

Job Displacement Risk and Severance Pay

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Abstract

This paper is a quantitative, equilibrium study of the insurance role of severance pay when workers face displacement risk and markets are incomplete. A key feature of our model is that, in line with an established empirical literature, job displacement entails a persistent fall in earnings upon re-employment due to the loss of tenure. The model is solved numerically and calibrated to the US economy. In contrast to previous studies that have analyzed severance payments in the absence of persistent earning losses, we find that the welfare gains from the insurance against job displacement afforded by severance pay are sizable.

Keywords: Severance Payments, Incomplete Markets, Welfare.

JEL classification: E24, D52, D58, J65.

[☆]We thank the editor, Urban Jermann, and an anonymous referee for helpful and constructive comments, as well as Gianluca Violante for his help on this project. We are also grateful to the George Alessandria, Rui Castro, Henry Farber, Dirk Krueger, Igor Livshits, Claudio Michelacci, Makoto Nakajima, Fabien Postel-Vinay, Víctor Ríos-Rull, Richard Rogerson, Andrew Scott and seminar participants at several conferences and institutions for useful comments and suggestions.

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1. Introduction

Employment contracts often contain explicit severance-pay provisions.¹ Many countries also mandate minimum levels of severance pay and other forms of employment protection. Both privately-contracted and legislated severance pay provisions are commonly increasing, approximately linear, functions of job tenure (see, e.g., OECD 2013 and Parsons 2013). The existence of these measures is difficult to understand in the context of standard, complete-markets models in which workers maximize expected labor income and wages are perfectly flexible. As observed by Lazear (1990), employment protection measures have no useful role in such a setting. This has led some authors (e.g., Pissarides, 2001) to conclude that the debate about employment protection has been mostly conducted within a framework that is not appropriate for a proper evaluation of its role.

There is robust evidence documenting both the failure of complete risk sharing² and the substantial costs associated with job loss.³ For example, Couch and Placzek (2010) estimate earnings reductions for workers affected by mass layoffs of more than 30 percent in the post-displacement year and as much as 15 percent six years later. The extent and persistence of displacement losses has prompted calls (e.g., LaLonde, 2007) for the introduction of long-term insurance for displaced workers by means of earnings supplements upon re-employment. Yet, loss-based, earnings-replacement insurance is subject to moral hazard issues due to its conditionality on wages being lower in the new job. In fact, the lack of, even public, provision of earnings-replacement insurance suggests that this kind of issues are even more relevant than in the case of unemployment insurance.

¹Parsons (2013) reports that 36 percent of US workers in firms with more than 100 employees and 16 percent in smaller businesses, were covered by severance-payment clauses over the period 1980-2001. For the UK, the 1990 *Workplace Industrial Relations Survey* reveals that 51 percent of union companies bargained over the size of (non-statutory) severance pay for non-manual workers and 42 percent for manual workers (see Millward, Neil et al., 1992). For Spain—a country usually thought to have high levels of state-mandated employment protection—Lorences et al. (1995) document that from 1978–91, the proportion of collective bargaining agreements establishing severance pay in excess of the legislated minimum varied between 8 and 18 percent in the metal manufacturing sector and between 22 and 100 percent in the construction sector.

²See, e.g., Attanasio and Davis (1996) and Hayashi et al. (1996).

³Examples include Topel (1990), Jacobson et al. (1993), Farber (2005), Couch and Placzek (2010) and Davis and von Wachter (2011). Couch and Placzek (2010) also provide a survey of existing estimates of the earning losses from job displacement.

These considerations suggest that a candidate explanation for the existence of severance pay is as a means of (imperfectly) insuring displaced workers against labor market risk and, in particular, against the persistence of earnings losses upon re-employment.

The objective of this paper is to provide a quantitative, equilibrium framework to assess the role of severance pay as an insurance device. The crucial features of our analysis that distinguish it from existing contributions are: a detailed modeling of the sources of labor market risk, and imperfect insurance. In particular, in addition to labor market search frictions, we allow workers' productivity and job duration to be functions of both age and on-the-job tenure. Namely, job displacement risk has two components: the—temporary—loss of earnings associated with transition through unemployment and the—persistent—loss of earnings upon re-employment due to the loss of tenure. To isolate the pure insurance role of severance pay, we assume, following Lazear (1990) and most of the matching literature, that wages are flexible (full bonding). Given the significance that life-cycle factors—namely, asset accumulation and the positive correlation between age and job-tenure—play for this trade-off, we cast our analysis in a life-cycle setting.

A calibrated version of our model implies the following results. First, the average welfare gains of realistic severance pay schemes are positive and quantitatively important, ranging between 0.5 and 1 percentage points. Second, a large fraction of these gains stem from the fact that severance pay provide insurance against the—persistent—loss of tenure associated with job displacement. In fact, in the absence of tenure effects on wages severance pay would actually *reduce* average welfare,⁴ as the insurance gains would be more than offset by the fall in precautionary saving and the equilibrium capital stock. Finally, the model can explain why severance pay is generally an increasing function of on-the-job tenure. Keeping constant the average severance transfer, the average welfare gains are between 15 and 20 per cent higher if the transfer is (linearly) increasing in tenure. A tenure-independent transfer over-insures workers with low tenure.

The paper is related to a large literature that can be divided into two main strands. The first strand studies the role of employment protection measures in environments with risk-neutral agents. Its main result (Lazear, 1990) is that, if wage bargaining is

⁴This result is in line with the findings in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) who use a similar welfare metric. Our average welfare gain/loss is the average of the individual losses associated with moving from one steady state to the other, where the average is taken with respect to the cross-sectional distribution in the benchmark economy.

efficient, employment protection is non-neutral only if it entails a *tax* component that is lost to the firm-worker pair. This “firing tax” is always welfare-reducing and has ambiguous, and model-specific, employment effects.⁵ Conversely, severance pay—the pure transfer component of employment protection measures⁶—is neutral unless efficient wage bargaining is constrained. If downward-rigid wages in ongoing matches results in inefficient separation, severance pay reduces job destruction and increase job creation and efficiency as long as entry-wage flexibility allows workers to pre-pay for future transfers (Saint-Paul, 1995; Fella, 2000, 2012). Entry-wage rigidity constrains such pre-payment and implies that severance pay reduces job creation and, possibly, employment and efficiency (Garibaldi and Violante, 2005).

This paper is closer to the second, and more recent, strand of the literature that develops microfoundations for the (potential) relevance of legislated employment protection measures based on risk-averse workers and incomplete markets. Fella and Tyson (2013) build an incomplete-market version of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and use it to characterize the privately-optimal size of severance pay and show that Lazear’s (1990) neutrality result (approximately) holds despite asset market incompleteness. Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) were the first to study the welfare effects of severance payments in an incomplete market setting. Our findings are complementary to theirs. Differently from us, they assume that a unique wage applies to all jobs and, therefore, that job destruction is inefficiently high in the absence of severance pay. As pointed out by Ljungqvist (2002), it is this assumption of wage rigidity, rather than market incompleteness, that accounts for the large welfare gains they find. Instead, Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) find that the pure insurance benefit of severance pay is negligible and even *negative* in their environment, given the short duration of a typical unemployment spell and the absence of tenure effect on wages, which implies that the earnings of displaced workers fully recover upon re-employment.

⁵Firing taxes depress employment in environments with employment lotteries (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993), and in matching models if they increase workers’ threat point in new matches. The latter is the case only if firms, counter-factually, incur the firing tax even if an encounter with an unemployed worker is not turned into an employment relationship, as in Millard and Mortensen (1997) (see Ljungqvist 2002 and reference therein for a comprehensive discussion).

⁶Garibaldi and Violante (2005) and Fella (2007) argue that firing taxes are unlikely to be quantitatively important.

