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In addition, the Journal seeks to use the study of Taiwan as a fulcrum for discussing theoretical and methodological questions pertinent not only to the study of Taiwan but to the study of cultures and societies more generally. Thereby the rationale of Taiwan in Comparative Perspective is to act as a forum and catalyst for the development of new theoretical and methodological perspectives generated via critical scrutiny of the particular experience of Taiwan in an increasingly unstable and fragmented world.

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This publication was supported in part by a grant from the Tsao Yung-Ho Cultural and Educational Foundation
Taiwan in Comparative Perspective
Volume 5: 2014

Special Issue
Taiwan and Hong Kong in Comparative Perspective

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Fang-Long Shih and Carol Jones

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Introduction to Taiwan and Hong Kong in Comparative Perspective: Centres–Peripheries, Colonialism, and the Politics of Representation

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Taiwan and Hong Kong\(^1\) are both primarily defined in relation to the Chinese Mainland, although their histories are also marked by strong associations with colonial empires: in Hong Kong, the British (1841–1941, then 1945–1997) and the Japanese (1941–1945); and in Taiwan, the Spanish (in the north 1626–1646), the Dutch (in the south 1624–1662), the Japanese (1895–1945), and arguably the KMT (1947–1987). In both locations, contemporary politics is consequently marked by struggles over contested histories, identities, languages, and cultures, in which questions of political representation have become increasingly important.

In this introduction, we place this current situation of contested identities and politics in historical context. From the perspective of the Chinese Imperial court, Hong Kong and Taiwan were always regarded as peripheral, barren places populated by barbarians, rebellious pirates, and illiterate fishermen. Further, both locations were respectively ceded to and governed by British and Japanese colonial empires, which, in contrast to China, perceived fertile land with economic potential in locations of strategic importance. Hong Kong and Taiwan were thus brought into the world capitalist system by the colonial powers, and underwent rapid transformations from rural modes of life into modern capitalist formations. However, both locations were profoundly affected by the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists on the Chinese Mainland after World War II: Hong Kong’s population trebled due to the arrival of refugees, while the eventual defeat of the KMT led to the retreat of the Nationalist government to Taiwan. Throughout these histories of migration, resistance, colonialism, and civil wars, the so-called ‘ethnic group’ (族群) has emerged as a new category of historical subject that challenges the very concept of ‘the Chinese’, and the result has been a politics based around competing identities and representations.

The crucial question here is whether the politics of identity in Hong Kong can develop in such a way under the ‘one country, two systems’ model that its inhabitants will be allowed to take responsibility for organizing their own lives together, and decide what common rules they will live under. This in turn raises

\(^{1}\) By Hong Kong is meant here the region comprising Hong Kong Island 香港岛, Kowloon 九龍, New Territories 新界 and outlying islands.
another question, of whether Taiwan will be able to retain its own identity and democracy if it is forced to follow the model of Hong Kong. The outcome will depend on to what extent Hong Kong will develop a representative political system, and whether democratic culture in Taiwan can be enriched and given a firm basis. As such, rather than being a comprehensive comparison of both locations, this introductory essay aims to highlight parallels beyond the most readily-apparent connections, as well as resonances that exist between the two locations despite the lack of direct communication. In particular, we explore centre–periphery dynamics in imperial China, as well as in colonialism and the world capitalist system, as well as democracy as a universal value and the politics of representation after World War II.

On the Periphery of Chinese Imperial Courts

Imperial China tended to define its domain as a land naturally bounded by mountains, rivers and seas, and places such as Taiwan and Hong Kong were regarded as peripheral, both geographically and politically. Hong Kong is off the southern coast of China, located in the South China Sea at the mouth of the Pearl River Delta, while Taiwan is separated from the southeast coast of China by the Taiwan Strait, which is about 161 kilometres wide. Both locations were inhabited by indigenous peoples who predate the first Han Chinese immigrants. Taiwan, up until the early seventeenth century, was inhabited almost exclusively by Austronesian peoples, with linguistic and genetic ties to other Austronesian ethnic groups spreading over maritime Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Madagascar, while the Hong Kong region was originally home to the Yao people, and to the boat-dwelling Tanka (疍家), who were descended from the Dan who were probably themselves also of Yao stock.

Due to conflict in the centre and north of China over many years during the Song Dynasty (960–1279), the focus of Han civilization shifted to the river valleys and plains of southern China, with the coastal Fujian and Zhejiang provinces becoming the Han demographic and cultural centres (Shepherd 1993: 398). The remoteness of Taiwan and Hong Kong from the Imperial Court meant that these locations became home for those who needed to flee China during periods of economic, political, social, and cultural upheaval.

In time, Hong Kong became the final bastion for the Han Chinese rulers of the Southern Song Dynasty, who were defeated in the war against the Mongols: the Song Court retreated to Lantau Island (大嶼山), and the last Song Emperor Bing (宋帝昺) was enthroned there at the age of eight in a place called Mui Wo (梅窩). After his final defeat, the child Emperor ended his life by drowning with his officials, in what is today known as Yamen (崖門) Town. One of these officials, named Hau Wong, is still enshrined and worshipped in Tung Chung (東涌) Valley on Lantau Island in Hong Kong today.

Centuries later, Taiwan similarly became the last refuge of Ming Dynasty loyalists who rejected Qing rule, with Zheng Cheng-gong (鄭成功, also known as Koxinga 國姓爺) and his successors establishing the Kingdom of Tungning (東寧王國) on the island after retreating from Amoy in 1661. This entwined the fates of Taiwan and Hong Kong, when the Kangxi Emperor ordered a Great Clearance (1661–1669) of the southern coast as a measure to isolate the Zheng family
regime. It was reported that around 16,000 so-called ‘locals’ belonging to the five clans (who had arrived during the Southern Song Dynasty period) were forced to leave Hong Kong, and only 1,600 later returned (Ingham 2007: 7). Meanwhile, Zheng ousted the Dutch from their settlement of Zeelandia (熱蘭遮城) on Taiwan, but he died soon after the last Ming claimant had been captured and killed, and his grandson eventually surrendered to Shi Lang (施琅), the Qing admiral, in 1683. After this, Taiwan fell under nominal Qing authority.

While Hong Kong’s first population boom occurred during the Yuan period of Mongol rule in China, Taiwan saw large numbers of Chinese immigrants arrive during the Qing period of Manchu rule in China. In both cases, the refugees and migrants were initially led by frontiersmen and traders, and they brought their native languages and cultures to their new homes: in Hong Kong, the first Han Chinese immigrants, known as ‘the five clans of Tang, Man, Liu, Pang, and Hau’ (新界五大氏族 – 鄧文廖侯彭), were largely Hakka. From the eleventh century they settled in the New Territories (for further details see Tang n.d.), which was part of Guangdong (Canton) province until 1898, and they gradually adopted Cantonese. Moreover, from the time that Chinese settlers to Hong Kong brought Sinicization, the indigenous Yao and Tanka peoples were gradually Sinicized, and they now speak Cantonese (Ng with Baker 1983: 22–23). In Taiwan, the majority were from Southern Fujian, and they spoke the Quanzhou (泉州) and Zhangzhou (漳州) forms of the Hoklo (福佬) language. There was also a minority of Hakka (客家) people who were originally from the border between Fujian and Guangdong.

The early Qing era saw the development of the largest empire in Chinese history under the Kangxi (reigned 1661–1722), Yongzheng (reigned 1722–35) and Qianlong (reigned 1735–1796) Emperors. However, Taiwan and Hong Kong were regarded as secluded and barren places in the East, occupied by savages, pirates, and rebels. The Kangxi Emperor showed no interest in ruling Taiwan; the island was a distant ‘ball of mud’ and therefore, in his view ‘taking it is no gain; not taking it is no loss’ (‘彈丸之地; 得之無所加, 不得無所損’). Originally, it was envisioned that Taiwan would be abandoned and its Chinese population evacuated once all the resistance forces were defeated. It is estimated that the Chinese population in Taiwan in 1684 dropped by a third, leaving fewer than 80,000 individuals (Shepherd 1993: 106). Most of those who remained had married indigenous women and held property on the island.

However, Admiral Shi had a different view of Taiwan; he argued that abandoning Taiwan would likely turn it into a lair of pirates, and as such it was worthwhile maintaining control of the island, at least to keep it out of the hands of hostile powers. The Qing court eventually took Shi’s advice, and in 1684 the island was made a prefecture of Fujian province. However, the new prefecture was difficult to govern, due to numerous fights between the new Han settlers and the indigenous Austronesian people; there were also constant conflicts between Quanzhou and Zhangzhou speakers over land, and these Fujian settlers also fought later settlers from Guangdong.

Qing rule over Taiwan therefore was not concerned with developing the island, but rather with preventing it from becoming a source of trouble (Shepherd 1993: 105–108, 142–146). Thus, a partial quarantine was imposed: the ban on maritime commerce was lifted, but crossings between the Mainland and Taiwan were regulated and required travel papers approved by the authorities on both sides of
the Taiwan Strait. Also, while promoting the repopulation of coastal areas under Han control, the Government placed strict restrictions on migration from the Mainland. Immigration policy fluctuated, with periods up until 1788 during which male labourers who travelled seasonally to the island were not allowed to bring their wives or families.

These quarantine policies, however, were undermined by population growth and economic expansion that increased the demand for frontier products. Han frontiersmen thus sought opportunities within local networks and gained access to local resources, resulting in inter-marriage with Aboriginal women and the growth of mixed families. Many single Chinese men married locally, as described in a Taiwanese saying: ‘We have Han Chinese grandfathers, but no Han Chinese grandmothers’ (‘我們有唐山公，沒有唐山嬤’). Additionally, Chinese migrants tended to form bonds of cooperation with their fellows from the same ancestral place. These associations were formalized in the late imperial era through the founding of organizations called tongxianghui (同鄉會), which were run on democratic lines and open to most fellow migrants. Religion also helped to promote solidarity among fellow migrants via the worship of common ancestors and also the patron god/desses from their ancestral places (J. Cole 1996:158–159).

The Colonial Powers and the World Capitalist System

Hong Kong, as it exists today, was the outcome of negotiations and three treaties signed between China and Britain over fifty years in the nineteenth century, at a time when the Qing Empire was in decline. Following the First Anglo-Chinese War (also known as the First Opium war, 1839–1842), the Qing signed the Treaty of Nanjing, which ceded the island of Hong Kong to the British in perpetuity. After the Second Anglo-Chinese War (1858–1860), the Convention of Peking gave the Kowloon peninsula (and Stonecutters Island 昂船洲) to the British, again ‘in perpetuity’. Finally, against extensive armed resistance, the Qing Empire signed the Second Convention of Peking, which gave the New Territories and outlying islands to the British on a one-hundred year lease in 1898. Granting Hong Kong extraterritorial status was, at the time, seen by the Chinese as convenient, as it meant that the foreigners there could more easily govern themselves (Hsü 2000:191).

With attacks by British and French forces in 1884–1885, the Qing court eventually realized the strategic importance of Taiwan. The island was brought under tighter control and raised to full provincial status. It was also given a higher-ranking governor with a military background, Liu Ming-chuan (劉銘傳, governor 1885–1892). Under Liu’s governance, a public education system and light industry were introduced, along with telegram and postal services and also a railway along the northwest coast from Keelung (基隆) to Hsinchu (新竹). However, within less than three years, the Qing Empire was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki after losing the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). This treaty ceded Taiwan, together with Pescadores, to the Japanese in perpetuity.

Hong Kong’s experience of British colonialism was somewhat different from Taiwan’s experience of Japanese colonialism. Hong Kong was undertaken solely for commercial reasons; the British in Hong Kong never embarked on the wholesale ‘reform’ of their colonial subjects, and were content to leave them to
themselves (except, of course, where their activities interfered with trade). By
contrast, Japan decided to avoid becoming itself colonized by instead ‘catching up
with the West’ (Ts’ai 2009: 23, quoting Kawashima 2004: 69), modernizing itself,
and joining the colonial powers. Taiwan was Japan’s first colony, and when it
ceded control in 1945 after World War II it was also its last. However, at the time
when Japan took control of Taiwan, Japan was barely ready to enter into the
colonial enterprise. Lacking colonial experience, Japan framed its colonial model
with reference to European ideas and practices, mapping out a security region in
which it further developed its interest in overseas trade.

At the start of Japan’s military takeover of Taiwan, several rebellions broke out
across the island. As a result, Japan decided to keep Taiwan under military rule.
There were three military Governor-Generals and constant fighting; this period has
been called an ‘age of mistakes and failure’ (Lamley 1999: 205). The military
administration did not resolve problems, but instead provoked further resistance. It
was a very expensive time, both in terms of cost (for maintaining the police force)
and also in terms of lives (lost from combat and disease).

There are similarities here with the situation in the New Territories. Until 1898,
the villagers in the New Territories, administratively part of Xin’an County (新安縣),
regarded themselves as part of Mainland China. Resenting their incorporation into
the British colony, the larger Cantonese-speaking clans mobilized their members in
armed resistance, in what Patrick Hase calls ‘a small colonial war’ (2008: 5). The
British responded with force of arms, aided by a proclamation from the Viceroy of
Canton exhorting the villagers to ‘tremble and obey’ and abide by the terms of the
treaty (Hayes 2006: 8–9; Hase 2008: 41). Thereafter, the people of the New
Territories often proved recalcitrant colonial subjects, and the Heung Yee Kuk (鄉
議局, Rural Council) was established in 1926 as a statutory advisory body to
negotiate with the colonial government and promote the welfare of the people of
the New Territories. Although there were improved transport links through the
century – the Kowloon Canton Railway (九廣鐵路) was built in 1910 – and the
presence of many British soldiers, these areas remained marginal. Eventually, the
British administration, in a further attempt at pacification pursuant to development
in the 1950s, granted indigenous New Territories residents special rights. The
1984 Joint Declaration and the 1990 Basic Law also recognized the rights of
indigenous residents (Ng with Baker 1983), who were defined as those who could
trace their ancestry back to before British colonization.

Taiwan, meanwhile, for the first half of the century found itself part of an
expanding colonial empire, as Japan moved into Korea in 1910 and Manchukuo in
1932, and eventually, in 1940, established the so-called ‘Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere’ (大東亞共榮圈). However, Japan’s policies reveal conflicting
attitudes: Japan adopted the British system of governing the home country and the
colony separately, but unlike Britain – which generally allowed its colonial subjects
to retain their culture – Japan wanted to culturally re-engineer the inhabitants of
Taiwan. After the Wushe Incident (霧社事件) of 1930, Japan employed the French
colonial model and put greater emphasis on assimilation. Taiwanese subject-
citizens were encouraged to adopt Japanese language and culture, and with the
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, assimilation began to be
enforced through the militarizing Kominka Movement (皇民化運動), which was
imposed until the end of World War II.
By acquiring Taiwan as its first colonial territory, Japan formally joined the list of colonial powers. The task of colonizing Taiwan became a symbol for the nation of Japan, meaning that Japan was, from that moment, on an equal footing with Europe. Japan endeavoured to raise itself to the level of a ‘civilized’ country, and it tried to modernize its institutions in accordance with European models. At the same time, though, it made an appeal to the European colonial powers about her mission to ‘civilize’ Taiwan: European colonial empires and Japan adopted the same ideas to justify their colonial adventures, such as bringing the light of civilization to allegedly ‘primitive’ peoples. However, although some colonial actors had religious or humanitarian aims, the colonial powers’ actual motive was to gain access to natural and human resources, and trade and profit.

This can be seen in the case of colonial Hong Kong. For almost the entire period of British rule, the administration adhered to the principles of liberal, laissez-faire economics and the related doctrine of the non-interference of government in social affairs. However, although in theory free market forces prevailed, in practice, cartels, corruption and cronyism distorted the operation of the economic sphere. Trade – including trade with China – remained the cardinal imperative of colonial rule. As far as London was concerned, colonies were meant to make money, or at least be self-sufficient. They were not meant to soak up funds. This partly explains London’s reluctance to sanction spending on welfare and infrastructure, and the Hong Kong administration’s emphasis on hard work and self-help as the route to success. In this regard, Hong Kong governance for much of the twentieth century closely echoed that of mid-Victorian Britain. Its tax system harked back even further, to the eighteenth century, favouring the accumulation of wealth and minimal government expenditure. The government’s general indifference to social matters meant that those disadvantaged by the operation of the free market could expect no assistance, whilst those who benefited could depend upon politicians not to interfere in their more rapacious practices. Indeed, the government itself was entirely comprised of European and – from about the 1880s – Chinese men of commerce, whose interests, despite their ethnic differences, were often identical: trade, commerce and profit (Munn 2001). Dominant economic roles were played by British conglomerates (known as ‘foreign hongs’ 洋行), such as Jardine, Matheson & Co. and Swire, local Chinese compradors such as Ho Tung (何東), who collaborated with the British, and local Chinese merchant families, such as the family of Lee (利氏家族), which owned extensive land in Causeway Bay, and the family of Li (李氏家族) which founded the Bank of East Asia in this period. By the 1960s, these close ties between business and government earned the government the nickname ‘Hong Kong Inc’.

The co-option of the Chinese elite in the latter part of the nineteenth century provided not so much a counter-weight to the influence of the European elite as added ballast to its continued rule (Carroll 2005). Together, they formed a mercantilist – and later an industrial and financial – hegemonic class (Chan 1991; B.K.P. Leung 1996: 39). Particularistic ties amongst the political and business elites were mirrored in the underworld by triad-run criminal syndicates and syndicated police corruption. As such, from the 1880s onwards, they increasingly came into conflict with the ‘coolie class’ they exploited. Episodes of labour unrest and insurrection in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also reflected anti-foreign, pro-China sentiments, indicating a fragile or non-existent loyalty to Hong
Kong (Tsai 1993). Movements for political change on the Mainland drew support from the Hong Kong population, most notably during the 1911 Revolution. It is this and subsequent episodes of cross-border political alliances that colour today’s Mainland government view of Hong Kong as a base for subversion.

By contrast, Taiwan had since the 1900s experienced a series of colonial reforms which sought to integrate Taiwan into the hierarchy of the colonial administrative mechanism and into a new web of economic relationships with Japan in the world capitalist system. A key feature of Japanese colonial rule from 1901 was administration through a centralized police force with the aid of the hook (保甲) system, which built upon natural settlements (i.e., neighbourhood units of ten to twenty households) serving as basic units for colonial administration (Ts’ai 2009: 93–118). Thus, a modern administrative system was established out of and rooted in age-old migration settlements for social control and economic development. For the first time, migration settlements and neighbourhood units were recognized as legal and political entities. This local system was further in line with the tradition of the county administration, which facilitated interaction between the state and local police force. As such, society and state were beginning to meet at the county level and by the 1920 Japan’s rule over Taiwan delegated part of its power to local government in a way that followed Tokyo’s ‘extension of policies in Japan proper to colonies (naichi encho 内地延長)’ (Ts’ai 2006: 98).

The modernization initiated by Liu Ming-chuan was expanded and consolidated: Japan set about road-building and developing railways; schools, postal and telegraphy facilities were established; and there was improved public health and sanitation, as well as more extensive hospitals. At the same time, agriculture and industry were improved; civil institutions were introduced; and mechanisms of law and order put in place. Japan also introduced newspapers, modern accounting, a banking system, and corporate enterprises. However, natural resources were squeezed out of Taiwan for the benefit of metropolitan Japan, in a process involving shifts in land ownership, the commodification of agriculture, and the emergence of a new wealthy and powerful capitalist class.

In particular, agriculture was reformed to meet Japan’s consumption needs and to compete in the international market: Taiwanese farmers were gradually forced to shift from subsistence agriculture towards the production of goods for export (the three major exports – the so-called ‘cash-crops’ – were tea, sugar and camphor). There was also public investment in modernization, such as irrigation, improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides (Ka 1995: 61). Taiwan was indeed a laboratory of Japan’s empire-building, and the experiment further evolved into the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ during the Pacific War.

Hong Kong also experienced Japanese rule, when the area was occupied from 1941–1945. One-and-a-half million people left the territory during this time, and others were forcibly repatriated to the Mainland (Baker 1993: 865). Many Hongkongers who returned to the Mainland fought the Japanese, while those who remained were exhorted by the Japanese to renounce their colonial identity and to regard themselves instead as members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, led by Japan. However, whilst members of the Chinese elite did collaborate with the Japanese, other Hongkongers joined forces with the British Army Aid Group to assist with gathering intelligence and rescuing prisoners of war. It was a sharp contrast: in Taiwan, Japan was using prisoners of war captured at
the surrenders of Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies as slaves for the Japanese war effort.

Post World War II and the Politics of Representation

Hong Kong and Taiwan have also long been seen as places of transit, as regards people, goods/commodities, and money. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, successive waves of migrants fled to Hong Kong or to Taiwan, or via both places to other areas of Southeast Asia, escaping political persecution, social upheaval, poverty and civil strife in Mainland China. In particular, there was large-scale immigration from China to both places after World War II: thousands who had fled to China from Hong Kong during wartime returned, accompanied by refugees fleeing the conflict between the Nationalist and Communist forces on the Mainland. Amongst these were Nationalist sympathizers en route to Taiwan; however, many simply stayed in Hong Kong, occupying Nationalist enclaves and squatter villages such as Tiu King Leng (調景嶺).

The then-ruling government in China – the Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) – retreated to Taiwan between 1947 and 1949, following the defeat of its forces on Mainland China at the end of the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The decision to give Taiwan to the KMT had been made by the Allies at the Cairo Conference of 1943 on the condition that the three nations (the ROC, US and UK) would fight alongside one another until Japan’s surrender. Indeed, the Americans at this time had initially wanted the Nationalist government to be given control of Hong Kong too, due to reservations about the British resumption of colonial rule. However, with Mao’s victory in 1949 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the geopolitical landscape radically altered. Overnight, Hong Kong became an important asset for Western powers in their defence against communism along the ‘Bamboo Curtain’. The Treaty of San Francisco, which Japan signed in 1951, stated that ‘Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores’, but it did not specify what Taiwan’s legal status actually was. In the years that followed, the Americans and the British were opposed to Taiwan being taken over by the PRC’s CCP, but they did not see Taiwan as a base for recovering Mainland China by the KMT either (for further information, see Wang 2014).

The KMT’s ROC de facto had no authority beyond Taiwan, but the party continued to assert its position as the sole legitimate government of all China. It regarded itself as in temporary exile on Taiwan, and the island was imagined as a mere province of a much larger Republic (Rigger 2011: 136). Also, memories of the eight-year war against Japan were still fresh: in 1946, KMT officials who were sent to survey Taiwan had reported that people in Taiwan had been ‘enslaved’ as the outcome of fifty years of colonization by Japan (Chen 2002). In this way, a new distinct historical subject was defined: the benshengren 本省人 (provincial natives, or Taiwanese) seen as an ‘ethnic group’ with its own language, colonial history, and way of life (for further details, see Shih 2012).

The distinction between benshengren and Chinese Mainlanders was deepened by the 2-28 Incident, which broke out at the end of February 1947 (Edmondson 2002: 25). A benshengren widow who was selling untaxed cigarettes at a street stand had her goods and takings confiscated by KMT officials, one of whom also
pistol-whipped her. The surrounding crowd began to protest, and one man was killed as officials fired their guns into the crowd. This prompted further protests, which were met with machine-gun fire. As news of the killings was broadcast and spread across Taiwan, violence erupted island-wide. This was followed by an operation called ‘village sweeping’ (清鄉) across the island, in which village collaborators helped to track down wanted people who were in hiding. This resulted in many more members of the elite and young students educated during the Japanese colonial period being either killed on the streets or arrested and then executed (Fleischauer 2011).

The violence has since been framed as an instance of ‘ethnic conflict’, and those who fled from Mainland China (i.e., from the provinces other than Taiwan) at the end of Chinese civil war during October 1945 and February 1955 became known as waishengren 外省人 (provincial outsiders, or Mainlanders) (Corcuff 2002: 164). In the aftermath of the 2-28 Incident, martial law was introduced following a constitutional amendment called the ‘Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion’ (動員戡亂時期臨時條款), which then led to the anti-Communist repression known as White Terror. Although making up around 13 percent of Taiwan’s population, waishengren represented approximately 80 percent of the ruling class, civil service, and educational and military sectors (Corcuff 2002: 163). The category of waishengren was thus seen, in contrast to benshengren, as an ‘ethnic’ group, defined through the shared experience of fighting against Japan followed by Chinese civil war, and as a homogenous privileged class with an identity that looked forward to recovering China or re-unification.

In contrast, in Hong Kong, refugees’ previous links to China provided some cultural anchorage to their places of origin, through their way of life. The majority were Cantonese-speakers from Guangdong, along with some merchants from Shanghai, as well as Mandarin-speaking intellectuals from the north. Political affiliations also played a role: some refugees identified with the Nationalist cause, while other refugees who fled to Hong Kong during the Cold War still clung to some forms of Communism, despite having fled the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward in 1962, the unrest of the Cultural Revolution from 1966–1976, or the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. As the prospect of sojourning somewhere else receded and a new generation came into existence, Hong Kong became ‘home’. According to Hugh Baker, it was refugee migrants – at first sojourners, later settlers – who ‘became the stuff of which Hong Kong Man was made’ (1993: 865). This category of Hongkongers has thus also developed as a distinct historical subject, known as Heunggongyahn (Hongkongers 香港人), also defined in terms of an ‘ethnic group’ with its common features of exile from China, refugee experiences, British colonial rule, and particular ways of life.

Throughout the Cold War period, the KMT in Taiwan represented continuity with the Republican legacy in China, and promoted its version of Chinese culture in the so-called ‘Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement’ (中華文化復興運動), which was presented as a contrast to the CCP’s Cultural Revolution on the Mainland (Katz 2003: 402–405). This ‘re-Sinicization’ policy was seen also as a de-Japanization campaign that was meant to wash away Taiwan’s past and colonial history. It re-engineered Taiwan’s supposed historical connection with Greater China, and also re-connected Taiwan with the supposed territory of early
twentieth-century China (as far as Outer Mongolia). Furthermore, by imposing the Beijing form of Mandarin as the national language (國語), the KMT suppressed other Chinese languages, such as Hoklo and Hakka, which had long before the KMT’s arrival been used on a daily basis by benshengren. Indeed, the ‘re-Sinicization’ policy was a kind of cultural colonialism imposed on ethnic Hoklo and Hakka groups. Benshengren languages were downgraded to the marginal status of patois and banned in the media and schools. The imperial centre–periphery dynamic re-appeared in the power relations between the ruling KMT waishengren and the ruled benshengren.

Again in contrast, as regard cultural policy, both the British government in London and its administration in Hong Kong were concerned to avoid any action – such as repression of cultural activities – which might provoke intervention in the colony by Communist China or Nationalist Taiwan. When the question of democracy was mooted, it was the Hong Kong elite that London heeded, rather than the voices of those clamouring for representation (Tsang 1988). Strict application of the rule of law was officially endorsed as a means of ensuring impartial treatment for all political groups. Though thousands were detained and deported for subversive activities, London urged tolerance and a low-key approach towards visiting Communist and Nationalist cultural groups.

This apparent tolerance of political activists, and of refugees’ cultural distance, has been seen by some as providing a space within which various communities were able to carve out for themselves a sphere of existence distinct from their distant rulers. Lau and Kuan (1988: 191), for example, describe a minimally integrated social-political system which allowed the ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese to flourish. They point out (20) that, unlike other colonial subjects, the Chinese who came to Hong Kong were largely self-selected: that is, they opted to reside under a colonial government which had brought with it an administrative and physical infrastructure preferable to what they had experienced in China itself. This did not necessarily mean that British colonial government was therefore regarded as legitimate; Pro-China ‘leftists’ and nationalistic intellectuals both remembered that the British had arrived through invasions and unequal treaties, and agreed that colonial rule was consequently illegitimate. Indeed, such views were held by even ordinary Hong Kong people, with the exception of pro-British Chinese elites and the upper class. Colonial rule – which before the 1970s was quite unfair and authoritarian – was, though, accepted for practical reasons.

Thus there was a general acceptance of authority, and an attitude of ‘utilitarianistic familism’ (Lau and Kuan 1988: 20; Vickers and Kan 2005: 175). The non-interventionism of British colonialism was particularly marked in Hong Kong, due to the awareness that the colony may return to China; this may have appealed due to the traditional proclivity to keep government at arm’s length. This absence of government from the daily lives of the population, Lau and Kuan hold, led to an alienation between the two, and a failure by government to provide a model of moral values. Describing a problem which is as true of contemporary Hong Kong as it was of the 1960s, the result was a ‘lack of moral linkage’ between the rulers and the ruled.

Indeed, as far as China and the British governments were concerned, Hong Kong had no identity or culture of its own. It was simply an economic city, its residents concerned principally with making money, eating, dancing and gambling.
Through ‘community building’ initiatives, and a re-iteration of the UK’s commitment to the rule of law, the administration sought to convince Hong Kong people that the city was a better prospect than Communist China, to prevent the city ‘turning red’ and to attach the Chinese population to colonial rule without granting them universal suffrage.

However, the 1970s gradually saw the superpowers favour China (PRC) over Taiwan (ROC) at the United Nations and in international diplomacy, although Taiwan remained strategically central to the US presence in the Asia Pacific. For the British government in London, Taiwan was merely of marginal interest, although for the British administration in Hong Kong, the island remained a sensitive presence – the KMT had links with affiliated groups in Hong Kong, and throughout the period the British were under pressure to demonstrate even-handed treatment of Communist and Nationalist activists. The latter were repeatedly accused by Beijing of following a ‘Two China’ policy.

By the early 1970s, it was also clear in Taiwan that there was very little hope of recovering the Mainland, while there was increased dissatisfaction with the KMT’s continually unmet but constitutionally required promise of democracy on the part both of benshengren and some waishengren. A token free-press magazine, Free China Fortnightly (自由中國半月刊), run by a waishengren named Lei Chen (雷震), began to criticize KMT authoritarian rule; further, a few Mainlanders and Taiwanese campaigned together for local elections and for the creation of an opposition party. Internal and external challenges both increased the pressure on the KMT to justify its claim to legitimacy by reforming the political and electoral system.

However, because opposition political parties were banned, opposition took the form of the Dangwai (Outside the KMT Party) movement. In 1979, the movement’s leaders founded Formosa (美麗島雜誌) magazine as an island-wide platform for campaigning for democratic reform and raising awareness of the politics of representation. On 10 December 1979, it arranged a march in Kaohsiung in commemoration of International Human Rights Day, following which eight protest leaders were given long jail sentences (Denny 2003: 168–169). However, Amnesty International publicized their fate (Amnesty International 1980), and the KMT came under pressure from the US government and a lobby of exiled Taiwanese-Americans. Calls for democratic reform and Taiwanization gained momentum: the first major opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (the DPP), was formed in 1986 and legalized in 1989, while martial law was finally lifted in 1987.

Reform in Hong Kong took the form of managed change: the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration introduced a transitional period, at the end of which Hong Kong was to be transformed from a British colony into a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China. The Declaration provided a framework – ‘one country, two systems’ – which it was hoped would ensure the continuation of what was seen as Hong Kong’s ‘way of life’ after the 1997 handover to China. This framework has also been cited as a model for unifying Taiwan with China.

However, the Joint Declaration was permeated with what Yiu-Wai Chu (2013: 12–15) calls the ‘misrecognition’ of Hong Kong. The image of Hong Kong people to which it appealed was an older colonial conception of Hongkongers as apolitical seekers of wealth, homo economicus personified (Jones 1999: 49–50). Consequently, the Declaration included only limited protections for Hong Kong’s
‘way of life’ after 1997. Both governments ignored signs of growing political activism and demands by Hong Kong people for a voice in their own affairs; since the 1960s, the demographic and cultural profile of the city had altered, and, as noted above, a younger generation born in Hong Kong began to claim the city as their home. Before the free flow of people between China and Hong Kong came to an end in 1950, there were very few permanent residents of Hong Kong who identified themselves as ‘Hongkongers’; this changed for those who came of age in the 1970s, and who, inspired by the west, were influenced by modern universal values (e.g. democracy, human rights, and justice). This new generation participated in various student and social movements, such as the Protect Diaoyutai Movement (保釣運動), the Legalization of Chinese Language Movement (爭取中文合法化運動) and the movement that emerged in response to the Golden Jubilee School Corruption Incident (金禧事件). These movement leaders and activists, such as Szeto Wah (司徒華) and Cheung Man-kwong (張文光) later become the core members of the democracy movement in Hong Kong from the mid-1980s.

Britain attempted to give Hong Kong people political representation after the signing of the Joint Declaration, as part of the decolonization process. Indirectly elected legislative counsellors were introduced in 1985, and in 1988 there was a proposal, rejected by China, for direct elections. However, the June Fourth Incident was a catalyst for further democratic development in Hong Kong, as indicated in a pre-1997 slogan of ‘Resist Communism with Democracy’ (‘民主拒共’). This trend consolidated the social and political distinction between Hong Kong – the ‘city of law’ – and Mainland China, where the government used armed force to repress protest. Combined with the growth of local Cantonese culture, June Fourth probably did more than any government strategy to promote a strong sense of local identity.

In an attempt to stave off capital-flight, calm fears, and stem mass emigration, the colonial government introduced a Bill of Rights, offering legal protections up to and after the 1997 retrocession. For a few years in the run-up to 1997, Hong Kong experienced an astonishing flourishing of human rights discourse and legal activism, all of which contributed further to its sense of itself as a ‘city of law’. Since 1997, the popular belief in the rule of law as a core Hong Kong value has made it the lightning rod around which anxieties about the depredations of the Mainland authorities have clustered. China’s attempts to re-shape Hong Kong’s law and legal institutions have become major rallying points for anti-Mainland protests (Jones 2007).

Hong Kong scholars now agree that social, political and economic changes between the 1950s and 1970s laid the foundation for the emergence of a distinctive Hong Kong identity (Carroll 2007). Factors central to this hegemonic restructuring included: the introduction of the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1974 to end backdoor means of enhancement; the substitution of legal rights for political rights, and of legal representation for political representation; and a renewed emphasis on the rule of law as the guarantor of a level playing-field and equal opportunities for all. Government embarked on a programme of dissolving old particularistic ties and associations, and creating instead a new sense of loyalty to and identification with Hong Kong. Furthermore,
the ideology of the rule of law successfully represented as fair, just and deserved the continuing structural inequities of an undemocratic society.

Hong Kong’s sense of itself was also developed by the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, and, after June Fourth, the Wilson ‘Rose Garden’ strategy of building new infrastructure (in particular, a new airport). Stephen Teo (2000) remarks that whilst Taiwan’s Mandarin cinema prevailed in Hong Kong until the mid-1970s, thereafter there was a ‘Cantonese Comeback’. Hong Kong films extolled populist values, native language, and by the 1980s social realist films were being made by local directors concerning Hong Kong society, the plight of displaced peoples and the experience of exile (Brett Erens 2000). Local writing, Canto-pop and kung-fu flourished, assisted by a local television channel (TVB) that was created in 1967 (P.-K. Leung 2000). In the mid-1970s, songs such as ‘Eiffel Tower above the Clouds’ (鐵塔凌雲) and the theme song to the television series, ‘Under the Lion Rock’ (獅子山下) marked a significant turn towards local self-consciousness and an emotional sense of Hong Kong as ‘our home’; the latter song was regarded almost as a ‘regional anthem’. The Joint declaration and the June Fourth Incident intensified fears and anxieties about losing this ‘home’.

By such means, Ping-Kwan Leung (2000) argues, cultural work has helped define and rethink Hong Kong’s identity through the construction of various narratives about and images of the city. This burgeoning sense of identity survived the increased economic integration with the Mainland’s economy in the 1980s, following the ‘open door’ reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, and Hong Kong’s reinvention of itself as an international financial – rather than a manufacturing – centre in the 1980s and 1990s. Carroll notes that a 1985 survey showed that three-fifths of Hongkongers preferred to see themselves as Hongkongers rather than Chinese (Carroll 2007: 170). Nevertheless, they were excluded from the signing of the Joint Declaration between China and Britain. This was locally portrayed as Margaret Thatcher ‘selling Hong Kong down the river’, or as a traditional Chinese arranged marriage in which the bride had no say (Carroll 2007: 182).

Subsequent negotiations over the Basic Law, the new airport, and disputes about the post-1997 legal and political arrangements made the years between 1984 and 1997 times of heightened uncertainty and anxiety. Hongkongers were promised a high degree of autonomy and ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’, under the somewhat amorphous ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula, originally developed by Deng Xiaoping to facilitate Taiwan’s re-incorporation into Mainland China. The prospect of being returned to China made Hongkongers hyper-vigilant about actual or potential incursions from the Mainland. The notion that the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula was a ‘blueprint’ for Taiwan also meant that Hong Kong was now regarded as a harbinger of Taiwan’s fate.

In contrast, the 1990s in Taiwan saw a peaceful transition to democratic elections. Benshengren were from that time allowed to vote and stand for public office; the opposition DPP was born out of the civic struggle for political

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2 Chu (2013) describes Canto-pop as music with lyrics written in standard modern Chinese but pronounced in Cantonese.

3 In many cases this would have an ethnic-cultural label marking a distinction from other ethnic groups or foreigners in HK, and without any political or nationalistic connotation.
participation and voting rights that preceded this. On the other side, the ruling KMT sought to justify its legitimacy and was driven to reform itself and electoral system. As Shelly Rigger notes, ‘in propaganda terms, local elections helped the ruling party support its claim to democracy. In practical terms,... by rewarding local politicians and factions who joined the ruling party, elections helped Taiwanese overcome their distrust of the KMT and become active in politics through the ruling party’ (1999: 179–180). The first non-supplemental elections were held, respectively for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, for the first time recognizing that delegates who nominally represented seats on the Chinese Mainland, and who had therefore remained in office for decades unchallenged, needed to be phased out. Nearly all of the newly-elected delegates represented Taiwan (Copper 1994: 23). In 1994, direct elections were brought in for the provincial governorship of Taiwan, and for the mayorship of Taipei and Kaohsiung; the first direct presidential election took place in 1996. Lee Teng-hui, who is a benshengren and also KMT member, was the first elected President of the ROC. With Lee’s authorization, the 2-28 Incident and the White Terror were able to be commemorated in public, and the events therefore gained a certain degree of recognition leading to compensation (Shih 2014). Between 2000 and 2008, an opposition DDP member, Chen Shui-bian, was elected as the first non-KMT President of the ROC. As such, a two party system was in this way established in Taiwan. In 2008, another KMT politician, Ma Ying-jeou, won the Presidency with 58.45 per cent of the popular vote and was re-elected in 2012 with 51.60 per cent.

After 2000, Hong Kong became a ‘city of protests’. As discontent mounted about livelihood issues, poor governance, interference by Beijing, and tycoon-government cronism, Hongkongers’ sense of identity and what constituted their ‘core values’ grew. There were protests against the demolition of old colonial sites at the Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier, which were partly against the government’s ‘raze and re-develop’ priorities which favoured commercial interests, and partly a defence of iconic symbols of Hong Kong’s identity (Cartier 2011). The First of July, the anniversary of the handover, became a ritual day of protest. Even so, the 2003 July First demonstration of over 500,000 people was a watershed moment in Hong Kong history. The target was Beijing’s insistence that Hong Kong implement Article 23 of the Basic Law, which stipulated the introduction of anti-subversion laws. The demonstration alarmed Beijing and, though the Hong Kong government withdrew the proposal in the face of public opposition, Mainland pressure to re-introduce the laws remained. In the aftermath of the July First march, Beijing also pushed for greater patriotic education of Hongkongers and tightened its politico-administrative grip on the HKSAR.

Such measures to promote patriotism were castigated locally: They produced a public backlash which, in 2012, culminated in large scale anti-government protests. As with the controversy over Article 23, the government was eventually forced to withdraw its proposals for a National and Moral Education curriculum in the face of overwhelming public hostility (Bradsher 2012). There was also growing anti-Mainland feeling, principally against a flood of Mainland tourists permitted to enter the HKSAR following the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) introduced by Beijing in 2003. Intended to support Hong Kong in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and SARS, this economic integration is now viewed by Hongkongers as a Trojan Horse through which Beijing can infiltrate the territory. In
recent months, Hongkongers have pointed to their fate as a warning to the people of Taiwan, whose government is embarking upon similar economic arrangements with Beijing.

In the final years of colonial rule, the last British Governor, Chris Patten, extolled the rule of law as Hong Kong's foundation stone, the guarantor of Hongkongers' liberty and freedoms. The Bill of Rights, introduced in 1991, consolidated these promises. Fears that Beijing would seek to undermine these liberties have been ever-present – Patten warned Hong Kong people that they might have to 'stand up' for their rights if this should happen. Increasingly, this is what has transpired. Throughout the mid-2000s, further National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) interventions in the operation of the legal system followed, leading to claims that the rule of law was dead in Hong Kong. Some of the clashes centred on the issue how the basic Law's provisions about universal suffrage, promised in the Basic Law but never delivered, should be interpreted. In 2004, the NPCSC declared that direct elections for the Chief Executive or Legislative Council violated the Basic Law, reneging on the understanding that this would be in place for the 2007 elections. In 2013, the issue remained controversial, as Beijing sought to back-peddle on the promise of universal suffrage.

There is now in Hong Kong a new generation of activists, too young to have clear memories of British rule, whose critical politics is less a legacy of British colonialism than of Mainland mishandling of Hong Kong affairs. For these young activists, the social, political and economic conflicts since 1997 have led to wholesale disillusion with the 'One Country, Two Systems' formula, and they have joined forces with more established groups to resist 'Mainlandization'. Their often fluid, fleeting, and unconventional political activities regularly wrong-foot the HKSAR administration and capture public attention. Meanwhile, the 'Occupy Central' civil movement for universal suffrage and social media websites frequently call upon Taiwanese to heed Hong Kong's fate after re-integration. In asserting their own identity as separate from that of the Mainland, Hongkongers increasingly perceive their fate as linked to that of Taiwan.

In March and April 2014, Taiwan's Sunflower Movement saw civic occupation and protest against the ratification of the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with China. Their demonstrations caught political observers by surprise, in part because the protestors utilized tactics by so-called Occupy protestors that were previously seen in New York and Madrid: they occupied buildings, blocked roads and utilized social media. On 17 March, the KMT government forced the CSSTA through the KMT-majority legislature with hardly any review; the speed with which it went through can be contrasted with the subsequent controversy and ongoing debate that erupted in Taiwan's society. The CSSTA will bring about monumental changes: in particular, it will further open Taiwan's service market to China, in up to 64 categories of industries. These include education, retail, transportation, telecommunication, and cultural industries (for further information, see Harrison 2014). The passing of the CSSTA will have a significant impact on the livelihoods of ordinary Taiwanese people in various sectors; in particular, it may cause serious damage to Taiwan's economic autonomy, and some suggest it will also be detrimental to freedom of speech, and even national sovereignty. It thus has the potential to alter Taiwan's character and democratic achievements fundamentally; yet such a critical decision for Taiwan's future was rushed through
the legislature in a manner that many believe violates the principles of democratic transparency and accountability. Meanwhile, President Ma’s approval rating dropped to less than 10 per cent, making the issue a question of his and his party’s ongoing political legitimacy.

The Sunflower Movement merged more than 50 civic organizations in Taiwan, all of which agreed to transcend their differences to fight for a common cause. As Michael Cole (2014) notes, although the campaigners did not succeed in forcing the KMT to change its policy, they nevertheless succeeded in making the CSSTA and the failing governmental mechanisms into a national issue, and even an international one. It is now clear that the impact of the Sunflower Movement has extended beyond Taiwan, serving as an inspiration for other campaigning groups; in particular, there have been growing exchanges between Taiwan, Hong Kong and elsewhere among likeminded youth and organizations.

**Conclusion**

Hong Kong and Taiwan were both regarded by Chinese Imperial courts dismissively, and they became of interest to Han Chinese mainly in the context of resistance to non-Han rule over the Mainland. Both locations were thus viewed as potentially subversive, and they were only brought under imperial authority to prevent them from becoming further sources of unrest.

The centre–periphery dynamic that dominated Taiwan in the Imperial period can also be seen in the power relations between the ruling KMT Mainlanders and the Taiwanese after 1945. During the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘Outside the KMT Party’ movement sought to radicalize opposition to KMT authoritarian rule, and also gave momentum to calls for democratic reform and Taiwanization. In the 1990s, Taiwan became the first Chinese polity to become democratic, following the end of martial law and one-party rule. The politics of Taiwanese identity has since that time played an important role in Taiwan’s democracy.

In Hong Kong, the British colonial government’s policy was to emphasize rule of law, in an attempt to ensure that neither Communists nor Nationalists would predominate. This has sometimes led to the portrayal of Hong Kong as apolitical, or of British rule as impartial, but the colonial situation was of course saturated with political and commercial interests of various kinds and it is hard to see how a colonial administration could ever be ‘impartial’. However, from the 1960s a younger generation born in Hong Kong began to claim the city as their home, and the socio-political and economic changes of the 1960s and 1970s laid the foundation for the emergence of a distinctive Hong Kong identity based in particular in forms of popular culture such as film and music. As the British implemented decolonization in other regions of the Empire, Hong Kong remained in a political limbo, caught between the desire of Beijing for ‘unification’, and in London for a peaceful way out. The Joint Declaration of 1984 made limited guarantees about the Hong Kong ‘way of life’, while setting in motion a timetable for limited political reforms. The interpretation of that document has, however, fuelled on-going political protests by Hongkongers seeking greater political autonomy from the perceived anarchy of the Mainland.

In both locations, long histories of settlement, evacuation and re-settlement in contexts of war, conflict and resistance have driven the inhabitants to emphasize
particular senses of self, and thus of identity. These in turn are bound up with particular values, such as democracy in Taiwan and the rule of law in Hong Kong. The so-called ‘ethnic’ identities, such as \textit{benshengren} in Taiwan and \textit{Heunggongyahn} in Hong Kong, have emerged as new markers of difference over the last two or one decades; they challenge the very concept of ‘the Chinese’, and the result has been a politics based around representations of culture and language and competing identities. As such, following Helen Siu, “the term “Chineseness” is not an immutable set of beliefs and practices, but a process which captures a wide range of emotions and states of being. It is a civilization, a place, a polity, a history, and a people who acquire identities through association with these characteristics’ (1994:19). This observation – that identity is something fluid, negotiated, constructed and acquired, and that particular identities have emerged out of social, political and economic relationships – is one which, as this Special Issue attests, remains pertinent to contemporary debates over history, languages, human rights, and the politics of representation in Hong Kong and in Taiwan.

