive; ASKI KKE 421 - F.25/3/41

from 13.5% of the vote in 1974, to 25.3% in 1977 to arrive to a landslide electoral victory in 1981 with 48% of the vote. Unlike PASOK, the Communist left remained remarkably stable across all three elections gaining constantly 10% of the vote, in 1974 as the United Left and, after being again legal, as the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Our outcome measure consists of the sum of the two parties, plus the vote share of other small left-wing parties.[20]

[20] See Online Appendix C, Figure 0.1, for more information about the other parties coded as left-wing in each election.

Since the exiled were predominantly members or adherents of the Communist party, one might question our choice to include PASOK, a non-Communist party, as part of the left in our outcome measure. This choice is made for three reasons. First, for the period under examination PASOK is unequivocally left-wing. For example, the party's manifesto in 1974 scores -37.6 in the left-right scale of the Comparative Manifesto Project, with the Communist party scoring -28.7. These differences persist both in 1977 and in 1981. Second, PASOK did not evolve as a left-wing party outside the historical context within which it operated. The politics of memory in post-transition Greece saw a reversal of ideological fortunes (Dinas 2017), resulting into "the ideological vengeance of civil-war defeated" (Mavrogordatos 1999). Within a context of right-wing stigmatization, PASOK embraced fully its historical role as the ideological and political descendant of ELAS, together with the KKE. This is evident both in its political rhetoric as well as in its own record once in power in 1981. It was PASOK in 1982 that formally recognized the Communist resistance during the period of the Axis occupation, amidst severe criticism and eventual evacuation of the plenary by the MPs of the right-wing party in the parliament, the New Democracy. Third, at least until 1981, despite their competition for votes within the same ideological space, the two parties signaled to their voters their ideological proximity via, for example, frequent coalitions in municipal elections (Nicolacopoulos 2013).

This last reason also explains why we stop in 1981. Once PASOK in power, the relationship between the two parties becomes more antagonistic, evolving around Papandreou's polarizing figure, worshiped by PASOK supporters but heavily criticized by other supporters of the left. This shift culminated in 1989, when the Communist party entered into a short-term coalition with the right, aiming at driving PASOK's leader not only out of office but also into a trial for corruption. Indeed, as pointed out by Kalyvas and Marantzidis (2002), after PASOK's re-election in 1985, KKE change its electoral strategy, avoiding allegiances with PASOK either at the national or at the subnational level.

The second measure is attitudinal and comes much later, in 2017. We make use of a unique survey (Hangartner et al. 2019), conducted for different purposes, but still

sampling respondents across all Greek islands, asking them, among several other questions, to place themselves in the left-right axis. We examine whether residents in islands exposed to higher volume of exiles register a pro-left-wing bias.

Threats to Inference

Imagine we recover a positive association between exposure to exiled and post-1974 left-wing support. There are at least two alternative stories accounting for this relationship, aside our ideological diffusion explanation. First, it could simply be that exiled are sent to islands where the local population is already predisposed towards the left. We account for this possibility by using, both as placebo outcomes and as covariates, the last two elections that took place before the enactment the "Idionymon" law in 1929, those of 1926 and 1928.

More broadly, our empirical strategy is based on the idea that political dissidents could not select where they would be deported. As discussed in the previous section, historiographic reports confirm that this is the case. That said, selection could still be introduced indirectly if the islands used for exile differ considerably in ways that could in the long-term generate diverse ideological trajectories. One such possibility might emerge if exile islands are more remote from the mainland, and thus closer to the Turkish coast. It is logical to assume that Greco-Turkish relationships worsened during the second half of 20th century and especially after the Turkish invasion in Northern Cyprus in 1974. If islands closer to Turkey felt more vividly this change through an increase in ingroup threat, islands closer to the Turkish coast may have witnessed different ideological trends. We test this possibility by looking into whether distance to the Turkish coast predicts the number of exiles in the island. We find no significant relationship either when looking into the encompassing exiled measure or when we decompose this measure into the three constituent waves.[21]

Second, it could be that the exiled remained in the island and changed its demographic

[21] See Table 6.1 in the Online Appendix C for the relationship between distance to Turkish coast and number of exiled per island.

composition. The historical evidence, summarized in the previous section, suggests that this unlikely to be the case. Historians and ethnographers agree that the exiled were keen on leaving the islands as soon as they were allowed to do so. A more systematic test of this possibility requires data on local population dynamics. We use census data from 1928 to 2011 to capture the long-term demographic change of the islands we are studying before and after the three waves of exile.

Gauging the Mechanism

We perform several additional tests to better grasp the validity of our proposed explanation. First, we use information as to whether the exiled wrote and circulated their own newspaper as a proxy of the organizational strength of the exiled. The collection of data on the existence of handwritten newspaper was based on archival evidence provided by the archive of the "Charilaos Florakis" Educational Centre and the Contemporary Social History Archives (ASKI), complemented by secondary sources, such as book collections and online publications.[22] We also try to see whether the effect varies according to whether exiles are predominantly male, female or mixed. This information is available at the island-wave level and we thus employ it as an additional moderator in our analysis.

Second, we include in our analysis one election that takes place amidst the three waves of political exclusion, namely the 1958 election. This was a landmark election for the left, taking place within a setting of vivid anti-Communist sentiment. With the Communist party banned from taking part in the electoral process from 1947 to 1977, the left was represented via a substitute party, the United Democratic Left, which in that election registered its historical high, 25% of the total vote. We use the vote share for this party in 1958 as a proxy for the support for the left in between the second and third wave of political exiles.

Third, we use the battery of items available in the Hangartner et al. (2019) survey to examine the two complementary sets of expectations developed in the previous section,

[22] More information about the sources used to detect and register newspapers in the islands can be found in Figure 0.2 the Online Appendix C.

namely the contact hypothesis and the markers of group identity hypothesis. Respondents were asked several questions about their attitudes towards asylum seekers, their sympathy towards various outgroups as well as questions about what it means to be Greek. We describe these outcomes in more detail in the next section.

Results

Table 2 regresses the vote for the left in the island on the total number of exiled across all three waves, while always controlling for the total population in the island, as measured in 1971.[23] We find a positive association, of only modest, however, magnitude. Let us consider the case of the 1974 election. The average vote share for the left in that election was 23%. The estimates shown here suggest that for every thousand exiled -somewhat less that one standard deviation, which is 1.475- the left gains approximately 2.3 percentage points, which amounts to an approximately 10% increase. The effect seems to remain up until 1981, although the magnitude deceases substantially, if one considers that by then the vote for the left had exploded to 59%.

