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TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Taiwan in Comparative Perspective is the first scholarly journal based outside Taiwan to contextualize processes of modernization and globalization through interdisciplinary studies of significant issues that use Taiwan as a point of comparison. The primary aim of the Journal is to promote grounded, critical, and contextualized analysis in English of economic, political, societal, and environmental change from a cultural perspective, while locating modern Taiwan in its Asian and global contexts. The history and position of Taiwan make it a particularly interesting location from which to examine the dynamics and interactions of our globalizing world.

In addition, the Journal seeks to use the study of Taiwan as a fulcrum for discussing theoretical and methodological questions pertinent not only to the study of Taiwan but to the study of cultures and societies more generally. Thereby the rationale of Taiwan in Comparative Perspective is to act as a forum and catalyst for the development of new theoretical and methodological perspectives generated via critical scrutiny of the particular experience of Taiwan in an increasingly unstable and fragmented world.

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Special Issue

Taiwan and Ireland in Comparative Perspective

Special Issue Editors:
Fang-Long Shih and John McNeil Scott

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Introduction

*He who knows only one country only knows none.*

(Sartori 1994:16)

The articles in this special issue collection were presented at the ‘Small Islands, Big Issues’ conference that was held at University College Dublin in September 2011. The conference is the first multi-disciplinary academic symposium devoted to comparative studies relating to Taiwan and Ireland, and to their respective area studies. The project resulted from a developing interest in recent years in finding ways to make theoretically useful comparisons between Taiwan and Ireland, and the discourses that have come to characterize the study of each place.

It may be thought that the comparison is suggested by situation: both Taiwan and Ireland are small islands adjacent to powerful neighbours with whom they have had complex histories. In both locations we can see histories, politics, and cultures marked by contested subjectivities and identities, as well as struggles over democracy and human rights. A focus on the human situation in both places invites the application of discursive categories such as colonialism and post-colonialism; globalization and localization; and nationalism and hybridity. It also allows explorations of the goals, problems, and limits of sovereignty and independence in the context of sub-ethnic and religious divisions, as well as of the complex relations with a nearby metropolitan ‘Other’ and of diaspora experiences in the era of post-national globalization. At the same time both contexts challenge the straightforward appropriation of such categories and demand their sophisticated reworking. However, Ireland and Taiwan are neither internally homogeneous, nor are they similar to each other. Indeed, they are strikingly distinctive in their political, institutional, and intellectual histories. The romance of comparison sits in tension with the difficulty of finding a secure and satisfactory place from which to make it.

The attempt is further complicated and enriched by important differences in the approaches and development of Irish Studies and of Taiwan Studies, both of which find themselves arriving at a point of self-examination where positivist assumptions dissolve and are replaced by questions concerning the epistemological and discursive bases of the academic enterprises that have come to be named ‘Irish Studies’ and ‘Taiwan Studies’.

For both Irish Studies and Taiwan Studies there are specific and limited questions that are asked, argued over, and answered, on the basis of particular discursive categories. Reflecting its diaspora origins in North American academic circles, Irish Studies privileges history, politics, language and literature, both ‘classical’ and modern. In contrast, Taiwan Studies operates to interrogate and create the possibility of Taiwan itself in a manner that reflects its later development and the contested history of Taiwan. Irish Studies encompasses the political, as Taiwan Studies does to some degree. However, Taiwan Studies exists as a self-
consciously political programme as well as an academic one. This existential questioning has become mainstream in Irish scholarship only in comparatively recent times as the possibility of Ireland itself has become a question. History and literature find themselves having to share unaccustomed space with other perspectives in the stories that the Irish tell about themselves.

Taiwan Studies, on the contrary, was organized from the outset at the intersection of a range of modern social sciences such as political science, cultural studies and anthropology. Therefore, though Taiwan Studies may claim to be ‘multidisciplinary,’ its epistemological structure is based on those of its primary disciplines (Harrison 2006:18).

The current volume comprises articles that aspire to make explicit comparisons using frameworks and modes of discourse characteristic of Irish Studies, of Taiwan Studies, and of ‘positivist’ social science. In itself this makes the present collection of interest as an ethnographic experiment where Ireland is inscribed in terms of Taiwan Studies, and Taiwan in a manner more typical of scholarship concerning Ireland. Scholars whose focus of interest is Taiwan or Ireland (or even more purely theoretical in orientation) are thus enabled not just to ‘see ourselves as others see us’, but also to expose their own discourse to scrutiny as comparisons are explored and Ireland is discussed as if it were Taiwan, and vice versa. It may be argued that the associations thereby constructed are sometimes fragile. But what is revealed in the attempt, perhaps, is itself instructive.

Fang-Long Shih takes up the challenge of comparing the development of nationalist discourses on both islands. Her treatment contributes to the scholarship concerning the natures and historical developments of the nationalisms in each island, including the Republic of China nationalism of KMT orthodoxy and Irish/Ulster unionism, as well as to that of contemporary Irish and Taiwanese nationalisms. Shih’s focus on the elements and processes involved in constructing and sustaining the ethnic, cultural and civic impulses in the various nationalisms of the two contexts makes what could otherwise be seen as a hopelessly distant and asynchronous comparison satisfying and fruitful. Although her attention is on Taiwan in the present article, her discussion of the role and dangers of ‘strategic essentialism’ provides a tool that may usefully reflect the Irish experience.

Stéphane Corcuff contextualizes Shih’s discussion of discourses of nation as naturalized subject by adding a geopolitical perspective. He adapts an anthropological concept, liminality, to parse the relationships between China and Taiwan, arguing that Taiwan is both conservatory and laboratory vis-à-vis the Chinese imagination. Corcuff’s elaboration of liminality helps to explain also how a place can be simultaneously marginal and symbolically essential, a conservatory and a laboratory. Corcuff rejects a number of theoretical models, including a centre–periphery paradigm, arguing instead for an appreciation that a new model is needed to understand Taiwan, and in the process to understand what Taiwan as a place and an unavoidable subject, as a threshold of China, causes China to reveal about herself, her perception of history, identity and relations with the world. One is left wondering in what manner Corcuff’s liminality, although developed to explain Taiwan, could be applied to relationships between the two jurisdictions of Ireland and perhaps even to Irish–British relations.
Among the stories that Irish nationalists have told about themselves is that Ireland was ‘the first colony to be free’ and ‘an inspiration for other nations in the British Empire’. Taiwanese people, if they have a clear concept of Ireland, often share this view of Irish history in which a small island wrested itself from the grip of its neighbour, at that time the world’s foremost imperial power. The paper on Lin Hsien-Tang by Fu-San Huang, Sam Huang and Conor Mulvagh is an interesting exercise in comparative historiography, and argues for the similarities and probable influence of John Redmond’s example and that of the Home Rule movement in Ireland on the political methods and aspirations of the leading native agitator for political change in the Japanese colony of Taiwan. As the authors note, the intrusion of global war caused the efforts of both men to be superseded. Although both figures ended their careers in frustration and disappointment, this careful and closely argued comparison casts light on the methods, contexts and philosophies of both figures.

Ming-Yeh Rawnsley expands the range of our comparisons to the visual and cinematic, with an examination of two films of different mood under the common category of resistance. Like other papers in this issue Rawnsley again shows how comparison can be enhanced and refined by great variations in representation and style, where differing contexts lead to varying notions of resistance, including overt challenge and more veiled defiance. The intricacy and variety of resistance as a concept and as an act is well-illuminated.

Resistance and its representation through the theatres of Taiwan and Ireland is the theme of Wei-Hung Kao’s contribution. Kao references Bhabha to argue that theatres can tell us much about a national self-understanding, although not always or even usually on purpose but rather through a kind of self-reflexivity different from the explicit and deliberate pedagogy of dominant narratives. From this ‘contradictory and ambivalent space’ those marginalized in each society speak. We are offered examples from the canons and movements of both nations to illustrate and develop this theme.

Both Ireland and Taiwan have been societies of emigration and immigration. Two papers examine these phenomena. Pei-Te Lien and Jeanette Yih Harvie deal comparatively with the situation of Irish and Taiwanese who have migrated to the United States through the prism of political incorporation into the receiving country. As well as expounding a number of parallels and differences in the migrant groups, and in the chronology of their movement to the United States, Lien and Harvie review the commonly employed theories used to explain patterns of political incorporation, leading to the conclusion that the discursive construction of racial difference is the unavoidable determinant of political incorporation even to the present day.

Questions of immigrant reception, incorporation and the projects of both cultural and economic nation-building are treated by Bryan Fanning. In his many-layered discussion, association is made not just between the relative openness to immigration of the different populations but also how this has influenced, and been influenced by, developmental goals. Fanning concludes with a positive evaluation of the potential for further comparative work, as well as the lessons that Ireland might learn from Taiwan.

Khinn-Huann Li, with Liam Mac Mathúna, presents a Taiwanese view of the Irish language movement in a study that those with an interest in Ireland will find
stimulating and informative, as it confirms that the situation of Irish is not as unique as is sometimes suggested and because it provides an evaluation from the viewpoint of quite a different context. Scholars of Taiwan, especially those with a concern or connection to the Taiwanese language movement, will appreciate the assessment of the Taiwanese movement in the light of the Irish experience.

The two commentary articles in this issue of the journal, those of Kerry Brown and Qiao Mu, give a view from London and Beijing respectively. Brown draws our attention to the ‘other Ireland’ and examines the external aspects to the Northern Ireland peace process in an attempt to set out the conditions that might underpin progress towards a more permanent peace across the Taiwan Strait.

It has been said that a ‘Chinese shadow’ lies over Taiwan, in that internationally Taiwan’s space is constrained by Chinese government pressure. The same shadow lies over Ireland’s knowledge of and engagement with Taiwan, Ireland having a so-called ‘One China Policy’ that is one of the most deferential of all her EU partners. Political decisions inside Taiwan are also constrained by the threat from China. In public media in the Western world little explanation is offered of Taiwan’s position or of the varying aspirations of its population beyond the ‘renegade province’ trope. Qiao Mu’s paper demonstrates that the Chinese view of Taiwan is evolving and that views on the ‘Taiwan question’ are increasingly varied, despite the near unanimity of official pronouncements. His paper describes the evolution of Chinese thinking and the responses to Taiwanese aspirations available to Beijing.

In these papers, we have an eclectic approach to the study of Taiwan structured around the notion of its change, and of some of the disciplines through which Ireland is usually studied in Irish Studies programmes overseas. The unmistakably Taiwanese-flavoured theoretical discussion is combined with comparative work involving Irish themes.

This collection of articles, together with the accompanying book reviews, which continue the Hiberno-Taiwanese comparative theme, represent a beginning. Each of the contributors has stepped out of their academic comfort zone to engage in this new venture. What is written is not the last word on any of the topics under consideration. Nor does it exhaust the possibilities. It is a contribution to Taiwan Studies, in particular, and also we hope to Irish Studies. In a broader sense, it serves to develop thinking about comparative area studies.

There is a kind of aesthetic to this collection of papers. It is clear that it is not only as Small Islands with Big Issues, but as locations characterized by Stéphane Corcuff’s ‘liminality’ and as nodes in the global flows of culture where East has come to West and West to East, both Ireland and Taiwan have much to contribute to scholarship of wider application. We have begun unashamedly in a somewhat ideographic vein. As we build familiarity, and the romance of scholarly engagement deepens, we aspire to develop our common enterprise further. Asking Irish questions of Taiwan (or questions informed by Irish assumptions) and vice versa holds the potential for greater understanding of both small islands.
Bibliography


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Taiwan’s Subjectivity and National Narrations: Towards a Comparative Perspective with Ireland

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Abstract

This paper looks at how Taiwan has been imagined or narrated as a national subject from the perspective of different nationalisms, using Ireland in the context of the colonized Other as a comparator. As with Irish nationalist projects, the Chinese nationalism of the KMT and the Taiwanese nationalism of the DPP were and are complex phenomena, with ethnic, cultural, and civic dimensions. However, in the cases of the KMT and of the DPP the civic dimension was either suspended or remained under-developed. This paper takes a critical view, focusing on ethnic and cultural nationalism to explore how the KMT and the DPP narrated their respective national imaginaries. The first framework examined shows how Taiwan was narrated as part of China through a particular form of Chineseness, which was imposed on Taiwan by the KMT. The second framework analyses how Taiwan was re-narrated through Taiwanization discourses as a national subject in its own right; in particular, through a post-modern primordialist turn by which the DPP used Taiwanization to stress ethnicity politics. Critical interpretations here make use of a comparative perspective, re-examining notions of national subjectivity in juxtaposition with Ireland, whose own national imaginaries have, like those of Taiwan, also emphasized ethnicity and culture. The paper concludes by suggesting a third framework, emphasizing the need to pay attention to the cosmopolitan processes of mobilization and globalization. These can help us to reconsider Taiwan and Ireland as network societies that can be narrated in the light of relationships and connections through which they have been constituted as places.

Introduction

Nations, like narratives…. [are ideas] whose cultural compulsion lies in the impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force. This is not to deny the attempt by nationalist discourses persistently to produce the idea of the nation as a continuous narrative of national progress, the narcissism of self-generation, the primeval present of the Volk.

(Bhabha 1990: 1)
This paper examines how Taiwan has been imagined, or narrated as a national subject from the perspective of different nationalisms. Further, I would like to explore comparatively to what extent there are parallels and divergences in the way that national subjectivity discourses emerged in Taiwan and Ireland in the context of colonialism. Ireland and Taiwan are both small islands whose histories reflect complex relationships with powerful adjacent neighbours. These histories, as well as the islands’ politics and cultures, are marked by contested subjectivities and identities, and also by struggles over democracy, language and human rights. These are not, though, experiences that Taiwan shares with China. However, while Taiwanese nationalism did not properly develop until the 1970s, Irish nationalism can be traced back to the eighteenth century. There is, therefore, a considerable historical contrast between these two case studies, and as such I do not intend to make a direct comparison of Taiwan with Ireland. Rather, I will juxtapose elements and processes in the construction of ethnic, cultural, and civic nationalisms in these two contexts.

My discussion of how Taiwan’s national subjectivity has been narrated focuses on two frameworks: Framework One is the national narrative of the Republic of China (ROC), which was brought with the Kuomintang (the KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) when it retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1947, while Framework Two is an ongoing narrating of Taiwanese nationhood which has been promoted by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is the major opposition party and which was in Presidential office from 2000 to 2008. However, to place these two frameworks in context, the first part of my discussion briefly introduces the period before any form of nationalism shaped Taiwan. Prior to the arrival of the KMT there was no real sense, among the peoples of Taiwan, that they were a national subject; therefore, I locate the period of Qing and Japanese rule in Taiwan as being ‘before the dawn of nationalism’. I also draw some contrasts with Ireland.

The second part looks at how Taiwan was framed as part of China, which remained at the centre of the KMT’s imaginary of Chinese-ness as the rightful inheritance of the Mainlander minority now living in exile in Taiwan. It begins by examining the construction of Republican Chinese nationalism on the mainland in the decades prior to 1947. The exiled KMT regime forcibly imposed on Taiwan the political structure of the ROC, as well as a Chinese nationalist culture, and was indeed a kind of ‘colonialism’. Taiwan was Sinicized and became a representation of true Chineseness as against its mutant strain on the mainland under communism. I then contrast this with Ireland, where descendants of the colonists have maintained a British identity that remains strong in Northern Ireland. I end this section with examples demonstrating that KMT Chineseness indeed shaped the study of Taiwan in the martial law period.

The third part explores how Taiwan was re-framed from the perspective of bentuhua (本土化, nativization, or Taiwanization) as a form of resistance to KMT Sinicization. Bentuhua, or Taiwanization discourses, emerged as a literary and cultural movement in the 1980s. They were later integrated into the process of democratic reform in the 1990s, and played a significant role in crafting Taiwanese subjectivities and nationalism. Taiwan was therefore re-narrated through the vehicles of de-Sinicization and Taiwanization, evidence for which can be found in the curriculum of Renshi Taiwan (認識台灣, Knowing Taiwan). I then investigate
the post-modern primordialist turn by which the DPP used Taiwanization to stress politics of ethnicity and identity by appealing to the major Hoklo ethnic group as a strategy in the struggle for power. I then compare this with Irish nationalism in the years before and after most of Ireland achieved independence from Britain. I end this section with examples demonstrating that Taiwanization discourses have in fact influenced the study of Taiwan since the late 1980s.

In the conclusion, I further consider subjectivity beyond imperialism, colonialism and nationalism, and I emphasize the need to pay attention to processes of industrial and digital modernization, mobilization, and globalization. I conclude that we must consider ourselves on the edge of new forms of belonging that bear no relation to anything that has been defined as Chineseness or Taiwaneseness. We shall need new concepts and practices with which to re-consider Taiwan (and Ireland) as network societies to be studied and re-narrated in the light of forms and visions of connected-ness and related-ness that today can hardly be predicted.

Before the Dawn of Nationalism: Taiwan and Ireland

Taiwan is situated on the immediate geographical periphery of China and Japan, as well as at edge of the USA’s current sphere of influence. It has thus been seen as a frontier in relation to each of these three super-powers, with a special geopolitical significance that is greater than its size (36,000 sq. km.) would indicate (for Taiwan and geopolitics see Stéphane Corcuff in this special issue). Up until the early seventeenth century, Taiwan was inhabited almost exclusively by Austronesian-speaking peoples, consisting of more than twenty ethno-linguistic groups (Shepherd 1993: 31). Similarly, Ireland, before the first invasion by England, consisted almost exclusively of Celtic peoples divided into various kingdoms, although under the ceremonial authority of a High King.

The situation in Taiwan began to change from the seventeenth century. Dutch and Spanish colonizers arrived in the 1620s, and in 1661 the island was invaded by Cheng-Gong Zheng (known in the west as Koxinga), a Chinese merchant and pirate who was opposed to the Qing Dynasty that had displaced the Ming Dynasty in China. The Dutch were eventually expelled, and under Koxinga’s successors the island remained independent from Qing Dynasty authority until 1683. From the middle of the century, large numbers of Chinese immigrants began to settle on the island, but these, like the native inhabitants, were diverse: the majority came originally from the localities of Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, or Hakka, and they brought the Hakka language and the Quanzhou and Zhangzhou dialects of Hoklo, as well as cultural variations in cuisine, dress, kinship, and religious practices. This variety has been described as ‘subethnic’ (Lamley 1981: 282). The Chinese immigrants later became the majority population in Taiwan, while in Ireland, by contrast, the indigenous Celtic population remained in the majority, even after the English invasion of Ireland in the same period as the Chinese settlement of Taiwan. However, Ireland and Taiwan continued to be seen as remote and uncivilized lands respectively in the eyes of the British Empire and the Manchurian Qing Empire.

The English invasion of Ireland in the mid-seventeenth century was undertaken with the aim of establishing control over a Catholic population widely viewed in England with suspicion and of being in need of civilizing. One important difference
from Taiwan, however, is that the contrast between England and Ireland was bound up with religious differences, following the Reformation of the sixteenth century. Roman Catholics continued to recognize the Pope as the earthly head of the universal church founded by Jesus Christ, while Protestants believed that the Pope’s teaching was in conflict with God’s teaching as given in the Bible. Protestantism was attractive to the King of England, because it meant the Pope no longer had authority over him, and that the Christian church in England could be brought under the control of the state in the form of the Church of England (or Anglican Church). This greatly consolidated a sense of English identity, particularly after a short return to Catholicism during which Protestants were persecuted. Most people in Ireland remained Roman Catholic.

While Chinese immigration to Taiwan in the seventeenth century was not directed by the central government, England’s invasion of Ireland during the same period established Ireland as the first colony of an emerging British Empire. However, the effort to enforce the Reformation thoroughly in Ireland would have been too costly. Instead, it was decided to install a minority of Protestants from England and Scotland as the ruling class. The English colonial government introduced penal laws which sought to discipline the native population by preventing Roman Catholics from taking an active role in public life and restricting their religious practices (Bartlett 2010: 141). In 1700, Protestants owned 80 per cent of the land but represented only a quarter of the population (Brown 1991: 13); these landowners developed into a privileged Anglo-Irish class, and the period from 1691 to 1801 is known as the ‘Protestant Ascendancy’, reflecting their dominant position. In 1801, an Act of Union incorporated Ireland into the British state.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Japan was seeking to join the colonial powers, as a way to avoid becoming itself a colony of the West and at the same time to advance into becoming a modern nation-state. Lacking colonial experience, though, Japan framed its colonial model mainly with reference to European ideas and practices, and it mapped out a security region in which it further developed its interest in overseas trade. In 1895, following China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was ceded by the Qing Dynasty to Japan, in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. However, neither the Qing Dynasty administration over the island from 1683 to 1895, nor Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945, succeeded in imposing their nationalisms on the peoples of Taiwan. Nor did Taiwanese people develop nationalism into a substantial movement during the Qing and Japanese periods.

Taiwan under Qing rule could be seen as a colony-cum-province, or as an aspect of what Vivienne Shue calls the pre-modern ‘honeycomb polity’ of the Qing Empire (Shue 1988: 89). The Qing itself was not a nation in the modern sense, and it only ruled Taiwan to a very limited extent. Over more than two hundred years of Qing administration, many Chinese immigrants made their homes in Taiwan and became nativized, including members of the Confucian gentry created by the keju (科舉) examination system, and this class became mediators between the Qing Empire and Taiwan’s localities. Japan, however, developed what Partha Chatterjee calls ‘anti-colonial nationalism’ (Chatterjee 1993 in R.-R. Wu 2004: 17), through which Japan sought to modernize itself via processes of nation-building. Following three years of military rule over Taiwan, Japan shifted its Taiwan policy
to a civic government, beginning a process of assimilation through differential incorporation (R.-R. Wu 2003). This meant that Japan expanded its territories and also incorporated the colonized – albeit hierarchically, not equally – into its modern nation-state formation. Although this policy did trigger resistance, this never developed into an island-wide nationalist movement, despite the fact that nationalist-type ideas did emerge, particularly in literary circles in the 1920s. Nevertheless, people in Taiwan were willing to accommodate themselves, to various degrees, to the new colonial situation and modern way of life. However, although the Japanese promoted dōka (assimilation), this was primarily a way to distinguish Japan from Western colonialism; the rhetoric of dōka was empty and did not lead to economic advancement or political representation (Ching 2001: 104–106).

However, Japanese colonialist projects engendered a new kind of research and knowledge about the peoples, societies, and cultures under colonial rule. Chinese residents in Taiwan were classed together administratively as hontōjin (islanders), while indigenous Austronesian groups were classed as ban (savages), in contrast to the Japanese naichijin (homelanders). Indeed, Japanese colonialism was based on an allegedly biological discourse of race (Weiner 1994: 27), which thereby distinguished ‘the Self’ from ‘the Other’ by differentiating the colonizer ‘Self’ from the colonized ‘Other’. It was this representation of Otherness that made people in Taiwan conceive of themselves as a distinctive ethnic and cultural group for the first time. This new research and knowledge further created a new self-reflection and self-awareness among Taiwan’s colonized people. Taiwan ‘came to be defined as an independent cultural entity with distinctive characteristics’ (Kikuchi 2007: 4) by its Japanese colonizers.

It is worth noting here that although the British colonization of Ireland goes back much further than the modern colonial theory of race, the Irish experience has a parallel with Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule. Stereotypical and indeed racist attitudes to Ireland and to the Irish remained normative in England even after the island was incorporated into the British state, and people in Ireland therefore learned that they were regarded as not-English and as not-England. As Declan Kiberd explains:

If Ireland had never existed, the English would have invented it; and since it never existed in English eyes as anything more than a patchwork-quilt of warring fiefdoms, their leaders occupied the neighbouring island and called it Ireland. With the mission to impose a central administration went the attempt to define a unitary Irish character. (Kiberd 1995: 9)

Kiberd’s analysis is derived from a central theme of Edward Said’s Orientalism, which is the process of ‘Othering’ in imperialism. Said explored how western scholarship and imperial administration interpreted the Middle East, observing that ‘the Orient was almost a European invention’ (Said 1978: 1). Orientalism, he explained, was

A way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience. The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its
civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other.