It is therefore hoped that this Special Issue’s comparative perspective will contribute towards understanding the processes that are involved with the transition to a representative political system in Hong Kong and the consolidation of democratic culture in Taiwan. Included here are essays as well as related commentary pieces and book reviews. Carol Jones explores law, society and culture in post-1997 Hong Kong, while Bruce Jacobs presents some hypotheses about how Taiwan’s colonial experiences relate to the development of ethnic identities. Also on identities, Fu-Chang Wang looks at the development of Holon identity in contemporary Taiwan, while Malte Kaeding compares the role of Taiwan’s social movements and perceptions of post-handover Hong Kong in the context of Hongkongization. Civil society movements are examined through a study by Simona Grano of movements in opposition to nuclear energy. Commentary pieces look at Hong Kong as a prototype of Taiwan for reunification, and at the notion of Taiwan as ‘liminal’ (the last in response to an essay on liminality that appeared in the previous volume of this journal). There is also a substantive review essay by Allen Chun that explores differences between Taiwan and Hong Kong by placing recent academic writing about the two locations side by side.

Before ending, there are two further ideas to develop from this introductory discussion: the first is that of multiple forms of Chinese-ness. One might ask why these different forms – for example those to be found in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China – are valued so differently. The second related idea is that these different forms of identity also have their own developing processes and histories. In this Special Issue the authors go some way in demonstrating how senses of identity are formed historically, often in moments of conflict, and are invented or fabricated with whatever comes to hand. When we see that identities – our identities – are ‘things’ that we ourselves have fashioned in the course of our pasts and histories, then we can appreciate that identity is surely not only associated with the grand project of nation-building, but is actually something rather less monumental and essential. The processes of sharing common pasts and memories are more fragile, but also more precious. As such, rather than being a comprehensive comparison of both locations, this selection of essays aims to make a small contribution to
debates and research particularly over issues of Taiwanization and Hongkongization, as well as of struggles for democracy and politics of representation.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Paul-François Tremlett and Ivan Hon for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

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Lost in China? Mainlandisation and Resistance in post-1997 Hong Kong

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Abstract

The ‘One Country, Two System’ formula under which Hong Kong was reunified with China in 1997 was heralded as a blueprint for Taiwan’s reintegration with the Mainland. However, Hong Kongers now complain of ‘Mainlandisation’, i.e. (1) the HKSAR’s increased economic dependence upon the PRC; (2) the undermining of its core freedoms, rights and values, and interference with the rule of law; (3) the subordination of its culture; (4) the weakening of its political institutions; and (5) the deterioration of everyday life. Strong anti-Mainland sentiments and a minor secessionist movement have arisen. As this resistance has intensified, Mainland officials face either making accommodation or further trouble.

Introduction: Anti-Mainland Feeling

In 2012, Hong Kong saw the culmination of anti-Mainland feelings (Figure 1, above). Many Hong Kongers feel their home is being ‘re-shaped by Mainlanders’ (J.H.C. Lau 2007). Their negativity is partly due to numbers: since 1997, more than half a million have moved to Hong Kong; 13.6 million visit each year, almost double the local population. Mainlanders are thus more visibly present in Hong Kong than they ever were. The introduction of the Individual Visitor Scheme in
2003 relaxed the rules on Mainland tourism, so that by 2012, Hong Kong had attracted 34.9 million visitors, representing 71.8 percent of Hong Kong total arrivals. (Hong Kong Tourism Commission 2013). A 2012 proposal to allow another 4.1 million non-permanent residents of Shenzhen multiple-entry permits triggered alarms about how Hong Kong’s population (almost seven million) was being swamped by Mainlanders.

The image which came to symbolise how Hong Kongers felt about Mainlandisation was that of a giant locust, towering over the Lion Rock: Mainlanders were ‘invaders’ devouring everything in sight, stripping Hong Kong shops of high-value items (especially gold); border villagers complained of local shops displaced by ‘pop-up’ gold shops, catering for Mainlanders. In a city short of housing, property developers built homes for Mainlanders: a quarter of all Hong Kong properties were being bought by them, and three new towns along the border near Sheung Shui were planned for Mainland buyers. Anti-development protesters claimed that:

...mainland visitors and investors... will overwhelm the new border towns with their hot money... ‘one country, two systems’ will collapse if visa-free access is given to mainlanders to visit the new towns and border area.

(quoted by Wong and Ng 2012)

Baby formula in particular became a hot issue: Mainlanders bought it in bulk to re-sell across the border, where contamination scandals had made baby formula unsafe. Shops offered special discounts on production of a Mainland passport, leading locals to complain of discrimination in their own city (see, for example, badcanto 2012; Caijing 2013). The protests forced the government to restrict baby milk purchases (Gao 2013). Mainland mothers were also targeted. Keen to acquire Hong Kong residency for their off-spring, they were blamed for taking up all the beds in local hospitals. Mainland children were ‘swamping’ local schools and nurseries, edging out local children. Urban passengers even blamed Mainlanders carrying outsize baggage for the crush on the trains to Lo Wu. When HSBC replaced the complex local script with simplified Chinese characters on its ATMs, it too was accused of ‘Mainlandisation’. Local newspapers blamed Mainlanders for everything from crime and disease to undercutting the job market (Gao 2013; see Figures 2 and 3 below). Mainlanders’ distinctive dialects, habits and dress provided ammunition for an explosion of xenophobic social media postings. These showed photos of Mainlanders urinating on the MTR and squatting in the streets. Exhorted since the 1970s to ‘Keep Hong Kong Clean’, for Hong Kongers such incidents were proof that Mainlandisation was debasing their way of life.

Resentment and hostility towards Mainlanders has other roots. In a reversal of fortunes, the newcomers were often better-off than the locals, sometimes conspicuously so. Hong Kongers have long seen themselves as superior to their ‘Ah Chan’ Mainland ‘country cousins’, but the Asian Financial Crisis and the SARS outbreak impacted negatively on Hong Kong just as China’s prosperity

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1 The ‘Ah Chan’ label follows a depiction of a country bumpkin in a popular television drama. See Mathews et al. (2008: 37 and Chapter 4).
grew. Indeed, Beijing helped Hong Kong out of its economic doldrums in 2003. Thus, where once Hong Kongers were the prosperous compatriots, they are now increasingly dependent upon Mainland largesse.

Those who govern Hong Kong seem not to have heard this groundswell of anti-Mainland sentiment. In a speech on 1 October 2012, the Chief Executive, C.Y. Leung, exhorted the population to ‘embrace every opportunity that the development of our country brings to Hong Kong’ (C. Lee 2012), arguing that greater integration with the Pearl River Delta region was ‘in the city’s ‘best interests’ (South China Morning Post 2012a). Not everyone agreed. One critic exhorted the people of Hong Kong to

… face reality. When the Mainland sneezes, we don’t just catch cold we develop pneumonia. Integration is a fact, and our future depends on it. But whilst we can’t reject it wholesale, we can deal with problems such as reducing the numbers of pregnant mainland visitors and tourists... To our national leaders, I say many Hong Kong people love China. But they express it not through waving the flag or singing the national anthem, but by protesting for dissidents and against national education. Their sentiment is unlikely to change and will only harden. We must deal with it wisely so the gulf between protesters and governors does not become unbridgeable.

(A. Lo 2012)

Leung’s pro-Mainland stance prompted large-scale confrontations and a dive in his popularity. Mainlandisation was a ticking time bomb: Hong Kongers saw their city ‘being changed too fast’ into something they feared (Chugani 2012a). Most Hong Kongers found the Mainland system ‘totally at odds with their own core values’ (Chugani 2012a). A small group of activists (The Hong Kong City-State Autonomy Movement) even called for secession and the establishment of a separate, Singapore-style, city-state (Stuart Lau 2012a). It sought to ‘safeguard Hong Kong’s autonomy’ and push for greater separation from the Mainland (Stuart Lau 2012a). Members raised the old colonial flag, claiming the territory had been better off under British rule; they even wrote a letter to the British government seeking its return. In May 2012, the Movement’s Facebook page had 2,000 subscribers; by October, this had risen to 4,300, a fast doubling of support which led to speculation about how deeply the anti-Mainland impulse ran amongst Hong Kongers. One demonstrator carried a placard reading ‘Chinese Scram Back to China’ (Stuart Lau 2012a); in the run-up to the 2012 LEGCO elections, some candidates chanted ‘down with the Communist Party’.

Mainland leaders reacted angrily. One told the protestors to ‘love China or leave’; others suggested that the Mainland should not wait until 2047, but effect Hong Kong’s full assimilation immediately (Stuart Lau 2012b). The De-Sinification/Re-Sinification debate had begun.

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2 Leung’s ratings dropped below the 50-point ‘pass mark’, and stood at a record low of 48.8. The figures were ‘the poorest recorded’ since the Hong Kong University polls began in July 1997 (Tsang 2012).
Economic Integration

For Mainlander leaders, Hong Kongers’ ingratitude is perplexing: after all, the tourist dollars from Mainland visitors rescued Hong Kong’s economy, and in 2003, a Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) was announced to promote cross-border trade and investment, giving Hong Kong companies preferential access to the Mainland domestic market. Cross-border infrastructure projects included the building of a Pearl River Delta bridge and a highway linking Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Macau (Hong Kong Democratic Foundation 1997).

The idea of merging Hong Kong and Shenzhen into a ‘mega city’ appealed to the business elites and policy advisers with ideas of creating ‘a single metropolis and an economic powerhouse bigger than London, Paris, Chicago or Los Angeles’ (K. Lee 2007). Multiple-entry electronic smart cards would permit Shenzhen permanent residents to enter Hong Kong; there would be a rail line between the two cities’ airports (K. Lee 2007). Whilst some ordinary Hong Kongers might benefit from such a plan, the principal supporters and beneficiaries were members of the pro-government business elites. Greater autonomy and democracy threatened to unmoor their vested interests and political position.
Economic integration was seen by others in Hong Kong as something of a Trojan Horse. It did not merely mean just the movement of money, plant and personnel – it required Hong Kongers to identify themselves as members of a common nation and a regional culture, with a common language, history, characteristics, and destiny: what Lagendijk calls the ‘social construction of notion of the region’, an illusory, but necessary step to legitimise the logic of global capital (Lagendijk 2007). Mainland leaders assumed Hong Kongers would welcome this: the Joint Sino-British Declaration and the Basic Law was, after all, premised on the conception of Hong Kongers as essentially economic wealth-seekers. They would ‘naturally’ integrate with the capitalist enclaves of Shenzhen and Zhuhai; the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula was based on the premise that capitalism – at any price – would attract support.

This conception of Hong Kong as an essentially economic and apolitical place has always been wrong. By describing the population as ‘residents’ and their culture as a ‘lifestyle’, the Joint Declaration had implied there was no such thing as a ‘people’ of Hong Kong and, as Turner says, ‘if there is no culture there cannot be said to be a people’ (Turner 1995: 7). Hong Kong was a ‘non-entity’, readily re-absorbed (Tambling 1997, cited in Armentrout 2007). This represented a failure by Beijing to know the people over whom it was resuming sovereignty. Subsequent re-unification efforts have all been based on the same faulty premise. Poorer sections of the population feared closer economic integration would mean further loss of jobs and/or competition from lower-paid Mainland workers; professionals feared competition from increasingly well-educated Mainlanders. The fear was that, ‘if Shanghai can reinvent itself as a great world centre, with double the population and the huge backdrop of the Yangtse basin, who [will] need this pimple on the backside of the dragon to the north?’ (Fenby 2001: 9); Hong Kong would cease to be of value to the Mainland.

By the tenth anniversary of the handover, when Mainland leaders included Hong Kong in China’s eleventh five-year plan, the idea of greater economic integration was therefore already freighted with suspicion, fear and distrust. The Hong Kong Polis likened the promised opportunities it offered to ‘a dirty old man trying to fool his little granddaughter into bed’ (Yam 2012).

Mainlandisation

Mainlandisation, Sonny Lo says, is the policy of making Hong Kong,

politically more dependent on Beijing, economically more reliant on the Mainland’s support, socially more patriotic toward the motherland, and legally more reliant on the interpretation of the Basic Law by the PRC National People’s Congress.


Hong Kong’s re-unification, Rey Chow says, was never a ‘natural return’ to the Motherland but a forced return in which China ‘masqueraded’ as a saviour whilst all the time coercing Hong Kong into submission (Chow 1992: 183). Some see this as a process of ‘re-Sinicisation’, the dilution of Hong Kong culture, loss of identity, the diminution and/or corruption of key institutions (the law, judiciary, the
Independent Commission Against Corruption [ICAC]), the loss of rights and freedoms, and the deterioration of everyday life (the rise of crime, corruption, gangsterism, cronyism). This narrative predates 1997. It subsided somewhat in the euphoria of the handover years, but has since has re-intensified. All aspects of life are scrutinised for signs of deterioration. Some point to the increase in Putonghua amongst the neon signs along the harbour; others to conflicts in which Mainlanders have demanded to be spoken to in Putonghua. John Woo’s films *A Better Tomorrow* (1986) and *Bullet in the Head* (1990) are seen as allegories of the fate post-1997 Hong Kong, documenting the loss of traditional Hong Kong values (honour, loyalty) and the individual's attempts to maintain their agency against the pressure to conform (see Sandell 2001). The loss of identity is a constant theme in local discourse. A wave of China-led anti-colonial rhetoric around 1997 depicted the British as having deprived Hong Kongers of their ‘rightful identity’, and paved the way for a new shared identity, ‘reorienting Hong Kong back to its sino-centric roots’ (Chun 2002), based in race, blood and ethnicity. A 1997 Hong Kong play (*The Archaeology Bird*) satirised this essentialist notion of Chinese identity, proposing a Hong Kong identity distinct from both Mainland China and Taiwan (Chun 2002). Such cultural tremors went unnoticed by Mainland leaders, whose intelligence on local sentiment was supplied principally by a co-opted business elite. Like colonisers everywhere, they were to see their assumptions about the natives unravel.

**Weak Walls of Law**

The economistic conception of Hong Kong was evident in the founding constitutional documents of the HKSAR – the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. As Yash Ghai points out, when China turned to economic reform in the 1980s,

> Deng’s vision did not include democratisation, but depended instead on the supremacy of the Communist Party. In the emphasis on profit for privileged groups and no democracy, the Chinese found not only allies among Hong Kong’s rich, and the beginnings of a partnership with Chinese communist regime, but also in Margaret Thatcher, the monetarist leader of the British Conservative Party. Mrs. Thatcher’s government negotiated the terms of the transfer of the exercise of sovereignty with economic reformer Deng, bringing to the negotiating table a Hong Kong well-versed in the techniques of the market economy – which China was keen to learn – and an efficient administration without democracy, which suited China’s agenda.³ It was in these circumstances that the future of Hong Kong was settled.

(Ghai 2013: 319)

Moreover, the Joint Declaration, although binding the two sovereign powers, has no mechanisms of enforcement. No formal procedures exist to test violations. The

³ A footnote here (number 14) adds: ‘Deng said to Thatcher that the main concern of the Chinese people was “that if prosperity is not maintained in Hong Kong, it might retard China’s drive for modernisation”’. Ghai’s quote is from Deng (1993: 3).
Joint Declaration was also was sparse on detail: Hong Kong’s government would consist of ‘local inhabitants’ (Ghai 2013: 321n19, referring to Article 3 [4]). All it said about the legislature ‘was that it would be “constituted by elections”’ (Ghai 2013: 321n20, referring to Annex 1, Part 1). It was vague as to the system of government (Ghai 2013: 321–322). The Basic Law was ‘destined to be an inadequate source of support’ (Ghai 2013: 325). The legal system was granted limited autonomy principally because the rule of law was seen by both the UK and China as essential to the continued functioning of capitalism in the HKSAR.

Consequently, a wide gap has arisen between this restricted conception of autonomy and what Hong Kongers thought they had been promised. The result has been years of conflict during which Hong Kongers have fought for their linguistic, cultural and legal distinctiveness and – in the political sphere – for democracy. Lo observes that between 64 to 83 percent of Hong Kongers support the introduction of universal suffrage for the direct election of the next Chief Executive. He argues that, since 1997, the concept of democracy has separated ‘the hearts and minds of some Hong Kong people from the ruling philosophy of both the central government in Beijing and the government of the HKSAR’ (Lo 2010: 1). He notes the view that a breakthrough in democratisation ‘would require a hard-line suppression from the PRC’s authoritarian regime, which secures the support of the local capitalists’ (Lo 2010: 13, citing Sing 2004: 204–205).

Mainland attempts to enforce or encourage convergence in the fields of politics, law and culture has provoked robust debates about the interpretation of the Basic Law and whether it provides room for democratic development, with every new Mainland retrenchment on universal suffrage provoking further local frustration and resistance. If the struggle for democracy is, as Lo says, a long-term and protracted affair (S. S.-H. Lo 2010: 61), so these tensions will persist. This resistance to the pains of reunification is seen by some as part of the process of Hong Kong’s ‘learning to belong to a nation’ (Mathews et al. 2008), of negotiating greater autonomy within a Greater China (Yep ed. 2013), and/or China’s re-colonisation of the HKSAR (S. [S.-H.] Lo 2007). However, it is also a process of the Mainland ‘learning to be a coloniser’. The mistakes made by Beijing in Hong Kong may indeed provide a template for Taiwan, if only in how not to set about the process of reunification.

**Patriotism, Education and Culture**

Language, as Ghai argues, often plays an important part in autonomy arrangements (Ghai 2013: 327). The legal instruments underpinning the HKSAR granted official recognition to only one form of Chinese, Putonghua. However, Cantonese is the dominant language and the promotion of Putonghua and of Mainland Chinese culture since 1997 has only served to underline the fact that Cantonese culture stands at the margins of the Chinese cultural canon. Cantonese is regarded by as ‘inferior’ to the culture of China’s Northern political centre (Beijing). This ‘belittling or distortion’ of Hong Kong’s own history and culture formed an integral part of Beijing’s strategy for the post-handover re-absorption of the territory (Vickers 2003: 273). Mainland writers, Chow argues, dismiss Hong Kong culture as a symbol of cultural decadence, artificiality and contamination by
the 'west' (Chow 1993). Official propaganda depicts Hong Kong as a place 'whose people showed a careless disregard for the poor and were solely devoted to the pursuit of money and pleasure' (Peng and Crothall 1996). Hong Kong is a 'fallen woman' whose cultural purity has been spoiled by 'Western' influences, or a 'bastard child' lacking a core sense of identity which re-adoption by China will supply (see McDonogh and Wong 2001). Hong Kongers should be grateful for the return of the 'authentic' Chinese cultural and linguistic canon. The over-arching narrative of reunification held that Hong Kong's recovery was a step in the completion of China's 'historical mission' to create a Greater Chinese nation. In Hong Kong, this required the sublimation of those cultural, linguistic, political, legal or economic differences which might disrupt China's resumption of her rightful place in world history as a strong, modern, capitalist nation (Karl 2002).

To this end, official campaigns have promoted patriotism, and the concept of kwokga (nation) and the love of the jokwok (motherland) (Wong 2005). Though the Hong Kong government promised no 'hard sell' on patriotism, its 'Ideal Citizen' campaign emphasised national songs, flags, emblems, and patriotism (Chan 1997). In 2001, the Education and Manpower Bureau specified that the school curriculum should 'nurture a Chinese identity' in students, organise cultural trips to China as well as quizzes, flag-raising ceremonies, and China-related topics. In 2002, guidelines encouraged schools to teach national identity as one of five major values. In 2003, a visit to Hong Kong by China's first astronaut was earmarked as a boost for patriotism. From 2004, a TV clip called 'Our Home Our Country' began to be played with the national anthem every evening before the news (popularly denounced as 'brainwashing') (South China Morning Post 12 March 2007). It prefigured a video series by the Committee for the Promotion of Civic Education to 'promote social harmony in the wake of recent political dissent' (A. Leung 2005). The second in this series, in 2005, featured local celebrities and exhortations for local schools to fly the national flag. Locals contrasted this with their own 4 June commemorations as a very different way of expressing 'love and hope for the nation' (C. Yeung 2005a). Loving the Chinese as a nation did not entail loving the Party. The third broadcast, in 2006, promoted the national anthem, 'Chinese virtues and arts': customs and practices such as filial piety, perseverance and harmony (W. Yeung 2006). Paradoxically, since it was broadcast in Putonghua, subtitles in Cantonese were required.

These attempts to inculcate the right kind of patriotism provoked the publication in 2005 of a popular comic book satirising patriotism. The publisher claimed its popularity lay in the public hostility to being force-fed the national anthem every day before the evening news (W. Yeung 2006). Other comic books satirising politicians and leaders proliferated. A 2012 comic book poked fun at the Chief Executive (Secretary Leung); another (Heng’s Heartfelt Ties to His Homeland, by Lau Sze-hong) described the experiences of ten secondary school students who

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4 This recalls David Lloyd's point that, from the nationalist perspective, hybridity is devalued: 'the inauthenticity of the colonised culture is recast as the contamination of an original essence, the recovery of which is the crucial prerequisite to the culture’s healthy and normative development' (Lloyd 2001).

5 One survey found that patriotism took a back seat compared to other cherished values such as the rule of law. See also P. Lo (1997).
went on a national education tour of the Mainland as ‘brainwashing’ (W. Yeung 2006).

In 2007, on the tenth anniversary of retrocession, President Hu Jintao returned to the theme of Hong Kongers’ need to ‘love the motherland’, urging a strong sense of national identity amongst the young (Cheung 2012). Schools were encouraged to undertake more flag-waving ceremonies and Mainland study trips. In 2010, the Chief Executive finally – and fatefuly – announced that moral and national education were to become a compulsory school subject (Cheung 2012).

Education has always been a prime tool of nation-building, social control and the dissemination of national culture. Morris argues that the most notable goal of the post-1997 government has been this ‘gradual harnessing of the school curriculum to promote a far stronger sense of patriotism and national identity’ (Morris 2009: 89). Of all school subjects, history is the most useful vehicle, though also the most politically sensitive, contributing to national identity and nation-building (Kan 2007).

The British were more interested in what was not taught in Hong Kong's schools, keen to keep politics out of social life. The PRC leadership, however, is more interested in re-politicisation of national history for the purposes of promoting uncritical patriotism (Vickers 2003: 243–251). Hong Kong was exhorted to 'promote students' national identity and commitment to society and to the nation' (Hui and Yeung 2001). The curriculum was explicitly re-politicised to develop a sense of Chinese identity (Kan 2007: 7). The promotion of a sense of national identity, national unity, and ‘a sense of belonging to China and its people’ became stipulated aims of the syllabus (Kan 2007: 118–119), laid out by the first Chief Executive and the 2002 Curriculum Guide (Morris 2009: 97). Subjects were to depict China in a positive light, promoting the benefits of Mainland rule and ‘a sentimental affinity for a common cultural and ethnic heritage’ (Morris 2009: 97). Schools (even kindergartens) were to adopt daily flag-raising ceremonies and oaths of allegiance.

All references to ‘Hong Kong society’ and ‘Hong Kong people’ disappeared from the secondary school History curriculum (Vickers 2003: 260). Hong Kong history, whilst still included, was regarded as peripheral to ‘one country’ history. Chinese history, with its emphasis on the Han dynasties, was ‘sacred and indivisible, to be studied in its entirety’ (Kan 2007: 120); it was also compulsory. Secondary school civics classes were redesigned to place more emphasis on China, its geography, political system and culture. Confucianism became central to the teaching of Chinese philosophy (Wan and Wong 2001).

The idea that Hong Kong culture ‘might itself offer a distinctive vision or even several competing visions – of what it means to be Chinese and Hongkongese in the modern world’ was nowhere entertained...There [was] ... no official vision of Hong Kong primarily as Hong Kong’ (Vickers 2003: 261).

It was, however, the Government’s Patriotic and Moral Education policy which provoked the most widespread opposition. Ironically, given that so much of the patriotic campaigns were directed at young people born after 1997, it was Scholarcism, a group of 150 young teenage activists, which led the opposition, arguing that the curriculum was one-sided and uncritical. The textbook for the new curriculum (The China Model) was politically biased in favour of the Communist Party. It praised the ‘Motherland’ whilst omitting any mention of controversial events such as 4 June 1989. Using social media to great effect, Scholarcism
rapidly mobilised a wide cross-section of over 90,000 school pupils, parents, teachers, activists and trade unions into a mass march on 29 July 2011, calling for the subject to be scrapped. Accused of being ‘unpatriotic’ by Beijing supporters, they responded that loving one’s country did not necessarily entail loving its government. Writing textbooks ‘to glorify communist rule’ was a ‘clear departure from the declared objective of giving students multi-faceted knowledge about the nation’ (South China Morning Post 2012b).

At subsequent demonstrations, the colonial British flag was flown; anti-national education graffiti sprang up, re-appearing every time the government erased it: at City University, students organised a 24-hour guard to prevent the authorities from removing a slogan, painted in ‘big characters’ on the university concourse and reading ‘Freedom of Thought. Academic Autonomy. Never Give In. Resist to the End’ (J. Chiu 2012). In September 2012, 120,000 protestors marched to government headquarters and for nine consecutive nights, ‘an ocean of black T-shirts swamped the Tamar site’ (D. Chong 2012); overseas Chinese joined the protests; some protesters went on hunger strike. Faced with massive opposition, rising anti-Mainland sentiments and an opinion poll disaster, the Chief Executive eventually conceded that the government would not force through the national education measures. On 9 October 2012, the guidelines for national education were dropped. The object of the patriotism campaigns – Hong Kong’s youth – had been transformed into its major opponents. A 2010 survey indicated that, whilst fewer Hong Kong teenagers identified themselves as pure Hong Kongers than in 1997 (29 percent as compared to 34 percent in 1997) there had been a sharp rise in the percentage calling themselves ‘Hong Kong Chinese’. Amongst the population as a whole, 55 percent still saw themselves primarily as ‘Hong Kong people’, whilst 49 percent classified themselves as ‘Hong Kong and Chinese citizens’; 43 percent classified themselves as ‘Chinese people’ (South China Morning Post 27 July 2007). Another survey in December 2011 found that more than a third of those polled identified themselves as ‘Hong Kong citizens’, a quarter as ‘Chinese Hong Kong citizens’, and the rest as ‘Hong Kong Chinese citizens’ or ‘Chinese citizens’. By 2012, as Hong Kong identity rose, people’s sense of Chinese identity dropped to a 13-year low. Arguably, it has been mistakes in the Mainland’s handling of Hong Kong affairs – its attacks upon the rule of law, its insistence on patriotism, the suppression of cultural difference – that has produced this state of affairs.

Language, Culture and Identity

As the above suggests, attempts to suppress Hong Kong culture have backfired. In recent years, films such as Vulgaria, I Love Hong Kong and Cold War have revelled in the celebration of a particularly robust Cantonese vernacular. Cantonese slang, ‘known for its inventiveness and its use of sexual references’ (Fenby 2001: 20) has become a cultural feature more popular than ever before. Clarke argues that Cantonese speakers have managed to avoid having their language extinguished by the Mainland by employing

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6 Survey conducted June 2007 by the University of Hong Kong. Respondents could choose more than one answer.
the use of spoken Cantonese, where the differences in tones offer possibilities for making verbal puns (conveying meanings unintelligible to those who speak official Putonghua) or the employment of ‘already culturally coded items of material culture’ (Clarke 2001: 92, quoted in Armentrout 2007).

This tactic enables Hong Kongers to maintain their own culture and modes of engagement. Playing on the differences between spoken Cantonese and Putonghua, local artists can also make verbal and visual puns and allusions, none of which are readily understood by non-Cantonese speakers or outside the Hong Kong context (Clarke 2001, cited in in Armentrout 2007). In 2013, possession of a toy wolf – whose name translated into a rude word in Cantonese – became de rigueur for pro-democracy supporters as a symbol of opposition to C.Y. Leung. He was characterised as a ‘wolf’ for his ‘perceived cunning and lack of integrity’ (T. Chong 2013).

As Vickers observes (2003: 67), the use of non-conventional characters and Cantonese colloquialisms in local comics and newspapers also retains the distinctiveness of the everyday spoken and written language of Hong Kong from the standard forms of Mainland China and Taiwan. Vickers also notes that because certain art materials (such as ink and absorbent paper) are tied to ‘pan-Chinese conceptions of high cultural tradition’, local artists also use alternative materials to construct their locally-centred works; several of these works revolve around the threat of disappearance and erasure of local cultural identity. Such projects amount to a serious contestation of official national ideology:

At a time when patriotic stories, often in the guise of cultural presentations, are being strongly promoted to Hong Kong people in an attempt to interpellate them as citizens of the People’s Republic of China, much of the best Hong Kong art is concerned to offer an alternative sense of subjecthood, and one not framed in national terms.

(Clarke 2000:101)

Vickers notes that, in 1997, three Mainland films were issued, all with patriotic themes concerning the importance of ‘national unity, morally upright political leadership, and resistance against foreign schemes to divide, dominate and exploit China’ (Vickers 2003: 69). Patriotism and nationalism were also explicit themes in a number of museum exhibitions, whilst increased collaboration with Mainland archaeologists and historians clarified for local officials the boundary between what was an acceptable narrative of Hong Kong history (Vickers 2003: 73–75). In response, some Hong Kongers mounted their own exhibitions of ‘fantasy history’ for display in local museums and galleries. Local history and archaeology have also assumed greater importance, confounding both the ‘barren rock’ narrative of British colonial discourse and Mainland belittling of Hong Kong heritage. A social movement has arisen to defend key sites of Hong Kong’s colonial heritage from

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7 The toy, ‘Lufsïg’, sold out in Hong Kong. The translation of its name used in Mainland stores sounded like an obscene Cantonese phrase for female genitalia.

8 The three films were The Opium War, Red River Valley, and The Soong Sisters.
demolition. As one protestor said, ‘It might not sound right, or politically correct even, but we’re doing this because of our fond remembrance of the colonial era’ (Tsui 2004). This ‘nostalgia craze’ raised questions about how Hong Kong treats its past, an issue which ‘may ultimately hinge on how its local leaders and the central government in Beijing resolve its present identity’ (Shirley Lau 2007). Post-handover attempts to ‘assiduously... cultivate and reinforce’ a sense that China is a homogenous and unified cultural space, and that Hong Kong has ‘an eternal and immutable place within it’ (Shirley Lau 2007) have thus met with wide and varied forms of resistance.

Social Activism

In recent years, resistance to Mainlandisation has become more overt. Since 1997, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of anti-government and anti-Mainlandisation demonstrations. Initially, there was an increase to over 2,000 public meetings and processions each year, earning Hong Kong the nickname ‘City of Protests’. By 2013, protest had become virtually an everyday phenomenon. Journalists, human rights activists, lawyers and pro-democracy politicians have all become allied in defence of civil liberties, press freedom and the rule of law (Ma 2007: 207). Everyone from the poor and the elderly to community groups has ‘taken to the streets’ (A. Lee 2002). In response, Mainland officials have become more distant from the local population. Mainland-style core security zones were implemented to isolate Mainland leaders from protesters; when Vice Premier Li Keqiang visited the HKSAR in 2011, the media were barred from 22 events. One man sporting a Tiananmen T-shirt was escorted away; three student protesters from the University of Hong Kong were held in a stairwell by police. As public demonstrations of disquiet have become more vociferous (and anti-Mainland), so police tactics have become more repressive.

The high-point of protest occurred on 1 July 2003, when 500,000 demonstrated against proposals to introduce Mainland-type anti-subversion laws under Article 23 of the Basic Law. Opinion polls in December 2002 had indicated that 54 percent of Hong Kongers were opposed to Article 23 (Ma 2007: 212, citing the Ming Pao Daily News of 14 December 2002). LEGCO member Margaret Ng had warned that there was hardly anything ‘more crucial to the preservation of Hong Kong’s separate systems and way of life than the rights and freedoms people in Hong Kong enjoyed, adding:

...a free press, the free flow of information, freedom of speech and of association, and free and open debate of political, religious or cultural views [should remain] no matter how distasteful they may be to

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9 Article 23 of the Basic Law required the government of the SAR to enact laws to prohibit ‘any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign organizations or bodies’.
government... It is universally appreciated that this should remain unchanged after reunification, and that the situation in the rest of China should not spread to the SAR.'

(Ng 2002)

Predictably, the pro-Beijing camp dismissed these views as unpatriotic and called upon all Chinese to support the law in the name of patriotism (Li 2002). The China Daily called for national security legislation to deal with ‘separatists’ like LEGCO member Emily Lau Wai-hing, blasted for shaking hands with former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui during a trip to Taiwan and allegedly stating that Taiwan’s independence should be a matter for the Taiwanese. The Secretary for Justice, Elsie Leung, stated that Hong Kongers ‘must follow mainland China’s policy on Taiwan’ and that ‘secessionist’ activities would indeed be an offence under Article 23 (E. Leung 2002). Expressing reservations about Article 23 was ‘unpatriotic’. Vice Premier Qian Qichen accused critics of having the ‘devil in their hearts’.10 One lone voice warned against a rhetoric which characterised the opposition as ‘splittists’, reminding the administration that the ‘one country, two systems’ formula was being observed from Taiwan by those already sceptical of China’s plans for ‘Great China’ unification (Li 2002). Yeung Sum argued that

Equating our democratic aspirations to a quest for independence is far-fetched. By fighting for universal suffrage, people are merely seeking a political solution to correct the systematic flaws now dogging Hong Kong. ‘Two countries, two systems’ or the quest for independence has never appeared on the people’s political agenda.

(S. Yeung 2002)

In an attempt to defuse the situation, Mainland leaders eventually agreed to place Article 23 on the back-burner. According to Lo, they were ‘shocked by the pro-democracy tide on 1 July 2003’ (S. [S.-H.] Lo 2007: 205). They responded by establishing a Central Hong Kong and Macao Work Coordination Group. This included officials from the State Council’s Hong Kong & Macao Affairs Office, the Hong Kong Liaison Office, the Macao Liaison Office, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of National Security, the Party Central Committee’s United Front Department and the People’s Liberation Army (S. [S.-H.] Lo 2007: 179). Its agents in Hong Kong (the Liaison Office and national security apparatus) adopted ‘a hard-line policy toward the democrats, and sought to single out ‘enemies’ and intimidate them (S. [S.-H.] Lo 2007: 205).

A further mass demonstration on 1 July 2004 persuaded Beijing to adopt a more soft-line policy, if only to avoid the popular vote going en masse to the pan-democrats in the September 2004 LEGCO elections. Communist Party intervention in those elections included polishing the image of pro-Beijing candidates whilst blackening that of the democrats. United Front tactics were deployed to mobilise support for the pro-Beijing DAB candidates. By such means, Lo says, the agents of Beijing ‘sank deeper into the electoral politics of the HKSAR’, to prop up their favoured regime (S. [S.-H.] Lo 2007: 206–207). Such

10 The remark was made in a television interview on 25 October 2002.
interventions were noted by locals as further evidence that ‘Mainland ways’ were undermining Hong Kong’s way of life.

The Rule of Law and its Erosion

During the anti-Article 23 controversy, Regina Ip asked the opposition: ‘What are you afraid of? We have the rule of law’ (C. Yeung 2002). This was a moot point. Events since 1997 had damaged the rule of law. On at least four occasions, it had been had undermined by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress’s (NPCSC) decision to issue interpretations of the Basic Law. The fact that the HKSAR government promoted episodes meant that it was left to the judiciary, the legal profession and the public at large to defend the rule of law and ‘minimize Hong Kong’s legal convergence with mainland China.’ (T.W. Lo 2012: 634).

Mainland interventions in the legal system have also served to entrench opposition. Since the 1970s, the government has been able to claim that Hong Kong was governed by the rule of law. Often this was pure rhetoric: corruption and inequality persisted. Nevertheless, it was powerful rhetoric, made all the more so by Chris Patten’s frequent reference to it as the foundation of Hong Kong’s way of life. Mainland interventions after 1997 activated Hong Kongers’ belief in the rule of law, transforming into a cherished ‘core value’, an icon to be popularly defended. As with national education, the mishandling of the situation by Hong Kong and Beijing created the very politicisation of Hong Kongers that both wished to avoid.

Re-union had barely begun when a conflict between the Mainland and the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) prompted some to ask, ‘who is the boss? Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal or Beijing’s NPC?’ (T.W. Lo 2012: 633) The case of Ng Ka-Ling v. Director of Immigration 11 made it clear that the Mainland was not prepared to allow the HKSAR’s courts to become an alternative locus of power. The case exemplified what Jacob calls ‘crisis by mistake’ (T.W. Lo 2012: 634), provoking ‘the worst constitutional crisis yet seen in the history of the HKSAR’ (Gittings 2007). The case began in 1997, when the Court of Appeal held that, under the Basic Law, all children of Hong Kong citizens born on the Mainland had the right of abode in Hong Kong. The Government challenged the judgment, claiming that it would ‘open the floodgates’ to at least 1.67 million Mainland migrants, swelling the population by 60 percent within ten years. It produced questionable statistics to substantiate the claim that they would overwhelm Hong Kong’s health, housing, transport and educational infrastructure. Hong Kong would be under siege. Ironically, given the later influx of Mainlanders, pro-government supporters said this was enough to make any normal person agree that the judges were out of their minds to ‘let these people in’.

As a result, surveys conducted in 1999 and 2000 showed that Hong Kongers’ anxiety about ‘over population’ stood at very high levels (Hong Kong Transition Project 2001), with many supporting the government’s opposition to further immigration from the Mainland. Indeed, it would come to seem that Beijing was Hong

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11 See Ng Ka Ling and The Director of Immigration (FACV No. 14 of 1998); [1999] 1 HKLRD 315; Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (No. 2) [1999] 1 HKLRD 577.
Kong’s saviour, protecting the territory against mad judges indifferent to public fears.

In January 1999, the CFA declared that the children in the Ng Ka Ling case were indeed entitled to right of abode in Hong Kong, a judgment heralded as an ‘almost a perfect demonstration of the rule of law’ (Ghai 1999). The South China Morning Post called it ‘the best shot in the arm for the rule of law since the handover’ (South China Morning Post 1999). However, the Chinese leaders ‘saw red’ (Jacob 1999). The CFA had argued that it had the power to invalidate actions of the NPC and the NPCSC if they breached the Hong Kong Basic Law (Jacob 1999). The Hong Kong courts had the right to determine whether an act of the NPC or NPCSC was inconsistent with the Basic Law and, if it was, the courts had the right to declare it invalid. Interpretation of the Basic Law on issues involving Hong Kong’s autonomy were thus held to be within the province of the CFA. Article 2 of the Basic Law had authorised the SAR to exercise a high degree of autonomy, and to enjoy independent judicial power, including the power of final adjudication.

Pro-Beijing critics responded that the CFA did not possess the power of final interpretation and had exceeded its authority in attempting to delimit the constitutional supremacy of the NPC in Hong Kong (Liu 1999). The ruling was seen as an attack on China’s sovereignty, ‘an attempt to turn Hong Kong into an independent political entity’; it would hinder stability and prosperity (Fenby 2001: 86). Subsequently, Mainland leaders informed the Hong Kong Secretary for Justice that the ruling should be ‘revisited’ and ‘rectified’ (Fenby 2001: 86). In June 1999, the HKSAR government then invited the NPCSC to overrule part of the court’s ruling, and to establish the NPCSC’s own right to interpret any part of the Basic Law at any time.

Later, Wikileaks would reveal that the CFA judges had considered resigning en masse, a scenario which would undoubtedly have prompted an even more severe crisis. In any event, the government’s legal victory was hollow: the administration lost popular legitimacy. The Apple Daily (1999) reported that Hong Kong citizens’ approval rating of Chinese rule dropped drastically from 60 percent in 1998 to 42 percent after the CFA incident. By the second anniversary of the handover, 43 percent of those polled said that the rule of law had deteriorated (Fenby 2001: 198). In an editorial by Jonathan Fenby, the South China Morning Post argued that the Hong Kong government had undermined the rule of law by appealing to ‘a political body [the NPC] when the decision of the highest court goes against them’ (Fenby 2001: 194), placing the supreme court in Hong Kong in a subservient position to the NPC:

…what had appeared to be a bedrock of Hong Kong’s way of life... has become subject to an essentially political process. The NPC ruling was a stark statement of where power lies... Within Hong Kong itself, there is a very real danger that application of the rule of law is becoming a partisan issue. Being for or against the interpretation route will be seen as a gauge of being for or against the government...

The Secretary for Justice branded those who make a link between

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12. The newspaper commissioned the Chinese University Asia Pacific Research Institute to conduct the poll.
interpretation and the rule of law as scaremongers who were destroying their own fortress... [She] has made it plain that the one country comes first followed by the two systems...

(Fenby 2001: 195–196)

A further four NPCSC interpretations followed, each one seen locally as undermining the autonomy of Hong Kong’s legal system. In 2004, when the NPCSC intervened to help the Chief Executive of the HKSAR (Tung Chee-hwa) resist pressure towards more democracy in the 2007 election of the CE and the 2008 LEGCO elections, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong (Joseph Zen Ze-kiun) described it as ‘our own June 4’, shattering hopes for full democracy:

…in their fierce shape, the so-called ‘guardians of the Basic Law’ came to lecture us about patriotism, and certain [Beijing officials] claimed some people wanted to achieve independence… Before we had a chance to discuss the issues surrounding universal suffrage in 2007–08, the committee had already made the decision for us.

(Hui 2004)

The third NPCSC interpretation in 2005 saw the Deputy-Secretary of the NPCSC declare that the NPCSC had unfettered powers of interpretation. An opposition group, called the Article 45 Concern Group, organised a silent march marking the death of the rule of law. Members of the group were barred from entering the Mainland: the Dean of the University of Hong Kong Law Faculty, Johannes Chan, was refused entry to Macau for a conference; Legislator and barrister Margaret Ng was refused a visa to attend an international conference in Beijing, provoking adverse international publicity (Hui 2004). Those who challenged the official Beijing line on the Basic Law were labelled disruptive and disloyal.

The NPCSC interpretations displaced the traditional legal machinery and allowed the government to fall in line with Beijing’s wishes by

...explicitly disregarding the common-law principles of interpretation used by the courts in favour of interpreting parts of the Basic Law, according to the more flexible principles that apply under the mainland legal system... [It] did so at the price of raising questions about which legal system the Hong Kong government was committed to protecting and what fundamental rights might end up being restricted if the provisions on civil liberties in the Basic Law were now also interpreted according to the Mainland’s more flexible rules’.

(Gittings 2007)\(^{13}\)

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\(^{13}\) The Mainland’s legal system places much more emphasis on legislative intent, as recalled by the drafters of the Hong Kong Basic Law. The CFA, on the other hand, laid out the common-law principles of interpretation to be applied in the cases of *Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration* [1999] 1HKLDR 577 and *Chong Fung Yuen* [2001] 2 HKLRD 533. These look at the language of the Basic Law in the light of its context and purpose. See also Ching (2004) for a discussion on how the NPCSC has interpreted Mainland law to achieve political goals.
Repeated attacks on law, barristers and the judiciary dented popular confidence in the rule of law and arguably encouraged the turn to cronyism, guanxi and corruption which came to tarnish the HKSAR government by 2012–2013. Pre-1997 fear that corruption would seep over the border seemed to be proven correct: high-ranking HKSAR officers curried favour with Mainland officials using gifts, drinks and banquets, flouting long-standing HKSAR rules designed to prevent misconduct in public office.

In June 2012, a University of Hong Kong law professor claimed that the rule of law was in continuous decline (Stuart Lau 2012c); a CFA judge, Mr Justice Bokhary, was forced to retire on age grounds, to be replaced by a more elderly judge, a decision widely seen as political. Bokhary was a liberal judge who had often ruled against the government. In a 2011 case when the CFA was divided on whether to seek an NPCSC interpretation. Bokhary had opposed it. At the time he said that,

> It has always been known that the day would come when the Court has to give a decision on judicial independence. That day has come. Judicial independence is not to be found in what the courts merely say. It is to be found in what the courts actually do. In other words, it is to be found in what the courts decide.’

*Bokhary, opening remarks, Democratic Republic of Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates LLC, HKCFA, 8 June 2011*

At the time, dozens of local NPC Deputies had petitioned Beijing for an intervention, a move seen as a ‘blatant disregard of the rule of law’ and an attempt to ‘destroy our legal system and the spirit of the law’ (Cheng 2012). Bokhary also opposed seeking an interpretation over the issue of mainland mothers giving birth in Hong Kong. In April 2012, he warned journalists against self-censorship. He had also criticised the former Secretary for Justice for bringing the rule of law under threat. As the local media put it:

> Something stinks yet we are choosing not to smell it... This business of Mr Justice Kemal Bokhary being ousted as a Court of Final Appeal judge due to age reeks of sewer stench. It attacks judicial independence. And that, in turn, is an attack on our free society... Bokhary’s liberal activism as a top judge has got up the noses of our rulers. They fear his dissenting voice. So when retirement age came they ousted him... How else can you sensibly explain sticking to the retirement age for Bokhary but not for his successor? ... If we remain mute we are allowing sewer stench to infiltrate the independence of our judiciary.

*Chugani 2012b*

Two pro-Beijing Basic Law experts called for all future CFA judges to be Chinese nationals, severing the appointment of local non-Chinese judges and non-permanent CFA judges from the Common Law world.
Over the years since 1997, other cases involving the desecration of the national and regional flag by local demonstrators have underlined the subordinate place of Hong Kong under the ‘One country, Two Systems’ formula. A series of Flag Ordinances specify that the national flag has priority, must flown in a more prominent position than the regional flag, must be larger than the regional flag, must be raised before the regional flag is raised, and lowered after the regional flag is lowered. Desecration and/or inappropriate use of the national and regional flags are prohibited. The red flag is supposed to represent the motherland, the bauhinia Hong Kong. The design implies that Hong Kong is an inalienable part of China and prospers in the embrace of the motherland. The five stars on the flower symbolize the fact that all Hong Kong compatriots love their motherland, while the red and white colours embody the principle of one country, two systems.

(Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, HKSAR v. Ng Kung-siu and Lee Kin Yun, 1999)

In January 1998, Ng Kung-siu and Lee Kin-yun were part of a peaceful demonstration organised by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China. They carried the national flag and the regional flag (Lee was also seen carrying an undamaged Taiwan flag). The centre of national flag was cut out and black ink daubed over the large yellow five-pointed star; the star itself was punctured. The Chinese character for ‘shame’ was written in black ink on the four small stars and a black cross daubed on the lowest of the four small stars. On the regional flag, one section was torn off, obliterating a portion of the bauhinia design and a black cross drawn across the design. Three of the remaining four red stars had black crosses daubed over them. At the end of the march, the defaced national and regional flags, as well as the Taiwan flag, were tied to railings outside Government Headquarters, stating that ‘the damaging and defiling of the national and regional flags was a way to express the dissatisfaction and resistance to the ruler who was not elected by the people’ (HKSAR v. Ng and Lee, 1999).

