Political Leadership, Populism, and Communication Media:

A comparative analysis of the political discourse of Andreas Papandreou and Alexis Tsipras

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

This dissertation compares the political discourse of two significant Greek politicians, Andreas Papandreou and Alexis Tsipras, primarily focusing on their time in opposition, as leaders of their parties (PASOK and SYRIZA), from 1974–1981 and 2010–2015 respectively, based on their rhetorical strategy regarding the United Europe. Using parliamentary and public discourses—and for Tsipras, also social media posts—the study seeks to pinpoint key concepts, rhetorical themes, and linguistic patterns they employed. One major aspect of the analysis is the examination of (national) populist discourse, conspiracy theories, and their potential reinforcement by the media. The study uses populism as a concept to determine whether it is an innate property of political rhetoric or if the rise of social media has led to more populist discourse. It also assesses and contrasts the two leaders' discourse in terms of framing, polarisation, and emotional language.

The findings reveal that, despite differences in style and context, the two leaders used similar rhetorical techniques in articulating their opposition to European integration, indicating a continuity of populist discourse across time and media environments.

Keywords:
Political discourse; Populism; Identification; Greece; Andreas Papandreou; Alexis Tsipras; Opposition rhetoric; Political communication

Wordcount: 8.004

CHAPTER 1. Introduction

The analysis of the mechanisms through which political discourse shapes social reality, as well as the use of new media for its dissemination, are crucial elements for the understanding of contemporary political communication. Understanding these transformations requires a thorough review of the changes brought about by technological advancement and the emergence of social media, highlighting the dynamic nature of the communication phenomenon.

Under these circumstances, the study of political discourse cannot remain detached from the specific historical, social and political conditions that give rise to it. Critical moments in political history, such as periods of international upheaval, transformation or major decisions, offer opportunities to explore the way in which leaders shape their discourse, influencing the public sphere and ultimately the electorate.

In particular, the period of Greece's preparation and entry into the United Europe (1974-1981), and the period when its staying in it became a contentious issue, during the period of the economic crisis (2010-2015), are two characteristic milestones that will be the subject of comparative analysis in this research.

Furthermore, this study is going to examine how two political leaders and protagonists of the respective periods shaped their public discourse at these critical moments, using the available communication tools of their time, in order to influence public opinion and achieve their political goals.

The central axis of this thesis, therefore, will be the comparative analysis of the political discourse of Andreas Papandreou and Alexis Tsipras (mainly in the opposition phase of their parties, i.e. in the periods 1974-1981 and 2010-2015 respectively) and the thematic axis, which will serve as the basis for this analysis, is the type of their political rhetoric, in terms of the relationship of Greece with the United Europe.

The focus of the study will be the way in which the two parties and their leaders dealt with the issue of integration into the European structure, in the case of Andreas Papandreou, and the way in which Greece remained in it during the years of economic crisis, in the case of Alexis Tsipras. The analysis will focus on the rhetorical strategies they adopted, the main themes they highlighted and the narratives that dominated their political discourse, while examining possible similarities and differences in their rhetorical choices. Particular emphasis will be placed on how the political and communication background influenced the shaping of their arguments, as well as the challenges they faced in shaping their public image.

In addition, the study will explore the relationship between their political rhetoric and populism, analysing the role of the "people vs. elite" dipole, the use of emotion, polarisation and ethical dilemmas as communication tools.

CHAPTER 2. (National) Populism and Political Communication

2.1 Theoretical approach to the phenomenon

Populism has been a dominant and controversial topic in public political discourse in recent years, at the international level, with the term possibly suffering a misuse, used, mainly at the journalistic level, to describe a multitude of political phenomena and forms of public discourse, which often do not meet the "formal requirements" to be included in the scope of the populist phenomenon.

Particularly in the Greek - at least - political reality, as well as in everyday political and journalistic practice, populism is used as a term mainly by the right and centre-right, in order to criticise a kind of political rhetoric that is expressed from the left of the political spectrum, which usually has a pro-popular aspect or advocates a policy of social benefits and support for the economically weaker, through a (irrational and not cost-effective, according to critics) state welfare arrangement. Against this backdrop, the term is often associated or even identified with the concept of demagogy or even political deception through false election promises.

However, Muller in his famous work "What is populism?" (2016), clarifies that populist rhetoric and practice, to qualify as such, must meet certain conditions. In other words, not every appeal to popular interests or defence of the rights of the socially weaker is automatically populist. After all, criticising, for example, certain aspects of the current global status quo in terms of social inequalities, the exploitative dimensions of capitalism or specific dysfunctions and problems in the functioning of the European Union could be argued to be perfectly legitimate, if not - sometimes - necessary political practice.

Having all that in mind, it is useful to clarify that populism, and in particular national populism, as it has been defined in contemporary political theory, is a specific and strictly defined form of political discourse, which is embedded in every political ideology, without necessarily being identified with any defined ideological direction. It represents society in a divisive and manichean way, through a simplistic bipolar schema that describes the "elite" and the "people" as two single entities in constant conflict and confrontation, while both of these social categories are imbued with strong moral characteristics, with the 'elite' being presented a priori as corrupt and oppressive, while the 'people' permanently retain a kind of moral advantage, as a homogenized 'transcendental' figure (Müller, 2016), (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

Of relevance here is Mudde & Kaltwasser's (2017) finding that populism does not operate entirely autonomously in the political arena, as an independent and autarchic system of ideas. Instead, it constantly adheres to an established political ideology, ultimately managing to "mutate" it to a significant degree. That is, it functions as a "microbe", which persistently seeks a "host" in order to find an environment in which it can grow and act (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This "complementary" (in relation to a core "body" of political beliefs) dimension of populism makes this phenomenon particularly complex and often difficult to deal with, because it has the capacity to transform and adapt to any circumstances. After all, in every political "family" one can identify common populist characteristics, of course with individual variations and differentiations.

2.2 The emotional dimensions of (national) populism

The study of populism and its nationalist manifestations reveals the deep interconnection between emotions, political behaviour and social mobilisation. Emotions are not merely biological or individual reactions, but social and cultural constructs that shape political behaviour and social interactions. In this direction, the concept of "sociology of emotions" offers a new prism for understanding contemporary political phenomena, especially populism and its nationalist aspects (Demertzis,2020). This approach allows us to understand how emotions shape political attitudes and behaviours, while highlighting the way in which certain political actors exploit and sometimes manipulate collective emotions to achieve their goals.