(Said 1978: 1)

Framework One: Chineseness in Taiwan in Dialogue with Britishness in Ireland

In Ireland, British colonial rule created self-consciousness in the population of being ‘Other’ and of being subordinate. British rule prompted resentment and resistance, leading to Irish independence in 1922. However, the situation has continued to be complicated; Ireland experienced partition, with the north of the island remaining a part of Britain. Here, in Northern Ireland, a slim majority maintains a British identity. In the case of Ireland, we see a nation become a state through resistance and independence. However, in the case of Taiwan, although Japanese rule similarly created self-consciousness in the population of being ‘Other’, this, as noted in the previous section, did not lead to a sense of nationhood. In contrast to the sense of nationhood that preceded statehood in Ireland, a sense of nationhood in Taiwan was imposed with the arrival of the KMT’s ROC state.

With Japan’s defeat at the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War (from the end of 1941, part of the Second World War), the Allies gave Taiwan to the Republic of China. This was in accordance with an agreement made between Roosevelt, Churchill, and the ROC leader Chiang Kai-Shek at the Cairo Conference of 1943. The Treaty of San Francisco, which Japan signed in September 1951, included the sentence that ‘Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores’, but did not specify Taiwan’s status. Chiang’s KMT, meanwhile, had retreated to the island between 1947 and 1949 after losing the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on mainland China. While the CCP took control of China and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the KMT relocated the ROC to Taiwan, planning to re-take mainland China at a later date. Although exiled to Taiwan, the KMT sought continuity with the Republican legacy on mainland China, and although *de facto* it had no authority beyond Taiwan it continued to assert its position as ‘the sole legitimate government of all China’ (Rigger 2011: 136).

Analysis of KMT’s ROC nationalism in Taiwan needs to be traced back to the preceding period of KMT rule in China. As noted by Benedict Anderson, ‘When Chinese nationalism did finally arise, it was rather late in world-historical time’ (B. Anderson 1983: 36). In fact, the Qing Dowager Empress did try, at the very end, to use Chinese identity as a form of resistance against the European and Japanese imperial powers, but the attempt was made too late and the dynasty was soon overthrown and replaced by the Republic of China following the so-called ‘Nationalist’ Revolution of 1911. KMT Republican nationalism was indeed itself a fairly modern invention, derived from a new notion of the ‘Chinese people’ (中華民族) which was first formulated during the last decade of the Qing dynasty by Qi-Chao Liang. In his article ‘Overview of Peoples of China in History’ (1905), Liang indicated that when a person encountered a foreigner, he/she immediately distinguished him/herself as ‘a person of China’ (中國人). This ‘person of China’ was to be considered to be a member of the ‘Chinese people’. He further explained that the ‘Chinese people’ were a product of history: all ethnic groups in
the territory of China had been assimilated into Chinese culture over thousands of years, and had thus been integrated into the ‘Chinese people’.

The ROC’s ideological foundation was formulated by Dr Sun Yat-Sen, as expressed in his ‘Three Principles of the People’: these were nationalism; civic rights or democracy; and civic welfare. For Dr Sun, China, after being freed from imperialist domination, needed to develop a ‘China-nationalism’ to unite all of China’s different ethnicities. Adapting Liang’s notion, in 1912 he further proposed a multi-ethnic ‘Republic of the Five Peoples’ (‘五族共和說’), composed of five major ethnic groups: Han, Manchus, Mongols, Uyghurs, and Tibetans. However, these groups were all integrated into one national subject, constituting the ‘Chinese people’. In the territory of China, membership as ‘Chinese’ was thus determined by assimilation into Chinese culture (Duara 1995: 143). From 1924, this assimilation also included Mandarin, established as the state language.

This new notion of Chineseness thus referred both to a homogeneous cultural category and to a homogeneous quasi-ethnic category. Further, a particular connection was made between this newer notion of Chineseness and an older notion of Zhong-guo (中國, Middle Kingdom). In this way, Zhong-guo now referred not only to the territory of the provinces of China (which at that time numbered 36) but was also tied to the idea of ‘Chineseness’, as a holistic conception of both a Chinese national subject and a Chinese national culture. In short, the boundary of the ROC as a territory/nation was synonymous with that of an imagined cultural Chinese homogeneity and of an invented quasi-ethnic Chinese homogeneity. The KMT’s Chinese nationalism took a form which was seen in Europe and theorized in the eighteenth century by Johann Gottfried von Herder, although it was not acknowledged as such. Herder’s primordialist view of nationalism saw an essential link between a land and its Volk. Herder’s Volk, as elaborated by Kenneth Minogue, ‘is not simply the people of a country, but a metaphysical entity defined relationally as that which produces a particular language, art, culture, set of great men, religion and collection of customs’ (Minogue 1969: 57). However, the term ‘Chinese’ is vague and ambiguous: while it may denote all five ethnic groups, in most instances it was used to represent only aspects of the core ethnic Han group, as expressed through Han language, art, culture, and customs.

The KMT’s national imagination was developed during the period when it had control of mainland China. However, while Chinese nationalism was being imposed on China, Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule. This version of Chinese nationalism was rejected by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which took control of the mainland, but it was brought to Taiwan by the KMT and imposed in a way that elided the island’s history. The year before the KMT arrived on the island, officials who were sent to survey Taiwan claimed that Taiwanese people had been ‘enslaved’ (奴化, huhua) as the outcome of fifty years of colonization by Japan (C. Chen 2002 in F.-C. Wang 2005: 59). Accordingly, a distinction was made between benshengren (本省人, ‘provincial natives’, or ‘Taiwanese’) and waishengren (外省人, ‘provincial outsiders’, or ‘mainlanders’). Benshengren meant those peoples who had arrived previously and were seen as the residents of Taiwan province, mainly Hoklo, Hakka, and indigenous Austronesian inhabitants; in contrast, waishengren referred to those Chinese who came to Taiwan with the KMT after 1947 from various provinces other than Taiwan,
but who were united in a common interest as a ruling class (for more on the issue of class, see Kao in this special issue).

The KMT erased the past of Taiwan and turned the island into a frozen imaginary of the pre-Communist Republican mainland, both politically and culturally. In the political domain, as with the British establishment of the privileged Anglo-Irish class in eighteenth-century Ireland, the KMT implemented a similar strategy to install the *waishengren* as the ruling class of Taiwan, protected by law. The KMT maintained the political structure of the Republic in China; as such, legislators who nominally represented mainland districts were able to remain in the legislative assembly in Taiwan indefinitely, on the grounds that they could not be removed from office without elections on the mainland. These *waishengren* make up approximately 15 per cent of the population, but were overrepresented in military and civil positions (Corcuff 2002: 170).

In light of the 1946 claim of ‘enslavement’, it was decided that the *benshengren* should not be treated as equals with *waishengren* until they had been de-Japanized and re-Sinicized (C. Chen 2002 in F.-C. Wang 2005: 59). The de-Japanization campaign banned the formerly official Japanese language from use in school and media. It also downplayed the Japanese era as a disgraceful page in Taiwan’s history. The ‘re-Sinicization’ policy was further seen as re-awakening Taiwan’s supposed historical connection with Greater China, and also reconnecting the island of Taiwan with the supposed territory of early twentieth-century China. ‘Re-Sinicization’ also imposed the Beijing dialect of Mandarin as the official language for education, media, and government. Other Chinese languages, such as Hakka and Hoklo, which had existed long before Mandarin and which were widely used as day-to-day languages in Taiwan, were reduced by this Sinicization policy to the marginal status of patois. Pupils were fined if they spoke their mother tongue at school. As Allen Chun elaborates,

> The [KMT] government in effect played an active role (as author) in writing culture (by constructing discourses on tradition, ethnicity, ethical philosophy and moral psychology). It also inculcated these reconstructed notions of tradition (as culture) through the ‘normative’ machinery of the school, media, family and military in order to construct disciplinary lifestyles and ritual patterns of behaviour compatible with the underlying ethos of the State. Chinese culture ultimately became an object of discourse not only in a political sense but also through the construction of knowledge… market commercialization, and domestication of life routines. (Chun 1994: 54)

Taiwan was somehow to be re-written into a long invented narrative of 5,000 years of unbroken Chinese history, beginning with the supposed common ancestor, the Yellow Emperor (黃帝, Huang Di), followed by about twenty dynasties and culminating in the establishment of the Republic in 1911. There was also an imagined geography of the 1911 ROC’s territory that included even Outer Mongolia. It is noted that ‘historical atlases published in Taiwan after 1949… often take for granted the logic of “imperial domain” and “lost territories”’ (Callahan 2009: 156n). This invented narrative ignored the historical reality of repeated invasions by non-Chinese (so-called barbarians), the rise and fall of imperial dynasties, and constant interaction with non-Chinese cultures. It also suggested a continuous
connection of Taiwan with China, even though Taiwan had not been of interest to the imperial mainland until the late seventeenth century, and had further been ceded by the Qing Dynasty to Japan in 1895. While the narratives of the PRC and the KMT territories both include Taiwan as part of a much larger whole, the KMT’s imagined geography differed from that of the PRC by continuing to include Outer Mongolia, which the PRC had recognized as independent in 1949.

In further contrast to the CCP, while Mao and the PRC encouraged the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976, Chiang Kai-Shek and the ROC urged a restoration of ‘tradition’ from 1966 onwards, under the name of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (中華文化復興運動, Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong). For example, traditional writing forms were preserved and used in ROC Taiwan, in contrast to the simplification of Chinese characters on the CCP mainland. This was one means by which the KMT represented itself and the ROC as the last bastion of ‘authentic’ Chinese culture, in this way justifying its right to possess various high-cultural imperial treasures which had belonged to the Palace Museum in Beijing but which had been removed to Taipei. The National Palace Museum in Taipei was presented as the ‘Temple’ of Chinese civilization, the symbol of the KMT’s preservation of that legacy (Vickers 2009).

In short, the exiled KMT in Taiwan attempted to demonstrate to the world that it was the legitimate heir and protector of traditional Chinese culture, and therefore of the Chinese nation. The KMT imposed only one form of Chineseness, consisting of political and cultural domination by a Chinese state (i.e., the ROC), a ruling class (i.e., waishengren with few token benshengren), and a high official language and culture (i.e., the Mandarin language and culture), at the cost of the suppression of other Chinese cultures and languages (i.e. Hoklo, Hakka etc.).

In the cases both of KMT Sinicization and British colonialism, one outcome was the same, in that Mandarin and English became the dominant languages in Taiwan and Ireland. However, there is a difference here between British colonialism in Ireland and the KMT’s Sinicization of Taiwan. Although, as noted above, the British imposed penal laws to suppress Roman Catholicism, particularly from 1691, these were gradually abandoned during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This was more in line with the general practice of British colonialism, which did not seek to impose Britishness on colonized populations, but rather to rule through a local elite. In the case of Ireland, this meant an Anglicized elite class that included settlers from outside, including Scotland. However for the Protestants of Ireland, Irish home rule made them not just a minority on the island, but the minority population of a Catholic country. The political compromise in 1921 was partition, with Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom. Here, Protestants were in the majority, although there was also a significant Catholic, and Irish nationalist, community.

Here we see another difference with Taiwan: a form of Chineseness was imposed on the benshengren majority across Taiwan, while the privileged status of Britishness was preserved by the Protestant minority in Ireland (the majority in Northern Ireland) only through partition. However, Britishness in Northern Ireland came to take on a distinct ‘unionist’ form; for example, unionist Britishness was expressed through symbols such as the display of the British flag, and through rituals such as parades organized by unionist ‘Orange Lodges’ (McAuley and Tongue 2010: 110). The men in these parades wore suits and bowler hats, which
looked smart but increasingly very old-fashioned. The marchers wear orange sashes, in memory of King William III, who became the monarch of England in 1688, replacing his wife Mary's father King James II. Although William's victory over James in Ireland was an important cultural memory in Northern Ireland, it is hardly remembered by most people living in Britain. Moreover, unionist Britishness projected by the officially-sanctioned culture of Northern Ireland did not even reflect the reality of Protestant diversity in Ireland, as Gillian McIntosh observes: 'Unionists' image of the state was exclusive, and one which alienated many, in particular, but not exclusively, Catholics' (McIntosh 1999: 223). Britishness in Northern Ireland for much of the twentieth century gave the impression of being frozen in time and of being exclusivist. According to McIntosh,

[Unionists'] proclaimed 'Britishness', when it did arise, was often a reflection of political necessity which co-existed with a sense of being 'Ulster' and, to a lesser extent, 'Irish'. Unionist culture was thus at times repetitive and contradictory; it claimed distinctiveness and individuality within the United Kingdom, while at the same time it rejected the state's own unique culture (particularly catholic) which it saw as a cover for an Irish national culture; and while it claimed unity with Britain, its culture simultaneously projected elements of anti-Englishness.  

(McIntosh 1999: 222)

Britishness in Northern Ireland was only one form of Britishness, and it was different from that of most of the rest of Britain. Similarly, KMT Sinicization was based on just one form of Chineseness, quite different to the CCP version of Chineseness which is imposed on China today.  

These processes of Sinicization also shaped the study of Taiwan during the 1960s to 1980s. As Stephen Murray and Keelung Hong (1994) have pointed out, anthropological studies of Taiwan at this time were conducted as if China and Chinese culture were the natural research contexts for Taiwan. According to Stevan Harrell,

This was the Golden Age, when Taiwan stood for China, not only politically but anthropologically, when foreign anthropologists, mostly Americans, dealt with their exclusion from the Chinese mainland [because of the Cultural Revolution] by moving to the next-best place, the island province, the unsinkable aircraft carrier, the place where Chinese culture had not only continued to flourish, but had not been subjected to the depredations of Communists trying to create a new world out of its ashes.  

(Harrell 1999: 211–212)

Anthropologists at that time studied Taiwan within a holistic and structural-functionalist framework of Chineseness, although they acknowledged the importance of contextualizing their data in Taiwan historically and socially, and were also concerned with Taiwan's local differences and cultural variations. However, the basic assumption as regards the existence of an essential Chinese culture and of a subjectivity of Chineseness tied to Taiwan was largely unquestioned. For instance, the anthropologist Arthur Wolf could assert that the Taiwanese conception of the spirit world was modelled on a conception of imperial China: 'Gods are the supernatural counterparts of the imperial bureaucracy...
Ghosts are the supernatural equivalents of despised, dangerous strangers... Ancestors are the senior members of one's own line of descent (Wolf 1974: 7–8). Similarly, Steven Sangren could also assert that: 'Despite the demise of its earthly counterpart [physically speaking, the death of the last imperial dynasty, in 1911], eighty years ago, the imperial bureaucracy persists in the religion of present-day Taiwan' (Sangren 1983: 5).

Wolf's and Sangren's assertions of the persistence of a continuing imperial and bureaucratic China in Taiwanese religion was regarded sceptically by Stevan Harrell (1999), who pointed out that the imperial bureaucracy had disappeared from Taiwan in 1895, when the island was ceded to Japan. Furthermore, as Feuchtwang, Shih and Tremlett have pointed out,

In retrospect it is clear that the problem was not that they contextualised their field work data, but that they did not develop a theory of context. Thus, China as a whole country or society, a whole culture or ethnic unit of identity was uncritically assumed to be a 'natural' or given context [for the study of Taiwan] rather than a political choice and/or contingent construction.

(Feuchtwang, Shih, and Tremlett 2006: 43)

But, as the KMT's subjectivity of Chineseness began to fade, new political and scholarly trends emerged to challenge it.

**Framework Two: Taiwanese Nationalism in Dialogue with Irish Nationalism**

Briefly surveying Taiwan's past at the time of the 2004 election, Perry Anderson observed that 'out of this sequence of historical experiences has come a distinctive kind of national sentiment' (P. Anderson 2004: 2). As mentioned above, the 1946 claim of 'enslavement' created a distinction between benshengren and waishengren, and benshengren encountered hostility and exploitation from the KMT in ways that led to Japan becoming an object of nostalgia while a Taiwanese subjectivity was developing. Conflict began as soon as the KMT arrived in 1947. In months of fighting which began on 28 February 1947, perhaps up to 30,000 benshengren were killed in what is now known as the '2-28 Incident' (see Rawnsley in this special issue), while others went into exile, primarily to Japan or to the USA. Most of the victims were urban intellectuals and well-off rural landlords who had prospered during the Japanese colonial period (Simon 2005: 132).

In the aftermath of the 2-28 Incident, martial law was imposed in 1949 as a 'Temporary Provision', despite the democratic principles written into the Constitution of the ROC (Nathan 1985: xi). It was claimed by the KMT that as the rights given in the Constitution had been formulated to apply to all the people of mainland China, these rights were now temporarily suspended due to the national emergency that had been precipitated by communist control of the mainland. The KMT rulers were strongly anti-communist, and the hunt for communists on Taiwan quickly developed into the period known as the 'White Terror' in which those suspected of communism were executed or imprisoned. Even villagers with no knowledge of communism were accused of being communists and sentenced as a warning not to resist the KMT (one example was the Luku White Terror Incident, see F.-L. Shih 2011).
The nature of KMT rule forcibly imposed on Taiwan the political structure of the ROC, as well as a Chinese nationalist culture, and was indeed a kind of ‘colonialism’ which was no less ‘foreign’ than Japanese rule. As such, from the perspective of the ruled Taiwanese the KMT’s Sinicization was a prolonged ‘re-colonialism’ following on from Japanization (Edmondson 2002; Su 1986). KMT rule provoked resistance in the name of ‘de-colonization’ and alternative discourses that took the form of bentuhua, or Taiwanization. Taiwanization as a political and cultural movement played a significant role in crafting Taiwanese nationalism.

There are similarities here with the formation of Irish nationalism. In 1846 and 1847 there was a huge famine in Ireland caused by potato blight, a disease which destroyed the potato crop. During these years of hunger and disease, the British government still held to its strongly free market economic policies, exporting large quantities of grain from the starving island for greater profit, and refusing to intervene to feed the starving. Perhaps around a million people died, and half a million were forced to emigrate to survive, primarily to the USA. Irish bitterness at England’s attitude is recorded in the popular Irish peasants’ saying that ‘God sent the potato-blight, but the English caused the Famine’ (see Kiberd 1995: 21).

Ireland since 1801 had been part of the new United Kingdom, along with England, Scotland, and Wales. This meant that Ireland was represented at the Parliament in Westminster. However, one consequence of the famine was a rise in anti-English feeling. In the decades that followed the disaster there were increased calls for ‘Home Rule’, meaning for laws to be decided in Ireland rather than in Westminster. There was also increasing support for this in Britain, and some reforms were made. For example, in 1871 the official church, the Church of Ireland (a province of the Anglican Church) was disconnected from the state in Ireland, in recognition that most Irish people were Catholics and not Anglicans. However, Eric Hobsbawm notes that while most nationalist movements in Europe at this time simply wanted some local autonomy, the preference in Ireland was for a sovereign state. Nationalist organizations (members of which were known generally as ‘Fenians’) ‘demanded an Irish Republic which could not but be independent from Britain’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 37).

Ireland declared independence in 1919, and following a guerrilla war the Irish Free State was established in 1922 following partition the year before. Ireland was from that time divided, with Northern Ireland remaining a part of the UK. However, the Irish Free State remained within the British Empire as a ‘dominion’, like Australia or Canada, until 1949, when it became a Republic. In contrast, Taiwanization and Taiwanese nationalism did not really take shape until the 1970s, and it is still an ongoing process. As a cultural movement, Taiwanization needs to be understood as a prolonged but discontinuous formation beginning in the 1920s and reviving in the 1980s. On the other hand, as a political movement, Taiwanization emerged sharply after the ‘Formosa Incident’ in 1979 and further developed to become integral to democratic reforms in the 1990s. However, the development of political opposition needs to be seen in relation to wider changes in international and domestic politics in the two prior decades.

The ROC constitution guarantees civic liberties and participation; the KMT, though, had suspended democracy, justifying its authoritarianism by claiming that it was preparing for the recovery of mainland China. The regime claimed that once it had retaken the mainland and the Chinese nation was reunited, it would allow for
nationwide elections to be held. However, the international context radically shifted and, consequently, the KMT’s legitimacy in representing all China both outside and within the island came into doubt.

With the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, ideological opposition to communism in the west lost ground to pragmatic political calculation. The US, along with many Western countries, used relations with China strategically against the Soviet Union (Goh 2009: 171–182, 215–218). As such, the CCP’s PRC began to replace the KMT’s ROC as the internationally recognized government of China. In 1971, the ROC lost its seat in the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, and this was followed by the loss of diplomatic recognition by the UK in 1972 and by the USA in 1979. The ROC has since become even more politically isolated, with the PRC undergoing a process of neo-liberal economic transition from the 1980s and increasing its interaction with the rest of the world from the 1990s (Naughton 1995).

By the early 1970s, it was clear in Taiwan that there was very little hope of recovering the mainland, despite years of war preparation. Increasing numbers of benshengren and some waishengren were becoming dissatisfied with the island’s political situation and were no longer willing to tolerate the KMT’s continually unmet promise of democracy. A token free press magazine sponsored by the KMT called Free China Fortnightly, run by a waishengren named Chen Lei, came to prominence: it began by publishing attacks on the CCP, but it shifted from its initial emphasis onto critiques of KMT authoritarian rule. Benshengren political activists expressed support for this change; mainlanders and Taiwanese worked together, campaigning for local elections and calling for the formation of an opposition party as a way to advance their demands for democracy. Both internal and external challenges increased the pressure on the KMT to justify its claim to legitimacy by reforming the political and electoral system.

Although opposition political parties were banned, activists could position themselves as members of the Dangwai (黨外, Outside the KMT Party). The Dangwai leaders founded Formosa magazine in 1979 to serve as a platform for voices of political opposition island-wide, and the magazine organized a march in Kaohsiung on 10 December in commemoration of International Human Rights Day. Eight leaders of the protest were arrested, and after trial given prison sentences of between 12 years and life (Denny 2003: 168–169). However, they were also recognized by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience (Amnesty International 1980), while the KMT came under pressure from the US government, partly because of lobbying by exiled Taiwanese Americans (for the issue of Taiwanese Americans, see Lien in this special issue). The ‘Formosa Incident’ worked to radicalize opposition to the KMT regime and to give momentum to calls for democratic reform and Taiwanization. The first major opposition party, the DPP, was formed in 1986 and formally legalized in 1989, while martial law was finally lifted in 1987.

In Ireland, the perspective of colonial Britain engendered among the Irish a self-awareness of being not-English. In turn, Irish people were motivated to reflect on the idea of a distinct culture and language as forming the basis of their collective experience and identity; this laid a foundation for the Irish national imaginary, which can be seen as having primordialist elements but also, as we shall see, other cultural resources to draw on for the construction of a national identity –
resources routed in a long history of relationships with outsiders. From the end of the nineteenth century, there was an increased emphasis on Irish culture in Ireland, including a movement to promote the native Gaelic language and a new emphasis on the island’s Celtic history. The Catholic Church also maintained a very strong focus for national identity: in 1879 some locals in the village of Knock claimed that they had seen a vision of Jesus’ mother, the Virgin Mary, alongside two saints. This was taken to show that God supported the Irish for following the true religion, and the Virgin Mary, as ‘Our Lady of Knock’, was given the name ‘Queen of Ireland’ (Kearney 2007: 44). Knock is today Ireland’s national Marian shrine.

As with Irish nationalist emphasis on ethnic and cultural particularity, Taiwan underwent a similar process, with the Irish model to some extent in mind among Taiwanese nationalists who have turned to Ireland to make sense of their own experiences. The bentuhua literary movement took its inspiration from an earlier manifestation of politicized localism, dating from the 1920s. Japan at that time had replaced military rule over Taiwan with a modern civic governance structure, and resistance primarily took the form of a reformist and non-violent anti-colonialism. While Ireland in that decade was achieving independence, Taiwanese activists at that time were seeking Home Rule, similar to the strand of Reformist nationalism in Ireland. They stressed ‘Taiwan for the Taiwanese’, and their aim was a reform of the colonial system rather than full national autonomy (see F.-S. Huang and S. Huang with Mulvagh in this special issue).

The perspective of the Japanese colonizers provided the first opportunity for people in Taiwan to see themselves as a group defined by a distinctive ethnicity and culture. More and more Taiwanese writers were eager to reflect on, and further to create, their own literature in their own languages. One prominent reformist, Wo-Chün Chang, regarded the Taiwanese language as ‘a patois, an inferior language without a writing system’. He therefore wanted ‘to change our patois into a decent language that can be written down’ (translated in Hsiau 2000: 38) (see Li with Mac Mathúna in this special issue). Another cultural reformist, Shih-Hui Huang, promoted xiangtu literature (native literature: literally ‘鄉, xiang meaning ‘rural’ and ‘土, tu meaning ‘soil’), arguing that ‘xiangtu literature represents speaking and each place has its own language’ (translated in Hsiau 2000: 41). Xiangtu writing, by using native language, would be better able to reflect and represent local culture and people.