The defendants, charged with publicly desecrating and willfully defiling both flags, argued that freedom of expression was an internally recognised right, guaranteed by Hong Kong law, which could not be restricted by the Flag Ordinances. Government lawyers countered that restricting freedom of expression by criminalising the desecration of the flags was justified if necessary for the protection of public order (ordre public). The defendants were convicted, but this was later reversed by the Court of Appeal, which held that the defendants’ actions amounted to freedom of expression, a right protected under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and under Article 27 of the

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14 Stipulations for the Display and Use of the National Flag and the National Emblem and the Regional Flag and Regional Emblem, Protocol Division HKSAR Government Secretariat. See also The National Flag and National Emblem Ordinance Statutory Instrument A401 and the regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance Statutory Instrument A602.
Basic Law. The government challenged this ruling in the CFA where the judges concluded that freedom of expression was not an absolute and could, under certain circumstances, be restricted. In this instance, restriction was justified since protecting the dignity of the flags was a legitimate matter of community interest at this particular point in Hong Kong's history, where they were necessary to the adequate functioning of public institutions:

The resumption of the exercise of sovereignty is recited in the Preamble of the Basic Law, as ‘fulfilling the long-cherished common aspiration of the Chinese people for the recovery of Hong Kong’. In these circumstances, the legitimate societal interests in protecting the national flag and the legitimate community interests in the protection of the regional flag are interests which are within the concept of public order (ordre public)… The national flag is the unique symbol of the one country, the People's Republic of China, and the regional flag is the unique symbol of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region as an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China under the principle of ‘one country, two systems’… Hong Kong is at the early stage of the new order… The implementation of the principle of ‘one country, two systems’ is a matter of fundamental importance, as is the reinforcement of national unity and territorial integrity. Protection of the national flag and the regional flag from desecration, having regard to their unique symbolism, will play an important part in the attainment of these goals. In these circumstances, there are strong grounds for concluding that the criminalisation of flag desecration is a justifiable restriction on the guaranteed right to the freedom of expression.

(HKSAR v. Ng and another, 1999)

The CFA described the national flag as the symbol of a nation:

…A unique symbol… The symbol of the State and the sovereignty of the State. It represents the People's republic of China, with her dignity, unity and territorial integrity… The regional flag is the unique symbol of the Hong Kong Special Administrative region as an inalienable part of the people's Republic of China under the principle of ‘one country, two systems’…

(HKSAR v. Ng and Lee, 1999)

15 Article 27 of the Basic Law says that ‘Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike. The appellants had argued that the regional flag was not a symbol of allegiance and there was ‘no evidence that the HKSAR flag was sacred to anybody’. 
Because Hong Kong was trying to ‘integrate itself into the Chinese motherland’, reinforcement of territorial and national unity were matters of ‘fundamental importance to this aim’ (HKSAR v. Ng and Lee, 1999).

The decision was a blow for freedom of expression, one of the main features of Hong Kong’s ‘way of life and political culture’ (Ng 1997). Fears grew about the resilience of other freedoms: a 2001 survey showed that freedom of the press and freedom of speech were felt to be under threat (Hong Kong Transition Project 2001: 28). The Government was already suspected of following Beijing’s orders by interfering with the editorial independence of Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK). Some RTHK programmes had discussed the ‘two states’ theory expounded by Taiwan’s president, Lee Teng-hui, following which Pro-Beijing figures had pressurised the Government to move the head of RTHK, Cheung Man-yee, to a post in Japan (C. Yeung 1999). The dismissal of a South China Post editor was also alleged to have been politically motivated.

By 2005, however, it seemed that the CFA had learnt how to protect the rule of law without incurring Beijing’s wrath. The case before it concerned the conviction of several Falun Gong protesters. Falun Gong was banned on the Mainland as an ‘evil cult’, bringing the ‘one country, two systems’ formula into sharp focus (Yeung May Wan v. HKSAR [2005] 2 HKLRD 212). In 2002, some members were arrested for causing an obstruction during a peaceful demonstration outside the Mainland government’s Liaison Office, where they had been protesting against the treatment of members on the Mainland. Appealing against their conviction, they argued that they were defending human rights and the rule of law, and that the charges against them were malicious persecutions due to pressure from the Mainland (Associated Press 2003). The case was seen as ‘a key test of judicial independence under Chinese rule’ (Lai 2005).

This time, the CFA concluded that, although the demonstrators had obstructed a public place (Gittings 2007), this did not automatically constitute an offence, nor was obstruction of a public place a serious enough matter to muzzle demonstrators exercising their right to free speech: ‘...when obstruction results from persons exercising the constitutional right to demonstrate, the importance of that fundamental right must be given substantial weight in deciding whether the obstruction is reasonable’ (Yeung May-wan and others v. HKSAR, Final Appeal judgement 2005)

The CFA’s decision was particularly striking because Tung Chee-hwa, using language more familiar in the Mainland, had called the group an ‘evil cult’ during a speech to LEGCO. He had also tried to bar overseas Falun Gong followers from entering Hong Kong ‘rather than upholding the group’s continued right to exist in Hong Kong under one country, two systems’ (D. Gittings, 2007). A local cartoonist depicted him jumping up and down over the prostrate body of the rule of law.

Such cases have heightened Hong Kongers’ sensitivity to the role played by law in protecting their way of life against Mainlandisation. They have also led to sometimes unlikely coalitions amongst social groups, pan-Democrats, the Bar and academia in defence of the rule of law. As 2012 ended, however, Mr Justice Bokhary warned that there was ‘a storm of unprecedented ferocity’ gathering over the rule of law in Hong Kong (A. Chiu 2012). Though the commitment of the people to the rule of law and freedom in Hong Kong was ‘unsurgeable’ (A. Chiu 2012) there were, as local law professor Eric Cheung Tat-ming argued, ‘tensions
between Hong Kong and the mainland’ (quoted in Cheng 2012). A few years earlier, Benny Tai Yiu-ting, Associate Dean of the University of Hong Kong’s law faculty, said that the ‘one country, two systems’ model were becoming much worse much faster:

As early as the 1990s, I felt increasingly that the conflicts in the ‘one country, two systems’ would be irreconcilable. This [system] would only be possible if Hong Kong people gave up their most important constitutional values, or if the Communist Party abandoned its one-party dictatorship... After 1997, we’ve seen constant tussles... The people of Hong Kong have demonstrated their strong aspirations for democracy and change. It resulted in full-scale control by Beijing... It’s fair to say Beijing has also changed. They know they have the power... The crux of the problem now is that the NPC Standing Committee has time and again asserted its authority and no longer restrains its power... Without any power to check the exercise of power by the Standing Committee, Hong Kong people can only influence the process through public opinion and mass movement.  

(Tai, quoted in C. Yeung 2005b)

Despite – or perhaps because – the walls of law surrounding Hong Kong have faced such constant battering by Mainland critics, the rule of law has become the core value amongst Hong Kong people. It symbolises all that makes Hong Kong distinctive from the Mainland. Officials determined to ‘Mainlandise’ Hong Kong and bring the territory to heel only succeeded in strengthening locals’ resolve to defend it.

**Conclusion: Lessons To and From Taiwan**

Repeated demonstrations of Beijing’s sovereign power have only served to crystallise for Hong Kongers their core values and their identity, whilst hardening their opposition to Mainlandisation. Faced with ‘cultural emasculation’ (Amuta 1989) they have responded by entrenching language and culture.

Arguably, Taiwan has a more long-established sense of itself. If so, popular resistance to Mainlandisation is likely to be stronger – but also different. Having once been denied an identity by the British, Hong Kongers are perhaps more expert in the arts of surviving domination by means of covert resistance, through symbol and subversion of the dominant narrative of reunion with the Motherland.

The ‘one country, two systems’ formula was originally devised by Deng Xiaoping in the 1950s as a means of securing the allegiance of Tibet and Taiwan (Hung and Kuo 2013). Finding it difficult to establish direct governance, Beijing co-opted the ruling elites, a strategy which succeeded for a time. Ultimately, however, attempts to suppress local diversity and create a homogeneous proletarian nation failed in Tibet. In Taiwan, Beijing ‘tried to win the hearts of the Taiwanese by hinting that unification would bring about social progress and the end of authoritarian rule... and promising high-level autonomy’ (Hung and Kuo 2013: 196). However, in the late 1980s, the Democratic Progressive Party was labelled an enemy of re-unification. Leaders of social movements and opposition forces were viewed as ‘malicious traitors... manipulated by evil imperialist forces’ (Hung and Kuo 2013:
much as pan-democrats were vilified in Hong Kong. Beijing shifted its support to the KMT but with the marginalisation of the KMT in the 1990s it lost its leverage and, in the face of rising Taiwanese separatism, resorted to shows of military strength and verbal attacks. The response was a more pro-independence stance, a ‘de-Sinicisation’ project, and the rejection of unification policies (Hung and Kuo 2013: 198–199), all of which resonate with the developing situation in Hong Kong.

The history of Tibet and Taiwan thus has lessons for the CCP about Hong Kong. Meanwhile, however, Hong Kong activists use social media to warn the Taiwanese what ‘one country, two systems’ looks like. The potential for an alliance of the discontents cannot have escaped Beijing’s notice.

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Taiwan's Colonial Experiences and the Development of Ethnic Identities: Some Hypotheses

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Common wisdom argues that Taiwan currently has four ethnic groups: (1) the indigenous or aboriginal ethnic groups (原住民); (2) the Hokkien (福建) or Hoklo (福州), who speak the Southern Fujian or Minnan (閩南) language; (3) the Hakka (客家); and (4) the Mainlanders (外省人). Such a characterization is too simple. For example, the aboriginal groups are categorized officially as belonging to fourteen different tribes, which vary considerably both in language and in culture, but these fourteen tribes do not include such aboriginal groups as the Siriya, Luilang and Pazeh, which have yet to obtain government recognition.

During the Manchu Qing (滿清) Dynasty the Hokkien group was actually divided into two major groups, the Quanzhou (泉州) and the Zhangzhou (漳州), who came from different parts of southern Fujian province and engaged in very serious ethnic conflict. Part of this paper analyzes this ethnic divide within the Hokkien group. The intra-Hokkien ethnic conflict ameliorated during the Japanese period and has much less importance today.

Finally, the Mainlanders came from very diverse parts of China after 1945, and especially during 1948–1949, when the Chinese Nationalist regime lost out to the Chinese Communists. These divisions among the Mainlanders were especially important during the authoritarian rule of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國). As Taiwan has democratized, the second-generation Mainlanders born in Taiwan have become less aware of the differences among the Mainlanders who came from China. In addition, democratization means that the formerly political powerful Mainlanders have lost power and status and, thus, become more defensive. As a result, they now play the ethnic card in electoral politics. In the words of Cheng and Hsu:

[Collective action by the ethnic minority in Taiwan has always created high instrumental value. Democratization in Taiwan has inevitably

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1 An earlier version of this article was delivered to the panel on ‘Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Modern State’ at the 1st World Congress of Taiwan Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 26–28 April 2012. The author wishes to express appreciation both to the Congress and to the Australian Research Council for a Discovery Grant on ‘A History of Taiwan’, which supported the research for this article.

2 For the latest in government recognition of Taiwan’s aboriginal groups, see Republic of China Yearbook (2011: 29–35).
reversed the preexisting imbalance of power between an ethnic majority that used to be in a subordinate position and an ethnic minority that used to be in a dominant position. Hence, it is utterly rational for mainlanders in Taiwan to undertake calculated collective actions if only to avoid being marginalized in a new political game. Playing ethnic politics is simply smart politics, as it minimizes costs that the new political game may impose while also ensuring or even enhancing group benefits that the new political game no longer confers automatically.

(Cheng and Hsu 2002: 152)

This paper does not attempt to discuss the modern politics of ethnicity in Taiwan, as this has been done by many others including Wang Fu-chang (e.g. 2004, 2012, and his paper in this current volume), Chang Mao-kuei (e.g. 1994), Wu Nai-the (e.g. 1994) as well as the current writer (e.g. Jacobs 2005, 2012). Rather, the writer attempts to use his current research on Taiwan’s history – which is still in a preliminary stage – to raise hypotheses about ethnic groups in Taiwan’s history.

The next section of this paper raises three hypotheses about Taiwan’s history which have relevance to ethnicity. The final section examines ethnicity in Taiwan’s history. One final note: even though the paper uses such terms as ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic group’, it does not attempt to define either term. Trying to define these terms remains extraordinarily complex and it seems that little is gained through such efforts. 3

Three Hypotheses with Relevance to Ethnicity in Taiwan’s History

First Hypothesis: Taiwan Was Ruled by a Succession of Six Colonial Regimes from 1624 to 1988

In recent years, the writer has argued (Jacobs 2008, 2013) that from the establishment of the Dutch colony in 1624 until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, Taiwan was ruled by six colonial regimes: (1) the Dutch (1624–1662); (2) the Spanish (1626–1642), who ruled in north Taiwan simultaneously with the Dutch; (3) the Cheng family (1662–1683); (4) the Manchu Qing empire (1683–1895); (5) the Japanese (1895–1945); and (6) the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime (1945–1988). In fact, this analysis was not new. Su Beng (史明) made this very point in his path-breaking history of Taiwan first published in Japanese in 1962 (Shi 1962) and later published with revisions in Chinese (M. Shih 1980) and again, in a greatly abridged version, in English (Su 1986). 4

What is a colonial regime? The writer simply defines the term: a colonial regime is rule by outsiders for the benefit of the outsiders. This definition fits all of the six cases in Taiwan. Colonial regimes may also include migrants from the colonial motherland. Thus, from about 1909 until independence in 1962, ten percent of

3 For an example of the difficulties, see S.-M. Huang et al. (1994).
4 Shi Ming himself romanizes his name as Su Beng, the Hokkien pronunciation. Born in 1918 and originally named Shih Chao-hui 施朝暉, Su remains active even though he is now over 90 years old. See H.-C. Shih (2009).
Algeria’s population were French colons. In Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period, Japanese accounted for six percent of the population (E. I-T. Chen 1970: 144n35) and under the Chinese Nationalists, Mainlanders accounted for ten to fifteen percent of the population.

When the Dutch arrived in Taiwan in 1624, Taiwan was an island of Austronesian aboriginal peoples. At that time, Taiwan had no permanent Han Chinese communities. Han Chinese came to Taiwan temporarily for trade with the aborigines, for fishing and for piracy. Dutch estimates suggest these Han Chinese at most totalled from several hundred to about 1,500 persons (Blussé 1984: 177; Shepherd 1993: 85; Chiu 2008: 128). When the Spanish came to northern Taiwan a few years after the Dutch, they found virtually no Han Chinese there (Andrade 2008: 83). The aboriginal population of Taiwan at the time was about 100,000 (Shepherd 1993: 7, 14; Andrade 2008: 30).

Almost fifty years ago, one of the earliest Western scholars on Taiwan history, Laurence G. Thompson, noted: ‘The most striking fact about the historical knowledge of Formosa is the lack of it in Chinese records. It is truly astonishing that this very large island… should have remained virtually beyond the ken of Chinese writers down until late Ming times (seventeenth century)’ (Thompson 1964: 163). An early text from about c.1350 may refer to Taiwan, but it mentions no Han Chinese there and states ‘the foreign countries start with this one’ (Thompson 1964: 169).

Around 1600, Japanese pirates used Taiwan as a base to attack Fujian. Thompson translates an account of Chen Di (陳第), who visited Taiwan in 1603 as part of an expedition to drive out Japanese pirates. Chen Di’s account of Taiwan’s aborigines is very close to the accounts of the Dutch who came (and stayed) two decades later. Thus, both Chen Di and the Dutch mention the uxorilocal family system, the marriage system whereby the husband lived in men’s quarters and visited his wife’s house without being announced, the long hair of the men and the fact older women broke their eyeteeth, headhunting by the men, and the proliferation of deer on the island.

Few readers will have difficulty with characterizing the Dutch and Spanish or the Japanese regimes as colonial. This leaves the Cheng family, the Manchus and the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo as potentially more interesting cases. For this paper, we will deal very briefly with these three cases.

Cheng Ch’eng-kung (鄭成功), also known as Koxinga (國姓爺), and his father, Cheng Chih-lung (鄭芝龍), also known as Nicolas Iquan, had run huge trading empires from their bases in southern Fujian. With the fall of the Ming, Cheng Ch’eng-kung remained loyal – at least on the surface – and helped the Southern

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5 For the population of Algeria in 1909, see Answers.com (n.d.); for the population in 1962, see Global Security (n.d.); and for the population in 1966 after the French left, see Country Studies (n.d.).
6 This and the following two paragraphs are from Jacobs (2011: 196–197).
7 For the translation of Chen Di’s 陳第 Dongfan ji 東番記 [An Account of the Eastern Barbarians], see Thompson (1964: 172–178).
8 For more detail, see Jacobs (2013: 570–575).
Ming continue its rebellion in southern China. In other words, Cheng Ch’eng-kung did want to ‘restore the Ming’ and he did have some successes fighting against the Manchus until his failure to take Nanjing in 1659.

The last Ming pretender, the Yung-li (永曆) emperor, died in Yunnan probably on 19 or 25 May or 11 June, 1662 (Struve 1986: 69). The Dutch surrendered to Cheng Ch’eng-kung on 1 February, 1662, so the last Ming pretender was still alive when Cheng Ch’eng-kung took over Taiwan. Cheng Ch’eng-kung died of illness at the age of thirty-nine on 23 June 1662 (Crozier 1977: 16), just a short time after the last Ming pretender died. The cause of his death remains unclear, but Tonio Andrade (2008: 214, 224n42) makes a good case that it might have been from tertiary syphilis. In any case, Cheng seems to have become insane before he died (see also Wills 1974: 27–28).

The successors of Cheng Ch’eng-kung basically lost control of all their Mainland territory except for a small area around Xiamen, but they continued to build a commercial empire that traded widely (Wills 1999: 100). In the words of a well-known Taiwan historian, the Cheng family operated ‘with the status of an independent nation and conducted foreign relations with Japan, Holland, Spain, England and other countries’ (F.-S. Huang 2005: 18). The Cheng regime also used Dutch colonial institutions, though they raised taxes. (The Chinese Nationalists did a similar thing following the defeat of the Japanese in 1945) Finally, the Cheng regime at most doubled the population of Chinese in Taiwan, from 30,000–50,000 to 50,000–100,000 (Wills 1999: 98). With an aboriginal population of about 100,000 (Shepherd 1993: 7, 14; Andrade 2008: 30), the Cheng regime constituted a minority of outsiders who ruled Taiwan.

Most people who assert that Taiwan is ‘Chinese’ focus on the two centuries of Manchu control from 1683 to 1895. The Manchu empire was administratively and ideologically very complex. Its rulers were all Manchus, as were many of its high officials. Manchus, for example, dominated the Grand Council (Crossley 1999: 14n24). As Han Chinese accounted for over ninety percent of the empire’s population, many high officials were naturally Chinese, but the ultimate sources of power rested with the Manchus, not with Chinese:

At the end of the eighteenth century the Qing empire encompassed an area twice the size of Ming China...The court handled this expansion in a range of fashions without any one model of incorporation and administration. Differentiation and heterogeneity came to be the keys to the division of space within the empire. As a conquest dynasty, Qing political culture and institutions derived as much from the traditions of Inner Asia as they did from traditional Confucian political theory.

(Tighe 2005: 21)

China, like Taiwan and many other places in East and Central Asia, had become part of the multinational Manchu Empire. And, Manchu rule in China differed from

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9 For a useful, recent biography of Cheng, see Clements (2005).
Manchu rule in Taiwan in at least a few respects, such as the terms of office of local officials.\textsuperscript{10} Qing attitudes toward Taiwan remained ambivalent over their two centuries of rule. According to John Shepherd:

\begin{quote}
even after paying a high price to defeat the rebel Cheng regime, the court still had to be convinced that the strategic importance of Taiwan justified retaining the revenue-poor island within the empire... [In Taiwan] the state was saved the expense of initial pacification of the natives... because it inherited the system of taxation and control created by the Dutch and continued by the Chungs.
\end{quote}

(Shepherd 1993: 408, 409)

This substantially reduced the costs of administering Taiwan, yet in its first century of rule, Qing administration remained limited to the western plains of Taiwan (Shepherd 1993: 178–214, especially maps 7.1 [page 188], 7.2 [pages 192–3], and 7.3 [pages196–7]).

In summary, two key points about Manchu control of Taiwan need to be made. First, Manchu control was – at best – loose, ‘minimal’ and partial. Substantial parts of Taiwan remained outside of Qing control throughout whole period of Qing rule in Taiwan (1683–1895). Secondly, this partial Qing control was not Chinese, but Manchu. Thus, despite administration by some officials of Han Chinese ethnic origin, for Taiwan the Qing period was another period of foreign colonial rule.

As noted earlier, few would have difficulty characterizing the Japanese regime (1895–1945) as colonial.\textsuperscript{11} Comparing the Japanese colonial regime with the Chinese Nationalist colonial regime (1945–1988) that replaced it, we find that the two regimes shared at least six characteristics in terms of their nature and in terms of the timing of their policies.

First of all, both regimes considered the Taiwanese natives to be second-class citizens and both systematically discriminated against the Taiwanese. Under the Japanese, for example, a Taiwanese never held a position above head of county (\textit{gun} 縣; see E. I-T. Chen 1970: 134). In October 1934, after almost 40 years of colonial rule, the Japanese finally unveiled their ‘long-awaited reform of local autonomy’, but this ‘outraged the Formosans... because what had been granted was, in essence, a rigged system in favor of Japanese residents’ (E. I-T. Chen 1972: 493–494). Similarly, when the Chinese Nationalist Party took over from the Japanese in late 1945, Taiwanese were excluded from many jobs in both central and local government. In addition, under both Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, Mainlanders, who account for less than fifteen percent of Taiwan’s population, always had a majority in the Cabinet and in the Chinese Nationalist Party’s Central Standing Committee (J.J. Wu 1995: 44, 103). Right until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, no Taiwanese ever held the position of Premier or Minister of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Economics, Education, Finance or Justice (\textit{Nianbiao} 1994: 231–233), Director of the Government Information Office,

\textsuperscript{10} Personal Communication from R. Kent Guy, 24 October 2007.

\textsuperscript{11} This and the following seven paragraphs draws upon Jacobs (2008: 41–42; 2012: 23–26; 2013: 573–575).
Chairman of the Economic Planning Commission or any senior military or security position. At least until 1983, no Taiwanese had ever held such key Kuomintang positions as Secretary-General or Director of the Organization, Youth, Policy or Culture Departments (Lan 1983).

Secondly, both regimes clamped down very hard at first, killing tens of thousands of Taiwanese. Davidson (1903: 365–366) estimated that close to 8,000 Taiwanese died resisting the Japanese in 1895; Lamley (1999: 207) says that the Japanese killed 12,000 Taiwanese ‘bandit-rebels’ during 1898–1902; while a Japanese source (Ito 2004: 138–139) states that the Japanese colonial regime executed over 32,000 ‘bandits’, more than one percent of Taiwan’s population, in the same period. In March 1947, as a result of the 28 February 1947 Uprising, Kuomintang armies came from the Mainland and slaughtered from 10,000 to 28,000 of Taiwan’s leaders and educated youth.

Third, both regimes continued to rely on oppression for about twenty-five years. During the Japanese colonial period, this was a period of military governors, strong rule through the police, and continued repression. From 1907 to 1915, more than eight hundred Taiwanese were executed (Lamley 1999: 211). According to official figures, during the White Terror of the 1950s, the Kuomintang executed 1,017 people and during the whole period of martial law from 1950 to 1987 some 3,000 to 4,000 people were executed for political offenses (Qiu 2005: [1] xiii).

Fourth, owing to international and domestic circumstances, both colonial regimes ‘liberalized’ after about a quarter century. Towards the end of World War I, Woodrow Wilson gave his speech about ‘self-determination’ and the Koreans had a major revolt, called The March First (1919) Movement. The liberalization under ‘Taisho (大正) Democracy’ at this time enabled public discussion in Japan of various policies. These discussions began to influence Japan’s colonial policies in Taiwan and led to the appointment of civilian governors from October 1919 until September 1936. While police repression continued, this was also the period when Taiwanese, often in cooperation with liberal Japanese, began their political movements (E. I-T. Chen 1972). Similarly, under the Chinese Nationalist Party, in the early 1970s, with Taiwan’s defeat in the United Nations, the Diaoyutai (釣魚台) Movement, the activities of The Intellectual Magazine (Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌) and the promotion of Chiang Ching-kuo to the premiership in 1972, Taiwan began to liberalize (Jacobs 2010: 440–456; 2012: 47–68).

Fifth, as both regimes came under pressure, they again stepped up repression. Under the Japanese, repression came with the appointment of military governors in 1936, and the push toward assimilation under the kōminka (皇民化) movement, and World War II. Under the Kuomintang, repression occurred following the Kaohsiung Incident of 10 December, 1979.

Finally, both regimes tried to make Taiwanese speak their ‘national language’ (Japanese kokugo, Chinese guoyu 國語) of Japanese and Mandarin Chinese respectively, as part of their larger cultural attempts to make Taiwanese second-class Japanese and Chinese.

Ultimately, the Allied Powers defeated the Japanese and forced them to leave Taiwan. The reforms in the last eighteen months of Chiang Chiang-kuo’s life, the accession of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency, and cooperation between the moderate elements in the Chinese Nationalist Party and the moderate elements in the new opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led to the end of the
Chinese Nationalist Party’s colonial dictatorship and to the island’s democratization.

Thus, we can see that from the arrival of the Dutch in 1624 until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988, Taiwan was ruled by a succession of six colonial regimes.

**Second Hypothesis: Colonial Regimes are Essentially Racist**

In the words of Albert Memmi:

> Racism appears then, not as an incidental detail, but as a consubstantial part of colonialism. It is the highest expression of the colonial system and one of the most significant features of the colonialist. Not only does it establish a fundamental discrimination between colonizer and colonized, a *sine qua non* of colonial life, but it also lays the foundation for the immutability of this life.

(Memmi 1965 [1957]: 74)

While Memmi talks about European colonization, it is quite relevant that the writer first saw reference to Memmi’s work in a discussion of Japanese colonization of Korea (Eckert *et al.* 1990: 319). All six colonial regimes in Taiwan’s history – all of which came from outside of Taiwan – discriminated against each and all of Taiwan’s ethnic groups. Such discrimination contributed to a sense of ethnic difference.

**Third Hypothesis: Colonial Regimes often Use Strategies of ‘Divide and Rule’ to Control the Colonized**

In looking at Taiwan’s history, we note numerous cases in which the colonial authorities applied ‘divide and rule’ tactics\(^{12}\) to further divide and control different ethnic groups.\(^{13}\)

**Ethnic Groups in Taiwan’s History**

**The Dutch Period**

When the Dutch arrived in Taiwan, the island was divided among several different aboriginal groups. Clearly, the Dutch used ‘divide and rule’ tactics: ‘Divisions among the aboriginal population worked against a united response to the Dutch presence. Dutch methods of administration maintained the isolated aboriginal villages in a posture of weakness’ (Hauptman and Knapp 1977: 176; see also Chiu 2008). The Dutch also clearly maintained a sense of superiority over both the various aboriginal groups and the Chinese whom they brought to Taiwan for labor.

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\(^{12}\) The common Chinese translation of ‘divide and rule’ is ‘分而治之’.
The Chinese, whom the Dutch had imported, and the aborigines also came into conflict. In a move with parallels to later Manchu rule, the Dutch used the aborigines to help put down the Chinese rebellion of 1652 (Andrade 2008: 182).

**The Manchu Period**

Ethnic conflict between various aboriginal groups and between the aboriginal groups and immigrants from China continued under Manchu rule. However, under the Manchus, ethnic divisions among the Chinese immigrants also developed and led to quite substantial armed struggles (xiédòu 城鬥) between these groups. The earliest Chinese ethnic group came from the Quanzhou (泉州) area of southern Fujian. They often came as shop keepers, factory owners or workers and they settled along the coasts or in ports. The immigrants from Zhangzhou (漳州), also in southern Fujian, came later and tended to settle on the inland plains and engage in agriculture. The Hakka (客家), mainly from eastern Guangdong, came later and settled in upland areas. After the Hakka, much smaller groups came from other areas of Fujian such as Fuzhou (福州) and Xinghua (興化). These groups tended to live in cities and engage in the three trades concerned with the three knives (三刀): tailors who used scissors (剪刀), cooks who used kitchen knives (菜刀), and barbers who used razors (剃刀). Even in the 1970s, Quanzhou people tended to be in commerce and industry, while Zhangzhou people engaged in agriculture (C.-L. Chen 1972: 130).

The three big ethnic groups – the Quanzhou, Zhangzhou and Hakka – engaged in substantial armed struggle. Of these, only the largest group, the Quanzhou, who accounted for about 45 percent of Taiwan's population at the end of the Manchu period (calculated from C.-L. Chen 1972: 129–130), fought among themselves on the basis of origins from different counties (縣) (Lamley 1981: 283). The Zhangzhou Hokkien, who accounted for about 35 percent of Taiwan's population, and the Hakka, who accounted for about 13 percent at the end of the Manchu period (calculated from C.-L. Chen 1972: 129–130) remained much more united as groups (Lamley 1981: 283). Yet, even the two Hokkien groups could unite when faced with a large Hakka opponent, as in the Hsia-tan shui river basin (下淡水溪) (now the Kaoping River [高屏溪]) on the border of modern Kaohsiung and Pingtung in southern Taiwan (Lamley 1981: 294).

In China, the existence of these ethnic groups did not lead to armed struggle. There was no widespread Hoklo–Hakka armed struggle ‘in areas of mixed habitation along this socio-linguistic boundary’ (Lamley 1981: 286). Similarly, there was not widespread conflict between the Quanzhou and Zhangzhou peoples in Fujian. In addition, they lived peacefully together in such places as Xiamen (Lamley 1981: 286). However, when these groups came to Taiwan, ‘they tended to form discrete communities and perpetuate the diverse customs of their native subcultures’ (Lamley 1981: 282).

What divided these three main ethnic groups with origins in China? Between the two Hokkien groups and the Hakka, at least six factors divided the two groups. First, the Hokkien and Hakka languages are quite different. Second, Hakka women did not bind their feet. Third, Hakka women had distinctive hairstyles. Fourth, the two groups had religious differences in festivals, temple names and deities. Fifth, the two groups had different architecture. Finally, they ate different foods (Lamley...
According to Lamley (1981: 292), among the Quanzhou and the Zhangzhou, the key differences were religious as the two groups had different deities, made offerings at different times and offered the gods different meats and delicacies (Lamley 1981: 293).

The armed struggles between the three major ethnic groups led to separate settlements in Taiwan. Even as late as 1926, in 50 percent of districts on Taiwan's west coast, over 80 percent of the population came from just one of the three main ethnic groups. In 81 percent of the districts, at least 60 percent or more of the population came from just one ethnic group (Shepherd 1993: 315; see also his map on page 314 for the distribution of these three main ethnic groups in Western Taiwan).

These armed struggles on occasion caused people to move. Near where the author has conducted considerable field research, the Zhangzhou people left Pei-kang (北港) in modern Yunlin County, where the Quanzhou dominated, and moved east to found Hsin-kang (新港) in contemporary Chiayi County. Quanzhou in Pei-kang would not marry their daughters to Hsin-kang, though they would accept brides from the latter. Similarly, in what is now southwestern Miaoli County, feuds among the three main ethnic groups during the mid-nineteenth century led to the formation of three separate port towns (Lamley 1981: 301).

The major rebellions in Taiwan during Manchu rule also involved ethnicity (Lamley 1981: 307). The leader of the great rebellion of 1721, Chu I-kuei (朱一貴), was from Zhangzhou. Early on, the local military commander mobilized 'civilized' aborigines to fight the rebellion with a bounty for each rebel killed. The 'aborigines proved overenthusiastic and started killing innocent Chinese and looting commoners' homes', thus driving 'large numbers of Chinese into the rebel camp.' (Shepherd 1993: 309). Ultimately, the recruitment of Hakka militia was crucial to defeating Chu I-kuei and the grateful commander lifted restrictions on Hakka migration to Taiwan (Shepherd 1993: 316–317). The leader of the Lin Shuang-wen (林爽文) rebellion of 1786–1787 was also of Zhangzhou origin, and both Quanzhou and Hakka militia helped put down the rebellion (Li 1999: [1] 64, 65). Aborigines too seemed to have been involved with both the government and the rebels (Shepherd 1993: 324–328).

Since Taiwan was administered as part of Fujian province, local civil and military officials considered the Hakka from Guangdong as ‘outsiders’. Sometimes the local civil and military officials actually exacerbated the Hokkien–Hakka conflict (Lamley 1981: 308). In fact, the Manchus often used ‘divide and rule’ tactics to control the ethnic groups. As Lamley has said, ‘Ch'ing [Qing] authorities fully understood this kind of competition among rival elites and attempted to make use of it' (Lamley 1981: 311).

Some writers argue that frontiers are often violent. In fact, whether or not frontiers are violent depends upon settlement patterns. In the United States, settlers often preceded the government and the American frontier was often characterized by violence. In Australia, on the other hand, government often went to the frontier with the settlers (or even before) and Australian frontiers tended to be peaceful. Some historians argue that Taiwan as a frontier followed the American pattern, but Lamley, who has read an extensive amount of documentation, argues that the frontier did not contribute to violence in Taiwan: ‘Ch'ing [Qing] records also serve to refute the commonly accepted idea that
subethnic dissension prevailed only among frontier settlements adjusting to a new environment’ (Lamley 1981: 316).

Ethnic conflict in Taiwan declined, according to Lamley, with an increase in Taiwan identity beginning in the 1860s. Lamley argues: ‘Taiwan’s gentry leaders began to foster a wider sense of provincial identity that tended to override local prejudice’ and that Japanese rule ‘hastened the growth of a more distinctly Taiwanese perspective among the island’s Chinese [sic] inhabitants. This perspective greatly reduced the significance of subethnic divisions’ (Lamley 1981: 312, 314). This led to a ‘peaceful merging’ of the Quanzhou and Zhangzhou ethnic groups. But Hokkien–Hakka discord continued, based on language, customs and attitudes.

The Japanese Period

Taiwanese of all ethnic groups remained subordinate to the Japanese during the Japanese colonial period. As noted above, the Japanese systematically discriminated against the Taiwanese politically, and held all of the key positions. The Japanese also maintained separate schools for Japanese in Taiwan and only a very few Taiwanese were able to gain admission and, even then, the Taiwanese graduates remained under Japanese administrative control in their careers.

The Japanese also engaged in ‘divide and rule’ through the use of ethnic groups in particular ways. Thus, for example, Hakka were given special roles among the police and among railway workers.

The Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo

As noted above, the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo also systematically discriminated against Taiwanese politically. This regime also used ‘divide and rule’ maintaining, for example, the important Hakka role in the police and the railways. Under this regime, the aborigines too were separated and suffered much discrimination (see, for example, Williams 2005).

Conclusions

This short survey suggests that our three hypotheses help explain the origins of Taiwan’s ethnic groups. The first hypothesis explains that from 1624 until 1988 Taiwan was ruled by a succession of six colonial regimes in which outsiders controlled the Taiwanese people and their various ethnic groups. The second hypothesis argues that colonial regimes are racist in their very nature and discriminate against the colonized, in this case the Taiwanese and their various ethnic groups. Finally, the third hypothesis argues that these colonial regimes used ‘divide and rule’ methods to control the Taiwanese during 1624–1988.

As we have noted, the huge ethnic divisions within the Hokkien group began to break down from the 1860s and now the Hokkien group is more united. Similarly, the Mainlanders, who ruled the Taiwanese under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, have become a defensive minority as Taiwan has democratized. As noted at the beginning of this paper, this has brought some solidarity to a group
which was formerly somewhat disunited. How Taiwan’s ethnic groups continue to evolve remains to be seen.

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Perception of Risk towards Nuclear Energy in Taiwan and Hong Kong

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Abstract

This article investigates the differences in the public reaction to the Fukushima disaster in Taiwan and Hong Kong, focusing on the public's perception of risk. This study shows that in both places weaker groups, such as civil society opposition groups and activists, have fewer outlets to disseminate their ideas and are thus easily overpowered by dominant ideologies pushed forward by pro-business groups and governments. Nevertheless, a closer look at local specificities will bring to light significant differences between social activists' and the general public's perception of risk in relation to nuclear energy in Hong Kong and Taiwan. While there is widespread opposition to it in Taiwan, in Hong Kong there seems to be no or only muted resistance.

Introduction

The degree to which there is public acceptance of nuclear power differs from country to country, depending on the historical background. While the Fukushima Dai-ichi incident has sparked numerous reactions both in the West and in Asia, it is in Asia that the majority of governments have decided to forge ahead with their plans for nuclear expansion.

Taiwan in particular is in a similar situation to Japan: it is a seismic, densely populated country with nuclear power plants located side by side to urban centers and in close proximity to numerous underwater volcanoes (Chao 2012). While many people, especially in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, were hoping for a future nuclear-free Taiwan (非核家園), presidential elections in January 2012 have crushed such dreams as newly re-elected President Ma Ying-Jeou firmly stated that the construction of the controversial Nuclear Plant Number 4, located in Longmen, northeast of Taipei (核四 or NPP-4, as the project is known inside Taiwan) will go on as planned (J. Tsai 2012). Recent polls (Apple Daily 2012; Chang 2012: 8) and previous reports (Women de Dao 2003) have demonstrated that nuclear safety was among Taiwanese citizens' top concerns in the past decade. The extent of interest in this issue is highlighted by increasing media attention, particularly in the aftermath of news-magnet incidents such as the Fukushima Daiichi meltdown (Women de Dao 2011a, 2011b; Fang 2012: 8; I-C. Lee 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).
In Hong Kong, citizens and activists worry most about something happening to the Daya Wan plant (大亞灣核電廠), which is located in close proximity to the city in neighboring Shenzhen. However, while the Fukushima disaster has also left a mark in Hong Kong, the public perception of risk and social movements’ views and tactics vary greatly from those of their Taiwanese counterparts.

The present article aims to analyze the debate that has taken place in Taiwan and Hong Kong around nuclear energy issues in the aftermath of a catastrophic event which has led many governments to reconsider their stance towards this technology. The article will also take into consideration the role of the State and media outlets in disseminating crucial information and influencing public opinion and perception of risk; furthermore, it will analyze the strategies employed by anti-nuclear activists to make their concerns widespread. This article examines nuclear safety problems in Taiwan and Hong Kong in light of Ulrich Beck’s theory of the risk society (Beck 1986), showing that perception of risk is not one-dimensional but that there are different aspects of risk: risk of death, risk of long-term genetic damage, risk of contaminated soil and food products, and so on. Findings are then utilized to better assess what prompts people to fear or support nuclear technology. The present article is based on a mixed body of data, including case studies by medical professionals (in the case of nuclear waste dumped on Orchid Island), surveys by governmental agencies and researchers, investigative reports and news articles in printed and online media, and ethnographic first-hand evidence obtained via interviews and participant observation during a prolonged 10-month fieldwork period.

Theory of Risk Society

Nuclear energy and the perception that it comes with the risk of massive disasters has become a focal point of public opinion, academic research and state regulation throughout the world. Beck argues that the notion of risk is a by-product of modernity and represents a novel kind of psychological state affecting numerous people living in postindustrial societies. While in traditional societies individuals led their lives according to the belief that dangers and hazards were ‘acts of God’ or of some other force higher than humanity, industrial modernization and its technological and scientific advancements have brought with them the knowledge and awareness that risk can be calculated and predicted in advance, and thus avoided. In the postindustrial stage of society, risks associated with the

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1 ‘Risk perception’ is the subjective judgment that people make about the severity of a risk. The phrase is most commonly used in reference to natural hazards and threats to the environment or health, such as nuclear power.

2 I conducted 14 in-depth interviews in Taiwan and Hong Kong on individual perceptions and moral beliefs about nuclear energy and the location of power plants, all the while collecting personal accounts in both locations of individuals and associations involved in the circulation and spread of the notion of risk in relation to nuclear energy. Five of my Taiwanese interviewees were NGO members, one was a medical examiner expert in radiation hazards, and one was a Canadian diplomat and long-time connoisseur of the island. As for Hong Kong, two interviewees were members of a think tank, two were NGO members, one was a Dutch politician and activist and two were university professors.
advancements in those same technological and scientific fields have brought about unplanned consequences that threaten humanity. Unlike natural hazards that plagued ancient civilizations, contemporary risks usually have no boundaries, expanding across wide spatial and social borders. This increasing awareness of risk has started to reshape how we think, behave and engage in politics, marking the arrival of a second modernity in which the emergence of the ‘risk society’ occupies a prominent space (Beck 1986, 2009). Hong Kong and Taiwan – and Taiwan especially, due to its rapid development from a pre-industrial society to a postindustrial society – provide interesting examples of how these novel kinds of risks become part of everyday life.

Taiwan

*Nuclear Energy in Taiwan*

Currently, Taiwan has six operating nuclear power reactors (based at three power plants), which are operated by the state-owned company Taipower (Figure 1). Construction of the first unit began in 1972, and it was expected that each unit would have a 40-year lifespan. Two advanced reactors, currently under construction at what will be Taiwan's fourth nuclear power plant, in Gongliao district, will bring

![Figure 1: Taiwan’s NPP-3, Kending’s National Park](https://example.com/figure1.jpg)

Figure 1: Taiwan’s NPP-3, Kending’s National Park

(© Simona Grano)

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3 The Taiwan Power Company (*Taiwan Dianli Gongsi* 鼎力股份公仔) is a state-owned power company that provides electricity to Taiwan and the offshore islands of the Republic of China. It is overseen by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
total capacity to eight. The plant’s construction, now in the final stages, began in 1997 but has been marred by controversy, public opposition, and a host of delays from the beginning.

Scholars of Taiwan’s anti nuclear movement have traditionally sought to explain opposition through the study of politics (Tang and Tang 1997; M.-S. Ho 2003, 2005; Lyons 2009; Jobin 2010: 47, 2012: 2). The first three nuclear power plants were all built before the end of martial law, and thus there was little or no concern about environmental repercussions or public opinion (Lupke 2012: 156). The fourth plant, in contrast, has been under attack from organized opposition island-wide, and has come to symbolize civic society’s fight against nuclear energy. In fact, due to Taiwan’s particular history, once martial law was abolished in 1987 – creating numerous outlets to vent discontent, such as newspapers, television programs, public protests – many previously repressed social movements and political opponents of the regime chose the anti-nuclear cause as their stronghold from which to attack the state (Shih 2012). Coincidentally, this was also in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, and numerous intellectuals started to question state policies and possible environmental damage arising from hasty and careless development in the energy and economic sectors.

**NPP-4: A Political Controversy**

The KMT government announced its intention of building a fourth nuclear power plant in the 1980s (Lupke 2012: 159–160). The project was nearly cancelled twice; individuals involved in its planning and construction have ended up in jail following corruption accusations and at least one person has been given a life sentence. However, the project, although clouded in political and corruption scandals, is forging ahead and is currently at the stage at which the activation of the two reactors is being carried out. The saga of NPP-4 is widely known among the general public in Taiwan as its story, depicted in detail by the media, has been dissected virtually from every possible angle, from journalistic reportages on the television show *Our Island (Women de Dao)* through to protests taking the form of politically dissenting documentaries such as *Gongliao: how are you?* (貢寮你好嗎?) by Tsui Su Hsin, Secretary General of the Green Citizens Action Alliance (*Lüse Gongmin Xingdong Lianmeng* 綠色公民行動聯盟).

Since the very first planning stages, which was at the time when political liberalization and democracy were slowly settling in (after 1987), protests clustering around the Gongliao plant came to be characterized by a unique mix of elements from political power, public involvement, local and central government friction and grassroots activism that would have been repressed in Taiwan only a few years earlier (Lupke 2012: 157).

In the 1990s, public opinion was quite informed about nuclear issues (Jobin 2012: 2) and risk perception was quite high. The lifting of martial law gave activists more room for maneuver; the Chernobyl incident and its aftermath had massive reverberations; and in 1996 a Green Party was formed in Taiwan. By comparison, in the following decade (2000–2008) green movements became ‘institutionalized’ following the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) electoral success (M.-S. Ho 2005: 405; Jobin 2010: 49). With green movements becoming quieter on nuclear energy, and the lack of any serious nuclear accidents at this time, citizens became
less informed and thus their perception of risk decreased. The Fukushima Daiichi event, in all of its drama, has had the effect of giving new impetus to the no-nuke movement all over the world.

Currently, Taiwanese anti-nuclear activists’ main goal is to halt the construction of NPP-4. To achieve their goal, they employ the powerful imagery of death evoked by the Fukushima Daiichi incident, presented as an example of what could happen on Taiwanese soil if the project is completed (Interviews with Tsui, Xu and Lai). In terms of risk perception, opponents of nuclear power focus on the elevated risks associated with an earthquake in a highly seismic country such as Taiwan; this aspect is particularly worrisome considering NPP-4’s location in the immediate vicinity of over fifty schools, at a distance of 40km from the capital, and within a radius of around a hundred underwater volcanoes, a few of which are still active (Chao 2012). Second, poor management on the part of government bureaus and Taipower regarding the nuclear waste facility on Orchid Island, where numerous leaks have caused radioactive material to seep into nearby sea and land, has increased public mistrust towards the authorities regarding nuclear technology-related issues (Chung 2005; Loa 2012a, 2012b). In Orchid Island, unverified rumors of stillborn infants and birth defects have increased exponentially, although few medical studies up to now have supported these statements in a consistent manner (Interviews with Chang and Voyer; Arrigo et al. 2000; Loa 2012c).