Populism as an emotional mobilisation strategy

As discussed above, populism does not constitute a single ideology, but a set of political practices and rhetorical strategies that are adapted to the historical and social context at hand (Stavrakakis & Katsampekis, 2017). The central axis of this approach is the "people-elitist" dichotomy, through which an attempt is made to construct a representation of an authentic "popular" entity, which is subjugated by the ruling elites. This dichotomy is not just a rhetorical schema, but is a fundamental element of populist political strategy, as it allows for the simplification of complex social and political issues and the creation of clear dividing lines through the simplistic schema of 'us and them'.

Bonikowski (2017) takes this analysis further by looking specifically at national populism as a strategy to activate and mobilise collective discontent. His approach highlights how (nationalist) populist leaders foment feelings of fear and threat by creating a narrative of a 'victimized nation' in need of protection from external and internal enemies. This strategy is particularly effective in times of social and economic uncertainty, where the need for clear, unambiguous explanations and simple solutions to complex problems becomes particularly appealing to a large portion of the electorate (Ostiguy, Panizza, & Moffitt, 2021).

From his point of view Demertzis (2020) delves into the socio-psychological roots of populism, underlining that the phenomenon very often appears as a response to the feelings of alienation and exclusion felt by a large part of the population. The sense of threat on the one hand and nostalgia for a 'lost' past on the other act as a catalyst for the effectiveness of the populist strategy, reinforcing the feeling of rallying around a common, universally banned national identity. More specifically, the emotions mobilised through this form of political discourse include anger and indignation towards the elites, fear of the loss of national identity, nostalgia for an idealised past, and hope for a radical change in the balance of power, leading to the restoration of national and popular sovereignty.

2.3 (National)populism and social media

In the view of most scholars (Gerbaudo, 2018), (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017) populism - due to various reasons related to the structure, use and function of all forms of contemporary online communication - is supported and reinforced by social media. The alternative and contradictory character of this digital world, the direct, elliptical and fragmentary way of transmitting the message, the freedom and lack of restrictions on how to express political ideas,

etc. are factors that have given new strength to ambitious populist leaders and their parties. Moreover, the broader environment of institutional delegitimisation and crisis of political representation observed in many cases around the world, particularly in the last decade (and which led to the rise of populist movements), coincided with the explosion of social media, which reinforced this dominant understanding of the relationship between populism and social media.

As the majority of theoretical approaches suggest, social media is not just the "media of our time", which will offer this kind of political discourse another way to gain substance and be heard, without playing any role in terms of content and style. According to this position, certain structural elements that define the functioning of social media differentiate them from traditional forms of communication and facilitate the expression of views and ideas of a deeply populist nature.

Nevertheless, for some theorists (Postill, 2018) it is obvious that this kind of political rhetoric and practice would still find some way to surface, as it always has. According to them, digital media does not create populism from scratch, especially in a volatile period characterized by a global antisystemic trend, that leads to a destabilization of the dominant status quo and strengthens populist and extreme radical voices.

In any case, based on the relevant literature review, it could be argued as a hypothesis that national-populist political discourse, i.e. a divisive, manichean rhetoric, with a strongly denunciatory and aggressive character, which is not based on solid argumentation and substantiation through facts and data, will find a suitable field of expression in any era regardless of the media landscape. Nevertheless, in the current era, due to the structural and intrinsic elements that govern the functioning of social media, this discourse has the potential to multiply, transform and gain greater intensity through its reproduction in these digital channels, altering and "poisoning", to a large extent, the content and essence of public discourse (Gerbaudo, 2018).

CHAPTER 3. The theory of identification in political communication

Kenneth Burke's identification theory constitutes a major contribution to the field of political communication, as it radically redefines the traditional understanding of the art of rhetoric. While the Aristotelian approach focuses on the concept of persuasion, Burke shifts the focus to a more complex understanding of communication and social relations. This theoretical shift is of particular importance for understanding contemporary political phenomena and strategic communication (Burke, 1969/1950).

Identification between political rhetors

In particular, the identification between political rhetors is a particularly important dimension of the theory. It is based on the recognition and cultivation of common points of reference, such as ideological principles, political priorities and shared rhetorical strategies.

In general, it is a complex process that goes beyond mere agreement on specific issues. As Cheney (1983) points out, the process involves both conscious and unconscious aspects, as political leaders do not simply agree on specific positions but develop common ways of perceiving and interpreting political reality.

In more detail, the process of identification among politicians manifests itself at multiple levels. At the ideological level, politicians recognise and promote common principles and values. At the strategic level, they develop common approaches to address and overcome political challenges. At the rhetorical level, they adopt similar language patterns, rhetorical tropes, narrative strategies and dramatic techniques.

In light of this, the use of common narratives as a mechanism of identification is particularly important. Political leaders jointly create narratives of reality that represent in a certain way the nature, texture and causes of political problems and propose their own solutions. These narratives are not only descriptive but also normative, as they specify what is desirable and achievable in political action (Foss, 2017).

At the same time, the identification between political figures is often strengthened through joint confrontation with other political actors. As Fortuna (2019) argues, the presence of a common "opponent" can act as a key factor in strengthening the identification between politicians who, otherwise, would have significant differences.

However, historical experience has proven that the identification between politicians is not always stable and can break down under the pressure of internal or external factors. Personal ambitions, changing political circumstances or new challenges may lead to a redefinition of identification and new policy alignments.

The rhetoric of polarisation

The rhetoric of polarisation is an important extension of identification by opposition. According to Fortuna (2019), it constitutes a strategy that uses specific textual structures to divide audiences into opposing groups. This process creates a positive in-group and a negative out-

group, reinforcing the cohesion of the former through opposition to the latter. King and Anderson (1971) define polarisation as the process of merging a diverse audience into mutually exclusive groups, with strong internal cohesion and external opposition.

This rhetoric extends beyond the mere division of political space and is a complex phenomenon inextricably linked to the process of identification. According to Jasinski (2001), polarizing rhetoric not only functions divisively but also coalesces, as the creation of rivalries often leads to the strengthening of internal bonds and identifications within the opposing groups.

The strategy of polarisation involves two parallel processes: affirmation and subversion. The strategy of affirmation involves the selection of those concepts, images and rhetorical devices that will construct or reinforce a sense of a group, collective identity. The strategy of subversion involves the selection of those rhetorical devices and modes that will undermine the ethos of opposing groups, ideologies or institutions.

A key element of polarizing rhetoric is the construction of the "enemy". According to Edelman (1988), an "enemy" is not simply an individual or group that has caused actual harm to the country or society as a whole. Rather, it is anyone who can be presented as malicious, regardless of their actions. Polarizing rhetoric focuses on attributing evil intentions and responsibility to this "enemy", even without tangible evidence. Thus, the image of the enemy is built more on "what he wants to do" than on "what he has done" (Fortuna,2019).