One obvious concern with this analysis is that instead of the exiled turning these islands more left-wing, they were simply sent into islands already more sympathetic to their cause. We address this possibility by looking into the most recent election that took place before the legal arsenal for political persecution, namely the "Idionymon" law, that of 1928. Including the support for the left in that election as a proxy for the pre-exile support for the left comes with a cost, however, as we lose almost half of our observations. This is for two reasons; first, one of the Aegean sea's group of islands, the Dodecanese, were not annexed to Greece until 1945. Second, changes in the administrative units make the results for 1928 impossible to detect at the level of the island. For example, Cyclades appear in the archives all together hence making it difficult to decompose the results into specific islands.[24] The results for 1974, 1977 and 1981 appear in columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 2 respectively and confirm the association between exiled and support for the

[23] Using other years, either prior or posterior to 1971, for population yields substantively identical results. 1971 is used as this is the closest census year to the end of the third and last exile wave.
[24] At least, selection into attrition does not seem to be driven by treatment status: a difference-of-means test in terms of the number of exiled between islands with electoral results missing and non-missing in 1928 yields a difference of 153 exiled with p-value 0.27.

left after the democratic transition.

Table 2: Exposure to Exiled across all three waves and vote for the left after the democratic transition.

	Left 1974		Left 1977		Left 1981	
Total Number of Exiles	0.023*	0.034***	0.016	0.031***	0.019**	0.026***
	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Population	0.001*	0.001	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.135***	0.133***	0.248***	0.263***	0.526***	0.520***
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.026)
Left 1928		0.949		0.468		0.722*
		(0.752)		(0.602)		(0.413)
n	73	44	73	44	73	44
R-squared	0.123	0.251	0.118	0.204	0.098	0.204

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3 decomposes these overall patterns by looking at each of the three waves separately. Doing so permits us to also include the 1958 election, which serves as a more short-term outcome for the first-two waves while being a placebo outcome for the Junta wave. Looking at the results across the board, the findings suggest that among all three waves the one that seems to have left a long-term ideological imprint is the one emerging after the civil war. Neither the first nor the second dictatorship seems to have produced waves of exiles that gave room to a long-term pro-left inclination. The civil-war, however, seems to have done so. For each 1000 civil-war exiled in the island, the left sees its vote share increase by 3.5 percentage points. This effect seems robust to the inclusion of pre-1930's left as a covariate. Finally, looking into the 1958 election, we see the seeds of the civil-war exiled had already yielded electoral fruits by then, with the effect, expectedly, being even stronger in that election than in those coming along after the military coup.

Table 3: Decomposing Exiled into their three constituent waves.

	(1) Left 1974		(2) Left 1977		(3) Left 1981		(4) Left 1958	
Exiles: Metaxas	-0.161	-0.586***	-0.126	-0.525*	-0.145	-0.527**	0.178	-0.429***
	(0.121)	(0.134)	(0.116)	(0.305)	(0.123)	(0.252)	(0.152)	(0.126)
Exiles: Civil War	0.034***	0.033***	0.033***	0.030***	0.027***	0.025***	0.039***	0.036***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Exiles: Junta	-0.016	3.613	-0.089*	-1.183	0.003	-0.588	-0.018	15.504***
	(0.053)	(4.113)	(0.046)	(14.005)	(0.051)	(10.395)	(0.068)	(1.436)
Population	0.825*	0.516	1.072***	0.773***	1.035***	0.857***	0.992***	0.660**
	(0.487)	(0.581)	(0.238)	(0.270)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.347)	(0.325)
Left 1928		0.906		0.427		0.675*		1.029
		(0.749)		(0.592)		(0.393)		(0.677)
Constant	0.139***	0.144***	0.253***	0.273***	0.528***	0.530***	0.099***	0.109***
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.025)
n	73	44	73	44	73	44	72	44
R-squared	0.187	0.308	0.227	0.248	0.120	0.244	0.244	0.334

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Moreover, consistent with historiographic evidence, the Junta-exiled seem to have been sent to islands where the left did not perform particularly well in 1958. If anything, this evidence suggests that there is more to our story than simply selection into left-wing islands.

We build on this finding to examine if any of the three waves was endogenous to prior left-wing inclination in the islands. We regress the percentage achieved by the left in 1926 and 1928 on the volume of exiled the island ended up hosting afterwards. Especially for the Junta period, we also include as outcome the 1958 election, which precedes that wave of exiled. In this analysis, we include each wave separately, without controlling for the other waves, as was done in the last column of Table 3. The results appear in Table D.l of the Online Appendix D and refute the possibility of positive selection. All in all, the islands that hosted exiled do not seem to be already voting more for the left before doing so. If anything, once again, this relationship seems to be more negative than positive.

Another concern could be that all we capture here is composition effects. Exiled stayed in the islands in which they were transferred and retained their ideological predispositions. Although historiographic accounts provide no support for this possibility, we put this idea to the test. A key premise in this study is that these people left their cultural capital in the island even after they abandoned the island. The alternative explanation would be that these people simply remained in the same area in which they were exiled, eventually altering the island's demographic composition. To test this possibility, we examine the long-term change in the population of the islands after the three waves of the exile. We use again all four measures, the encompassing running tally of exiled as well as the three separate ones capturing the corresponding waves. In all cases we employ as dependent variables all census years following the exiled waves, while controlling for the more recent census year that precedes each wave. Thus, for example, when looking at the Metaxas wave, our baseline population measure comes from the 1928 census, while when we examine the civil-war wave our pre-treatment population measure comes from 1940. By the same token, our first outcome is 1951 for the Metaxas wave and 1971 for the civil-war wave. This procedure generates different sets of analysis per wave of exiled,

as shown in Table D.2 of the Online Appendix D. All estimates, however, point to the same conclusion. We find no evidence that the number of exiled predicts an increase in the population in the island compared to its population before any of the exile waves.[25]

A yet another competing explanation could be that the effects are not driven by ideological indoctrination but are due to the political endowment of the exile in local party personnel. Work in post-war Italy suggests that resistance gave room to "telluric partisans" (Schmitt 2012), who used their networks and skills to their electoral advantage (Costalli and Ruggeri 2019, 2015). Transferred to our case, this idea could imply that the exiled did not necessarily transmit their ideology, but those who stayed got involved into politics and received personal vote due to their charisma. If that is the case, the effects are not due to ideological transmission, but due to a valence vote. We address this possibility by looking into all candidates of either PASOK or the Communist party in electoral districts that include islands with exiles. We look into the 1981 election because it is the most recent of our elections and thus the one most likely to yield information on the web about the candidates' biographies. We found that among 226 candidates only 17 of them had some experience of exile. Among them only two were elected, one with PASOK and the other one with the Communist party. Replicating the search for 1977 we found a very similar pattern: among 161 candidates, only 10 of them had experienced exile (with only one of them elected -the same one as the one elected with PASOK in 1981). This pattern makes it quite unlikely that all we capture here is simply personal vote on valence grounds.[26]

As a next step, we try to delve more into the idea that this effect comes precisely from the fact that the exiled used their human capital as a means of ideological transmission.

