Felli, Leonardo

Professor Leonardo Felli  

Department

Position held

Experience keywords:

economic theory; economics; forecast feedback; game theory; human capital investment

Media experience:

Radio; TV

Contact Points

LSE phone number:

+44 (0)20 7955 7525

LSE email:

l.felli@lse.ac.uk

Publications

2016

Felli, Leonardo and Hortala-Vallve, Rafael (2016) Collusion, blackmail and whistle-blowing Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 11 (3). 279-312. ISSN 1554-0626

2015

Felli, Leonardo and Roberts, Kevin (2015) Does competition solve the hold-up problem? Economica. ISSN 0013-0427

2014

Baccara, Mariagiovanna and Collard-Wexler, Allan and Felli, Leonardo and Yariv, Leeat (2014) Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6 (3). 133-158. ISSN 1945-7782

Felli, Leonardo and Anderlini, Luca and Riboni, Alessandro (2014) Why stare decisis? Review of Economic Dynamics, 17 (4). 726-738. ISSN 1094-2025

2013

Baccara, Mariagiovanna and Collard-Wexler, Allan and Felli, Leonardo and Yariv, Leeat (2013) Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Immordino, Giovanni and Riboni, Alessandro (2013) Legal institutions, innovation, and growth International Economic Review, 54 (3). 937-956. ISSN 0020-6598

2011

Felli, Leonardo and Koenen, Johannes and Stahl, Konrad O (2011) Competition and trust: evidence from German car manufacturers CEPR discussion papers, 8265. CEPR, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Anderlini, Luca and Riboni, Alessandro (2011) WHY STARE DECISIS? CEPR Discussion papers, 8266. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2011) Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? Review of Law and Economics, 7 (1). ISSN 1555-5879

2010

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (2010) How to sell a (bankrupt) company? 2881. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Anderlini, Luca and Immordino, Giovanni and Riboni, Alessandro (2010) Legal institutions, innovation and growth CESF working papers, 256. University of Naples, Naples, Italy.

Felli, Leonardo and Baccara, Mariagiovanna and Collard-Wexler, Allan and Yariv, Leeat (2010) Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race NBER working paper series, 16444. National Bureau of Economic Research, Massachusetts, USA.

2008

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2008) Agency problems In: Durlauf, Steven N and Blume, Lawrence E, (eds.) New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK. ISBN 9780333786765

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Riboni, A. (2008) Statute law or case law? Mimeo. 1-31.

2007

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2007) If you cannot get your friends elected, lobby your enemies Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (2-3). 624-635. ISSN 1542-4774

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2007) Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23 (3). 662-684. ISSN 8756-6222

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2007) Costly contingent contracts: a failure of the Coase theorem In: Cafaggi, Fabrizio and Nicita, Antonio and Pagano, Ugo, (eds.) Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions. Routledge Siena Studies in Political Economy. Routledge, Oxford, UK. ISBN 9780415329422

2006

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2006) Endogenous lobbying Journal of the European Economic Association, 4 (1). 180-215. ISSN 1542-4766

Felli, Leonardo and Anderlini, Luca and Al-Najjar, Nabil (2006) Undescribable events Review of Economic Studies, 73 (4). 849-868. ISSN 0034-6527

Felli, Leonardo and Anderlini, Luca (2006) Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem Economic Journal, 116 (508). 223-245. ISSN 0013-0133

Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (2006) Firm-specific training TE/04/473. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2006) Active courts and menu contracts TE/2006/511. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2006) Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? TE/06/510. The Suntory-Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Postlewaite, Andrew and Felli, Leonardo (2006) Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? this paper replaces TE/2003/464 Theoretical Economics, TE/2006/510. The London School of Economics and Political Science, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

2004

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2004) Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts Research in Economics, 58 (1). 3-30. ISSN 1090-9443

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2004) Book review: economics and language: five essays by Ariel Rubinstein, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 Economica, 71 (281). 169-171. ISSN 0013-0427