A third problem affecting Taiwanese citizens and activists’ perception of risk concerns the management of NPP-4 (J. Tsai 2011). Although the managing contractor is General Electric (GE), the turbines in the reactors are contracted to Mitsubishi and other parts of the reactors are subcontracted to GE’s Japanese partners, Hitachi and Toshiba (Power Technology n.d.). A common fear among anti-nuclear activists is that, given the numerous companies that have a stake in the project, should something happen, no one would take responsibility (Interviews with Xu and Lai). Activists often engage the media to highlight the numerous incidents and delays that have marred the construction of NPP-4 so far (Pan 2012: 8). While the plant was initially supposed to be completely computerized, the project has taken so long to build that the sophisticated technology it was based on is now obsolete. Due to the numerous developers involved, and the technological advancements of the past 20 years, several reactor components are now difficult to find or are simply incompatible with newer parts, causing anger and concern among the public (Interviews with Xu and Pan). Further, this is the first plant that Taipower has built in its entirety; the company previously restricted its role to the management of nuclear facilities after other companies (such as General Electric or Japanese companies) had carried out the actual construction. Media reports and several of my informants have reported rumors such as electric cables chewed by rats (Interviews with Xu and Pan; J. Tsai 2011) and the substitution of critical components with plastic parts unable to endure exposure to high temperatures (Interview with Xu). Such scandals, which have been made highly visible by media outlets politically close to opposition parties, have contributed to a rapid decline of social trust, which has far-reaching social and political ramifications.
Public Perceptions towards Nuclear Power (Before and After Fukushima)

While everybody in the ‘green’ camp (by which I mean green NGOs and the Green Party) explicitly emphasizes the link between nuclear energy and one of the biggest disasters in Japanese history, displaying an utter and complete rejection of nuclear energy (Interviews with Tsui, Xu, Lai and Pan, among others), citizens in general take a more practical stance: as demonstrated by numerous polls, nuclear safety was among Taiwanese citizens’ top concerns both before and after Fukushima (Apple Daily 2011; Women de Dao 2011a, 2011b). In a survey of public perceptions of technological risks conducted by Chen Dung-Sheng in 2009, 74.5 percent of respondents thought that nuclear waste affected the health of humans, and 71 percent agreed that nuclear technologies pose unknown risks to both the environment and to mankind (Chen 2011: 570).

A few opinion polls carried out after Fukushima showed a clear division reflecting political orientations. While the Liberty Times suggested that anti-nuclear feelings were predominant among its readership, with more than 92 percent of respondents fearing the risks posed by nuclear plants, the China Times, which is sympathetic to the KMT, reflected opinion on the other side of the political spectrum which showed that 57 percent of the people agreed with President Ma’s stance on nuclear energy (as quoted in Jobin 2012: 12).

It is also important to be aware that while the majority of Taiwanese are more anxious about nuclear accidents since Fukushima, when asked whether they would be willing to pay higher energy prices for a ‘nuclear-free home’ (Y.-W. Tsai 2011), not many declare themselves willing to forsake nuclear power immediately, and instead want to defer the decision to future generations (Interviews with Tsui and Lai). An island-wide survey carried out by the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) in 2000 had found that 42 percent of the people think nuclear power should be gradually phased out; 32 percent think of it as ‘safe and necessary’ for the country’s energy survival, while 21 percent consider it ‘unsafe but necessary’, thus clearly illustrating the ambivalent feelings displayed by many Taiwanese in regards to nuclear energy, even more so in the pre-Fukushima period.

Before the presidential election of 2000, when for the first time a member of the opposition DPP became President, the hope that NPP-4 would be shelved was solid. Nowadays, however, it is only the Green Party that takes seriously the possibility of stopping construction (Jacobs 2012). In 2008 the KMT regained the presidency, and in January 2013 it launched the idea of a popular referendum on the issue. This sparked numerous heated discussions within political parties and among Taiwan’s citizens (Fell 2013), and it was recently deferred to a later time.

Finally, it is important to stress that nuclear safety problems are complicated because they pose different risks to society as a whole: perception of risk consists of more than the one dimension of high vs. low, with aspects such as risk of death and long term genetic damage, to ‘secondary issues’ such as contaminated food and radioactive products. In Taiwan, perception of risk towards these kinds of ‘by-

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4 In Taiwan, the phrase ‘green camp’ traditionally indicates the DPP, in contrast with the KMT ‘blue camp’.
products’ seems to be higher (Women de Dao 2012b; Interview with Chen) than the risks associated with the possibility of an actual disaster taking place on Taiwanese soil, especially considering the high quantities of food imports coming from Japan.

Anti-Nuclear Activists’ Perception of Risk towards Nuclear Power

In the aftermath of the nuclear meltdown in Japan, numerous civic groups such as the Green Citizens Action Alliance, TEPU, legal aid groups such as Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association and political groups and parties such as the Green Party of Taiwan have found new vigor to fight an issue that had been dormant for a while (Interviews with Tsui and Pan).

Massive protest parades were organized for 30 April 2011, less than two months after the disaster. These were extremely successful, due to the high degree of emotion generated by the terrible images of people dying in Japan; such was the turnout that a new name was coined to describe the parades: the 430 Movement (430行動). The Green Citizens Action Alliance is particularly active in organizing events and activities popularizing the anti-nuclear banner, including protests (Figure 2), rock concerts (Figure 3) and numerous public conferences, which have contributed to an increased public mistrust both of Taipower and of the government, and which have raised awareness of the risks connected to nuclear energy.

Figure 2: No-Nuke protest, 5 November 2011
(© Simona Grano)
On the other hand, Taiwanese are also aware that Taiwan’s energy output is not adequate for today’s needs (Lupke 2012: 159). Green activists, however, maintain that Taipower spreads misleading information by emphasizing Taiwan’s lack of energy resources (Interviews with Tsui and Lai); in response, the activists argue that since 2009 the electricity back-up capacity has remained at a steady 20–30 percent – although it is not clear if this estimate also takes into account the different requirements of daily and seasonal peak demand. In Tsui Shu-Hsin’s words:

> Even if all three operational nuclear plants were to cease operation, our back-up capacity would still remain at about 20.9 percent. It is a myth that nuclear power is indispensable. Taiwan’s electricity supply is sufficient without nuclear power; the so-called supply crisis is premised on huge economic growth in future decades, which will not lead to insufficient supplies but to a reduced back-up capacity (at perhaps above 10 percent). We need to look beyond these threats.

(Interview with Tsui)

Environmentalists maintain that energy costs are too low and should be increased so as to reduce waste (Interviews with Tsui, Xu, Lai and Pan).

It is a fact, though, that Taiwan is an island geographically isolated from other countries that can provide energy sources, and could suffer from energy restrictions if no suitable substitute for nuclear power is found (J. Lee 2012).
On the day he was invested for a second term as President, Ma Ying-jeou stated that no one inside Taiwan is opposed nuclear energy (Mei you ren fan he 没有人反核). In response, anti-nuclear activists collected 15,000 signatures, composed a huge banner with the names of the signatories, and brought it to the Presidential Palace to confront Ma Ying-jeou. They chanted a slogan: ‘Wo shi ren, wo fan he 我是人，我反核!’ (‘I am someone, I oppose nuclear energy!’) (Ma 2012).

In light of the above-mentioned data, it is safe to conclude that while Taiwanese citizens display a practical attitude towards nuclear energy and its risks vs. its benefits, social activists express a total and absolute rejection.

Hong Kong

The Anti-Daya Bay Controversy

Hong Kong has no nuclear power plants located inside its borders; however, ‘it has been buying electricity from the Daya Bay nuclear plant across the border with China since 1994, which currently meets 23% of the city's need’ (Loh 2012a). From its very beginning, the plant has provoked strong opposition inside Hong Kong, mainly from politicians belonging to the pro-democracy camp, such as Martin Lee and Szeto Wah.

In 1985–1986, when discussion about building the plant started in earnest, strong opposition in Hong Kong hinged predominantly on the concerns people had about its location, in the immediate vicinity of the city. Citizens were aware of the risks connected with this kind of technology in case of a nuclear accident. Right after Chernobyl, which contributed to the ignition of social protests against the construction of Daya Bay inside Hong Kong, social groups were able to exploit the mounting fears associated with nuclear power – together with uncertainty over Hong Kong’s future – to their own advantage by organizing numerous petitions and protests. As emphasized by Greenpeace senior campaigner Prentice Koo, Hongkongers did not question nuclear technology per se but rather had objections about the location of the plant and its management (Interview with Koo). The debate was initially concerned with whether China had the ability to manage such a facility and whether there was a need for it, but then quickly became politicized and polarized along a ‘pro-PRC/business interests’ camp on the one hand and a ‘liberal oriented/middle-class/intellectual’ camp with pro-environmental sympathies on the other (Chiu et al. 1999: 63). The Anti-Daya Bay movement solicited more than one million signatures in a big campaign, but its leaders then retreated from high-profile environmental protests and turned to other rising issues of political and social discontent. In particular, following the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, Hong Kong’s social movements shifted their focus to issues around political

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5 Daya Bay is 25 percent owned by Hong Kong-listed CLP Holdings, which buys about 70 percent of the plant's output to supply Hong Kong's power needs.

6 Greenpeace HK was established in 1998. Due to Guandong’s symbolic status as the first province to have developed, with the second highest GDP of China, GP HK focuses mainly on local problems such as nuclear plants and air quality issues like climate change. GP HK cooperates with the non-official NGO (registered as a company) Greenpeace Beijing (Interview with Tan).
liberalization such as protecting freedom of speech and other rights, which were deemed to be more urgent concerns in the light of Hong Kong’s imminent return to China less than a decade ahead.

Thus, after the Guangdong Nuclear Power Plant Joint Venture Company signed a contract with British and French suppliers, nuclear fears and the Daya Bay plant were forgotten, and when the plant was eventually connected to the energy grid few voices of protest were heard (Interview with Koo). Concerns were aired in 1995, after major inspections at Daya Bay in April of that year led to the plant being temporarily shut down (Chiu et al. 1999: 87), but other than that the discussion around nuclear power gradually lost importance.

However, in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, the Special Administrative Region (SAR) government has put forward a proposal to increase reliance on nuclear energy at a time when numerous governments around the world have reconsidered and shelved their nuclear plans. The plan was unveiled in September 2011, when authorities released the long-awaited ‘Hong Kong’s Climate Change Strategy and Action Agenda’, which recommended that the best way to reduce carbon emissions would be to raise the nuclear power share from 23 percent to 50 percent of the energy mix (Interviews with Koo and Kilburn).

According to Christine Loh, Hong Kong, as an importer of nuclear energy and not a producer, has to decide whether to be a passive player or whether to start playing a proactive role in terms of safety as an importer and consumer of nuclear energy; this is especially important in light of its geographical proximity to Guangdong province, where China is planning a host of new plants (Loh 2012b). ‘Hong Kong’, in Christine Loh’s words, ‘cannot avoid taking a position on nuclear energy because it is already a major nuclear user, although this fact is not appreciated by many people’ (Loh 2012b: 9). She observes that ‘Guangdong, Hong Kong’s neighboring province, has several reactors already functioning and is planning several more. In case of a nuclear accident Hong Kong and its 7 million citizens could be affected’ (Loh 2012c: 5).

**Social Movements’ Perception of Risk and Nuclear Technology**

While in Taiwan it is almost a necessary trait for NGOs and social groups to be seen as ‘anti-nuclear’ (Interviews with Lai and Pan), in Hong Kong social movements and think tanks hold conflicting opinions. As aptly put by Paul Jobin:

> This is probably the most salient and interesting difference between Taiwan’s and HK’s environmental NGOs. In the latter, social groups seem to be somewhat influenced by famous British environmentalists turned pro-nuclear such as George Monbiot, James Lovelock or Mark Lynas.

(Paul Jobin, personal communication, 24 October 2012).

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7 Dr Christine Loh Kung-wai is a former Hong Kong Legislator and the former CEO of Civic Exchange, a Hong Kong think tank that she co-founded in 2000. As of 12 September 2012, she has held the post of Under-Secretary for the Environment in the HKSAR Government.

8 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that Hong Kong, as a former British colony, has been influenced by the shift that has taken place in the United Kingdom.
Nevertheless some NGOs, such as Greenpeace, are staunchly opposed to nuclear and to the energy policy put forward by the SAR government for the next seven years: ‘

We believe there is absolutely no need to increase our share of the energy mix derived from nuclear; it would be sufficient to restructure the energy market in HK – a monopoly in the hands of a few private corporations – making it more efficient and allowing access to third actors, while reforming the pricing system.

(Interviews with Koo and Tan)

Other social groups and think tanks, such as Civic Exchange\(^9\) and Friends of the Earth, maintain a more cautious approach, organizing conferences and workshops aimed at spreading awareness of nuclear risks and benefits among the general population (Interviews with Kilburn and Ng). In fact, social groups’ attitudes towards nuclear power in Hong Kong vary, from perceiving nuclear power as a risk (Greenpeace and a few other radical but ineffective groups) to outright support for it in light of a lack for better alternatives for solving the city’s worsening air quality situation (Loh 2012c; Interview with Zimmerman). As Mike Kilburn, Head of Environmental Strategy of Civic Exchange until September 2012, said to me in an interview: ‘some people became in favor of nuclear energy after Fukushima’.

According to the non-profit Clean Air Task Force, 10,000 people have died of cancer a result of Chernobyl, the world’s biggest nuclear accident, but pollution from coal plants was responsible for more than 13,200 deaths in 2010, and is the cause of 20,000 heart attacks per year (Schneider and Banks 2010). Many in Hong Kong share a similar position: some social groups (this certainly holds true for Civic Exchange) do not seek to propagate or promote a specific attitude towards nuclear, whether pro or con: ‘What we seek to do is to inform the public by offering seminars, lectures and scientific research papers from experts aimed at improving knowledge of certain issues among the general population’ (Interview with Kilburn).

Civic Exchange is not alone; I have spoken to numerous activists and academics involved with environmental activism in Hong Kong and many of them are of the opinion that, considering the city’s abysmal performance in terms of improving air quality standards,\(^10\) nuclear energy could offer a viable – albeit partial – solution to Hong Kong’s worsening air pollution (Interviews with Kilburn, Ng and Lee). Nuclear power to diminish fossil-fuel dependency and to decrease GHG emissions has become increasingly discussed as air pollution in Hong Kong has reached after 2006, among experts and the general public, favoring pro-nuclear stances (Doyle 2011).

\(^9\) It should be noted that Civic Exchange is an independent policy research think tank established in 2000, which aims at conducting research and publicizing results in order to spread civic awareness among the community. It contributes to debates by undertaking research on a plethora of developmental, social and environmental issues.

\(^10\) Hong Kong’s air quality standards date back to a 1987 regulation which is deemed too outdated to be of any effectiveness in fighting the city’s air pollution problems.
saturation levels: on 2 August 2012, the Air Pollution Index (API)\(^{11}\) hit an all-time high score for concentrated levels of Particulate Matter 2.5.\(^{12}\) A point stressed by many of my interviewees is that since no death has been directly linked to the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, this form of energy looks safer than fossil-fuel related energy mixes, which after persistent exposure lead to permanent health problems (Interviews with Kilburn, Ng and Chau). This debate over whether nuclear energy is preferable to the release of more hydrocarbons that cause global warming is not confined to Hong Kong, but is a hotly-debated issue in numerous environmental circles around the world.

Even among those NGOs with a stance of radical opposition to nuclear power, there seems to be a tacit agreement that aggressive behavior should be avoided to prevent public distrust. In the words of Melonie Chau, Senior Environmental Affairs Officer for Friends of the Earth HK:

> To some extent we can say that people in Hong Kong do not want to be involved in politics too closely. They tend to consider any kind of protest as having ulterior political motives and are wary of activities which are even remotely connected to politics. In order to advance our goals in the interest of society, we have to avoid being perceived as a political force, because these are often seen as dirty and corrupt.

(Interview with Chau)

The main reason that Hong Kong’s NGOs are not antagonistic is because they want to be perceived as ‘non-political’ and ‘non-radical’, and as ‘having absolutely nothing to do with political parties’ (Interview with Chau). On the other hand, a complete separation is not possible, because social movements are often in need of political parties’ better-established networks to achieve their goals. As Chiu et al. (1999: 60) put it: ‘For environmental groups, a confrontational approach would largely rule out possibilities of cooperation with members of the power elite, such as the government and business, while a consensual approach is largely premised on support from the elite.’

The picture this article has painted so far is somewhat incomplete, perhaps giving the impression that there are no radical actions such as street protests or hardline campaigns and sit-ins in Hong Kong. Nothing could be further from the truth: the city’s history includes numerous successful demonstrations on a plethora of issues, from the fear of losing political freedoms under China, to plans for mandating a more patriotic ‘national education’ curriculum to foster pupils’ love for

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\(^{11}\) The Air Pollution Index is a simple and generalized way to describe air quality in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Malaysia. The API is calculated from several sets of air pollution data.

\(^{12}\) Roadside readings on 1 and 2 August showed a concentration of toxic chemicals and particles at or above 190 for more than 24 hours, with an all-time peak of 212 recorded at the monitoring station in Central. According to Hong Kong’s own standards, an API of between 51 and 100 is already considered ‘High’ and able to cause chronic health problems upon persistent exposure. At 101 to 200 the level is ‘Very High’, and above 200 ‘Severe’. For details see Cheung (2012) and *South China Morning Post* (2012), which were published together.
the motherland (namely China); this latter issue sparked mass protests and marches throughout the summer of 2012 that ended with a partial success for social movements and opponents of the measure (Liu 2012).

Several factors help to explain the absence of consistent protest against nuclear energy in Hong Kong: first, increased use of nuclear energy could help solve Hong Kong’s abysmal air pollution problem while decreasing energy consumption derived from coal; second, more urgent environmental problems affecting daily life have come to the fore and priorities have shifted; third, social organizations are currently focusing on informing the public about nuclear energy rather than on expressing outright opposition; and fourth, because the nuclear power plant that serves Hong Kong is not located in the SAR, it is difficult for Hong Kong people to protest against it, let alone influence Chinese nuclear policies.

Public Perception of Risk towards Nuclear Energy (Before and After Fukushima)

Perception towards nuclear energy in Hong Kong is quite varied: among the business community, a survey by the China Climate Change Business Forum put forward three choices: (1) continuing with the current coal-dependent fuel mix; (2) opting for a mix of gas and nuclear power, which would reduce pollution and carbon emissions and provoke a moderate tariff increase; and (3), relying heavily on nuclear power, further reducing pollution and emissions but at a higher cost in terms of energy tariffs. Almost two thirds of respondents (62 percent) opted for the third and most expensive option, thus indicating that among businesses the idea of reaching a low-carbon economy is preferable even if it entails higher costs (Hong Kong Business Survey on Energy Efficiency and Climate Change, as quoted in T. Ho 2013).

In contrast, a survey by the Kadoori Institute has shown very high levels of opposition towards nuclear energy among the general population, with preferences for energy saving, energy efficiency, and renewable energy (Mah et al. 2011: 1, 25). Sixty-two percent of respondents opposed an increase of nuclear power in the city’s energy mix and 96 percent admitted considering ‘risk and safety such as health risks related to nuclear explosion’ as important (Mah et al. 2011: 12). Surveys have to be interpreted in the light of various contextual factors. The Kadoorie survey was carried out barely two months after the Fukushima accident, reflecting the impact of a nuclear catastrophe on people’s perception. The findings of two Greenpeace surveys carried out in 2010 and 2011 show that many people who were undecided on whether or not to support nuclear power previous to Fukushima have since shifted towards opposition (Greenpeace 2010, 2011). According to a global survey conducted in Hong Kong in 2008, Hongkongers are more conservative regarding nuclear energy and less supportive of it than their peers in other Asian countries such as Taiwan and China (World Public Opinion 2008).

Another survey, carried out by Civic Exchange in July 2013, has shown that even though one of the city’s biggest problems is air pollution, people are far more worried about nuclear energy, with 39 percent of respondents ‘very worried about health effects of nuclear radiation’ and a mere 14 percent being ‘very worried about health effects of coal generation’ (DeGolyer 2013). A high level of ignorance
about Hong Kong’s own relationship to nuclear power persists even after Fukushima, with only 47 percent of respondents correctly answering that Hong Kong does not generate any nuclear energy inside of its territory (DeGolyer 2013).

Media outlets also devote more attention to nuclear-related news in the aftermath of Fukushima, even more so when one of Guangdong’s power plants is concerned. The *South China Morning Post* gave high visibility to an article titled ‘Third zero-risk nuclear incident worries greens’ on 15 August 2012, which investigated an accident that had occurred the previous day at the Ling Ao Plant, which lies about 50 kilometers north of Hong Kong and about a kilometer away from the Daya Bay plant (Mok 2012: C2). While the problem was a malfunctioning radiation detection system in reactor number 4, which resulted in a faulty transmission of the readings in real time to the control room, activists argue that there is no way of knowing whether human error was involved, because China refused to share any information about the incident (Interview with Koo).

**Conclusions**

As shown by relevant data collected through interviews and written sources, the response to the Fukushima disaster took very different forms in Taiwan and Hong Kong. This article has argued that even though in Taiwan most social organizations are quite radical and the majority of citizens have a rather high perception of what nuclear risks entail, the population is largely in favor of continuing to use nuclear, at least for the near future.

While many actors, from media outlets to state organs and civil groups, shape public perception towards nuclear energy, the most powerful parties (e.g. state and business groups) are those that have more means at their disposal, such as newspapers and other media outlets, to influence and shape public perception of risk associated with nuclear energy. In Taiwan, all important newspapers other than the *Taipei Times* and its sister publication the *Liberty Times* are controlled either by influential political elites such as the central state or rich business tycoons, who often share similar positions in support of nuclear energy. This partly explains why Taipower’s emphasis on increased energy prices should nuclear power’s share of the energy mix diminish has so far been more successful in influencing the public than the campaigns of social activists.

In Hong Kong, the situation is different. Here, there is high degree of mistrust and fear towards nuclear energy among the general population, while social movements and think tanks in contrast take a rather non-antagonistic and non-oppositional position (with a few exceptions): rather than simply adopting pre-conceived ideas that are either ‘pro’ or ‘con’, they instead seek to educate the public by seeking more understanding themselves. This attitude has its roots in the administrative and political system of Hong Kong, where elections, contrary to what happens in Taiwan, cannot overturn government nor change policies; instead, all activists can do is simply to try to influence public opinion. Furthermore, in Hong Kong and in environmental circles around the world, the nuclear power option is being re-evaluated for its positive role in abating carbon dioxide emissions.

Finally, a key difference between Taiwan and Hong Kong is that in Taiwan a strong attitude of ‘Not In My Backyard’ (NIMBY) – which developed during the
1980s and early 1990s – has linked local grievances with the campaigns of environmentalists. In Hong Kong there cannot be any NIMBY attitude because nuclear plants are not located inside the city’s territory. In addition, Hong Kong’s environmental movement is weaker than that of Taiwan for several reasons, including the fact that few Hong Kong residents seek to protect the environment as an expression of regionalism or localism.

Based on what we know about the Chernobyl disaster, we can expect the Fukushima catastrophe to increase public anxiety for a short period (as I have shown, this was the case in Taiwan and Hong Kong), though not that this will necessarily increase support for Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s antinuclear movements at the expense of rapid economic growth. Certainly, though, both in Taiwan and Hong Kong as well as in other countries, the importance of public opinion in determining and influencing the outcome of public debates and policy changes has to be recognized fully.

Acknowledgments

I owe special thanks to Professor Paul Jobin, Former Director of the French Center for Research on Contemporary China in Taipei, for his insightful comments, criticism and suggestions for revision.

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A Reluctant Identity: The Development of Holo Identity in Contemporary Taiwan

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Abstract

This paper traces the development of Holo identity in contemporary Taiwan by comparing two waves of disputes over the proper Chinese name for the Taiwanese Holo, in the 1950s and then in the 1990s. The first debate broke out in 1958 in the literary journal Taipei Wenwu, when Taiwanese Holo intellectuals strongly contested the usages ‘福佬’ (pronounced ‘Ho Lo’ in Taiwanese Holo, but ‘Fu lau’ in Mandarin), ‘河洛’ (again ‘Ho Lo’ in Holo, but ‘He Luo’ in Mandarin), and, to a lesser degree, ‘閩南’ (Min nan). These debates occurred during a feverish period of study and recording of Taiwan’s languages, cultures, and customs that developed before Taiwan was returned to Chinese rule in 1945. A close examination of the content and context of the 1958 debate indicates that its real and yet hidden agenda was in fact a clash of different national imaginations, and that it served as a proxy for dispute over views of Taiwan’s Chinese legacy at a time when hostility between Taiwanese and the newly arrived Mainlander migrants was still quite evident after the first turbulent decade of regime change. The debate ended unexpectedly without any conclusion: Holo intellectuals were unable to use the preferred term, ‘台灣話’ (‘Taiwan Hua’), and other names remained in use as a reluctant compromise.

The debate rose again from the late 1980s under a very different circumstance, when a new version of the Taiwanese national imagination was formally proposed by a substantial political opposition force. Ethnic tensions in the early 1990s impelled the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to propose an alternative ideal pattern of ethnic relations in its nation-building project: facing protests from other ethnic minorities, who accused the DPP of allowing a Holo chauvinism to develop among its over-enthusiastic supporters that equated ethnic Holo with national Taiwan in its national imagination, the DPP’s Holo members responded by initiating a discourse of ‘Taiwan’s Four Great Ethnic Groups’. The 1994 debate over the proper Chinese name for the Holo ethnic group, which is still unresolved,

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1 An early draft of this paper was presented at the 1st World Congress of Taiwan Studies, Panel on Ethnicity, Nationalism and Modern State, 26–28 April 2012, organized by the Academia Sinica. The current version incorporates substantial revisions. The author is thankful for useful suggestions by anonymous reviewers.
indicated another dimension of Holo reluctance to accept a self-constrained identity imposed by others.

On 26 August 1991, Taiwan’s major opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), held a convention that led to the Draft Taiwan Constitution (台灣憲法草案), the first document of its kind proposed by a major political force in Taiwan. Amendments were made at a second convention three years later (see Shih 1995 for the Proceedings); this was initiated by some DPP leaders and strong supporters of the Taiwan independence movement, but the DPP itself did not take charge, since it was widely thought that the first convention had been partly responsible for the DPP’s disappointing performance in the first general National Assembly election at the end of 1991. Although the second draft was never formally discussed beyond this convention, let alone put into effect, some of its main ideas became guiding principles for official policies during the 2000–2008 DPP administration. Along with a change in the title, which was amended to Draft Constitution of the Republic of Taiwan (台灣共和國憲法草案), the most substantial and important amendments between the two drafts was the addition of a new chapter, entitled ‘Ethnicity’:

第九章 族群
第 100 條 台灣現有住民包含原住民、新住民、客家、Holo 四大族群，統稱為台灣人。各族有自我命名之權利。
第 101 條 國民依法有選擇族群認同之權利，並於每回人口普查中確
認。
第 102 條 各族群之語言文化及少數族群之工作權應予保障。國民義務
教育，除個人母語外，至少需學習一種其他族群語言。
第 103 條 中央政府應設超黨派族群委員會，由各族群依法推派等額委
員組成，處理族群事務，促進族群平等與和諧。
第 104 條 各族群依法推派等額國會議員組成族群委員會。有關族群之
法律案應先提交族群委員會審議。

(施正鋒，1995: 210–211)

[Chapter 9 Ethnicity]
Article 100 There are four ethnic groups that comprise Taiwan’s current residents: Aborigines, the new residents, Hakka, and Holo. They are all Taiwanese. Each group is entitled to name itself.

Article 101 Taiwan’s citizens have legal rights to choose their ethnic identity, which will be reaffirmed in every population census.

Article 102 Every ethnic group’s language and culture, as well as the working rights of the ethnic minority, should be protected. Each citizen should learn one or more ethnic languages beside his or her own mother tongue.

2 Other versions of a constitution for Taiwan had been proposed by individual opposition leaders, such as Lin Yi-hsiung (林義雄) and Koh Se-kai (許世楷), in 1989. Unlike the 1991 DPP version, both Lin and Koh specifically used the term ‘Republic of Taiwan’.
Article 103 A Commission for Ethnic Affairs should be established by the Central Government with equal representatives from each ethnic group to handle ethnic-related issues and to enhance ethnic harmony.

Article 104 An Ethnic Committee should be established in the National Congress with equal representation of congressional members from all ethnic groups. All laws related to ethnic affairs should be reviewed by the Ethnic Committee first.

(Quoted in Shih 1995: 210–211)

Compared to the previous 1991 draft, in which the only ethnic group mentioned was the Aborigines, the newly added chapter symbolized important changes in the perception of ethnicity and an ideal pattern of ethnic relations that developed during the early 1990s in Taiwan. Ethnic affairs were considered to be so vital and fundamental to Taiwan that participants thought they should be regulated in the Constitution. It was also the first time that a classification of four major ethnic groups was written into a document of this kind.

The document also revealed a peculiar aspect of Taiwan’s ethnic phenomenon: the naming of the largest ethnic group as ‘Holo’. In Article 100, there was no Chinese name for ‘Holo’; instead, they chose a Romanized word. However, as will be shown later in this paper, at least four Chinese names for ‘Holo’ were raised during the discussion. Apparently, the Holo participants in the 1994 convention could not agree upon any of these, and they had to compromise by using an awkward foreign term as the name of the ethnic group in this historical document. It is quite ironic that the convention could not reach a consensus on the proper name for ‘Holo’ in Chinese, as most people considered the DPP to be a champion for the Holo ethnic group’s interests, to such a degree that it was often criticized as being guilty of Holo chauvinism in some of its practices. As Article 100 also emphasized the right of every ethnic group to self-name, the bizarre term implies a significant division among the Holo elites regarding their ethnic identity, at least at the time of 1994 convention.

This paper investigates the development and the nature of Holo ethnic identity in contemporary Taiwan by focusing on the question of why the Holo elites could not agree upon any Chinese name for their ethnic group, signaling their lack of solidarity. As ethnic identity is usually developed by an ethnic minority in pursuit of its collective interests – be they political, economic, social, or cultural – the case of

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3 Chapter 9 of the first version of the Draft Taiwan Constitution defines the status of Aborigines in Taiwan and their rights, including that of political autonomy, and regulates the State’s obligation to establish a special organization for handling Aboriginal affairs (DPP 1991: 477).

4 Koh Se-Kai’s version, which was published in Japan in 1989, had already mentioned a similar classification of ‘four cultural groups’ (四大文化集團) in Taiwan.

5 In this paper, I choose the term ‘Holo’ rather than ‘Hoklo’, a common standard English translation for the language or the people of Hokkien (or Fujien) Province, to translate the Chinese term ‘福佬’. This is mainly because the former is the exact term used by Taiwanese Holo linguists and political activists after 1980s to name themselves and their language.

6 The proposed Chinese names were ‘福佬’, ‘河洛’, ‘閩南’ and ‘鶴佬’ (Shih 1997).
Holo ethnic identity is especially interesting, because the Holo are typically considered to be an ethnic majority, at least in their relatively large population size, rather than an ethnic minority in Taiwan. However, the Holo also constituted the majority of the native Taiwanese population who were deprived of the right and opportunity to self-determination by different outside regimes over the past century leading up to the early 1990s, when Taiwan underwent its long overdue democratic transition. It therefore seems quite justifiable for the Holo to claim themselves as an ethnic minority. And yet, according to conventional wisdom, contemporary Holo identity in Taiwan seems to be related more to its numerical majority status rather than its previous political minority status. Why is this so?

This paper will try to answer the question by exploring two issues. First, what were they really fighting about in the dispute over the name for ‘Holo’? Why do Holo people insist on using different Chinese names to refer to themselves? The content of the arguments will be analyzed in this part. Second, why were there disputes over the naming of the Holo? What were the political and social contexts of these disputes? Given that the proponents of different names in the dispute in 1994 all referred to the same historical evidence to support their claims, it seems unlikely that this would have been a newly emerging issue. This was indeed an old debate, the origin of which can be traced back to a similar debate among Taiwanese intellectuals in 1958. The contexts of the two disputes that occurred 30 years apart, not surprisingly, were quite different. By analyzing the content and context of the dispute over the name for Holo, this paper sheds light on the nature of Holo identity, and ethnic relations in general, in contemporary Taiwan.

‘福佬’ (‘Fu lau’), ‘河洛’ (‘He Luo’), or ‘閩南’ (‘Min nan’)? The Debate over the Proper Name For Holo In 1958

The first debate about the proper Chinese name for Holo erupted in the latter half of 1958 in the quarterly literary journal Taipei Wenwu (台北文物), published by the Taipei City Commission of Archives (台北市文獻委員會). Although different names for the Holo language and for Holo people had appeared in previous editions, as well as in publications such as Taiwan Folkways (臺灣風物) and Nan-yin Wen-Hsien (南瀛文獻) after the beginning of Chinese rule in 1945, most authors did not tackle the issue of determining a universal proper Chinese name for ‘Holo’. In the early editions of Taiwan Folkways and Taipei Wenwu in the early 1950s, three terms emerged in the following order to refer to Taiwanese Holo people and the language they spoke: ‘福佬’ (‘Fu lau’ in Mandarin, but ‘Ho Lo’ in Taiwanese Holo), ‘閩南’ (‘Min nan’), and ‘河洛’ (‘He Luo’ in Mandarin, ‘Ho Lo’ in Holo).

In the following, I will describe the content of the debate by analyzing relevant articles that appeared in these journals on Taiwan in the early 1950s. Please see the Appendix for the chronological order in which articles appeared (as well as articles in a fourth major journal, Wen-Hsien Journal  文獻專刊).

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7 The full Chinese title means ‘culture and artifacts of Taipei’.
The Content and Origin of three Chinese Terms for Holo

The term ‘福佬’ (‘Fu lau’) made its literary debut in Taiwan in a Taiwanese–Japanese Dictionary compiled by Japanese linguist Ogawa Naoyoshi (小川尚義) in 1907. The entry for ‘福佬人’ says that this was originally a term used by Taiwanese Hakka to refer to Taiwanese Holo people. In 1950, a Japanese-language Grammar of the Ho-lo Dialect of the Chinese Language Spoken Throughout Tsian-tsui, Tsuan-tsui, Amoy and Formosa by Li Hsien-chang (李獻璋) stated in the first chapter that the proper name for the Taiwanese Holo language was ‘福佬話’ (‘Ho lo ue’) rather than ‘福建語’ (literally, ‘language of Ho Kien’), as the Japanese usually and ‘mistakenly’ called it. Li was thus the primary advocate of the term ‘福佬’ in the early 1950s. However, Li later also edited a book of collected essays by a fellow Taiwanese scholar, Kuo Min-kuan (郭明昆), who had studied the Chinese family structure and Taiwanese language and who had been among the first authors to use the term ‘福佬’ (or ‘福老’), also pronounced as ‘Ho Lo’ in the 1930s, in his essays published in Japanese. Besides publishing his own original piece discussing the origin of a common Holo greeting phrase, ‘Have you eaten yet?’ (‘汝食未’) in the very first issue of Taipei Wenwu in 1952, Li also translated one of Kuo’s pieces on the ancient usage of the Holo language from Japanese into Chinese and published it in Nan-ying Wen-hsien (南瀛文獻) in 1953. In both articles, Li specifically used the term ‘福佬話’ for the Holo language. The term ‘福佬’ was also used by many others, especially Lin Ben-yuan (林本元), who later became a core participant in the 1958 debate.

The term ‘台灣話’ (‘Taiwan Hua’) was the preferred expression most commonly used by the local Taiwanese Holo, followed by ‘福佬話’ and ‘福佬人’, which were particularly used by Hakka. In fact, the term ‘福佬’ was originally derived from the Chinese expression for the name given to Holo people by Taiwanese Hakka. According to Ogawa’s 1907 Taiwanese–Japanese Dictionary, Taiwanese Hakka used the term ‘福佬’ to refer to Taiwanese Holo in a demeaning way (1907: 829). Holo people, however, grew to accept the name ‘福佬’ for its expressive sound and used it when they needed to distinguish themselves from Hakka (Chi 1957; Lin 1958a). Some authors acknowledged the same common practice but used different terms, such as ‘和老’ (‘Ho lo’ in Taiwanese Holo) or ‘福老’, to express the same pronunciation.

Some Taiwanese authors also began to use the term ‘閩南’ (‘Min nan’), which was introduced by the Chinese Mainlanders who came to Taiwan after 1945. The new immigrants soon realized that the Taiwanese Holo language was in fact

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8 This is the English title as it appeared in the back of the book, although the word ‘Grammar’ was misspelled as ‘Grammer’.

9 Kuo used ‘福佬’ in a paper published in 1936, and ‘福老’ in two other papers published in 1937 and 1940. Kuo and his family were killed in a ship sunk by a submarine in 1943 during the war. The edited volume of Kuo’s works was published in Japan in 1963 (Kuo 1963).

10 In the Hakka (which Japanese referred to as ‘Cantonese Race’) language, ‘佬’ had negative connotations such as ‘thief’ (‘賊佬’) or ‘mute person’ (‘啞佬’).

11 For instance, Su Wei-Hsiang (蘇惟熊) used ‘和老’ in a paper published in 1952 in Taiwan Folkways (article 5 in the Appendix); Chi Yuan (寄園) used ‘福老’ (Chi 1957).
derived directly from Min Nan Hua (閩南話), a language spoken in the southern part of Fu-kien Province, according to the classification of Han Chinese dialects in a survey conducted in China during the 1930s. As the majority of Han Taiwanese ancestors had come from the southern part of Fu-kien Province, starting from the 1680s, it was quite reasonable for some Taiwanese to quickly adopt the new term to signify the origin of their language and their ancestral hometown. In the early 1950s, however, '閩南' was used to refer only to the Taiwanese Holo language, and not the people. The term '閩南人', by contrast, clearly referred to Mainlander migrants who came from the southern part of Fu-kien Province and arrived in Taiwan after 1945. Li Teng-yueh (李騰嶽) was the first author to adopt the term in the first issue of Taiwan Folkways (published in 1951), when he talked about Lien Ya-tan’s (連雅堂) study of the Taiwanese Holo language during the 1930s. In the following year (1952), Wu Hwei (吳槐) also used it in the inaugurating issue of Taipei Wenwu, in which he wrote about the change of pronunciation in the Holo language spoken in Taipei. The most important promoters of the term '閩南' were Taiwanese linguistics professor Wu Shou-li (吳守禮) and Min-nan dictionary compiler Hsu Cheng-chang (許成璋), both of whom had relied heavily on linguistic materials compiled by Chinese scholars on the Min-nan Dialect.

Although it was commonly believed that the idea of '河洛' was implied by Lien Ya-tan during 1930s to refer to the Taiwanese Holo language (e.g. Ang 1987a), the first real usage of '河洛' in the literature appeared in 1955, when Wu Hwei wrote about the stories of ancient Tung and Song Dynasties preserved in the Taiwanese Holo language (which he called 'He luo yu' (or 'Min nan yu') ('河洛語', '閩南語') in Volume 4 of Taipei Wenwu (H. Wu 1955). Wu did not specify why he chose to use the new term 'He luo yu' ('河洛語') in the 1955 article, in which he still held on to the old term '閩南語', placed in parentheses. Later, after the debate over the proper name for Holo erupted in 1958, Wu began to write a series of articles for Taipei Wenwu under the title 'On He luo yu' ('河洛語叢談'). In the first contribution to the series, Wu clearly stated his reasons for preferring the term '河洛', as will be discussed later in this paper.

The Debate over the Name for Holo in 1958

The dispute over the proper Chinese name for Holo started when Tsai Yu-Jai (蔡毓齋) published an article entitled 'Examples of He luo hua' ('河洛話舉例') in Taipei Wenwu in June 1958, in which he severely criticized the terms '閩南' and '福佬' as either historically inaccurate or absurd (Y.-J. Tsai 1958a). He was especially harsh about the general usage of '福佬' and targeted one particular author with criticisms of the specific examples of Holo idioms he had given. Tsai resented the name '福佬' for its literal implication that Holo were savages (Man 蠻) in the Fu-kien area, according to some interpretations of the two Chinese words in ancient Chinese texts. Although Tsai did not clearly identify the target of his criticism, a regular reader of the journal could easily figure it out by comparing what Tsai claimed to

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12 Also known as Lien Hen (連橫), he is best known as the author of A General History of Taiwan (台灣通史).

13 竟有人寫作『福佬』（佬與狫同，蠻也，見苗俗記），儼然以福建之蠻苗自居，乖謬尤甚矣。' (Tsai 1958a: 11).
be ‘disgusting’ and ‘fabricated’ examples of Taiwanese Holo idioms given by others. It was quite obvious that Tsai was in fact attacking examples given in an article by Lin Ben-yuan published in the same journal nine months earlier (B.-Y. Lin 1957). As the critique was too obvious to ignore, Lin responded by writing a rebuttal, entitled ‘Fu-Lau Ren? Or Ho-luo Ren?’ (福佬人乎河洛人乎), which was published two issues later in October 1958. Lin emphasized the importance of consulting with Taiwanese Holo and Hakka for the current consensus over usage, rather than referring to an ancient Chinese text when deciding a proper Chinese term for Holo in Taiwan. He argued that He luo (河洛) was not an inclusive hometown for Han migrants in Fu-kien. Likewise, it was unreasonable to expect that the ancestors of Taiwanese Holo came exclusively from He luo area or claimed themselves to be direct descendants of ancient Chinese kings and nobles from that area (B.-Y. Lin 1958b). Therefore, he considered ‘福佬’, rather than ‘河洛’, was a more appropriate Chinese name for the Taiwanese Holo.

Lin Ben-yuan’s polite and yet subtle rebuttal provoked another round of debate in the next issue of Taipei Wenwu. Wu Hwei began to publish his series of ‘On He luo hua’, Tsai Yu-Jai wrote ‘We are He luo ren’ (正是河洛人), and Chi Ya (集鴉) responded with ‘Comments on Fu-Lau Ren? Or Ho-luo Ren?’ (福佬人乎河洛人乎讀後書感). All three articles unanimously argued for ‘河洛’ over ‘福佬’.

In the first part of his series of studies on He luo hua, Wu confronted the naming issue in a direct manner. He explicitly claimed that other sound expressions of the term ‘Holo’, including ‘河老’, ‘福老’, ‘學老’, ‘福佬’, and ‘學佬’, were inferior to ‘河洛’ in their connotations and historical relevance. Quoting Chinese classic literature and historical documents, Wu argued that the area of the two rivers (Yellow River 黃河 and Luo River 洛水) was the political center of three ancient Chinese dynasties (夏商周) and the ancestral homes of the Han migrants who came to Fu-kein when the capital of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (東晉) fell into the hands of foreign invaders in 310CE. Wu believed that the term ‘河洛’ originated because the Han migrants and their descendants were called ‘河老’ (河洛) by the natives of Fu-kein.

Tsai (1958b: 20) again referred to a book by two Chinese scholars, Chou Ru (鄒魯) and Chang Shuan (張煊), which had been originally published in 1907 under the title A History of Han’s Hakka and Fulau (漢族客福史) and republished in 1932 by the National Sun Yat-sen University Press. Chou and Chang (1932 [1907]) wanted to clarify that both 福老 and Hakka came from the He luo area and were therefore pure Han people, in contradiction to a statement made by a Cantonese scholar named Huang Jei (黃節) in a book on the local history and geography of Kwang-tung Province that both were non-Han (for the details of this dispute, see Lo [羅香林] 1933: 5). Tsai claimed that the name ‘福老’ (Fu-lau) was acceptable because the two Chinese scholars had used it in 1907, but that ‘福佬’ (Fu-lau) was not, because ‘佬’ (lau) is same as ‘佬’ (lau), which means ‘savages’ or ‘barbarians’.

To support his argument for using ‘河洛’ rather than ‘福佬’, Chi Ya also referred to another debate about whether Hakka and Holo were of Han descent, which had taken place in Kwang-tung Province in 1905. He further indicated that Lin Ben-

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14 For instance, Tsai criticized Lin for making up an absurd story to explain the origin of a Holo idiom, ‘無某無猴’, which he said was mistaken and should be written as ‘無婦無後’ (Tsai 1958a: 12–13).
yuan’s insistence on using ‘福佬’ to imply that the ancestors of Taiwanese Holo in Fu-kein were in fact Bi Yueh Tribe (百越族) rather than Han – a previous debate over which had already been settled in China some 50 years earlier – was an intentional move to separate the Taiwanese from the Chinese nation. Chi Ya did not use his real name when publishing this article, probably because this was a serious accusation: that Lin intended to claim that Taiwanese were not Han Chinese even before their ancestors migrated to Taiwan, which in some way collaborated with the major argument of the Formosan Nationalist movement proposed by Liao Wen-yi (廖文毅) in Japan in 1956.\(^{15}\)

If we examine Chou and Chang’s (1932 [1907]) original work that both Tsai Yu-Jai and Chi Ya () cited heavily in this debate, however, we cannot find the term ‘河洛’ anywhere, even though the authors did mention that the Holo ancestors originally came from He Nan (河南) and later moved into Fu Kien (福建). Instead, the terms ‘河老’ and ‘福老’ repeatedly appeared in their little book (especially on page 9). Also, although Wu Hwei cited many classic texts in which the term ‘河洛’ appeared, none of them provided direct evidence for his argument that ancestors of Taiwanese Holo were called 河洛人 by the natives after they migrated from He Nan to Fu Kien. Judging from the existing evidence, it may be fair to say that Wu in fact invented ‘河洛’ as an substitute for the term ‘福老’ used in Chou and Chang’s book against the term ‘福佬’, which Tsai Yu-Jai considered to be an ‘unbearable and outrageous invention’.

The debate about the proper name for Holo ended quite unexpectedly after these three articles were published simultaneously in the same issue of Taipei Wenwu, as there was no follow-up article on the same topic.\(^{16}\) No agreement or conclusion was reached, as different authors stuck to their preferred terms in various publications after the debate. However, Wu Hwei’s series articles of ‘On He luo Hua’ appeared regularly in Taipei Wenwu in ten parts over the next three years, concluding in September 1961. As Wu was the only resident member (his job title was ‘常駐委員’ in Chinese) of Taipei City’s Commission of Archives, which was the publisher of Taipei Wenwu, the continuing publication of his series in the specific titles could be seen as indicating the journal’s unspoken official position of promoting the term ‘河洛’ over others at that time.

**The context for the 1958 Debate**

How can we make sense of this old debate among cultural intellectuals from more than 50 years ago? I argue that the real issue was more than just the proper Chinese name for the Holo language and Holo people: by examining the content and focus of Taiwanese language studies undertaken by the authors involved, we can see that the debate was a confrontation over different national imaginations.

The 1950s followed a turbulent five years that saw regime change in 1945, the tragic conflict of the 2-28 Incident in 1947, and the relocation of the Chinese

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15 In his his book *Formosan Nationalism* (台灣民本主義), published in Tokyo, Liao proposed that the Taiwanese nation was a people of mixed blood and therefore not Chinese (see F. Chen 1998: 67–68).