[25] A closer look into the table reveals another relieving pattern. It could be that the reverse trend has been in place. If the experience of hosting political detainees triggered emigration of the locals, there would be no one left to transmit the ideological trait. This is more than a theoretical scenario, as emigration from Greece to Germany, Belgium, Australia or the U.S. was far from rare from the early 20th century and until the early 1970's. That said, emigration was more frequent in the mainland than in the islands (see Table D.3 of Appendix D). Instead, islands mostly suffered from temporary migration, which was predominantly male-driven (see Tables D.3 and D.4). Thus, women, elderly and children remained in the island. Now, going back to Table D.2, consider Models (1), (8), (13) and (17), all using the number of exiled in the island as predictors of the population in 1981—a year by which migration had already shrunk—, while controlling for the population at the island level in 1928—our earliest year in the data. The results suggest that the number of exiled did not cause a significant reduction in the island's population.

[26] In this respect, what we see here with the exiled is not simply their conversion into local partisan entrepreneurs, as seen in other cases of civil war (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015). This is not to say that some of the exiled did not capitalize their experience by entering into politics. But they did so by carrying their experience in other, more central districts, different to the ones in which they were detained. One such example is the district of Piraeus, which became a locus for many left-wing politicians with a background history in exile.

Using the hand-written newspapers circulated by the exiled as a proxy of organizational capacity and effort, we examine whether the legacy of the exiled was more persistent when the exiled community in the island produced their own newspaper. In total, ten of these islands had at least one handwritten newspaper by the exiled. Expectedly, these are also the islands that had most exiles, which makes newspapers also a proxy for the volume of exposure to exiled.[27]

Indeed, as we see in Figure 2, these are also the islands that drive the effects. Without being the only explanation for this heterogeneity in the effects, this pattern provides suggestive at least evidence in favour of our horizontal transmission hypothesis.[28]



Figure 2: Exiled effects conditional on the exiled publishing their own newspaper in the island.
Note: Lines denote 95% (thin spikes) and 90% Confidence Intervals (thick spikes).

We also examined whether there is any heterogeneity according to the presence of women among the exiled. Merging all available information, we classify exiled groups in each island into three categories; consisting of only men; only women, or mixed. We then use a binary version of this variable, namely whether the island was either mixed

[27] While islands with exiled but without newspaper had approximately 0.08 exiled per inhabitant, those with newspaper had 1.6 exiled per inhabitant.
[28] Figures D.l, D.2, and D.3 in the Online Appendix confirm this effect stems from the civil-war wave, which is also the wave where most exiled-run newspapers are found (10 vs only two for each of the other two waves).

or included only women, or not, to see whether effects differ between the two sets of communities. The results are shown in Tables D.5 and D.6 of the Online Appendix D and provide limited evidence for gender-based heterogeneity in the effects.

An Anti-Fascist Legacy?

Together with pro-left sentiments, the ideological indoctrination taking place through the experience of the exile in the islands must have also touched upon anti-fascist sentiments. Juxtaposing themselves against those persecuting them, the exiled should be perceived as the major opponents against supporters of the two right-wing authoritarian regimes, or, even worse, the Nazi rule and its allies. At a minimum, this duality implies that pro-left-wing sentiments should be also accompanied by anti-far-right sentiments.

There is no better candidate to test this idea from the Golden Dawn, a neo-fascist party that gained salience at the aftermath of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and ended up gaining a remarkable 7% of the vote in four consequent elections-from May 2012 and up to September 2015-before it got banned as a criminal organization responsible for the murder of a hip-hop activist. Throughout its history, the Golden Dawn portrayed itself as the "authentic winners of the civil-war" (GD 1980), not only fiercely anti-Communist, but particularly opposed to left-wing insurgency during the Nazi occupation and the civil-war (Smith 2013). In short, the Golden Dawn placed itself as the absolute ideological adversary of the political heritage of the exiled.[29]

We examine whether support for the Golden Dawn declines with the volume of exiled in the island. We use both aggregate electoral results, focusing on the very first election that brought the party into the parliament, that of May 2012, and individual-level data, coming from responses to two vote recall questions asked in Hangartner et al. (2019). Respondents were asked to recall their vote choice in both January and September 2015.

[29] Quotes abound, for two indicative examples see Appendix E.

Table 5: Exiled inflows and left-right self-placement in February 2017.

	Island-level Voting Data				Survey Data: Vote Recall					
	GD May 2012				GD Jan. 2015			GD Sep. 2015		
Exiled	-0.003***	-0.003***			-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002**	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Metaxas			-0.035	-0.127***						
wave			(0.036)	(0.041)						
Civil-war			-0.003***	-0.003***						
wave			(0.001)	(0.001)						
Junta			0.010	4.103**						
wave			(0.016)	(1.856)						
Population	✓	✓	✓	✓						
Left 1928		✓		✓						
Individual-level covariates						✓	✓		✓	✓
Refugee inflows in summer 2015							✓			✓
n	73	44	73	44	2064	2057	2057	2064	2057	2057
R-squared	0.028	0.053	0.035	0.113	0.000	0.027	0.027	0.000	0.024	0.025
N. Clusters					92	92	92	92	92	92

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered within islands. $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The first half of Table 5 shows the aggregate voting patterns. Indeed, higher exposure to exiles appears to predict lower levels of support for the Golden Dawn. The results are robust to inclusion of pre-exile support for the left and, like all our previous analyses, appear to also be driven by the civil-war wave of exiles. The individual-level analyses, shown in the second part of Table 5, tell a similar story, with respondents coming from islands with higher degree of exposure to exiled registering a lower probability of voting for the Golden Dawn. Taken together, the results seem to confirm the expectation that the legacy left by the exiled did not only drive people more to the left, but also far from the far-right, especially when it openly presents itself as the ultimate historical advocate of the political prosecutions against the left.