After two decades of escapist modernism in Taiwan (Hsiau 2000: 73), literary culture made a turn back to the xiangtu genre in the 1970s. This ‘Return to Xiangtu’ was an expression of complex responses to political and economic frustrations, such as the dispute over jurisdiction of the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands (once again in the early 2010s the focus of a diplomatic dispute between China and Japan), diplomatic failures, and also Taiwan’s decline into an economic and cultural colony of the West, and in particular of the USA. The xiangtu writers urged the creation of a literature which ‘bases itself on the soil of Taiwan’s real society’; ‘any kind of person, thing, and phenomenon existing in this society is what such a literature is intended to reflect and describe’ (Tuo Wang translated in Hsiau 2000: 71). In benshengren xiangtu literature, we read about the ‘use of the Taiwanese dialect [i.e., Hoklo], depiction of the plight of country folks or small-town dwellers in economic difficulty, and resistance of the imperialist presence in Taiwan’ (Chang
Consequently, xiangtu writers were accused by the KMT of provoking ‘localism’ or ‘provincialism’, and therefore ‘separatism’ (Hsiau 2000: 70–71). It was not until the early 1980s that xiangtu literature took a further step toward ‘a literature for nation-building’, via the notion of bentuhua.

Bentuhua discourses were well connected with the political debates about Taiwanese subjectivity and identity. In fact, the DDP was born out of civic struggle for political participation and voting rights. More than 80 percent of the residents of Taiwan were benshengren, but until that time they had not been allowed to participate in the elections of public officials and there were only a few token Taiwanese politicians. After Chiang Ching-Kuo died in 1988, Lee Teng-Hui, who was a KMT reformer, succeeded to his position as the first benshengren president of the ROC. The bentuhua movement gained further momentum under Lee’s presidency (1988–2000), and he sought to develop a concept of ‘new Taiwanese’:

Between us, there should be no argument about ethnic division. We are all Chinese. Only identify with Taiwan, give your heart to preserving and developing Taiwan, no matter what ethnic group, no matter whether you came to Taiwan early or late, then all are Taiwanese.

(translated in Hughes 2011: 59, from Zhongguo shibao 31 December 1994)

Lee Teng-Hui acknowledged the plurality of ethnic background while maintaining a Chinese identity. Rather than emphasize Taiwan’s status as a nation-state, Lee’s vision focused on Taiwan’s position within the ‘global village’, recognized for its commitment to human rights and democracy and for its economic achievements (Hughes 2011: 58).

Lee’s approach and the DPP campaign both helped to increase the growth of the bentuhua movement, which was integral to democratic reform in the 1990s. The DPP, as the first native opposition party, regarded the KMT regime as alien and sought to displace its Chinese version of nationalism. It issued a manifesto in 1991 rejecting Chinese mainlander superiority, advocating Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, and articulating a new politics of Taiwanese identity and nationalism (Ogasawara 1998). The DPP portrayed Taiwan as a nation made up of successive waves of immigrants consisting of ‘Four Great Ethnic Groups’ (Rudolph 2008: 51–52): the Yuanzhumin (原住民, ‘original provincials’, or ‘indigenous peoples’), Hoklo, Hakka, and Mainlanders (for more about the issue of immigration, see Fanning in this special issue). Furthermore, the DPP contrasted democratization against the KMT; independence against China; and Taiwanization against Sinicization.

Debates prompted by the bentuhua movement further led to a political transition to democracy in the form of electoral reform. Indeed, as Shelley Rigger observes, the only process that could allocate political power legitimately both for the ruling KMT and emerging opposition parties was ‘voting for democracy’. According to Rigger,

The ruling party believed it could use elections to enhance its legitimacy in an unstable era. At the same time, it expected to control the pace and direction of reform, because it was confident of its electoral ability. The opposition saw elections as an
opportunity to gain influence and to reach a larger audience. Although dissidents recognized the limitations of the electoral system, the majority of them were convinced that working to change the system from within was the most fruitful course open to them.  

(Rigger 1999: 33)

The 1990s saw a peaceful transition to democratic elections: as explained above, prior to 1991 delegates purporting to represent mainland districts did not have to contest their seats because there was no way that elections could be held on the mainland, and so they maintained their positions unchallenged. The only national elections that occurred were ‘supplemental’ elections for new seats relating to Taiwan and nearby islands. However, in the 1990s the first non-supplemental elections were held, respectively for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. Nearly all of the newly-elected delegates represented Taiwan (Copper 1994: 23). In 1994, direct elections were brought in for the provincial governorship of Taiwan, and for the mayorship of Taipei and Kaohsiung; the first direct presidential election took place in 1996.

As well as changes in political structure, Taiwan also underwent a process of cultural transformation in national ideology and narration. In the previous section, we saw that the KMT consolidated its Chinese nationalism by creating a public amnesia about Taiwan’s past; there was little place for Taiwan in the KMT’s nationalist history and geography, other than in its current position as a retreat for preserving the ROC nation and Chinese culture. In fact, primary and secondary school textbooks on average devoted less than 3 per cent of their content to Taiwan (F.-C. Wang 2005: 62–63, citing Y.-T. Long 1987: 44); high school history textbooks had 5 per cent of their content on Taiwan, while geography textbooks less than 4 per cent (F.-C. Wang 2005: 62–63, citing calculations by Xiao-Feng Liu). However, following democratization, there was a new demand for knowing about Taiwan, and so a new way of narrating Taiwan was needed. A major change was announced in 1989 without serious controversy, in the form of a plan to publish new textbooks in a series called Renshi Taiwan (Knowing Taiwan) (Jacobs 2012: 220). According to this proposed reform, students would learn about Taiwan in their first year, followed by China in their second year, and the world in the third year. Moreover, the new textbooks would treat all ethnic groups proportionately, and accommodate the ethnic diversity in Taiwan.

‘Voting for democracy’ reached its fulfilment with the first direct presidential election, in 1996. During this time, the PRC held missile tests in an attempt to intimidate Taiwan’s electorate. These persistent cross-strait tensions offer perhaps a useful counterpoint to the approach taken by Britain towards achieving a peace agreement for Northern Ireland (see Brown in this special issue). Britain accepted the partition of Ireland in the 1920s, and by the late twentieth century it was taking a more moderate and pragmatic attitude to the conflict in Northern Ireland. In 1985 the governments of Ireland and the UK signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The document said that Britain would consent to a united Ireland if a majority of the population of Northern Ireland agreed to it, and it established an ‘Intergovernmental Conference’ by which ministers and officials would meet. Britain accepted that Ireland ‘will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland’. Further:
The Conference shall concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland, to protect human rights and to prevent discrimination. Matters to be considered in this area include measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form in Northern Ireland.

(Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985)

The process continued with a ‘Declaration on Peace’ in 1993, and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The agreement contained details for a democratically elected power-sharing assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, and a British-Irish Council ‘to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands’ (Belfast Agreement 1998).

In contrast, the PRC is still unable to recognize Taiwanese people’s rights and subjectivities (see Qiao in this special issue). The PRC’s attitude has affected the formation of Taiwanese nationalism, which has consequently taken stronger anti-Chinese forms. For instance, the PRC’s missile provocations have prompted incredible anger from Taiwanese citizens: Lee Teng-Hui, to whom the PRC objected as an electoral candidate, was voted into presidential office, ironically because of this anger. There was also a furious rejection of the PRC’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, and resistance against both the ROC’s Chinese nationalism as well as the PRC’s Chinese nationalism. In 1996, a group of Taiwanese students burnt textbooks that expressed the KMT’s Chinese nationalism in front of Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, and they rejected Chinese identity with slogans such as ‘We Want to be Taiwanese, not Chinese!’ ‘Study Taiwanese History, not Chinese History’, and ‘Study Taiwanese Geography, not Chinese Geography’ (Hsiau 2000: 1). This anti-Chinese form of nationalism has been characterized by Horng-Luen Wang (2004) using Nietzsche’s term *ressentiment*. Wang argues that although Taiwan has many of the elements of a state, including anthem, flag, army, and diplomacy, there is a sense of grievance against the PRC for not allowing Taiwan to be treated fairly in international society or to receive universal recognition as a sovereign state.

In 1997, there was a turn as the new *Knowing Taiwan* textbooks came under attack from an elite group of *waishengren* under the leadership of a legislator named Ching-Hua Lee. The dispute was fundamental to narrations of Taiwan’s relations with China: the new textbooks interpreted Taiwan’s history from a Taiwan-centred perspective, stating that the Spanish, the Dutch, the Ming Dynasty loyalist Koxinga and his clan, the Qing, the Japanese, and the KMT were all foreign rulers or colonizers over Taiwan. In contrast, the group around Lee attempted to restore the formerly hegemonic Sino-centric paradigm, arguing that Taiwan has since ancient times been a part of China, and that Koxinga and his clan, followed by the Qing dynasty and the KMT, were certainly not foreign (F.-C. Wang 2005: 73–76). *Knowing Taiwan* was criticized as promoting Taiwan’s independence, attempting to erode Taiwan’s links with the Chinese Mainland, and as using education to remove a Chinese consciousness from the people of Taiwan.
Unfortunately, the Taiwanization movement since then has increasingly developed in a way that departs from Lee Teng-Hui’s vision of a shared identity, emphasizing instead ethnic particularity. Although the Taiwan-centred political transformation of the 1990s established the principle of equality between waishengren and benshengren, members of the waishengren who had previously enjoyed political privilege felt threatened by their new minority status. At the same time, benshengren in turn continued to feel resentful of waishengren and, on top of this, to feel threatened by the attitude of the PRC. Meanwhile, long-suppressed nativist energies, created through reflection on being regarded as the Others (i.e. as not-China and not-Chinese), began to explode in the form of Taiwanese ethnicity and nationalism. Rwei-Ren Wu, who is dedicated to projects relating to Taiwan’s nation-formation, argues that:

Taiwan was broken off China before the latter began its transformation from empire into nation, and from this point on the historical trajectory of the two bifurcated sharply; while the nationalism in China rose after the moribund empire’s 1895 defeat to imagine a Chinese nation without Taiwan, the nationalism in Taiwan emerged as a reaction to Japan’s colonial nation-building to imagine a Taiwan that belonged only to the Taiwanese. In short, the bifurcated histories of China and Taiwan since 1895 created two separate political fields that induced in both places movements of nationalism paralleled to – yet separate and different from – each other.

(R.-R. Wu 2004: 17)

While to some extent embracing multiculturalism and appropriating Taiwan’s indigenous heritage, the DPP’s overarching representation of itself was as embodying the marginalized Taiwanese majority. Indeed, many DPP activists were descendants of the victims of the 2-28 Incident and KMT authoritarianism. Taiwanization has further been used by the DPP as a political strategy to appeal to Taiwanese supporters and voters during election campaigns. However, the term ‘Taiwanese’ is vague and ambiguous: while it may denote all residents of Taiwan, in areas where there was a struggle for power, the DPP tended to stress the politics of ethnicity and identity, and ‘Taiwanese’ thus merely stood for the majority Hoklo people. As such, Taiwanization also became associated with the majority Hoklo identity and ethnicity.

Here, it is worth noting a comparison with Ireland: the new Irish state emphasized the historical identity of the Celtic-Catholic majority of the population; as Declan Kiberd observes:
Those words *Sinn Fein* (ourselves alone) \(^1\) ... became synonymous with the movement for national independence. That movement imagined the Irish people as an historical community, whose self-image was constructed long before the era of modern nationalism and the nation-state. There are many texts in the Irish language to bear this thesis out.

(Kiberd 1995: 1)

However, alongside this emphasis on ethnic and cultural Celtic and Catholic identity, Kiberd also notes:

> the extraordinary capacity of Irish society to assimilate new elements through all its major phases. Far from providing a basis for doctrines of racial purity, they seem to take pleasure in the fact that identity is seldom straightforward and given, more often a matter of negotiation and exchange.

(Kiberd 1995: 1)

If Irish nationalism contained strands of ethnic and cultural particularity and senses of hybridity, Taiwanese ethnic and cultural nationalism must be framed as an example of a discourse of strategic essentialism. In the beginning of his article ‘Imagining Taiwan’, Cheng-Feng Shih pointed out that:

> On the way to democratic consolidation, Taiwan, as a multiethnic settlers’ society, has faced the challenge of how to forge its national identity. If we understand nation as an ‘imagined community’, to borrow the term from Benedict Anderson..., the task of nation-building is to reach consensus on the question of ‘who[se] community’ and ‘how to imagine’.

(C.-F. Shih 2003:14-1)

Indeed, the formation of Taiwanese nationalism was a process of self-conscious adoption of various nationalist strategies that had been identified by western scholars. The DPP and pro-DPP scholars appeared to take on a self-conscious primordialist perspective to develop a Taiwanese nationalism which reflected the old linguistic nationalism of nineteenth-century Europe, in which each supposedly ‘true’ nation ‘was marked off by its own peculiar language and literary culture, which together expressed that people’s historical genius’ (see B. Anderson 2001: 40). As such, was the DPP attempting to prove itself to be a ‘true’ nation, by developing a totalizing and essentialist narrative of an ‘imagined’ community based on shared Taiwanese language, Taiwanese history, Taiwanese ethnicity, and Taiwanese culture?

The DPP’s Chen Shui-Bian was in power as the first elected non-KMT president between 2000 and 2008. During this period, new cultural and tourist and recreation policies were developed and implemented: in contrast to the KMT representation of Taiwan as the last bastion of authentic Chinese culture, the DPP attempted to demonstrate to the international community that Taiwan was a sovereign state with

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\(^1\) *Sinn Fein* is the name of a political party, founded in 1905 and associated with militant nationalist republicanism against British rule in Ireland and in later decades in Northern Ireland. It is today the third-largest political party on the island of Ireland.
its own distinct culture. Culture was constructed through ‘invented traditions’, a phenomenon explored by Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds 1983). There was thus a conscious ‘invention’ of tradition and authenticity, in which Taiwanese heritage and religious practices and rituals were selected, re-generated, and promoted as tourist festivals and destinations defined by cultural particularity as well as potential vehicles for Taiwanese national culture and identity. These were further designated as ‘flagship’ tourist events and also commercialized as consumable goods in the global capitalist flow (see F.-L. Shih 2006: 276–279).

As such, as noted above, in the play of ethnicity politics, the DPP in many instances has reduced the meanings of ‘Taiwanese’ to standing only for the majority ethnicity of Taiwan; that is, the Hoklo people. Indeed, this is a critical element in the DPP’s strategy, which is to showcase an invented culture (i.e., the Hoklo culture, with few token Hakka, Formosa Austronesian and waishengren cultures) and an imagined community (i.e., the Hoklo communities, with few token Hakka, Formosa Austronesian and waishengren communities) that is local, essential and natural, which contrasts with what can be found in China, and which is enduring in a globalizing world. A-Chin Hsiau, who has paid extensive attention to Taiwanese cultural nationalism, points out that:

Based on the recognition that for specific political and practical purposes in identity politics, marginalized social groups cannot act without stabilized identities, strategic essentialism expresses a positive attitude toward and/or refers to the very act of essentializing the identities of such groups as a means to these ends. Strategic essentialism, however, can rarely remain just ‘strategic’. In practice, any essentialist claim of identity strategically constructed for its practical effects typically turns out to be a form of de facto essentialism, which in turn causes essentialist reactions.

(Hsiau 2005: 127)

Yet, from within the limits of the DPP’s essentializations and ethnicizations emerge the problems of the ‘Others’ and of the politics of a multi-cultural society. If the anthropology of Taiwan is a kind of barometer of the narration of Taiwan’s subjectivity, it is worth taking note of how post-1980s anthropology of Taiwan has been influenced by bentuhua discourses to contextualize Taiwan in its own right and within its various processes. Taiwan by the late 1980s was no longer a simulacrum of a greater China but is instead its own place. But the anthropology of Taiwan has not, as it were, been ‘colonized’ by bentuhua discourses but has rather worked with and against them in the writing of a Taiwan profoundly implicated in local, regional and global connectivities. This shift has certainly generated a new trend of Taiwan-focused and comparative ethnographies; one good example is Robert Weller’s Alternate Civilities (1999) which contrasts fieldwork data from Taiwan, Hong Kong and China, and takes proper consideration of the specific history and socio-cultural experience of each location. For instance, Weller demonstrates that the worship of ghosts thrived in Taiwan in the 1980s as a response to the new developments of a global capitalist economy in a way that ‘tends towards utilitarian granting of individual desires, dissolving the local community interests of temple-based religion’ (1999: 88) and thus imperial patterns of order and belonging. He also notes that the emergence of ‘Buddhism in the Human Realm’ (人間佛教, renjian fojiao) and the increasing role of women in the
movement, (such as seen in the Tzu Chi Association), are ‘defining new kinds of communities no longer based on local geography’ (1999: 88). Weller’s Taiwan is described by Paul-Francois Tremlett in his ‘Introduction’ to Re-Writing Culture in Taiwan (2009) as:

a Taiwan that cannot be assimilated to the cultural and historical experiences of any elsewhere and which simultaneously throws down the gauntlet for new, comparative studies – religious beliefs and practices emerge as vehicles for different kinds of social action and identification, whereby what emerges is not the playing out of a Sinic code or deep structure of Chineseness, but rather the active and contested making of culture, place, and identity by agents with varying access to sources of economic, political, and symbolic capital and power.

(Tremlett 2009: 11)

I myself conducted research on the issues around maiden death and its related death practices, regarding religious practices in Taiwan as being always embodied or embedded in economic, political, and social processes in the globalizing world. My research took place in Taipei City and Taipei County during the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, when urbanization, democratization, and increasing female mobility were causing the breakdown of traditions. It was shown that Chinese ancestral orthopraxy never manages to constitute itself as a fully complete structure, and its incompleteness provides spaces in which other practices and systems of relations can emerge in Taiwanese society (F.-L. Shih 2007). These findings have significant consequences for how Taiwan was re-narrated. If religious practices merely legitimate an imperial Chineseness, then they are broadly a passive reflection of a given Chineseness. If the relationship is drawn differently – if religious practices in Taiwan constitute a partially autonomous sphere – then they might also be understood as vehicles for different kinds of social action and identification, and could further be seen as the condition for social re-invention that may create the possibilities for changes in Taiwan (also see F.-L. Shih 2009).

This shift and trend in the anthropological study and analysis of Taiwan has broken new ground: in Tremlett’s words, ‘nothing here is essentialized. Culture, identity, society, religion – these “things” are not objects passively awaiting anthropological description, but are the contested sites of human social action’ (Tremlett 2009: 11).

Conclusion

Until recently, Taiwan was not a free subject as regards thought or action, and the narrating of Taiwan’s subjectivity cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of the forces that have been imposed on the island. In Framework One, Taiwan was narrated as part of China and as embodying a particular form of Chineseness; therefore, to understand the narration of Taiwan as a metonym of China, we need to analyse the configurations of KMT power and domination. We can see that the KMT’s Chinese nationalism as developed in the early twentieth century reflects a primordialist perspective, in which the nation-state is regarded as an expression of the essence of a people, in their language, history, culture, and territory. However, the people and culture represented in KMT nationalism for the
most part reflected only typical aspects of Han ethnicity. This nationalism was forcibly imposed on Taiwan during the martial law period, and Taiwan was Sinicized and represented as the last bastion of authentic Chinese culture. This, though, was a KMT invention which did not correspond with the full picture of the reality of Taiwan’s history, people, languages or culture. Furthermore, KMT Chineseness dominated the representation of Taiwan in anthropological studies of Taiwan in that period. Taiwan was studied as merely a window through which a greater continuing imperial China, characterized by the idea of Chineseness, could be brought into view. I argue that the way the KMT narrated Taiwan as an embodiment of Chineseness was only one version of Chineseness, reflecting only one Chinese culture: that of a Mandarin ruling class.

In Framework Two, Taiwan since the transition to democracy was re-narrated as a national subject in its own right, or in some DDP instances as standing for a Hoklo subjectivity, and to understand this new narration we need to analyse the configurations of bentuhua discourses and the DPP’s power struggle and political strategies. We see that the DPP developed education, tourism and recreation policies to create the Taiwanese as a re-imagined community; while DPP state discourse was primordialist, its approach to culture was promoted through invented traditions. I argue that the DPP engaged in a sort of playful or post-modern primordialism, self-consciously inventing a form of Taiwanese nationalism which stood in most instances only for the majority Hoklo subjectivity. However, although the DPP’s strategic approach to crafting nationalism and national subjectivity was probably necessary for self-assertion in the context of a democratic struggle, and although there is recognition in Taiwanese nationalism of its inventedness and historicity, how can we judge the difference between strategic essentialism and un-reflexive chauvinism? We witness that Taiwan’s democracy grew in close relationship to nationalism, but, as Craig Calhoun notes: ‘nationalism was also (at least often) an attempt to reconcile liberty and ethical universalism with felt community’. He also asks: ‘how can we reconcile the important potential of multiple and hybrid cultural and social identities with political participation and rights?’ (Calhoun 2008: 444)

We understand people as implicated in social actions which to some extent they are not entirely free to choose. Ironically, despite the DPP’s resistance to the KMT, the DDP’s strategies of nationalism were not much different in form from those pursued by the KMT, as the KMT was the only example of a nationalist political party from which, as it were, the DPP learned its craft. I argue that although DPP nationalism was a form of post-modern primordialism, it still bears striking similarities to its KMT ‘Chinese’ counter-part: both nationalisms are strategically essentialized, assuming an underlying unity out of which a common national culture and subjectivity are formed, and this underlying unity is, respectively, an essential ‘Chineseness’ or an essential ‘Taiwaneseness’. Here, we witness that the KMT’s essentialism triggered the DPP’s essentialist resistance. While the DPP’s reactionary version of ‘Taiwaneseness’ may have been constructed strategically for its practical uses, it also turns out to be a form of de facto essentialism, in turn bringing about other essentialist reactions such as indigenous ‘First Nation’ nationalism (Simon 2009).

However, we also see that bentuhua discourses have inspired the crafting of Taiwanese subjectivity and nationalism, and have also influenced the post-1980s
anthropology of Taiwan. There has since then been a significant move away from the frameworks that typified the 1960s and 1980s – namely, a structure of essential Chineseness – towards the contextualization of Taiwan within its various processes of industrialization, urbanization, democratization, localization and globalization etc. The anthropology of Taiwan today represents plural voices and new claims on multiple histories and narrations in a globalizing web of connections that reach across space and time and suggest a Taiwan in both tension and transition.

This critical review of KMT and DPP nationalisms has further made use of comparisons with Ireland. I consider Taiwan and Ireland as both situated as the Other in processes of colonization. As such, I attempt to demonstrate that it is through the concept of Otherness that Taiwan and Ireland came to be places of distinct histories, marked by difficult formations of subjectivities. This Otherness is also what connects Taiwan and Ireland, through the experience of struggle for self-assertion over hegemonic domination. In both cases, we understand that the inhabitants of an island adjacent to a larger country have had not only to resist political domination and subordinate status, but also to negotiate identities that have been imposed upon them or used to maintain barriers. In the post-colonial era, Ireland and Taiwan have both sought to recover their pre-colonial pasts, as seen in the official recognition of indigenous cultures and languages. However, the present also contains colonial legacies, and I argue that there is the risk that a new ‘official’ identity will be at the expense of the rights of a minority who retain an identity that was formerly hegemonic. In the case of Ireland, that fear led to partition, which in turn led to a continuing conflict over identity in the north of the island. However, through consideration of the on-going struggle for peace in the north of Ireland, a struggle based in an attempt to shift nationalist politics away from identity and onto civility and the processes of democratic government, it becomes possible to imagine an alternative future for Taiwan (and Ireland).

Here, before ending this paper, I would like to raise several questions while arguing for an understanding of national subjectivity that embraces broader perspectives than the narrow frameworks of ethnic and cultural nationalism: Has globalization led to renewed nationalism and the strengthening of boundaries in Taiwan and Ireland? Is ethnicity an essential quality or merely one choice of identification? At what point is essentialism for Taiwan, as a strategy, no longer needed? While strategically it may have been useful as a vehicle for democratic struggle, is a new strategy needed in the second decade of the 21st century, after Taiwan’s transition to democracy? In particular, how should we consider the narration of a subject beyond the subjectivities of imperialism, colonialism and nationalism, and instead in the contexts of transnational cosmopolitanism, digital modernization, and globalization?