This tactic often works because it is based on recognisable faces or stereotypes, to which it is easy to attribute negative characteristics. The construction of the enemy is therefore based on how someone can be presented as a threat, rather than on whether they are actually a threat.

The effectiveness, now, of polarising rhetoric often depends on its ability to exploit pre-existing social divisions and tensions. Political orators do not necessarily create new divisions, but often activate and intensify existing divisions in society. This process can lead to the strengthening of political alliances and the formation of strong political identities.

At the same time, the rhetoric of polarisation often works through the dramatisation of conflict. Political orators present political debate as an intense confrontation between good and evil, right and wrong. This dramatization and moralization of political debate enhances the emotional investment of audiences in the conflict and intensifies the process of identification with one side or the other (Demertzis,2020).

CHAPTER 4. Research and Methodological Framework

4.1 Research hypotheses and questions

This study is grounded in two central research hypotheses, which in turn lead to three research questions.

The first research hypothesis supports the existence of significant similarities, but also some differences, in the rhetorical approach of the two political leaders regarding the European perspective of the country. Specifically, we hypothesize that Alexis Tsipras, despite the temporal distance and the different political and media conditions, adopted similar rhetorical patterns and argumentative structures to those employed by Andreas Papandreou. This hypothesis is based on the observation that during periods of strained relations with the European Union, Greek political leaders of a certain ideological orientation tend to develop similar rhetorical strategies, especially when addressing domestic audiences.

The second research hypothesis focuses on the presence of national-populist elements in the political discourse of both leaders. We hypothesize that both Papandreou and Tsipras incorporated such elements in their rhetoric, albeit with varying intensity and across distinct contexts. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that confrontation with European institutions often lends itself to the development of nationalist rhetoric, particularly in times of crisis, tension and intense social polarisation and hostility.

Research questions

Based on these working hypotheses, the research questions under consideration are formulated as follows:

-Are there elements of identification or imitation in the political discourse of Alexis Tsipras in relation to that of Andreas Papandreou?

-Are there common rhetorical patterns, as well as formulations that are repeated in a similar way, or do the two political leaders approach the issue in question with significant differences-especially considering that they operated in entirely distinct communicative environments?

-Are there elements of (national) populist political discourse in the selected extracts from the speeches and statements of the two political leaders, which refer to the relationship between Greece and the United Europe?

4.2 Methodology

<u>4.2.1 Collection and processing of empirical material</u>

The process of qualitative comparative discourse analysis will form the methodological basis for this research, which requires defined steps, clear definition of the unit of analysis, coding of the political discourse extracts, as well as thematic analysis and interpretation of them (Foss, 2017).

The study starts with the definition of the unit of analysis, which is defined as any verbal element contained in the selected extracts of the speeches and public statements of the two political leaders in general, which refer to Greece's relationship with the united Europe. These extracts will be taken from texts, interviews, public statements or other relevant archives of the period. The set of extracts that constitute the empirical material for this research is listed in the appendix, while the main text gives an indicative list of some of them.

In terms of analysis, it focuses on specific features such as the use of metaphors, similes, personification and historical analogies (Foss, 2017). Within this framework, the rhetorical sites associated with the idea of 'independence', 'popular sovereignty' or 'national pride' are indicative examples to be examined.

The selection of passages

The data collection includes public statements, speeches in parliament, interviews and election material. For Andreas Papandreou, the period 1977-1981 focuses on his speeches on Greece's accession to the EEC and his criticisms of Western institutions. Similarly, for Alexis Tsipras, the period 2012-2015 is mainly examined, with emphasis on his positions on the memoranda, the Troika and the negotiation of the Greece-Europe relationship.

Regarding the sampling strategy, the selection of the quotes follows the logic of purposive sampling, where each quote is selected based on specific criteria that serve the research objectives (Tsiolis, 2014). The main criteria include the thematic relevance between the quotes of different orators, in this case the relationship between our country and the United Europe, the diversity of communication environments , in order to form a complete picture of the type and form that political discourse takes in different media landscapes, as well as to fit - to a large extent - into the political context of the oppositional phases of the parties.

Research saturation in the qualitative analysis of political discourse is achieved when recurring patterns in the political discourse of the two speakers are identified, while the addition of new quotations does not provide new findings on rhetorical strategies, rhetorical places, narrative patterns, modes of argument construction and persuasive techniques (Wodak & Meyer, 2016)

Coding process

Data coding is done to systematically organize and analyze the extracts. First, thematic categories are created based on the theory of syntax. These include rhetorical tropes, such as national independence and popular sovereignty, and rhetorical techniques, such as the use of metaphors or historical analogies (Tsiolis, 2014).

At the same time, the coding of the passages is done taking into account the historical and political conditions of each period. The timing, the communicative context and the circumstances of each discourse are recorded, while particular emphasis is placed on the changes and adaptations of rhetoric according to the political conditions at the time.

The analysis then focuses on the decoding of the rhetorical strategies and techniques used to create identification and studies the ways in which each leader attempts to shape collective identities and mobilize his or her audience (Tsiolis, 2014).

Finally, the comparative dimension of the analysis is highlighted through a parallel examination of the similarities and differences in the rhetoric of the two leaders, considering the specificities of the communication setting of each era (Wodak & Meyer 2016).

4.3 Limitations of the research

Despite the intensive effort for a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the topic, the present research is subject to certain methodological and practical limitations, which are important to clearly and explicitly point out in advance in order to accurately define the scope and reach of its conclusions (Flick, 2018).

First, the comparative analysis of two different time periods where very different communication circumstances prevail involves inherent difficulties. The fact that the available evidence of political discourse differs significantly between the two periods - with the first period relying mainly on print sources and audio documents, while the second includes a wealth of digital material - makes direct comparison of communication practices a particularly complex exercise (Chadwick, 2017; McNair, 2018). The different nature of the means of recording and transmitting political discourse between the two periods, that is, creates challenges in trying to extract comparable data and in analysing individual communication strategies.

Furthermore, the research is necessarily limited to a selected sample of speeches and public statements of the two political figures (Krippendorff, 2018). Although the selection of material was made with defined representativeness criteria, it is impossible to include all of their relevant public interventions, which poses limitations in terms of the 'universality' of the findings (Mason, 2017), since the selective nature of the sample, although methodologically necessary, may leave out of the analysis important aspects of their rhetoric that could enrich or differentiate the findings of the research.