Discussion

Using an amalgamation of qualitative and quantitative information, we sketched the conditions that converted political dissidents in Greece into “plants” of ideological indoctrination. The results lead credence to the idea that cultural traits can be transmitted horizontally, through inter-group contact. Importantly, horizontal and vertical transmission may not only operate as substitutes but can as well run in sequence. In this respect, the former sets the seed for cultural change, which then becomes reproduced through the latter.

Our main result, that it was, above all, the civil-war wave of exiles that became

the driving engine for the formation of left-wing strongholds in some of these islands challenges coarse classifications often made between regimes. The overall effects are neither due to the Metaxas dictatorship nor due to the Junta; instead, both the volume and the pervasiveness of exiles reaches its peak during the time span that lies in between the two dictatorships. Granted, the quality of Greek democracy throughout that period was far from ideal (Nikolakopoulos 2001), operating as a political enclave to insulate the country from the Communist threat. Even so, Greek political history offers an example of how political exclusion can co-exist with democratic electoral processes.

In this respect, the Greek case also reminds us of the uncomfortable relationship some democratic states have had with the Communist ideology. Granted, several west European polities incorporated Communist parties in the democratic process, letting them freely compete in elections. Yet, from McCarthyism in the US (Morgan 2020), to legislation disincentivizing affiliation with the radical left in Germany (Bischof and Valentim, n.d.), Communism and the radical left in more general has been either explicitly persecuted or implicitly stigmatized. Reminding us of Popper's paradox of tolerance (1945), this practice showcases how modern democracies have struggled to balance between sometimes self-contradictory principles.

This mismatch between dissident and state ideology can also account for the dramatic asymmetry found across the waves. True, horizontal transmission is more likely to work when the trait is more visible within the local community, which in turn is a function of the relative size of the group. Additionally, a critical mass is probably needed for local scale economies to evolve, giving rise to higher levels of embodiment of the exiled community within the island. Undoubtedly, all these factors have done a lot to boost horizontal transmission and they were all more prevalent during and after the civil-war. Yet, there is probably also one more factor that played to this wave's advantage, not anymore in terms of horizontal but in terms of vertical transmission.

The Turkish invasion in Cyprus in late 1973 and the disastrous role of the Greek colonels in it, not only forced the fall of the dictatorship but also left a bitter image about

the regime, which spilled over onto the ideological side with which it was associated - the right (Kornetis 2013). The resulting swing of the ideological pendulum, form an anti-left to an anti-right bias (Dinas 2017), was accompanied by a restoration of the historical role of the left in public memory. Similar to the rest of Europe (Judt 2006), the Greek state searched for a unifying narrative around a glorified resistance against the Nazi. Under those circumstances, however, it was no more possible to celebrate the resistance without acknowledging the Communists' part in it. Bringing the left back within the realm of political legitimacy meant also shifting the paradigm through which the civil war was narrated (Marantzidis and Antoniou 2004). Semantically, this shift was marked by the replacement of other terms such as, "gang-war" between nation-minded and the traitors (Demertzis 2015), with the term "civil-war."

This overturn in the official memory also meant a shift in public perceptions of those exiled as political dissidents. Composers, writers, and public intellectuals who experienced the exile featured as new iconic figures, enjoying massive popularity within the Greek society. Local commemorative practices around the country emerged, seeking to honor victims of the resistance that belonged to the left. As part of the national reconciliation project, by the late 1980's islands such as Makronisos and Trikeri, would be designated as historic sites. Within this context, the memory of the exile ceased to be a source of humiliation, instead transforming into a source of merited pride (Δεμερτζής 2011, 95–99). In other words, while horizontal transmission could be set in place even when national conditions did not favour it, for vertical transmission to fully operate, some alignment, at some point, between national and local trait seems to have been needed.

References

Allport, Gordon Willard, Kenneth Clark and Thomas Pettigrew. 1954. “The nature of prejudice”.

Apostolakou, Lito. 1997. “’Greek ‘Workers or Communist’ Others’: The Contending Identities of Organized Labour in Greece, c. 1914-36”. *Journal of Contemporary History* 32 (3): 409-424.

Asch, Solomon E. 1956. “Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority.” *Psychological monographs: General and applied* 70 (9):1.

Balcells, Laia. 2012. “The consequences of victimization on political identities: Evidence from Spain”. *Politics & Society* 40 (3): 311-347.

Banaszak, Lee Ann. 2006. “The gendering state and citizens’ attitudes toward women’s roles: State policy, employment, and religion in Germany”. *Politics & Gender* 2 (1): 29-55.

Bauernschuster, Stefan, and Helmut Rainer. 2012. “Political regimes and the family: how sex-role attitudes continue to differ in reunified Germany”. *Journal of Population Economics* 25 (1): 5-27.

Beissinger, Mark, and Stephen Kotkin. 2014. *Historical legacies of communism in Russia and Eastern Europe.* Cambridge University Press.

Bischof, Daniel, and Vicente Valentim. n.d. “The Consequences of Punishing Political Ideologies in Democracies-Evidence from Employment Bans in West Germany”.

Bisin, Alberto, and Thierry Verdier. 2000. ““Beyond the melting pot”: cultural transmission, marriage, and the evolution of ethnic and religious traits”. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115 (3): 955-988.

. 2001. “The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences”. *Journal of Economic theory* 97 (2): 298-319.

Broockman, David, and Joshua Kalla. 2016. “Durably reducing transphobia: A field experiment on door-to-door canvassing”. *Science* 352 (6282): 220-224.

Charnysh, Volha, and Leonid Peisakhin. 2022. “The Role of Communities in the Transmission of Political Values: Evidence from Forced Population Transfers”. *British Journal of Political Science* 52 (1): 238-258.

Costalli, Stefano, and Andrea Ruggeri. 2015. “Forging political entrepreneurs: Civil war effects on post-conflict politics in Italy”. *Political Geography* 44:40-49.

. 2019. “The long-term electoral legacies of civil war in young democracies: Italy, 1946-1968”. *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (6): 927-961.

Davenport, Christian. 2007. “State repression and political order”. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sei.* 10:1-23.

Δεμερτζής, Νίκος. 2011. "Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος ως πολιτισμικό τραύμα". Επιστήμη και Κοινωνία: Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής και Ηθικής Θεωρίας 28:81–109.

Demertzis, Nicolas. 2015. "The drama of the Greek civil war trauma". In *Narrating Trauma,* 169-198. Routledge.

Dinas, Elias. 2014. "Why does the apple fall far from the tree? How early political socialization prompts parent-child dissimilarity". *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (4): 827-852.

. 2017. "Political socialization and regime change: How the Right ceased to be wrong in post-1974 Greece". *Political Studies* 65 (4): 1000-1020.