In the main discussion of this paper, I show that imperialism, colonialism and nationalism have all imposed specific limits on how people in Taiwan belong together through the identification of a subject with specific intentions and imaginaries and so on. However, a fuller picture needs to consider the development of extended international networks formed by decades of diaspora and immigration, as well as by capitalism and gender politics, which mark the decline of the ethnic nationalist subject and the emergence of new forms and visions of belonging (also see Meaney 2011). Moreover, transnational
cosmopolitan processes expand through the new digital media, alongside older networks of kin and ethnicity, migration and diaspora, according to logics which seem a million miles from the intentions and imaginations of any previous subject. Here, it is important to note that in order to be transnational, it is not necessary to be first a nation; although Taiwan is not recognized as a nation, it is a *de facto* nation-state. Taiwan is situated in a state of what Corcuff calls ‘liminality’, namely, ‘being neither a state nor a non-state’, and he suggests we should ‘explore how liminality can be adapted from an analysis of a transitional period into a focus on spatial inter-connectivity within a timeframe’ (Corcuff in this special issue: 53), in order to study the sociology of Taiwan’s nationalism and international relations. However, whether analysis emphasizes a transitional period or a transnational condition, both represent a different way of thinking about international relations of power in tension, and a new way of connecting with other nations or other places in transition. Thus, we must consider ourselves on the edge of new forms and visions of belonging that bear no relation to old models of ethnic and cultural nationalisms. This requires new concepts and practices – in short, a new language, if we are to be able to make sense of them.

Post-modern critiques by the likes of Edward Soja (1989) suggest that places should no longer be understood to be natural facts or passive objects. Rather, places are constituted or fabricated in and through specific types of human action, social relationships and connections. It is through particular articulations of connectedness and relatedness that places come into being. Indeed, in both Taiwan and Ireland, Chineseness and Britishness, or Taiwanese and Irishness, were and are imagined and invented, with technologies such as printing and the media creating a national bond of solidarity. The narration of the national subject, then, is not the expression of particular ethnic and cultural characteristics, but the social cement of a new kind of greater universalism in the clash of technologies for connectivity. Consequently, I conclude with the thought that we may usefully think of Taiwan and Ireland in a new framework as network societies that can be studied in the light of connectedness and relatedness through which they have been constituted as places in an inter-connected world. In my view, Taiwan’s subjectivity and Irish subjectivity could be enriched by comparing what aspects of ‘Otherness’ are shared, but also by exploring ‘the perspective on what humanity shares’ (Calhoun 2008: 429); namely, the complex webs, links, relationships and connections through which Taiwan and Ireland have both become increasingly (dis) integrated parts of our globalizing world.

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The Liminality of Taiwan: A Case-Study in Geopolitics

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Abstract

This article tries to adapt the anthropological concept of ‘liminality’ to three fields of research: China–Taiwan relations; the ontology of Taiwan Studies; and the conceptual development of geopolitics. Liminality, as translated into these fields, refers here to a spatial/temporal position of ‘geopolitical threshold’, rather than to an in-between, transitional period of time. The concept is used here as a substitute for, or nuanced alternative to, ‘marginality’, with reference to the growing debate over the significance of Taiwan as a geopolitical entity in the face of a China experiencing global renaissance. Beyond this, the paper is also an attempt to reflect upon the historical significance of the emergence of Taiwan since the early seventeenth century, first as a geopolitical object of appropriation or control, and later on as a geopolitical subject of its own, to help reassess Taiwan’s global significance. Finally, this is a contribution to the better understanding of the geopolitics of asymmetrical interdependence between a major state and a minor, neighbouring one, within the wider frame of a geopolitics of values.

Introduction

Since the spring of 2011, a debate has agitated American scholars, observers, and policy-makers about the extent to which Taiwan matters with regard to the national interest of the United States of America. A new perception of Taiwan as an increasingly marginal geopolitical entity in the face of China emerging as a global superpower raises the question of how relevant it is today either to defend or to study Taiwan. At the same time, and since the 2000s at least, there has been an introspective movement among Taiwan specialists about how to define their field with regard to Chinese studies.¹ The convergence of these two issues has produced interesting debates in recent symposia and their preparatory meetings, such as the First World Congress of Taiwan Studies (held in Taipei in April 2012).

¹ For how Taiwan has been misinterpreted as a local example of Chinese culture see Hong and Murray (2005); for what can be said about the ontological relations between Chinese studies and the study of Taiwan, see Corcuff (2010a, 2010b); for how to connect the study of Taiwan, with its specificities, to wider Chinese studies see Lupke (2012).
and recent regional congresses of Taiwan Studies held by the North American, European, and Japanese Associations of Taiwan Studies.²

Taiwan’s Geopolitical Importance

Taiwan’s integration into the world’s written history started late, in the sixteenth century. However, being situated close to both the Japanese and the Chinese empires, and from the early seventeenth century being a European colonial outpost in East Asia, Formosa rapidly emerged as an important geopolitical element of the earlier process of globalization that started with Europe’s colonial expansion. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, Taiwan has had a significantly more important geopolitical role than the size of its territory or population would appear to entail. Is this a ‘Taiwan Paradox’? And is Taiwan unique in this matter, as there are quite a few other places around the world where a small territory has yielded strategic importance, due to reasons such as the positive value attributed to its geographical given, or processes of human settlement, international trade, territorial and national building movements, wars, etc. Examples are numerous, from Gibraltar to Bali or Singapore, from Panama to Okinawa, from the Spratleys and Paracel Islands to the Falkland Islands or Pinnacle Islets.³ Many, obviously, are islands, peninsulas, archipelagos, or straits, and reasons for their special significance may include: being situated on the immediate periphery of one or more important power(s); being on the crossroads of important trade routes; being able to deny or facilitate access to inland or deep-sea regions; possessing, or being reputed to possess, key natural resources; or being on a frontline between two areas of influence.

However, Taiwan’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis China certainly presents an especially high degree of complexity, notably due to the island’s cultural links with China, and to China’s irredentist posture on the Taiwan issue. It is not a mere geographical question of commanding a strait or of access to inland regions.⁴ For geopoliticians, could the study of Formosa’s relation to China help further develop new paradigms applicable to other geopolitical case studies in which a smaller entity has to deal with a larger one, without necessarily being either subject to it or fully free from its influence? Is Taiwan simply a modernized version of ‘Finlandization’, a case among many others of delicate relations with an important neighbour, or is it a specific case, which nevertheless can be compared to others in order to develop geopolitical theory?

Political Agendas and Historical Discourses

Although many studies have reflected on Taiwan’s relationship with China (from historical, economical, societal, and military points of view, among others), these

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³ Better known as Senkaku by the Japanese or Diaoyutai by the Chinese. On this point, please also see the caption for Figure 2.
⁴ In this respect, relations with China appear to be an important dimension of Taiwan Studies, together with more local and domestic issues.
have, regrettably, often consisted of directly- or indirectly-politicized discourses as soon as they have touched upon issues of Taiwan’s history, identity, and belonging. Figure 1 below shows this plurality and evolution of the most vocal discourses over time.

![Figure 1: Competing Discourses of Legitimization Regarding the Taiwan Issue by Political Actors of the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait Since 1941](image)

Such politicized discourses have generally been formulated with the purpose of justifying a particular situation or desired outcome:

- **For China’s Nationalist Party [KMT] and the Republic of China [ROC]:** while still based on the Mainland at that time, the KMT’s aim from 1941 to 1945 was to recover the island ceded to Japan in 1895 by its predecessor regime, the Manchu empire;
- **For the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China [PRC] on the mainland in 1949 and since then:** the CCP’s aim is to annex the island where its archenemy, the KMT, had retreated after losing the civil war, and where the ROC had managed to survive;
- **For the KMT after its retreat to Taiwan:** the KMT’s aim now was (and still is) to justify its hold on its last shelter, which had been integrated into China only recently before the KMT’s exile to the island, and with difficulty (the 1947 massacre of the Taiwanese elite by Chinese troops);
- **For the movement for Taiwan’s autonomy within China (1945–1946, after Taiwan’s integration in ROC), and the Taiwan independence movement**
(since the 1947 events): the aim is to justify Taiwan’s independence vis-à-vis the now-insularized Republic of China, change its name, and sever relations (including constitutional links) with the continental past of the Republic ‘of China’.

Each constructed discourse was aimed at describing the nature of Taiwan–China relations in a way that justified inclusion, appropriation, or independence, subjection, proximity or distantiation. The politicized rewriting of Taiwan’s history by Chinese authorities started in fact with the 1937–1945 Sino-Japanese war, and not before. More specifically, the changed started with Chiang Kai-Shek’s first mention of Taiwan, around 1941, as a topic of modern Chinese nationalism, in the context of mobilization against Japan.

A Recent Element in Chinese Nation-Building Discourse

Before 1941, Taiwan was of little interest for China and the Chinese. ‘In the 1930s, before the war against Japan, none of us in China would really care about Taiwan’, recalled an old, first-generation ‘Mainlander’ (外省人) resident of Taiwan in a discussion with the author in 1997. As this interviewee suggested, with the war against Japan, perceptions started to change.

After the ‘Mukden incident’ of 18 September 1931, by which Japan started its invasion of Manchuria, mobilization against Japan was launched. Maps of the Republic of China started specifically to emphasize the loss of Taiwan to Japan in 1895, in accordance with the treaty of Shimonoseki, by the Manchu empire after its defeat by Japan in the 1894–1895 war. For instance, a learned society in Shanghai, by the name of Rixin Yudi Xueshe (日新輿地學社), published in 1932 a ‘New Map of China’s Situation’ (新中華形勢大地圖) (see Figure 2 overleaf), listing recent foreign aggressions which had led to portions of Chinese territory being ‘cut off’ [‘割’] from the motherland. An emphasis was clearly put on Manchuria, called (for political reasons) the ‘Three [North] Eastern Provinces’ (東三省). The map also listed all previous losses, including feudatory but independent states, such as Burma, while, interestingly, nothing was said about Hong Kong. Taiwan, however, was now listed as having been ‘cut off and given to Japan’ (‘割於日’ in the twenty-first year of Guangxu, or 1895.

Taiwan had thus become a new element in China’s discourse on national humiliation. However, if ‘irredentism’ is the refusal to accept current boundaries and the wish to see a territory that has been lost to a foreign country, or which has declared independence, incorporated back into the motherland, the young Chinese Republic in 1932 did not yet express irredentism over a small island lost decades before by another regime, the Qing dynasty.

In 1936, just a few months before Chiang Kai-Shek was forced by the ‘Young Marshall’ Chang Hsüeh-Liang, during the Xi’an Incident, into a KMT-CCP alliance against the Japanese, Taiwan was still not yet an issue in mobilizing China against Japan: it was simply an argument in a discursive construction of the Japanese enemy, in reaction to Tokyo’s imperialism in China. That year, in a government map published by the Bureau of Roads of the Economic Council of China (全國經
In Figure 2, the ‘New Map of China’s Situation’ (‘蘇甲榮編裝，新中華形勢大地圖，上海’), 1932 (Private collection).

(Left: ‘Do not forget national humiliation [毋望國恥]: swift occupation [本佔] of the three [north]eastern provinces of our country [after the incident of] 18 September 1931; the [first] war of Shanghai of 28 January 1932’. Right: ‘Taiwan. Cut off in the twenty-first year of Guangxu [1895] and given to Japan’ [In red: ‘光緒二十一年割於日’]).

Pictures by Stéphane Corcuff, 2007

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6 One may notice that the then-named Pinnacle Islets do not appear on this map, even though the scale would have permitted it. These islands have been hotly disputed territory between China, Taiwan, and Japan since the 1960s, and are now known as either the Diaoyutai or the Senkakus.
Around 1941, Chiang Kai-Shek started to incorporate Taiwan into a discourse vilifying Japan and aimed at mobilizing China against the Japanese, or rallying the people behind himself. Since then, Taiwan has remained constantly on the Chinese agenda as a symbol of national division, except during the years 1945–1949, when it was effectively integrated into the Republic. From 'cut off and given to Japan', Taiwan would become 'stolen by the Japanese', as indicated in the joint declaration made by the press attachés of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-Shek, the three allied leaders who had met in Cairo in December 1943. This was part of the so-called ‘Cairo Declaration’; from a neutral mention of a historical fact, the discourse had changed into a political claim: China had become irredentist.

However, it is still only with the retreat of the central government of the Republic of China to Taipei on 7 December 1949 that Taiwan specifically became a stake – both in China’s domestic geopolitics (between the now two Chinese governments) and in Chinese historiography. Not even the Sino-Japanese war of 1937–1945 had achieved this. With the events of 1949, Taiwan became a place of exile for the defeated regime of the Republic of China, and a place to be conquered for the newly founded People’s Republic of China, which was unhappy to see the ROC still surviving on the other side of the strait. Both regimes had to legitimize their official goals: on one side, ‘Taking back the Mainland’ was the stance of the ROC, now reduced to the recently recovered island; on the other, ‘Liberating the Island’ was the goal of the PRC on the Mainland. Both regimes, though, also tried to legitimize another agenda: for the ROC on Taiwan, emphasizing that Taiwan belonged to China was a justification for the policy of suppressing the Taiwan independence movement, which threatened to eradicate the remains of the Republic of China. It also helped to avoid facing the truth: the regime was in a sort of exile, as the so-called 1945 ‘retrocession’ had not technically happened in international law, in the absence of a formal treaty between the ROC and Japan at
that time. For the PRC, meanwhile, the goal was to eradicate the Republic of China, which had not fully disappeared, to bring Chiang Kai-Shek back to the Mainland and to put a formal end to the civil war. This would consecrate the People’s Republic’s full and undeniable status as successor to the Republic. Figure 4 below shows how claims by Chinese government(s) regarding sovereignty over Taiwan have evolved.

The exile of the KMT on Taiwan represents the opposite end of the spectrum in historiography of Taiwan’s years of change, starting from 1941. Both the ROC, reduced to Taiwan, and the PRC, longing to put a formal end to its predecessor regime, had to explain that Taiwan was fully a part of China, had always been so, had been wrongfully stolen by the Japanese in 1895, and had been formally restored to China in 1945. Such a discourse was formulated with China’s division into two competing governments, and not earlier. In September 1945, after the Japanese capitulation, although General Douglas MacArthur had agreed to the occupation of Taiwan by Chiang Kai-Shek’s troops, the island was still not mentioned as a part of Chinese territory in official documents (which the ROC would discursively turn into a formal ‘retrocession’ act), such as the official China

![Figure 4: Evolving Discourses Regarding the Issue of Sovereignty over Taiwan by Mainland Governments since 1895](image)

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7 The legal reality of that 1945 ‘restoration’, called ‘glorious’ in Chinese (光復), being a much more complex issue that the two governments claimed.
insisting on the ‘patriotic resistance’ of ‘Formosan Revolutionists’ against the Japanese and in favour Chinese recovery of the Island, the passages about Taiwan in the edition published in 1947, more than a year and a half after Taiwan’s return into Chinese hands, still had not been updated from the description of Taiwan as a Japanese colony in the first, 1945, edition (see particularly pp. 33–34). Similarly, Taiwan is significantly absent from a list of provinces of the official Chinese territory (p. 1–3, see Figure 5 below).

Figure 5: Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 1937–1945: A Comprehensive Survey of Major Developments in China in Eight Years of War (New York: Macmillan, 1947)
It was, apparently, only when Chiang started to consider Formosa as a probable retreat, around 1948, that Taiwan’s strategic importance started to be seriously considered.8

Focus of This Paper

As Duara (1995), Détienne (2003, 2010), and several others have reminded us, ‘national narratives’ have tended to cluster history into rigid and politicized historiographical frames. Following decades of such politicization in the historiography of China–Taiwan relations, there is, today, a need to re-examine the nature of Taiwan’s complex relation to China, and to understand it from a pure, yet integrated and multi-dimensional, geopolitical perspective that does not aim at justifying a particular political or nation-building program. This understanding is a precondition for the development of Taiwan studies as a genuinely academic field both inside and outside the borders of Taiwan, including both in China and in the rest of the world.

This paper does not explore relations between aboriginal peoples and Taiwanese of Chinese (and often Chinese-aboriginal) ancestry, where the notion of ‘marginality’ can be mobilized in addressing the status of aboriginal people in Taiwan, at least before the early 1990s and the presidential administrations of Lee Teng-Hui (1988–2000) and Chen Shui-Bian (2000–2008).9 Neither does it grapple substantially with Taiwan’s relation to Japan, where some dimensions of what will be described here as ‘liminality’ can also be applied. When qualifying Taiwan as ‘liminal’, this paper is not either an attempt to describe or analyse Taiwan’s ethnicity, pluralistic culture, national identifications, or position in the world (such as being a gateway to another region, a nodus of contacts in a globalized world, a territory unable to choose between different national identities or a state left in a limbo of poor diplomatic recognition and ambiguity about its status in international law). Though the concept may be extended in these directions if our use of liminality here is proven to be valid or useful, characterizing Taiwan as ‘liminal’ in this paper focuses on just one of Taiwan’s important geopolitical relations with the outside world: the relation that the island has to, or with, China. Perhaps a paradigmatic element will be identified, which, mutatis mutandis, may guide geopoliticists in analysing relations in other, partially similar yet always specific situations in the world. Such situations may be found where there is, or has been, a strong geopolitical entity interacting with a smaller one that has, in spite of its smaller size, a word to say in an asymmetrical political and discursive exchange. This is often the case in the geopolitics of values; here, as often, an imbalanced one, in which actors mobilize what they see as worth fighting for – the difference

8 More specifically, Chiang Kai-Shek started to prepare for a retreat as early as 1948. Several signs indicate this, such as the transfer to Taiwan of the treasures of the National Palace Museum (initially to Taichung), and of some political prisoners, and of the faculty members of the Peking University (to Taipei) that year.
9 In mentioning aboriginal issues, I follow here Scott Simon’s (University of Ottawa) recommendation not to capitalize the words ‘aboriginal’ or ‘aborigine’, as they are not ethnic terms per se, and would deny each group’s specificities as a nation equipped with its own language, cultural habits and myths.
between values and norms – in order (a minima) to protect their values at home, and (a maxima), when considered necessary, to impose them to others, outside their boundaries.

Following this introduction to a geopolitics of values in international society, as well as to the asymmetrical nature of cross-strait relations and the precautions to be taken when addressing questions of Taiwan’s status, historiography, and belonging, the paper will continue with a brief review of different theories that can be mobilized to characterize Taiwan’s relation to China, along with a short explanation of why they appear to be of little help. Building on this, the paper attempts to identify some of the most salient traits of Taiwan’s relation to China, although it should be borne in mind that, depending on one’s angle of approach, several other key traits could probably also be isolated, which are not mentioned here. The paper then proposes to translate, adapt, and further develop the anthropological notion of ‘liminality’ into the field of geopolitics. Such a translation has been attempted previously, but without the concept being substantially adapted to the specific needs of geopolitics, or at least without it being used in a way that really addresses situations that are both temporal and spatial (‘spatio-temporelles’), rather than based only on a change in time, as supposed by the original anthropological approach of Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner. The paper will then characterize Taiwan’s ‘discursive and geopolitical liminality vis-à-vis China’, by mobilizing several examples pertaining to different disciplines. The paper concludes that translating liminality in geopolitics is not about describing a transitional phase, but rather about describing a space of connexion developed over a long period of time.

The Difficulty of Characterizing Taiwan’s Relations to China with Existing Theories

Understanding the nature of Taiwan’s relation to China certainly has to be made with reference to what Fernand Braudel called ‘longue durée’ (which can be rendered in English as ‘history in the long haul’). Reducing the focus to the current state of cross-strait relations, or merely going back to the post-World War II period, would limit the capacities of an analyst to detect the complexities of a relationship constructed over a much longer timeframe. Unfortunately, proponents of politicized discourses justifying unification or independence often lack a sense of precise historical facts. For an analyst, whose purpose is to deconstruct existing historiographies, Taiwan’s relation to China is a complex object that is ‘neither this nor that’, and that yet still needs to be identified and characterized.

The Ancient Knowledge of Taiwan

Clearly-documented relations between China and Taiwan started to develop in the late sixteenth century, when the declining Ming dynasty had fallen prey to Sino-Japanese piratical activity on its southeastern coasts and to Manchu pressure on its northern frontier. Earlier knowledge of Taiwan by China is possible, but it is neither formally attested to by historical documents, nor supported by the overall geopolitical logic of pre-Ming dynasties’ weak interest in exploration and exploitation of overseas territories (the Song dynasty [960–1279] had developed a
powerful commercial navy, but we have no record of a discovery of Taiwan during this period). In the post-2008 political debate over textbooks in Taiwan, characterized by a methodical attempt at the resinicization of Taiwan (Corcuff, 2011, Chapter 2), an old idea has been advanced again: that the reference to the ‘discovery’ of a mythical territory – Yizhou (夷洲) – during an expedition in 230 CE, which is found in Chen Shou’s Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms (三國志) (吳書, Book of Wu), written in the late third century CE, is the first mention of Taiwan in a Chinese text. But this cannot be scientifically established, considering the paucity and vagueness of information given, and could be equally the Ryukyus, the Penghus, or even north Philippines. And in any case, knowledge of a place does not mean possession, and discovery is not equivalent to actual appropriation: Wherever the explorers went, they did not settle there and never attempted to return. Instead, the debate exemplified the determination of the pro-unification camp of today (on both sides of the Taiwan straits) to justify Taiwan’s belonging to China ‘since ancient ages’ (從古時代, as the Chinese say), even though academic work in Chinese and foreign languages has long attested the limited, if not non-existent, knowledge of Taiwan by China before the Ming Dynasty (Cartier 1983; Zheng 1995; T.-J. Chen 2005).

The Pivotal Seventeenth Century

With wide-ranging geopolitical changes at play in the region throughout the seventeenth century (the arrival of Western colonial powers, the decline of the Ming Dynasty, the beginning of the invasion of China by the Manchus, and the last decades of Japan’s maritime activities followed by the Shogunate’s ‘Closed Country’ policy for Japan), China’s perceptions of Taiwan started to evolve from a historic attitude characterized by poor knowledge and cultural prejudice, suspicion, and even fear, into a more acute perception of Taiwan as bearing a geopolitical significance. The process was long, spanning all of the seventeenth century, but it was especially the case after Taiwan was seized from Dutch colonial hands in 1661 by the Chinese Zheng clan, a pro-Ming Chinese family of businessmen at sea (or, to some, ‘pirates’). However, this sudden interest in Taiwan by the Manchu court post-1661 was prompted by the Zhengs’ aggression against the newly conquered Chinese territory of the Manchu empire, and did not include an interest in Taiwan per se. Nor, until the early months of 1684, did this interest mean any desire to incorporate the recently Sinicized regions of Taiwan as parts of the Qing/Manchu Empire. The aim was primarily to put an end to the Zheng family’s attempts to restore the Ming Dynasty in China, and to the Zhengs’ constant denial that the Manchu people had now the heavenly mandate to rule over the Chinese people. For that, the Manchus had to destroy the Zhengs’ island bastion (Wong 1983; Corcuff 2011).

During the pivotal decades of 1624–1684 – between the arrival of the Dutch on Formosa and the incorporation of the newly Han-populated plains of the island into the Manchu Empire – not only the court in Peking, but also a multitude of other actors developed their own perceptions of Taiwan and of continent–island relations; perceptions that were varied and complex from the very beginning. With the great development of Taiwan historiography in recent decades, in no instance can it be suggested that Taiwan was simply ‘this’ or ‘that’ for the Chinese, or for
the Manchus, or for itself, without the risk of simplifying what is now known of the past.

Geopolitics and Axiological Neutrality

Geopolitics studies how geographical territories are turned into places invested by human memories and projects in contexts of interaction and competition over land and power when bare geography is augmented by memories, projects, and values. Geopolitics, as a study of this augmented reality, is supposed to listen to a plurality of competing discourses and projects that make territories multi-dimensional – from the geographic to the historical, and from the ideological to the emotional – without making distinctions between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, at least in the personal values of the analyst. It is by its nature an invitation to take into consideration the multiple ways that situations are perceived by a great variety of stakeholders, rather than an attempt to determine an essential geopolitical ‘truth’.

Can such a geopolitical approach be of help to better understand the plurality of actors in the history of cross-strait relations and their respective perceptions?