Rogerson and Schindler (2002) is the first quantitative equilibrium study of the welfare costs of the risk of persistent earnings losses. They evaluate the welfare costs of a one-off, mid-career, permanent earnings loss in an incomplete-market setting, but with no unemployment. They find that the welfare cost of a permanent 30% earnings loss at age 45 is around half a percentage point of permanent consumption. Since the shock is one-off, permanent and common to all workers it can be perfectly insured by a common, one-off transfer equal to about four years of wages. Unlike them, the combination of returns to tenure and positive job loss hazard in each period implies heterogeneity of displacement costs in our environment. We find that the welfare gains from severance pay are significantly larger in our set up, despite the fact that our parameterization implies more conservative and non-permanent displacement costs, and that we restrict attention to a (linear) severance-pay schedule in line with observed measures.

Krebs (2007) evaluates the welfare gains from eliminating the *cyclical variation* in idiosyncratic job displacement risk, while we study the welfare gains from using severance pay to provide insurance against the average job displacement risk.

Michelacci and Ruffo (2014) study the optimal age profile of unemployment benefit replacement rates in a life cycle model with unemployment risk and on-the-job accumulation of (general) human capital. They show that the trade-off between moral hazard and insurance/liquidity provision associated with unemployment benefits is weak for young unemployed workers, who have little wealth and high returns to on-the-job human capital accumulation, and steep for older workers. As a result, optimal replacement rates are strongly decreasing in age. They find that allowing for optimal severance pay adds little to the welfare gains from the optimal policy, but conjecture that this result may be due to the absence of returns to tenure (as opposed to labor market experience) in their model. Our findings indeed confirm that severance pay is a valuable, complementary form of insurance/liquidity provision when earnings losses reflect the loss of accumulated job tenure.

On the positive side, the paper is also related to a number of recent contributions that propose alternative mechanisms to generate realistic displacement costs. In line with the job-ladder models of Jarosch (2015) and Krolikowski (2015), it generates earnings losses as a result of both lower average match quality upon reemployment *and* a downward-sloping separation-tenure profile that slows down the rate of which workers rebuild match

capital.⁷ In Huckfeldt (2016) there is effectively a job ladder across occupations, with better occupations having both higher productivity and higher rates of skill accumulations. Persistent earnings losses are the result of job loss being associated with a fall off the occupational ladder. Our environment captures these forces in reduced form, while maintaining sufficient tractability to study the welfare implications of earnings losses.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model, Section 3 discusses the calibration and Section 4 presents the main results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the sensitivity of the results to our assumptions, while Section 6 concludes.

2. The model

2.1. Environment

Demographics, preferences and endowments: The economy is populated by a continuum of agents (workers) of measure one in every period. Agents have stochastic lifetimes, transiting through working ages $i \in \mathcal{I} = \{1, 2, \dots, I\}$, retirement⁸ and, eventually, dying. We denote by π_i the, constant, age-transition probability and by ρ_i the retirement probability for an agent of age i . Retired agents die with constant probability π_d and are replaced by an offspring who starts life as an unemployed.

Agents do not value their offspring's welfare and have time-separable preferences with time discount factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$. Their intra-period utility function is defined over consumption c and search effort ψ as

$$U(c, \psi) = u(c) - v\psi,$$

with $v > 0$ and $u(\cdot)$ strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfying the Inada conditions. The search effort choice is binary (participation) and defined over the set $\Psi \equiv \{0, 1\}$.⁹

Let $b \in \mathcal{B} \equiv \{0, 1\}$ denote an unemployed worker's benefit entitlement status. Agents of working age can be employed, unemployed and eligible to collect unemployment

⁷The coexistence of these two forces was first documented by Stevens (1997).

⁸We consider a retirement period because of its role in generating a realistic saving behavior.

⁹Note that for the same consumption level, employed workers enjoy (weakly) higher utility than unemployed workers and quitting a productive job is never optimal. This feature, together with the binary effort choice, simplifies the analysis substantially. A previous version of this paper, allowing for continuous job search effort, yielded very similar results, but also numerical instability.

benefits— $b = 1$ —or unemployed and ineligible to collect unemployment benefits— $b = 0$. Employed workers supply labor inelastically. Newly born agents are endowed with a_0 units of the consumption good.

We index job tenure in the last job held by t ,¹⁰ with $t \in \mathcal{T} = \{1, \dots, T\}$. Tenure on the current job increases with constant probability $\pi_t > 0$ between successive tenure levels until $t = T$.

We assume that both tenure and age affect the productivity of a worker and denote by ε_s the productivity level of a worker of type $s \equiv (i, t)$ and by \mathcal{S} the set of worker types $\mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{T}$. The component of productivity related to age i can be thought of as general human capital. Conversely, the component of productivity due to on-the-job tenure t is not transferable and lost upon job loss. Age and tenure transitions are assumed to be independent events.

Technology: Each production unit (firm) uses one worker and capital to produce output according to a common, constant returns to scale technology. The output of a firm employing a worker of productivity ε_s and K_s units of capital is $Y_s = F(K_s, \varepsilon_s)$. The same production function in intensive units is $y_s = f(k_s)$, with $k_s = K_s/\varepsilon_s$. Capital depreciates at the exogenous rate δ .

Labor Market: Unemployed workers meet a firm with an unfilled vacancy with probability $\phi(\psi)$ with $\phi(1) > \phi(0) = 0$. Keeping an open vacancy is costless and there is free entry of vacancies.

At the beginning of each period a currently-active firm and its worker of type s bargain over the wage w_s according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. After the wage is agreed upon, capital is rented and production takes place. We consider the limit case in which the workers' bargaining weight converges to one.¹¹

At the end of the period, the firm can be hit with exogenous probability $\sigma_s > 0$ by

¹⁰Namely, t denotes tenure in the current job match for employed workers (including new hires) and tenure in the last job for unemployed workers.

¹¹The assumption implies that wages are determined only by productivity and severance payments. If firms had positive bargaining power wages would depend on the workers' marginal utility of consumption and wealth. This would substantially complicate the problem as one could not solve recursively for equilibrium wages independently of the equilibrium wealth distribution. Krusell et al. (2010) show that, when firms' bargaining power is positive, wealth affects only the wages of workers very close to the borrowing limit. Furthermore, the effect is small and hardly relevant for wage dispersion.

an idiosyncratic productivity shock that renders the match unproductive.¹² If hit by the shock, the firm lays its worker off, paying a severance payment—a one-off transfer— θ_s if the worker is entitled to it. The severance payment is a non-negative function $\theta_s = \gamma_t w_s$ of the last wage. Such specification allows the severance payment to depend both on productivity ε_s and on tenure length t .¹³

Other market arrangements: The final good market and the rental market for physical capital are competitive.

There are no state-contingent markets to insure against unemployment and income risk, but there is a competitive banking sector that: 1) takes deposits from and lends to consumers at the risk-free rate r ; 2) holds firms and physical capital and rents the latter to firms.

Consumers' borrowing is subject to a limit, denoted by $d \geq 0$. There are perfect annuity markets where retired workers share their mortality risk.

Government: Unemployed workers are entitled to unemployment benefits upon job loss, but lose benefit entitlement with probability π_b . The unemployment benefit for a worker of type s whose benefits have not expired is given by $\varpi_s^1 = RRw_s$,¹⁴ where RR is the benefit replacement rate. Unemployed workers of type s whose benefits have expired still receive a flow $\varpi_s^0 = g$ of the consumption good, which can be thought of as a safety net policy (e.g., food stamps).

Finally, retired workers receive a pension income y_p .

The government balances the budget in every period by levying a proportional labor income tax τ on employed consumers to finance the unemployment insurance scheme,

¹²There is a large body of evidence, discussed for example in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999) and Neumark et al. (1999), showing that workers' retention probabilities are significantly affected by a set of observables, such as age and tenure. Age and tenure specific separation rates help in fitting the tenure and unemployment distributions, and the unemployment rates over the life cycle.

¹³The ratio between severance pay and wages is indeed increasing in tenure for most OECD countries.

¹⁴In reality, unemployment benefits are usually proportional to the last wage. Since, s may change if the worker ages over the course of an unemployment spell, our formulation makes benefits a function of the wage a worker would have received in the *current* period had her tenure been the same as at the time of job loss. In the numerical model, making the severance payment proportional to the last wage would have further increased the dimension of the state space. Given the much larger probability of unemployment-employment rather than age transitions, the number of age transitions among unemployed workers is negligible.

the safety net program and the pay-as-you-go pension system.