Dinas, Elias, Vasiliki Tonka and Alain Schlapfer. 2021. "Family history and attitudes toward outgroups: evidence from the European refugee crisis". *The Journal of Politics* 83 (2): 647-661.

Enos, Ryan D. 2014. "Causal effect of intergroup contact on exclusionary attitudes". *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111 (10): 3699-3704.

Esberg, Jane. 2021. "Anticipating dissent: The repression of politicians in Pinochet's Chile". *The Journal of Politics* 83 (2): 689-705.

Essay, of the Communist Party. 2013. *Essay on the history of the Communist Party (KKE) 1939 -149 (Second volume).* Modern Times.

Fernandez, Raquel, Alessandra Fogli and Claudia Olivetti. 2004. "Mothers and sons: Preference formation and female labor force dynamics". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (4): 1249-1299.

Finseraas, Henning, Andreas Kotsadam and Javier Polavieja. 2020. "Ancestry culture, assimilation, and voter turnout in two generations". *Political Behavior,* 1-26.

Fouka, Vasiliki, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2022. "Collective Remembrance and Private Choice: German-Greek Conflict and Behavior in Times of Crisis". *American Political Science Review,* 1-20.

Fytili, Magda. 2022. "Including the" Nation's Enemies": The Long Politics of Recognition and Restitution during the Third Greek Republic (1974-2006)". *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 40 (1): 195-222.

CD. 1980. "Golden Dawn's Declaration of Ideological Principles".

Giuliano, Paola, and Marco Tabellini. 2020. *The seeds of ideology: Historical immigration and political preferences in the United States.* Technical report. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Gritzonas, Kostas. 2001. "ΟΜΑΔΕΣ ΣΥΜΒΙΩΣΗΣ: Η ΣΥΝΤΡΟΦΙΚΗ ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΗ ΣΤΗ ΒΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΕΓΚΛΕΙΣΜΟ [Symbiosis Groups: The Comradeship as a Response to Violence and Confinement]". *Athens: Filistor.*

Grosjean, Pauline. 2014. "A history of violence: The culture of honor and homicide in the US South". *Journal of the European Economic Association* 12 (5): 1285-1316.

Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales. 2008. “Social capital as good culture”. *Journal of the European economic Association* 6 (2-3): 295-320.

Hangartner, Dominik, Elias Dinas, Moritz Marbach, Konstantinos Matakos and Dimitrios Xefteris. 2019. “Does exposure to the refugee crisis make natives more hostile?” *American political science review* 113 (2): 442-455.

latrides, John O. 2005. “Revolution or Self-Defense? Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War”. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7 (3): 3-33.

Jennings, M Kent, Laura Stoker and Jake Bowers. 2009. “Politics across generations: Family transmission reexamined”. *The Journal of Politics* 71 (3): 782-799.

Judt, Tony. 2006. *Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945.* Penguin.

Kalampogias, Antonis. 2019. *[Ikaria. The "Red Rock".]* Athens: Sychroni Epochi.

Kalla, Joshua L, and David E Broockman. 2020. “Reducing exclusionary attitudes through interpersonal conversation: Evidence from three field experiments”. *American Political Science Review* 114 (2): 410-425.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2016. “EIGHT. Red Terror: Leftist Violence during the Occupation”. In *After the War Was Over,* 142-183. Princeton University Press.

Kalyvas, Stathis N, and Niko Marantzidis. 2002. “Greek Communism, 1968-2001”. *East European Politics and Societies* 16 (3): 665-690.

Kim, Daeeun, JuYoung Kim and Hackjin Kim. 2021. “Increased Conformity to Social Hierarchy Under Public Eyes”. *Frontiers in Psychology* 12:636801.

Kornetis, Kostis. 2013. *Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics and the’Long 1960s’ in Greece.* Vol. 10. Berghahn Books.

Koundouros, Roussos. 1978. *The Security of the Regime, 1942-1974.*

Linz, Juan Jose. 2000. *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.* Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Lupu, Noam, and Leonid Peisakhin. 2017. “The legacy of political violence across generations”. *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (4): 836-851.

Luttmer, Erzo EP, and Monica Singhal. 2011. “Culture, context, and the taste for redistribution”. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 3 (1): 157-79.

Marantzidis, Nikos, and Giorgos Antoniou. 2004. “The axis occupation and civil war: Changing trends in Greek historiography, 1941-2002”. *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2): 223-231.

Mavrogordatos, G. Th. 1999. “The Vengeance of the Defeated: 50 Years after the Civil-War”.

Mazower, Mark, et al. 2000. *After the war was over: reconstructing the family, nation, and state in Greece, 1943-1960.* Vol. 41. Princeton University Press.

Miho, Antonela, Alexandra Jarotschkin and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2019. “Diffusion of Gender Norms: Evidence from Stalin’s Ethnic Deportations”. *Available at SSRN 3417682*.

Morgan, Ted. 2020. *Reds: McCarthyism in twentieth-century America.* Random House.

Nicolacopoulos, Hi as. 2013. “Elections and voters, 1974-2004: Old cleavages and new issues”. In *Politics and Policy in Greece,* 38-56. Routledge.

Niemi, Richard G, and M Kent Jennings. 1991. “Issues and inheritance in the formation of party identification”. *American Journal of Political Science,* 970-988.

Nikolakopoulos, Elias. 2001. Η καχεκτική δημοκρατία: κόμματα και εκλόγες, 1946- 1967. Vol. 4. Ekdoseis Patake.

Paluck, Elizabeth Levy, and Donald P Green. 2009. “Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice”. *Annual review of psychology* 60 (1): 339-367.

Panourgia, Neni. 2009. “Dangerous citizens”. In *Dangerous Citizens.* Fordham University Press.

Pettigrew, Thomas F, and Linda R Tropp. 2006. “A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory.” *Journal of personality and social psychology* 90 (5): 751.

Παππάς, Τάκης Σ. 2001. “Κομματικό σύστημα και πολιτικός ανταγωνισμός στην Ελλάδα, 1981-2001”. Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης 17:71–102.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua Tucker. 2017. “Communism’s Shadow”. In *Communism’s Shadow.* Princeton University Press.

Popper, Karl. 1945. *The open society and its enemies*. Routledge.

Rico, Guillem, and M Kent Jennings. 2016. “The formation of left-right identification: Pathways and correlates of parental influence”. *Political Psychology* 37 (2): 237-252.

Ruggeri, Andrea. 2012. “Gramsci’s persuaders: studying collective mobilization”. *International Studies Review* 14 (4): 677-681.