There is not ‘One’ Single Chinese Way to Look at Taiwan

In the decades and centuries that followed the progressive integration of initially limited portions of Taiwan’s southwestern plain as an overseas extension of the Qing Empire, Manchu and Chinese actors developed a set of perceptions, in which different and sometimes self-contradictory dimensions were intertwined: fear and prejudice, estrangement, appropriation, rejection, policies of subjectivization and dependency, jealousy, hate, and a feeling of cultural proximity. Each can be historically dated; they form a nexus of interrelated passions (clearly an object of interest to geopolitical studies), and a system of perceptions that have shaped policies as well as individuals’ decisions over the course of cross-strait history.

Taiwan’s relation to China cannot be reduced to one of subjectivization only, of merely a succession of waves of colonial or colonial-like domination by powers originating from the mainland.¹⁰ As a brief introduction to the idea of Taiwan as a liminal territory, it could be noted that, from the onset, Taiwan was in many respects treated differently from other Chinese provinces by the ruling Qing/Manchu dynasty (Corcuff 2006). The relationship was not, or not only and not always, that of a sheer and self-confident domination by the centre over a docile periphery. Among the theoretical tools that can be mobilized to better understand the nature of such a relationship, which ones could be of help? Could hegemony, imperialism, centre–periphery relations, be useful keys?

¹⁰ These are the Zheng (1661–1683), the Manchus (1684–1895), and, following the Japanese period, the Republic of China. This third period can be divided into (1) 1945 to 1949, in which year the KMT government crossed the strait to relocate itself at the margin of its official national territory; and (2) the period up to the years of 1992/1996, before the Taiwanese were finally allowed to elect representatives (for parliament in 1992 and the presidency in 1996) solely elected by the inhabitants of Taiwan and its associated islands of Lanyü, Lütao, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.
As discussed below, various notions, concepts, and paradigms are available to help us characterize aspects of this relationship. However, these can never be fully applicable; hence the need for a further concept that may, initially at least, be applied specifically to Taiwan’s relation to China. It would then remain to be seen whether this could be adapted into a paradigm applicable to other case studies, to help Taiwan studies, from an epistemological point of view, to consist not only of concepts imported from abroad and applied to Taiwan (particularly from the European and American academies), but also of elaborations derived from Taiwan studies and exported abroad into relevant disciplinary fields of study.

**Centre–Periphery**

It is tempting to characterize Taiwan’s relation to China as one of periphery and centre, after the large Manchu empire progressively established a Qing administration on part of the small island in 1684. This perspective may also be commonly applied in the future, if growing economic integration between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (or whatever regime may succeed it), leads to the reorganization of cooperation between the two on the world economic stage, and, perhaps, of a political restructuring of the China–Taiwan ensemble.

The complexity of the *centre–periphery* paradigm was illustrated long ago, when Chen Chi-Nan elaborated his notion of the ‘indigenization’ (土著化) of Chinese culture in Taiwan in 1975. This was subsequently critiqued by Lee Kuo-Chi, who opposed it with the idea of Taiwan’s ‘integration into the centre’ of the Chinese Empire (內地化) (C.-N. Chen 1991). Political passions in this debate usually hide the fact that the two ideas address different dimensions of the Taiwan–China relation over the *longue durée*; one cultural, the other geopolitical. In some respects the two views are not incompatible. Integration into the Manchu Empire is a fact, but it was made possible through the localization and hybridization of Chinese culture in Taiwan, in a society where non-Chinese influences have been numerous and are more ancient than Chinese influences. Further, more than an *integration* of Taiwan within a neighbouring empire, we can consider the events of 1684 and the subsequent extensions of Qing rule on parts of the island as an overseas *expansion* – in French, we could here coin the word ‘*outremerisation*’ (and, in Chinese, ‘海外化’) – of the empire. Is there room for an approach that could reconcile the two points of view, and which could allow us to understand Taiwan in its complex specificity, apart from any political agenda?

The centre–periphery paradigm, however, seems to lack historical validity, for several reasons. Less than a century after Taiwan’s integration into the Manchu empire, China’s southern provinces had already become dependent on Taiwanese grain, to the point that when typhoons or social unrest in Taiwan destabilized transportation, there were food shortages on the mainland (Corcuff 2006). In terms of economic development, Taiwan in 1945, when the latter integrated the island into its territory following fifty years of Japanese rule, was considered to be much more advanced than China. In 1949, the periphery (Taiwan) of the Chinese metropole was chosen for the relocation – in Taipei – of the central government of the Republic of China, and the Chinese mainland political centre (as perceived in the Republican Chinese and Chiang Kai-Shek’s eyes, at least) was thus displaced onto its own, recently re-included insular periphery, while claiming to be a centre...
only temporarily displaced, with legitimacy to rule over all of China. As for the present situation, China and Taiwan are, in purely geopolitical terms, two sovereign states, each of which considers itself to be a centre *per se*, at times contesting the other’s legitimacy to speak for itself. This is even the case in the complex discourse of the Ma administration since 2008, which tries somehow to combine antagonistic objectives: the defence of Taiwan’s interests; progress towards unification; engaging China; and clinging to an outdated definition of the ROC’s national boundaries that encompasses the mainland. That definition had been virtually abandoned for nearly two decades already, by the previous KMT administration of Lee Teng-Hui (1988–2000), not to mention by the pro-independence administration of Chen Shui-Bian (2000–2008). In addition, although most observers see the balance of forces between the two states, in both military and economic terms, as shifting towards China, China cannot yet regard Taiwan as a ‘small problem’. Instead, it still has to patiently negotiate with Taiwan’s authorities, whether these authorities be cooperative or reluctant.

To conclude, viewing Taiwan as ‘peripheral’ is by definition a continent-centred point of view, which appears legitimate only because of China’s past and present influence over Taiwan. However, it forgets the amount of historical material that can establish Taiwan’s insertion into world (economic) networks since the early seventeenth century. In great part, this is a bias induced by our habit of looking at, assessing, and interpreting Taiwan from the viewpoint of the Continent, of China, of Chinese archives, and of an Empire. An insular-centred point of view would reject this, ‘disimperializing’ and ‘decontinentalizing’ our perceptions of Taiwan. A good example was given by the Chen Shui-Bian administration when it published a series of maps showing different Taiwans: Taiwan facing the sea, or with a south orientation, or placed at the centre of a world projection. The series (see Figure 6 overleaf) was entitled *Whirling Ocean, Beautiful Island* (*婆娑之洋, 美麗之島*), reflecting a rhetoric typical of the pro-independence movement, which considers Taiwan to be a ‘beautiful ocean nation’.

This illustrates the limited validity of the classic centre–periphery frame of analysis. Perhaps the China-leaning policies of President Ma’s administration (2008– ) are indeed giving more validity to this perspective (Chow ed. 2012); however, for reasons linked to Taiwan’s democratic structure, a now China-leaning government of Taiwan can go only so far in accommodating Beijing, at least officially. In an unofficial dialogue at South Taiwan’s Chang Jung Christian University in November 2011 between scholars across the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese scholar and Taiwan specialist Liu Guoshen (刘国深), head of the Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University, noted for instance that ‘now that China and Taiwan are developing relations, we cannot continue to oppose centre and periphery’.

Arguably, the KMT’s stance on the issue is very complex, especially since the return of the KMT to the presidency of the Republic in 2008: while it is still trying to maintain that Taiwan is a centre of its own (but not as an independent country *per se*), in order to defend its interests, the KMT has however returned to a former rhetoric of insisting heavily on the idea that the official and constitutional territory of the Republic of China, now reduced to Taiwan, is the whole of China.
Dependency and Empire

Taiwan being governed by the Republic of China, although recognized as a sovereign entity by a few states only, invalidates the possibility of using the classic paradigm of empire to analyse relations between the island and the People’s Republic of China. How about dependency theory? The current administration’s strategy of progressively opening Taiwan to Chinese investment may increase this interdependence, but it may also, by providing Taiwan’s economy with an increased source of speculation, undermine efforts to diversify sources of profit and increase China’s influence over Taiwan’s economy (Chow, ed. 2012.). Dependency may increase if Taiwan’s administration focuses primarily on one market, whether or not this is done with a view to future unification with China. However, dependency theory cannot be completely helpful, as Taiwan does not play the role of provider of raw materials for China’s industrial machine. Although Taiwan is increasingly dependent economically on Chinese manpower, the island continues to provide capital and high technology to China, and uses China’s cheap labour to export to the world. There is also Taiwan’s contemporary cultural influence on China: in addition to exporting capital and technology, Taiwan exports (at least to the youth, and to Chinese urban areas) its way of life, including its pop
music, food habits and delicacies, and some screen productions (films and entertainment). In terms of cross-strait economic relations, asymmetric economic interdependence seems a more accurate way to characterize the situation.

**Hegemony and the Geopolitics of Values**

In the early 1990s, a group of scholars around the UK-based Hong Kong academic Steve Tsang started to raise the issue of a ‘shadow of China’ over Taiwan (Tsang ed. 1993). Twenty years later, the issue had become central to political and academic debates in Taiwan (see Figure 7 below). Could hegemony therefore be a more interesting approach? After all, as China appears to be in the process of becoming a regional hegemon, one can suggest that Taiwan might well be its primary target, due to the PRC’s longstanding irredentist posture on the issue of sovereignty over the island.¹² As the theory of hegemony, properly speaking, postulates neither inclusion nor the full power of coercion, it could be an attractive concept with which to describe Taiwan–China relations.

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¹² ‘Irredentism’ is surprisingly often misunderstood as ‘secessionism’. Irredentism does not designate the policies of a country wishing to obtain independence from another, but the policies and discourse of a country emphasizing its ‘right’ to rule, often justified by history, over a territory now independent or ruled by another country, which used to be part of its national territory. It denotes a rejection of the state as defined by existing boundaries.
In addition, the notion of hegemony, as most notably defined by Gramsci, refers to shared values: the hegemon cannot exert influence on states simply by pure force, but instead imposes consent on willing states because they consider the hegemon to be able to represent them and defend their interests. Several sovereign states can hence coexist in a system in which one hegemonic state has an enduring influence over others, without necessarily imposing specific demands. Although ‘ba’ (霸 – hegemon/y) refers today in Chinese to despotic rule, and to a government of force rather than law, in ancient times, it had a more sophisticated meaning. In Confucius’ Analects (論語), it refers to the legitimate authority that a central state has over feudatories; and as we know, legitimacy is a constructed perception of how a relation between a ruler and a ruled ‘must be’, based on the principle of shared values and explicitly consented submission to this authority.

As Robert Keohane (1984) has observed, a hegemonic state, as opposed to an imperial state, cannot impose its norms without a degree of consent from the other states. Here we find the fundamental difference between norms and values: norms are imposed, and they are respected because they have become rules, not necessarily because people believe in them; values, however, refer to shared beliefs; they are, at least originally, shared and accepted because members of a community – or at least the founding members of such a community – give or gave a fundamental value to such values. The international system is, to some extent, moved by and organized around a geopolitics of values (of States, NGOs, the UN…) that determines, along with other dimensions, much of the relations between its actors. In summary, if China exerts a strong influence on Taiwan; if Taiwan shares some values with China (Taiwan’s government oftentimes considers itself and Taiwan as ‘Chinese’); and if China has to negotiate with Taiwan, then hegemony as a concept seems to describe quite well some important aspects of this relation.

However, hegemony is originally and by definition formulated to analyse the power of one dominant or hegemonic state among an inter-state system, and it cannot be applied without adaptation to a two-state system. Simply adapting the concept and giving it a new dimension could certainly overcome this problem easily. However, another problem would have to be addressed: the particularities of Taiwan’s relations with China encompass more than these few elements, of a type of hegemony consisting of an imbalanced interdependence and shared values. The liminality of Taiwan is also based on a form of discursive power that Taiwan retains on Chinese affairs: as a free region close to China and heavily influenced by its culture, Taiwan has something to say about China and to China, which in turns makes it something more than a geopolitical entity to be merely ‘liberated’, controlled, or ‘pacified’. The small island retains this ability in spite of China’s immensity, prestige, wealth, and power, perhaps because Taiwan protected some of China’s treasures: knowledge, a memory, archives and cultural treasures, as well some of the world’s best expertise on Chinese affairs. And considering the propensity of Chinese to view their culture as central, immensely rich, and superior, the fact that Taiwan may keep a memory of things that China has forgotten, an understanding of subtle elements of Chinese knowledge that China has lost, is likely to be a complicating factor in an otherwise simple model. There is something more than a partially consented to, partially rejected hegemony
of China over Taiwan. Obviously, we need to add some more complexity to the model.

**Comparison and Variation: Is Taiwan a ‘Case Study’?**

Taiwan’s relationship to China comprises elements of cultural proximity and difference, and factors bringing the two sides together as well as driving them apart. Within Taiwan, there are also processes of preservation, indigenization, and rejection of elements of Chinese culture. Does this make Taiwan specific in the world of geopolitics?

Samuel Huntington tended to establish a rather strict division of the world into clearly distinguishable cultures, as embodied by his ‘map of civilizations’ at the opening of *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996) – a surprisingly simplified description in a book otherwise more balanced than it may appear. As an alternative to his view, can we view the world as composed of a continuum of human cultures, a *continuum of differences* neither in a homogenizing, linear movement nor separated into several perfectly distinct cultures? In such a scheme, what would make an entity specific would be less the various elements of human culture that it ‘contains’ than the specific combination of such elements of culture, combinations that would be specific to each given culture.

Geographic insularity probably does not suffice to make Taiwan a unique entity – which is not equivalent to saying that it does not play a role in shaping cultural, social, and political identities – and hence comparisons can and should be conducted with other parts of the world. However, are not the various ‘elements’ (geography, history of mentalities, geopolitical status etc.) that turn Taiwan into a distinct human society, into a particular geopolitical entity, and into a noteworthy spatial-temporal segment of the world’s geography and history, combined in a way that is specific to Taiwan, and proper to that particular human society? Reflecting on Taiwan as a contemporary field of study, framed within the background of a *compared historical geopolitics* of Taiwan (from the seventeenth to twenty-first centuries), the purpose of this question would be to consider to what extent Taiwan has a ‘historical significance’ that makes it a legitimate field of study *per se*, whether the study be limited to Taiwan’s various levels of locality or enlarged to consider Taiwan’s interactions with its regional and global environments. This possibly ‘unique combination’ of nevertheless shared features (in different combinations, by other entities) can be studied *geopolitically*. This is not meant narrowly, as studying a balance of forces (which is the field of strategic studies), economic interaction (or geo-economy), or Taiwan’s place in public and private global society (sociology of international relations). Geopolitics is broadly conceived of here as including sociological, political, economic, historical, legal, and military approaches, providing a holistic framework for understanding a relation of power in tension. In our case, it addresses Taiwan’s relations with China over a longer timeframe.

Our understanding of these multiple factors leads us to consider that the specific combination of geopolitical features that characterizes Taiwan’s relation to China as a case study is composed at least of the following basic diacritical dimensions, to which numerous others could certainly be added, depending on perspective:
A major state, internationally recognized, exerting diplomatic, political, economic, and societal influence on a minor state that is poorly-recognized diplomatically;

A minor state, in which society is divided between different political identifications and programs: these include formal independence; recognition of its present status by the neighbouring hegemon; or compromising and avoiding conflict;\(^{13}\)

The culture of the hegemon being the principal but not unique source (nor, historically, the first) of the cultural matrix of the minor territory;

A complex inter-dependency (economic links, but also global strategic situation), which means that the dominant or hegemonic state cannot use force to re-conquer the minor state;

The unfolding of a series of strategies (including economic relations, influence on media, diplomatic pressure, or engagement) to constrain the policies of the minor and sovereign state, in order to obtain favourable changes within a wider *status quo* to ensure hegemony, and perhaps ultimately to alter fundamentally the *status quo* in order to overcome the minor state’s sovereignty;

A proportion of the society and polity of the minor state being sensitive to some of the discourses of the major state, for reasons of cultural proximity (common ancestry, diasporic identity, etc.), which prevents the minor state from adopting a unified and firm response to the pressure exerted by the major state.\(^{14}\)

**Liminality and Geopolitics**

We have seen that the specificity (as distinct from the idea of a ‘uniqueness’), of Taiwan’s relation to China cannot be explained fully by the few paradigms mentioned above; hence the necessity of a new concept with which to understand the complex frame of relations in their spatial and temporal dimensions.

Liminality is a concept well known to anthropologists, originating in the French scholar Arnold van Gennep’s 1909 opus, *Les rites de passage*. The book addresses the transitional periods between two states of life, such as (among many others) between childhood and adulthood, which are often accompanied by ‘rites of passage’ established by group cultures to mark the passage symbolically and materially. Later popularized and extended by the American anthropologist Victor Turner at the very end of the 1960s, the concept of liminality addresses a

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\(^{13}\) In Taiwan’s case, it is understood that a formal peace treaty is too delicate to proceed with due to the hegemon’s irredentist view of the adverse state’s territory, as a peace treaty would give equal acknowledgment to the latter’s sovereignty.

\(^{14}\) As suggested by the author in a recent book, the mixed feelings experienced by most Taiwanese of recent mainland origin (the so-called ‘Mainlanders’) in terms of national identification towards both Taiwan and China, express Taiwan’s position as a liminal place *vis-à-vis* the country from which they have come, at least for first generation migrants. In other words, the anthropological liminality (中介時期／地帶／狀況) of *Waishengren* in Taiwan is directly linked to Taiwan’s geopolitical liminality (閾境性) *vis-à-vis* China (Corcuff 2011: 116–188).
phenomenon inscribed in a timeframe, although its Latin origin, ‘limen’, or ‘threshold’, refers to a physical place. Liminality is an in-between period during which an individual is in transition between a state of life that (s)he has not yet fully left, and a new stage into which (s)he has not fully entered. Rites of passage are often public, as they have to be attended (at least at some point) by members of the community who witness, share, control, or support. As shown by Turner, the new status acquired after the transitional period confers an increased dignity or respectability, or in any case another status in life that may be conferred either permanently or for the duration of a period that precedes the next status.

A number of scholars have attempted to introduce the notion of liminality into the sociology of nationalism and into the study of international relations. However, their use of liminality most often still aims at describing an in-between, transitional position unfolding in most cases within a timeframe; in other words, and to put it simply, a period of change. Is it possible, and useful, to further import, adapt, reconstruct, and develop the idea of liminality by reconnecting the notion with its spatial dimension, as suggested by the Latin origin of the word? The aim is to construct a time- and space-based tool to analyse the relations of a smaller geopolitical object situated at the margin of a larger geopolitical one, and interacting with it in a scheme more complex than that of a dominant centre to a dominated margin. This integrated concept of liminality should not exclude timescapes: history in the long haul is the canvas on which geopolitical complexities progressively develop, and the means by which human-appropriated territories are turned, over extended periods of time, into social spaces of memories that bear political projects. This leads to the field of geopolitics as soon as any frontier is crossed by any actor, factor, or idea touching upon the balance of power between different centres of production of values.

The concept of liminality is not yet widely used in geopolitics and international relations, although it is a popular analytic tool in sociology, cultural studies, and post-colonial theory. However, a recent move to apply liminality to international studies (sociology of international relations/geopolitics) has started to explore how liminality can be adapted from an analysis of a transitional period into a focus on spatial inter-connectivity within a timeframe. Wang Hung-Luen (2001), who studies Taiwan, used the word in the early 2000s with the meaning of psychological inbetweenness, or, more accurately, of being ‘neither-this-nor-that’: he argues that Taiwan is presently in a state of liminality, being neither a state nor a non-state; at least inform the perspective of an approach focusing on the sociology of nationalism. This is based on an understanding, which is frequent, of ‘liminality’ as expressing vagueness, a limbo period, a time of ‘undeterminedness’, even though the original theorists of the notion, van Gennep and Turner, have on the contrary insisted on the codification (with rites of passage) of that non-status, which is ispo facto a sort of status, in a transitional trajectory from a clearly defined state to a clearly defined other state. Wang departs from this and uses liminality in a more ‘common’ understanding of the word. He also makes an implicit reference to space rather than to time, by changing the traditional ‘中介’ (jiè, being between) into ‘中界’ (jiè, territory, boundary) as his Chinese translation of the anthropological ‘liminality’ (Wang 2001: 286–287), as a subtle reference to Taiwan’s situation at the margin of a huge country that denies it the quality of a sovereign state.
Another example is Higgott and Nossal (2008), who have written about how Australian society has been repositioning itself as a part of Asia’s renaissance through an increasing perception of belonging to Asia, in contrast to Australia’s traditional self-perception as an overseas Anglo-Saxon society closely linked to Britain. This is a first attempt to theorize a ‘geopoliticized’ liminality, although it still applies the concept to describe changing geographical perceptions over a period of time. For Higgott and Nossal, Australia is in a liminal phase of reorientation; they do not consider, for instance, Australia as being in a liminal state of connectedness between, or next to, both the East and the West. This approach, nevertheless, clearly applies to a situation that concerns contemporary geopolitics. It is also the case with Maria-Ruxandra Stoicescu’s (2008) work on Romania’s self-construction as a liminal place, first during the process of post-communist modernization, and then within the frame of its integration into the European Union, integrates both time and space, although over a shorter timeframe than is proposed in our analysis of the Taiwan case study.

As a fourth example, Lerna Yanik (2009, 2011) has shown how Turkey has attempted to construct, for itself and for the rest of world, an image of itself as an exceptional country (Turkey’s ‘exceptionalism’), imbued with an ‘inbetweenness’ that can be interpreted, in the author’s eyes, in terms of liminality. Yanik notes that Turkey’s discourse as a country where two continents converge – Europe and Asia, the West and the Orient – is based on geographical and historical approaches. This approach seems close to ours, as it mobilizes both the time and space references. There is, however, a difference: the timeframe used to characterize Taiwan’s liminality vis-à-vis China is not that of a contemporary change (the emergence of Turkey as a middle-sized international actor, as an emerging economy, and as a self-envisioned mediator), but a long-term construction of a complex relation between the two sides of the strait. Compared to those papers, and especially Wang’s interest in Taiwan’s national identity question, the focus of the present paper is both narrower (Taiwan’s relation to China) and wider (geopolitical relations in a 400-year perspective). It considers that all elements of the relation between the two sides of the Taiwan strait contribute to a specific form of relationship. My work in Chinese language on this topic calls for a new Chinese translation of the word liminality, when applied to geopolitics and referring both to time and space: while it is translated as ‘中介時期’ or ‘地帶’ in the field of anthropology – representing an in-between period – I propose in geopolitics the use of ‘閾境性’ (yù jìng xìng) – or a threshold character – with ‘閾’ meaning precisely limen, the threshold (Corcuff 2011).

Geopolitical Liminality: A Typology

There are, indeed, several types of geopolitical situation that can be called liminal. It appears that the sudden vagueness of the concept, once it has been extracted, by geopoliticians, from its original field as studied by Arnold van Gennep and Victor

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15 This article translates into English and further elaborates the content of Chapter Four (‘臺灣閾境性’, ‘The Liminality of Taiwan’) of Corcuff’s Chine 鄰國，臺灣閾境，(Neighbour of China: The Liminality of Taiwan), Taipei, 2011, as well as of a French-language paper on the ontology of Taiwan studies vis-à-vis sinology published in Etudes chinoises in 2010.
Turner, means that it encompasses already at least five different types of geopolitical realities:

- the transition between two states in a specific temporal sequence of the history of a region or a nation – this is the case of Australia as analysed by Higgot and Nossal (2008);
- the 'inbetweenness', or the fact of being between two world civilizations and trying to be a bridge, which is how Turkey is viewed by Yanik (2009, 2011);
- being in a limbo of unclear self-definition and self-identity can be also characterized as 'liminal', as Wang (2001) has applied the term to Taiwan in the contemporary era;
- being at the margin of a larger entity and trying to adapt to it, as Stoicescu (2008) analyses Romania's position vis-à-vis the European Community;
- being a historically constructed place of contact that has something to say to a hegemonic neighbour, as shown in the case of Taiwan.

These approaches are either temporal or spatial, or a combination of both but not systematically explored as such, and in the first four cases history 'in the long haul' could have been a useful additional element, but was not mobilized. The case-study of Taiwan's 400-year relation with the Manchu empire, the Chinese Republic, and finally the People's Republic of China, is a stimulus to further elaborate the concept of geopolitical liminality and to propose a refined conceptual tool: liminality as the geopolitical and discursive dynamic produced by a historically constructed reality of being a zone of contact in a context of asymmetrical interdependence, a threshold situated at the border of a large entity that has influenced deeply the smaller one without having ever been able to swallow it.