2.2. Consumers

2.2.1. Employed consumers

Let $V_e(s, a)$ denote the value function of an employed consumer of type $s = (i, t)$ with current assets a while $V_u(s, b, a)$ denotes the value function of an unemployed consumer of type s , with benefit entitlement status b and current assets a . Finally, $V_r(a)$ denotes the value function of a retired consumer.

To streamline notation, we denote by $\pi(\zeta'|\zeta)$ the generic transition probability from the current value ζ of a state variable to some future value ζ' . The recursive representation of the problem of an employed consumer can then be written as

$$\begin{aligned} V_e(s, a) = & \max_{c, a'} u(c) + \beta \rho_i V_r(a') + \beta(1 - \rho_i) \times \\ & \left[(1 - \sigma_s) \sum_{s'} \pi(s'|s) V_e(s', a') + \sigma_s \sum_{i'} \pi(i'|i) V_u(s', 1, a' + \theta_s) \right] \\ \text{s.t. } & c + a' = (1 + r) a + (1 - \tau) w_s \quad a' \geq -d. \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Employed agents receive a post-tax wage $(1 - \tau)w_s$, choose current consumption and face several uncertain events in the future. They retire with probability ρ_i . With probability $(1 - \rho_i)(1 - \sigma_s)$ they remain in employment and may undergo a stochastic age or tenure transition. With probability $(1 - \rho_i)\sigma_s$ they lose their job and enter unemployment being entitled to benefits, with a severance payment θ_s , and $s' = (i', t)$; namely job losers may undergo an age but not a tenure transition. Hence the summation over i' in the last term in the square bracket.

2.2.2. Unemployed consumers

The problem of unemployed agents of type s and benefit-entitlement status b can be represented as follows

$$\begin{aligned} V_u(s, b, a) = & \max_{c, a', \psi} u(c) - v\psi + \beta \rho_i V_r(a') + \beta(1 - \rho_i) \times \\ & \left[\phi(\psi) \sum_{i'} \pi(i'|i) V_e(i', 0, a') + (1 - \phi(\psi)) \sum_{i', b'} \pi(i', b'|i, b) V_u(s', b', a') \right] \\ \text{s.t. } & c + a' = (1 + r) a + \varpi_s^b, \quad a' \geq -d. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Unemployed agents choose optimally both their consumption/savings plans and whether to participate in the labor market in the current period. They may retire with probability ρ_i . Alternatively, if they participate— $\psi = 1$ —they find a job with probability $\phi(1)$ and become employed at the lowest tenure level. Workers who are entitled to benefits— $\varpi_s^1 = RRw_s$ —may also experience a change in the level of benefits either because of an age transition or because of benefit expiration.

2.2.3. Retired consumers

The problem of retired agents can be represented as follows

$$\begin{aligned} V_r(a) &= \max_{c, a'} u(c) + \beta(1 - \pi_d)V_r(a') \\ \text{s.t. } c + a' &= \left(\frac{1+r}{1-\pi_d} \right) a + y_p, \quad a' \geq -d. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Agents receive pension income y_p , and the rate of return on their saving reflects the actuarially fair insurance against their survival risk.

2.2.4. Firms

Firms maximize the present discounted value of profits. In every period, after wages have been set, the value of a firm matched to a worker of type s satisfies

$$J(s) = \max_{k_s} f(k_s)\varepsilon_s - w_s - (r + \delta)k_s\varepsilon_s + \frac{1 - \rho_i}{1 + r} \left[(1 - \sigma_s) \sum_{s'} \pi(s'|s)J(s') - \sigma_s\theta_s \right]. \quad (4)$$

Similarly to equation (1), the firm's Bellman equation takes into account all possible transitions the currently employed worker can go through. Free entry implies that the firm's payoff equals zero if the match is destroyed due to the worker's retirement, as retiring workers are not entitled to severance pay.¹⁵

Constant returns to scale imply all firms use the same stock of capital k per efficiency unit of labor satisfying the first order condition

$$f'(k) = r + \delta. \quad (5)$$

2.2.5. Wage determination

In each period, the wage solves the Nash bargaining problem

$$\max_{w_s} (V_e(s, a) - V_u(s, b, a))^\zeta J(s)^{1-\zeta}.$$

¹⁵This formulation of the Bellman equation already substitutes the equilibrium, free-entry condition.

This is the same bargaining solution used in Krusell et al. (2010). Contrary to Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), but in line with the standard matching literature, it implies that wages are privately efficient, subject to the constraint that bargaining is over spot wages rather than contracts.¹⁶ It also assumes that severance pay does not affect the parties' bargaining threat points.¹⁷

It is straightforward to verify that in the limit when the worker's bargaining weight ζ converges to one, the equilibrium value of a productive match $J(s)$ goes to zero. Hence, it follows from equation (4) that w_s satisfies

$$w_s = f(k)\varepsilon_s - (r + \delta)k\varepsilon_s - \frac{1 - \rho_i}{1 + r}\sigma_s\theta_s. \quad (6)$$

The wage falls by the actuarially-fair value of the expected layoff transfer (full-bonding).¹⁸

3. Parameterization

We calibrate the model to data for male workers in the US economy, where there are no mandated severance packages. In order to properly capture the labor market dynamics, we work with a short time period; namely, one model period corresponds to two months.

In what follows, we first comment upon the choice of parameters set outside the model and then discuss those whose calibration requires solving for the equilibrium. All parameters are reported in Table 1. We assume that newborns enter the economy without any asset endowment, or $a_0 = 0$. The CRRA coefficient η is set to 2.0, a common value in the literature (see, e.g. Attanasio, 1999)

[Table 1 about here]

¹⁶With risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms, bargaining over spot wages is only constrained-efficient as it is Pareto dominated by bargaining over contracts. The assumption keeps separate the insurance role of, exogenously-given, severance pay from that of more general, optimal contracting.

¹⁷This is the natural assumption for bargaining with new hires ('outsiders'), as severance pay is not due if a contact between a firm and a worker is not turned into a match. Section 5 discusses why, in our environment, it is the more reasonable assumption even for ongoing matches.

¹⁸It follows that, at constant interest rate, severance pay does not affect the shadow cost of labor. Section 5 discusses how wage flexibility is sufficient for severance pay to have negligible effects on the allocation of labor even with endogenous contact and destruction rates.

The age grid has 10 points each corresponding to a five-year age bracket. Workers enter the economy at age 18-22 and reach at most age 63-67. It follows that $\pi_i = 0.033$ for all $i < I$. We specify the retirement probability as $\rho_i = 0$ for all ages between 18 and 47, and $\rho_i = 0.02$ for the remaining ages. This parameter is calibrated for the model to match the median age observed in the US labor force (39 years). The pensioners' death probability is set to $\pi_d = 0.0238$, which matches the US Census share of (male) retirees of 15.6%.

The tenure grid goes has 11, equally-spaced, points each corresponding to a two-year interval between 0-2 and 20+. On average workers in continuous employment experience an increase in tenure every 2 years. It follows that $\pi_t = 0.083$.

The unemployment benefit replacement rate is set to $RR = 0.5$, and the probability of losing benefit eligibility is set to $\pi_b = 0.333$ which implies an average benefit duration of six months. These values capture unemployment benefit rules in place in several US states. Transfers to unemployed workers who have lost eligibility are set to a $\varpi_s^0 = 0.077$, which corresponds to a monthly payment of approximately \$140. This value matches the average transfer observed for households receiving food stamps in the US in 1996, according to USDA (2014).

Pension income y_p is set so as to imply a pension replacement rate equal to 0.394 of average earnings, which is the value found in OECD (2011). The borrowing constraint \underline{d} is the natural one—the value of food stamps capitalized at the market interest rate—and equals around 12 times average post-tax wages. Finally, $\gamma_t = 0$ in the benchmark economy consistent with the absence of mandated severance pay in the US.