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2004) Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? 4197. Center for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

2003

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2003) Endogenous lobbying TE/03/448. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2003) Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies TE/03/447. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2003) Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? TE/2003/464. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

2002

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2002) Endogenous lobbying 3174. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Roberts, Kevin W. S. (2002) Does competition solve the hold-up problem? 3535. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

Al-Najjar, Nabil and Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2002) Unforeseen contingencies 3271. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

Al-Najjar, Nabil and Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2002) Unforeseen contingencies TE/02/431. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

2001

Felli, Leonardo and Anderlini, Luca (2001) Costly bargaining and renegotiation Econometrica, 69 (2). 377-411. ISSN 0012-9682

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2001) Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies 2835. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Roberts, Kevin (2001) Does competition solve the hold-up problem? TE/01/414. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

2000

Felli, Leonardo and Roberts, Kevin (2000) Competition and hold-ups In: Atkinson, Tony and Glennerster, Howard and Stern, Nicholas, (eds.) Putting Economics to Work : Volume in Honour of Michio Morishima. STICERD Occasional Paper (22). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 31-70. ISBN 0753013991

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (2000) How to sell a (bankrupt) company? 292. CESifo, Munich, Germany.

Felli, Leonardo and Villas-Boas, J. Miguel (2000) Renegotiation and collusion in organizations Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9 (4). 453-483. ISSN 1058-6407

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2000) Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem TE/01/409. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2000) Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts TE/00/407. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

1999

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1999) Incomplete contracts and complexity costs Theory and Decision, 46 (1). 23-50. ISSN 1573-7187

1998

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Describability and agency problems European Economic Review, 42 (1). 35-59. ISSN 0014-2921

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy 2030. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Ortalo-Magné, François (1998) Technological innovations slumps and booms 394. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Costly coasian contracts TE/98/362. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Costly bargaining and renegotiation TE/98/361. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

1997

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (1997) Ex-ante efficiency of bankruptcy procedures European Economic Review, 41 (3-5). 475-485. ISSN 0014-2921

Felli, Leonardo and Ortalo-Magné, François (1997) Technological innovations: slumps and booms CARESS: 97-17. University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, USA.

1996

Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (1996) Learning, wage dynamics, and firm-specific human capital Journal of Political Economy, 104 (4). 838-868. ISSN 0022-3808

Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (1996) A note on G. Bertola and L. Felli (1993) “Job matching and the distribution of surplus” Ricerche Economiche, 47, 65–92 Ricerche Economiche, 50 (3). 317-319. ISSN 0035-5054

Felli, Leonardo and Hortala-Vallve, R. (1996) Preventing collusion through discretion TE/1996/303. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Poltical Science, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Villas-Boas, J.M. (1996) Friendships in vertical relations TE/1996/314. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1996) Costly contingent contracts TE/1996/313. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

1995

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (1995) The theory of bankruptcy and mechanism design In: Eichengreen, Barry and Portes, R, (eds.) Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK, 69-86. ISBN 1898128235

1994

Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (1994) Job matching, learning and the distribution of surplus TE/1994/277. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1994) Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4). 1085-1124. ISSN 0033-5533

1993

Felli, Leonardo (1993) Turnovers and asymptotic behavior of workers Economics Letters, 42 (1). 43-50. ISSN 0165-1765

Diamond, Peter and Felli, Leonardo (1993) Search, sticky prices and deflation Mimeo.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1993) Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature TE/1993/263. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Bertola, G. and Felli, Leonardo (1993) Job matching and the distribution of producer surplus Ricerche Economiche, 47 (1). 65-92. ISSN 0035-5054

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1993) Incomplete written contracts: endogenous agency problems TE/1993/267. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

1988

Felli, Leonardo and Ichino, Andrea (1988) Do marginal employment subsidies increase re-employment probabilities? Labour, 2 (3). 63-89. ISSN 1121-7081

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