Opposition to induced abortion is strongly associated with religion in most Western countries. There is much less evidence that the same is true in East Asia, where abortion is common. Even in Taiwan, where society is relatively conservative and religious belief and practice are widespread, religious objections to abortion have been moderate and intermittent. Nevertheless nearly half of the population disagrees that "women have a right to abortion." The present paper is based on analysis of two surveys conducted in 2009: the Taiwan Social Change Survey and the Religious Experience Survey in Taiwan. Both contain questions on attitudes to abortion in different circumstances as well as extensive sections on religion. Although there is an association between religious affiliation and opposition to abortion, controlling for education eliminates the relationship almost completely. There may be, though, some influence of religion at least at the extremes. Respondents were asked whether abortion is wrong if there is a strong chance of a serious birth defect, but also if the family has a very low income and cannot afford another child. It is thus possible to identify individuals with the strongest "pro-life" or "pro-choice" views, who may be most influenced by religious or nonreligious ideology. Despite the lack of salience of abortion as a political issue, there are groups campaigning both to liberalise the existing law (that restricts access to some extent) and to tighten it (for example by requiring counselling or waiting periods). Religion will play a role in this debate.

Email@ voas@man.ac.uk

Fertility patterns of native and migrant Muslims in Europe
Marcin Stonawski, IIASA; Michaela Potancoková, Vienna Institute of Demography

This paper presents (as part of a large global project on demography and religion) unique findings on fertility differentials between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe, separating between native and immigrant European Muslim populations. Our estimates of TFR (from censuses and surveys) find that although European Muslims have significantly greater fertility in most countries. The differentials are larger in countries where most Muslims are migrants themselves or descendants from migrants arriving since the 1960s. For instance, in Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia and Ukraine the greater fertility of Muslims ranges from 0 to 0.4 children; and also all the Muslim populations have below replacement fertility (ranging from 1.4 to 1.9 children). In Germany and Italy Muslims have 0.5 to 0.6 children more (with a TFR of 1.8 to 1.9 children) than non-Muslims; while in Norway, Austria, Finland, Ireland, the UK and the Netherlands, the fertility discrepancies are higher (from 1 to 1.3 children) and while non-Muslim fertility levels are below replacement, Muslim TFR is relatively high (ranging from 2.4 to 3.3 children). We discuss this in the context of the composition of the origin countries (TFR levels, trends) for the migrant populations, selectivity of migrants (particularly in terms of education), integration periods and whether and when fertility levels are likely to converge or not. We also investigate the cases where we both have significant shares of recent migrant Muslims and native Muslims.

Email: michaela.potancokova@oeaw.ac.at

Religious deregulation and demographic change: A key to understanding whether religious plurality leads to strife
Brian J. Grim, Pew Research Center & Boston University; Vegard Skirbekk, IIASA

The dangers of religious pluralities seemingly appear all too obvious. With ever-present religious conflicts around the globe and throughout history, religious plurality seems to be the spark, if not the flame, that leads to raging conflicts within and between countries. Indeed, this apparent relationship serves to motivate and justify states' denying religious freedoms. The concern is that to leave religion unchecked and without adequate controls will result in the uprising of religions that are dangerous to both state and citizenry. This paper tests the proposition that as religious freedoms increase, violent religious persecution and conflict decline. Using data on nearly 200 countries, the study finds that religious deregulation and de jure and de facto protections for religious freedoms coincide with pluralities in which no single religion can monopolize religious activity and all religions can compete on a level playing field. Religious grievances against the state and other religions are reduced because all religions can compete for the allegiance of people without the interference of the state. Rather than religious plurality leading to strife, the data indicate that it is the attempt to prevent religious pluralities from existing that tends to be the source of social strife related to religion. We also consider the effect of current and past fertility levels on measures of religious freedom as well as social hostilities. Our preliminary estimates suggest that lagged TFR significantly affects the risk of social hostilities. We discuss how a rise in the share of specific religious groups through conversion versus natural growth may have different effects on religious freedom and social hostilities.

Email: skirbekk@iiasa.ac.at

The demography of religious switiching around the world
Conrad Hackett, Brian Grim, Noble Kuriakose, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life

We survey what is known, can be known, and will likely remain unknown (for now) about the dynamics of religious switching in countries around the world. We analyze switches between seven identities: Christian, Muslim, Unaffiliated, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, and all other religions inclusively. We use cross-sectional surveys that collect data about religion of origin and current religion, such as the WVS, ISSP, ESS, GSS, Baylor China survey, Pew Africa surveys, and the Religious Landscape Survey. We also consider patterns of religious change by age and sex cohorts in select countries for which we have access to relevant census data. We describe the pervasiveness of religious switching and individual characteristics associated with switching. We compare the patterns of switching to a new religious affiliation with the patterns of switching to claiming no religious affiliation. The purpose of this analysis of recent trends in religious switching is to develop plausible scenarios of future switching patterns for global religious projections. We present several future scenarios for discussion purposes.

Email: conradhackett@gmail.com