16 One possible reason for the interruption of the heated debate was the sudden death of Tsai Yu-Jai in 1958, after his second article was published.
national government to the island as the Kuomintang (KMT) regime lost its civil war against the Chinese Communist regime in 1949. At the start of the new decade, Taiwanese intellectuals were slowly recovering from the initial cultural shock and engaging once again in public affairs. The inflow of more than one million Chinese Mainlanders, who were supposed to be of the ‘same national lineages and cultures’ (同文同種) as their fellow Taiwanese, yet who occupied most of the important positions in the transplanted national government institutions, led to rising tensions. While the ruling KMT regime sought to reduce this tension by stressing the common cultural connections and blood lineages of Taiwanese and Mainlanders, some Taiwanese intellectuals took an opposite approach that attempted to enhance mutual understanding through studying Taiwan’s culture and history. They argued that hostility between Taiwanese and Mainlanders was the result of cultural misunderstanding following fifty years of Japanese rule, and the study of Taiwanese language thus became a priority. An editorial in Taiwan Folkways (1953) said that the journal had been created to promote mutual understanding, although some Taiwanese intellectuals also wanted to document Taiwan’s unique culture and languages before they were influenced by the newly arrived migrants, who carried the ‘high culture’ of the supposed ‘fatherland’.

This is the background for the 1958 debate over whether ‘河洛’ or ‘福佬’ was the proper Chinese term for the Holo language and people. Those who argued in favour of ‘河洛’ or ‘閩南’ tried to highlight the cultural linkage with ancestral hometowns in China and ancient Chinese language, while those who preferred ‘福佬’ wanted to show that the Taiwanese Holo language had been influenced by other cultures and languages, especially Japan and Japanese, and had developed unique sayings and phrases. Wu Hwei’s series of ‘On He luo Hua’, as it appeared regularly in Taipei Wenwu (1958–1961) and later in Taiwan Folkways (1967–1969), was the most typical example of the former: Wu spent years searching for and compiling traces of ancient Chinese classic texts still preserved in 河洛話, including ‘詩經’, ‘尚書’, ‘禮記’, and ‘書經’. Wu’s articles were usually written in the classic style of Chinese writing (文言文), which was unfamiliar to most Taiwanese readers apart from an elite minority trained in classical Chinese literature.

In contrast, those who argued for using ‘福佬’ (or ‘福老’) sought to collect all the proverbs, phrases, and children’s songs that Taiwanese Holo people had developed in the 300 years since their ancestors had migrated from China. This endeavor soon became a fashionable collective effort in the 1950s and 1960s, with all kinds of people devoting a great amount of time to reporting and recording what they called Tai-yu Yen-yu (臺語諺語), folksongs (歌謠), or vulgar proverbs (俚諺). Some authors tried to compile all the proverbs commonly used in rural agricultural settings; others wrote about proverbs relating to women, sexual relations, child-bearing customs, or life in general (please see the Appendix for related articles). Some authors even tried to record sayings that were used only in certain areas, for instance, Bei Tou (北投) Yang Ming Shan (陽明山), or southern Taiwan (see the first volume of Taipei Wenwu for examples). However, because there was no agreed-upon standard system to express these proverbs in writing, the authors had to devise an ‘accurate’ method to record their findings and to explore the meaning and story behind each item. The Taiwanese Holo proverbs recorded in these articles were so unique to Taiwan in most cases that even the
Mainlander migrants from southern Fu-kien Province who spoke a similar Min-nan language had a hard time understanding them. In some cases, the proverbs were used only in specific regions, and Taiwanese Holo in other regions had never heard of them.

Such works obviously intended to demonstrate the undeniable existence of a unique Taiwanese culture. They implied, implicitly or explicitly, that although Taiwanese Holo language originally came from Southern Fu-kien, it had developed into a distinctive language as early migrants and their descendants had adapted to local conditions that included being ruled by different foreign regimes, coping with Taiwan's sub-tropical climate, and interacting with Hakka and the aboriginals. Lin Ben-yuan’s discussion of the languages of Taiwan vividly demonstrated this point (B.-Y. Lin 1958a). As well as distinguishing between the three major Taiwanese language categories (which he called ‘dialects’) of Aboriginal, Hakka, and Holo, he also discussed the influence of Japanese, and of English and French, which he judged had been for the most part mediated through Japanese. All these elements became part of the Taiwanese Holo language.

The fact that Taiwanese Holo people at this time called themselves ‘福佬人’, and their language ‘福佬話’, was also seen as demonstrating that Taiwanese culture was distinctive. As noted above, the term ‘福佬’ had been used originally by Taiwanese Hakka to describe the Min-nan or Holo-speaking people in Taiwan, and in its original Chinese textual context it may even – as Wu Hwei, Tsai Yu-Jai, and Chi Ya () claimed – have carried a negative connotation. Despite this, Holo people had grown to accept the term and accordingly used it to refer to themselves in the presence of Hakka. As most people in Taiwan during the Ching Dynasty were illiterate, they might not have fully understood or cared about the negative connotations of the ‘written’ name.

However, for a long time, it was a term that was known only to those Holo who interacted with Hakka on a regular basis. Given that Hakka had been subjected to relocations following intra-ethnic strife ( 分 類 械 鬥) and were a minority concentrated within a limited geographical area, most Holo people remained unaware of the term. More common terms for their own language were Taiwan Hua (‘台灣話’) or Tai Yu (‘台語’). The KMT regime disliked ‘Taiwan Hua’, which had become popular in Taiwan during the Japanese period, because it implied a language distinct from the Min-nan dialect of China. When, for ideological reasons, Taiwanese Holo-speakers could not use the preferred term Taiwan Hua, they would instead use a term that better reflected their historical experience and relations with other Taiwanese rather than a term implying ancestral connections with China, even though their historical relations with Hakka and aboriginals may have been quite hostile. That is why they preferred ‘福佬’ over ‘河洛’. Some authors disapproved of ‘福佬’, but their reasons were taken from the debate that had taken place in China in 1905 to 1907 and were not convincing.

As hostility between the Taiwanese and the newly arrived Mainlanders was still quite evident in the 1950s and 1960s, Taiwanese Holo intellectuals who dared not openly support the Formosan Independence Movement that had developed overseas seemed to utilize the debate as a significant opportunity to express their frustration and discontent. This can be seen by examining how their studies of the Taiwanese Holo language shifted focus. Unlike their predecessors, such as Kuo Min-kuan (郭一舟) or Li Hsein-chang (李獻璋), who pioneered using the term ‘福佬
in their studies of Taiwanese Holo language during Japanese rule, Lin and others who advocated using the same term from the 1950s paid disproportionately less attention to Chinese legacies in the Holo language. Kuo’s and Li’s works were aimed at Japanese readers, and by publishing on ancient Chinese traces in the Holo language they tried to convince them that Taiwanese Holo was a beautiful and elegant language that probably preserved more ancient Chinese language forms, idioms, and expressions than other Chinese languages or dialects. They also used Chinese legacies in Holo as a counter-argument against the superiority of the Japanese (language) over the Taiwanese Holo (language). However, Lin and his fellow Taiwanese Holo writers who published on topics related to Taiwanese languages in the same period had a very different agenda. They attempted to highlight that Japanese legacies had been greatly diminished by the KMT’s progressive policy of de-Japanization and re-Sinicization, and with that a distinctive culture in the language as a way to express Taiwan Holo identity in contrast to that of Chinese Mainlanders. Yang Yang (洋洋, apparently a pen name), for instance, published two pieces on Taiwan Folkways (臺灣風物) in 1958 that discussed how the Taiwanese dialect was being distorted among the younger generation due to how they were being influenced by the Japanese they learned in school (Yang 1958, 1960).

Another sign that language studies were being used to distinguish Taiwanese from Mainlanders was the emergence of a special topic or genre relating to new phrases or idioms that had been popularized in Taiwan after 1945. Although Taiwanese had not initiated this topic, it was Taiwanese writers who gave the genre a strongly distinct flavor. Chung Hua 忠華 (a pen name of Chen Han-kuang 陳漢光, a well-known Mainlander author in Taiwan literature from Fu-Kien Province17) wrote the first piece on this topic, which appeared in Taiwan Folkways in 1958. It was entitled ‘Taiwan’s new Idioms after the Glorious Restoration’ (光復後台灣新俗語), and it reported some popular ethnic slurs against Mainlanders by Taiwanese, such as ‘阿山’, ‘阿山婆仔’, and ‘外省仔’.18 As Chen spoke Min-nan and could comprehend the Taiwanese Holo language quite well, it was very likely that he understood Taiwanese hostility toward Mainlanders. Chen (again as Chung Hua) also wrote a second article on the same subject for the journal, while Yang Yang also contributed a piece (see Appendix for information about these articles). Yang’s article was much more explicit, with five of the six new idioms he (or she) reported coined to describe ‘corrupt Mainlander officials’ (外省貪官).19 In an article published in 1963, Lin Ben-yuan used his real name to write a particularly comprehensive article on this topic, ‘The New Phrases that Appeared in Taiwan after its Restoration to China’ (光復後台灣的新名詞), in which he collected 83 new

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17 This is confirmed as Chen’s other name (字) in the bibliography compiled by his widow Lai-tsui Chen (陳賴垂) after he passed away in 1973 (L.-T. Chen 1974: 116).
18 All three terms referred to ‘Mainlanders’ in a demeaning tone. I choose not to cite the worst examples in this paper as they are too racist to repeat.
19 I was not able to find any concrete evidence to confirm whether Yang Yang was a Taiwanese or a Mainlander. However, the article’s tone and knowledge of Taiwanese Holo language, as well as details of in a second article (Distorted Taiwan Hua’ [走樣的台灣話], in 1958) about the absorption of Japanese terms, are suggestive that the author was more likely to be a Taiwanese.
phrases. Readers could easily sense a strong flavor of sarcasm in this piece, which implied the emergence of a corrupt political culture and practices following the ‘glorious restoration’ of Chinese rule in Taiwan (B.-Y. Lin 1963). Some of these phrases had appeared in Taiwan’s news media before the outbreak of the 2-28 Incident in 1947 and represented Taiwanese elites’ clear anger against and astonishment at the new rulers over the corrupt and ‘backward’ political culture of the time. Lin specifically stated that while these phrases were quite common and even taken for granted among Mainlanders, they were new to the Taiwanese. For some discontented Taiwanese intellectuals, the KMT regime controlled by the Mainlanders was regarded as an even worse substitute for their previous Japanese rulers, who may have been cruel and discriminatory but at least were law-abiding and decent.

As can be seen from the above analysis, Taiwanese intellectuals were divided in their attitudes toward the new rulers from the ‘fatherland’. While some chose to cooperate with the new regime and adapted the Chinese nationalist doctrine in treating Taiwan’s historical relations with China and Japan, others took an opposite approach. Tsai Yu-Jai was well known as closely related to Mainlander intellectuals socially: Tsai and a large number of Mainlanders established a riddle society in Taipei (集思謎社) in July 1958, with Tsai serving as its first president until he passed away a few months later. With the coming of Mainlanders and the Chinese literature and materials they brought with them, Taiwanese Holo authors who identified with Chinese nationalist doctrine had more Chinese cultural resources at their disposal to counteract the previous dominance of Japanese materials among Taiwanese intellectuals, including those created by Taiwanese during the Japanese era. During the 1958 debate, Chinese literary materials published in China during the Japanese period in Taiwan, and therefore unknown to most Taiwanese, were heavily cited by those who favored ‘河洛’ over ‘福佬’ to support their claims, including Chou and Chang (1907 [1932]), Chung (1922), and Lo (1933).

In contrast, those who preferred ‘福佬’ usually relied on materials written by Taiwanese scholars during the Japanese colonial period; these included materials both in Chinese and in Japanese, some of which already focused on documenting Taiwanese folk stories or songs as a way to record and preserve the unique Taiwanese culture (e.g. H.-C. Li 1935 [1970]). The most extreme position on this side was the development of a Formosan nationalist movement overseas, such as that of Liao Wen-yi in Japan. In 1962 the Taiwan Youth Society (台灣青年社), a Taiwan independence organization formed by Taiwanese students in Japan, formulated a Formosan nationalist discourse that saw the Taiwanese nation as consisting of Hakka, Holo, and Aboriginals; Mainlanders were regarded as Chinese and therefore another regime of foreign invaders (Chang and Chen 2012: 20).

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20 For example, Lin listed the following new phrases that carried a sarcastic tone to describe the KMT government’s bureaucratic and corrupt ways of conducting official business: 馬虎 (careless), 特權 (privilege), 一問三不知 (unresponsive), 回扣 (kick-backs), 偷工歛料 (cutting corners), 擦油 (ask for bribes), 紅包 (bribe money), 護航 (cover up) and 幫閒 (hang on to and serve the rich and powerful).

21 The following website has information on Tsai Yu-Jai’s involvement with Mainlander scholars in the riddle society: http://edu.ocac.gov.tw/local/riddle/page/201.htm.
Although the Taiwan Independence Movement could not extend into the public domain in Taiwan, given the harsh repression by the KMT, some intellectuals on the island were sympathetic and some members of the Taiwanese elite also treated the Chinese Mainlander migrants as outsiders.

In all, we can say that the first driving force for developing a Holo identity came from the Mainlander-controlled state, which tried to impose the name ‘Min nan Hua’ (閩南話) as the substitute for ‘Taiwan Hua’ (台灣話), the more commonly used term among the Taiwanese Holo. This formed part of a re-Sinicization project in which Mandarin was promoted as the Taiwan’s national language, and Holo had the status of a Han Chinese ‘dialect’. This accidentally stirred the first debate in 1958 among some Taiwanese Holo intellectuals, who shifted the focus of the debate to whether ‘福佬’ or ‘河洛’ was the appropriate Chinese name for Taiwanese Holo. Two different national imaginations stand behind the difference: one in which Taiwan is an inseparable part of the Chinese nation, and one in which Taiwan is seen as having developed a unique culture of its own and thus deserving to be an independent nation. Given the highly sensitive nature of national issues at this time, however, this real difference remained unspoken during the 1958 debate.

**Consequence of the 1958 debate**

The 1958 debate was never really settled, as all three terms continued to appear in the literature. Also, other than the few who were actually involved in the debate, most authors seemed to not care about determining a universal and proper name for Holo, instead using the three Chinese terms interchangeably and sometimes even simultaneously in their works. For instance, several books and monographs on the Taiwanese Holo language published in the 1960s and 1970s used at least two different terms in their books, even though they all used ’閩南話’ in their Chinese titles:

1964: 孫洵侯, 臺灣（閩南）話考證
(H.H. Sun, *The Origin and Nature of Taiwan or Southern Fukien Colloquial*)

1967: 董同龢, 趙榮琅, 藍亞秀, 記臺灣的一種閩南話
(Tung Tung-ho, Chao Yung-lang and Lan Ya-shiu, *A South Min Dialect of Taiwan*)

1977: 黃敬安, 閩南話考證：證說文解字舉例
(Huang Ching-an, *A Study of Minnan Hua*)

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22 The English title of the book appeared on its front cover. ‘Origin’, however, was misspelled as ‘Orgin’.

23 In the preface, the authors discussed ’閩南話’ and ‘福佬話’. The English title appeared on the back cover; ‘Dialect’, however, was misspelled as ‘Dealect’.

24 In the preface, Huang remarked how Taiwanese were also called ‘河洛人’, and that the title of his book could be called *A Study of Taiwan Hua* 台灣話考證.
Of the three instances cited above, the authors did not seem to care about the issue of name, as none of them take any firm stand on any one of the three terms. Huang Ching-an (1977) even used the suppressed and yet popular term ‘Taiwan Hua’ in his book’s preface.

More important, the debate among the cultural elites seemed to have little impact on common usages among the general public, who still preferred using the term ‘Tai Yu’ (‘臺語’) to describe movies, pop songs, and radio programs in Taiwanese Holo, despite the KMT regime’s efforts to impose the term ‘Min-nan’. If we take a look at how these terms were used in a major newspaper, the United Daily News (聯合報), we can see that ‘台語’ remains the most frequently used term from the 1950s through to the 1980s, especially in the first two decades. Table 1 shows the frequencies of each term as they appeared in articles or news reports in the United Daily News between 1951 and 1990; of the three proposed alternative terms for Taiwanese Holo, ‘閩南’ was the most frequently used, followed by ‘福佬’. Their frequencies, however, were far less than those of ‘Tai-Yu’ or ‘Taiwan Hua’. As most of the newspaper’s reporters were Mainlanders during the period under investigation, their frequent use of the term ‘Tai-yu’ reflected the KMT regime’s very limited success in its attempts to impose the new term ‘閩南話’ at this time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Different terms for Holo</th>
<th>Tai-Yu</th>
<th>Taiwan Hua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>河洛</td>
<td>福佬</td>
<td>閩南</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–60</td>
<td>4 (7.8)</td>
<td>13 (25.5)</td>
<td>34 (66.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–70</td>
<td>16 (22.2)</td>
<td>22 (30.6)</td>
<td>34 (47.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–80</td>
<td>25 (29.8)</td>
<td>33 (39.3)</td>
<td>26 (31.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981–90</td>
<td>43 (25.0)</td>
<td>44 (25.6)</td>
<td>85 (49.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88 (23.2)</td>
<td>112 (29.6)</td>
<td>179 (47.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figures in brackets are percentages)

Source: Adapted from Wang (2011: Table 3-3). The data comes from the United Daily News Data Bank (聯合知識庫).


A simple answer to the question of why the imposed new name did not effectively replace the more commonly used word was that the KMT regime did not forcefully impose it before 1970. ‘Taiwan ren’ and ‘Tai-yu’ were not yet deemed to be ‘inappropriate’ names by the KMT regime or, more importantly, by the Taiwanese Hakka at this time. In the Chinese national imagination, Taiwan Province was a part of the Chinese national territory, and therefore the term ‘Taiwan’ was considered to be a regional name. There was no need to ban the use of the terms ‘Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwanese’. The KMT regime began to oppose the terms
strongly only after they acquired a nationalistic connotation in the 1970s, with the escalation of the Taiwanese Independence Movement (TIM) overseas (especially in the US), and even more so after the 1980s, with a newly-emerging contentious Taiwanese national imagination within Taiwan. As such, even though the KMT regime and the Mainlanders formally recognized the language of Taiwanese Holo as ‘閩南話’, the term ‘閩南人’ was still mainly used to refer to their fellow ‘Mainlanders’ who came from the southern part of Fu-kein Province. They would not call Taiwanese Holo ‘閩南人’, because the term would be confusing. This convention can be observed by examining the changing meanings of the term ‘閩南’ in the *United Daily News* across time (see Table 2). In the 1950s and 1960s, these terms more often referred to Mainlanders from southern Fu-kien Province, overseas Chinese originally from Min-nan district, or the ancestors of Taiwanese Holo. These three meanings together accounted for about 85 percent of all usages in that newspaper up until 1970. From 1971, however, the term that was used nearly 80 percent of the time to refer to the Taiwanese Holo was ‘閩南’. Why? What happened?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning of Usages</th>
<th>Mainlanders</th>
<th>Overseas Chinese from Minnan</th>
<th>Taiwanese Holo</th>
<th>Minnans migrants in Taiwan history</th>
<th>Hard to judge</th>
<th>No. of usages</th>
<th>No. of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–60</td>
<td>21 (61.8)</td>
<td>8 (23.5)</td>
<td>5 (14.7)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–70</td>
<td>18 (52.9)</td>
<td>4 (11.8)</td>
<td>4 (11.8)</td>
<td>7 (20.6)</td>
<td>1 (0.3)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–80</td>
<td>2 (0.7)</td>
<td>1 (0.4)</td>
<td>21 (77.8)</td>
<td>3 (11.1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981–90</td>
<td>11 (12.4)</td>
<td>6 (6.7)</td>
<td>69 (77.5)</td>
<td>2 (2.2)</td>
<td>1 (1.1)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>52 (28.3)</td>
<td>19 (10.3)</td>
<td>99 (53.8)</td>
<td>12 (6.5)</td>
<td>2 (1.0)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figures in brackets are percentages)

Source: Adapted from Wang (2011: Tables 3-4). The data comes from the *United Daily News* Data Bank.

Note: The number of usages is slightly higher than the number of articles because in some cases, two or more usages appeared in the same article.

Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Different Meanings of ‘閩南’ (人) as they appeared in *United Daily News*, 1951–1990

There are several reasons for the drastic change in the meaning of ‘閩南’ after 1970. Most important was the general atmosphere of a reinstated nationalizing project by the KMT regime after the mid-1960s. This created a stronger motivation to oppose the use of ‘Taiwan’, which had been given a new national meaning by the TIM. The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (中華文化復興運動), launched in 1966 (Tozer 1970; Wang 2005a: 61), had an international and a
domestic purpose; internationally, it showed the world community that the KMT regime in Taiwan was the true defender of an authentic Chinese culture, in contrast to the Chinese Communist regime, which vowed to establish a new China by casting off the baggage of tradition in the Cultural Revolution – this was important, given ongoing diplomatic manoeuvring by the PRC that eventually succeeded in achieving UN recognition for Mainland China in 1971 at the expense of Taiwan. On the domestic side, which was the real site of the struggle, it also meant converting Taiwan into a ‘real’ Chinese domain, which the KMT regime had failed to accomplish since 1945. The issue of promoting Mandarin as the national language was again raised as a top priority for the movement, in response to escalating internal pressure. After the first television station began to broadcast in 1962, many Mainlander national elites gradually sensed the continuing dominance of the local Taiwanese language among the general populace as they found out that television programs in Taiwanese Holo were more popular than those in Mandarin. In 1970, some Mainlander legislators were especially concerned about the negative effect of a famous puppet show in Taiwanese Holo among the Taiwanese, especially school children, and demanded that air time for TV programs in Taiwanese ‘dialects’ be gradually reduced.25 From 1971, the KMT regime began to enforce a much stricter and more national language policy, including tougher punishments for students or government employees who were caught speaking Taiwanese ‘dialects’ at school.26 Foreign languages were also targeted – specifically Japanese – as barriers to promoting the national language and enhancing national solidarity.27

More important, in 1968 the KMT regime also actively emphasized Taiwan and the Taiwanese people’s historical connections to China through the first standardized textbooks for students, edited by the National Editing and Translation Bureau (國立編譯館) (Wang 2005a: 62). These textbooks, issued during the heyday of the Cultural Renaissance Movement, created what I call a ‘China-Centered Paradigm’, with an official historical vision that clearly defined Taiwan’s close historical relations with China. Under these new circumstances, the KMT regime began to emphasize the Taiwanese ancestral hometowns in China, especially Fu-kien and Kwang-tung Provinces. In 1971, some Taiwanese KMT members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly even proposed that the central

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25 See the news coverage on the inquiry made by Yang Bao-lin (楊寶琳), a Mainlander legislator of Shantung Province on the Committee of Education of the Legislative Yuan (United Daily News, 12 June 1970: 2). For the official record, see the Legislative Yuan Gazette (1970). The puppet show in question was Huang Chun-Hsiang Puppet Show (黃俊雄布袋戲), which debuted in February 1970 and soon became the most popular TV program at the time. See my analysis of the incident in Wang (2005a).

26 The Department of Education of the Taiwan Provincial Government (台灣省政府教育廳) issued an order to all city and county governments, schools, and government agencies under the Taiwan Provincial Government on 7 July 1971, demanding that all students and public employees use Mandarin at all times and stating that offenders should be punished (see Chang 1987: 158–164).

27 The Taiwan Provincial Government issued an order on 5 March 1971 to all government agencies and schools re-asserting the prohibition against using Japanese in the public domain (See B.-Y. Chang 1987: 164–65).
government should consider amending the Household Registration Law (戶籍法) to make registration of ancestral domiciles (祖籍) mandatory, in order to ‘erase the sense of distinction among Taiwanese and Mainlanders and to strengthen the will to recover China among the younger generation’ (see Wang 2005b: 83–85).28

The KMT regime’s new cultural policies of promoting a Chinese national sentiment obviously had a negative impact on the development of Taiwanese consciousness in general. It also had strong implications for studies of Taiwanese languages, and hence, the proper Chinese term for Holo, as discussed in this paper. Studies of Taiwanese languages were channeled into a small part of the nation-building project, which left little room for those who tried to establish a distinctive Taiwanese identity through their language studies, as they had done before the mid-1960s. Taiwanese proverbs and idioms were now considered to be vulgar, and were no longer a fashionable topic to pursue. Studies of Taiwanese Holo languages’ connections with the ancient Han languages, as was first exemplified by Wu Hwei’s works on He Luo Hua, however, were picked up by younger authors, such as Lin Jin-Chau (林金鈞) (J.-C. Lin 1975, 1980), Tarn KaornHack (陳冠學) (Tarn 1984 [1981]), and Huang Ching-an (黃敬安). Huang began to publish a series of books compiling traces of ancient Chinese classics in the Holo language, which was now typically called ‘閩南話’ or ‘河洛話’, but not ‘福佬話’ (C.-A. Huang 1977, 1984, 1985, 1990). In fact, in his 1990 book, Huang even included a long article in the appendix, entitled ‘Introduction to the Historical Origin of Ho-lo People’ (‘河洛人 泉州人、漳州人、唐山人、閩南人 源流概述’), which was not directly related to the main topic of his book, to make clear his strong position on the issue of naming Holo properly in Chinese.

These were the circumstances in which ‘閩南’ began to be used more frequently to refer to Taiwanese Holo than to Mainlanders from southern Fu-kien after 1970 in the United Daily News (as seen in Table 2). It seems quite evident that ‘閩南’ was the KMT government’s preferred term at this time. In fact, when the first TV drama broadcast in Taiwanese Holo was aired in 1962, it was specifically called ‘Min Nan Yu TV Drama’ (閩南語電視劇), even though movies in Taiwanese Holo, first appearing in 1955, were typically called Tai Yu Moives (台語電影) or Tai Yu films (台語片), because they were privately funded and produced. Similarly, when the first TV news program in Taiwanese Holo was finally approved and aired in May 1979, it was also called Min nan yu News (閩南語新聞).

The period between the mid-1960s and the late 1970s was thus characterized by a rigid language policy and tight state control. Robert L. Cheng (鄭良偉) argued in the early 1970s that although the KMT government had stated clearly that there

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28 They demanded that Holo Taiwanese were to be registered as having Fu-Kien Province as their ancestral domicile, while Hakka Taiwanese should be registered as having come from Kwang-tung Province. Twenty Taiwan Provincial Assemblemen chose the highly symbolic date of 7 July, when war between China and Japan had broken out in 1937, to make public their common demand in 1971. Although their demand was never realized by the central government, it was nevertheless highly welcome by the government for its ‘political correctness’ implications when it was first proposed.

29 Tarn KoarnHack used Taiwanese Holo pronunciation to translate his name 陳冠學 into English on the cover of his book. I adopt his translation in this paper; see the author’s note in the bibliography.
were two principles its language policy – using Mandarin to unify all languages in the nation, and allowing 'dialects' to continue to exist – in reality it practiced a linguistic assimilationism under a one-language policy (Cheng 1973). In the 1970s Cheng, a professor at the University of Hawaii, and Huang Shuan-Fan (黃宣範) a distinguished Taiwanese linguistic professor at the National Taiwan University, were the only two Taiwanese academics who dared to openly argue for a dual language policy (S.-F. Huang 1975). This was noted in a collection of essays on Taiwan's language problems published in 1983, when the political opposition movement began to challenge the KMT regime on this particular issue (C.-H. Lin ed. 1983).

The KMT regime's ban on the name 'Taiwan' was initially a response to mounting pressure from overseas, rather than from domestic sources. The development of the overseas TIM gained a new impetus with the increasing success of the PRC's efforts in gaining international recognition, at the expense of the KMT regime's legitimacy, of being the true representative of the Chinese nation. The main advocate agent of the TIM moved to the US and established the World Union for Formosan Independence (WUFI) in 1969, and the group took advantage of the 1971 setback at the UN. For the first time, the KMT regime had to deal directly with the threat that the TIM might gain support inside Taiwan. Although Taiwan's political opposition movement began to organize around a dissident magazine, Taiwan Political Review (台灣政論), in 1975, it did not gain real momentum until 1977, when the dissident politicians won an unprecedented number of seats in local elections. This led to the formation of the Formosa group in the form of a quasi-political party under the name Dangwai (黨外) around Formosa Magazine (美麗島雜誌), published in 1979. The rising tensions between the KMT regime and Dangwai, however, resulted in a clash known as the Kaohsiung Incident in late 1979. One reason for the setbacks after the clash was that the movement positioned itself as a democratic movement, and tried to avoid promoting overt ethnic and nationalist issues in its platforms. The opposition camp was more concerned about universal human rights (especially political rights) rather than group rights or ethnic equality, and the two political dissident magazines that were published in 1975 and 1979 with four issues each did not address the issue of language at all (see Wang 1996: 158–165, 2008: 107–114).

The rapid development of the opposition movement after the setbacks of the 1979 incident was to a great extent a result of its openly adopting a new Taiwan-centered national imagination which gradually evolved from a demand for self-determination in 1983 to Taiwan independence in 1987. The Taiwanese nationalist discourse developed at this stage was very different from the previous form developed overseas in how it defined the Taiwan nation. The new version of Taiwanese nationalism that began to take form in the late 1970s, as exemplified by Annette Lu's (呂秀蓮) book The Past and Future of Taiwan (台灣的過去和未來)

30 Another academic who openly expressed opinions on the language issue in opposition to Taiwan's government policy in the 1970s was J. Bruce Jacobs (in his Chinese name 家博). He wrote a commentary that was published in Central Daily News (中央日報) entitled 'Language in TV and Voices of Farmers' (論電視語言與農民心聲), on 19 January 1973, in which he suggested increasing or establishing TV programs or news in the Min-nan language to better serve the needs of farmers in rural areas (see C.-H. Lin 1983: 197–201).
in 1979, included all current residents of Taiwan as nationals of Taiwan, including Mainlanders, as long as they identified with Taiwan (Lu 1979: 166–167).

It was under these new circumstances that a new wave of debates about the proper name of Taiwanese Holo began to take shape.

‘福佬’ (‘Fu lau’), ‘河洛’ (‘He Luo’), ‘閩南’ (‘Min nan’), ‘鶴佬’ (‘He Lau’), or ‘Holo’?: The Debate over the Proper Name For Holo In and Around the 1990s

A new debate started in the mid-1980s with a suggestion for the proper name for Holo proposed by a linguist who based his proposition on phonological grounds. Ang Uijin (洪惟仁), a Taiwanese linguist, proposed ‘河佬’ rather than ‘福佬’ or ‘河洛’, based on his phonological research of the term ‘Holo’ in its Chinese tone. He formally proposed using the term in an article published in Taiwan Folkways in 1984, and again in a book entitled Phonological Research of the Taiwanese Holo Language (臺灣河佬語聲調研究) in 1985 (Ang 1984, 1985). He argued that although it may be true that Taiwanese Holo people came from the ancient He Luo (河洛) area, he doubted that the term was correct, because the two Chinese characters are not pronounced as ‘Holo’. His new term, ‘河佬’, was chosen strictly due to its closeness to Chinese pronunciations, given that there was no consensus on the ‘correct’ Chinese term for Holo.

One year later, however, Ang admitted that he had made some mistakes in his previous argument for ‘河佬’ and changed his position by proposing yet another term for Holo in his next book (Ang 1986: 31–35): ‘鶴佬’ (‘He Lau’). After carefully comparing the tones and sounds of the words and consulting ancient texts, he now firmly believed that the correct term for ‘Holo’ according to the Chinese tone was ‘貉獠’ (he luo). He was willing to change it to ‘鶴佬’, however, because he thought ‘貉獠’ sounded ‘too “barbaric”’. Ang also stated that Cantonese in Hong Kong had used the term ‘鶴佬’ to refer to people from Chao-chow (潮州人). He repeated the same argument again in an article that appeared in Taiwan Folkways two years later as a formal announcement to his fellow authors about his new proposition (Ang 1988: 1).

Ang’s new proposition of ‘鶴佬’ gained some attention, because he had begun to write a regular column, ‘Tai-yu Mailbox’ (‘台語信箱’), for the DPP Weekly (民進報週刊), the official publication of the DPP, from October 1987, in which he intentionally used the new term (Ang 1987a). In the thirteen articles that appeared in the column’s series, which finished in January 1988, eleven used ‘鶴佬話’ or ‘鶴佬人’. This intentional act, of course, aroused some reactions from readers. In one particular article that appeared two months after the column started, Ang tried to answer a question posed by a regular reader from Tai-nan County who asked him...
why he chose to use ‘鶴佬’ over other terms, in a polite protest (Ang 1987b). This was not the only case in which the new term was challenged.

Hsu Chi-duan (許極燉), a Taiwanese Holo scholar who had resided in Japan for a long time, also wrote two articles for the newspapers, in 1988 and 1990, respectively, in which he criticized Ang for proposing ‘鶴佬’ and argued for ‘福佬’ or ‘台灣話’ (Hsu 1988, 1990a). Hsu’s opinion on this issue can be traced to his previous work. In a book published in 1987, Hsu had followed the path left by authors in the 1950s debate and had collected many materials, especially by Chinese authors, that were not available to Taiwanese writers because of the separation of Taiwan and China during the Cold War. Compared to Lin Ben-yuan or others who had argued for ‘福佬’, Hsu added some newly-found evidence from Chinese texts, both ancient and contemporary, that testified to the antiquity of ‘福佬’. For instance, Hsu cited studies by Chinese scholars (Yuan et al. 1959 [2003]: 237; Hsu 1987: 22–25). He also mentioned Lo Hsiang Lin (羅香林) (1963) to demonstrate that the term ‘福佬’ was widely used among well-known scholars (Hsu 2000: 2). Like his predecessors in the 1950s, Hsu was arguing specifically against the usage of the term ‘河洛’, which he believed had been invented by Lien Ya-tan (連雅堂). He continued to argue in later books for ‘台灣話’ and ‘福佬話’ (Hsu 1990b: 34–36; Hsu 2000).

Ang’s proposition of ‘鶴佬’, of course, was also supported by some Taiwanese Holo intellectuals, as well as by some Hakka. For instance, the political scientist Shih Cheng-feng (施正鋒) strongly supported this usage (Shih 1996, 1997).

These discussions over the proper Chinese name for ‘Holo’ around the late 1980s to early 1990s rarely took the form of a real debate, however, because there were few rebuttals to particular opinions or criticisms. Although, in his reply to a reader, Ang did mention that he was constantly misunderstood and attacked for his newly-invented Chinese term for Holo (Ang 1987b), most criticisms against him remained unanswered. There were many other opinions around this issue that are not presented here because of space limitations; however, they would not change the general observation, that there was no real debate among proponents of different terms in the 1980s. This does not mean that the differences are not important — in fact, they are quite important when it really matters — but that there was neither an urgent necessity nor a proper occasion to discuss the naming issue and settle it once and for all before the mid-1980s. Most people, including the authors discussed here, usually used different terms interchangeably, depending on the occasion or their personal preferences. Even though the government would prefer to use ‘閩南’ or ‘河洛’, it was not able to effectively prevent other terms, including ‘福佬’, ‘鶴佬’, or ‘台灣’ (話) from being used. In which case, how can we account for the sudden surge of different opinions after the mid-1980s?

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34 Hsu returned to Taiwan for the first time in eighteen years in 1987. He founded the Taiwan Language Research and Development Foundation (台灣語言研究發展基金會) and afterwards published several books discussing topics relating to Taiwanese language.

35 However, Chung Du-fwo’s original book, as published in 1922, shows that he in fact used ‘福老’ rather than ‘福佬’, as was claimed by Yuan et al. (Chung 1922:10–11).
The Emergence of a New Necessity

Due to the KMT regime's increasingly repressive policy of promoting a national language and restricting the use of the Taiwanese language in television and radio after the mid-1970s, preserving the use of 'local dialects' became an important political agenda for the opposition movement, which began to strategically utilize the language issue to strengthen its democratization and bentuhua (本土化) agendas after the 1980s. It specifically used Taiwanese Holo – the 'repressed mother tongue' of the majority people in Taiwan – during its mass political gatherings and campaign activities, as the primary media of communication, to appeal to the audience's collective sense of sorrow (Y.-M. Liu 1983). The spouses of opposition leaders imprisoned in the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident who ran for public office on their husbands' behalf attracted a great deal of sympathy during these mass gatherings; some popular Taiwanese Holo language songs were also used in these campaigns. These songs and the language were typically called Tai-yu (台語) or Tai-yu songs, rather than '閩南語', because the latter name had been imposed by the KMT regime to imply the status of 'local dialect'. In terms of the language they used, the opposition movement had in a sense developed a sub-culture of its own at these public gatherings. As the movement became more successful in obtaining popular support in elections, especially after the DPP was established in 1986, such practices became standard repertoire among DPP members and supporters.

Taiwanese Hakka, however, were quite offended by such practices and felt excluded or alienated, because they implied that the Hakka (or their language) were not Taiwanese. Some Hakka among the elite began to voice their discontent by protesting against what they called the DPP's 'Holo chauvinism' ('福佬沙文主義'). This was most evidently displayed in an article published in 1987 by a famous Hakka/Holo writer 36 and DPP member, Li Chiau (李喬), with a sensational title: ‘Arrogant Holo, Self-Abased Hakka, Self-Abandoned Aboriginals’ ('自大的鶴佬人、自卑的客家人、自棄的原住民') (C. Li 1987). Li talked about his unpleasant experiences relating to the language issue with other Holo DPP comrades during the oath-taking ceremony on joining the new party and during internal meetings when they were forced to use Holo Taiwanese language. This article was widely cited among the opposition camp, especially by Hakka supporters. Some elite Hakka were especially furious to learn that the KMT government had decided in September 1987 to allow bilingual programs to be broadcast in Mandarin and in Taiwanese Holo, in response to the opposition movement's demand. This news prompted elite Hakka to launch the first-ever Hakka cultural movement magazine, the Hakka Monthly (客家風雲), the following month. Complaints and protests against Holo chauvinism by Hakka was a major theme of the articles published in

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36 According to Li's own account, he is a Holo by birth and became a Hakka by adoption.
37 For some unexplained reasons, however, ‘鶴佬人’ in the original title and in the article was changed throughout to ‘福佬人’ when Li's series The Ugly Sides of Taiwanese was collected and published in book form (C. Li 1988).
the first few years of the magazine. Some of the DPP’s Hakka members even threatened to organize a Hakka party as a protest against both the KMT’s language policy and the DPP’s insensitive practice of imposing the Taiwanese Holo language on Hakka. The most unbearable thing was that the DPP insisted on using the Holo language on all occasions and calling it ‘Dai wan ue’ (‘台灣話’ in Holo pronunciation).

This protest over language – which came DPP Mainlander members as well as from Hakka – was at first met with mixed reactions among DPP’s Holo members. Eventually, those who were more sympathetic to the Hakka’s protest got the upper hand, given the indisputable political correctness of the Hakka’s demands. Ang, for instance, was invited to write for the Hakka Monthly, due to his devotion to the studies and promotion of Taiwanese language in the past. He advised that Hakka and Holo should try harder to work together to promote Taiwanese languages (Ang 1987c). At the DPP’s Third National Convention, held on 29–30 October 1988, some of the DPP’s Holo members, led by Lin Cho-shui (林濁水), made a formal motion demanding that programs broadcast in Hakka be added to the DPP’s political agenda (Chiu 1988). Ang also advised DPP members to be more sensitive to how the Hakka felt about their calling the Holo language simply ‘Taiwanese language’.

The need for a proper name for Taiwanese Holo therefore arose because the terms ‘台語’ and ‘台灣話’ preferred by the Taiwanese Holo were now under heavy criticism by Hakka as well as Mainlanders, who were now considered to be part of the Taiwanese nation in the new version of Taiwanese nationalist discourse. As the DPP tried to pursue its political agenda of Taiwanese nation building, healthy relations among its major ethnic groups became a major challenge.

What, then, was the proper occasion on which to discuss or settle the issue?

**The Presence of a Proper Occasion for Discussion**

As the DPP tried to promote a new Taiwanese national imagination to replace the old Chinese national imagination of the KMT regime, drafting a new Constitution took a high priority on its agenda. On 26–28 August 1991, the DPP held the first Convention for Drafting a Constitution by the People (人民制憲會議). The result, as discussed at the start of this paper, was the Draft Taiwan Constitution (台灣憲法草案). Article 24 stipulated that the state should not impose one particular language or discriminate against any other language, and that it should not take a dual language position either. Instead, the state should be multi-cultural and multi-lingual. The draft was written before a rise in ethnic tensions between Taiwanese and Mainlanders in the early 1990s (which resulted in the formation of the Chinese New Party [新黨] CNP in 1993), and the only ethnic issue that was considered as worthy of being regulated by the Constitution concerned the Aboriginals. Participants in the drafting added a new Chapter 9, entitled ‘Aboriginals’ (‘原住民族’), with five new articles that were added to the original draft prepared by the DPP.

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38 Chung Shiao-sung (鍾孝上) wrote an article in the first issue of The Hakka Monthly to discuss the issue (Chung 1987).
39 Again, Chung Shiao-sung was one the most notable figures writing on this issue.
The newly emerging conflicts over language between Holo and Hakka, however, did not receive any special attention in this final draft of the 1991 meeting. However, ethnic conflict between Taiwanese and Mainlanders and between Hakka and Holo during the early 1990s forced the DPP to pay more serious attention to the issue. In August 1993, the DPP published its first white paper on ethnic and cultural policies (DPP 1993). It stated clearly that the DPP was proposing a new policy of recognizing four ethnic groups – the Aborigines, Min-nans (閩南人), Hakka, and Mainlanders – as the constituting elements of the Taiwanese nation. It should be noted that the name of the Taiwanese Holo ethnic group in this official DPP document was '閩南人', and that there was no mention of any dispute over the proper name for Taiwanese Holo.

In 1994, the KMT regime lead by President Lee Teng-hui initiated another convention of the National Assembly in order to amend the Constitution, while proponents of the TIM – especially the core members of the Taiwanese Professors Association (TPA) – proposed an alternative second convention with the same purpose. The DPP decided to take part in the convention held by the ruling KMT regime but not to take charge of the one proposed by its radical ally. Thus, although for the most part the same DPP members who had been involved with the first convention organized and participated in the alternative second convention, the DPP was not the official organizer. During the preparation meeting, which took the form of an academic conference (Symposium on Taiwan’s Draft Constitution [台灣憲草討論會]) sponsored by the TPA on 18 April 1994, new dimensions of ethnic relations in Taiwan became an important issue after the emergence of the CNP in 1993 (Shih 1995: 4). In fact, the key organizer of the conference, Shih Cheng-feng, deliberately invited a famous Hakka, the novelist Li Chiau (李喬), and a Mainlander sociologist named Chang Mau-kuei (張茂桂) to give opening remarks on the panel on ethnicity (including Aborigines), and also Lin Cho-shui (林濁水), a Holo, DPP legislator, to comment on the two papers as a way to deal with the new ethnic issues. Both Li Chiau and Chang Mau-kuei talked about the various types of ethnic chauvinism, including Han and Holo, as being the causes of ethnic tensions in Taiwan at the time. Li specifically raised the issue of Holo monopoly over the terms ‘Taiwan ue’ and ‘Taiwan ren’, even by some of his Holo comrades in the TPA.

Consequently, during the Second Convention of Drafting a Constitution by the People, on 26–28 June 1994, a new chapter on ethnicity was added, containing the five articles cited at the beginning of this paper. According to Shih, who was the key organizer and the editor of the conference's Proceedings, the most important amendment was ‘Constitutional Considerations of Ethnic Relations’, and this was the title of his preface to the Proceedings (Shih 1995). The focus of the convention was to regulate all dimensions of ethnic relations in the Constitution. To achieve this, the organizer invited participants from all ethnic groups, in order to enhance the event’s ethnic representativeness, and the session on ethnicity was the most fiercely debated among all the sessions.

As this was the first time that the names of ethnic groups other than the Aboriginals were to be written into the constitution draft, it also became a proper occasion to discuss the name of each ethnic group. Shih, however, says that the Holo participants could not agree upon any of the Chinese terms available at the time and the only compromise reached at the conclusion was to use the
Romanized spelling ‘Holo’. The main reason for the disagreement was that Holo participantsresented the connotation of a close relation with China embedded in
the names ‘河洛人’, ‘福佬人’, or ‘閩南人’ (Shih 1996: 70). Shih himself is a strong
supporter of the term ‘鶴佬’, as proposed by Ang, and he used it consistently
throughout his works during the 1990s. His explanation for why he chose the new
term clearly summarizes the core of the name debate:

Holo 族群習慣自稱為「台灣人」；客家精英往往認為太具擴張性，而
一般客家人稱之為「福佬人」；在過去，官方稱之為「閩南人」或「河
洛人」，帶有源自中國的弦外之音。在這裡，我們借用洪惟仁建議的
「鶴佬人」，僅其音而不計較其義。

[People of the Holo ethnic group are accustomed to calling
themselves ‘Taiwanese’. Hakka elites usually consider this term to be
too exclusive and call them ‘Fu lau ren’ instead. In the past, the
government called them ‘Min nan ren’ or ‘Ho lo ren’, with the
connotations that their ancestors came from China. I will follow Ang
Uijin’s suggestion and use ‘He lau ren’ to borrow its sound without
paying attention to the textual meaning of the term.]

(Shih 1997: 99)

However, Shih also appreciated the degree of complexity involved in the naming
issue during and after the 1994 convention. Thus he became more conservative
about promoting using the term ‘鶴佬’, when he stated that it is a challenging task
to find an agreed-upon name for the Holo other than the commonly used
‘Taiwanese’, to which Hakka strongly objected:

長期解決之道，可以嘗試替鶴佬人找出一個大家可以接受的族群名
字，簡單明瞭，又不與台灣民族相混淆，但恐非易事；短期內，或可努
力說服鶴佬人接受「Holo」這個族名（取其音，而不計較漢字如何
寫）。

[The long-term solution to the problem is to find a name for the Holo
ethnic group that is acceptable to all, is simple and clear, and does not
become confused with the name of the Taiwan nation. This, however,
will not be easy. A short-term solution is to persuade the Holo people
to accept the name ‘Holo’ in English, which is used simply because of
its sound, and forget about how to write it in Chinese.]

(Shih 1997: 81–82)

If we compare this suggestion from the Proceedings of the Symposium on
Taiwan’s Draft Constitution, when the participants were still using different
Chinese names for ‘Holo’, 40 with what was eventually written in the 1994 Draft

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40 According to the Proceedings of the Symposium compiled by Shih (ed. 1995), all three
terms ‘河洛’, ‘福佬’, and ‘閩南’ were used interchangeably by the participants, even by
the same person. For instance, ‘河洛’ appeared on pages 57, 100, and 123; ‘福佬’ on pages 96,
100–103, 112–113, 116, and 123; and ‘閩南’ on pages 108 and 113.
Republic of Taiwan Constitution two months later, it is quite evident that using the Romanized ‘Holo’ in this historical document as the group name for Taiwanese Holo was a compromise that had been reached among the Holo participants at the 1994 Convention, the result of a vote count among participants (Shih 1996: 70n2).