There are a few other, perhaps slightly simpler (but not necessarily so), cases of small geopolitical entities in a relationship with a larger body in the world, in which what the smaller entity 'has to say' is a reversal of what would otherwise seem to be the natural order in which the bigger entity dictates its wishes upon the smaller. As well as multi-cultural, insular Taiwan vis-à-vis continental China, examples include Hindu Bali vis-à-vis Muslim Java, or Ryukyus vis-à-vis Japan, resenting Japanization efforts and the generalization of the name ‘Okinawa’. All three cases share some basic similarities in spite of multiple contextual differences, and the smaller entity has been included in the larger’s territory or empire at a late date (the early Manchu Empire and the Chinese Republic; the late Dutch Indies Empire and the young Indonesian Republic; the nineteenth century Japanese Empire and 1970s Japan).

By postulating that this asymmetrical relation does not result in the stronger party imposing its will without concession or negotiation, liminality, as distinct from marginality, restores the 'power of words' retained by the smaller entity: liminality is not only geopolitical, it is also discursive. Because an unstable smaller entity was obviously a danger to their empire, the Manchus, as noted above, adapted their rule when controlling Taiwan; and for complex reasons, the PRC, however strong it may become, today has to engage in negotiations with Taiwan. Meanwhile, Japan faces regular opposition movements both in relation to the increased Japanization of the Ryukyus/Liuqius and to the use of the archipelago for American military bases. Bali, further, has protected as much as it could of its cultural specificity and
autonomy, both as a part of the Dutch Empire (with the help of Dutch administrators) and after World War II, when it took an active part in opposition to the new republic and negotiated very stiff conditions for its eventual inclusion into it. By rediscovering today these alternative voices from the past, belonging to the then margins-to-be, we can better remember, long after re/integration has been acted or re-enacted (1945 for Taiwan, 1949 for Bali, 1972 for Okinawa), that the subaltern discourse has legitimacy, based on an original point of view on itself as a centre for itself. Furthermore, and as subaltern studies have emphasized, it is often at the margins that interesting and original phenomena can be observed, producing points of view that revisit hegemonic, centred perspectives from the so-called, but not self-called, ‘periphery’.

Taiwan’s Liminality vis-à-vis China

Taiwan’s liminality vis-à-vis China is intimately linked to the 400 years of history that connect the island and the mainland, including the period since 1949. Since the seventeenth century, cultural inflows from the mainland have not always been a merely natural, demographic, or societal phenomenon, but have also had, at times, a political and programmatic intention: from early on, successive Chinese or continental regimes have in several instances used culture to shape the identity of Taiwan’s society. For instance, Chen Yonghua (陳永華) (1634–1680), under the anti-Manchu insular rule of Zheng Jing (鄭經) (1662–1681), actively created Chinese-style institutions, and built Taiwan’s first Confucian temple as a message that government was to be virtuous and as a symbol of the Dongning kingdom’s Confucian values. Another example is the decision of the Manchus, who traditionally considered the former Zheng rulers of Taiwan during the 1661–1683 period as their enemy, finally to accept, in 1874 (under the petition of the Qing imperial commissioner in Taiwan, Shen Baozhen, 沈葆楨), the officialization of the cult of the Chinese hero Zheng Chenggong, which had been observed unofficially in Taiwan long after the Qing takeover in 1684. Another good example is the policy of active re-Sinization of Taiwan under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the KMT, not to mention, at this current moment, the policy of restoring elements of traditional Chinese culture in Taiwan since 2008 (in textbooks, in national cultural programs, in TV shows, etc.). All are examples of the use of Chinese culture on Taiwan in support of a political project.

As a consequence of its China-connected history, Taiwan has become both a conservatory and a laboratory of Chinese culture(s). Both dimensions are known – Taiwan as a sanctuary, often idealized by the way, of Chinese culture, and Taiwan as a ‘laboratory of identities’. It is less common to realize and acknowledge that those two dimensions are intertwined, and in fact can hardly exist without each other: the laboratory grows out of the conservatory, while the conservatory, if never a replication of the copied object, always supposes an evolution. The first characteristic of Taiwan’s liminality vis-à-vis China is the conservatory and the laboratory in a dialectical relation.

Cf 高格孚 (Corcuff) 中華鄰國。臺灣閾境性, Chapter 2, ‘回朝退潮’ (‘Return to Power, Low Tide’), especially the passages about the resinicization of political symbols and textbooks.
The Taiwan Strait, originally only a geographical entity, from the seventeenth century onwards progressively became a geopolitical entity as Taiwan was colonized and the island was inserted into regional and global geopolitics. This new geopolitical identity of the Taiwan Strait became very singular. On the one hand, the Taiwan Strait is sufficiently narrow for Taiwan to have been the recipient of successive waves of Chinese culture and to have been heavily influenced by China over four centuries. As a result, Taiwan became a conservatory for many aspects of China's culture and memory. However, on the other hand, this same geographical-turned geopolitical entity is also wide enough to have provoked, by a rupture of geographical continuity (Taiwan's geographical insularity), an indigenization of that culture, or the process of its insularization: insularity is not only a geographical notion, but also a social construction. Added to this is the role played by aboriginal cultures and other non-Chinese influences over Taiwan's history and culture: Chinese culture was from the onset indigenized, hybridized, and pluralized in its Formosan context... and first of all because it did not start to develop out of a *terra nullius*, in a virgin island free of Mankind.

Further, the emergence of an open identity debate in Taiwan in the post-authoritarian era has enabled Taiwan's society to discuss a wide set of options in terms of identification, enabling Taiwan to become a 'laboratory of identities', ranging from modern ways to be Chinese, national identification as Taiwanese, or global citizenship. This laboratory is perhaps not as new as it appears. An illustrative example is the invention of the modern Chinese word for 'president': while the word used at the end of the Qing dynasty was a phonetic translation ('伯雷/理璽天德') that was adopted by Taiwan's gentry in the initial reflection on the founding of the short-lived Taiwan Republic in 1895, it was also during this period that the word '總統' was invented. The Republic soon failed, but the project was a modern one: by establishing a sovereign 'republic' with a 'president', the self-proclaimed 'sovereignty' of the island was supposed to appeal to European powers to defend Taiwan against Japan after the Manchu court had ceded the island in the Shimonoseki Treaty (Morris 2002).

It should also be noted that the Taiwan laboratory developed in great part due to the conservatory of cultures, which provided the cultural material to work with, to reflect upon intellectually, or to build up in contrast against. Further, the 'conservatory' has itself probably never replicated the mainland's cultures in their diversity and original shape, except perhaps at the sacrosanct National Palace Museum (at least until Du Cheng-Sheng's mandate, after the transfer of power of 2000, which tried to 'aboriginize', 'Taiwanize', and 'Asianize' its collections and exhibitions). In fact, in its efforts to build a new China on Taiwan, the KMT could not avoid creating something different and independent from the historical, mainland-based ROC. Dominic Yang shows in a 2012 paper that the KMT, after relocating to Taiwan, forbade military men from entering *tongxianghui* (同鄉會), locality-based associations which brought together people from the same native locations in China. This was to avoid reproducing on the island a problem that was one cause, in the KMT's eyes, of the regime's defeat on the mainland: provincialism. One can also suggest that Chiang Kai-Shek's so-called 'Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement' had little to do with China's vast, pluralistic, and ancient cultures taken as a whole, and rendered only an essentialized version of culture though a political movement.
The conservatory cannot but become a form of laboratory, just as the laboratory nurtures itself from the conservatory. One example of the delicate and interesting relations between the two is the creation of new Chinese characters in Taiwan, a complex issue in the Sinitic world. As Kaohsiung City and Kaohsiung County were preparing to merge in 2010, the city mayor and the county commissioner, both DPP figures, wanted to run in the December 2009 election. When the two teams were negotiating, during the previous November, negotiators from the camp of Kaoshiung city mayor Chen Chü (陳菊) proposed creating a new character merging the characters 縣 (xiàn), ‘the district’, and the character 市 (shì), ‘the city’. A new character was officially proposed to Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior with the pronunciation of ‘dū’ (thus reminiscent of ‘都市’, dū shì, the capital). The Ministry, however, refused to acknowledge the new character, for it was, arguably, a zàozì (造字) or ‘invented character’. The laboratory had produced one effect, the conservatory another. In the meantime, local associations, as well as the municipal government itself, undeterred, started to use the new character, and even created a logo incorporating it (see Figure 8 below): a green chrysanthemum, reminiscent, obviously, of Japan’s colonization of Taiwan, associated with the green colour of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party.

![Figure 8: The new logo of the Kaohsiung Government under Mayor Chen Chü](image)

There is, in conclusion, a dialectical relation between preservation and creation, protection and modernization. The laboratory and the conservatory dimensions of this liminality are clearly linked in interaction.

**A Taiwan Detour**

A second dimension of this liminality is its discursive power. By this is meant that Taiwan’s liminality in history produces a discourse, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, which would not be produced without this tension between proximity and distance, or without push-and-pull factors, inclusiveness and independence, or inter-dependence. Such discourse, on Taiwan’s side, is a discourse on China that is both informed and keeps a critical distance from its object.

Taiwan having been close to China (historically, geographically, culturally) for extended periods of time, numerous segments of Taiwan’s society are familiar, and particularly concerned, with Chinese issues such as evolving identities, nationalism and national development, human rights, cultural issues, etc. Hence,
Taiwan’s politicians, businesspeople, artists, scholars, intellectuals, and NGOs can produce informed and valid discourses on China. In other words, the discursive liminality of Taiwan is possible because the Taiwan Straits is narrow enough for Chinese culture to have deeply influenced Taiwan over centuries and because it is also wide enough to have given Taiwan the possibility of assessing such a cultural heritage (though of course not always without ideological biases) from a distance, as well as maintaining a critical perspective on its discourse on China. In that process, being a free and democratic country has been a valuable asset for Taiwan, in the sense that, after the lifting of the martial law in 1987, the debate on identities and national building has been relatively open. As a centre, and thinking highly of itself, China is not always in the best position to assess critically all questions concerning itself, though a large transformation of China’s public debate freedoms has been underway for a decade. This is one of the interests of studying Taiwan: not only for the island’s own social reality, but for what it has to say about China, which is, in fact, a part of that reality. The *Taiwan detour* is the possibility for China-watchers to learn about contemporary China itself by looking at ways Taiwan perceives China. But how many acknowledge this, or are even at all conscious of it, so imbued as they are with a Chinese and mainland perception of Taiwan as marginal? We speak here not only of Chinese themselves, but of course also of still so many China-watchers.

There is yet another dimension of Taiwan’s discursive liminality, that justifies the Taiwan detour in another way: namely, what China and the Chinese reveal of themselves, in their multiple positions on Taiwanese questions, and in how they view China as a nation, territory, identity, and history. What China tends to see as marginal (at its margin, secondary) is nevertheless symbolically essential to that same country: post-1941 war politics, and then post-1949 cross-strait politics, have erected Taiwan as a symbol of national humiliation, incomplete victory, and the denial of its legitimacy to rule, and these are all elements certain to be found in a Chinese political psyche prone to building upon the romanticization of a traumatic past involving partially self-inflicted pains (of which Taiwan is the perfect example). In addition, due to geopolitical realities, Taiwan remained largely closed to Chinese action until recently, and it still remains, against Chinese will, an independent and sovereign entity. Elements of proximity, national frustration, and geopolitical deadlock combine to make Taiwan a delicate question for China, and it is no wonder PRC politics in recent decades have alternated a series of approaches to Taiwan, from conciliatory to bellicose, which reveal as much about how China views itself as how it actually views Taiwan. A simple example is how China, in its international public diplomacy, refers to Taiwan as belonging to China ‘since ancient ages’ (從古時代), yet prefers not to specify what actual ‘ancient history’ is meant beyond this vague expression, for fear of being too easily contradicted by even the least capable of historians. If we count Chinese history as consisting of over roughly 35 centuries (dating back from the invention of Chinese characters), Taiwan was integrated at century 32, which would not be considered ‘ancient history’, for a country so proud of being the oldest civilization still alive, were it not for Taiwan’s historical belonging to China being such a sensitive issue today. More generally, China’s utilization of trauma to legitimize irredentism reveals how China, in different periods, has viewed its own national identity, its links to history,
territory, and colonial aggression, and ultimately, perhaps, its mode of insertion into international society.

Taiwan’s liminality is of course not only discursive: it also has a geopolitical dimension, in the classical sense of the term as relations of power with regard to territory. As said, China has to negotiate with Taiwan, even when a government more inclined towards unification leads the island. Taiwan, in other words, remains globally out of reach for China, even though the situation has been changing quickly since 2008. China postulates the inclusion of Taiwan into its territory as desirable, legitimate, and ultimately unavoidable, and is turning itself into one of the world’s most powerful countries. However, China cannot impose itself upon Taiwan by sheer force; in order to achieve its goals, China has to compromise, make proposals, wait, and negotiate, seduce and manipulate (including by taking control progressively of Taiwan’s print and electronic media). The reasons for this are many, and the military factor appears to be important – but for how long? However, it is probable that other factors are also particularly significant, such as the necessity of avoiding the political cost that a brutal intervention in Taiwan may have for China, both in terms of its international image and of its image in Taiwanese minds. In other words, Taiwan, as the weaker of the two, and by far the most vulnerable, still remains immune from having an imperial form of power imposed upon it; hegemony, as discussed above, would have been a better tool to explain the shadow of China, had the concept been able to encompass more dimensions than those mentioned.

Just as with the dialectical relation between the conservatory and the laboratory, the geopolitical and discursive dimensions of Taiwan’s liminality are also intertwined, and as they influence each other they are sometimes difficult to differentiate fully. It is significant, for instance, that Taiwan, which has an economy now considerably dependent on China, still has the power to attract, but also to limit, regulate, and control, millions of Chinese tourists who wish to travel to Taiwan. Chen Chien-Yuan shows that in Chinese tourism handbooks newly developed for tourists leaving for Taiwan, the island is constructed as a repository of Chinese culture – the idealized conservatory. And while the tourists are on the island, insular travel and government agencies help them to see what corresponds only to what he calls Taiwan’s ‘constructed familiarity’: they depart from China to have a sense of a ‘real China’, whether or not illusionary, and what they see in the concrete in Taiwan is limited to essentialized motifs of Chinese culture and of modern Chinese history (C.-Y. Chen 2012). This is obviously done at the expense of a fair description of Taiwan’s pluralistic cultures, and such tourists never get an insight into what makes Taiwan pluralistic.17 In addition to tourists, some Chinese (anti-communist) intellectuals eager to visit Taiwan also fall into the trap of ‘Taiwan as the repository of true Chinese culture’ – which appears radically to contradict their perception of Taiwan as an otherwise minor territory compared to the great Chinese motherland. For instance, Xu Zhiyuan (許知遠), in his latest book Stranger to his Motherland (祖國的陌生人) recalls his first trip in Taiwan in late 2008, and his

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17 Simple observation shows that in addition, they tend to group together before entering the places visited and smoke while waiting for other tourists to exit. However, one taxi driver in Tamsui told me in 2011 that at night, some 陸客 (Mainland tourists) discreetly leave their hotels to freely tour the night markets and get another picture of Taiwan.
fascination in seeing the symbols of the Republic and of the true China, in contrast to the modern China that has erased, through communism and capitalism, the traditional one – but hasn’t Taiwan also modernized? He finally ‘confesses’ that, though a self-described anti-communist democrat, he is unable to understand the legitimacy of the reasons why Taiwanese independence militants were rejecting the visit to Taiwan (at the same time of his own visit) of China’s chief negotiator, and, beyond this, rejecting unification with China: as we know, being an anti-communist Chinese does not necessarily mean being able to deconstruct a communist-constructed Chinese chauvinism.

Yet, according to every available statistic, Taiwanese people’s identification with Taiwan has never been stronger than it is today, and this is the moment when cross-strait relations are at their warmest. By almost entirely ignoring the local realities of a Taiwan that clearly thinks of itself not as a province of China, Chinese tourists and intellectuals bring back to China a confirmation of an idea of Taiwan that is more and more distant from the real Taiwan. It is a form of metaphor for a globalization that facilitates transportation and connects peoples, but does not necessarily allow individuals to understand others in a deeper way. This discrepancy is caused by the ‘unreachability’ of Taiwan, in that it remains outside of China’s governance, as well as by the ability of some in Taiwan to mobilize Chinese culture, whether authentic or not, to satisfy the consumerist desires of people with whom they don’t even share identification schemes. If, among Chinese tourists’ destinations, the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial, the Sun Moon Lake (which was, by the way enlarged to its current size by the Japanese colonial authorities), or the Martyr’s Shrine in Taipei are perhaps not embodiments of Taiwan’s role as the conservatory of Chinese culture, the National Palace Museum undeniably is so, and illustrates that Taiwan’s discursive and geopolitical liminality is far from marginal. Instead, Taiwan is both a depository of Chinese heritage and able to negotiate that heritage.

In sum, what is proposed here as the liminality of Taiwan is a combination of four major characteristics of Taiwan’s relation to China:

- Chinese culture is the main cultural matrix of Taiwan’s culture, but not the only one and not the earliest one; Taiwanese increasingly think of Taiwan as having a pluralistic and partially oceanic culture, even though they regularly vote for the KMT – these are distinct questions, one of national identification, one of political pondering; there is a debate on these issues and on how to view Taiwan’s cultural identity (identity politics in Taiwan);
- Taiwanese society plays the role both of conservatory and laboratory of that major cultural matrix, preserving and modernizing elements of the Chinese culture in a movement that is typical of the normal life of any living culture (cultural anthropology of Taiwan);
- China would like to extend its rule to Taiwan and establish a political continuity to bridge a geographical discontinuity, but remains to this day obliged to negotiate with Taiwan to advance its agenda (geopolitical liminality of Taiwan; study of the geopolitics of the Taiwan strait);
- Taiwan is a topic through which China reveals a lot of itself, because Taiwan as a political, cultural and geopolitical issue is a complicated and
sensitive one (discursive liminality of Taiwan; study of Taiwan; study of China, especially its nation-building discourses).

Conclusion

With regard to its relation to China, Taiwan is in a liminal situation that has slowly developed over four centuries. The term ‘liminal’ is proposed as an alternative to the term ‘marginal’. It suggests acknowledging the complexity of a relation that can be called a ‘marginal position’ only if it is reduced to its negative elements and by viewing it from one particular point of view, the one of the centre.

Taiwan’s liminality is derived from a complex heritage that obviously has not yet escaped from its politicized fate. The suggestion of using ‘liminal’ is also a call to abandon seeing Taiwan’s identity as either merely ‘Chinese’, downsizing Taiwanese culture to a local one, or as ‘Taiwanese’, in a way that would consider Chinese culture in Taiwan as simply colonial, belonging to the past, and oppressive. Furthermore, it is a call to see that, in its discursive power in relation to China and Chinese affairs, Taiwan is still relevant. Ultimately, it is a way to better understand the complexity of China’s feelings toward Taiwan, where self-proclaimed love and hidden hate, feelings of proximity and jealously, appropriation, interdependency, fascination and contempt all mix.

The island, as a threshold of China, is in sum an excellent topos for understanding China itself. In ancient Greek, τόπος means both ‘place’ and ‘subject’, which fits the description of Taiwan’s liminality as both geopolitical and discursive. This topos says a lot about China itself, because China reveals itself through this delicate topic on matters such as its perception of history, the nation, identity, and relations with the world.

The liminal position of Taiwan is also a consequence of the ‘conservatory/laboratory’ combination that the island has because of its multicultural society in which Chinese culture is an important matrix: as Taiwan protected Chinese culture, it also constantly revisited it, inventing new forms of Chineseness, a civic, if not national, Taiwanese identity, and ways to be global in the absence of diplomatic recognition.

In conclusion, liminality as a concept reframes an understanding of Taiwan that is, in each political program, usually simplified to fit an ideology revolving around a certain idea of the nation. I have tried to develop it to better accommodate the plurality of dimensions in Taiwan’s relation to China, which includes cultural, political, psychological, memorial, economic, and military aspects. Some of these dimensions bring Taiwan and China close to each other, while others keep them distant. It is damaging to the understanding of Taiwan to deny either of these contrary and concomitant movements. This context of push-and-pull forces is also a situation of distance and proximity, or conservatory and laboratory. Summarized to its narrowest definition, geopolitical liminality here defines an asymmetric interdependence where the small entity has something to say in the couple formed with the bigger entity, thanks to the historical and cultural thickness of their geopolitical relation over time. A geopolitical understanding of liminality, in this sense, may be exportable to other fields in the discipline; perhaps not without the risk of losing some of its substance, but hopefully as a way to rebalance the analysis of the strengths of the weak, as well as of the weaknesses of the strong.
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Abstract

Lin Hsien-Tang played the most significant role in leading resistance to colonialism in Taiwan during the Japanese period, 1895–1945. In 1907 Lin took the advice of a Chinese leader-in-exile named Liang Chi-Tsau to follow the Irish way of resisting English rule, and in 1911 he invited Liang to visit Taiwan. It can be assumed that Lin was thus influenced by Liang to start his political career from 1914 as a reformer rather than a revolutionary, though it is not known how exactly they conceptualized Irish Home Rule. Lin’s rise and development as a politician has parallels with John Redmond, who during the same period was leading the Irish Home Rule movement. This paper uses valuable and largely-unresearched materials, such as Lin Hsien-Tang’s Diary, contemporary Taiwanese and Japanese newspapers, and Japanese official records, to analyse the achievements and problems of Lin’s political career in depth. Lin is then compared with Redmond, drawing on scholarly and contemporary sources. In his role as leader of the Irish nationalist MPs at Westminster, John Redmond worked towards enhancing political rights and the social position of nationalists in Ireland while maintaining a peaceful political co-existence with his opponents, just as Lin wanted to achieve equality between the Taiwanese and the Japanese. Both succeeded in keeping the flame of national consciousness alight in their people, although sabotaged and attacked by radicals of their own side and ultimately frustrated in their aims.

Introduction

In 1895 Taiwan was ceded to Japan, and the inhabitants endured unequal treatment as colonial subjects. The Japanese Empire was interested in learning from the British model of colonialism: Michael Hoare notes a report from the London Times from 12 June 1903 that ‘Viscount Kodama, Governor of Formosa’
was planning a visit to England and to ‘the Transvaal in order to inspect the working of the British Colonial System’. A generation later, a report in the *Times* of 29 October 1936 stated that ‘when talking to Englishmen, the Japanese refer rather proudly to Formosa as “their India”’ (quoted in Hoare 2010). However, the British Empire’s colonial subjects also offered their own lessons, which came to the attention of Japan’s new subjects; the current paper is particularly concerned with the Taiwanese leader Lin Hsien-Tang (林獻堂), who followed advice from a Chinese leader-in-exile, Liang Chi-Tsau (梁啟超), to follow the Irish way of resistance to English rule. In Irish history, this paper considers the example of John Redmond as a possible counterpart to Lin in Taiwan; Redmond led the Irish Home Rule movement from 1900 until his death in 1918, coinciding with the period during which Lin launched his political career. It is interesting to consider why and how the Irish model inspired Lin’s moderate anti-colonialism, and to consider related questions: what was the nature of Lin’s anti-colonial movement? Was it successful? And finally, what comparisons and contrasts can be made between the careers of Lin and Redmond?

Lin came from a prominent family in central Taiwan, and played a most important role in leading the anti-colonial movement throughout the period of Japanese rule, which ended in 1945. Generally speaking, he was a moderate reformer rather than a revolutionary, and he sought to achieve his goals by peaceful means. There are various source materials for Lin’s political life, the most important of which are the three volumes of the *Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series* (1960, 1974) and the published correspondence between Lin Hsien-Tang and Liang Chi-Tsau (Hsu 2007). Other sources include contemporary Chinese and Japanese newspapers. A number of works published in Taiwan discuss Lin’s anti-Japanese movement, and two in particular should be noted. Chang was the first scholar to discuss Lin’s political activities systematically (1981: 64–72). However, his book contains only eight pages on Liang’s visit to Taiwan in 1911, and he made little reference to the Irish home rule problem. Huang’s 2006 biography of Lin describes Lin and Liang’s dialogue in 1907 and Liang’s visit to Taiwan in 1911, and discusses their importance, but it does not go into details (22–27). There are also some relevant articles, such as works by Tsai *et al.* (1971), Huang (1965), Chen (1996), and Chou (1989), but most give only brief mentions of the topic and there are again few references to Irish anti-colonialism. The purpose of the present paper is to fill this gap.