CHAPTER 5. Comparative analysis of the political discourse of Andreas Papandreou and Alexis Tsipras

5.1 Central concepts, rhetorical patterns and strategies used by the two leaders

Greece as a victim of Europe

The rhetorical construction of Greece as a victim of the European establishment was a fundamental element of the political discourse of both leaders, although it was expressed in different ways, reflecting the distinct circumstances of each period.

Firstly, Andreas Papandreou depicted the EEC as a direct threat to Greece's national and economic independence in a series of public interventions and speeches throughout this period. This rhetorical strategy was not limited to mere denunciation, but was structured in a coherent narrative framework that attempted to highlight the mechanisms of exploitation and dependency. Papandreou placed particular emphasis on the presentation of the EEC as an organisation of economic oppression and subordination, which aimed to turn Greece into a peripheral economy dependent on the powerful European centers (Pouliou, 2019).

In a similar spirit, but adapted to the conditions of the economic crisis, Alexis Tsipras developed the narrative of the *"debt colony"*. In Tsipras' rhetoric, the lenders were presented not just as economic overlords, but as forces that systematically sought the *"divestment of public wealth"* and the *"impoverishment of the people"*. The concept of the "debt colony" served as a powerful rhetorical tool linking economic dependence with the loss of national sovereignty, thus creating a multi-layered narrative of oppression on the one hand and the need for resistance on the other.

National independence and dignity

The concept of national sovereignty was a central rhetorical tool for both Papandreou and Tsipras, although each exploited it in different ways depending on the historical period. In Papandreou's case, the threat to national independence was directly linked to the process of European integration. His characteristic statement that joining the United Europe *"means submission to a center of power outside Greece" (see Appendix B, Comprehensive Table 1: AP10),* as well as other similar formulations, functioned as a rhetorical tool that identified membership of the EEC with the loss of national self-determination. This narrative was reinforced by the repeated use of concepts such as "subordination", "dependence" and "exploitation", which constituted a coherent frame of reference for understanding the European perspective as a threat to the country's national existence (Pouliou, 2019).

Tsipras reinterpreted this rhetorical scheme in the context of the economic crisis, giving it new dimensions and presenting SYRIZA's stance as an active resistance to the lenders' demands, which were presented as a threat to the national sovereignty and dignity of the Greek people. His rhetoric essentially formed a dichotomy between the "external forces" that imposed the memoranda, in cooperation with the "submissive" domestic governments, and those who resisted, defending the interests of the Greek people (Tsakatika, 2020).

More specifically, of particular interest is the way in which both leaders linked the concept of national independence with the dignity of the people. In the case of Papandreou, this connection was encapsulated in his emphatic statement *"We prefer to belong to the Greeks"* (Appendix B, Table 1: AP8), a phrase that underscored the idea of national self-determination and the people's collective "ownership" over the country's future. Similarly, Tsipras invoked the principle of popular sovereignty as a counterforce to the Troika and the international lenders, positioning SYRIZA as the only political force capable of restoring national dignity.

Social justice and defence of the weak

The rhetoric of social justice was a fundamental element of the political discourse of both leaders, although it was expressed in different ways, again due to the special socio-political conditions of each era. Andreas Papandreou systematically promoted PASOK as the preeminent agent of social liberation, integrating the protection of the weaker social strata into a broader narrative of national and social emancipation (see Appendix A, Comparative Table 1).

In this narrative framework, social justice was presented not simply as a matter of redistribution of wealth, but as an integral element of a broader process of national regeneration.

Furthermore, particularly interesting is the way in which both leaders linked social justice to national independence. In Papandreou's discourse, social liberation was presented as impossible without detachment from the mechanisms of EEC dependency. Similarly, Tsipras promoted resistance to austerity and immediate release from the regime of memorandum guardianship as necessary preconditions for the restoration of social justice and the creation of a developmental perspective (Appendix A, Table 1).

Despite the individual differences in the form of the political discourse of the two politicians, due to the different communication environment in which they operated, both of them inextricably linked social justice with national independence, since Papandreou viewed the EEC as a threat to autonomous development, while Tsipras directed his criticism at the institutions of the Troika and the mix of economic policies they imposed, which according to him were of a vindictive, punitive and anti-developmental nature (Tsakatika, 2020).

However, as in the case of PASOK, the transformation of rhetorical criticism into real political change proved to be a much more complex process than the emotional mobilisation of public opinion against the European political and economic establishment.

5.2 The identification strategy and the effect of functional substitution

Alexis Tsipras' use of common rhetorical topics and strategies can be constructively analysed through Kenneth Burke's theory of identification. At the level of political communication, Tsipras achieved a remarkable double identification: on the one hand with the historical PASOK audience that felt betrayed by the party's course during the memoranda period, and on the other hand with Papandreou's own anti-European discourse of the 1980s. This double identification was a catalyst in the process of PASOK's disintegration and the emergence of SYRIZA as the dominant force in the centre-left.

Focusing mainly on the second part of the identification (between the two leaders, which led to the first), Tsipras' rhetorical strategy was not limited to the simple imitation of Papandreou's conceptual schemes, but proceeded to a creative reinterpretation of them in the framework of the economic crisis. The historical slogan of PASOK: *"Greece belongs to the Greeks"* was transformed into Tsipras' rhetoric in the declaration:

"We will not allow any vested interest, any foreign power to place its interests above those of the people" (*Appendix B, Table 2: AT6).*

This transition was not merely verbal, but reflected a shift from traditional ethnocentric discourse to a more complex narrative of popular and national sovereignty.

At the same time, Papandreou's historical Euroscepticism towards the EEC found its contemporary expression in Tsipras' anti-memoranda rhetoric. The latter primarily targeted EU institutions and austerity policies, embedding at the same time his criticism in a broader context of questioning the neoliberal model of European integration. This rhetorical choice allowed SYRIZA to successfully claim the role of the authentic exponent of the original visions and values of PASOK, which the latter seemed to have abandoned.

Moreover, Greece's position in the United Europe and the opposing views that developed around the country's European perspective and its role in the European structure constitute a fertile field for tracing elements of imitation or identification in the political rhetoric of these political personalities, since both of them acted politically in periods when the country's broader geopolitical orientation was at the centre of the political debate.

Moreover, we can see that, speaking of post-dictatorial political history, a radical rhetoric developed in at least two historical phases - in the first cycle of the Papandreian PASOK and in the opposition period of SYRIZA during the crisis, which wanted to present Greece as a nation under constant threat, which must regain its lost pride and move independently and autonomously in the global scene, without being subjected to "international directorates" that wish to treat it as a "protectorate" or "colony" (Tsakatika, 2020).