The capital depreciation rate is set to $\delta = 0.017$ which implies an investment/output share of about 20%, on an annual basis. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, with capital share equal to $\alpha = 0.3$.

The labor market statistics rely on CPS data for the period 1996-2006 and, in order to be consistent with the model, we restrict our analysis to workers between the ages of 18 and 67.

The job finding probability for searching workers is set to $\phi(1) = 0.524$ to match an average unemployment duration of about 16 weeks in our target population.

The profile of efficiency units ε_s for $s = (i, t)$ is estimated using CPS data.¹⁹ We

¹⁹In the US also the NLSY and the PSID contain information on age and job tenure. The advantage of

start by estimating a simple linear regression by OLS, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of earnings and the set of explanatory variables are a second-degree polynomial in age and tenure and year dummies. Notice that, in order to preserve consistency between the theoretical model and the data, we transformed the dependent variable and the explanatory ones to the same time period of the model, that is we estimated log-wages on a bimonthly basis. Table 2 reports the results of both an OLS and a Tobit regression. The Tobit specification, taking into consideration the right censoring in the data due to top-coding, gives virtually the same estimates. With the estimated parameters, we retrieve the $\{\varepsilon_s\}$ as the fitted values of the econometric model at all the pairs of the respective mid-points of our tenure and age bins.

Although our estimation procedure does not deal with the likely pervasive selection and endogeneity problems, it implies an estimated average return to tenure of approximately 2% on a yearly basis. This value is in the middle of existing estimates of returns to tenure. At the low end of the spectrum, Altonji and Williams (2005) reconcile the large discrepancies in the seminal studies of returns to tenure by Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991) and report a return of 1.1-1.4% per year as their preferred estimate for the PSID. Yamaguchi (2010) estimates a similar value for the rate of job-specific wage growth associated with employers matching of outside offers in the NLSY79. At the upper end of the spectrum, Buchinsky et al. (2010) find a yearly average return of approximately 5% for the first ten years in the PSID. Dustmann and Meghir (2005) estimate a yearly return of 4% for unskilled and 2.4% for skilled workers in the first five year of tenure and respectively 1.1 and 1.7% thereafter, using German administrative data.

[Table 2 about here]

The remaining parameters are chosen to minimize the sum of squared deviations of a set of simulated moments from their data counterparts. The job destruction probability is assumed to depend on age and tenure according to $\sigma_s = \bar{\sigma} \cdot \exp \{ -\bar{\sigma}_i \cdot (i - 1) - (\bar{\sigma}_t^0 + \bar{\sigma}_t^1 \mathbb{I}_{t>2}) \cdot (t - 1) \}$, where $\bar{\sigma}$, $\bar{\sigma}_i$, $\bar{\sigma}_t^0$ and $\bar{\sigma}_t^1$ are parameters to be calibrated. $\bar{\sigma}$ represents the common starting value for the job separation probability (for the young and untenured workers), while the

the CPS is that it is a random sample of the whole US labor force, unlike the NLSY that contains information on only one cohort and the PSID that provides a tenure measure contaminated by measurement error, as discussed for example in Altonji and Williams (2005).

other three parameters allow for increasing job retention probabilities for workers that are older and/or with higher seniority.

The four parameters ($\bar{\sigma}, \bar{\sigma}_i, \bar{\sigma}_t^0$ and $\bar{\sigma}_t^1$), together with the disutility of search effort v and the rate of time preference β are calibrated with an over-identified moment-matching procedure. It is implemented with more moments (33) than unknown parameters (6). The moments we match are an annual interest rate of 4% and 32 moments from the CPS; namely, the tenure distribution of the employed, the age distribution of the labor force, the profile of unemployment rates over the life cycle, and the ratio of the number non-participants— $v = 0$ —to that of searching unemployed workers— $v = 1$. The target for this last moment is 0.06. This is the share, relative to the unemployed population, of the number of workers that report having looked for work in the previous year—but not in the previous four weeks—*and* that do not report being discouraged.²⁰ This target effectively identifies the search cost. Since, for tractability, the model lacks an intensive search margin, targeting a category of workers that are marginally attached—as opposed unambiguously out the labor force—has the aim of ensuring a meaningful, extensive-margin response of the number of active searchers to changes in policy.

The calibrated parameter values are $\bar{\sigma} = 0.042$, $\bar{\sigma}_i = 0.035$, $\bar{\sigma}_t^0 = 0.094$, $\bar{\sigma}_t^1 = 0.009$, $\beta = 0.998$ and $v = 3.735$.²¹ The job separation profiles imply a monthly mean separation rate of 0.015. This is the same value used in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and is line with Fallick and Fleischman’s (2004) estimates from the CPS over our sample 1996-2006 period.

4. Numerical analysis

4.1. Further properties of the calibrated economy

Although the parameterization is quite parsimonious, the calibration achieves a very good fit. The four panels in Figure 1 plot the data (the solid black line) against the model (the dashed blue line) statistics for the target marginal distributions of workers by age, employment status and tenure.

[Figure 1 about here]

²⁰The formal CPS category is marginally attached workers who are not discouraged.

²¹The complete list of targets and moments generated by the model, are reported in Table A.8 in the Appendix.

As for the age distribution of the labor force, plotted in panel 1, the model captures well the decline in the shares of older workers, while it misses the non-monotonic behavior for younger ones. The errors, though, are relatively small.

Panel 2 plots the distribution of current tenure for employed workers. The model captures well the main patterns, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, three important features of the data are accounted for: the high share of jobs with less than two years of tenure, the smoothly decreasing share of workers employed at increasing levels of tenure, and the high share of jobs lasting for at least 20 years.²² The model somewhat misses, though, the sharp decline moving from less than two to less than four years of tenure.

Panel 3 plots the age distribution of the unemployed distributions, while panel 4 the unemployment rates over the life-cycle. The model overestimates the share of young unemployed, while it matches almost perfectly the unemployment rates until age 50. As for Panel 4, also in this case age and tenure dependent separation rates are instrumental to achieve a good fit.

Finally, a crucial—and untargeted—ingredient of our quantitative analysis is the size of earnings losses associated with displacement. Following the seminal contribution of Jacobson et al. (1993), a growing body of research has exploited program evaluation techniques applied to administrative data to identify the causal effect of job displacement on earnings. The study with the most comprehensive coverage is Davis and von Wachter (2011) (DV in what follows), using annual Social Security records for all U.S. states from 1974 to 2008. To compare our simulated data to their empirical estimates, we aggregate our simulated bi-monthly wage series into annual earnings and estimate the following equation which is equivalent to equation (1) in DV.

$$e_{it}^y = \iota_i^y + f(\text{age}_{it}) + \sum_{j=-6}^{20} \xi_j^y D_{it}^j + u_{it}^y, \quad (7)$$

where y is a separation year, the outcome variable e_{it}^y denotes yearly earnings for individual i in year t , ι_i^y is an individual fixed effect, $f(\text{age}_{it})$ is a quartic polynomial in age and D_{it}^j are dummies equal to one in the j -th year before or after displacement for the treatment group of workers displaced in year y and zero otherwise. We follow DV

²²With a constant separation rate over age and tenure the model would miss the first and third characteristics.

and restrict attention to workers aged less than 50 with at least 3 years of tenure in the current job.²³ The sequence of coefficients ξ_j^y then captures the (absolute) change in earnings j years after the displacement year relative to the control group of non-separators. Similarly, estimating equation (7) using average wages (i.e., average earnings conditional on employment) rather than earnings as the dependent variable returns a measure of post-displacement wage losses. Wages losses capture the contribution to earnings losses of the loss of human capital. The difference between earnings and wage losses is accounted for by the post-displacement fall in employment, the result of post-displacement unemployment incidence and average unemployment duration. Unemployment incidence is initially higher after a displacement event, as separation rates are decreasing in tenure both in the model and in the data.