The paper begins with a discussion of how Lin Hsien-Tang’s approach to anti-colonialism was inspired by the Irish Home Rule movement, and shows why he adopted a peaceful approach to anti-Japanese colonialism. In particular, the paper describes how the Irish model was introduced by Liang to Lin when they met and had a dialogue in Japan in 1907. The second part describes the character of the Irish Home Rule movement, which, under the leadership of John Redmond, saw an Irish parliament written into law in 1914 after four decades of campaign and struggle. Despite this achievement, war in Europe and rebellion in Ireland ensured that this parliament, although legislated for, was never convened, and Irish nationalism took a very different course. The third part discusses the first stage of

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1 Hoare adds that the plan was abandoned when Kodama became Chief of General Staff of the Manchurian Army on the outbreak of war with Russia the following year.
Lin’s political movement, which included The Assimilation Association (20 December 1914 to 26 February 1915) and the subsequent Law 63 abolition movement (August 1918 to November 1920), while the fourth part deals with Lin’s second stage of activism with the Taiwan Assembly establishment movement. Between 1920 and 1930 this movement aimed to establish an independent assembly in Taiwan to counter the tyranny of the governor-general. This movement declined when Japan tightened political controls after initiating its aggression against China in the 1930’s. The conclusion includes a brief comparison of Lin and Redmond.

Lin Hsien-Tang’s Idea of Anti-colonialism as Inspired by the Irish Home Rule Movement

Lin Hsien-Tang was born in Taichung, Taiwan, in 1881. His father was an intellectual, but his mother died when he was young and he was brought up by his paternal grandmother and received home-tutoring from two prominent scholars. This helped to form his personality and intellectual perspective throughout his life.

In 1895, the Ch’ing Empire lost a war with Japan, and Taiwan was consequently ceded to Japan. This had a strong impact on Lin, and he devoted his entire life to fighting for the freedom and dignity of the Taiwanese and against the Japanese colonial power. He was known to be a moderate, leading a peaceful, non-violent political movement. There were a number of reasons he took this approach.

The Difficulties of Anti-Colonial Resistance through Military Measures in Taiwan

Lin’s idea of peaceful struggle against the Japanese was formulated in relation to several factors. First, he learnt the lesson of the disorganization of the Taiwanese resistance forces during the initial stage of the armed struggle, between 1895 and 1902 (Huang 2004: 14). Despite the initially high morale of the Taiwanese resistance, its forces were immediately overwhelmed by the well-trained and well-equipped Japanese forces. The resistance lacked military discipline, modern weaponry and a competent leader to conduct a sustained armed struggle against the Japanese.

Moreover, the Japanese initiated a massive disarmament program, using the carrot and the stick to divide and destroy resistance forces and ensure stability. This was immediately successful: in 1903, the ‘stick’ approach obliged the Taiwanese to hand over any weapon which was deemed threatening to colonial rule (Lamley 1964), while the ‘carrot’ approach which followed offered locally-respected Taiwanese individuals opportunities to become local officials. Some privileges were also offered, such as monopolies on the sale of opium and salt.

Furthermore, the Lin family was not very keen on the idea of armed struggle. Although his family was wealthy and would have been able to organize an armed force, he faced difficulties in coordinating different family members into united action. Lin himself was brought up in a family regarded by Taiwanese as ‘educated’, ‘well-cultured’ and ‘moderate’ (Huang 2004: 15). He received a Confucian-style education which emphasized the values of civility, moderation, and politeness. These became Lin’s personal characteristics, which affected his approach in dealing with the colonial rulers. Therefore, he saw himself as a
political leader who was struggling for peace, and rather than as a revolutionary engaging in armed conflict.

A final factor was the lack of international help for the armed struggle against the Japanese colonial regime. Taiwan, by the terms of the Peace Treaty of Simonoseki between China and Japan, was a ceded territory, and therefore no nation could legally assist Taiwan, not even China. After the defeat of the Taiwanese resistance forces in 1895, there were further incidents of armed resistance in Taiwan against the Japanese in 1913 and in 1915, but they were sporadic and inconsistent.

*The Influence of the Dialogue between Lin Hsien-Tang and Liang Chi-Tsau in 1907*

Although there was no international support for a potential armed struggle against the Japanese, Lin did receive moral support from a sympathizer in China, Liang Chi-Tsau. Lin met Liang in Nara, Japan, in 1907, and eagerly explained the ill-treatment of the Taiwanese by the Japanese and sought Liang’s advice. Liang bluntly told Lin:

> China would not and will not be able to support Taiwan in its potential liberation from the Japanese colonial rulers. In such circumstances, it will not be wise to make any drastic move which would result in unnecessary loss of life. The best option is to imitate the Irish model in fighting against the British rule. In other words, Taiwanese political activists should try to build deep relations with prominent Japanese politicians in Tokyo, who may, in turn, curb possible political oppression of political rights in Taiwan by the Japanese general-governor.

*(quoted in Huang 2004: 15)*

This was Liang’s response and advice to Lin, which strengthened Lin’s belief in non-violent struggle as the means for gaining political freedom from the Japanese. Lin cherished this precious meeting and consequently invited Liang to visit Taiwan in the future. This shows the influence of the Irish Home Rule movement on Lin.

*The Influence of Liang Chi-Tsau’s Visit to Taiwan in 1911*

On 24 March 1911, Liang, accompanied by his eldest daughter and his close friend Tang Chue-Tun (湯覺頓), embarked on his first visit to Taiwan (Chang 1981: 67–68). It was a highly publicized event, and subsequently caught the attention of the Japanese colonial regime. After their arrival, Liang was greeted by huge crowds of Taiwanese intellectuals in Keelung (the main port in northern Taiwan) and in Taipei. During their visit, Liang stayed in four different places and tried hard to understand the strong anti-Japan sentiment amongst the Taiwanese people. Ironically, he concluded and conceded that, although the Japanese colonial rulers were undemocratic and autocratic, their development programs in Taiwan, such as water irrigation, education, banking system, telegrams, newspapers, and radio broadcasting, were, to his mind, worth emulating in China (Liang 1975: 167). In other words, Liang was not very keen on drastic anti-colonial measures. Lin considered Liang’s words and regarded his anti-colonial activism as a peaceful...
and political movement, which would not resort to the kind of armed revolution seen in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Following Liang’s advice to emulate the Home Rule movement in Ireland, Lin soon afterwards began to implement his approach by seeking the help of influential politicians in the Japanese central government, and in 1914 he cooperated with Taisuno Itegaki (板垣退助) in organizing the Assimilation Association (同化會). This was followed by plans for the establishment of a Taiwanese Assembly, political parties, and cultural associations which were to consist of Taiwanese intellectuals, which will be discussed later.

The Irish Home Rule Movement and the achievement of Redmondism (1900–1918)

It is perhaps significant that Liang was advocating the Irish Home Rule model in 1907. Regrettably, it is not clear from the sources how or in what context Liang described the Irish Home Rule movement to Lin or indeed what was the extent of Liang’s knowledge of the Irish question. It is as likely that Liang was referring to an earlier phase in the Irish constitutional struggle as to current events in Anglo-Irish politics. Whether his information was derived from history books, newspapers, or word of mouth, it is probable that his concept of Irish history and politics constituted an idealized and somewhat simplified interpretation of the situation. For this reason, it is excusable here to present the course of modern Irish history and the Home Rule movement in broad terms rather than entering into the nuances of factionalism, regionalism, and parliamentary intrigues which dominate the modern historiography of constitutional nationalism.

If Liang had learned of Home Rule through books – either directly or indirectly – a number of important works had been published prior to 1907 that may have had some bearing on his concept of Irish Home Rule. If this was the case, it is more likely that Liang was referring to the iconic struggle of Charles Stewart Parnell against the forces of Conservatism and unionism culminating in the failed 1886 Home Rule Bill. On the other hand, if Liang was keeping up with contemporary developments in Irish politics, 1907 was a pivotal year for John Redmond as chairman of the Irish Parliamentary Party.

Background to Irish History: Contested Island

As island nations with colonial pasts, there are similarities worth exploring in the Home Rule and independence movements in Ireland and Taiwan. While the history of British rule in Ireland has a substantially longer lineage than the Taiwanese experience of Japanese rule, in both cases these were the first overseas territory taken by the colonizer. In Ireland, numerous armed insurrections had been attempted against the rule of the English monarchy from the sixteenth century onwards. In the present context, notable uprisings occurred in 1798 and

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2 For example, Callanan (1992); Bew (1987); and Wheatley (2005).
3 Among the publications which may have had a bearing on Liang’s impressions of Irish politics could be McCarthy (1904, 1907); O’Brien (1898), and O’Connor (1886).
1867 under the banners of the United Irishmen⁴ and the Fenians⁵ respectively. From the 1540s onwards, owing to the concurrence of England’s Protestant reformation and the extension and consolidation of British rule in Ireland, Irish demands for political rights were inextricably linked with broader questions of land ownership and religious freedom.⁶ One fundamental difference between Ireland and Taiwan in this respect is that, whereas Japan was reluctant to settle its people in Taiwan, Ireland experienced waves of plantation by English and Scottish settlers in the early modern period.⁷ The success of plantation in the northeast of the province of Ulster led to sectarian and ethnic tensions that persist to the present day. In addition, the descendants of these Ulster settlers became the most vocal and credible defenders of the union with Great Britain from the 1880s onwards. During the nineteenth century, the peacefully orientated (constitutional) and the revolutionary (physical force) traditions of Irish nationalism ran simultaneously and often with an ambiguous degree of overlap and interaction.

Arguably the most significant event during Ireland’s nineteenth century was the outbreak of a devastating famine beginning in 1845.⁸ The famine had a lasting effect on the demographics and economy of the island and, in the political context, British mismanagement of the disaster added fuel to the fire of Irish nationalist sentiment for generations thereafter. Furthermore, the famine gave rise to increased tensions over land holding. The grievances of tenant farmers became an even more pressing issue in Irish life and politics than they had been prior to the famine. In this period, British governments and the newly emergent Home Rule movement began to focus on the resolution of the land question alongside the wider issue of governance (Mansergh 1975: 135–138).

⁴ A society based on Enlightenment principles and religious egalitarianism. Despite these lofty aims, the actual rebellion in 1798 had sectarian overtones in certain parts of the country. The arrival of a French invasion force in the west of Ireland after the main action had been suppressed gave an international dimension to this episode. Alvin Jackson has dubbed the rebellion ‘a short but bloody civil war... the explosive release of pent-up economic and sectarian pressures’ (Jackson 1999: 20).

⁵ Having staged an unsuccessful rebellion in 1867, various groups committed acts of terrorism in both Ireland and Britain, including a dynamiting campaign and political assassinations in the 1880s, under the banner of ‘Fenianism’. The official leadership of the Fenians, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, remained operational up to the 1916 Rising – which it planned and orchestrated – and beyond. As such, it provided a strand of continuity between the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Moody ed. 1978).

⁶ David Thornley has referred to nationality, land, and religion at the ‘three great stimuli’ behind the common people’s resentment of their rulers (Thornley 1964: 13).

⁷ On Japanese reluctance to settle its own people in Taiwan, apart from colonial administrators and police, see Song (2009: 83n).

⁸ The famine had been caused by the failure of the potato crop, in which blight was first observed in September 1845. The population of Ireland stood at 8,175,124 in the census of 1841. Ten years later, starvation and emigration contributed to a fall of 1,622,739 in the population of the island. Figures taken from Foster 1988: 606–607.
The Origins of Irish Home Rule

Beginning in 1870, the Home Rule movement sought to re-establish on Irish soil the parliament that had voted itself out of existence in 1800 when it passed the Act of Union with Great Britain. Isaac Butt, the founder of the Irish Home Rule movement, was openly sympathetic towards the Fenians whose insurrection of 1867 had ended in catastrophic failure. Despite initial ambivalence, mass arrests of Fenians had swung the sympathies of a large section of the public in favour of the rebels, who took their place in the pantheon of Irish nationalism (Lyons 1971: 126–127). Butt’s legal defence of the Fenians at their trials provided him with a platform from which to launch his political campaign for Home Rule (Thornley 1964: 19–20). Initially, the Home Rule movement had been moderate, gently pressing for the British Government to benevolently grant Ireland greater freedoms culminating in the restoration of a domestic legislature within a federalist framework (Jackson 1999: 12). However, oratory and reason alone were ineffectual methods for securing these aims. By the middle of the 1870s, a section of the Home Rule party began to adopt more radical, but still firmly constitutional methods.

By 1880, under the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell, the Irish Parliamentary Party brought machine politics to Westminster. Its new aim was to grind the business of Parliament and, by extension, the entire British Empire to a halt through the application of obstructionist tactics. By so doing, it was hoped that the presence of Irish representatives in the British House of Commons would become such a burden as to convince the Government that Home Rule was the only solution. From the 1880s onwards, the Home Rule party dominated electoral politics in Ireland and, following franchise extension in 1884, the consistent election of roughly eighty pledge-bound and well-disciplined Home Rule MPs to Westminster became a source of exasperation and ire to successive British Governments, both Conservative and Liberal. Though never violent, Home Rule aligned itself with agrarian agitation in Ireland advocating boycott and civil disobedience. Between the 1880s and the first decade of the twentieth century, numerous nationalist MPs were imprisoned and nationalist public meetings in Ireland were subjected to police surveillance.

9 On the way in which the Irish Parliament was bribed and induced to pass the Act, see Foster (1988: 284–285).
10 Through long and rambling speeches, Irish MPs managed to force the House of Commons to sit for marathon sessions of several days. This eventually provoked reformative action from the Government and the liberties of individual members were consequently curtailed. On the origins of obstructionism among Home Rule MPs, beginning in July 1874, see Thornley (1964: 235–239) and Cruise O’Brien (1957: 21–23).
11 Interestingly, the burden of Ireland on the business of Parliament was cited by Prime Minister Asquith as a justification for the re-establishment of an Irish parliament when he introduced the third Home Rule Bill in April 1912 (see Hansard, 11 April 1912, col. 1404).
12 Detailed secret police reports relating to nationalist involvement in land agitation and the participation of nationalist MPs in public meetings in Ireland can be found in the files of the British Colonial Office (The British in Ireland, CO 904, Part One: Anti-Government Organisations, 1882–1921).
The first great opportunity for the Irish Home Rule movement came when the British Liberal Party, traditionally more moderate on the Irish question, found itself relying on the numerical support of Irish Home Rulers to form a government following the General Elections of 1885 and 1892. In both instances, a pact was made between William Gladstone, the Liberal Prime Minister, and the leadership of the Irish Parliamentary Party. In exchange for making possible the formation of a Liberal administration, Gladstone introduced a bill providing for the establishment of a Home Rule parliament in Ireland.

The first Home Rule Bill of 1886 proposed the establishment of a unicameral legislature – deliberately avoiding the term 'parliament' (Jackson 2003: 57) – and the removal of the 103 Irish representatives then sitting in the House of Commons. The new Irish legislature was to consist of two 'orders', one partially elected and with a property/wealth qualification, and the other fully elected and 'wholly representative' (Lyons 1977: 344). Importantly, although Ireland was to be relatively unrestricted in its legislative remit, executive power was to remain in the hands of the monarch's representative in Ireland, the Lord Lieutenant, and the assembly in Ireland was to remain strictly subordinate to Parliament at Westminster (Jackson 2003: 57–58). The Irish Parliamentary Party initially gave only a 'guarded welcome' to the 1886 Home Rule Bill, largely due to the clauses relating to finance, the creation of two orders within the legislature, and the restrictions on the powers that would be granted to this new body (Lyons 1977: 345). However, it quickly became clear that the Bill had little chance of being passed by the Commons, and at this point the Nationalists threw their unequivocal support behind the Bill, aware that quarrel with Gladstone over particulars was now irrelevant (Jackson 2003: 61).

In 1886, the first Home Rule Bill was sufficiently unpalatable when it entered the House of Commons that it split the Liberal Party and the Bill was promptly defeated (Lubenow 1983). Between 1890 and 1891, the Irish Parliamentary Party experienced its own schism, this time owing to the involvement of its leader, Charles Stewart Parnell, in a divorce scandal. Despite the fragmentation of the Home Rule movement, in 1892, Irish nationalists again found themselves holding the balance of power at Westminster. A second Home Rule Bill was introduced in 1893 and, this time, it passed through the House of Commons only to be thrown out by the House of Lords which enjoyed a veto over legislation. The second Home Rule Bill was modelled on the Bill of 1886 but it had several key modifications. Most notably, the parliament – and this time it was a parliament that was proposed – was to be bicameral, with both an upper and lower house. The other major alteration was that Irish representation at Westminster was to be retained, albeit at a reduced level and, in the initial draft of the Bill, Irish members were to be excluded from any business that pertained solely to Britain (Jackson

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13 For an in-depth analysis of the conversion of the Liberal Party to the cause of Irish Home Rule, see Mansergh (1975: 133–174).
14 All matters pertaining to religion as well as to police and imperial issues were to be reserved by Parliament at Westminster (Lyons 1977: 344).
15 On the split, see Callanan (992).
16 For a contemporary perspective on this from the then leader of the majority wing of Irish Nationalism, see McCarthy (1907: 462).
Finance remained problematic in the 1893 Bill and the blueprint for the financial relationship eventually settled upon in 1893 skimmed over complex structural and theoretical issues and its operability was questionable (Jalland 1983: 236–237).

Home Rule under John Redmond

By the end of the bitter and divisive decade of the 1890s, the nationalist public were growing disillusioned with their political representatives and, in a bid to maintain their relevance to the nationalist electorate and threatened with newly emergent political forces, the opposing factions of the Home Rule movement re-united in February 1900. The Irish Parliamentary Party chose John Redmond as its chairman and leader. Redmond had led the minority faction during the 1890s and was a loyal follower of his chief, Parnell, who had died in 1891. Redmond’s personality and outlook were intrinsically conciliatory. He was chosen as a compromise candidate for the chairmanship in preference to several stronger candidates who were bitterly opposed to each other (Bull 1988). Redmond fought hard to maintain the unity of the Home Rule movement in the opening years of the twentieth century. After Ireland had been brought to the brink of civil war in 1914 due to unionist fears over the implementation of Home Rule, Redmond became an enthusiastic advocate of Irish participation in the British war effort. For Redmond, if both communities in Ireland fought side by side in the trenches of the First World War, then a new ‘all-Ireland’ national identity could be born that would focus on shared values and put aside sectarian strife. Michael Wheatley has neatly summed up the ideology of Redmondism as ‘advocating support of empire, conciliation with unionists, and the wooing of men of property to help lead the independent nation’ (Wheatley 2005: 10). It should be noted that Redmond’s view was never more than a ‘minority taste’ (79) within the umbrella of Irish nationalism. By contrast, the bulk of nationalist Ireland was steeped in a tradition of ‘conservative respectability’, machine politics, and the language of ‘Catholicity, sense of victimhood, glorification of struggle… and antipathy to England which suffused provincial, nationalist orthodoxy’ (Wheatley 2005: 266). Through his Catholic education and his lineage as a member of the Irish Catholic gentry, Redmond inherited a gift for oratory, a strong sense of duty to his community, and a deep social conservatism.

In 1900, the re-united Irish Parliamentary Party was faced with an unsympathetic Conservative government which was keen to dilute the Irish demand for Home Rule through ameliorative public works and legislation aimed at solving the Irish land question, which many British politicians believed to be at the core of the Irish

17 In the political vacuum, the 1890s saw the flowering of cultural nationalist movements such as the Gaelic League (an Irish language movement) and the Anglo-Irish Literary Theatre, which included such luminaries as W.B. Yeats and J.M. Synge. See Hutchinson (1987).
18 A literary insight into this world can be seen in Ó Faoláin (1934).
19 The influences of ancestry and education on John Redmond are explored in the opening chapters of Meleady (2008).
grievance with British rule. Faced with this, the Irish party reverted to the tactics of harassment and attempts to obstruct the business of the Parliament which had proved so effective in the 1880s. However, the re-election of a Liberal Government by an overwhelming majority in 1906 precipitated a massive tactical re-evaluation on the part of the Irish nationalists. As noted above, it is not clear as to which phase in the history of the Irish Home Rule movement Liang Chi-Tsau was referring when he counselled Lin Hsien-Tang to follow the Irish example. However, if he was thinking of moderation and the gradual extension of rights and privileges, then it is likely that the convivial interaction of Home Rulers with Liberal governments was to the forefront of Liang’s mind when he first discussed the Irish example with Lin in Nara in 1907.

As already stated, the British Liberal Party was decidedly more sympathetic to the concept of Irish Home Rule than their Conservative counterparts. However, since the death of Gladstone, a wide section of opinion within the upper echelons of the Liberal Party favoured a ‘gradualist’ or step-by-step approach to solving the Irish question (Lyons 1971: 260–261). In 1907, a bill that closely resembled an abortive Conservative scheme for the devolution of limited powers to Ireland – a measure that had shaken the Conservative Government in 1905 – was promulgated. The ‘Irish Council Bill’ proposed the setting up of a partially elected body to administer some of Ireland’s local affairs including education and agriculture. Just as in the previous Home Rule Bills, policing, finance, international diplomacy, and trade were to remain under Imperial control. Despite initial optimism for this scheme, John Redmond and the rest of the Irish party leadership became disillusioned at the Government’s unwillingness to improve upon the original proposal. In May 1907, while the Bill was still before the House of Commons, a caucus of the official Irish nationalist organization held in Dublin voted that the Irish Parliamentary Party should not support the Bill. It was the view of the delegates, and by extension the leadership of the Irish party, that Ireland would not settle for ‘half measures’ (Gwynn 1932: 148). Only full Home Rule would be acceptable. Following nationalist rejection of this genuine attempt by the Liberal Government to assuage the Irish grievance, no further efforts were made to address the question of Irish Home Rule until 1912. In the interim, a Parliamentary crisis in Britain and the results of two elections during 1910 left Redmond’s Irish Parliamentary Party holding the Parliamentary balance between the Conservatives and the Liberals as had been the case in 1886 and 1892.

20 Dubbed ‘constructive unionism’ or ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’, this outlook dominated Conservative policy towards Ireland at the turn of the last century. See Gailey (1987).
21 Unionist uproar over this ‘devolution scheme’ of 1904–1905 resulted in the resignation of the then Chief Secretary for Ireland, George Wyndham, and caused significant embarrassment to the Government (Hepburn 1971: 472).
22 For the reactions of the nationalist leadership to the devolution proposals of 1904–1905, see Lyons (1968: 274).
24 John Redmond to John Dillon, 13 May 1907 (Trinity College Dublin, Dillon Papers, MS 6747/222).
In the political turmoil of 1910, Redmond had forged a pact with the Liberals, promising support for the Government and for its programme of parliamentary reform in exchange for a new Home Rule Bill for Ireland (Callanan 1996: 470). The Bill of 1912 was modelled largely on that of 1893. It proposed a bicameral parliament with an accountable executive subordinate to Westminster, but with free reign over much domestic legislation and with predictable restrictions on issues such as religious discrimination and control of police. Financially, a scheme highly favourable to Ireland had been drawn up during 1911. However, when it was found that there was a deficit of roughly £1 million in Irish taxation, and that this would increase to £1.5 million the following year, much less ambitious financial clauses were written into the Bill. This deficit had arisen largely through new Liberal legislation on social insurance and pensions which applied equally to Britain and Ireland (Jalland 1983: 236–240).

Despite concerns over finance, the third Home Rule Bill represented the most comprehensive and far-reaching commitment to legislative autonomy for Ireland to date and it laid out a roadmap for the orderly transfer of a meaningful amount of political control from Britain to Ireland and the disestablishment of the Act of Union. When the third Home Rule Bill was put before the House of Commons in April 1912, the veto of the House of Lords had been removed. From a legal perspective, Home Rule was virtually certain by this point. However, if finance was the most objectionable aspect contained within the third Home Rule Bill, then the most conspicuous absence from its clauses was any reference to the economically and religiously distinct region of Ulster. Mindful of the futility of constitutional opposition since the removal of the House of Lords’ veto, unionists on both sides of the Irish Sea now turned to extra-constitutional methods and began organizing and arming a paramilitary force to protect Ulster from being forced under the rule of a Dublin parliament. Six northeastern counties – containing approximately 802,500 mainly unionist Protestants and 407,000 mostly nationalist Catholics26 – would eventually preserve their union with Great Britain, excluding themselves from the jurisdiction of the Southern Parliament which was established in 1919 and officially recognized by London in 1922.