This rhetoric was strongly expressed, as we have already seen, by Andreas Papandreou, particularly during the opposition period of the early PASOK in the late 1970s and early 1980s, who, wanting to counter the geostrategic choice to join the United Europe, adopted a political discourse with peculiar ideological and aesthetic characteristics (Pouliou, 2019). This discourse constructed the image of an extremely combative and dynamic Greece, which has to conquer its place in the modern world by relying exclusively on its own forces or by allying with countries of the Arab world. Joining a broader scheme such as the European structure is seen as a sign of subjugation and voluntary ceding of its sovereign rights and its ability to shape its own economic and foreign policy (Pantazopoulos, 2000).

Similarly, Alexis Tsipras, during the period of the economic crisis and the anti-austerity struggle, adopted a rhetoric aimed at deconstructing European policy and the power structures represented by the EU and the Troika. Focusing on the memoranda and austerity policies, it presented Greece as a 'debt colony' where popular sovereignty and national self-determination

had been curtailed under pressure from external powers. This narrative focused on the restoration of national dignity and the recovery of the country's political autonomy.

More specifically, the EU and Greece's lenders, such as the IMF and the European Central Bank, were presented as external oppressive mechanisms, operating for the benefit of banks and markets and at the expense of the Greek people. Tsipras, mimicking Papandreou's dichotomy between "the people" and "external elites", constructed a similar discourse, focusing on the conflict with the forces that, according to his rhetoric, were undermining the country's interests.

Tsipras' phrase, *"We will play the zurna and they will dance. And since we're in Crete, we will play the lyre and the markets will dance the pentozali" (Appendix B, Table 2: AT13)* is a typical aversion of this rhetoric, where Europe and the markets are seen as too powerful, but at the same time countervailable opponents, provided that a "government of the people" ,with a clear mandate to resist, emerges. This reference has a direct correlation with Papandreou's resistance to the commitments and dictates of the EEC and his declaration of national autonomy and self-determination.

The polemic against the United Europe by Andreas Papandreou and Alexis Tsipras reveals the strategic use of common rhetorical motifs to rally popular audiences and shape new political identities. In this direction, identification theory offers a valuable interpretative tool for understanding this process. Tsipras, through the imitation of basic elements of the Papandreian rhetoric, managed to fluidise the traditional PASOK and functionally substitute it with SYRIZA, presenting his party as the new force that will defend national dignity, popular sovereignty and economic justice against the pressures of Europe and international institutions.

This strategy is directly linked to Kenneth Burke's theory of identification through which SYRIZA managed to significantly expand its electoral dynamics by disintegrating and absorbing a significant part of PASOK, which paid for wasting a huge part of its political capital by being the party that introduced the country into a regime of memorandum guardianship.

In more detail, as we have already argued, Alexis Tsipras' rhetorical strategy towards the European Union highlights a highly elaborate process of political identification with the Papandreian PASOK. This strategy, analysed through the prism of Kenneth Burke's theory, was a catalyst for the gradual disintegration of PASOK as a political force and the parallel shift of a significant part of its electorate towards SYRIZA.

This strategy paid off, leading to a deep and radical reordering of the political scene during the crisis period, as reflected in the 'double electoral earthquake' of 2012 (May and June elections).

Flowchart 5.2.1: Identification and disintegration strategy

Strategic identification between Alexis Tsipras and Andreas Papandreou	→	Disintegration of PASOK	→	Functional replacement of PASOK by SYRIZA

Identification Mechanisms	Disintegration results	Substitution data
- Reframing of the "anti-EOK" discourse into a critique of the Troika and the European establishment - Invocation of the historical continuity of the democratic and popular movement	-Destruction of PASOK as a progressive political institution -Displacement of traditional voters -Crisis of identity of social democratic space	-Assuming the role of a progressive party -Assertion of historical continuity of the "patriotic" PASOK -Representation of the popular strata

5.3. Exploring possible differences in style and rhetoric

On the other hand, the comparative analysis of the political rhetoric of Andreas Papandreou and Alexis Tsipras reveals a number of crucial differences, that go beyond the level of simple communication strategy and touch on the political and ideological background of the two leaders.

In terms of style, Papandreou's speech was characterised by a more elaborate theoretical formation. His academic education and experience in the field of economics (and more specifically in political economy) was reflected in his ability to articulate complex arguments, especially when analysing issues of international economic relations in the context of dependency theory. This does not, of course, mean that simplistic sloganeering and populist divisive discourse were absent, as has been discussed above (Pouliou, 2019).

Instead, Tsipras adopted a more direct and simplistic style of speech, adapted to the demands of digital communication. The use of popular expressions and the emphasis on the emotional dimension of the discourse were key features of his rhetoric (Tsakatika, 2020).

An important difference can also be found in the way the political debate was handled. Despite his strong criticism of the system, Papandreou, primarily at that time, avoided personal attacks and maintained a level of "institutional respect". Tsipras, on the contrary, often resorted to personal attacks and derogatory moral characterisations against his opponents.

This differentiation reflects the transition to a new communication environment, where a direct and emotional approach often takes precedence over theoretical elaboration. Social networks, with their character constraints and emphasis on immediate appeal, favour the simplification of political discourse and polarisation (Appendix A, Table 2).

In general, the study of the communicative landscape of each period highlights fundamental differences in the way political discourse is articulated and disseminated. In the Papandreou era, the traditional media - newspapers, radio and television - operated according to a linear logic of information transmission. This structure enabled the development of more complex and comprehensive political arguments, as there was time to process and absorb the messages.

Also, mass meetings, as the dominant form of political communication of the time, created a particular setting of ritual communication. The physical presence of the crowd and the direct interaction between speaker and audience formed a collective experience that reinforced the sense of political community.

In contrast, in the era of Tsipras, digital media have brought about a radical change in the logic of political communication. The immediacy and interactivity of social networks have created an environment of constant information flow, where political messages have to compete for the public's attention, while the personalisation of information through social media algorithms has led to a new form of political communication, where the message is tailored to the preferences and characteristics of specific audience groups. This parameter allows for a more targeted electoral campaign, but at the same time reinforces the fragmentation of the public debate.

In other words, these differences do not simply demonstrate distinct communication strategies, but suggest a deeper transformation in the very nature of political communication and public debate in the digital age.

Divergence in political vision and ideological identification

Despite striking similarities in rhetorical strategy, the political discourse of the two leaders shows significant differences in their vision of Greece's relationship with Europe. Papandreou, although strongly Eurosceptic, formulated a more integrated national development vision that focused on the concept of "self-reliant development". For the founder of PASOK, the EEC was not just an economic mechanism, but a structural threat to the national productive base (Pouliou, 2019).