The solid line in Panel 1 in Figure 2 plots the earnings losses in the model against the losses estimated by DV for workers displaced as part of a mass layoff, respectively, in expansions and recessions. Qualitatively, the model captures rather well the time profile of losses,²⁴ but implies a much faster recovery in the second post-displacement year, and lower afterwards. Therefore, our estimated tenure profile of productivity implies substantially conservative earnings losses compared to the estimates in DV. The dashed line plots wages losses in the model. Wages fall very little in the separation year, because most employment in that year is pre-displacement. Instead, wages in the first post-displacement year are associated with re-employment and are roughly 15% lower than counterfactual wages. The 10 percentage points difference between the earnings loss and the wage loss reflects both the incidence of subsequent separations from post-displacement jobs and the average duration of unemployment. Two years after displacement, though, earnings losses are due to the persistent reduction in wages rather than in hours. These findings are consistent with Stevens (1997), Altonji et al. (2013) and Huckfeldt (2016) who also find a similar fast convergence of earnings and wages for the PSID. Intuitively, though unemployment incidence increases with the loss of pre-displacement tenure, given an average unemployment duration of one quarter in the US, the contribution of higher

²³DV consider workers displaced as part of a mass layoff (defined as a lasting decline in firm-level employment of at least 30%) to control for selection.

²⁴The difference between the model and the data in year zero, the displacement year, is due to the fact that DV average over three adjacent years (see their fn. 12) to smooth the timing issues highlighted in Stevens (1997).

post-displacement separation rates declines very quickly.²⁵

Panel 2 plots compares earnings losses in the model with estimates from another influential, recent study by Couch and Placzek (2010) (CP), using quarterly administrative data for Connecticut from 1993 to 2004. CP estimate quarterly, average earnings losses for workers with at least 6 years of pre-displacement tenure, aged between 20 and 50. We report losses for this group of workers in the model²⁶ (solid line) against the estimates in CP for, respectively, workers displaced as part of a mass layoff (dashed-dotted line) and all separators claiming unemployment insurance (dotted line).

[Figure 2 about here]

Comparing earnings losses for the various groups in CP reveals that losses are substantially larger for separators who claim UI benefits. Intuitively, separations resulting in UI claims do not include voluntary quits to unemployment and job-to-job transitions—which, at least the latter, are likely to entail substantially lower average losses.²⁷ This also explains why the average losses estimated by CP are considerably smaller than those reported in DV even for workers displaced in expansions and with at least 3 rather than 6 years of tenure. The relevant period considered by CP features an unusually low unemployment rate (3.8% on average) and a proportion of UI claimants among job losers of 36%.²⁸ As a reference, DV document that only 23% of all years from 1980 to 2005 had an unemployment rate below 5% and the average incidence of UI claims among unemployment entrants is about 0.5 according to Figure 14 in Song and von Wachter (2014). DV’s estimates (Table 1, p. 22 in their paper) imply a 1.6 ratio between the present value (over 20 years and as a fraction of pre-displacement earnings) of the average loss for workers displaced in years with an unemployment rate below 5% and the unconditional average

²⁵This findings contrasts with Jarosch (2015), who finds a much slower convergence of wages and earnings using German data. The difference can easily be reconciled once one notes that the the unemployment exit rate in the German economy is nearly one third of the US one (0.09 per month instead of 0.26).

²⁶Quarterly losses in the model are obtained from linear interpolation of half-yearly losses.

²⁷Given that all workers in the sample have more than one year of pre-displacement tenure, the most likely reason for benefit ineligibility is that the separation does not involve an involuntary entry into unemployment.

²⁸CP argue that differences in economic conditions and, in particular in the incidence of UI recipients, are “...the primary factor that underlies differences...” between their estimates and the much larger earnings losses estimated by Jacobson et al. (1993) for Pennsylvania in 74-86.

loss. For this reason, we plot the losses in the model both unadjusted (solid black line) and scaled down by 1.6 (solid black line with triangles). Again, the model captures reasonably well the profile of the empirical estimates. The (unadjusted) losses in the model are substantially below the estimates for UI claimants, but than those estimated by CP both for mass layoffs. On the other hand, the rescaled losses are below even the lowest set of estimates.²⁹

To sum up, taking into account the above discussion about the representativeness of the CP sample period, together with the fact that the population of displaced workers in the data, but not in the model, includes job-to-job quitters, it seems safe to conclude that if anything the model generates rather conservative earnings losses relative to the data. Therefore the gains from insurance in the model are likely to provide a lower bound for the actual gains.

4.2. Quantitative effects of severance pay

4.2.1. Benchmark economy

This section discusses the allocational and welfare effects of introducing severance pay in the benchmark economy.

In assessing the welfare consequences of any policy change one should ideally take into account the transition path to the new steady state. This is a very costly computational task in our environment, as it requires tracing the equilibrium sequence of the rate of return on capital, average wage and labor income tax along the transition. For this reason, we restrict attention to a comparison of steady states. We report welfare effects according to two different welfare criteria in order to facilitate relating our results to the existing literature. The first is the one used in Hansen and İmrohorođlu (1992) and Rogerson and Schindler (2002). It measures welfare changes as the fraction—constant across time and contingencies—by which consumption in the benchmark economy would have to be scaled to equalize the lifetime utility of a newborn in the benchmark economy to the utility of a newborn in the counterfactual economy.³⁰ The second welfare criterion averages the heterogeneous individual gains in lifetime utility associated with switching

²⁹The dashed line plots wage losses in the model. Even for workers with more than 6 years of tenure, earnings and wage losses converge within two years from the first displacement event.

³⁰Since newborns have zero assets, our choice of a natural borrowing limit was dictated by the desire to minimize the impact of wealth at birth on this welfare measure.

from the benchmark to the counterfactual economy (keeping constant each individual’s state) where the weights are given by the steady-state, cross-sectional distribution in the benchmark economy. The welfare gain is the fraction—cost-ant across time, contingencies *and* individuals—by which consumption in the benchmark economy would have to be scaled for the average gain to be zero.³¹ This average welfare criterion is used, for example, in Chatterjee et al. (2007) and is comparable to the one employed by Alvarez and Veracierto (2001).³²

In most countries, levels of both privately-negotiated and mandated severance pay increase linearly with job tenure, subject possibly to a maximum limit (see, e.g., OECD, 2013; Parsons, 2013). Table A.9 in the Appendix reports levels of statutory severance pay for three different levels of tenure for a number of OECD countries. Since our aim is to quantify the effect of realistic measures, we study the effect of severance payments that are linear in tenure. In particular, we consider severance payments equal to 0.3, 0.6, 0.9 and 1.2 months of the last wage per each year of tenure.³³ These values span most of the spectrum from the least (UK) to the most restrictive (Spain) country.

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 reports the allocational and welfare effects of introducing severance payments—columns 3 to 6—compared to the *employment-at-will* benchmark economy in column 2.³⁴

Severance pay marginally increases the number of non-participants, as job losers have higher assets compared to the baseline economy. The unemployment rate also marginally increases as the reduction in the number of searchers is concentrated among relatively older, wealthier workers. Since the probability of losing one’s job is decreasing in age,

³¹This average welfare criterion can be seen as either trading off (according to a utilitarian social welfare function) distributional effects across ex post heterogeneous individuals or as evaluating expected lifetime utility under the veil of ignorance of not knowing when in the cross-sectional distribution one would be placed.

³²To the best of our understanding Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) weigh allocations in the counterfactual economy by the steady-state distribution in the counterfactual, rather than the benchmark, economy. We have verified that there is little difference in using their rather than our ex post measure.

³³We evaluate the severance payment for a job losers at the mid-point of her tenure bin.

³⁴The quantities with no meaningful unit of measurement, namely output, consumption and welfare, are reported as a percentage of their values in the benchmark economy.

the fall in the average age of (searching) unemployed, and therefore also of employed, workers marginally increases the average job destruction and unemployment rates.