It should be emphasized that although the Romanized ‘Holo’ had appeared in the previous literature, usually as the English translation of the Chinese term for how Taiwanese Holo referred to themselves (e.g. H.-C. Li 1950:1; Ang 1988: 1), this was the first time that it had been used as an official group name as a result of a face-to-face debate in a symbolically significant convention to draft a new constitution for Taiwan. The decision to use a group name from another language highlighted that they agreed only on what they called themselves verbally, and that there was no agreement about a written name. A comparison of the debates in 1958 and 1994 also reveals that some important changes had occurred in the meantime. Shih informed us that the three Chinese terms for Holo were all rejected in 1994 because of their implication that the Holo descended from China. In other words, while some of their predecessors had advocated ‘福佬’ as more related the Taiwanese historical experience than ‘河洛’ or ‘閩南’, which were seen as more connected to China, the Holo participants of the 1994 convention thought that the name ‘福佬’ also implied a connection with China. Even though the fourth alternative name, ‘鶴佬’, as proposed by Ang Uijin in 1986, was chosen and adopted by some, strictly on the basis of its phonetic resemblance to ‘Holo’, participants did not support this name either.

The Impact of and Reaction to the New Romanized Word for ‘Holo’

Although the most important amendment made in the 1994 convention was a new chapter on ethnicity, the content of the new draft was not mentioned in any mainstream media and it seems that most people in Taiwan did not even know about the ‘consensus’ on naming Holo that had been reached. The compromise was overshadowed in news coverage by the convention’s more radical programs of selecting a new national flag and national anthem for the new Republic of Taiwan, which triggered strong reactions from the government and the ruling KMT. The fact that the convention’s organizers and participants were mostly pro-Taiwan independence members of the opposition camp indicated that neither the choice of ‘Holo’ nor the rationale for it reflected a widely preferred preference, even within the political opposition. As popular support for Taiwan’s independence was still quite low at the time, the DPP decided not to take a radical position on

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42 See the news coverage on the reactions of an unknown official in the Ministry of Interior and the spokesperson of the KMT during the 1994 convention (China Daily News, 25 June 1994: 4 and 26 June 1996: 4). Media coverage of the convention focused on the new flag-raising ceremony attended by more than 3,000 people.
43 According to a Gallup Poll, support for Taiwan independence between 1989 and 1994 fluctuated between 8.2 and 27 percent (China Evening News, 17 April 1994: 1):
the issue. The director of the DPP’s Policy Research Center, Chen Chung-hsin (陳忠信), even wrote an article in the *China Daily News* two weeks after the 1994 convention to explain the party’s more cautious position: that declaring Taiwan independence and initiating a new constitution should be a decision made collectively by the Taiwanese people, even when the DPP became the ruling party.\footnote{Chen Chung-hsin, ‘It is the People Who should Decide on Taiwan Independence and Drafting A New Constitution’ (‘要不要「獨立、制憲」由台灣人民決定’), *China Daily News*, 17 July 1994: 11.}

Consequently, the new Romanized name at first had no visible immediate impact on the common usage of how to refer to Taiwanese Holo. In fact, it did not enter the public sphere until after 2000, when the DPP became the ruling party after winning the Presidential election. The first time that the term appeared again in the public domain was when the Commission for Promoting National Language in the Ministry of Education (教育部國語推行委員會) passed a Draft Language Equality Law (語言平等法草案) in February 2003, which defined ten Aboriginal languages, Hakka, Holo, and Mandarin as the ‘National Languages’ of Taiwan, as follows:

國家語言係包括國內使用之各原住民語（阿美族語、泰雅族語、排灣族語、布農族語、噶瑪蘭族語、卑南族語、賽夏族語、雅美族語、邵族語等）、客家話、Ho-lo話（台語）、華語。

《語言平等法草案》，第二條，第三項，2003

One of the most controversial parts of this official document, was that the Taiwanese Holo language was referred to as ‘Ho-lo 話 (台語)’, while Mandarin was indicated by ‘華語’ rather than the more commonly used term ‘國語’. The decision to use ‘Ho-lo 話 (台語)’ was again a compromise among the Taiwanese Holo members of the Commission, made under protest from their Hakka colleagues, after they had for different reasons rejected all six commonly used Chinese terms (C.-Y. Lin 2003).\footnote{The six terms mentioned during the meeting of the Commission of Promoting National Language were: ‘福建話’， ‘福佬話’， ‘河洛話’， ‘鶴佬話’， ‘學佬話’ and ‘閩南話’ (see C.-Y. Lin 2003).}

Although the intention of the new law was to ensure that all languages used in Taiwan would be recognized as national languages that would enjoy equal rights and protection from the state as part of a new ideal of multiculturalism, the act of renaming the two most-spoken languages in Taiwan in this draft triggered strong reactions from some KMT legislators and members. The KMT think tank, the National Policy Foundation (國家政策研究基金會), severely criticized the draft in a radio talk show immediately after it was made

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public, and later published the transcripts of the entire program on its official website. The host, Chao Li-yu (趙麗雲), and the invited speaker, KMT legislator Wu Tun-yi (吳敦義), specifically commented on the ‘bizarre’ terms ‘Ho-lo’ ‘話’ (‘台語’) and ‘華語’, which he saw as indications of the DPP administration’s ‘de-Sinicization’ scheme (去中國化). In the talk show, both Chao Li-yun and Wu Tun-yi favored the terms ‘河洛話’ or ‘閩南語’. Eventually, under great pressure, the DPP’s Minister of Education announced that he would withdraw the Draft Language Equality Law to avoid any further controversy.47

Another good occasion for evaluating the impact of the newly-proposed Romanized name on the usages of terms was the Convention for Ethnic and Cultural Development (族群與文化發展會議), organized by the Executive Yuan of the DPP administration on 16–18 October 2004. After the controversial 2004 Presidential election, in which the incumbent DPP President Chen Shui-bian won his second term by a very narrow margin after a shooting incident on the eve of the election, the ruling DPP decided to hold the first-ever national meeting to deal with ethnic and cultural issues as a response to the political confrontations and turmoil that followed. The 333-page convention Proceedings were published three months later (Executive Yuan 2005). Again, several names for ‘Taiwanese Holo’ were used during the three-day convention without anyone seriously thinking about settling the naming issue. According to my calculations, on the 56 occasions when the Taiwanese Holo (language) was mentioned, participants used at least ten different names. Other than the four most commonly used Chinese names (河洛’, ‘閩南’, ‘福佬’, and ‘鶴佬’), their variations (閩, ‘福老’, and ‘鶴老’), and the Romanized ‘Holo’, another new Chinese term, ‘福台語’ (Fu Tai Yu), was also used.48 This new term was proposed by some as a response to Hakka protest over the common practice of calling the Taiwanese Holo language ‘台語’. In the same vein, they called the Hakka language ‘客台語’ to show that it was also considered to be one of the ‘Taiwanese languages’. Table 3 shows the frequencies of each term as it appeared in the Proceedings.

46 See http://old.npf.org.tw/Symposium/s92/920222-EC.htm for the complete transcript of the radio talk show broadcast on 22 February 2003 on the China Broadcast Station (中國廣播電台), a KMT-owned radio station. The KMT think tank was established by Lien Chan after he lost the 2000 Presidential Election.

47 In 2007, a newly revised Draft National Language Development Law (國家語言發展法草案) proposed by the Council for Cultural Affairs (文化建設委員會) was sent to the Legislature Yuan for approval without a controversial part with had specifically defined the national languages. However, the National Policy Foundation still published an article criticizing the new draft by referring to the original 2003 draft (H.-Y. Liu 2007). The revised draft was boycotted by the KMT and by the People First Party (PFP) legislators, and never even made it onto the agenda for discussion in the national congress.

48 The new term was used by Chang Su-fang (張淑芬), the Chairperson of the Taiwan Mother Tongue Education Association (台灣母語教育學會理事長), who clearly stated that she did not like other terms (河洛’, ‘閩南’, ‘福佬’) during the panel on the Preservation and Development of Ethnic Languages (Executive Yuan 2005: 150). Yu Bao-chuan (余伯泉), another Taiwanese language activist, also used the term during the same panel.
Names (Frequencies) | Frequencies
--- | ---
河洛 | 18
閩南 (14)、閩 (2) | 16
福佬 (6)、福老 (2) | 8
鶴佬 (3)、鶴老 (1) | 4
Holo | 4
台語 | 4
福台語 | 2
Total | 56

Table 3: Frequencies of different terms of Taiwanese Holo appearing in the 2005 Convention for Ethnic and Cultural Development Proceedings

As can be seen in Table 3, the most frequently used term at this convention was ‘河洛’ (18 times), followed by ‘閩南’ (16 times); the others were all used less than 10 times. As the DPP had just adopted the term ‘河洛’ in the highly symbolic Resolution ‘Multi-Ethnicity, One Nation’ ('族群多元國家一體決議文') in September 2004, and President Chen Shui-bian had also used ‘河洛’ in his opening remarks, it is no surprise that ‘河洛’ became the most popular term at this convention. It seemed that the DPP had adopted the term ‘河洛’ without paying attention to its original textual connotation of emphasizing Holo’s close historical relation with China. In contrast, the Romanized ‘Holo’ was used only four times by Taiwanese Holo Language teachers or researchers.49

The compromise decision to use Romanized ‘Holo’, nevertheless, was honored to a certain degree by other Taiwanese Holo intellectuals. For instance, if we check the entry for ‘Taiwanese Holo’ in the Dictionary of Taiwan History (臺灣歷史辭典) published in 2004, we find that even though the author prefers to use ‘福佬’, he nevertheless put the Romanized ‘Holo’ next to the Chinese term as part of the title of this entry, which is as follows:

福佬 (Holo)

福佬又常被寫為「河洛」或「鶴佬」，雖然一般認為福佬人即閩南人，但實際上臺灣的福佬人是指來自閩南、粵東操閩南語系的漢人移民，主要包括泉州、漳州，廣東潮州部分移民，在歷史上由於原鄉不同，福佬中的漳州人及泉州人曾是分類械鬥中的主角。與客家人相似，語言也是其族群認同的重要標誌。而目前漳州、泉州之分已不再明顯，福佬人下的分類亦已不具現實意義。目前福佬人是臺灣人口數最多的族群，約占臺灣人口總數的 75% 左右。

薛化元 2004：1034，《臺灣歷史辭典》

49 Romanized ‘Holo’ appeared on pages 87, 152, 277, and 281 of the Proceedings. It should be noted that it was misspelled as ‘itolo’ on page 281, which indicated that even the government officials responsible for spell-checking, to have made such a mistake, had no idea what it meant.
\text{Fu-lau}' is often referred to as ‘Ho lo’ (河洛') or ‘He lau’. Although it is commonly believed that \text{Fu lau ren} are in fact \text{Min nan ren}, Taiwan’s \text{Fu lau ren} are Han immigrants from the southern part of Fu-kien and the eastern part of Kwang-tung who spoke the Min-nan dialect. They included immigrants from Chuan-chow, Chang-chow of Fu-kien Province and Chao-chow of Kwang-tung Province. Given that they came from different ancestral hometowns, migrants from Chang-chow and Chuan-chow were participants on the opposite sides of the classificatory strife during the Ching Dynasty. Like for Hakka, language is also an important marker for the \text{Fu lau} ethnic identity. Currently, the distinction between Chang-chow and Chuan-chow is no longer visible and has no practical meaning. As of now, \text{Fu lau ren} is the largest ethnic group in Taiwan, making up about 75% of its population.\text{[}\text{Hsueh Hua-yuan, 2004, Dictionary of Taiwan History}\text{]}

It is quite evident that the debate over the Chinese name for ‘Holo’ was still nowhere near being settled in 2004, and not even in 2013, when this paper is being written. Different usages continue to appear in all kinds of public media by different authors. Also, most people seem not to care about the debate, and refer to different terms interchangeably without showing any preference. There are, however, continuing discussions on the issue every once in a while whenever someone – usually a member of the cultural elite – openly expresses a strong opinion in support of one particular usage over others. The most heated debates have usually occurred when certain terms have been chosen to illustrate different national imaginations. For example, a dispute occurred overseas in 2008 when a well-respected Taiwanese Holo cultural worker, Hong Ming-ling (洪敏麟), was invited to give a series of lectures to Taiwanese communities in the United States. His strong opinion that Taiwanese Holo language came from the ancient \text{He Luo} (河洛) district, or the area of the Central Plain (中原), and that therefore its ’correct name’ should be \text{He Luo Hua} (河洛話), provoked some equally strong criticisms in the newsletters of the San Diego Taiwanese Cultural Association (see Chen 2008; Chu 2008). Hong’s critics focused mainly on his underlying Chinese nationalist consciousness, embedded in his one-sided selection of fragmented historical facts to support his conviction about the origin of the Taiwanese Holo language. Others have used reasoning more logical than this to discredit the argument of a historical connection between the Taiwanese Holo language and the language spoken in the ancient \text{He Luo} 河洛 district (for instance, K.-M. Wu 2008: 69–71). These disputes are hard to settle, as personal preferences for particular terms are usually confounded with mixed historical evidence and different national imaginations. Some even think that it would be virtually impossible to find a Chinese name for the Taiwanese Holo that would be acceptable to all (e.g. K.-M. Wu 2008).

\textbf{Concluding Remarks}

In what respects can an analysis of the two waves of debates over the Chinese name for ‘Holo’ inform us about the development of Holo identity in contemporary Taiwan?
The historical account of the first debate in 1958 indicates that most Taiwanese Holo were quite accustomed to and preferred to call themselves ‘台灣人’, and their Holo language ‘台語’ or ‘台灣話’. In its content and nature, the Taiwanese identity was an ethnic minority identity that was formed in contrast with a Japanese identity before 1945 and a Chinese Mainlander identity after 1947. Although the Hakka spoke a different language and had a slightly different culture from the Holo, they were considered to be Taiwanese when such an identity was first conceived in the 1930s under Japanese colonial rule. As the Japanese constantly emphasized the distinction between the Holo and Hakka in their official documents and population census – respectively, ‘福建（語）族’ and ‘廣東（語）族’ – even the Holo and Hakka who resided in their own ethnically concentrated geographic areas began to acknowledge the existence of other Han people. In common usage, however, most Holo still called themselves and their language Taiwanese, and only referred to themselves as Holo in the presence of Hakka (B.-Y. Lin 1958a). The Holo identity, therefore, was at best a situational identity that existed mostly only among the Holo who had the chance to engage in regular contact with Hakka. As Hakka only accounted for not more than 15 percent of Taiwan’s population and tended to be concentrated in certain geographical regions, it is little wonder that many Taiwanese Holo who resided in areas without a substantial Hakka population were unfamiliar with the term, let alone would not identify themselves as such before the 1960s, when geographical mobility was still quite limited. The development of a Holo identity to include all Taiwanese who spoke the Taiwanese Holo language was a result of a compromise among the Taiwanese Holo, who after 1945 were forced to refer to their language or themselves by names other than Taiwanese. The fact that the KMT government tried to promote or even impose the name ‘閩南（話）’ on the Holo language, and later on the Holo people, indicated a strong intention to subordinate the Taiwanese within the KMT’s nationalist ideological indoctrination, in order to reduce rising tensions caused by mutual misunderstanding and the tragic conflicts that occurred during the initial contacts between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. The debate over ‘河洛’ and ‘福佬’ among the Taiwanese Holo cultural elites in the late 1950s demonstrated an effort to defend their rights to name themselves with a different national imagination than that of the KMT regime. The Holo identity, therefore, was initially conceived as a reluctant compromise among these elites.

The second wave of debate, around the 1990s and still not resolved, demonstrates another dimension of reluctance around the Holo identity. The earlier debate was between members of the cultural elites, and did not have a significant impact on the general public. Consequently, the everyday meanings of ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Holo’ persisted, and the Taiwanese identity remained the most important form of an ethnic minority identity among the Holo and Hakka, as constructed and promoted by the opposition movement camp. This was especially the case among the postwar generations from the 1980s. However, as the opposition camp escalated the scope of its challenge and began to develop a Taiwanese nationalist discourse to counteract the Chinese nationalist discourse of the KMT regime after 1980s, language issues between Holo and Hakka began to take a different course. Even though the Taiwanese nationalism constructed in Taiwan after the 1980s defined all residents in Taiwan as belonging to the Taiwan nation, both the definition formulated by the KMT regime as part of its nationalist
project and the opposition counter-strategy had alienated most people other than the Holo. The Hakka were the first to raise their discontent over the DPP’s insistence on using only the Taiwanese Holo language as a weapon in its mass gatherings, and of calling it ‘Taiwanese Hua’ after 1987. There was protest from other ethnic minorities, who also accused the DPP of allowing Holo chauvinism to develop among its overly enthusiastic supporters, and of identifying ethnic Holo with national Taiwan in its national imagination. In response, in 1993 the DPP’s Holo members initiated a discourse of ‘Taiwan’s four great ethnic groups’. However, the eventual outcome was the awkward compromise of using Romanized Holo as the name of the Holo people, as was shown in the chapter on ethnicity in the Draft Taiwan Constitution in 1994.

More important, due to accusations from other ethnic minorities, Holo identity has a new negative connotation, of being an ethnic chauvinist majority group that in its conception of a new Taiwan nation has attempted to exclude other ethnic minorities from their rightful place. A survey of the United Daily News indicates that various terms for ‘Holo chauvinism’ debuted in the news media only in 1990.50 Between 1990 and 2010, however, different terms appeared 66 times in different news units in this paper alone (Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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Table 4: Articles Referring to ‘Holo Chauvinism’ in the United Daily News, 1990–2010

Accusations of Holo chauvinism unsurprisingly in most cases targeted the DPP, especially when the DPP was the ruling party in Taiwan between 2000 and 2008. The stigmatization was so successful that the DPP was eventually forced to respond publicly to the accusation in a news bulletin announcing its ‘Political Agenda for the Next Ten Years’ (‘十年政綱’) released on 11 August 2010. Some Taiwanese Holo were so bothered about the accusation that it became one of the main reasons why they would not support the DPP. Consequently, Taiwanese Holo were quite divided in their minority ethnic consciousness and partisan support compared to Mainlanders, who overwhelmingly voted for KMT or Mainlander candidates in the major elections.

Table 5 below demonstrates the voting patterns among different ethnic groups in Taiwan in the four Presidential elections between 2000 and 2012; it shows that Taiwanese Holo as a category of people is still far from being a group of people with a fully developed ethnic consciousness.

---

50 Hakka elites were the first to propose such a concept in 1987 in the Hakka Monthly (客家風雲) magazine.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
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<th>Actual Votes received</th>
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<td>19.1</td>
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<td>11.5</td>
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<td>(72)</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>68</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>(% in voters)</td>
<td>(74)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
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(Figures in columns are percentages)

Sources:
1. The 2000 data were adopted from the ‘Survey Research of the Voting Behaviors of the 2000 Presidential Election’, collected by the Department of Political Science, Soochow University (東吳大學政治學系). A national random sample of 1,308 individuals was interviewed after the election. Those who reported voting for other candidates (Li Ao [李敖] and Hsu Hsing-liang [許信良], who between them received 0.76 percent of actual votes cast) or refused to answer were deleted from column percentage calculations.
2. The 2004 data were adopted from an ‘Exit Poll of the 2004 Presidential Election’ conducted by the TVBS Poll Center (a Taiwan Cable TV network company) and Mitofsky International (a US poll company) on Election Day. A national random sample of 13,244 individuals was polled outside 150 voting posts throughout the country. See Table 2-4 of the full report released on 12 April 2004 on the TVBS website: [http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/poll_center/default.asp](http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/poll_center/default.asp).

Table 5: Voting for Different Candidates by Ethnic Background in the Presidential Elections, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 (continued on next page)


Appendix: 臺灣風物、台北文物、文獻專刊、南瀛文獻中有關台灣語言名稱的文章彙編 (A List of Articles on the Naming Issues of Taiwanese Languages in Taiwan Folkways, Taipei Wenwu, Wen-hsein Journal, and Nan-ying Wen-hsein)
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Challenging Hongkongisation: the role of Taiwan's social movements and perceptions of post-handover Hong Kong

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Introduction

On 18 March 2014, approximately 300 students stormed the Legislative Yuan in Taipei, and began occupying the building. This was done in response to legislators from the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) expediting the review process of the controversial Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CCSTA) with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Many Taiwanese feared that the CSSTA, a follow up to the Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in 2010, might be detrimental to Taiwan’s economy and sovereignty. In the days after the occupation of the Legislative Yuan, more than 10,000 Taiwanese surrounded the Yuan building in support of the students. These demonstrations were followed by student-led protests in other Taiwanese cities against the CSSTA. A remarkable characteristic of these protests was the frequent reference that protestors made to Hong Kong. The Special Administrative Region was depicted as a victim of economic integration with Beijing. Delegations from the student movements in Hong Kong paid visits to the occupying students and organised a rally in Hong Kong in support. It was the first time that people in Hong Kong and Taiwan had expressed their solidarity and strong mutual support so vocally.

The economic integration of Taiwan and China has accelerated since the KMT regained power in 2008 under President Ma Ying-jeou. During this period, Taiwan’s semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) has signed several agreements with their Beijing counterpart, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). These included an agreement concerning the ‘Three Direct Links’ (flights, shipping and post), the ECFA, and ten follow-up agreements. This pattern of economic integration follows that of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) signed between Mainland China and Hong Kong in 2003. Both the Taiwan ECFA and the Hong Kong CEPA frameworks provide preferred access to the Chinese market for Hong Kongese and Taiwanese.

1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Tenth Annual Conference of the European Association of Taiwan Studies in Lyon, May 2013 and in November 2013 as part of the Taiwan in Comparative Perspective seminar series at the London School of Economics organised by Dr Shih Fang-long. The author wishes to thank conference and seminar participants for their constructive feedback and Ms Heidi NK Wang for her valuable comments and help.
companies respectively, and allow individual Chinese tourists to visit both territories.

However, there has been increasing concern among the Taiwanese that integration with China is transforming Taiwan, and questions have been raised as to whether it is becoming the next Hong Kong. In recent years, the issue of the ‘Hongkongisation’ (香港化) of Taiwan, framed as following the path of Hong Kong’s post-1997 development, has gained significant public attention and has been widely discussed in the media; media outlets in sympathy with pro-independence organisations and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), such as the Liberty Times Group, have raised the spectre of the Hongkongisation of Taiwan since as early as 2001 (Liu 2001). The KMT administration has continued to deepen its relations with Mainland China, with the result that debate over increasingly negative similarities between Taiwan and Hong Kong has intensified during Ma Ying-jeou’s second term. Issues that have been debated have included economic dependence on Mainland China, as well as a pro-China media bias, and these have been perceived by some to be indicators and features of Hongkongisation. The debate has been further fuelled by concerns over the increasingly dominant position of the pro-China Want Want China Times Group in the media sector. This concern increased after the Group emerged as one of the investors taking over the Next Media Group (Taiwan), including Apple Daily, the largest newspaper on the island.

Although there are scholarly attempts to define what ‘Hongkongisation’ means, the discussion remains largely descriptive and unsystematic and the Taiwanese media continues to employ the concept without a fundamental assessment of its appropriateness and limitations. This paper goes beyond current research and journalistic practices to develop a deeper understanding of the concept, through a critical investigation of the relationship between Hong Kong and Taiwan and by comparing Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s relationship vis-à-vis Mainland China. The paper begins with an outline of previously-dominant discourses in Taiwan on Hong Kong, following which the concept of Hongkongisation is de-constructed and re-conceptualised by considering the argument for comparing Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s relationship with the PRC (in the case of Hong Kong, focusing particularly on the post-1997 period). Next, convergence theory is introduced as a theoretical framework, and the current discussion of Hongkongisation is critiqued through evidence from interviews with Taiwanese party officials and social activists. The concluding remarks put forward suggestions for a balanced perspective on Hongkongisation.

‘One Country, Two Systems’ Challenged by Hongkongisation

The PRC does not officially recognise the Republic of China on Taiwan; instead, it considers it as a renegade Chinese province. From a historical perspective, the post-Mao era saw a significant shift in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy towards Taiwan, emphasising ‘peaceful reunification’ over ‘liberation’ by force. This was accompanied by the formula ‘One Country, Two Systems’, devised by Deng Xiaoping in 1983 (Cooney 1997, 500–502). This model was used during the Sino-British negotiations over the Hong Kong’s sovereignty change and implemented after 1997. Hence discussions of Hong Kong in Taiwan were initially and mainly
focused on the feasibility of the so-called ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model in Hong Kong. The current official PRC position on ‘One Country, Two Systems’ as it applies to Taiwan appears in the State Council's 1993 White Paper on ‘The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China’ (Taiwan Affairs Office 1993). The four key principles set out in the White Paper can be distinguished into a ‘One Country’ part, which includes the strict adherence to the ‘One China’ principle, and the promise of a continuation of Taiwan’s current socio-economic system, way of life, and economic and cultural ties with foreign countries after ‘reunification’ under the ‘Two Systems’ element. Taiwan would become special administrative region (SAR) with a ‘high degree of autonomy’, and it is emphasised that economic and other links with Mainland China should be rapidly expanded, with negotiations towards peaceful reunification commenced as soon as possible. ‘One Country, Two Systems’ continues to be the PRC’s formula vis-à-vis Taiwan despite Taiwan’s democratisation and the Chen Shui-bian era (Hughes 2001). Yet the argument that such a system would ‘radically reduce the degree of autonomy and accountability which currently exists in the Taiwanese political system’ (Cooney 1997: 500) has made it largely unacceptable for Taiwan’s political actors and population. Indeed, public opinion surveys routinely indicate an overall rejection of the formula: in 2007, only 12.8 percent found it acceptable, with 72.2 percent responding negatively (Shaw 2009). The negative experience of Hong Kong with the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model did deepen the adverse view of the model in Taiwan.

Hong Kong’s post-1997 development has been used by the DPP in political campaigns to emphasise the value of Taiwan’s sovereignty and the dangers of close economic integration with China. In DPP discourse, the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model is a proven failure in Hong Kong and will be a disaster for Taiwan. In summer 2010, prior to the municipal elections and after the signing of ECFA, the DPP produced a short video to illustrate this. It was narrated entirely in Cantonese, and thus conveyed a sense of authenticity of a local Hong Kong perspective: the usage of Cantonese is a rare practice in Taiwan’s electioneering, and it creates a strong connection between Hong Kong and Taiwan, as it implies that Hong Kong today could be Taiwan tomorrow. Post-CEPA Hong Kong was portrayed as dark place, in which the rich were getting richer and the poor were getting poorer. The message was that when the ECFA comes into effect, Taiwan will similarly experience increasing inequality. The reference to Hong Kong in the video indicates that the political elites in Taiwan are observing closely changes in Hong Kong, and consciously comparing these two special political entities. This is further exemplified by frequent reference to Hong Kong by Taiwan media outlets critical of the PRC government, or which support the opposition and pro-independence perspectives. Hong Kong is employed as an example of the negative outcome of the current administration’s pro-integration policies.

This paper provides an alternative discourse of Hongkongisation, salient and relevant to Taiwan’s politics and society. It therefore goes beyond existing arguments and a discussion of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model. That model has been subject to a very comprehensive debate, and its formula has been predominantly rejected in Taiwan; another analysis focusing solely on the same model would only reinforce the hegemonic structure of the debate, in which the PRC ‘grants’ Taiwan the status of an SAR. It would also provide a further
opportunity for the CCP to manipulate Taiwan and Hong Kong, and ignore political opportunities for Taiwan and Hong Kong to resist. Conversely, a balanced and fair argument would assume that all actors – the CCP, Hong Kong and Taiwan – possess a certain degree of agency, and this is the key to a thorough understanding of the term ‘Hongkongisation’.

**Hong Kong and Taiwan in Comparative Perspective**

Hong Kong figures in the political thought and policy of political elites as well as of the media in Taiwan, making a comparison between the two locations’ respective relationships with Mainland China critical. Currently, ‘Hongkongisation’ as used in the media lacks sufficient depth and understanding, due to a lack of clear definition and appropriate analytical framework: meaningful comparison between Hong Kong and Taiwan is largely absent in scholarly literature and media analyses, and Hongkongisation is treated as if it were a surprisingly new phenomenon. Therefore, before defining Hongkongisation, this paper will first establish the rationale and justification for comparative research on Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Hong Kong and Taiwan share a number of comparable social, economic, cultural and political elements. While there is a fundamental difference in the level of sovereignty, there is a general consensus within the research community that both societies are in ethno-cultural terms predominantly Chinese societies. The majority of the populations are ethnic Han Chinese, and rituals of ancestral worship, religious festivals and traditions prevail in the living culture of both societies. These features are considered to be defining characteristics of Chinese values and identity (Weller 2007: 342). In Taiwan and Hong Kong, religious rituals and traditions were not affected by the campaigns of the Communist regime of China. The same holds true for cultural values and philosophies such as Confucianism. In Taiwan, the KMT actively promoted traditional Chinese culture in the 1960s while, in Hong Kong, the British colonial rulers did not interfere in the cultural and religious affairs of their subjects. Chinese history and language were taught in schools in both societies. Therefore both societies favour very similar ‘Chinese core cultural values’ (Yang 1986). Among the foremost is the Confucian idea of filial piety, which continues to shape social organisations and interpersonal interaction in Hong Kong and Taiwan (Yeh 2003).

Another crucial factor is shared experience: the decades of colonial rule in Hong Kong and Taiwan (by the British and the Japanese respectively), economic success in the 1970s, and democratisation in the 1980s (So and May 1993; Yu 2004). This shared experience has led to a set of similar social structures, political institutions to accommodate democratic development, and a rising civic awareness. Hong Kong and Taiwan both tasted modernity and progress as introduced by their colonisers. Also, the colonial history experienced by the two societies has created a strong identification with values associated with modernity, as well as recognition of the need to preserve tradition. Most importantly, the two cases refute the claim that Confucian countries are not compatible with democracy.

A further basis for comparison is the presence of a ‘common opponent’. Both entities face the challenge of Chinese nationalism and its related policies, known as the ‘China factor’. Bhattacharya (2005), for instance, envisions a clash between
the state nationalism of the PRC and the civic Hong Kong identity. By contesting Chinese state nationalism, Hong Kong contests the CCP’s legitimacy. The proclaimed unity of nation-state-party advocated by Beijing is also undermined by alternative ideas of Chineseness not only in Hong Kong, but also in Taiwan. Analytically, therefore, two factors determine the position of the Beijing regime in relation to Taiwan and Hong Kong. Firstly, there is the emerging nationalism discourses of the 1990s, particularly the narrative of colonial humiliation, that explain the great symbolic importance of the ‘handovers’ of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999. Taiwan’s de facto status is in this way framed by Beijing as a consequence of foreign intervention in the region, especially by the US, and thus as evidence of imperialism against the Chinese people (Brown 2004: 21). Secondly, there is the ethno-cultural understanding of Chinese identity which forms the basis of PRC discourse and is evident in the PRC White Papers on Taiwan and the rhetoric of the Beijing leadership in relation with Hong Kong. Beijing’s purpose is to roll back democratic progress and penetrate both societies with its influence. The PRC regime employs the discourse of national identity to engender a dichotomy between Western and Chinese values. This ‘either democracy or Chinese political values’ mentality enables the regime to brand democrats in Hong Kong and Taiwan as traitors in collusion with foreigners against the ‘authentic’ Chinese (Wu 2007). Thus, through the lens of the Communist Party, shared civic awareness in Taiwan and Hong Kong is portrayed as threatening and unpatriotic.

The experience of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) has implications for Taiwan simply because the Communist regime in Beijing is using Hong Kong as a laboratory to experiment with policies and government formula prior to applying these to Taiwan. The Chinese government is learning from its experience in Hong Kong and, as a consequence, the post-1997 experience of Hong Kong is of crucial importance for the analysis of Taiwan and its future. Hong Kong’s path to further democratisation over the past decade has been described as retroactive (Sing 2004; Ma 2007; Chan 2008). While Taiwan’s democracy has been further consolidated during the Chen Shui-bian era and with the second change of power in 2008, China has been allowed to exert its influence more and more directly and forcefully in Hong Kong, which, for example, effectively halted moves towards meaningful universal suffrage. (This process is crystallised in the term used by Sonny Lo: ‘Mainlandisation’. Lo observes that this term had been used by Hong Kong analysts and politicians to refer to ‘the political and legal processes in which the HKSAR has demonstrated the practices of mainland China’ (S.S.-H. Lo 2008: 42). Cases in which politics was perceived to interfere with the rule of law were already being cited shortly after the handover. However, Hong Kong politicians and scholars have not provided a comprehensive conceptualisation of the process. The discussion is usually confined to individual cases, and examples of ‘Mainlandisation’ are provided with reference to the civil service, the media and the protection of civil liberties. Lo removes the negative connotation from the definition, stating merely that the purpose of Mainlandisation is to activate ‘Hong Kong’s swift convergence with the motherland in multi-faceted aspects’ (43). He thus neutralises the term, which, in actuality, refers to an active policy of the HKSAR government to be ‘politically’ more dependent on and similar to Beijing, economically more reliant on the Mainland’s support, socially more
patriotic toward the motherland, and legally more reliant on the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress' (42–43).

Lo reconceptualises the term ‘Mainlandisation’ through the lens of convergence theory. This systemises the often anecdotal evidence about the Taiwan–China relationship and the phenomenon of so-called Hongkongisation into a more analytical framework, and is used by Lo to interpret Hong Kong's development under its first Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa.

Convergence theory is based on the ideas of a Dutch economist, Jan Tinbergen, as explained in his seminal 1961 article ‘Do Communists and Free Economies Show Converging Patterns?’ Tinbergen observed that Western capitalist economies appeared to be moving towards a social democratic-oriented welfare state model at the same time that Eastern European economies were leaving behind their Stalinist legacies and beginning to liberalise economically and politically. As a consequence, the two types of economies were becoming not only increasingly akin, but were also beginning to influence each other (Tinbergen 1961: 332) and to show signs of convergence in the areas of bureaucratisation, social welfare guarantees and pricing (338). Both systems were being altered beyond recognition.

Brockmann (1997) provides the context for the growing popularity of convergence theory. He notes that it was well received during the 1960s when the post-war economic boom in the West was at its height, and Communist economies were attempting to address the failures of the command economy through cautious liberalisation. Subsequently, ‘convergence theory... spread beyond the relatively narrow realm of economic theory to become part of broader cultural debate about post-war industrial society’ (59). The essential premise was that industrial societies in the West and countries in the Soviet realm would both make socio-economic progress and become alike. This thesis appeared to be validated with the collapse of the Soviet empire and the spread of capitalism and democracy through Eastern Europe.

Applying Western theory to the case of Hong Kong, it seems that the process of convergence is largely one-way, from China to Hong Kong and not vice versa. It is true there had initially been hopes that democrats would be able to influence a reforming China, thus effecting a convergence towards the Western model of democracy; Peter Cheung (2011) does indeed observe the selective adaptation of Hong Kong practices, experiences and values, especially in Southern China. These have been mostly limited to business practices and some bureaucratic structures. Interesting instances are the adaptation of limited protests practices that have diffused among the younger generation from Hong Kong to China. Yet it seems premature to speak of political convergence, with China adopting more liberal values and practices, and the process remains very much dependent on a further liberalisation and democratisation of the PRC. Therefore, for the time being the Hong Kong case presents a one-way flow of the convergence process, and the predominant influence is that of Beijing on Hong Kong. Thus Lo’s earlier verdict – identifying no signs of political convergence between the PRC’s authoritarian system and Hong Kong’s semi-democratic, semi-competitive system, and instead observing a dilution of the territory’s political and economic uniqueness – remains valid for the time being (S.S.-H. Lo 2008: 41–42). This one-sidedness of convergence, and the dilution of Hong Kong’s pre-1997 civil liberties and
freedoms, are not only results of the HKSAR government policy but also a direct consequence of the strategies employed by the Beijing regime vis-à-vis the democratic societies in the so-called Greater China region.

The lopsided nature of the convergence process in Hong Kong can be explained by the strategic dimension of the Communist regime, which is exaggerated by the media but overlooked by academia. Mainlandisation is not merely a descriptive concept, but also a strategic one, encompassing a number of facets. It includes putting political pressure on the media, civil society groups and the judicial community to adhere to positions promoted by Beijing. At the same time, the direct involvement of the Liaison Office in local politics enables the CCP to monitor social development on a micro-scale. In addition, the rise in importance of Mainland businesses has become a part of the government–business collusion in Hong Kong, leading to increasingly blatant political interference in local business and competition in favour of pro-Mainland Chinese companies and the weakening of the anti-corruption bodies. This makes the situation akin to that in Mainland China, and it also has the potential to re-write the rule of law, a key part of the Hong Kong identity. At a mundane level, the everyday life of Hong Kong people is altered through the influx of Mainland tourists and immigrants, and the growing usage of simplified Chinese characters and Mandarin Chinese in the public realm. It would be unfair to argue that the entire phenomenon is strategically planned in detail by the Communist Party with the goal of fully assimilating Hong Kong. However, it would be equally naïve to overlook the strategic aspects of Beijing’s actions, steering the political development of Hong Kong away from further democratisation and, indeed, the Western model of democracy in its entirety. The following section defines Hongkongisation, and facilitates a better understanding of the strategic aspect of convergence.

Framing Hongkongisation

Following the opening of the border with China in the late 1970s, and with the beginning of Sino-British consultations over the future of the territory in the 1980s, the Beijing leadership managed to identify and convert new allies and co-opt them into their united front scheme. The main target were Hong Kong elites such as the business community, industrialists, and real estate conglomerates, as well as former British appointees to consultative bodies set up by the colonial administration (Wong 1997). As a consequence, pro-Beijing social and economic elites became dominant in the city from the 1990s, while the lack of accountability in consultative committees has hampered the performance legitimacy of the administration. This has been further exacerbated by the continuous patronage in post-1997 administrations of ‘patriotic’ and pro-business forces (Fong 2014). Beijing’s united front work furthermore relies on traditional leftist groups, such as pro-Beijing unions and a wide array of associations ranging from hometown to women’s groups. If politically necessary – e.g. during elections or government consultation exercises – these groups could be easily mobilised in support of pro-government forces or government policies (Kaeding 2010).

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2 Research has shown that the Beijing government has for decades made extensive use of united front organisations in Hong Kong (Wong 1997; S.H. Lo 2001).
This strategic co-option under a united front scheme is taking place in Taiwan, in a similar fashion as seen in Hong Kong. Capitalists who rely on the Mainland market or production, and who favour intimate relations with the Chinese regime, have been targeted directly since Taiwan’s democratisation and the early improvements in Cross-Strait relations. This strategy was intensified with the onset of the Chen Shui-bian era (Hughes 2001). Since at least the beginning of intensive face-to-face exchanges under Ma Ying-jeou, a broader spectrum of societal groups and leaders has been identified by the Communist Party as possible agents in a united front strategy. Yet there remains one fundamental difference between Hong Kong and Taiwan – the degree of sovereignty. In Hong Kong, political intervention by Beijing after 1997 has been overt, and increasingly so after 2003, accelerating particularly during the Tsang era. This political intervention has come via either the direct involvement of staff and associates of the Joint Liaison Office in Sheung Wan, through Basic Law interpretations of the NPC’s Standing Committee, or through comments by Mainland law professors and constitutional experts or statements by the Beijing leadership. Where Taiwan is concerned, however, it is hard to imagine that comments by the Beijing leadership will have the desired outcome on the island. Nevertheless the possible establishment of a Joint Liaison Office in Taipei might allow the PRC to concentrate and organise its undercover activities on the island, and establish links with united front actors and agents coming to Taiwan through individual visitor schemes and student exchanges.

As with Mainlandisation, the concept of Hongkongisation remains a largely fuzzy concept. However, four dimensions can be identified. Wu Jieh-min recognises three areas of direct influence on Taiwan, or ‘Mainlandisation’: economic, media, and political discourse, and I argue that united front strategies can be added to Wu’s framework to give a more complete conceptualisation. The economic realm is a frontier that encompasses trade and business relations: in this, united front agents can be business tycoons and tourists from Mainland China. And, as mentioned earlier, the ECFA between Taiwan and the PRC has been likened to the CEPA between China and Hong Kong. The Taiwan economy’s growing dependency on the Chinese market might lead to limitations in the government’s manoeuvring space, as the Beijing regime could use the economy as leverage vis-à-vis Taipei. The 2012 Presidential election is evidence of the growing clout of pro-Chinese business interests, in which key business figures, such as HTC chair Cher Wang, went beyond general endorsements of an administration or candidate, to urge the public to back the KMT’s China policy and accept the ‘1992 consensus’. Meanwhile, Chinese tourists form the largest group of overseas tourists in Taiwan. Since July 2008, more than 4.83 million Mainland tourists have visited the island. This illustrates clear parallels with the situation in Hong Kong, where the government has transformed the territory into a prime destination for Mainland visitors, and the SAR has come to rely heavily on tourism from Mainland China after the individual travellers’ scheme was implemented in 2003. Within a single decade, the cumulative number of Mainland visitors under the scheme had surpassed 100 million (Chong et al. 2013).

Beijing’s second strategy is to interfere with media freedom in Taiwan, as in Hong Kong. With the assistance of pro-business groups, the media are increasing manipulated by a de facto alliance of the KMT and the CCP with regard to
reporting on China. Changes in the ownership structure of the Taiwan media have given rise to self-censorship (Wu 2012), which has gained greater public attention after the moderate conservative *China Times* was purchased by Want Want Holdings. This company is led by a pro-Beijing businessman, and it consequently adopted a staunchly pro-China editorial stance. The issue of media freedom has been extensively debated in Hong Kong, as China has exerted influence on journalists' reports and analysis. Freedom of expression and of the press have deteriorated since the transition period, largely as the consequence of journalists' self-censorship (Zhang 2006) and the change of media ownership (Fung 2007).

The recent firing and life-threatening attack on a famous *Ming Pao* editor, well-known for his critical stance vis-à-vis the HKSAR and Beijing governments, has raised fears of China's more direct involvement (Mullany 2014).

However, the model of Mainlandisation provided by Wu underestimates the breadth and strength of the united front work on the societal level. It overlooks, for example, the efforts of Beijing to co-opt Taiwan university students. Interviews with Taiwanese student activists and political party strategists confirm that the CCP approach to winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese has moved already beyond the business sector and direct material benefits: politically active students and student union members are targeted by united front agents, and invited onto organised trips to Mainland China promising prestige but also taking advantage of curiosity about China. In co-opting either naïve or politically convinced student leaders, united front institutions are able to gain access to other Taiwanese students; they also benefit from the legitimacy of the student organisations. This model has been tested and effectively put in place in Hong Kong for a long time, hence illustrating another area in which Taiwan is being Hongkongised.

Wu's analysis of the political dimension as the third element of Hongkongisation is also instructive. In this, he identifies both discursive hegemony and the hands-on micromanagement of local politics. The discursive area of Cross-Strait relations and elections is dominated by the so-called ‘1992 consensus’ of ‘One China, different interpretations’ and, through this, Beijing has increasingly been involved with, and even participated in, the manipulation of Taiwan’s (national) elections. Such involvement was evident in Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential elections (van der Wess 2012). In relation to Hong Kong, scholars have pointed out that the financial balance is clearly tilted in favour of pro-Beijing candidates (S.H. Lo 2001; Ma 2008), so that the ‘1992 consensus’ has become a mainstream and unchallenged discourse during campaigning. Pro-Beijing parties have been able to use their extensive grassroots network of leftist and patriotic organisations in election campaigns; more importantly, there also is a mismatch between the vast financial and logistic resources deployed and the official election expenses of individual candidates, even when grassroots organisations providing volunteers and direct assistance are taken into account. Scholars have pointed out that the financial balance is clearly tilted in favour of pro-Beijing candidates (S.H. Lo 2001; Ma 2008).

The isolation or shunning of pan-democrats in Hong Kong and pan-green parties in Taiwan by mainstream media outlets and the China-friendly business sector is thus part of the CCP’s election strategy. However, it is a key feature of these strategies that they are carried out underground. Moreover, the influence of Taiwanese and Hong Kong businessmen working on the Mainland and with Mainland counterparts is likely to grow further, given the accelerated pace of
economic integration. Figure 1 below shows the four dimensions that provide a comprehension framework of Hongkongisation, as viewed through the lens of the united front scheme of the Chinese Communist Party. It demonstrates Beijing’s strategy of assimilating Taiwan, in a similar manner to Hong Kong.

**The Role of Agency**

Beijing’s attempts at Hongkongisation overlook the agency of Taiwan and Hong Kong, including the flipside of Taiwan’s Hongkongisation. In this, the island has experienced a different kind of Hongkongisation which includes the rise of civil resistance against too-rapid integration with China. Taiwanese civil society organisations and social movement actors follow closely the analysis and arguments made in Hong Kong, as well as the patterns of protests employed by the Special Administrative Region. In any case, the convergence between Hong Kong and Taiwan is different from the process involving Hong Kong and Mainland China. The former is two-directional, whereas the latter is largely one-directional. Wu observes that Taiwan increasingly resembles Hong Kong, but there is evidence that Hong Kong is also increasingly converging with Taiwan, as Hong Kong learns from Taiwan. The increasing sophistication of civil society actors, social movements and, most importantly, political parties with regard to mobilisation and election campaign strategies and styles that has been seen in Hong Kong in recent years is inspired by Taiwan. A number of political parties have adopted more confrontational and elaborate styles of political campaigning, modelled after Taiwan politics (Kaeding 2010). Furthermore, the rise of identity politics in Hong Kong parallels that in Taiwan.
The question as to whether Taiwan will increasingly bend to Beijing’s pressure and become increasingly like Mainland China is more difficult to answer. On the one hand, the island remains a democratic, vibrant country and, unlike Hong Kong, it has the means to defend its sovereignty. On the other hand, the rising influence of business interests in politics, and the non-transparent nature of negotiations over trade pacts with China, point towards Mainlandisation. There is also the question as to whether, like Hong Kong, the process of convergence or Hongkongisation applies equally in all areas actively fostered by the government and the political elites. In some key areas such as tourism, economic relations and cultural exchanges, this is clearly the case. However, it is difficult to argue that KMT government elites are consciously aiming at turning Taiwan into a version of post-1997 Hong Kong or of the Chinese Mainland. Such an outcome is more likely to be due to miscalculation on the part of the Taiwanese government, caused by naivety: the government might simply underestimate or misinterpret aspects of cooperation with China. This seems to be a possibility in the cultural sector, as a telling incident illustrates: at an overseas public forum, the KMT’s new Minister of Culture, Lung Ying-tai, a well-known writer and academic, appeared to be oblivious to the fact that Chinese cultural productions from mainland China were based on a Chinese culture selectively created by the CCP, and containing ideological elements. In this regard, the DPP appears at least superficially better prepared, as it seems to be more critical of advances by the CCP with respect to cooperation between Taiwan and the PRC.