In contrast, Tsipras' political discourse, despite his strong criticism of European austerity policies, maintained a more positive attitude towards the European perspective. His goal from the outset was not withdrawal from the EU, but a radical renegotiation of the terms of Greece's participation (a position, of course, that was also progressively adopted by Andreas Papandreou, approaching the 1981 elections).

This differentiation reflected both the different historical circumstances and the evolution of European integration itself. While Papandreou could question the very membership of the EEC, Tsipras focused on criticising the neoliberal character of European integration and the need to build a "social Europe".

In other words, Andreas Papandreou developed a coherent ideological framework that linked criticism of European integration with a broader vision of national and social emancipation. His declaration that: *"entry into the EEC undermines the development of an autonomous national development policy and conflicts with the long-term interests of the Greek people"* (Appendix B, Table 1: AP4), was not merely a denunciation, but was part of a comprehensive proposal for an alternative path of development, even if utopian or in any case not easily achievable.

At the same time, another deviation lies in the fact that the emphasis on "self-reliant development" and the "third way to socialism" constituted a long-term political project which, despite its subsequent adjustments, maintained an internal coherence. PASOK's anti-Europeanism was not limited to the rejection of the EEC, but was linked to an alternative conception of Greece's place in the international system.

On the contrary, Alexis Tsipras' rhetoric, despite its strong denunciatory dimension, showed a remarkable fluidity in terms of the long-term political vision he expressed, focusing more on direct resistance to the memorandum policies than on the formulation of a complete alternative program (Appendix A, Table 2).

To sum up, despite the striking similarities, the rhetoric of the two leaders presents important differences that reveal both the different historical and media conditions and the different strategic objectives. Papandreou's Euroscepticism was embedded in a broader vision of national "renaissance" and autonomous development, while Tsipras's criticism of the EU focused more on questioning specific policy choices than on rejecting the European perspective as a whole, but without proposing or suggesting an alternative developmental model.

5.4 Possible aspects of populism in their political discourse

Reinforcing the rhetoric of polarisation and the creation of an "enemy"

One of the most characteristic elements in the rhetoric of both Papandreou and Tsipras was the constant cultivation of intense political polarisation through the construction of a dual "enemy" - internal and external. This rhetorical strategy was not limited to mere political confrontation, but constituted an integrated narrative framework that conceptualised political reality in terms of existential conflict.

As part of his criticism of the EEC, Andreas Papandreou often elaborated the rhetoric of "foreign interests" seeking the full exploitation of Greece (Pouliou, 2019).

According to this approach, the EEC was presented not just as an economic institution, but as a mechanism of "dependency", while the domestic elites were accused of conscious complicity in this subjugation. The emblematic slogan "Greece belongs to the Greeks" functioned as a

condensation of this double confrontation, underlining the need to shake off both external and internal "tutelage".

Alexis Tsipras transferred this rhetorical scheme to the era of the economic crisis and the memoranda. The Troika and the "Brussels directorate" were presented as forces that imposed a "regime of economic occupation". His rhetoric culminated in denouncing domestic political forces as "yesmen" and directly questioning their patriotic credentials (Appendix A, Table 3).

The exploitation of emotional discourse

In this atmosphere of intense polarisation, both Papandreou and Tsipras developed a highly elaborate strategy of emotional mobilisation of their audiences. Their rhetoric was not limited to logical argumentation, but carefully deployed concepts such as "dignity", "independence" and "hope" to activate deeper emotional and ideological reflexes of the electorate (Demertzis,2020).

More specifically, Papandreou addressed the popular strata through a discourse that intertwined the promise of "popular sovereignty" with a broader vision of "change." Towards this direction, his assertion that *"The EEC is the economic arm of NATO in Europe. It is part of a broader mechanism of dependency for the peoples of the periphery" (Appendix B, Table 1: AP7)* functioned as an implicit call for national awakening and resistance. The EEC was portrayed not merely as an economic union, but as a geopolitical tool that threatened Greece's independence, contrasting sharply with the path of alignment with European institutions pursued by the then New Democracy government.

Similarly, Tsipras also adopted a strongly emotional tone, exploiting the narrative of "hope" and the importance of "resistance" against austerity policies, attributing all the ills of the Greek economy and society to the memorandum policies and the Troika (Tsakatika, 2020).

Characteristic in this regard is the following quote from him, speaking at a farmers' blockade in Lamia in February 2013:

 "All your demands are linked to the memorandum. As long as the memorandum and the Troika exist, there is no future for farmers. The struggle must be common—among farmers, workers, small businesses, the self-employed. It must be common" (Appendix B, Table 2: AT3).

In addition, the rhetoric of resistance culminated in the use of simple but powerful and catchy references, such as the famous:

"Go back Mrs. Merkel, go back ladies and gentlemen of the conservative nomenclature of Europe. Greece is not a guinea pig" (Appendix B, Table 2: AT7).

In this direction, the constant rhetoric about the need to "shake off austerity" promoted the notion that the solution to Greece's problems depended solely on the political will of a determined and uncompromising national government, overlooking or downplaying the objective financial and institutional conditions (Appendix A, Table 3).

Papandreou and Tsipras apply similar rhetorical strategies, which demonstrate a continuity of populist discourse through time. The processes of their enemy creation, emotional appeals and easily identifiable binary oppositions galvanized voters by depicting intricate problems as battles between "the people" and corrupting forces. Not only did this approach bring electoral victories but it helped shape Greek political culture, showing how populist rhetoric can successfully expand through moments of crisis, by offering simple explanations and solutions that often bypass the political and economic reality.

CHAPTER 6. Discussion-Conclusions

The analysis of the political rhetoric of Andreas Papandreou and Alexis Tsipras reveals the existence of striking parallels in the perceptions and positions they expressed against the United Europe. The two leaders, although they acted in different political, social and media settings, adopted a rhetoric that highlighted national sovereignty as a key stake, using elements aimed at emotional and mental identification with their audiences.

More specifically, a comparative analysis of the rhetorical strategies of Andreas Papandreou and Alexis Tsipras highlights both the profound similarities in their identification mechanisms and their crucial adaptations to the particular circumstances of each era. Papandreou exploited Euroscepticism as a vehicle for promoting a radical vision of national independence and popular sovereignty. Tsipras reinterpreted this rhetorical framework in the landscape of the economic crisis, shifting the focus of his rhetoric to resisting austerity, defending social justice and addressing the consequences of the "humanitarian crisis".