Severance pay also reduces precautionary saving and therefore the supply of assets. It follows that the equilibrium capital stock³⁵ and output fall. Consumption follows a pattern similar to output, but its variability is substantially reduced. The fall in the asset supply, and therefore, in output and consumption is not monotonic though. As severance pay increases from 0.9 to 1.2 months per year of tenure, the asset supply increases as the average worker is overinsured and increases saving. The fall in consumption variability, though, is substantial and monotonic, more than compensating for the fall in aggregate consumption relative to *laissez-faire*. As a result welfare increases and the increase is significant, ranging from 0.3 to 1 percentage point with minor differences between the two welfare metrics.

In order to understand what drives the welfare gains it is useful to decompose them into a pure insurance—at constant interest rate—effect and the effect associated with the general equilibrium response of the interest rate and the capital stock. The general equilibrium increase in the interest rate has two implications. On the one hand, it increases the cost of capital to firms and reduces output and wages, reducing workers' welfare. On the other hand, it increases the return to saving which is welfare-increasing for savers but welfare-reducing for, the mostly young, borrowers. Table 4 reports the results for the same policy change, but at constant interest rate. Comparing the welfare changes with their counterparts in Table 3 reveals that the general equilibrium increase in the interest rate offsets roughly one third of the pure insurance, partial equilibrium, welfare gains.

[Table 4 about here]

In a related paper, Rogerson and Schindler (2002) compute the welfare costs of displacement risk; namely the risk of persistent wage loss. They consider an economy without unemployment and model displacement as a one-off, permanent fall in workers' productivity. On the basis of the estimates in Jacobson et al. (1993), they parameterize displacement risk as a 0.25 probability of a permanent 30 per cent fall in the intercept of

³⁵The difference between the capital stock and the aggregate supply of assets in tables 3-7 is the aggregate value of firms which is negative in the economy with severance pay. A negative aggregate value of firms is consistent with a competitive banking sector, since wages ensure that the internal rate of return on *new* firms coincides with the market interest rate.

the labor income process at age 45. They compute the benefits of completely eliminating such risk and argue that this can be achieved by a one-off payment (severance pay) to displaced workers equal to about four years of pre-displacement wages. For our chosen value of the CRRA coefficient— $\eta = 2$ —their results imply a welfare gain, measured from the perspective of a newborn, of about 0.5 percentage points at constant interest rate and 0.3 in general equilibrium.³⁶

In our framework a severance payment of 1.2 months per year of tenure—i.e., on average 7.2 months of wages, against their four years—implies substantially larger gains. The main difference is due to the fact that, although our model features a lower displacement risk at age 46 and earnings losses that are persistent but not permanent, it features ongoing risk in every period. This cumulates to a larger overall risk and implies welfare gains that are three times as large as those computed by Rogerson and Schindler (2002).

4.2.2. *No tenure effects*

The purpose of our model has been to isolate the welfare gains from the pure insurance role of severance pay. In this sense, the gains we find are additional to the gains associated with the firing tax component of severance pay in the presence of downward rigid wages identified in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001).³⁷ Yet, the welfare gains we compute may, at first, appear surprising in the light of Alvarez and Veracierto’s (2001) findings that the welfare gains from the pure-transfer (what they call the “unemployment-insurance”) component of severance pay are negligible in general, and *negative* for values of severance pay exceeding three months of wages (see their Section 5.2, in particular tables 4 and 5).

Our model is indeed close to Alvarez and Veracierto (2001). The main difference is that in their model there are no returns to job tenure; the only risk associated with job loss is that of transiting temporarily through unemployment. To understand the

³⁶These numbers are obtained by linearly interpolating the welfare gains when $\eta = 1.5$ and $\eta = 3$ in Rogerson and Schindler (2002). Their partial equilibrium welfare gains are indeed linear in the CRRA coefficient, but the general equilibrium gains are less than linear. In this sense, 0.3 is an overestimate of the general equilibrium gains in their model for $\eta = 2$.

³⁷As pointed out by Ljungqvist (2002), the sizable welfare gains from the introduction of severance pay in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) do not stem from market incompleteness, but from the assumption that job loss is involuntary due to downward wage rigidity. As shown by Fella (2000), in such an environment, severance pay increase welfare and efficiency by making firms internalize workers’ cost of involuntary job loss.

quantitative importance of the loss of tenure we simulate our model by shutting down the tenure-related component of productivity. The results are reported in Table 5 and are very much in line with those in Table 5 in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), featuring endogenous search effort. Small values of severance pay marginally reduce consumption variability and saving. For larger values, consumption variability and saving eventually increase as unemployed workers are overinsured and unemployed agents save to finance consumption during employment. According to the average welfare metric, which is the counterpart of that used in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), the welfare gains are zero or negative and very similar in magnitude to those they find.

[Table 5 about here]

In fact the comparison of the average post welfare gains in our Table 3 and Table 5 reveals that the *differential* gains from providing insurance against persistent earnings losses are even larger than the net gains in Table 3. Intuitively, in the absence of persistent earnings losses, the job loss risk faced by the *average* individual is easily insured given the duration of the average unemployment spell. On the other hand, the loss of tenure associated with displacement is persistent for two reasons. First, the higher the tenure in the previous job the longer it takes to rebuild it in the new match, even conditionally on the match surviving. Second, the probability of job loss is decreasing in tenure. Therefore, the average welfare gains from insuring against displacement risk are sizable.

From the perspective of a newborn, though, the gains from severance pay are half as large relative to the case in which wages increase with tenure, but still positive. For a newborn the insurance provided by severance pay is more valuable than for the average individual, as young individuals hold less assets and have a higher desire to bring consumption forward, given that wages increase with age.

The important message from these results is that, to the extent that it generates counterfactually small and transitory earnings losses from displacement, the standard search literature substantially underestimates the potential benefits of insurance against job loss.

[Table 6 about here]

A related question is how much of the welfare losses from displacement stem from the fact that unemployment incidence is higher post-displacement. We address this question by studying an environment in which productivity increases with tenure, as in the

benchmark, but separation rates are now tenure-independent. We maintain the same separation rate as in the benchmark economy. Table 6 reports the effects of introducing severance pay in such an environment. Comparing it to Table 3 reveals that the welfare and allocational effects are effectively identical to those in our calibrated economy. Keeping the average separation rate constant, the effect of a higher separation rate post-displacement is negligible. The intuition is that the implications of higher separation rates post-displacement are transitory, as we have shown in Section 4, and workers can easily self-insure against. This is not the case with the much more persistent wage losses associated with the loss of tenure.

4.2.3. Tenure-independent severance pay

The previous section has made clear how the gains from severance pay revolve around the persistence of displacement losses. Both these losses and their persistence are higher for workers with higher tenure. This seems to call for insurance against job loss to be increasing in tenure. To verify this hypothesis we simulate the model under the assumption that severance pay is independent of tenure. For comparability we impose that the average severance pay is the same as in the counterpart economy with linear severance pay considered in Section 4.2.1. Given an average completed job tenure of 6 years, this implies a severance pay of 1.8, 3.6, 5.4 and 7.2 months, respectively.

Table 7 reports the results. Comparing them to those in Table 3 suggests that, from the perspective of a newborn, these effects are negligible as they accrue into the future. Yet, measured from the perspective of the average individual, welfare gains are between 15 and 20 per cent larger in the economy in which severance pay increases linearly with tenure.

[Table 7 about here]

This result may provide a rationale for the stylized fact that both privately negotiated and mandated severance pay is indeed increasing in tenure in most countries (Parsons 2013).

5. Discussion

This paper focuses on measuring the insurance benefits of severance pay when job displacement implies persistent earnings losses and markets are incomplete. To this

effect we have concentrated our efforts on carefully modeling the various aspects of job loss risk, namely its evolution over tenure and age, and purposefully abstracted from other potential roles of severance pay.

In line with most of the matching literature, the assumption that wage setting is privately (constrained-) efficient, and therefore wages are flexible at the match level, distinguishes this paper from Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) who emphasize the sizable welfare gains associated with the (Pigouvian) tax role of severance pay when wages are downward-rigid in the face of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.³⁸ Assuming wage flexibility abstracts from this mechanism and our welfare gains are additional to those they find.