Schmitt, Carl. 2012. *Theorie des Partisanen.* Duncker und Humblot.

Schmitz, Sophia, and Felix Weinhardt. 2019. “Immigration and the Evolution of Local Cultural Norms”.

Shayo, Moses. 2009. “A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution”. *American Political science review* 103 (2): 147-174.

Smith, H. 2013. “Greeks protest against Golden Dawn attack on Communists”.

Steinmayr, Andreas. 2021. “Contact versus exposure: Refugee presence and voting for the far right”. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 103 (2): 310-327.

Szabo, Zsolt Peter, Johanna Ray Vollhardt and Noemi Zsuzsanna Meszaros. 2020. “Through the lens of history: The effects of beliefs about historical victimization on responses to refugees”. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 74:94-114.

Theodorou, Viktoria. 1976. *[Women’s Camps].* Athens: Self-publishing.

Tzamaloukas, Nikos. 2022. *[Anafi. Calvary of freedom. (Memoir)].* Athens: Sychroni Epochi.

UNRRA, European Regional Office. 1947. *Agriculture and Food in Greece.* Operational Analysis Papers nr. 19, London.

Vasilopoulou, Sofia, and Daphne Halikiopoulou. 2015. *the Golden dawn’s ‘nationalist solution’: explaining the rise of the far right in Greece.* Springer.

Villamil, Francisco. 2021. “Mobilizing memories: The social conditions of the long-term impact of victimization”. *Journal of Peace Research* 58 (3): 399-416.

Voglis, Polymeris. 2002a. *Becoming a subject: political prisoners during the Greek Civil War.* Berghahn Books.

. 2002b. “Political Prisoners in the Greek Civil War, 1945—50: Greece in Comparative Perspective”. *Journal of Contemporary History* 37 (4): 523-540.

. 2017. “Becoming Communist: Political Prisoners as a Subject during the Greek Civil War.” In *The Greek Civil War. Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences.* Edited by Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas, 141-158. Routledge.

Voigtlander, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2012. “Persecution perpetuated: the medieval origins of anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany”. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127 (3): 1339-1392.

2015. “Nazi indoctrination and anti-Semitic beliefs in Germany”. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 112 (26): 7931-7936.

Weber, Eugen. 1976. *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870- 1914-* Stanford University Press.

Westholm, Anders. 1999. “The perceptual pathway: Tracing the mechanisms of political value transfer across generations”. *Political Psychology* 20 (3): 525-551.

Wittenberg, Jason. 2006. *Crucibles of political loyalty: Church institutions and electoral continuity in Hungary.* Cambridge University Press.

Zervos, Dimitris. 2003. *[Illegal handwritten newspapers. From prisons and exiles.]* Athens: Sychroni Epochi.

Appendix

A List of Primary Sources

- The Contemporary Social History Archives (ASKI)
- Archive of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), boxes: 419, 421 - 425
- Archive of the Educational Centre Charilaos Florakis
    - Civil war
        * political exiles - nominal catalogues - handwritten newspapers
    - Anti-dictatorship struggle 1967-1974
        * political exiles - nominal catalogues - handwritten newspapers
- Army History Directorate
    - Civil War Archive, files: 816, 1005, 1006, 1008, 1013, 1020, 1223
- Greek Ministry of Interior
    - 1928, 1929, 1958, 1974, 1977, 1981, 2012 national elections
- Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT)
    - 1928 - 2011 population census
- The National Archive
    - FCO 9, 162 | FO 371 | WO 22, 32, 204 | HS 5

B Examples of Newspapers in the Exile



Figure B.l: Handwritten newspaper 'Anti-fascist', published by political exiles in Anafi (1939).

Figure B.2: Handwritten newspaper 'Pyrsos', published by political exiles in Ikaria (1947).

Descriptive Statistics

Political Parties	(Original Name)	Party leader
1926	**1926**	
Agrarian party of Greece	Αγροτικό κόμμα Ελλάδος	Σπύρος Χασιώτης [Spyros Chasiotis]
Greek Communist Party	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος (ΚΚΕ)	
1928	**1928**	
Peasants	Αγροτικό κόμμα Ελλάδος	Σπύρος Χασιώτης [Spyros Chasiotis]
Greek Communist Party	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος (ΚΚΕ)	
4th of August Regime (abolition of parliamentary government)		
Axis occupation of Greece 1941-1944		
Greek Civil War		
1958	**1958**	
United Democratic Left (EDA)	Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά (ΕΔΑ)	Ιωάννης Πασσαλίδης [Ioannis Passalidis]
Military Dictatorship 1967-1974 (abolition of parliament)		
1974	**1974**	
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα (Πα.Σο.Κ)	Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου [Andreas Papandreou]
United Left	Ενωμένη Αριστερά	Ηλίας Ηλιού [Ilias Iliou]
Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece	Επαναστατικό Κομμουνιστικό Κίνημα Ελλάδος	Governing Committee
1977	**1977**	
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα (Πα.Σο.Κ)	Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου [Andreas Papandreou]
Progress and Left Forces Alliance	Συμμαχία Προοδευτικών και Αριστερών Δυνάμεων (ΣΥΜΜΑΧΙΑ)	Ηλίας Ηλιού [Ilias Iliou]
Greek Communist Party (ΚΚΕ)	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος (ΚΚΕ)	Χαρίλαος Φλωράκης [Charilaos Florakis]
Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece	Επαναστατικό Κομμουνιστικό Κίνημα Ελλάδος (Ε.Κ.Κ.Ε.)	Principal Επιτροπή
Popular Democratic Union (LDE)	Λαική Δημοκρατική Ενότητα (Λ.Δ.Ε.)	Principal Επιτροπή
International Workers' Union – Trotskyists	Εργατική Διεθνιστική Ένωση - Τροτσκιστές	Χαράλαμπος Δούζας
Labor and Peasant Party of Greece	Εργατοαγροτικόν Κόμμα Ελλάδας	Ηλίας Μέμτσιας [Ilias Memtsias]
Fighter Communist Organization	Κομμουνιστική Οργάνωση Μαχητής	Governing Committee
1981	**1981**	
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα (Πα.Σο.Κ)	Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου [Andreas Papandreou]
Greek Communist Party (ΚΚΕ)	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος (ΚΚΕ)	Χαρίλαος Φλωράκης [Charilaos Florakis]
Internal Communist Party of Greece	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος Εσωτερικού	Χαράλαμπος Δρακόπουλος [Charalampos Drakopoulos]
For a Revolutionary Left	Για μια Επαναστική Αριστερά	Θάνος Δημάκος [Thanos Dimakas]
Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece - Marxist Leninist Communist Party of Greece (ΕΚΚΕ - ML.ΚΚΕ)	Επαναστατικό Κομμουνιστικό Κίνημα Ελλάδος - Μαρξιστικό Λενινιστικό Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος (ΕΚΚΕ - ΜΛ.ΚΚΕ)	Christos Bistis
International Labor Union - Trotskyists	Εργατική Διεθνιστική Ένωση - Τροτσκιστές	Μάτσας Σαμπέτας [Matsas Sabetas]

Figure C.1. List of political parties as left- wing per election.