Particularly important was the use of common symbolic elements and rhetorical tools. The concept of national independence, the confrontation with "foreign elites", the defence of popular sovereignty and the invocation of moral superiority acted as bridges that allowed the transfer of significant political capital and popular "legitimacy" from PASOK to SYRIZA. This process was greatly facilitated by the gradual shift of PASOK itself from its original positions, as early as the 1980s, but which culminated during the memorandum period.

Moreover, the successful reintroduction and revival of PASOK's rhetorical positions by SYRIZA was not just a communication strategy, but a profoundly political act that contributed decisively to the realignment of the political scene. Tsipras' rhetorical prowess in appropriating and updating the rhetorical patterns of the Papandreian rhetoric acted as a catalyst for the disintegration of PASOK and the emergence of SYRIZA as a dominant force not only in the radical left, but also in the centre-left or social democracy, expressing the historically known in Greece as "democratic camp".

On the other hand, the comparison of the two political leaders highlights a profound shift in the way politics itself is perceived in Greek society. Papandreou, despite his strong anti-European discourse, operated within a framework where politics was understood as a field of conflict between different visions for the future of the country. His criticism of the EEC was not a standalone initiative- it was part of a broader narrative of a different geopolitical and strategic orientation for the country. There was, in other words, a dialectical relationship between the critique and the alternative proposal.

In contrast, in the case of Tsipras, we observe a transition towards what we might call the "politics of direct reaction" - in line with the mode and speed required by social media. The emphasis on personalized denunciation and the emotional charge of discourse reflects an era when politics has lost its long-term perspective and the horizon of expectations has become blurred. As a result of that, it is no coincidence that even promises of radical change were couched in terms of immediate upheaval rather than long-term transformation (Tsakatika, 2020).

Overall, the success of the strategy of identification is largely due to Tsipras' ability to reinterpret and reframe the Papandreian rhetorical schemes under the conditions of the economic crisis. The shift from criticising the EEC as a mechanism of dependency to denouncing the Troika as an instrument of austerity has preserved the basic structure of the Eurosceptic rhetoric, effectively adapting it to the new socio-political framework.

The opposition rhetoric of Andreas Papandreou and Alexis Tsipras, although developed in different external circumstances, shows remarkable similarities in terms of central narrative schemas, main messages and rhetorical patterns. Both Papandreou and Tsipras used common strategic framing techniques, utilising concepts such as national independence, social justice and resistance to United Europe as key axes of their political discourse and practice.

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APPENDIX A: Comparative Tables

This appendix presents a series of comparative tables that synthesize key rhetorical features identified in the political discourse of Andreas Papandreou (1974–1981) and Alexis Tsipras (2012–2015). These tables support the analysis developed in Chapter 5 and illustrate recurring themes, variations in rhetorical strategy, and populist dimensions within their respective narratives.

Comparative Table 1: Common Rhetorical Themes in the Political Discourse of Papandreou and Tsipras

Rhetorical Theme	Andreas Papandreou	Alexis Tsipras
Greece as a victim of foreign powers	The EEC as a "mechanism of dependence". Emphasis on economic and political subjugation. Risk of marginalization of the Greek economy.	"Debt colony". Emphasis on submission to the Troika. Need to protect public wealth from creditors. Austerity as a tool of oppression.
Anti-Western discourse	"The EEC and NATO are the same syndicate" – the EEC portrayed as an extension of American interests. Systematic criticism of mechanisms of "dependence" and "subjugation".	"Go back, Mrs. Merkel, go back ladies and gentlemen of Europe's conservative nomenklatura." Condemnation of the Brussels "directorate". The EU seen as serving elite interests.
Attributing problems to external factors	"No to agricultural destruction [...] which is the EEC."	"As long as the Memorandum and the Troika exist, there is no future for the farmer."
National-social dimension of rhetoric	Linking social liberation with national independence. Emphasis on protecting vulnerable social groups.	Resistance to externally imposed austerity. References to the legacy of popular left-wing struggles. Emphasis on social justice.
Moral/Emotional appeal	Moral superiority of the nation against foreign exploitation. Appeals to national dignity.	The moral advantage of the Left. Use of concepts such as hope and resistance to economic subjugation.

Source: Author's own analysis

Comparative Table 2: Variations in Rhetorical Strategy

Dimension of Analysis	Andreas Papandreou (1974–1981)	Alexis Tsipras (2012–2015)
Confrontation Framework	Institutional critique of the EEC as a mechanism of dependence. Emphasis on the ideological and geopolitical dimension of the conflict.	Personalized attacks on proponents of the Memoranda. Moral framing of the confrontation.
Rhetorical Tools	Systematic development of anti-imperialist discourse. Theoretical substantiation of criticism against European integration.	Emotional charge and moral denunciation. Use of popular metaphors and personal characterizations.
Relationship with Opponents	Acknowledgment of the institutional legitimacy of opponents despite disagreements.	Challenge to the moral and political legitimacy of opponents.
Ideological Orientation	Coherent ideological framework with explicit references to the socialist project.	Flexible ideological positioning, centered on anti-austerity stance.
Temporal Dimension	Long-term vision of national regeneration.	Immediate reversal of austerity policies.

Source: Author's own analysis

Comparative Table 3: Aspects of Populism in the Discourse of Papandreou and Tsipras

Dimension of Analysis	Andreas Papandreou	Alexis Tsipras
Construction of the "People" as a political subject	Dialectical fusion of national and social liberation.	Representation of the people as a "moral community" of resistance. Emphasis on the notion of dignity.
Definition of the "Enemy"	Systemic mechanisms of dependence (EEC, international capital).	Foreign and domestic power actors (Troika, pro-Memorandum governments).
Rhetorical Tools	Theoretically grounded anti-imperialist discourse, along with more "digestible" slogans.	Direct emotional appeals, popular metaphors.
Ideological articulation of ethno-populist elements	Synthesis of national independence with the socialist project.	Flexible combination of anti-neoliberalism and patriotism.

Source: Author's own analysis

Appendix B: Corpus of Political Statements used in the Analysis

This appendix includes selected verbatim excerpts from public speeches and interviews by Andreas Papandreou (1974–1981) and Alexis Tsipras (2012–2015), which constitute the primary material for the rhetorical analysis presented in Chapter 5.