As first pointed out by Lazear (1990), severance pay is in fact neutral if wages are flexible and asset markets complete. Complete asset markets are not crucial for this result as long as bargaining is efficient, as shown by Fella and Tyson (2013).³⁹

The assumption that workers have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations still implies efficient bargaining, but substantially simplifies the model computation. If firms had positive bargaining power, the distribution of wages would depend on the workers' asset distribution, as shown in Krusell et al.'s (2010) version of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) with CRRA preferences, period-by-period wage bargaining with symmetric weights and endogenous interest rate. Reassuringly, Krusell et al. (2010) find that the dependence of wages on workers' asset position does not have quantitatively significant effects. We have actually verified that introducing a severance payment up to 6 months of wages in the steady-state version of Krusell et al. (2010) has a negligible impact on the equilibrium allocation of labor and the interest rate.⁴⁰

In a nutshell, privately (constrained-)efficient wage setting implies that severance

³⁸In fact, if wages are downward rigid, the tax role of severance pay is welfare improving even under complete markets (see Fella, 2000).

³⁹While Fella and Tyson (2013) assume that workers have CARA preferences and borrowing is unconstrained, the same result holds in an earlier version with CRRA preferences and hand-to-mouth workers.

⁴⁰In particular, a severance payment equal to six months of wages increases the aggregate capital stock by 0.14%, and the unemployment rate by 0.02 percentage points. Results are available upon request. We were not able to obtain convergence for higher value of the severance pay. Moreover, introducing wage and tenure effects in Krusell et al.'s (2010) model would have entailed a functional fixed point problem with as many wage schedules as worker types (110 in our case), which is computationally intractable.

pay are near-neutral, independently from whether asset markets are complete and the particular value of workers' bargaining power. Therefore, our assumption that severance pay does not affect the firm-level dynamics—namely the job destruction rate and job finding rate for searching workers— not only buys us substantial tractability, but is in fact consistent with the implications of wage flexibility.

While the assumption that severance pay does not affect threat points when bargaining with new hires ('outsiders') is a natural and common one, the literature entertains two different assumptions on how severance pay affects wages for continuing workers who have matured entitlement to it ('insiders'). The first one (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) implicitly maintains that insider workers are able to unilaterally secure severance pay in case of disagreement. As a result, a severance payment θ reduces the firm's and increases the worker's bargaining threat point. Effectively, insider workers receive the severance pay with probability one: either as a wage premium equal to the annuity value $r\theta$ or as a transfer θ upon separation.⁴¹ The alternative assumption (see Ljungqvist, 2002) is that severance pay affects wages only indirectly but not, directly, through the bargaining threat points. This is consistent with the point made by Binmore et al. (1986) that the appropriate threat points are the parties' expected payoffs in case of perpetual disagreement and not the payoffs that the parties would obtain by *irreversibly* breaking the match to trade outside (outside options). Applications of this insight are Hall and Milgrom (2008) and the wage renegotiation framework introduced by MacLeod and Malcolmson (1993) and used in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and their subsequent work. This is also the route we follow here.

If workers are risk-neutral, Ljungqvist (2002) shows that the two assumptions are equivalent, the only difference being a backloading of payments from firms to workers in the case in which severance pay are paid in case of a breakdown in bargaining. If workers are risk-averse, though, this equivalence no longer holds. As in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), under our assumption severance pay can potentially provide insurance. In the alternative case, though, the purely deterministic backloading of payments is either fully undone—if Ricardian equivalence applies—or reduces insurance—if, as in our framework,

⁴¹If workers are risk neutral, this is true independently of their bargaining power (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). If workers are risk averse, it can be shown analytically that it is still true if workers' bargaining power is zero or one.

Ricardian equivalence fails. Among the many possible bargaining protocols, the one assuming that severance pay is due in case of a breakdown in bargaining is the only one that delivers this counter-intuitive result. This lack of generality and the related argument in Binmore et al. (1986) that, whenever there is ambiguity about the appropriate threat points one should get guidance by modeling the bargaining process strategically, induced us not to pursue this alternative route in the paper.⁴²

6. Conclusion

This paper has provided a quantitative equilibrium framework to study the insurance properties of severance payments when markets are incomplete and workers' job displacement risk includes the kind of sizable and persistent earnings documented, for example, in Couch and Placzek (2010) and the literature they survey. Our focus has been to carefully model the various aspects of job loss risk while abstracting from other potential roles of the severance pay emphasized in previous literature.

We find that the introduction of severance pay entails sizable welfare gains. These gains are due to the difficulty of self-insuring against the persistent earnings loss upon displacement stemming from the loss of job-specific human. In line with existing studies, we find that severance pay reduces average welfare if the only cost of job displacement is the transitory income loss associated with transiting through unemployment. The average welfare gain we find is higher if severance pay is an increasing function of tenure, consistently with observed privately-negotiated and mandated severance packages.

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⁴²In preliminary work, we have solved the model at constant interest rate under the alternative assumption. Perhaps counterintuitively, the welfare gains from severance pay are larger than those reported in Table 4. The backloading of transfers reduces welfare for new hires and increases it for continuing workers. Since the latter are the vast majority of agents, the policy has a large positive effect on the average welfare metric. This seems an unappealing implication of the assumption.

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	Value	Source/Target
<i>Value of assigned parameters</i>		
Newborns' asset endowment a_0	0	–
CRRA coefficient η	2.0	Attanasio (1999)
Age ($i = 1, 2, \dots, 10$) transition π_i	0.033	A jump every 5 years
Retirement prob. ρ_i	0 ($i < 50$); 0.02 ($i \geq 50$)	Median age of workers
Pensioners' death prob. π_d	0.0238	% of retirees $\approx 16\%$ (Census)
Tenure ($t = 1, 2, \dots, 11$) transition π_t	0.083	A jump every 2 years
UI benefit replacement rate RR	0.5	Avg. replacement rate
UI benefit loss prob. π_b	0.333	Avg. time limit 6 months
Food stamps g	0.077	Avg. transfer (\$140/m) (USDA 2014)
Pension y_p	$0.394 * \bar{w}$	OECD (2011)
Severance Payments γ_t	0	Employment at will
Capital share α	0.3	NIPA
Capital depreciation rate δ	0.017	$I/Y = 0.22$ (NIPA)
Job finding prob. $\phi(1)$	0.52	Un. duration $\approx 16.4w$ (CPS)
ε_s - Productivity values	See Table 2	Regression on CPS data
Borrowing limit d	–	Natural borrowing limit
<i>Value of calibrated parameters</i>		
Disutility of search effort v	3.735	0.06 - ratio of marginally-attached to unemployed workers (CPS)
Job losing prob. baseline $\bar{\sigma}$	0.042	Unemployment/tenure moments (CPS)
Job losing prob. tenure gradient $\bar{\sigma}_t^0$	0.094	”
Job losing prob. tenure gradient $\bar{\sigma}_t^1$	0.009	”
Job losing prob. age gradient $\bar{\sigma}_i$	0.035	Unemployment/age moments (CPS)
Discount factor β	0.998	4% - annual interest rate

Table 1: Parameter values in the benchmark economy

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>OLS (CPS)</i>	<i>Tobit (CPS)</i>	<i>OLS (Model)</i>
<i>Age</i>	.0262816 (.00055)	.0263248 (.0004587)	.0257998 —
<i>Age</i> ²	−.0000507 (1.22e − 06)	−.0000508 (9.92e − 07)	−.0000497 —
<i>Age*Tenure</i>	−.0000965 (.0000149)	−.0000949 (.0000138)	−.0000963 —
<i>Age</i> ² * <i>Tenure</i>	2.03e − 07 (3.27e − 08)	2.00e − 07 (2.91e − 08)	2.03e − 07 —
<i>Age*Tenure</i> ²	2.43e − 08 (3.47e − 08)	2.58e − 08 (3.20e − 08)	2.43e − 08 —
<i>Tenure</i>	.0172868 (.0016133)	.0171138 (.0015543)	.016948 —
<i>Tenure</i> ²	−.0000339 (.000011)	−.0000347 (.0000104)	−.0000339 —
<i>Constant</i>	4.624496 (.0573555)	4.618056 (.049042)	−2.907707 —
<i>Year Dummies</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	—
<i>N. Obs</i>	36013	36013	158809
<i>R</i> ² (<i>Pseudo R</i> ²)	0.2482	(0.1260)	1.0000

Table 2: Log Earnings Pooled OLS Regressions, t-statistics in parenthesis. For the Tobit model, the right censoring point is 9.33, and there are 831 censored observations. (Data: CPS Displaced Workers/Job Tenure Supplement, 1996-2006). The model is stationary, and the year dummies don't have to be included. The constant in the model differs from the estimated one, because the highest value of the efficiency units is normalized to one. The OLS estimates for the model do not have standard errors, because we are running only one very large simulation.