Island	Title	Editorial board	No.	Date	Source	Price & other
Samos	Laokratia	OSPE Samos	11(2nd year)	27-Jun-38	Zervos 2003	1 gr. drachma
Samos – Ικαρια	Laokratia	OSPE Samos	18 (3rd year)	5-Mar-39	Zervos 2003	1 gr. drachma
Samos	Laokratia	OSPE Samos	25	14-Oct-45	Zervos 2003	
Lesvos – Mytilini	Alygistos	Published by the Political Prisoners of Lesbos	1	26-Oct-45	Zervos 2003	238 pol. exiles
Lesvos – Mytilini	Alygistos	Published by the Political Prisoners of Lesbos	1	26-Oct-45	Florakis Archive	238 pol. exiles
Lesvos - Mytilini	Alygistos	Published by the Political Prisoners of Lesbos	2	2 November [1945]	Florakis Archive	249 pol. exiles
Lesvos - Mytilini	Alygistos	Published by the Political Prisoners of Lesbos	7	1-Jan-46	Florakis Archive	
Anafi	Antifascist	NA	NA	1938	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	13	7-Nov-39	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	15	Jan-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	16 (special issue)	21-Jan-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	17	6-Feb-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	18	4-Mar-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	20	1-May-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	21	4-Jun-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	22	4-Jul-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	23	1-Aug-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	49	22-Jun-42	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Antifascist	OSPE Anafi	58 (5th year)	23-Feb-43	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Political Review	OSPE Anafi	14	17-Nov-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Our bulletin	OSPE Anafi	16	1-Jul-38	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	NA	NA	5	5-Dec-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Exormisi	Anti-fascist Youth of	1	26-Jun-40	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Youth	Young scientist explorers	1	28-May-39	Zervos 2003	1 cigarette
Anafi	Artistic News	NA	1	30-Jul-39	Zervos 2003	1 egg
Anafi	Zaloggo	Union of exiles from Epirus, Kerkyra & Lefkada	1	9-Jan-41	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Gazzeta	NA		NA	Zervos 2003	
Anafi	Fighter	Union of exiles from Athens and Piraeus	1	6-Mar-41	Zervos 2003	
Agios Efstratios	Voice of the exile	OSPE Agios Efstratios	13	25-Apr-47	Florakis Archive	
Agios Efstratios	Voice of the exile	OSPE Agios Efstratios	14	9-May-47	Florakis Archive	
Agios Efstratios	Beware!	NA	1	Jan-62	Zervos 2003	
Agios Efstratios	Beware!	NA	3	Mar-62	Zervos 2003	
Agios Efstratios	Pre-protect yourself!	NA	NA	Easter 1962	Zervos 2003	
Ikaria - Raches	Pyrsos - Lefterias	OSPE Raches	2	10-May-47	Florakis Archive; Zervos 2003	
Ikaria - Christou (Raches)	Pyrsos - Lefterias	OSPE Christos Ikarias	3	15-Jun-47	Florakis Archive; Zervos 2003	
Ikaria - Christou (Raches)	Pyrsos - Lefterias	OSPE Christos Ikarias	4	1-Jul-47	Florakis Archive	
Ikaria - Christou (Raches)	Pyrsos - Lefterias	OSPE Christos Ikarias	5	30-Jul-47	Florakis Archive; Zervos 2004	
Ikaria - Agios Dimitrios (Raches)	Spitha	OSPE Agios Dimitrios	1	15-Feb	Florakis Archive; Zervos 2005	
Ikaria - Agios Dimitrios (Raches)	Spitha	OSPE Agios Dimitrios	2	1-Mar	Florakis Archive; Zervos 2006	
Ikaria - Marathos (North Ikaria)	Rock	OSPE Marathos Ikaria	NA	1-Mar-48	Florakis Archive; Zervos 2008	
Antikythera	The Sea Binder	OSPE Antikythera (ELIA)	1 (1st year)	30-Nov-46	Florakis Archive	
Kythera	Vari (EPON)	OSPE Kythera	NA	23-Feb-47	Zervos 2003	
Leros	LAKKI	NA	2	3-Aug-69	Zervos 2003	
Sikinos	Adouloti foni	OSPE Sikinos	7	31-Dec-46	Florakis Archive	

* OSPE: Political Exiles' Cohabitation Group

Figure C.2: List of newspapers published by the political exiles in the destination location.

Table C.1: Exiled inflows and distance from the Turkish coast.

	Respondent-level Data				Island-level Data			
	Combined Waves	Metaxas Wave	Civil-War Wave	Junta Wave	Combined Waves	Metaxas Wave	Civil-War Wave	Junta Wave
Logged Distance	-0.001	0.002	-0.006	0.003	-0.051	-0.005	-0.030	-0.015
	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.045)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.016)
n	2064	2064	2064	2064	92	92	92	92
R-squared	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.001
N. Clusters	92	92	92	92				

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered within islands. ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Additional Analysis

Table D.1: Exposure to Exiled across all three waves and vote for the left after the democratic transition.