Finally, it must be admitted that the terms Hongkongisation or Mainlandisation are value-laden and to some degree misleading. These terms suggest a lack of agency on the Hong Kong and Taiwan side: Hong Kong is Mainlandised, Taiwan is Hongkongised. This discourse ignores the power and agency of Taiwan and Hong Kong. It also leads to a hidden empowerment of the CCP, as the terms assume the existence of a highly sophisticated Beijing government capable of manipulating both Hong Kong and Taiwan. The unstated assumption is that the power of the central leadership is so strong that it leaves little room for resistance by either Hong Kong or Taiwan. Indeed, the terminology distances Hong Kong from Taiwan, resulting in a missed opportunity for co-operation between the two locations. However, this co-operation does, in fact, exist, as student leaders and party representatives in both societies confirmed during the Legislative Yuan occupation through visible and frequent exchanges and expressions of solidarity on social media sites such as Facebook and actual visits of Hong Kong delegations to the protesting students. Here, convergence theory suggests a two-way communication and the fluidity of power. Taiwan can influence Hong Kong, and Hong Kong Taiwan. This gives agency to both Taiwan and Hong Kong, and creates the possibility for both of them to counter CCP manipulation.

Minister Lung publicly stated on 22 March 2013 in a forum held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, that Mainland Chinese television programmes would be safely acceptable to Taiwanese audiences and should be readily available.
The Future of Hongkongisation

This paper re-visits the notions of Mainlandisation and Honkongisation, and attempts to conceptualise them. It has identified areas in which there are symptoms of Hongkongisation in Taiwan were identified, but also spaces in which Taiwan and Hong Kong can resist the surrounding influence of China. Wu Jieh-min, as well as Wang Dan (a former Chinese student leader and scholar), have emphasised the role of civil society in resistance against the reversal of democratic progress. Social movements such as student movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan co-operate and exchange ideas; illustrative examples include Scholarism in Hong Kong, the anti-media hegemony movement in Taiwan and, most recently, the occupation of the Legislative Yuan. Furthermore, there is the possibility that – at the grassroots level – democratic ideas and values can travel into China via student exchanges from Taiwan and Hong Kong.

A systematic analysis of Hongkongisation narrows the gap between the journalistic usage of this term and the empirical evidence. However, although there is a distance between suggested developments in the media and the reality on the ground, there is also a wide array of possibilities for resisting PRC pressure. The Taiwanese (and Hongkongers) have basically four options in dealing with Mainlandisation/Hongkongisation. There is the utilitarian option, which would mean making the most economically of the situation, and seizing the possibilities of closer integration that exist in the short and medium terms. There is the defeatist option, which would mean giving up all resistance and perhaps emigrating elsewhere, as many Hong Kong people did in the run-up to 1997. There is the radical position, in which Taiwanese would strive for a fundamental break with China, as propagated by pro-independence groups in Taiwan and the autonomy movement in Hong Kong. The forth option might be more realistic, and would entail both co-operation and resistance. In this, Taiwanese need to be well informed and aware of developments in Hong Kong civil society groups in both societies, and to co-operate to resist PRC policies of integration. However, resistance must be based on information and education. The importance of democracy and human rights needs to be communicated, together with the idea that these are not guaranteed and need continually to be defended. The value of the status quo in Hong Kong and Taiwan vis-à-vis China has to be emphasised, together with areas where caution needs to be applied in co-operating with China. In short, Hong Kong and Taiwan need to know each other, and learn from each other to resist Mainlandisation and Hongkongisation.

It would appear that, at the moment, a significant part of the population, led by student activists in both territories, is opting for the fourth option. This is attested to by the close co-operation and mutual support demonstrated among civil society groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan at the Occupy Legislative Yuan and in the planned Occupy Central movements. This co-operation shows that, while the fear of Mainlandisation and Hongkongsation is real, there is recognition that both groups – learning from and supporting each other – have the power to effect political action. Hongkongisation should therefore not be simply understood as a passive phenomenon, but also as a situation that creates an active motion of resistance. It would be ironic if the united front strategy of Beijing should create a
vibrant cross-strait civil society fighting for more political participation and government oversight.

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Commentary:

The Myth of Greater China? Hong Kong as a prototype of Taiwan for Unification

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Introduction

The issue of China and Taiwan has long been receiving attention, not only in Asia but also the other side of the world. As early as the 1950s, US President Harry S. Truman declared that America would perform ‘lawful and necessary functions in that area’ (Wachman 2001) should China attempt to occupy Taiwan (or ‘Formosa’) at that time. Dragging over decades, whether Taiwan should unify with China, declare independence, or remain unchanged, is still a popular topic within academia as well with the public. Positions on the subject form the basis for the main ideological and electoral platforms of the two dominant parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

While discussion and negotiation over Taiwan remains on-going, Hong Kong, which was ceded to the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century, was returned to China in 1997, ending 150 years of British colonial rule. Similarly, Macau was also restored to the Chinese motherland in 1999. With these former Chinese territories returned to China, it is not surprising that Taiwan – though very different from the cases of Hong Kong and Macau in terms of size, location, historical background, colonial status, military ability and sovereignty (Bundy 1989) – has also become a target for integration into a Greater China. However, rather than use coercion, which was China’s main strategy in the 1990s, the PRC, observing that force is impractical due to China’s tumultuous and unstable internal situation as well as external pressure, is currently adopting a softer strategy. Instead, China wants to prepare a path to unification by establishing confidence in rule from China. As analysed by Hughes (2001), the principle of Beijing’s policy of ‘peaceful unification’ is that under One Country, Two Systems, ‘Taiwan will be brought under PRC rule through a process of economic, social and political integration, facilitated by personal exchanges, cross-Strait trade and investment and joint cultural, sporting and educational activities’ (Hughes 2001). Hong Kong and Macau are special administrative regions enjoying differing degrees of autonomy and rights, but they both serve as prototypes for Chinese policy through which the minds and loyalty of Taiwanese can be influenced.
While One Country, Two Systems which was devised by Deng Xiaoping after he resumed his power in the Communist government in 1977 was initially a strategy for Taiwan, it is widely acknowledged that it was subsequently used in Hong Kong which then be used as a model for Taiwan for future unification (Weng 1987, 2002; Bundy 1989; Cooney 1997; Yu 2004; Lo 2007, 2008), and as early as in the late 1990s Taiwan, which understood the implications of Hong Kong’s handover, has been keeping an eye on domestic politics in Hong Kong in order to interpret interaction with China (Neilan 1997). This paper aims to examine how China uses Hong Kong as a model, in both its political and economic aspects, for resolving political and sovereignty problems in Taiwan. It begins by outlining the framework of ‘Greater China’, and argues that although economic unification might become a reality, the complicated political context means that Hong Kong is becoming increasingly irrelevant as model for demonstrating future unification. Hong Kong seems to present a rather successful model for Taiwan in its economic aspect, but it is here argued that politically, One Country Two Systems, which fails to uphold high degree of autonomy in the post-1997 Hong Kong, has instead highlights the contrasting socio-political situation in Hong Kong and Taiwan that pushes away the dream of Greater China. Meanwhile, unlike the situation of Hong Kong, in which people played very little roles in the negotiation of the future of Hong Kong in the 1980s, Taiwan, being a democratic entity, is argued that it would lead a rather different path ahead.

The Concept of ‘Greater China’

The concept of ‘unification’ is culturally dominant in the Chinese society. The reunion of the family during Chinese Lunar New year and Winter Solstice is a traditional Chinese occasion to which Chinese people give the highest importance; China, which underwent a series of external and civil wars in past centuries, was divided into parts with some lands ceded to other powers. With unification such a strong concept, China has in recent decades actively implemented strategies and policies for future reunification into a ‘Greater China’ (da zhong guo, or da zhong hua 大中華), a term that has been broadly used since the 1980s and which has received increasing attention in academia. It is not an easy task to conceptualize the term ‘greater’, as the different levels of meaning and interpretation embedded in historical, cultural and political understandings have made it into a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. Both Harding (1993) and G.W. Wang (1993) have suggested that Greater China can be understood differently, depending on whether the emphasis for interpretation is on politics, culture or economics. It is true that in the first instance, Greater China was more to be understood in terms of economic cooperation, mainly emphasizing on the close ties between China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and Singapore – all of which are in close geographical proximity and composed of majority Chinese populations. Yahuda (1993) has also indicated that this is an ‘informal’ aspect of intramural relations of Greater China, as their economic networks are based more on social links between overseas Chinese sharing the same ancestral background and ‘network of relationships (guanxi)’ (Yahuda 1993: 688), rather than institutionalized or legal forms of interactions.
There is no doubt that, economically and culturally, increasingly frequent contact and cooperation has made the relationship between these countries more interdependent. With close proximity, and sharing family ties, ancestral roots, culture as well as language, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan demonstrate a transnational Chinese economy and cultural orbit in the Asia-Pacific region. Although direct economic activities between China and Taiwan started only after mid-1990s,\(^1\) exports and imports, trade and investment through Hong Kong have long been prosperous since Cold War period and soared after Deng Xiaoping adopted the Open Door policy in 1978. While the ‘Chinese network’ including China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau and Singapore which are mainly composed of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, in Cooper’s (2003) words, had implied a closer framework for economic activities and business, it is worth noting that political unification is not a necessary prerequisite. ‘Greater China’ has been used widely within academia and the media to refer to economic and business investment among China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, but very rarely to refer to integration in political sense or political unification as an obligatory condition for economic cooperation. In other words, an apolitical implication is stressed here, with the concept solely emphasizing economic cooperation and links among Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Naughton (1997) has also given some insight on the concept of ‘Greater China’, which is mainly understood in economic terms. He points out the three tiers of the China Circle: the first, smallest, circle incorporates mainly the Hong Kong metropolitan area, while Taiwan and Hong Kong are both included in the second and third circles.

However, it is striking to observe that this apolitical framework has gradually been embedded in a more political sense, under circumstances that hint at the unification of these places. Hong Kong, as mentioned above, returned to China in 1997, and Taiwan has become the focus for discussion when defining ‘Greater China’ in a way that is multi-dimensional and political. While ‘Greater’ on one hand focuses on the dynamic process of economic activities and integration within an apolitical framework, it also suggests ‘the state’s expansion of its political boundaries to include territories formerly outside its control’ in a political sense (Harding 1993). As a matter of fact, ‘there is a general consensus about the composition of political Greater China, but especially as far as Beijing is concerned. It will comprise the PRC, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan’ (Cooper 2003: 30). In other words, China’s understanding about the reunification of these ‘lost places’ is both economically and politically implicated in a Greater China. This political sense has a far-reaching effects not just on China and Taiwan, but also internationally: China taking over Taiwan would be seen as destabilizing the Asian Pacific region, which might lead to military confrontation between the USA, Japan and China. Meanwhile, China is also looking for ‘Greater China’ through economic integration instead of political recognition. The open-door policy advocated by Deng, and the closer commercial ties with both Hong Kong and Taiwan that followed later, show China’s ambition. As Ross explains, China’s goal is to develop “comprehensive power” – they seek to develop the technological and scientific foundations for developing a world-class advanced economy as the basis for

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\(^1\) Direct trade and investment only started after the launch of ‘Three Mini Links’ allowing limited postal, transportation and trade links between some cities in 1994.
expanded international economic and military influence’ (Ross 1995: 83). In this sense, Hong Kong and Taiwan play a prominent role during the integration process within Naughton’s third concentric circle, incorporating not only economic activities with Taiwan and Hong Kong, but also closer economic relations with countries in Asia such as Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries.

**Rule over Hong Kong: One Country, Two Systems and Economic Integration**

One Country, Two Systems and economic integration are very crucial strategies that have been used by China to reunite and rule over Hong Kong since 1997. It is striking, though, that the term ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is not a policy tailor-made for Hong Kong as the Special Administrative Region (SAR) from 1997, but was actually conceived by Deng Xiao-ping in the late 1970s.

**The Origin of One Country, Two Systems: The Taiwan Experience**

As stated above, the first step towards the unification of ‘one China’ started with Hong Kong, and later included Macau. Under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Hong Kong is guaranteed a high level of autonomy for fifty years (until 2047). However, the model of One Country, Two Systems as an expression China’s desire for unification long predates the Declaration. As part of ‘early stage socialism’ and a ‘socialist market economy’ (Weng 2002), One Country, Two Systems was originally a strategy of China for unifying Taiwan, and it was later incorporated into the Hong Kong Basic Law during the handover. In the late 1970s, Deng sought to make China a strong nation both domestically and internationally, but he also wished to re-build the relationship with and reunify with Taiwan. In 1979, a ‘message to Taiwan Compatriots’ was issued, ‘calling for the end of hostilities and the beginning of cross-Strait links and exchanges’ (Weng 2002). Despite the refusal of the Kuomintang government in Taiwan, expressed through the ‘three-nos policy’ (no contact, no compromise, and no negotiation with communist China), China’s desire remained strong, and, gradually, a more open and concrete policy was created envisioning peaceful unification through ‘One Country, Two Systems’. In 1981, while anti-hegemonic reunification was identified as one of the three national tasks, a ‘Nine-Point Proposal’ (the ‘Ye Nine Points’) was released by the chairman of the Standing Committee of China, Ye Jianying, in September 1981. This restated the terms and conditions for unification, emphasizing negotiation and cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Taiwan Kuomintang through three links (postal, commercial and navigation links) and four exchanges (tourist, academic, cultural and sports exchanges), as well as autonomy on local and domestic affairs. This initial model for One Country, Two Systems became the strategy for China’s reunification with Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. The formation of a SAR was first listed in the Constitution in China in 1982, and this gave One Country, Two Systems a clearer status.

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2 Deng resumed his power in the Communist government 1977 after the third purge and he proposed the reunification of Taiwan
As several scholars have argued, the One Country, Two Systems model practised in Hong Kong by China is a way to demonstrate to Taiwan further steps to unification in the future (Cheng and Ngok 1999; Sung 2005). In 1992, the last Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, and three legislative council members representing different parties told interviewers that they recognized the fact that negotiating One Country, Two Systems in the Basic Law had ramifications with Taiwan in mind, and that Hong Kong’s One Country, Two Systems was a model for Taiwan to retain a high level of autonomy and democracy within the country:

One country, Two systems’ is a policy with Taiwan in mind. Hong Kong was an issue in the latest Taiwanese election. The Taiwanese view PRC behavior with Hong Kong as a model.

(Governor Chris Patten, quoted in Gordonan and Wong 1994)

Originally, China wanted to tackle Taiwan unification first, but they found that the British were so obliging, that they turned to Hong Kong unification first. They are still trying to entice Taiwan on more or less the same formula – one country, two systems. Except that Taiwan continues with their own army, which is a big difference. But Taiwan is looking to HK, since if it doesn’t work here, why should they have it? I think Taiwan wants confederacy.

(Martin Lee, Legislative Council member, quoted in Gordon and Wong 1994)

As stated above, One Country, Two Systems was originally designed for unification with Taiwan. Due to the refusal of the Taiwan government to engage on the issue of unification while the use of force or violence is impossible, China has adopted a two-handed strategy to regain confidence and win the popularity of Taiwanese people. The practice of One Country, Two Systems in Hong Kong as a result has become a model for Taiwan to demonstrate that social values, legal concepts and lifestyles will remain unchanged while political stability and prosperity will continue.

The Hong Kong One Country, Two Systems Model

The Hong Kong model of One Country, Two Systems was introduced by Deng in 1984, during the signing of Sino-British Joint Declaration, on the model of China’s strategy for Taiwan. As the term implies, Hong Kong, even though it belongs to the ‘one China’, does not need to follow China’s socialist system. As the Constitution states:

The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.

The basic ideas of the policy, as defined in the Basic Law promulgated in 1990, include adhering to one country and safeguarding national sovereignty; upholding
the arrangement of keeping the system basically unchanged; and safeguarding stability and prosperity. Hong Kong was established as a Special Administrative Region, as authorized by Article 31 of the PRC Constitution.

After 150 years of colonial rule, this was the first experience of local political power over this piece of land which means Hong Kong is supposed to start its time of ‘Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong’ (Cao 2008). The HKSAR government is limited to responsibility for domestic affairs only, but its remit encompasses legislative, executive, and independent judicial powers, including power of final adjudication, and over immigration and customs, public finances, internal public policies and currencies etc. within the framework of Basic Law. Control over diplomatic relations and national defense still rests in the hands of China. Under this system, two teams are formed in HKSAR: the Hong Kong SAR establishment team, which includes the Chief Executive, Principal Officials, and members of the Executive Council, the civil service, the judiciary and other personnel administering the justice system; and Central and Mainland Authority cadres, responsible for carrying out work in Hong Kong that comes under the Central Government and their external organs. Also, as explicitly suggested in the Joint Declaration, there is also a fully elected legislature, rather than the appointed legislature of the colonial period.

Given high degree of autonomy, Hong Kong SAR is supposed to govern itself with its own elected officials without interference in local affairs until 2047, following the One Country, Two Systems model. However, there is doubt over whether this is indeed the case, and whether the model has been properly enforced.

**Economic integration: the signing of CEPA**

One Country, Two Systems provides a framework for self-governance by Hong Kong people, and it is undeniable that financial and economic autonomy have been granted as guaranteed in the Basic Law (Horlemann 2003). However, the central government of China has also been taking further steps to integrate with Hong Kong, especially in terms of economic policies. As Takeuchi (2006) observes, integration is not a necessary requirement for unification, but the fact that Hong Kong is getting closer to and becoming more integrated with China, especially on economic areas, is very obvious.

Economic integration didn’t start only after the handover to China: Hong Kong has played an important role in financing the industrialization and modernization of China in the past decades through trade, remittances, investment, and travel and tourism (Jao 1983), and it has benefited from China’s modernization through introducing new industries and expanding foreign investment activities in China (Chen 1983). Such strong ties and inter-dependence are not surprising given cultural, ethnic and geographical factors. Since the ‘open door’ reform in China starting in the late 1970s, Hong Kong, as an entrepôt for China’s hinterland in Guangdong, has built a close trading relationship and became the largest trading
partner\(^3\) with Mainland China (Johnson 2001). \(^4\) The establishment of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) on the southeastern coast of China around Hong Kong and Taiwan also played an important role, boosting trade and business with Guangdong District since the 1990s. Also, economic integration also means ‘the lowering of barriers to economic interactions across countries or regions, thereby facilitating trade and investment’\(^5\) (Sung 1996: 186). Further economic integration between HKSAR and China after 1997 is also noted by Sung (2005). Using Hong Kong as a testing ground for further foreign trade and investment in the future, China increased cooperation with Hong Kong on infrastructure development and economic policies. In 1999, a joint committee consisting of the Mainland’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and Hong Kong’s Trade and Industry Bureau was set up to strengthen communication and coordination on economic, business and trade issues.

Another essential element is the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), the first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) made within a country (Mainland and SAR), which was signed between China and Hong Kong on 29 June 2003, to take effect from 1 January 2004. CEPA aims to facilitate stronger economic ties and to promote economic prosperity in both places. This is obviously a measure by which China can develop economic integration with Hong Kong while also demonstrating to Taiwan China’s friendliness towards its SAR. There are three main areas to CEPA: trade in goods, trade in services, and trade and investment. It granted zero tariffs to Hong Kong manufacturers in 273 product categories, including economic goods, textiles, jewelry and watches etc. from 2005, and for a further 4,000 products after 2006. Hong Kong companies thus have preferential access on wider range of service industries, and have entered the Mainland market. It is not surprising that these opportunities would help and encourage Hong Kong professionals and residents to establish business or work in China. It also means that Hong Kong businesses can partner with foreign companies which wish to explore China’s market. Hong Kong, as always, acts as a door to both China and to foreign companies looking for a future business opportunity. Also, cooperation in tourism and the mutual recognition of professional qualifications has encouraged a closer bilateral relationship, which undoubtedly is a step forward to integration.\(^6\)

Through friendly economic policies, China aims to give a good impression to people in Hong Kong and to the world that the ‘new master’ is doing all it can to support and maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. It is argued that

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\(^3\) Hong Kong had become China’s important partner. In 1991, exports to Hong Kong accounted for 45% of China’s exports, and exports to China accounted for 25% of Hong Kong’s exports (Sung, 1996).

\(^4\) Sung’s (1997) research on trade and investment between China and Hong Kong in the 1990s give a clear picture on how close the relationship was in the Hong Kong-China economic nexus.

\(^5\) For example, Institutional channels such as establishment of free trade areas or granting mutual discriminatory preferences.

\(^6\) In contrast, due to the fact that Hong Kong has been over-run with tourists from Mainland and some relevant problems, the initial purpose of integration through tourism has shown an opposite effect.
Hong Kong is a small, yet developed, market, and when the benefits gained from CEPA are examined, Hong Kong seems to be at an advantage. However, in the long run, CEPA is definitely favorable to China, by facilitating investment and trade. With Hong Kong, China can help its service industries to enter the world market and adapt to global competition. It is obvious that this economic integration functions as a demonstration to Taiwan and prepared the way for the economic agreement with Taiwan in 2010. Using the experience on Hong Kong, China will ultimately further its step forward aiming for political integration which helps fulfil its Greater China dream.

Implications for Taiwan: Political and Economic Aspects

The return of Hong Kong to China has had an extensive effect, not only locally but also affecting Taiwan. China, observing that how it governs Hong Kong will be the mirror for Taiwan, has grabbed the opportunity to demonstrate how friendly China is after unification. Whether or not the means are successful – discussed in the later part of this paper – China wants to draw Taiwan’s attention to two aspects: politically, the guarantee of autonomy under One Country, Two Systems, and, economically, the advantage the Taiwanese have gained from cooperation with China. However, the ultimate goal of China is to unite with Taiwan, and it will be interesting to see how the ‘emerging breadth and depth of economic interaction among various sub-regions has led some to argue that trade boundaries are blurring political boundaries’ (Khanna 1995: 1).

Political aspect- One Country Two Systems guaranteeing unchanged democracy?

Taiwan, after experiencing long periods of colonial rule by the Netherlands, Spain, Japan, and – as some people might put it – the Chinese Kuomintang, democratized in the early 1990s. Through peaceful, open, competitive, fair and transparent elections, and party reformulations, Taiwan demonstrated its democratic consolidation and is now perceived as one of the world’s democratic and liberal regimes. As one of the most democratic countries in Asia, people in Taiwan treasure the value of democracy which they have fought for over the past decades with sweat and blood. Worrying that unification with China might lead to the end of democracy and prosperity in Taiwan, Taiwanese people do not have a high inclination for unification. The brutal Tiananmen Massacre on 4 June 1989 gave a further impetus to both Hong Kong people and Taiwanese who have totally lost confidence in the rule of China. So, in order to establish Taiwan’s confidence and trust, it is necessary for the Chinese government to prove to the Taiwanese that democracy and prosperity will continue after unification. Preferring not to use violence or force, to a large extent due to external pressures such as the USA (Wachman 2001), China has chosen to use a soft method, which is to use Hong Kong as a model to win the popularity and trust of the Taiwanese.

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7 Taiwan has been recognized as a ‘free’ and democratic country by Freedom House since 2007. See http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/taiwan
Economic aspect: the effect of CEPA on ECFA

Since 1978, China (or Greater China including Hong Kong and Taiwan) has self-evidently developed into one of the most dynamic regions in the world, with clear moves towards economic integration with other global powers. Economic integration within Greater China and involving Hong Kong and Taiwan is a dual-goal policy: first, by observing the different unique strengths and assets of the three locations, China has realized that integration will help accelerate outward economic development that will increase its power not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also around the world. Second, it will serve the ultimate goal of reunification (Van Kemenade 1998). China's active attempt to build economic and commercial ties with Hong Kong and Taiwan is not just about having 'natural economic territories', but also serves a political purpose. As Harding explains:

From Beijing's perspective, economic interaction is viewed as a way of facilitating the eventual political reunification of China. The mainland Chinese government has therefore adopted a series of policies to stimulate commercial relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan, most notably the creation of special economic zones directly opposite them, for political as well as for purely commercial reasons.

(Harding 1993: 666)

While China aims to demonstrate that Taiwan's political stability is guaranteed, it also needs to promote the continuity of economic prosperity, as was the case in Hong Kong SAR in the post-handover period. Rather than focusing on discriminatory tariff preferences, new-style integration is more flexible, and better accommodates the service trade. CEPA is thus a channel for China to show its friendliness and its sincerity on economic policies. Although political considerations have affected and hindered the process of economic development between China and Taiwan, barriers have disappeared and economic relations have progressed positively. Generally speaking, CEPA has had a long-term and far-reaching effect on Hong Kong, not only due to the advantage preferential access, but possibly in relation to attracting foreign investment; however, it should be noted that there are also uncountable disadvantages for Hong Kong, especially relating to the labour market. Either way, it is a model for Taiwan's further economic cooperation with China. As explained by Sung (2005), 'Politically, the Mainland wants to keep Hong Kong's economy healthy to demonstrate the viability of “one country, two systems”, as the formula is also intended for Taiwan' (Sung 2005: 54).

The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) as T.F. Wang (2009) argues, is actually a copy of CEPA. Similarly to CEPA, ECFA stresses the advantage of the zero tariff, preferential access policy, investment protection, and

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8 Cheng et al. (2007) have highlighted the complementary assets of the three places: China has abundant low-cost resources, Taiwan has advanced technological know-how and capital, while Hong Kong has a strong and sophisticated legal system, financial services and management skills.

9 The 'new style' of integration is described by Sung (2005) as referring to policy coordination, as exemplified by APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Community).
enlarging the market in both countries. It is argued that this is beneficial to Taiwan due to China’s size and dominance; citing Hong Kong as an example, the Ma government in Taiwan has been lobbying very hard on the advantages of ECFA and advocating the implementation of economic integration with China. After experiencing the ‘economic tsunami’ that also affected other Asian countries, Taiwan, seems to see the economic ‘success stories’ of Hong Kong as a life ring in the ocean, and is looking forward to economic development and the ‘ten golden years’ that will be a panacea for its economic predicament. As mentioned above, in the short-term, CEPA does have some positive effects for Hong Kong, especially after economic crisis, such as escalating foreign investment, business and trade opportunities. So, it is not surprising that not only businesspeople in Taiwan, but also scholars, have quoted the ‘successful’ experience of Hong Kong for the Taiwan case.

There are many voices among the public and within Taiwan’s political parties raising concerns about ECFA and even highlighting possible negative effects such as increased unemployment. However, at the political level, it is the ideology of the agreement that matters. As stated earlier, economics and trade may blur political boundaries, and this is exactly the case with ECFA. Some people in Taiwan worry that signing ECFA indirectly recognizes the implementation of One Country, Two Systems with Taiwan as a SAR, as well as the full market-economy status of China. Echoing this discourse, T.F. Wang (2009) also agrees that ECFA, as a special arrangement trading arrangement within one country like CEFA, highlights the role of SARs and is implemented under the framework of ‘One China’ (T.F. Wang 2009).

Whether ECFA receives extensive support in Taiwan, and whether it is beneficial to Taiwan in the long-run, it is undeniable that China’s strategy on economic integration and further political integration has taken its first step. CEPA, signed not only for economic integration between China and Hong Kong but as a model for Taiwan, has successfully served its role and paved the path for ECFA. This has an extensive and pervasive effect on the dream of making a Greater China.

The Path to a Greater China? Superficial Success and Fundamental Failure? The Reality and the Concerns of Taiwanese People

Although China has invested a great deal in attempting to show that it has a plausible strategy for unification with Taiwan, there is a contrary perspective that argues that Taiwan and Hong Kong are totally different, and that any success in

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10 President Ma has made comments about the positive effect of ECFA in different circumstances. He suggested Taiwan’s as an international logistics centre (see http://www.nownews.com/2009/04/22/301-2440629.htm) and in his debate on ECFA with Chairman Tsai of the DPP in April 2010 he highlighted Taiwan’s internationalization and the ten golden years that would come after the signing of ECFA.

11 Professor J.C. Wang of the Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research has published an article on the website Economic Forum First Look, sponsored by the Council for Economic Planning and Development of Taiwan’s Executive Yuan of Taiwan, in which he quoted the experience of Hong Kong without much reference on problems and negative effects (see http://www.cier.edu.tw/ct.asp?xItem=11687&ctNode=61&mp=1).
Taiwan on the model of Hong Kong would be superficial and the ultimate result would be failure. In order to assess the feasibility of strategies for unification, it is crucial to address the existing concerns of the majority of the Taiwanese people.

**The Reality and Concerns of Taiwanese People**

Although Hong Kong’s arrangements are supposed to last until 2047, the last 15 years have instead created worries and disappointment about the future, not only for people in Hong Kong but also the people in Taiwan. The promise of One Country, Two Systems has not been kept, and people in Hong Kong and Taiwan undoubtedly feel let down. The interference of judiciary, the deterioration of press freedom, the failure of introducing universal suffrage of the Chief Executive in Hong Kong are some examples that arose not only disappointment but also anger in Hong Kong towards the SAR government under Chinese rule. While it might not have direct influence to Taiwan yet, the resentment of the Hong Kong people has reinforced the distrust and suspicion towards China’s rule.

In Hong Kong, even though the constitution itself gives a great deal of space for its people to govern themselves without interference from China, the reality is another story. The practice of Two Systems was violated less than a year after the handover: as Yeung (2001) points out, the Chief Executive, which is elected by committee, not only is responsible to the people of Hong Kong, but it also serves a second master, the central government of China. Taking the Chief Executive ‘as an institutional authority with legitimacy coming from the central government’ (Yeung 2001), China actively but indirectly interferes with Hong Kong’s domestic affairs. A promise that the Chief Executive would be elected directly has been broken, and China has challenged the independence of the judiciary system and the rule of law.\(^\text{12}\) This demonstrates the breakdown One Country, Two Systems.

It is self-evident that China has been actively pursuing the target of ‘one country’, neglecting and overlooking ‘two systems’. Echoing Takeuchi (2006), Bowring (2007) also questions whether One Country, Two Systems in Hong Kong is fading away:

This territory’s separate status under the ‘one country-two systems’ concept is supposed to be good for 50 years from 1997. But recent events suggest that Hong Kong could, for all practical purposes, be re-absorbed long before 2047.

(Bowring 2007)

\(^\text{12}\) According to Article 158 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong courts are authorized to interpret the Law when adjudicating cases. Yet there have been four cases in which the law has instead been interpreted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) since the handover, and this has been seen as a serious violation of the concept of an independent judiciary as conceptualized in One Country, Two Systems. These cases include decisions about right of abode, the term of the Chief Executive, direct elections for Chief Executive, and Hong Kong’s foreign relations. Of these, the decision about right of abode in 1999 was the most significant (Cheng and Ngok 1999).
Referring to the annual policy address of the Chief Executive Donald Tsang in 2007, Bowring points out that the focus was one ‘one country’ rather than ‘two systems’, and attempting to make Hong Kong people think that they do not have many differences with the Mainland.

It is clear that the Hong Kong One Country, Two Systems model has been fading away during after the first decade since 1997, and that official discourse has instead emphasized benefits from China through integration. As Yeung (2001) concludes, there seems to be a gap between the promises and reality of One Country, two Systems. As a strategy, China emphasizes a high degree of autonomy as a guarantee of political stability, but One Country, Two System is actually like ‘a slap in its own face’, showing up weaknesses and potential conflict after reunification.

Cooney (1997) suggests that One Country, Two Systems might be a feasible model for Hong Kong, a place which has never experienced full degree of democracy, but its feasibility and applicability on Taiwan, which has achieved a much larger degree of autonomy and accountability, remains in serious doubt:

The PRC’s OCTS [One Country, Two Systems] model may once have been a feasible plan for the peaceful reunification of China, but it has been overtaken by fundamental political and constitutional reform on Taiwan. OCTS was originally designed to deal with the features of a colonial or authoritarian regime.

(Cooney 1997: 546)

Similarly, the extent to which the premise of ‘One Country’ – i.e. ‘One China’ – can be accepted and applied in Taiwan is also in serious doubt. As Weng has added: “two systems” cannot be juxtaposed unless the “One China principle” is upheld first’ (Weng 2002: 730).

As well as the dismal-looking future under One Country, Two Systems, the emergence of Taiwanese identity may also be a big obstacle in the path of unification. Shen and Wu (2008) indicate that ethnic and civic nationalisms in Taiwan help to form and consolidate the Taiwanese nation. Alongside the process of democratization, there is growing sense of a shared history and of an ‘in group’ that includes ‘Mainlanders’ who migrated to Taiwan after 1949 and their descendants, and the native Taiwanese. The ‘New Taiwanese’ identity promoted by President Teng-hui Lee during the Taipei City mayoral elections in 1998, and the advocating of Taiwanese nationalism under President Shui-bian Chen, has no doubt given Taiwanese people a new way to reconsider their identity, and this

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13 ‘New Taiwanese’ is a term coined by President Teng-hui Lee during the 1998 Taipei City mayoral election, Lee suggested that being a ‘New Taiwanese’ did not depend on where someone was born or their ancestry.

14 Policies highlighting Taiwan sovereignty and national identity have been put forward since 2000, when Shiu-bian Chen of the DPP was elected President of Taiwan. Schubert and Braig (2011) note how Taiwanese nationalism has been integrated into its domestic politics through educational policies, the remembrance of the 228 Incident and other political discourses.
idea of ‘nation-state’ and Taiwanese identity has provided a platform for political unity on the island (Stockton 2008).

This has led to doubts about the One China goal, and encouraged Taiwanese people to examine critically the current strategy. Weng (2002) argues that Taiwanese people have five concerns in relation to the Hong Kong model: autonomy, the political system, civil liberties, the rule of law, and Taiwan–Hong Kong relations. Going through a difficult path towards democratization, Taiwanese people treasure what they now have, and it is not surprising that discussions about unification, when not concerned with economic advantage, focus on the political and social situation in Hong Kong. Democratization in Taiwan also creates a bigger gap between the political and social situation of Taiwan and China, making unification less practical. As Hughes notes:

> Pointing out the difference in political systems between the two sides of the Strait is not just a matter of principle. It also has important practical implications for the limits of Beijing’s unification policy. This is because the more democratic Taiwan becomes, the more important it is for Beijing to correctly gauge the amount of pressure it can put on Taiwan before it becomes counterproductive. (Hughes 2001: 16)

China has put so much effort into establishing a positive image for Taiwan through One Country, Two Systems, but its failure to sustain the promise has left Taiwan with a dim and pessimistic view of the future. The Mainlandization policy (Lo 2008), the lack integrity in the electoral system, the failed promise of universal elections, the suppression of press freedom and freedom of speech.

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15 As Lo (2008) explains, a Mainlandization policy was introduced during the Tung Cheehwa era. It attempted to make HKSAR not only economically, but also politically, legally and socially converge with and reliant on China. For instance, there were changes in the administrative system and civil service, as well as in the media.

16 Regarded as fake democratic city, Hong Kong demonstrates a fake democratic election system, in which there are sixty seats representing the geographical constituencies, thirty seats representing the functional constituencies, and a further thirty elected through smaller closed elections within business sectors inside the unicameral Legislative Council.

17 Although Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law stated that the Chief Executive should be elected directly from 2007, and all seats of the Legislative Council in 2008, the controversy was finally settled through an interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. This has been seriously criticized as a violation of judicial independence and a setback in the path of Hong Kong’s democratization.

18 Hong Kong is recognized as ‘partly free’ by Freedom House, and freedom of the press and of speech has been under threat since the handover. The Hong Kong journalists’ group expressed their concerns in July 2011 (see Greenslade 2011). Developments demonstrating the deterioration of press freedom in Hong Kong include the visit of Li Keqiang to the University of Hong Kong in August 2011 (see the Sun 2011b and iSun Affairs 2011), and the suspension of broadcasts by Albert Cheng and Raymond Wong (see BBC News 2004). Journalists’ concerns are shared by the people of Hong Kong (see Mak 2012).
the coercive pressure on national education, and the dismantling of the legal system, as mentioned above, have undoubtedly left Taiwanese people doubtful and apprehensive on prospects for unification. There is also a discourse of ‘Hong Kong being marginalized’ on political or economic matters, which was widely discussed ten years after the handover (Apple Daily 2006a; BBC News 2006; Tsao 2006). Taiwanese people are particularly worried about how social values and the way of life would change after unification. Taiwanese people would need to pay a rather ‘high price’ (Weng 2002; see also Wachman 2001). Taiwanese people enjoy belonging to one of the most democratic countries in Asia, and would rather not to take the risk of putting themselves in a vulnerable position.

Conclusion

Unification – symbolizing the triumph of the ruler – has always been a traditional Chinese cultural norm. A strong desire to reclaim ‘lost places’ has in recent decades prompted China to implement political and economic strategies and policies that look towards future reunification and ‘Greater China’.

China is acting rationally by adopting various strategies to convey to the Taiwanese people a good impression. Having been independent, Taiwan is very different from Hong Kong and Macau, and might find unification a ‘high price’ to pay. As Cooper observed: ‘Greater China came to have very salient political implications, especially as the “Taiwan issue” became more heated and difficult with rapid democratization on the island’ (Cooper 2003: 29). Whether or not One Country, Two Systems and China’s economic policies in Hong Kong are genuinely beneficial to Hong Kong, China’s strategy of taking Hong Kong as a prototype for Taiwan has had only superficial and limited success, probably due to economic factors in the short term, but more fundamentally because of the contrasting social values of the Chinese Communist Government and Taiwan. There is also the failure of One Country, Two Systems as practiced in Hong Kong. There may be optimism over ‘Greater China’ as an economic concept, but political unification seems more difficult to imagine. It is true that some Hong Kong people and Taiwanese have greater confidence in China since 1997, as was found by Wong’s (1998) review of One Country, Two Systems one year after the handover. Some people in Taiwan seem to welcome the ‘10 golden years’ promised by the signing of ECFA, although they retain serious reservations regarding autonomy, the rule of law, and China’s political system.

People in Hong Kong have been compared to a ‘boiling frog’ (Liberty Times 2007; Liu 2007; Chen 2011; Sun 2011a; Apple Daily 2012a): that is, a frog placed

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19 A series of protests and demonstrations took place in September against the implementation of national education in primary schools, regarded as an attempt to brainwash students with pro-China education (see BBC News 2012b)

20 In 2006, Rafael Hui JP, Chief Secretary of the Administration from 2005–2007, wrote a note expressing his concern that Hong Kong would be marginalized at the Forum of the 11th Five-year Programme (see Apple Daily 2006a). This concern was also shared in Hong Kong, with journalists, politicians and scholars responding with different points of view. Tsao (2006), a well-known columnist and broadcaster in Hong Kong, indicated how Hong Kong was and would be marginalized (see Tsao, 2006).
in cold water that is gradually heated without the frog ever becoming aware of its changing environment. However, people in Hong Kong have gradually become more aware of their situation, and are now standing up to fight for their rights (Apple Daily 2012b; BBC News 2012a; Mingpao 2011). While Hong Kong was initially regarded as the prototype for Taiwan, due to its political stability and economic prosperity, it is ironic that political unrest and the concern that Hong Kong is becoming marginalized have had the opposite effect. One Country, Two Systems is found not to be genuine, while economic advantage is seen as short-term and sure to fade away. Taiwan’s government focuses on the advantages – particularly economic – that China has brought to Hong Kong, and is ready to establish a closer relationship, as is clearly shown by its determination to sign ECFA. However, Hong Kong as a model is becoming increasingly problematic, and there is also a stronger sense of Taiwanese identity. While some, such as Lo (2008), might suggest that China needs more flexibility, creativity and innovation in dealing with the Taiwan–China issue in the spirit of One Country, Two Systems, this paper argues that the fundamental ideological issue is sovereignty, and for Taiwan to recognize itself as part of China cannot be achieved in the short term.

There are also other variables, such as the role of countries such as Singapore and the USA (Lo 2008). Their attitudes and diplomatic strategies are also determining factors in the future political destiny of Taiwan.

References


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21 The boiling frog story is originally an experiment conducted by scientists in Cornell University which describes that a frog is slowly boiled alive in water. Being put in boiling water, the frog will jump out immediately avoiding burning while another frog which is placed in cold water that is slowly heated would not perceive any danger and finally cooked death. The term is now culturally used extensively in different situations as a metaphor to describe the ignorance of people to the changing environment and the slow reaction would eventually lead to an undesirable consequence.

22 Starting from 2003 in which a series of crisis had undergone in Hong Kong including SARS, ‘Lexusgate’ Scandal of the Financial Secretary Anthony Leung as well as the legislation of the controversial Hong Kong Basic Law Article 23, the 1 July Marches had become a regular and annual event in Hong Kong, in which Hong Kong people stand out to demand for democracy, universal suffrage and express discontentment to the government.


Review Essay:

What the Differences between Taiwan and Hong Kong Studies Reveal about the Differences between Taiwan and Hong Kong Society

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邊城對話：香港、中國、邊緣、邊界 [City on the Edge: Hong Kong, China, Boundaries and Borderland], edited by Pang Lai-kwan (彭麗君編) Hong Kong: [The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press], 302pp, TW$142.00 ISBN: 978-9629965440


In recent years, there has been an explosion of scholarly reflection and writing about Taiwan and Hong Kong, with works both about the present and with an eye to the future. Books comparing Taiwan and Hong Kong abound in the literature, although most tend to be narrowly defined. It is certainly possible to write a comparative history, to compare political relations and destinies, or to analyze
differences (typically within a set analytical framework) between specific institutions, such as education, family, etc., but is more difficult to identify how and why Taiwan and Hong Kong are different and what makes them unique, even given what we already know about their historical experiences and in terms of their social, cultural and political attributes. Area studies experts tend to view the world primarily within their own confines and within a language that reflects niche concerns and interests: I argue that what makes local area studies accounts noteworthy is not necessarily their explicit content, but what they tend at the same time to omit as irrelevant. These omissions do not simply reflect objective differences, but also point to salient differences in mindsets that are produced by different experiences. I have chosen to review three books each for Taiwan and for Hong Kong. Despite the different disciplinary coverages for each area, they share common concerns or outlooks that are absent or differently manifested in other areas. Only after identifying these is comparison relevant.

The book edited by Schubert and Damm is a collection of 13 essays by a varied group of scholars from Germany, Taiwan, France and UK. Several of them, including the co-editors, are associated with the University of Tubingen; thus the work presented may be considered the result of collective research. All of the essays clearly show that the authors are experts in Taiwan Studies, or social scientists involved actively with Taiwan. As suggested by its forward-looking title, the field of inquiry traverses the concerns of recent history, in particular contemporary politics. Given the standard association of Taiwan with postwar Republican-era KMT policy, the obvious motivation behind this book seems to be the need to update our profile of Taiwan to include sociopolitical transformations that have taken place in the last few decades. If invoked at all, history in this regard is one that predicates the future.

The essays are framed within domestic, regional and global contexts, which reflect their primary relevance presumably for contemporary area studies specialists and political relations of all kinds. Taiwan’s internal transformations are portrayed as sui generis, which impact in turn its relationships with neighbors and beyond. However, the directionality of global/local relations is misguided. In this regard, identity in the book serves as a convenient keyword to characterize changes from an early postwar era marked by the KMT’s policy of monocultural nationalism. Multiculturalism and economic liberalism have, in short, replaced the identity politics of a now-bygone era. But just as the conservative stance of Taiwan’s ‘Republic of China’ was the product of Cold War dualism, it was Taiwan’s expulsion from the UN that eventually forced it to adopt ‘a third way’. It is possible to view identity formation largely as internal discourse, but its significance is misplaced. In content, Heylen’s reinventions of historical memory and Fleichauer’s historiography of the 2-28 massacre of Taiwanese reflect in essence the ongoing consequences of the KMT’s negotiation with its Taiwanese majority. Wu’s essay on the evolution of the KMT’s One China policy is also articulated as a kind of domestic dialogue that in the process of straddling the two poles of reunification and independence has adopted ambivalences and ambiguities reflecting the nuances of constantly mutating relationships across the Straits. Corcuff phrases changing identities in terms of relationships between ethnic Mainlanders and Taiwanese, or in the ongoing tension between cultural and political meanings of such ethnicity. Fell delves into the ramifications of ethnic identity for party politics,
while Schubert and Braig expound on the ramifications of the DPP’s policies of ethnic indigenization for the future of cross-Strait relations. The other essays on regional and global perspectives are articulated largely in terms of a language of international relations or with reference to cross-cultural comparison. Chu’s essay ruminates on the consequences of Taiwan’s identity politics on relations between China and the US, while Keng assesses political entanglements caused by increased economic and social integration across the Straits. King examines the effects of cross-Straits marriages upon perceptions of national identity in both Taiwan and the PRC. Lee looks at the possibilities of divided sovereignty from a legal point of view. Damm describes the changing status of overseas Chinese, overseas Taiwanese and huaren from a long historical perspective. Shih speculates on the role of Taiwan in an East Asian imaginary. Finally, Kaeding compares identity formation in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

While the concrete diversity of these essays covers the field of seminal issues, they all display a stereotypical political-science view of things, especially in the definition of identity. The spin on identity, broadly conceived, contrasts with interests of more empirically minded social scientists fixated on hard power and statistical trends, but most, or all, of these works seem to underscore the assumption that identity is a tangible entity that people have by nature or necessity. Its relevance to politics is never really problematized. The constant making and unmaking of identity in the process of crisis is analytically distinct from its strategic uses.

The edited collection by Heylen and Sommers comprises 12 essays by diverse scholars representing various institutions and walks of life. The essays are all written by experts who either do research on or who live in Taiwan, and together they represent diverse disciplinary backgrounds. The theme of ‘becoming’ in the book’s title focuses on transition, and the wide historical scope that is applied to colonialism and democracy covers a wide historical range from the Japanese colonial era to contemporary culture and society. Yet despite this, there is little attempt to probe colonialism or democracy in any serious way; they are simply keywords for investigating distinctive aspects of change. The book is divided into three sections: (1) How Chinese is Taiwan?; (2) Organizing a Taiwanese Society; and (3) Speaking about Taiwan. Themes of ethnic identity, language and education, literary representation, historical memory or cultural policy traverse almost every essay. However, why such culturalist themes provide a seminal or distinctive locus for understanding the transition of Taiwan from colonialism to democracy – as opposed, for example, to mainstream political or economic approaches – is not really directly addressed. Nonetheless, most if not all of the essays in the book are concrete case studies that provide a wealth of data.