Figure 1: Calibration - Model Fit.




Figure 2: Earnings losses. Panel 1: workers with at least 3 years of tenure: model vs estimates in Davis and von Wachter 2011 (DV). Panel 2: workers with at least 6 years of tenure: model vs estimates in Couch and Placzek 2010 (CP).

Months of wages/year	Severance pay				
	0	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.2
Unemployment rate (%)	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.4	6.4
Non-participants/searchers (%)	6.2	7.1	7.7	8.5	9.2
Output	100.0	99.7	99.5	99.5	99.6
Capital	100.0	99.1	98.6	97.8	98.9
Assets	100.0	98.9	98.2	97.2	98.1
Consumption	100.0	99.9	99.8	99.8	99.8
S.D. consumption	100.0	97.4	95.6	94.3	93.4
Welfare (newborns)	100.0	100.3	100.6	100.8	101.0
Welfare (average)	100.0	100.4	100.6	100.7	100.8

Table 3: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay

	Severance pay				
	0	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.2
Months of wages/year	0	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.2
Unemployment rate (%)	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.4
Non-participants/searchers (%)	6.2	6.6	7.0	7.6	8.5
Output	–	–	–	–	–
Capital	–	–	–	–	–
Assets	100.0	96.8	94.8	93.5	93.9
Consumption	100.0	99.8	99.7	99.7	99.8
S.D. consumption	100.0	95.6	92.9	91.5	91.5
Welfare (newborns)	100.0	100.5	101.0	101.3	101.5
Welfare (average)	100.0	100.4	100.8	101.1	101.4

Table 4: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay (constant interest rate)

	Severance pay				
	0	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.2
Months of wages/year	0	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.2
Unemployment rate (%)	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.1	6.1
Non-participants/searchers (%)	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.7
Output	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.3	100.6
Capital	100.0	100.0	100.4	101.1	102.3
Assets	100.0	99.8	100.0	100.6	101.5
Consumption	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.1
S.D. consumption	100.0	99.6	99.3	99.5	99.8
Welfare (newborns)	100.0	100.2	100.3	100.4	100.5
Welfare (average)	100.0	100.1	100.0	99.9	99.7

Table 5: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay: no job-specific human capital

	Severance pay				
	0	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.2
Months of wages/year	0	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.2
Unemployment rate (%)	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.4	6.4
Non-participants/searchers (%)	6.6	7.1	7.8	8.6	9.4
Output	100.0	99.7	99.5	99.5	99.5
Capital	100.0	99.0	98.6	98.5	98.8
Assets	100.0	98.8	98.1	97.9	98.1
Consumption	100.0	99.9	99.8	99.8	99.8
S.D. consumption	100.0	97.5	95.6	94.4	93.6
Welfare (newborns)	100.0	100.3	100.6	100.8	101.0
Welfare (average)	100.0	100.4	100.6	100.8	100.9

Table 6: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay: tenure-independent separation rates

	Severance pay				
	0	1.8	3.6	5.4	7.2
Months of wages	0	1.8	3.6	5.4	7.2
Unemployment rate (%)	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3
Non-participants/searchers (%)	6.2	6.7	6.9	7.1	7.1
Output	100.0	99.7	99.6	99.6	99.6
Capital	100.0	99.1	98.6	98.6	98.9
Assets	100.0	98.9	98.2	98.0	98.2
Consumption	100.0	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9
S.D consumption	100.0	98.5	97.4	96.0	94.8
Welfare (newborns)	100.0	100.3	100.6	100.8	101.0
Welfare (average)	100.0	100.3	100.5	100.7	100.7

Table 7: Allocational and welfare effects of (tenure-independent) severance-pay

Appendix A. Data and model fit

<i>Moment</i>	<i>Data</i>	<i>Model</i>	<i>Moment</i>	<i>Data</i>	<i>Model</i>
			<i>Unemployment rates</i>		
<i>r</i>	0.0400	0.0383	<i>Age = 20</i>	0.1361	0.1194
			<i>Age = 25</i>	0.0759	0.0617
<i>Tenure distribution</i>			<i>Age = 30</i>	0.0528	0.0557
<i>Tenure = 0</i>	0.3001	0.2744	<i>Age = 35</i>	0.0486	0.0520
<i>Tenure = 2</i>	0.1493	0.1867	<i>Age = 40</i>	0.0432	0.0493
<i>Tenure = 4</i>	0.1327	0.1308	<i>Age = 45</i>	0.0407	0.0467
<i>Tenure = 6</i>	0.0743	0.0941	<i>Age = 50</i>	0.0405	0.0431
<i>Tenure = 8</i>	0.0513	0.0694	<i>Age = 55</i>	0.0384	0.0411
<i>Tenure = 10</i>	0.0580	0.0523	<i>Age = 60</i>	0.0389	0.0394
<i>Tenure = 12</i>	0.0362	0.0400	<i>Age = 65</i>	0.0391	0.0377
			<i>Unemployment distribution</i>		
<i>Tenure = 14</i>	0.0364	0.0311	<i>Age = 20</i>	0.2093	0.2646
<i>Tenure = 16</i>	0.0244	0.0246	<i>Age = 25</i>	0.1448	0.1366
<i>Tenure = 18</i>	0.0216	0.0196	<i>Age = 30</i>	0.1118	0.1235
<i>Tenure = 20</i>	0.1156	0.0769	<i>Age = 35</i>	0.1155	0.1153
<i>Discouraged workers</i>			<i>Age = 40</i>	0.1079	0.1089
	0.0605	0.0611	<i>Age = 45</i>	0.0992	0.1031
			<i>Age = 50</i>	0.0875	0.0596
			<i>Age = 55</i>	0.0626	0.0352
			<i>Age = 60</i>	0.0410	0.0207
			<i>Age = 65</i>	0.0203	0.0324

Table A.8: Model Fit - Empirical vs. Predicted Moments

The labor market data used in this paper come from the *Current Population Survey* (CPS): it's a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey has been conducted for more than 50 years. The CPS is the primary source of information on the labor force characteristics of the U.S. population. The sample is scientifically selected to represent the civilian non-institutional population. Data and codebooks can be downloaded from

<http://www.bls.census.gov/cps>. Our sample selection rule is males, between the age of 18 and 67, in the labor force, and with a valid observation for the tenure variable when computing the wage regressions.

Table A.8 reports the fit of the model in terms of the set of moments targeted in the calibration.

Table A.9 below reports levels of severance pay for a selected number of countries and tenure levels.

Country	Tenure		
	9 months	4 years	20 years
Australia	0	1.9	2.8
Belgium	3	5	21
Canada	0	0	2.1
Denmark	0	0	0.9
Finland	0.5	0.9	6.1
France	0.9	2.8	7.5
Germany ^a	0.3	2	10
Ireland	0	2.1	9.6
Italy	2.6	5.8	21
Netherlands	0	6.1	20
Portugal	3	4	20
Spain	1.5	6	23
Sweden	0.9	3	6
U.K.	0.2	0.9	4.7
U.S.	0	0	0

^a. Dependent on age and length of service; we assume employment started at age 20.

Table A.9: Severance pay and/or notice period (in months of wage) in selected OECD countries at three different tenure levels, Source: OECD (2013). For this group of economies there are different provisions for different workers' categories and type of dismissal. For each country, the largest possible payments are reported.