	All Waves		Metaxas Wave		Civil War Wave		Junta Wave		
	Left 1926	Left 1928	Left 1926	Left 1928	Left 1926	Left 1928	Left 1926	Left 1928	Left 1951
Exiled: All	-0.001	-0.004							
	(0.001)	(0.002)							
Exiled: Metaxas			-0.057**	-0.137*					
			(0.023)	(0.078)					
Exiled: Civil War					-0.001	-0.004			
					(0.001)	(0.002)			
Exiled: Junta							-0.013**	-0.031*	0.040
							(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.073)
n	41	44	41	44	41	44	41	44	75
R-squared	0.004	0.005	0.014	0.006	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.007

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.2: Exiled inflows did not alter the population density of the islands in the long- term.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
		All waves			Metaxas wave							CW wave								
Junta wave	1981	1991	2001	2011	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	1981	1991	2001	2011
Exiled: All	-0.670	-0.775	-0.921	-1.159																
	(0.506)	(0.570)	(0.648)	(0.763)																
Exiled: Metaxas					-1.711	0.465	0.495	0.673	0.771	0.237	-0.767									
					(2.059)	(2.429)	(2.556)	(3.266)	(3.670)	(4.222)	(5.371)									
Exiled: Civil War												-0.680	-0.824	-0.948	-1.107	-1.356				
												(0.491)	(0.586)	(0.656)	(0.751)	(0.880)				
Exiled: Junta																	0.730	0.804	0.631	0.465
																	(0.582)	(0.580)	(0.558)	(0.758)
Population: 1928	1.050***	1.135***	1.226***	1.317***	1.178***	1.017***	0.967***	1.052***	1.137***	1.228***	1.319***									
	(0.177)	(0.197)	(0.216)	(0.262)	(0.065)	(0.131)	(0.142)	(0.178)	(0.197)	(0.217)	(0.263)									
Population: 1940												0.936***	1.024***	1.109***	1.198***	1.294***				
												(0.102)	(0.134)	(0.149)	(0.167)	(0.213)				
Population: 1961																	1.073***	1.168***	1.271***	1.401***
																	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.112)
n	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74	74
R-squared	0.740	0.729	0.715	0.662	0.928	0.812	0.785	0.740	0.728	0.714	0.661	0.854	0.814	0.803	0.789	0.738	0.982	0.978	0.975	0.950

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Selective Migration?

The next entries are percentages of temporary and permanent emigration per capita. In absence of systematic data for temporary and permanent emigration for all the period un- der consideration, we use available data from two statistical yearbooks for two timepoints, in 1959 and 1977, corresponding to the periods following the Civil War and the Greek Junta waves, respectively. We then created the percentages using the closest census data, 1961 and 1981, respectively.

Table D.3: Percentage of inhabitants migrating from Greece.

	1959		1977	
	Permanent	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary
Mainland	0.31%	0.22%	0.18%	0.62%
Islands	0.15%	0.38%	0.10%	0.93%

Note: Entries are percentages, source: National Statistics Agency (ELSTAT).

Table D.4: Male migrants as percentage of total migrants.

	1959		1977	
	Permanent	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary
Evoia	76.92	99.71	61.9	99.15
Ionian	68.32	99.82	54.97	98.92
Creta	65.22	100	63.96	95.96
Dodecanesos	59.14	99.83	54.04	98.68
Cyclades	76.34	99.81	75.68	99.26
Northern Aegean	54.65	99.84	54.98	99.16

Note: Entries are percentages. National Statistics Agency (ELSTAT).

Table D.5: Was transmission more successful in islands with women in exile?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	1974	1977	1981	1974	1977	1981
Exiles: Combined	0.024*	0.018	0.019**	0.035***	0.033***	0.026***
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female or	-0.108***	-0.058	-0.069	-0.127***	-0.114	-0.124**
Mixed island	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.074)	(0.052)
Exiles × Female	0.024	-0.018	0.025	0.029**	-0.009	0.035*
or Mixed	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.032)	(0.020)
Constant	0.144***	0.254***	0.531***	0.141***	0.272***	0.527***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.028)
Population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Left 1928				✓	✓	✓
n	73	73	73	44	44	44
R-squared	0.167	0.139	0.108	0.292	0.253	0.234

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.



Figure D.1: Exiled effects conditional on the exiled publishing their own newspaper in the island, Metaxas-wave.
Note: Lines denote 95% (thin spikes) and 90% Confidence Intervals (thick spikes).

Table D.6: Was transmission more successful in islands with women in exile?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	1974	1977	1981	1974	1977	1981
Exiles: Metaxas	-0.051	-0.034	-0.032	-6.312***	3.964	0.001
	(0.085)	(0.075)	(0.088)	(2.012)	(8.045)	(4.202)
Exiles: Civil War	0.035***	0.035***	0.027***	0.034***	0.033***	0.026***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Exiles: Junta	-0.060*	-0.127***	-0.038	288.367***	-225.253	-27.160
	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(96.073)	(400.813)	(206.389)
Population	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Left 1928				✓	✓	✓
Observations	73	73	73	44	44	44
R-squared	0.230	0.257	0.131	0.332	0.293	0.254

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.



Figure D.2: Exiled effects conditional on the exiled publishing their own newspaper in the island, civil-war-wave.
Note: Lines denote 95% (thin spikes) and 90% Confidence Intervals (thick spikes).



Figure D.3: Exiled effects conditional on the exiled publishing their own newspaper in the island, Junta-wave.
Note: Lines denote 95% (thin spikes) and 90% Confidence Intervals (thick spikes).

Golden Dawn Quotes

- Michaloliakos' speech to party members on March 3rd, 2012: "We are none of those things! We are the seed of those defeated back in 1945. That's who we are! Nationalists, national socialists, fascists!" Source: here [accessed April 29, 2021]
- Golden Dawn's election campaign rally (2012): "Let them face it! The fight is not going to end that easily. If Marx's and Stalin's orphans, politicians like Kanelli, Dourou and Tsipras believe that they will cut the flow of the nationalist river, they did it once before, we buried them in Grammos and Vitsi and we won. This will happen again if they want it.". Source here [accessed April 29, 2021]

Greek Communists struggle for Democracy: From Junta to Metapolitefsi

Charalampos Panagiotidis
PhD Student – University of Peloponnese

Greek Education in the Shadow of the Cold War: Cultural Diplomacy, educational exchanges and youth politics in the 1970's

- Main policy challenges during the dictatorship and Metapolitefsi era in the fields of culture and education
- Differences between the distinct eras
- Sports and politics – infrastructure and mentality
- Youth, politics and everyday life

Greek Communist Party and Greek Communist Party-Interior

- Youth = KNE or EKON Rigas Fereos
- Miscommunication and global events led to party split in 1968
- Effort to win the hearts and minds of communists
- KKE vs KKE-interior / KNE vs EKON Rigas Fereos

Dictatorship Era

- Resentment
- Inability to fight the regime
- Scarce resistance actions
- 1973 – Law school uprising & The Politechnic Uprising

Metapolitefsi Era

- Participating in the 1974 elections and onwards
- Wide scope of political involvement- education, labor, culture, international relations
- Cooperations with other progressive parties
- Being legitimized by establishing relations with sister parties (KKE-interior)
- Political refugees

Conclusion

- Communism was illegal for most of the 20th century
- The coup surfaced underlying problems within the Greek Communist Party
- 1973 as a milestone
- Changing social norms after 1974
- The most resilient political system