The authors in Part I (P. Kerim Friedman, Alexander Tsung-ming Chen, Darryl Sterk, and Pei-yin Lin) confront ethnic relations between aboriginal peoples, Taiwanese and Han Chinese over different periods of rule. Friedman deals with the history of aboriginal education from the end of the Qing through the Japanese colonial period into the KMT postwar era, within which language policy played a salient role in acculturation. Chen’s paper on the linguistic adaptation of the Jesuits in KMT postwar Taiwan also focused on the importance of language in successfully carrying out their missions. Many Jesuit priests came from Mainland China, and thus spoke Mandarin fluently. Others continued to learn local
Taiwanese and Hakka dialect. Sterk's essay examines Chinese and aboriginal intermarriage relations as represented in novels during KMT postwar rule, in which the desirability of assimilation and settler ideals was emphasized. This began to change with the advent of aboriginal cultural consciousness and identity. Novels from this point to some extent reflect prevailing views of interethnic relations: Lin's essay compares the novels of Lin Yaode and Li Qiao in regard to the February 28 Incident or KMT massacre of Taiwanese intellectuals, taking an aboriginal perspective, while Li views the same events from a Taiwanese perspective. Both attempt to construct alternative historical memories. The essays in Part II (by Caroline Hui-yu Ts'ai, Fang-mei Lin, Min-chin Chiang and Mike Shi-chi Lan) speak to the issue of organizing a Taiwanese society, but in actuality they share little in common. Tsai's essay focuses on social engineering of the rural baojia system during the late Japanese colonial era. Lin's paper discusses the legal debates and social movements surrounding the rights of sex workers in 1990s Taipei. Chiang's paper deals with the role of museums in the construction of heritage and social memory in 1990s Taiwan. Lan's paper describes the socially alienating experiences of KMT soldiers in Taiwan during the Cold War era and its aftermath. In Part III, loosely characterized as 'speaking about Taiwan', the essays (by Ann Heylen, Sandrine Marchand, Tana Dluhosova and Scott Sommers) seem to address issues of language again. Heylen discusses the tensions of becoming Japanese and Taiwanese in the Japanese colonial era, with education playing a seminal role. Marchand discusses the effects of language suppression on Taiwanese intellectuals in different phases of colonial and postwar era Taiwan. Dluhosova's paper discussing early postwar debates in the Taiwanese literature ultimately addresses issues pertaining to cultural integration. Lastly, Sommers' essay examines Mandarin, Taiwanese and English in relation to politics and everyday uses.

In sum, this book is a mixed bag of essays on Taiwan's societal evolution over a wide historical spectrum, but with a heavy emphasis on language, ethnicity, education and culture.

Blundell's edited volume comprises 19 essays written by experts working in and outside Taiwan. Six of the authors have been affiliated with the International Postgraduate Program in Taiwan or Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University, where Blundell, the editor, teaches. Reflecting its breadth of coverage, the book is divided into two parts, 'Society and Culture' and 'Politics and Economy'. Most of the essays are concrete case studies of various aspects of Taiwan culture or economy, but written in a way that is readable to people seeking general information about Taiwan. Like many of the recently edited books on contemporary Taiwan, the focus is on changes since the Cold War, reflected in, among other things, the liberalization of the economy, cosmopolitan openness, political democratization, and multicultural indigenization. At the same time, it avoids presenting rigorous theoretical perspectives on any of the above. As a long-time resident of Taiwan, Blundell's introduction to Taiwan since martial law depicts a generally upbeat picture of successful achievements 'in our time', as he puts it, without directly addressing the repressive, nationalistic past that preceded it. The essays give a positive assessment of Taiwan's current situation. Tedards' 'Trajectories of Democratization' refers to democratization as the 'other miracle', lesser known than the economic miracle. This transition is viewed in contrast to
Taiwan repressive past, the subsequent revision of the Constitution, the trajectories of the two major political parties, the future prospects of civil society, and threats to Taiwan’s democracy, especially from the outside. Blundell’s ‘Taiwan Coming of Age’ traces his involvement in grassroots ecology associations and heritage protection movements, showing how these have contributed to Taiwan’s unique sense of place. Heylen’s ‘Grassroots Taiwan History’ focuses in part on studies of pingpu Plains Aborigines (indigenous cultures that became Sinicized in past centuries), which have contributed to the emergence of a Taiwan-centric perspective in other disciplines. Wood’s essay on Beitou’s Hot Springs Museum, located at a famous hot springs vacation venue, situates the museum in the general context of heritage conservation. Ku Kun-hui’s essay on minority rights and the politics of indigenous cultures in the context of an emerging Taiwan nationalism outlines the situation of Taiwan’s Austronesian peoples within the changing postwar minority policies of the ROC government and the later advent of Taiwanese indigenization. Wu’s essay covers a similar ethnic renaissance movement among the Hakka, a Han minority whose history of settlement in Taiwan parallels that of Hokkien speakers. Mitsuda’s essay depicts the various developments leading up to the government’s recognition in 2009 of the Thao, an aboriginal group living at Sun Moon Lake, as the fourteenth official indigenous culture in Taiwan. Hu’s essay on Yami ecological memory on Orchid Island focuses on land rights and the sacredness of place identity in the face of military land use, housing developments, reforestation, tourism and the location of a nuclear waste site there. Leifelt-Tsai’s essay recounts the varied experiences of Taiwan exchange students in Germany since the 1980s. Hsiao’s essay is a general history of the middle class in postwar Taiwan from the 1980s. Alsford’s essay discusses the history of the tea industry in Taiwan from the nineteenth century to the present. Muyard’s sociological account of the formation of Taiwan’s new national identity since the end of the 1980s is an attempt to reconcile changes in sub-ethnic consciousness with the changing nature of national identity. Sullivan’s essay deals with election campaigning, especially in the era of democratic politics. This is followed by an essay by Gary and Ming-yeh Rawnsley on the evolution of Taiwan’s media in the aftermath of democratization. Tan’s essay describes Taiwan’s adoption of civil rights law from the US system and its role in a fledgling democracy. Reid discusses land rights issues in the Atayal village community of Smangus. Bowman then compares human rights policy under Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou. Vio discusses economic integration across the Straits and its effects on cultural identity and issues of national sovereignty. Chu’s essay deals with the growth of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry in the context of globalization, migration across the Straits and with regard to technology transfer, investment patterns and talent flows. Finally, Chow offers a review of Taiwan’s economic performance, focusing on the role and policies of the developmental state in particular in relation to democratization.

In contrast to other edited volumes on contemporary Taiwan, a large number (seven) of the essays deal with anthropological issues or indigenous peoples, which perhaps reflects the editor’s background in anthropology. Two essays dealing with heritage or the culture industry can also be considered to have anthropological relevance. The three essays dealing directly with political changes, media or human rights, as well as the two sociological essays dealing with the rise
of a middle class and the multiplicity of new ethnic, national identities, establish a link with the democratization process. Similarly, the three essays dealing with economic growth and science/technology developments promote a generally progressive outlook. In sum, what all of the essays in this volume project in the long run is a positive, optimistic spin.

The three books cover different sides of Taiwan. The authors in Schubert and Damm’s book are ultimately interested in the new Taiwanese identity that emerged after democratic reforms and the development of a free market economy. The contributors to Heylen and Sommers’ book cover a wider historical transition from colonialism to democratization, but the focus is largely on how cultural education, language strategies, and historical memory have affected assimilation and ethnic consciousness. The essays in Blundell’s book are loosely structured in a different way: they are parts of an encyclopedic account of various aspects of social, cultural, political and economic life in Taiwan today. Taken together, all three books paint a rather compatible picture about Taiwan in which democratization seems to be the prime factor that brought about the changes seen today. Colonialism is present, but largely as a discontinuous past that was dualized during the early KMT regime but influenced the rise of Taiwanese identity, at least indirectly. Ethnicity is a prominent theme not just because of Taiwanese–Mainlander tensions but also given the existence of Hakka and indigenous minorities. Nationalism has been relegated to the past, largely as a result of democratization, and all of these experiences in the long run have contributed to the rise of a new Taiwan, as though unchained from the past and defined by a renaissance of distinctive features and outlooks. This seems to be the new look of Taiwanese Studies as well: progressive, multicultural, open-ended and cosmopolitan.

The volume edited by Sinn et al. consists of eleven papers first given at the ‘Paradigms and Perspectives in Hong Kong Studies’ conference at the University of Hong Kong, under the auspices of the Hong Kong Culture and Society Programme and subsequently published by the Center for Asian Studies. The need or desire to rethink Hong Kong was clearly precipitated in large part by the circumstances engendered by the change of regime in 1997; equally significantly, most of these authors are established scholars with decades of research and writing on Hong Kong, in addition to representing diverse fields and perspectives. Thus, it appears that the impetus stems less from the need to assess the actually changing nature of Hong Kong than the desire to rethink paradigms of or perspectives on Hong Kong, given its change of circumstances.

While turning on the phrase ‘one country, two systems’, Wang Gungwu’s essay, ‘One Country, Two Cultures: An Alternative View of Hong Kong’, represents in fact a level-headed attempt to transcend the rhetoric of state policies and ideological labels. Culture, for him, is a kind of broad mindset and practical strategy rather than something bound by ethnic or language barriers. Nonetheless, the cultural divisions remain real obstacles toward reconciliation. J.Y. Wong attempts to apply a periphery–centre paradigm to political relations between Hong Kong and Beijing, but the various observations he makes on numerous events are rambling at best. Bernard Luk’s essay on schooling and social change in Hong Kong from 1950–1980 does not seem to be new at all, as it reiterates the same narratives of modern progress in the history of the school system. As for prospects after 1997,
he just says that this is an open question. David Faure’s ‘Rethinking Colonialism in Hong Kong’ is a condensation of part of a longer book, Colonialism and the Hong Kong Mentality (2003). While he attempts to sift through changes in the nature of political rule over a long period, as well as the role of education in the changing relationship between colonizers and colonized, he tries ultimately to bridge institutional with cultural changes as part of a larger framework for future analysis.

Takeshi Hamashita’s essay, ‘Geopolitics of Hong Kong Economy’, asserts that little research has been done on the economic history of Hong Kong, taking a line of vision extending from the early nineteenth century to the present. While it is true that Hong Kong played an important role as trade intermediary between the West and Southeast Asia, China and Japan, and as a node for Chinese regional and overseas migration (in addition to their remittances), the historical scope of his attention is somewhat broad. It is also unclear what new paradigms he suggests here, aside from the obvious mass of statistical data that could be compiled for the above. Wong Siu-lun’s essay on the rise of Hong Kong as a ‘network society’ apparently has less to do with the internet version than with business networks, with large socially and politically. He describes this as decentering, because of Hong Kong’s peripheral location yet multicultural axis. The essay by Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu on Chinese business networks is more of the same, except that it focuses on the concrete role of connections made at Lunar New Year banquets. Despite its title, I am not sure what exactly about this field is being reconsidered. In another essay, Thomas Wong sums up the objectives, practices and lessons of the Hong Kong social indicators survey project that he had been involved in over the previous 25 years. This is followed by Carolyn Cartier’s essay on the future prospects of relational urban studies, in relation especially to post-colonialism and globalization. Elizabeth Sinn argues for a better understanding of Hong Kong’s role in history as an ‘in-between place’ for large scale migration, which has had ramifications for transnational investment, disaster and war relief as well for as the birth of institutions, such as the Tung Wah Hospital. At the same time, Salaff and Greve’s work on the migration triangle between PRC, Hong Kong and Canada focuses on current networks and social processes. Yet what is new about Hong Kong or its paradigms is still unclear.

Chu Yiu-wai’s book comprises independent essays that formulate a broad reflection on the state of Hong Kong after 1997, with specific reference to the meaning of postcoloniality in the abstract and the relevance of global capitalism in the concrete. There have been many works dealing with Hong Kong after 1997, especially in relation to things political. More interestingly, the political emerges, but in the context of cultural studies. What political scientists call ‘soft power’ is anything but soft, just cultural. It is by dissecting the cultural that one can understand at a deeper level the nature of that political transition. Chu rightly addresses the myth of ‘one country, two systems’ in order to suggest in part that the political crisis can be read primarily in cultural terms. As the following essays argue, Hong Kong is lost in the transition between national and global, in the reconfigurations of Chineseness in the age of global modernity, in the attempted advent of a neo-liberal cultural governmentality and in the tensions between cultural heritages and creative industries. Chu’s background in comparative literature leads him to focus quite naturally on cinema, music and the arts, which...
become the basis for a final reflection on the state of comparative literature as critical theory.

In his introductory essay on the state of Hong Kong’s transitional dilemma, Chu argues that Hong Kong culture has not disappeared in a strict sense but that its cultural confrontation with China involves in part a recognition of the multiplicity of Chineseness-es as well as a renewed synthesis between culture and a changing urbanity, globality and transnationalism. In ‘The Rise of China and its Soft Power’, he attempts to decipher the China factor in terms of China’s emerging cultural hegemony. Part of this is prompted, of course, by the rise of China as a superpower, but Chu is mindful of Zhang Xudong’s description of China’s particularity as a superpower ‘in which state propaganda, advertising industry, market-driven popular media as well as semi-autonomous intellectuals all act as competing agents’. The result is ‘a dazzling collage of images and a cognitive vacuum to be detected by a new critical practice’ (cited by Chu on p. 20). Echoing Arif Dirlik, it is a superpower in which the very language of alternatives and multiplicity is enabled historically by the presupposition of a common modernity shaped by a globalizing capitalism. In this space of a new global modernity, Orientalism, nationalism and postcolonialism become reconfigured. Chu cites the example of Zhang Yimou’s films, then addresses the role of Hong Kong in the age of China. In ‘Central District Values’, he discusses the strong governance policies of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Donald Tsang, which he calls ‘Donaldization’, in reference and comparison to the McDonaldization-of-society thesis. The modernity being promoted here is one of an administrative rationality that does not respond in actuality to the people. The incomplete packaging of society experienced under Tsang’s regime leads to a discussion of the ‘Brand Hong Kong’ program and its adverse effects on Hong Kong’s cultural and creative industries. Needless to say, the history of Hong Kong’s culture industry well precedes 1997, but the role of government in promoting it integrated the bundled development of creative industries to the local heritage conservation movement. Brand Hong Kong in essence packaged the local with a global marketing strategy in ways that perverted the advent of true cosmopolitanism. In ‘One Country, Two Cultures’, Chu analyzes the development of Hong Kong and Chinese cinema in the reconstructed space of post-1997 Hong Kong. Perhaps unlike other cultural studies commentators, he focuses less on the content of cinema per se and assesses it in the context of a changing market that includes a ‘greater’ PRC, especially given the rise of Hong Kong–Mainland co-productions. There are clear ramifications here also for cultural identity as variations on a global relationship. In ‘Who Sings for Hong Kong?’, Chu assesses the changing nature and role of Cantopop in the Age of China and in the general transition from a prior Greater China to a Greater PRC. There are many similarities here with that of cinema. He concludes with some speculative thoughts on the future of Hong Kong ‘exceptionalism’.

The book of twelve essays edited by Pang Lai-kwan, City on the Edge, has the title Border City Dialogues in Chinese. Its English title gives a stronger sense of crisis. Nonetheless, the element of dialogue, between scholars and between two sides of the border, is equally relevant. As Pang reiterates in her introduction, ‘marginalization’ is the source of Hong Kong people’s greatest sense of panic, which has prompted scholars and intellectuals, mostly based in Hong Kong, to reflect critically on Hong Kong-China’s anxious state of relations.
The book is divided into three parts: (1) History: Borders Outside Hong Kong; (2) Life: China's Border Peoples; and (3) Border City: Alternative Discourses of Hong Kong–China Relations. In Part I, all four papers deal with China’s relations with its internal minorities or its alterity. In ‘The Hermeneutics of Recognition of China’s Minority Peoples: Views from the “Margin”’, Lo Kwai Cheung explores perceptions of China from the frontier throughout history, mutual incompatibilities of nation (minzu) and state (guojia) leading up to modern times and official nationalities policy in the PRC era. In ‘The Problems of Tibet and Taiwan from a Historical Perspective’, Hung Ho-fung and Kuo Huei-ying contrast the political positions of Tibet and Taiwan in light of their respective political developmental paths. As variations on the principle of ‘one country, two systems’, their relevance is not lost on Hong Kong’s situation in theory and practice. In Yu Siu-wah’s ‘The Margins of Chinese Music: Ethnic Minority Musi’, she documents the influences of ethnic minority music on Chinese traditions in the Qing dynasty. Like prior papers, she ends with an analogy to highlight the distinctive vitality of Hong Kong music in the larger Chinese context. In ‘Illiteracy, Social Masses and the World: The Latinization Movement in 1930s China’, Huang Zhimin recounts a failed attempt to Romanize Chinese script characters. However, despite its conclusions, the relevance to Hong Kong is remote. Part II, ‘Life’, moves away from ethnic minorities per se to marginal groups in a broader sense. In ‘Monopolistic Capitalism and Chinese Labor’, Pun Ngai and Xu Yi examine the factory work regime and mode of production at Foxconn. Here, the core–periphery distinctions in global capitalism that link China to the world and create social stratification along regional and class lines manifest in turn different genres of marginalization. In ‘Responses to Ecological Crisis: From the “Peace Women” of Rural China’, Chan Shun Hing plays on the relativism of women to men and rural to urban to reflect on that of Hong Kong to China. In ‘Marginal Status in Transition: The Reciprocity of Politics and Religion in China’, Kung Yap Yan delves into the politicized status of religion and the parallel plight of religious freedom in PRC. What he calls ‘marginal’ is less a geographical analogy to Hong Kong than its minor role in the larger politics of society. In ‘Counterfeit China vs. Creative China’, Pang Lai-kwan examines two facets of the PRC’s culture industry that co-exist, perhaps uneasily, at two levels of the economy. Hong Kong may be indeed in the creative stage now, but in its developing stage it also played a large role in the counterfeit goods industry. In Part III, ‘Border City’, Chow Yiu Fai’s ‘Possibilities of Flow, Movement and Reversal: The Marginalization of Hong Kong’s Pop Music?’ reflects on the presumed demise of Hong Kong’s pop music. Without doubt, while some of this can be attributed to the advent of China from a transnational space once situated outside PRC; he offers an optimistic view on the ever-changing nature of such Chinese music. Ma Kit-wai’s essay, ‘Hong Kong’s Reappearance (Transborder Cultural Politics)’, is partly an allusion to Ackbar Abbas’ Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance, but he argues for a politics of reappearance based on negotiation with a newly emerging present. Li Cho-kiu’s ‘The Margins of “Hong Kong Culture”: A Preliminary Investigation of the Cultural Logic of the Patriotic Left’ looks at the legacy of Hong Kong’s left wing in relation to the evolution of socialist China, concluding with prospects for the possibilities of Hong Kong cultural studies.
The above three books offer slightly different perspectives on Hong Kong, and in each case the post-1997 transition provides a common platform for reflexive concern. Despite the search for new paradigms and new perspectives for rethinking Hong Kong, the essays in the book edited by Sinn et al. seem to recycle the same old approaches already prevalent in the established scholarly literature. The diversity of disciplinary viewpoints is admirable, but there is little explicit attention to changes in the post-1997 era or any serious attempt to rethink how changes in regime have prompted the desire or necessity for new paradigms. The other two books get their impetus generally from critical cultural studies, which at the same time privileges questions – all other things remaining equal – of perception and interpretation. Perhaps unlike the standard cultural studies line, Chu Yiu-wai’s object of critical scrutiny is the advent of global capitalism in PRC and its influence upon relations with Hong Kong. The rise of neo-liberal governmentality in Hong Kong’s SAR is not in this regard an irrelevant development. In many regards, the developmentalist focus in both Hong Kong and the PRC represents at the same time an overt diversion from democracy-related issues. In culture, as in politics, Chu seems to argue that the future of Hong Kong lies first in its recognition of intertwined relationship as a point of departure for developing new tactics of engagement and cultural strategies. In the book edited by Pang, the authors share with Chu (and to a less obvious extent with those in Sinn et al.) the fiction of ‘one country, two systems’. However, there is an explicit attempt to stretch the concept of marginality as a basis for cultural alterity and critical difference. Marginality resonates with Marxist critique in general and has enjoyed a resurgence of meaning under the banner of ‘subaltern studies’. However, one might ask to what extent can one meaningfully extend the relevance of marginality from one rooted in a politically economic condition and social stratification, to cultural geography and other states of imagination. Ethnic minorities have been an established field in sinological history and contemporary ethology; what, therefore is the critical difference put forth by essays in Part I? On the other hand, one might reverse sides and ask that while many of the papers, especially on the 1930’s Latinization movement, ethnic minority music during the Qing and the politicization of religion in PRC, are respectable essays in the their own right, how do they benefit exactly from the book’s focus on marginality and in relation to Hong Kong? While it is clear that Hong Kong suffers from crises of marginality, one might also ask why Macau seems much less afflicted by such crises and perceptions.

It is easy to observe Taiwan and Hong Kong from the narrow prism of area studies. In each case, research on local culture, society and politics is conducted by experts in respective fields and with reference to an ongoing literature. In fact, the overall contribution to Taiwan and Hong Kong Studies has not been insignificant, with ramifications for a better appreciation of developments in both places. However, the differences that distinguish Taiwan and Hong Kong are less apparent in what experts say about their own niches than in what is omitted, as though by common sense, from these accounts. On the whole, Taiwan Studies is driven by an inherent optimism, prompted by the triumph of democratization and liber(aliz)ation of various sorts. By contrast, Hong Kong’s return to or integration with China has become the pessimistic basis for predicting an inevitable clash. Whether one calls the root of it a crisis invoked by nationalism, post-colonialism,
global capitalism, or assimilation within a whole, is and can be a matter of further scrutiny. What is less obvious is the extent to which the same kinds of political, economic, and cultural processes have affected both Taiwan and Hong Kong. The diverse ways in such processes unfolded, however, constitute in actuality the basis of ongoing developments and significant divergences in experience that have in turn molded different geopolitical contexts, institutional frameworks, and regimes of everyday life. It is safe to say that the specter of colonialism is different in Taiwan and in Hong Kong. The advent of a free market port and economy in Hong Kong in the 1970s is not all that different from that which followed Taiwan’s radical break with its insular societal structure and centralized economy. Taiwan’s cultural nationalism was an attempt to eradicate a colonial legacy, but it also helped precipitate the rise of Taiwanese consciousness much later. Hong Kong’s return to the motherland is to some extent a process of cultural nationalist incorporation too, but with subtle nuances. The significant differences involve a question: why is ethnicity such an integral part of Taiwan culture, while it is completely absent in the Hong Kong mindset? In Taiwan, Japanese colonial nostalgia is an invention provoked largely by the oppressive nature of early KMT rule. In Hong Kong, British colonialism is a legacy whose real effects on the present are a matter of interpretation. Democratization in Taiwan is also seen as linked to the rise of multiculturalism or Taiwanese indigenization, whereas in Hong Kong it is viewed as irrelevant to culture overall. Needless to say, Taiwan is marginal vis-à-vis China in many respects, but it certainly feels less threatened by the fiction of ‘one country, two systems’ and the reality of economic integration. What accounts for these differences? Those experiences that Taiwan scholars take for granted as unique to Taiwan – namely democracy and ethnic multivocality – are products of a different geopolitical or historical constitution. The same can be said for the cultural politics of incorporation that has engendered crises of hegemonic domination and social alienation in Hong Kong today.

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Review Essay:

Response to Corcuff’s ‘Liminality of Taiwan’

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‘The Liminality of Taiwan: A Case-Study in Geopolitics’, by Stéphane Corcuff, in Taiwan in Comparative Perspective, 4, December 2012, pp. 34–64.


The ambiguous political status of Taiwan is of global political importance, given the significance of the island in China’s self-perception as a great power and to the security interests both of China and of other regional powers. However, it is an ambiguity that presents a conceptual challenge to the conventional framework of international politics, which often fails to problematize the nature of sovereign states. To grasp the phenomenon of Taiwan’s status properly entails new conceptual framework.

Stéphane Corcuff’s work applying the term ‘liminality’ to Taiwan sheds a critical light on these issues. This review essay will focus on the originality of this application and the contribution it makes to China and to International Relations, with a view to developing a critical analysis of how Corcuff’s post-structuralist approach might be generalized as an approach for studying the abiding tension between nation and state as a contemporary source of international conflict.

The State: Theory and History

In the Weberian conception, the essential characteristic of the state is understood to be the monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a given territory. The tolerance of the destructive force that is generated by the exercise of state violence in turn entails psychological affinity with the community order that the exercise of state coercion potentially serves: as Weber puts it in Economy and Society, ‘the community of political destiny, i.e., above all, of common political struggle of life and death has given rise to groups with joint memories which often have had a deeper impact than the ties of merely cultural, linguistic, or ethnic community.’ The political destiny associated with the state as a territorial political community can be fostered by particular notions of distinctiveness and moral purpose that endow the various groups under the same state authority with a
common identity. However, while this suggests a spontaneous development, state formation may also be a product of expediency due to a hostile relationship with other, structurally similar, communities. Thus throughout history, strategic incentives compelled the expansion of state, while ideational appeals helped to consolidate the existing power relationships between the ruler and the ruled.

International Relations has long been characterized by state-centric approach. In recent decades, as the case of China has become increasingly integrated with International Relations, China’s security policy has tended to be conceived of as a product of domestic and international pressures; examples include Thomas Christensen’s *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (1996); Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross’s *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security* (1997); Allen Whiting’s article ‘China’s Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan’ (2001), and M. Taylor Fravel’s, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes* (2008). The state-centric approach in works such as these implicitly assumes a unitary actor model of the state that operates between the domestic and international arenas.

This Weberian notion of the state lacks a sophisticated treatment of the intrastate dynamics that give rise to state authority. For international relations scholars, interstate relationships are assumed to differ characteristically from intra-state relationships: as Richard Ned Lebow argued in *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (2008), if the two were identical, it would become pointless to discuss interstate relationships in their own right. Efforts to differentiate between interstate and intra-state dynamics culminated in Kenneth Waltz’s elaboration of the concept of anarchy in his seminal work *Theory of International Politics* (1979). Waltz argues that in an anarchical environment, where no supreme authority exists above the state to make and enforce law, states have no alternative but to act in their self-interest by building up arms, negotiating alliances, and making preemptive attacks on threatening states. Interstate power relationships are fundamentally determined by the contest of force. Within the state, by contrast, power relationships are mediated by commonly accepted norms, rules and decision-making procedures that help establish hierarchy among the relevant actors. With the state providing security as a common good for all social members, societal differentiation is possible as well as desirable, while the division of labor encourages diversification of expertise that contributes to social prosperity.

Corcuff takes issue with this widely accepted dichotomy between intra-state and interstate relationships. For him, statehood is seldom uncontested and the state-making project cannot be done once and for all. Rather, the establishment and perpetuation of statehood within entails conflicts abroad. The more ambiguous the statehood, the more that interstate conflicts are likely. He characterizes situations in which statehood is contested over an extended period of time as ‘liminality’, and this sheds a critical light on a new source of international tension.

‘Liminality’ and Taiwan

An anthropological concept, ‘liminality’ connotes neither a transitional state of affairs nor a subordinate status. Rather, it suggests a ‘geopolitical threshold for a
particular type of governing entity, thus differentiating a particular governing body from the category of the “nation-state” commonly understood.

The evolution of Taiwan’s political status, as Corcuff demonstrates in his works, was defined by Taipei’s relationship with China, and it was the very ambiguity of Taiwan’s political and cultural connections with China that defined Taiwan’s liminality. Given the difficulty of characterizing Taiwan’s relationship with China using existing theories, Corcuff’s invocation of liminality is of particular importance to the fields of China/Taiwan Studies and of international relations. Few scholars have ever addressed Taiwan’s political status as seriously as Corcuff does. Corcuff narrates how various political parties throughout modern Chinese history ‘talked’ about Taiwan and made Taiwan’s political status an issue to serve their own political agendas. In this sense, the nature of liminality is not only geopolitical but also discursive. It is embedded in continuous practices of power relationships that depend both on geographical location and discursive meanings that are given by powerful actors. According to Corcuff, Taiwan did not become a stake in Chinese domestic politics and in Chinese historiography until 1949, when the Kuomintang government was replaced by the Chinese Communists as the de facto governing body in Mainland China. Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT government at this point took shelter on Taiwan, creating a cross-strait confrontation that has now continued for decades. In the process, the governments on either side of the Strait have endeavored to utilize Taiwan’s historical connections to Mainland China as an ideological tool to mobilize their populations and legitimate their respective causes. The Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong claimed that liberating Taiwan would be a step toward creating a strong nation. Chiang’s KMT, on the other hand, was committed to ‘taking back the Mainland’, and so made efforts to suppress the independence movement within Taiwan and to occlude KMT’s status as a government on exile. But this was yet the beginning of Taiwan’s liminality: both regimes claimed to incorporate Taiwan into a unified governing structure under the name of ‘China’, and Taiwan’s de facto independence from the Mainland China was not viewed as permanent.

What helped to stabilize Taiwan’s liminal status, according to Corcuff, was the democratization of Taiwan’s political system from the late 1980s. With Taiwan’s political spectrum becoming plural, various political parties within Taiwan came to express identities that reflected their political aspirations. This, in turn, has converted Taiwan into a ‘laboratory of identities’, in which only some identities are attributable to Taiwan’s historical connections with Mainland China. Crucially, this constituted a dilemma in Taiwan’s geopolitical relationship with the Mainland China, now under the CCP regime: while the CCP refused to recognize Taiwanese identity claims, the KMT has tended to identify with local aspirations for new self-understandings. The key to reconciling conflicting conceptions of Taiwan’s status might ultimately lie in the wisdom of political leaders on both sides of the strait. A prerequisite for having that wisdom, however, is to develop a conceptual framework that captures the subtleties of Taiwan’s claim to new identities. Corcuff provides just that.
Corcuff’s Scholarly Contribution

By breaking down the stark distinction between intra-state and interstate relationships, Corcuff contributes to our thinking about how international politics is discursively and socially constructed. Further, by focusing on the ambiguity of Taiwan’s political status, Corcuff also enriches the discussion of the implications of the instability of China’s frontiers for international order.

More specifically, Corcuff makes scholarly contribution to China and International Relations in two aspects.

First, in narrating the formation of Taiwan’s liminality vis-à-vis China, Corcuff helps to restore the centrality of Taiwanese people’s own identity/identities to scholarly discussion. With a very few exceptions (particularly Alan Wachman’s *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratisation* [1994] and Christopher Hughes’s, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* [1997]), English-language works have given insufficient consideration to how Taiwan’s unique self-understandings have been formed and the way these self-understandings have become intertwined with the identity politics on that island. Corcuff thus enriches studies of China by shifting the focus to the concept of Taiwan itself. Furthermore, he even helps problematize the meaning of ‘China’ by highlighting Taiwanese identity claims which have maintained more robust continuities than those on Mainland China. Indeed, the coherence of Chinese identity remains at issue on Mainland China, where the populace has experienced political turmoil such as the Cultural Revolution in the twentieth century.

Second, by laying out the concept ‘liminality’ Corcuff contributes to the discussion of international politics. International Relations often takes state sovereignty as given. While sovereign states are taken to be the primary actors of international politics, the nature of sovereign states is underexplored. ‘Liminality’, as Corcuff discusses it, implies an alternative conception of (contested) statehood, applicable to a range of geopolitical phenomena where these is asymmetrical political recognition. Sovereignty ordinarily presupposes reciprocal recognition of international status by the state actors involved. Liminality, in contrast, implies an alternative to this conception of sovereignty. Conflicts tend to arise between parties who embrace the legitimacy of liminality in practice and those who do not, and such circumstances are not unique to the China–Taiwan cross-strait relationship. As Samuel Huntington observed in *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996), identity politics has become a global phenomenon and a new source of tension since the end of the Cold War. Despite many differences, conflicting identity claims in Northern Ireland are another example. In this way, Corcuff develops a new conceptual framework applicable to cross-regional comparative studies.

Conclusion

Stéphane Corcuff regards Taiwan as an illustration of liminality, meaning that statehood has been contested over an extended period. This perspective provides much insight into a wide range of separatist movements at the core of international tensions. His work accordingly serves as a starting point for further exploration. However, he does not discuss the possibility of generalizing from Taiwan’s experience and its relationship with Mainland China to other cases in other parts of
the world. Simply, the edited volume *Memories of the Future* doesn't have any comparative component in its discussion of Taiwan's independence movement. However, his use of the concept of 'liminity' opens up new potentials for scholarly advancement.

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This book provides the political analysis that forms the basis of Hong Kong’s Occupy Central movement. Its author, Benny Tai Yiu Ting, is a devoted Christian and Associate Law Professor at the University of Hong Kong, and it was surprise to many observers that he emerged as the main organiser of the Occupy movement in 2014: although he has been has been involved with many demonstrations in the territory on behalf of democracy and Hong Kong’s core values, he has for the most part worked behind the scenes.

Occupy Central with Love and Peace is sold at pro-democracy mass demonstrations and rallies in Hong Kong, such as the annual July 1 marches; and its title, whether by coincidence or design, echoes Occupy Taipei in 2011 by advocating the same values. Currently, people in Hong Kong are observing and learning from Taiwan enthusiastically, as vividly showcased in the recent Taiwan Sunflower Student Movement.

However, this influence from Taiwan is at a distance: by contrast, China has power over Hong Kong through direct interference. Tai envisions Occupy Central as a final push, or campaign of last resort, for universal suffrage ahead of decisions to be made by the Beijing and Hong Kong governments during 2014 on the election mechanisms for the 2017 Chief Executive Elections and the 2020 Legislative Council Elections. The book illustrates how Occupy Central is designed as a multi-faceted campaign, including various deliberative elements and potentially culminating with acts of civil disobedience directly challenging the central government in Beijing. The year 2014 is not only significant for Hong Kong, in which its possible democratic future will be decided: it also marks the 25th anniversary of the students’ protest for democracy that occurred in Beijing during spring 1989.

Ever since the Occupy Central movement announced its plans, it has been criticised and attacked by mainstream Hong Kong media, by pro-Beijing and pro-establishment forces in the territory and by commentators based in Beijing: the prospect of thousands of protestors blocking roads in China’s international financial centre and fighting for democracy apparently does worry many. Indeed, Tai gives a fitting picture of the situation when he describes Occupy Central as an ‘atomic bomb’, because it has the potential to mobilise a significant majority of citizens to undermine the legitimacy of the central government and nullify Beijing’s claimed willingness to join the international liberal order. His book provides an analysis of democratic developments in Hong Kong, the rationale of Occupy Central, and outlines the possibility of a new formula of democracy in Hong Kong. At the beginning of the book, Tai identifies important actors and their possible attitudes towards universal suffrage. Hong Kong’s democracy is contingent on the
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Beijing government, as well as pro-establishment forces, pan-democrats, and civil society in Hong Kong. Tai proposes five scenarios, in which each player has a different stance on universal suffrage, and he correspondingly suggests varying degrees of opportunity for cooperation. Beijing’s possible stance on universal suffrage in Hong Kong ranges from unconditional rejection at one pole through to unconditional support for *bona fide* universal suffrage at the other: intermediate positions that may be adopted are conditional universal suffrage or quasi-universal suffrage; uncertainty and indecisiveness; or reserved willingness to grant real universal suffrage (68–70).

Tai further identifies five trends among the pro-establishment elements who are in line with Beijing. One trend is to justify quasi-universal suffrage as the final stage of Hong Kong’s democratic development, since Beijing will not grant true (liberal Western-style) universal suffrage to Hong Kong. Two alternatives are to persuade Beijing or to convince Hong Kong citizens that genuine universal suffrage would be harmful to Hong Kong’s stability, economic growth, and prosperity. The fourth and fifth strands of pro-establishment thought agree in principle with fully-fledged universal suffrage: one group believes that Beijing is willing to provide Hong Kong with fair elections eventually, and it thus would be wise to defend electoral mechanisms proposed by the government sufficiently early to sustain their influence and interests, while the other is less politically calculated but takes the view that universal suffrage will benefit Hong Kong. Unfortunately, these last two perspectives are in the minority – indeed, it remains to be seen whether the fifth group, which appears to be indifferent to the interests and benefits of the pro-establishment camp, even exists, and, if so, whether it has any influence.

Tai emphasises that Hong Kong’s efforts to achieve democracy and universal suffrage are a game which requires strategy. Pan-democrats have five possible options, the first of which is to persist with the traditional repertoires such as demonstrations and debates within the Legislative Council. The second is to perform quasi-referendums, replicating the 2010 by-election triggered by the resignation of pan-democratic lawmakers in five constituencies; the by-election campaign that would follow similar resignations would be framed as a referendum for universal suffrage. The third and fourth strategies, respectively, are non-violent and violent civil disobedience, while the fifth choice is to design an innovative election model as a third and middle way: a compromise between Hong Kong’s desire for democracy and Beijing’s unwillingness to completely copy the Western model. However, this new democratic mechanism should accord with the spirit of real universal suffrage, and create political opportunities for pro-establishment forces to remain in power.

Tai suggests that pan-democrats should work together with those pro-establishment politicians who believe in universal suffrage (the aforementioned fourth and fifth trends in the pro-establishment camp). The minimal differences between these groups allow for a constructive conversation, and consequently empower both forces to exert influence on Beijing’s final decision. Tai is correct that such a conversation is not impossible, and it is no secret that in private, radical democrats are on good terms with liberal members in the pro-establishment camp. However, in public – and particularly in front of the media – politicians try to differentiate themselves. In such a small territory as Hong Kong, it is a reasonable tactic for small parties to occupy particular niches to win support from targeted
constituencies. Purity of democracy is one indicator of the difference between liberal pro-establishment and practical pan-democrats. The ‘innovative model’ of democracy, suggested by Tai as the fifth tactic, is an alien concept to the pan-democrats. If the fifth branch of the pro-establishment camp is indeed non-existent and the fifth tactic of democrats is simply imaginary, then cooperation between pan-democrats and pro-establishment elements on the issue of democracy is of course unattainable.

Tai’s greatest contribution in this book is his sharp analysis of civil society in Hong Kong. Impregnated with hope and influence, Hong Kong’s civil society cannot be underestimated. The power of civil society derives from the plurality of opinions and the unpredictability of its temper, as it nurtures a changing climate of views. The various constituencies can again be categorised into five factions. The first bloc is indifferent to the debate about universal suffrage, and is electorally apathetic. The second opposes real universal suffrage, and harbours doubts about the benefits of democracy. The third cluster remains neutral in this dispute, but welcomes quasi-universal suffrage. The fourth is in favour of democracy, but currently confines its actions to the extant legal framework. The final, fifth, group of pan-democrats possesses a strong opinion about democracy, and will potentially go beyond the legal framework. Within this group one subset insists on non-violent actions, while the other does not exclude violent behaviours. People in the first group have the potential to be in line with the fifth group, yet it is difficult to predict which voice will prevail and how long this dominance will last. Tai’s analysis benefits our understanding of Hong Kong’s political landscape, as he demonstrates that civil society is not a unitary voice and that it keeps changing. The biggest bargaining power held by civil society in Hong Kong is the potential to undermine the legitimacy of both Hong Kong’s government and Beijing. No government can sustain its power without support from the people (66). Beijing’s efforts to interpret opinion polls and interfere with the design of questionnaires bespeak its fear and caution of the territory’s civil society.

Tai proceeds to justify civil disobedience, having outlined relevant actors and possible scenarios for Hong Kong’s political future. He reconciles his identity as a law professor with his ‘unruly’ campaign. First, he argues that civil disobedience is not in fact unruly. It is a legitimate alternative strategy when the people have exhausted all other legal means (187). Inspired by Gene Sharp and Martin Luther King, Tai justifies the urgency and the need for collective action expressed in movements such as Occupy Central. In particular, the campaign for universal suffrage requires immediate action. Universal suffrage is a pointer to social justice and equality, and Tai boosts the morale of the pan-democrats through a quote by Martin Luther King: ‘justice too long delayed is justice denied’. Second, the arguably sentimental mobilisation is advantageous to the ostensible ‘rational’ negotiation. As argued by Gene Sharp, the function of negotiation is limited to delivering justice, and is even dangerous in the process of democratic transition. Tai applies this principle to Hong Kong. He illustrates that the 2010 constitutional reform package negotiated by some Hong Kong pan-democrats and the Beijing government led not to democratic progress, but instead created a split within the pan-democratic camp. Tai instead proposes the mechanism of deliberation, rather than of negotiation. The former pays attention to social justice, whereas the latter is an exchange of interests (145). However, deliberation is not a gift given by the
authorities or the Communist Party, in a top-down process. It has to be fought for in a bottom-up process using various means. Social activists in Hong Kong should do their utmost to persuade both the policy makers and the general public, using coercion, exerting pressure, shaming, informing, moralising, touching, arguing, and enticing policy makers (101–6). Occupy Central is designed to balance of sense and sensibility, combined with many strategies to influence politicians and the public.

Tai mobilises the people to act, and meanwhile assures the Communist Party that universal suffrage does not necessarily challenge its exercise of sovereignty over the special administrative region. He argues that Beijing should be confident in four aspects. First, the Communist Party should be certain that pan-democrats in Hong Kong are patriots, though their patriotism is expressed in a different way from party-line patriotism. Second, Beijing ought to be more optimistic about the capabilities of the pro-establishment camp and its ability to win elections under universal suffrage. Third, the rationality and democratic quality of Hong Kong citizens merits Beijing’s trust, because Hong Kong people can judge independently and avoid being manipulated by populist appeals. Last, but not least, the Beijing government must be confident of its own economic performance and its popularity among various constituencies. Tai jettisons the argument that the fight for democracy is a zero-sum game, because neither pan-democrats nor the Communist Party are trying to eliminate the other: ‘On the road to democracy, we have adversaries, but no enemies’ (158), and what democrats want is a fair opportunity to compete with other actors. Universal suffrage, therefore, is a platform of constructive and benign competition. Consequently, and in the long run, the central government will profit from an authentic universal suffrage which sustains the prosperity of Hong Kong. Democracy reinforces the legitimacy of the government and allows it to deal with deep-rooted problems.

In order to further persuade Beijing that the fight for democracy is not traitorous, Tai stresses that Hong Kong’s democracy is not a complete duplicate of the Western model, and that is already adapted to local conditions. He argues that universal suffrage is a compromise between different actors with different expectations and calculations, and that the idea of universal suffrage will be localised if procedures are local and the discussion revolves around local conditions. The result of Occupy Central might be a new model of how elections should be held. Though Tai is not specific about this new democratic formula, he does propose methods for getting there: according to Tai, deliberation and an atmosphere impregnated with deliberative culture localise the Western concept of democracy. Thus, although the practice of deliberation is learnt from the USA, Tai tries to devise a form of deliberation with Hong Kong characteristics. Its process secures procedural justice and embraces inclusive participation and plural voices: the discussion of Hong Kong’s political future is not the preserve of pan-democrat politicians alone, but rather reflects the lifestyle of ordinary citizens, in which Hong Kong citizens have a say. The ‘deliberation day’, as Tai terms it, demonstrates that a real democratic system does not bring about mob politics and populism. The biggest difference between the American and Hong Kong versions of deliberation is that whereas the former is organised and monitored by the US government (top-down), the latter is self-organised (bottom-up).
In the context of Hong Kong, the best venue for holding such a process is the university. The university can serve as the beginning of a deliberation culture if it invites the public and entertains a free debate. It is regrettable that Tai only mentions the US as a template and to the localisation of democracy in a general way; he remains too vague to be convincing. He offers no inkling of how Hong Kong people comprehend democracy. As a law professor, Tai clearly prefers procedural democracy to substantial democracy. This has the potential to become an Achilles heel when the Communist Party promotes its ‘democratic model’ and ‘election’ template in the absence of freedom, human rights, and equality.

Overall, this book provides a crisp understanding of the current political landscape in Hong Kong. As a book calling for action, it is accessible to the general public and invites debates among intellectuals. The author acknowledges that he might be naïve or idealistic about the fight for universal suffrage. The possibility of cooperation between pro-establishment supporters and pan-democrats is questionable. The speculation that Beijing has sincerity and willingness to give a green light to universal suffrage in Hong Kong is largely unfounded. It is a particular pity that this book does not draw a direct linkage with Taiwan, and Taiwan’s dynamic civil society – we drew attention to Taiwan’s 2011 Occupy Taipei movement, and its more recent Sunflower Student movement, at the start of this review. Reference to Taiwan would not only make more convincing the argument that democracy can thrive in a Confucian culture, but also establishes solidarity between these two political entities living in the shadow of the People’s Republic. But this absence might be intentional: the author is probably trying to avoid Beijing accusing Occupy Central of being in line with Taiwan’s independence movement, or even with Hong Kong’s new autonomy movement. After all, Tai does not radically question existing institutions in Hong Kong. He wants to maintain the status quo, and universal suffrage as promised in the Basic Law is a part of this.

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Submission Details

Academic articles
Articles should contain a comparative perspective in the widest sense. This could mean comparisons between Taiwan and other parts of the world, Taiwan in the past and in the present, different regions and cultures of Taiwan, or different methodological and disciplinary approaches to the study of a theme or issue concerning Taiwan. Articles for inclusion in the Journal should be around 8000 words, and should follow the Harvard style of referencing. Manuscripts should begin with an abstract of around 100 words.

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Review articles should be around 1500–2000 words, and should contain no footnotes. Reviews should be of a comparative nature: either comparing a work (e.g. a book, film, or exhibition) on Taiwan with a work on another area, or bringing in background knowledge from a different area. Reviews may also be written on Taiwan-related material contained within volumes that have a wider scope, such as edited volumes with a chapter on Taiwan. The journal also welcomes reviews of older ‘landmark’ texts about Taiwan reviewed from a contemporary perspective; for example, a re-appraisal of George Kerr’s *Formosa Betrayed* (1965) four decades on would be suitable.

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Submission should be made by MS-Word compatible email attachment with a file name based on the title of the article to F.Shih@lse.ac.uk. On the cover sheet, please give your full name, institutional affiliation (if any), and a brief biographical note of your research interests. Please do not include your name on other pages. All manuscripts should be double-spaced.

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References should follow the Harvard Style. Citations should appear within the text in parentheses, and consist of the author’s surname followed by year of publication and, if appropriate, specific page numbers – e.g. (Yang 2005) or (Smith and Lin 1999: 74). If there are more than two authors, please indicate this as (Lee et al. 1978). Where an author has more than one work cited which originated in the same year, the dates should be distinguished in the text and bibliography by a letter – e.g. (Hirose 1987a). Where several references appear consecutively, these should be chronological, or if from the same year, alphabetical – e.g. (Perkins 1997; Wu 2003) and (Adams 2003; Pan 2003).

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