Comprehensive Table 1: Excerpts from Andreas Papandreou's Speeches (1975–1981)

Code	Excerpt (Verbatim)	Context / Date
AP1	"It is clear that for countries subject to colonization and exploitation, like ours, socialism—that is, popular sovereignty, not only politically but also economically, which is its core meaning—is linked to national independence. This is what distinguishes us from the socialists of the West. It gives us a very significant kinship with the socialist movements of the Mediterranean, especially the Arab world".	Speech at a rally in Larissa, July 1975
AP2	"It is nothing more than the other face of NATO—that is, the other face of the USA".	Statement in *Rizospastis*, 16 September 1975
AP3	"There are the sirens of internationalism who refuse to link the anti-imperialist struggle with the fight for national independence and the defense of the territorial integrity of the country. [...] Words that disorient, words that ultimately support the internationalism of NATO. (...) Let the advocates of this 'internationalism' reflect on their responsibilities to the Greek people".	Text by Andreas Papandreou in *Greece to the Greeks*, Athens, Karanasis Editions, 1976
AP4	"Entry into the EEC undermines the development of an autonomous national development policy and conflicts with the long-term interests of the Greek people".	Interview in *Oikonomikos Tachydromos*, 29 September 1977
AP5	"The EEC, under current conditions, is the EEC of monopoly capital; it is the mechanism for consolidating the dominance of American-German capitalism in Europe. [...] Well before the neo-Marxists, Gunnar Myrdal argued that if a relatively underdeveloped country joins an economic community with a more developed one, their economic gap will widen—that is, accession will be detrimental to the underdeveloped country. This will surely apply to Greece if it joins the EEC".	Article in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 1977
AP6	"We are facing a social and economic crossroads. The prices at which you sell your products are much lower than those in Western Europe. So, they tell you that behind this building lies a paradise called EEC—there you will find better prices for olive oil... there you are to place your hopes for a great future for our country. [...] They impose quotas on our wines. This is the treatment reserved for us, who are associated with them, while much more favorable terms apply to 56 other countries that	Speech in Chania to farmers, election campaign period, 1977

Code	Excerpt (Verbatim)	Context / Date
	have special agreements with them. [...] But they don't inform the people—because they know what the answer would be: 'No to the rural destruction that is the EEC".	
AP7	"The EEC is the economic arm of NATO in Europe. It is part of a broader mechanism of dependency for the peoples of the periphery".	Interview in *To Vima* newspaper, 1977
AP8	"The decision for accession was made on the altar of 'We belong to the West'".	Parliamentary speech, 1977
AP9	"We prefer to belong to the Greeks".	Parliamentary speech, 1977 (response to Konstantinos Karamanlis)
AP10	"It [EEC accession] means submission to a center of power outside Greece".	Statement in *International Herald Tribune*, 14 April 1978
AP11	"We have said that PASOK opposes accession to the EEC. And our position remains crystal clear on this issue. Accession entails the transfer of national sovereignty to foreign centers. The critical decisions for our economy are made in Brussels, without the people's involvement".	Televised message, election campaign 1981
AP12	"The PASOK government that will result from the elections of October 18 will, in accordance with constitutional procedures, call for a referendum so that the people can freely decide whether to continue accession or, if the national interest demands—as we believe—pursue a special agreement with the Common Market".	Televised message, election campaign 1981

Comprehensive Table 2: Excerpts from Alexis Tsipras' Speeches (2012–2016)

Code	Excerpt (Verbatim)	Context / Date
AT1	"They are organizing the bankruptcy in such a way that the entire burden falls on the Greek people, on Greek society, while they and the bankers are rescued".	Reference to Eurogroup meeting, February 2012
AT2	"The Europeans may say that we are all Greeks, but apparently some Greeks are not so Greek—those who govern us".	Reference to Eurogroup meeting, February 2012
AT3	"All your demands are linked to the memorandum. As long as the memorandum and the Troika exist, there is no future for farmers. The struggle must be common—among farmers, workers, small businesses, the self-employed. It must be common".	Speech at farmers' blockade in Lamia, February 2013
AT4	"We bring a different perception of politics and power. We are not looking for ways to become caliphs in place of the caliph and continue the same policies with the same methods. We bring more and more meaningful democracy, public participation in decisions that affect them. We bring the principles and values that the left has carried through harsh times, through many struggles and sacrifices: devotion to the people—above all, to the workers. Devotion to the homeland, to national independence and sovereignty. The determination not to allow any vested interest, any foreign power, any economic complex to place its interests above those of the people".	Speech in Mytilene, May 2014
AT5	"Mr. Samaras, Mr. Venizelos, their banker friends, their oligarch allies, their far-right buddies, and the entire clan that brought us to this point".	Speech in Mytilene, May 2014
AT6	"We will not allow any vested interest, any foreign power to place its interests above those of the people".	Speech in Mytilene, May 2014
AT7	"Go back Mrs. Merkel, go back ladies and gentlemen of the conservative nomenclature of Europe. Greece is not a guinea pig".	Speech in Mytilene, May 2014
AT8	"The disastrous duo of Samaras and Venizelos—I have information on this—is ready to sacrifice themselves again to 'save' the country once more by accepting more harsh measures for a people already on its knees. Now they want to play the saviors again".	Speech in Lamia, SYRIZA regional conference, November 2014
AT9	"We will beat the drum and they will dance; they won't be playing the zurna while we dance".	Speech in Lamia, SYRIZA regional conference, November 2014
AT10	"The Troika's goal isn't the loans, it's the airports, the ports, the country's public wealth... They want to turn the country into a debt colony, turn workers into cheap uninsured labor, destroy	Speech in Lamia, SYRIZA regional

Code	Excerpt (Verbatim)	Context / Date
	small businesses, dismantle the welfare state, and squeeze blood from a stone".	conference, November 2014
AT11	"Ask Mrs. Merkel what she will do if governments with popular mandates arise in Greece, Spain, and elsewhere and say 'no' to austerity and this destructive path".	Speech in Lamia, SYRIZA regional conference, November 2014
AT12	"They tell us the markets will punish the Greeks if they don't vote as the markets wish. They also say Europe will punish us. The markets are doing their job—their job is to profit. We are doing our job—our job is to serve the interests of the Greek people".	Speech in Heraklion, Crete, December 2014
AT13	"We will play the zurna and they will dance. And since we're in Crete, we will play the lyre and the markets will dance the pentozali. We acknowledge the role of markets, but politics comes above them, and needs come above them. When they see a development plan and a quick solution to the debt, they will adapt to the new realities—because tomorrow they'll still want to profit".	Speech in Heraklion, Crete, December 2014
AT14	"We are determined to defend the rights of the Greek people. We are determined not to abandon our people to the 'yes-men' who support the continuation of austerity for many years".	Speech at the 5th Congress of the Party of the European Left, Berlin, December 2016