The Shift from Constitutionalism to Physical Force: Irish Nationalism, 1912–1922

To briefly summarize the evolution of the Irish question between 1912 and 1922, the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 saw the Home Rule Bill placed on the Statute Book only to be suspended for the duration of the European conflict and pending suitable accommodation for the unionist minority in Ulster. Having been at the height of his popularity in 1914, Redmond advocated the enlistment of Irish nationalists into the British army as a sign of loyalty to the powers that had just legislated for Irish Home Rule and also for the defence of other small European nations. As public opinion in Ireland turned against the War, Redmondism began to share this fate. Having been put on hold for the duration of the War, the Irish question stagnated. In April 1916, a small and unrepresentative minority of

26 Figures (rounded to the nearest 500) are taken from ‘Mr Redmond’s Address to the Buckingham Palace Conference, 21 July 1914’ (Parliamentary Archives, Westminster, Lloyd George Papers MS C/20/2/9).
nationalists, believing the old maxim that ‘England’s difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity’ and pledged to achieving independence through physical force, staged an insurrection. With little action outside of Dublin, the rebellion was put down within a week. Public opinion was initially hostile to these unrepresentative rebels due to the fact that many nationalists were serving in the British army and because Dublin had been subjected to artillery bombardment during the hostilities. However, the public mood shifted rapidly when the British military authorities began to execute the ringleaders in early May.

This ‘draconian reaction’ (Foster 1988: 484), coupled with the extension of martial law to areas of Ireland that had not even seen fighting resulted in the political wing of the rebel faction witnessing a sudden and dramatic rise in popularity at the expense of Redmondism and the Home Rule movement. In the 1918 General Election, this new status quo was confirmed. The Home Rulers managed to hold on to only six seats. Meanwhile, the rebels’ Sinn Féin party won seventy-three seats, taking over as representatives of majority Irish nationalism. Sinn Féin abstained from attendance at Westminster and set up a new administration in Dublin. Between 1919 and 1921, Southern Ireland found itself embroiled in a war of independence while in Ulster, six counties combined to form a new Northern Irish state (Buckland 1979). In the South, a truce was declared in the summer of 1921 and a treaty was drafted by December (Pakenham 1992). Although this treaty precipitated a civil war between rival nationalist factions in the South, an Irish Free State, with powers even greater than those proposed under the Home Rule Bills, was established in 1922. British control over Ireland was further eroded by successive Irish governments in the ensuing decades and Ireland severed its last political tie with Britain in 1949, exiting the Commonwealth of Nations and declaring itself a republic (Ferriter 2005: 484–485).

Through a mixture of antagonism and cooperation, nationalist involvement in Parliament ensured that the Irish question was not forgotten in British political circles. Indeed, at many points in this chronology it was, in fact, brought centre stage through the efforts of nationalist MPs. By courting the favour of Liberal politicians and by exploiting British political crises, Home Rulers managed to extract commitments and concessions from successive Liberal governments, culminating in the placing of the third Home Rule Bill on the Statute Book in September 1914.

With a commitment to Irish self-determination enshrined in law, the principle of a domestic legislature for Ireland had been conceded. Even the Conservatives had to content themselves with working towards the salvation of Ulster. Home Rule, for nationalist Ireland was an accepted fact by all sides from 1914 onwards. Ironically, the physical force wing of Irish nationalism, which so detested the insipidness and latent imperialism of Redmondism, would likely have faded into history as yet another failed Irish revolutionary movement had it not been for the monumental efforts of the constitutionalists since the 1870s. One Irish agitator

\[27\] This point has been made by Eugenio Biagini. Furthermore, Biagini claims that, in British Liberalism, Irish self-determination fed into a broader debate on liberty stretching back to the Chartist movement established in 1838 (Biagini 2007: 3–5).

\[28\] On the carving up of Ulster between nationalist and unionist representatives in 1914, see Mulvagh (2007).
claimed that ‘Violence is sometimes the only way to secure a hearing for moderation’ (quoted in Lyons 1971: 131) but given the crucial spadework undertaken by the Home Rule movement which laid the foundations for Sinn Féin’s independence movement, the opposite is equally true. Until the principle of political freedom has been extracted from the ruling regime, violence only begets repression and restrictions on liberty. Regrettably for the Taiwanese Home Rule movement, while the principle of enhanced liberties and legislative powers had been conceded in 1935, the exigencies of wider geopolitics forced a reversal of policy from Tokyo within just two years. Just as the First World War would eventually prove to be the vehicle of change for Ireland, 29 so too the defeat of Japan in 1945, and not the efforts of the independence movement, would force regime change in Taiwan.

The First Stage of Lin Hsien-Tang’s Political Movement in Taiwan: The Assimilation Association (1914–1920) and the Law 63 Abolition Movement

Lin rose to leadership of the Taiwan Assimilation Association and of the Law 63 Abolition movement in the 1910s. These two political movements were both non-violent, limiting their goals to winning equal rights and status between the Taiwanese and the Japanese.

The Taiwan Assimilation Association (同化會)

The ‘Taiwan Assimilation Association’ was nominally established by the Japanese human rights activist Taisuno Itegaki (板垣退助) and supported (and in fact, initiated) by Lin with the aim of unifying Taiwan and Japan as a community. In other words, the association wanted the Taiwanese to have the same political rights as the Japanese.

Itegaki had played a prominent role in the Meiji Reform period. He had been appointed as Secretary for the Senate and Minister of Civil Engineering in 1871, but resigned when his advocacy of ‘Korean conquest’ went unheeded. In 1874, he organized the ‘Patriotic Public Party’. In 1881, he founded the Liberal Party and became its leader, and was renowned for advocating liberalism. He later formed the Constitutional Party, and, in cooperation with the Reform Party, the first political party-led cabinet in Japanese history was formed in 1898. Shigenobu Okuma (大隈重信) became Prime Minister and Itegaki himself served as Minister of Internal Affairs. After stepping down in 1900, he still maintained a substantial influence on Japanese politics due to his reputation for incorruptibility (Chang 1981: 80).

Lin kept in close contact with Liang Chi-Tsau after Liang’s visit to Taiwan in 1911, and he even received books and newspapers from Liang on numerous occasions; Liang was also a journalist and thus kept Lin informed of international developments, which would have included the Irish Issues (Hsu 2007: 32–152). In May 1913, Lin informed Liang that he would soon visit him in Beijing (Hsu 2007: 153), and he did that autumn, meeting Liang and also some Chinese politicians.

29 Roy Foster has dubbed the First World War ‘one of the most decisive events in modern Irish history’ (1988: 471).
Lin then went to Tokyo to call on Itegaki through the introduction of Wang Shue-Tsien, a member of the Taichung Poetry Society (Chang 1981: 79–80). He complained about the distresses of the Taiwanese people and went further, inviting Itegaki to make a fact-finding trip to Taiwan. Itegaki was sympathetic with the Taiwanese people, though he was also a Pan-Asianist, advocating the idea of southward expansion. He considered that Taiwan would be a good fulcrum for promoting Sino-Japanese intimacy as Japan expanded in East Asia, and thus promised to help and accepted Lin’s invitation without hesitation (Chang 1981: 79–80). We may safely assume that Lin’s actions must have been encouraged by Liang, who as early as 1907 had advised Lin to follow the Irish approach of making links with the influential politicians.

On 17 February 1914, Itegaki came to Taiwan for an inspection tour. In the autumn of the same year, Lin visited Tokyo again, and was introduced by Itegaki to Sir Shigenobu Okuma, a prominent Japanese political figure. Itegaki then began to put serious thought into the possibility of political co-operation between Japan and Taiwan, and formulated the ‘Taiwan Assimilation Association’. For this purpose, he came to Taiwan for the second time in November 1914, and on 20 December he officially launched the association at the Taipei Railway Hotel. Due to Itegaki’s reputation and Lin’s influence, many political and intellectual elites in both Taiwan and Japan became involved. It is also interesting to know that the British parliament passed the third Irish Home Rule Bill in 1914, which might have encouraged Lin and Itegaki in their actions.

However, the Association provoked immediate suspicion, leading to constant harassment and persecution at the hands of the colonial administration and the media. In particular, it was alleged that the chief member of the Association had cooperated with Mr Kuo, the Lin family secretary, and misused 50,000 Japanese Yen which had been raised through ‘fundraising’ in order to assist an individual named Lin Tsong-Gen ([林熊徵](#)) in acquiring a title of nobility. Therefore, the members of the Association were forced to resign en masse on 21 January 1915, and two days later the colonial administration revoked the Association’s permit to collect membership fees. The Association was forcibly dissolved on 26 February (Yang 1988: 76–77). Consequently, the first political movement developed by Lin was unsuccessful, and the measures advised by Liang did not work.

The purpose of the ‘Taiwan Assimilation Association’ was to encourage the eventual ‘cultural unification’ of Japan and Taiwan, which in theory could help strengthen Japanese political rule in Taiwan. If so, why did the association face such extreme opposition from the colonial administration and from Japanese residents in Taiwan? There are two reasons. First, the Japanese were deeply suspicious of Taiwanese intentions. Second, the Japanese were still not willing to share their political power and economic advantages with the Taiwanese, as ‘assimilation’ between Japan and Taiwan would ‘dilute’ their privileges.

The failure of the Taiwan Assimilation Association was one reason why Lin was consequently forced to stay silent for the time being. Another reason was the bloodshed of the anti-Japanese Yu Ching-Fang Incident in 1915, which resulted in massive political oppression by the colonial regime. This was the first violent anti-Japanese incident following the end of the first period of resistance to Japanese rule.
The Law 63 Abolition Movement

After the brief appearance of the Taiwan Assimilation Association, Lin switched the focus of his political activism to abolishing the so-called ‘Law 63’ outside Taiwan. This legislation had been imposed by the Japanese colonial regime, which claimed that Taiwan had unique characteristics in the Japanese empire. Therefore, any law within mainland Japan was ‘inapplicable’ to Taiwan. Instead, Law 63 was proclaimed to give the government-general special authorization to conduct executive, military, and even some legislative powers in Taiwan. Many Taiwanese saw this Law as enslaving Taiwan.

After 1910, the number of Taiwanese students in Japan increased rapidly, and included Lin’s own children. Through receiving a modern education, many students learned political resistance through legal measures, as Japan had become a constitutional nation. In August 1918, Lin visited Tokyo with his private secretary Shih Chia-Pen, and had regular contact with Taiwanese students (Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 54). He invited the students to a banquet at Jinbocho in Tokyo, where he discussed how Taiwan could move forward from its political stalemate. Various political ideas were discussed, ranging from independence, through to autonomy and the abolition of Law 63. Eventually, it was decided that the best political route was the abolition of Law 63, as proposed by Shih Chia-Pen. Thus was formed the Law 63 Abolition League, headed by Lin himself (Chang 1981: 106–107). Lin then focused all his efforts on achieving this new goal.

In April 1919, Lin used his residence in Tokyo as a base for organizing the first related activities, and he travelled from Taiwan to Japan again in October. During 1919, Den Kenjirō (田健次郎) became the first civilian governor-general of Taiwan, and Lin formally visited him to express his anticipation of political reform (Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 55). In 1920, Lin visited Tokyo again to meet Japanese political leaders and to call for the abolition of Law 63.

However, Lin again changed direction suddenly, after meeting Taiwanese students in a church in central Tokyo on 28 November. From this time, he began to call for the establishment of a Taiwan Assembly (Tsai et al. 1971: 68–69; Chang 1981: 111–112). There are three main reasons to explain this change: first, Japan was very protective of its political status in Taiwan, and so the abolition of Law 63 was very difficult to achieve. Second, the students’ association which had pursued this goal had had to be dissolved due to fundraising difficulties 1919. Finally, the political movement had to follow constant changes in Taiwanese political ideas.

The Second Stage of Lin Hsien-Tang’s Political Movement: The Taiwan Assembly Movement (1920–1930)

Lin’s fight for equality between Taiwanese and Japanese had failed, and this led him to consider an alternative direction. Since the concept of ‘national self-determination’ had become a trend in global politics after the First World War, Lin’s political activities developed to emphasize the uniqueness of Taiwan, aiming to establish a Taiwan Assembly as a check on the Taiwan governor. This change
was motivated by overseas students, and the main battleground shifted from Taiwan to Japan. The effort reached its climax between 1920 and 1927.

The Background of the Taiwan Assembly Movement

On 28 November 1920, members of the Enlightening Association (啟發會) and the Taiwan Youth Association (臺灣青年會) met in Tokyo to discuss the Law 63 abolition movement. There were severe disputes between the two sides. Lin Cheng-Lu (林呈祿) advocated autonomy through a special assembly in Taiwan; Lin was convinced to terminate the Law 63 abolition movement, and instead focused on the establishment of a Taiwan Assembly (Tsai et al. 1971: 68–69; Chang 1981: 111–112). Subsequently, Lin became the head of the Enlightening Association in December (Lin Hsien-Tang Comemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 54, 57; Chang 1981: 112), changing its aim to the setting up of an independent Taiwan Assembly (Chou 1989: 39–45).

The Taiwan Assembly movement was the result of three major factors. First, there was encouragement from US President Woodrow Wilson, who advocated the principle of national self-determination. Second, Taiwan was stimulated by the example of the Korean independence movement in 1919. Third, amendments to Law 31 in 1906 and to Law 3 in 1921 had made the Law 63 abolition movement pointless and fruitless. A more important factor was the sudden boom in Taiwanese students studying in Japan, which increased from 60 men in 1906 to more than 2000 in 1922 (Yoshino 1927: 247–248). These students became the forerunners of the political movement in Taiwan.

However, the young Taiwanese students differed over political ideas and courses of action, and so needed an older and competent leader to coordinate disputes. Lin, due to his scholarship, seniority, personality, and family wealth, was regarded as a common leader of the movement.

The Leadership of the Taiwan Assembly Petition Movement

Lin led the Taiwan Assembly petition movement in Taiwan between 1921 and 1934, petitioning the Japanese Imperial Diet fifteen times. Unfortunately, his efforts did not bear fruit beyond educating or enlightening the Taiwanese public.

In December 1920, Lin and 178 Taiwanese activists signed and filed a petition for the establishment of a Taiwan Assembly for the first time in Tokyo. This was only days before the opening of the Diet (Imperial Parliament) commenced (Chou 1989: 71). The main aims were: (1) the setting up of the Taiwan Assembly, which would have the right to approve or reject the budget of the governor and the

30 Just as Lin Hsien-Tang can be compared to John Redmond, Lin Cheng-Lu might be compared to Arthur Griffith, who advocated parliamentary abstention and the establishment of a rival parliament and administration in Ireland. Based on the example of the Hungarian nationalist, Ferenc Deák, Griffith’s policy became the template for the Irish independence movement between 1919 and 1921. Griffith outlined his policy in a highly influential manifesto: The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland (2003 [1904]). In recent historiography, Michael Laffan has branded Griffith’s manifesto a ‘bizarre political tract’ (Laffan 1999: 3).
colonial administration; (2) that every adult resident of Taiwan, regardless of their racial and cultural background, should be entitled to vote in elections. However, the petition was immediately rejected by both houses of the Diet between February and March 1921, because the colonial administration did not want to be overseen by the Taiwanese (Chou 1989: 72).

The colonial administration was very fearful of the petition movement, but its hands were tied due to the fact that petitioning did not breach the Japanese constitution. On 24 April 1921 Lin returned to Taiwan, accompanied by Tsai Pei-Huo (蔡培火). The colonial administration dispatched a secretary to Keelung harbour to oversee their arrival, and Lin afterwards received several anonymous threatening letters. Despite these threats and obstacles, mainstream Taiwanese society was encouraged by Lin’s political action. Lin then travelled around Taiwan to spread his message, which made him a recognized and popular Taiwanese political leader (Chang 1981: 133). To woo Lin, the colonial administration appointed him as the first ombudsman of the colonial administration on 1 June 1921 (Chang 1981: 133).

Lin did not give up his activism, and he started a second petition at the end of 1921 and the beginning of 1922. He received 350 signatures and again travelled to Japan to gather further names. He paid visits to prominent Japanese politicians and the press, but the Diet continued to refuse to act on the petition (Chang 1981: 133–134).

In May 1922, Lin returned to Taiwan and continued his activities by making public speeches and explaining the progress of the Taiwan Assembly movement. The colonial administration again became nervous, but it was restricted by the constitution from taking drastic measures. However, from August 1922 the colonial administration started to oppress the petition movement through other channels, such as forcing Taiwanese employees to leave their posts, obstructing the financing of Lin and his members, and smearing Lin’s reputation (Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 65–66). However, the belief that Taiwan should be given the right to home rule may have become widespread; the only Taiwanese magazine, Taiwan, advocated home rule, and an editorial in May 1922 entitled ‘From Assimilation to Home Rule’ noted an international trend in this direction and mentioned the Irish case specifically (M. Wu and Z.-L. Wu 1992: 45–46).

Lin filed the third petition in 1923. He even set up a Taiwan Assembly Association, although this was immediately banned by the colonial administration. The petition was again rejected by the Diet (Tsai et al. 1971: 124–126). This did not stop the flame of the movement in Taiwan, and so the governor-general intensified acts of suppression, such as ending Lin’s post in the colonial administration on 10 March 1923. This was followed by mass arrests of Taiwanese political activists in 1924.

In 1923, the head of Taichung Prefecture plotted to destroy the Taiwan Assembly petition movement. He not only forced Lin to join the pro-Japanese Sun Worshipping Association (向陽會), but also tempted him to meet the governor, Kakichi Uchida (內田嘉吉). On 29 September, Lin met Governor Uchida with eight other Taiwanese political activists. Uchida told them that although the Taiwan Assembly petition movement was a political right protected by the Japanese imperial constitution, he advised them not to go any further. The colonial
administration even disseminated the rumour that Lin had ‘promised to terminate the Assembly petition movement’. The activists in Tokyo were puzzled and agitated. It was rumoured that Lin had abandoned his political beliefs in return for 300 acres of land, which deeply damaged his reputation (Chang 1981: 142).

Furthermore, the colonial administration started large-scale arrests of several members of the movement from 16 December 1923, on the pretext they had violated the ‘Public Order Law’. As a result, 99 people were detained or taken in for interrogation. The colonial administration claimed that the petition movement had been banned in February, but that a splinter group had been formed in Tokyo with the same name and the same members, and therefore violated the law. Lin immediately contacted his friend Yeh Rong-Chong (葉榮鐘) to dispatch a letter to Japan secretly, in which this mass persecution was described. In the period up to 7 January 1924, Chiang Wei-Shui (蔣渭水) and 18 other activists were prosecuted and were sentenced from three to four months in prison (Chou 1989: 82–84). However, this trial was the first ever public trial in the history of Taiwan, and so provided good political education for the public.

Due to intensifying oppression by the colonial administration, Lin temporarily stepped down from leadership and took on a supporting role. The nominal leaders were succeeded by Chiang Wei-Shui (蔣渭水) and Tsai Pei-Huo. They submitted the fourth and fifth petitions, but again without success. The colonial administration still continued their acts of oppression, and pressed pro-Japanese Taiwanese leaders to organize a gathering called ‘the Powerful Men’s Meeting’, attacking the petitioners. As a counter-attack, anti-Japanese activists organized ‘the Weakers’ Meeting’, by holding public meetings in Taipei, Taichong, and Tainan. When Lin gave his public speech in Taichung (Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 73), the morale of the Taiwanese political activists had suddenly been given a big boost again.

At the same time, the political climate in Taiwan had changed favourably. Governor Uchida stepped down and was replaced by Izawa Takio (伊澤多喜男), who was friendlier to the Taiwanese. In addition, two reformist Japanese members of the Diet’s Lower House visited Taiwan, delivering speeches and meeting Lin to discuss political issues (Tsai et al. 1971: 132–133). Therefore, between 1925 and 1927 Lin came out to lead the Taiwan Assembly petition movement for a sixth, seventh, and eighth time. The numbers of signatures increased drastically, and Lin’s political influence reached a further climax.

On 11 February 1925, Lin and three other key members of the Taiwan Assembly petition movement went to Japan and submitted the sixth petition. Lin even invited several prominent Japanese politicians from the ruling and opposition parties in Tokyo to support his political cause (Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 76). Lin then returned to Taiwan in March and was invited to several places to give public speeches, especially in Er-Lin Village (二林), where there was a dispute which had led to local farmers resenting the Japanese colonial

31In the Diet, Daikichirou Tagawa (田川大吉郎) was deeply sympathetic to the Taiwanese and from time to time introduced the proposal of the Taiwan Assembly petition on behalf of the movement.
In February 1926, Tsai Pei-Huo, the petition movement representative, went to Japan and submitted the seventh petition (Chou 1989: 91–93). Once again, their demands were turned down. However, the key members of the movement made further efforts, by delivering more public speeches and showing films to gather public support. This time, the number of signatures reached 2,470 (Chang 1981: 155).

**The Weakening of the Petition Movement**

Unfortunately, after 1927 the political movement in Taiwan stagnated, and even dramatically receded. There are two factors which explain this: there was a split within the anti-Japanese groups, and the rise of the Japanese militarism resulted in stricter controls over Taiwan.

*The split and the deterioration of the anti-Japan groups*: On 15–16 May 1926, Lin held a meeting of the Taiwan Cultural Association in his home to discuss forming a political party. Lin, Tsai Pei-Huo, and Hsieh Chun-Mu were named as leaders of the committee to coordinate this. In August, Lin met shareholders of the Taiwan New Daily, a major Taiwanese newspaper, again to discuss the formation of a political party, but the meeting ended without any firm decisions due to vast differences of opinion. On 17 October 1926, the sixth annual general meeting of the Taiwan Cultural Association was held in Hsin-Chu to discuss further details, but there was again no conclusion due to differences of opinion (Chang 1981: 210). In order to put its principles into practice, Chiang Wei-Shui proposed that the Cultural Association should change its name to ‘Liberation Association’, aiming to ‘achieve the political, economic and social liberations of the Taiwanese’ while giving up the idea of ‘autonomy’ within the Japanese empire.

Unfortunately, in January 1927 the Cultural Association formally split into left and right wings. The left wing, after achieving total control of the Association, concentrated its actions on social revolution and even clandestinely sought

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32 Er-Lin Village, in present-day Changhua County, had been a poor area until the establishment of sugar factories in the Japanese period. The Lin Pen-Yuan Sugar Company was set up in 1909–1911, financed by the Lin family but actually run and controlled by Japanese managers approved by the Governor-General of Taiwan. In April 1924, the sugarcane farmers requested that the company raise its purchasing prices, which had long been lower than that of other companies, and their request succeeded in December. The Taiwan Cultural Association then went further to help organize the Er-Lin Sugarcane Farmers’ Co-operative to bargain with the company for farmers’ rights, but this was not recognized by the company. Lin Hsien-Tang was at one time invited to make a speech criticizing the sugar policy, and he received enthusiastic responses. In 1925, the company tried to harvest the sugarcane by force, and consequently provoked a conflict between the police and more than 100 farmers. The police subsequently arrested more than 400 farmers and sued them. This so-called ‘Er-Lin Incident’ stimulated farmers in other areas to set up their own respective co-ops, and a General Taiwan Farmers Co-operative was established in 1926–1928 by Chi Chien, the leading figure in Taiwan farmers’ movements, to fight for farmers’ rights. (T.Y. Chen 2005 30–36).
Taiwan’s independence. The right wing retreated to form a ‘Taiwan People’s Party’ to continue the assembly petition movement. However, this party also split between moderates and radicals, thus weakening its standing (Chang 1981: 205–208). These two political events severely tarnished Lin’s image as the overall leader of the political movements in Taiwan, and forced him to undertake global travel for a year until 1928 (Chang 1981: 86–87). Without effective leadership, the political movement declined (Chang 1981: 208–209).

Militaristic rule from the 1930s: Japan began the invasion of China in 1931, and the colonial administration in Taiwan consequently intensified the suppression of political activities. In 1936, Japan reinstated the governorship of Taiwan as a military position. The then-governor Kobayashi started the projects of ‘Japanization, Industrialization, and Southern Expansion’, which extended control over the island’s social and political life. The internal and external problems strangled Lin’s activities. He resigned as the advisor of the Taiwan People’s Party in January 1931, and on 19 February the party was dissolved by the Japanese police on the basis that it advocated class struggle. The first-ever political party in the history of Taiwan had existed for only three years and eight months. Further, the party leader, Chiang Wei-Shui, died on 8 August, which symbolized the termination of a moderate political force in Taiwan politics. Lin’s role in anti-Japanese activism was becoming less and less important. A comparison with Ireland was made by A.R. Byers, Consul to the British ambassador in Tokyo, in a letter of 26 March 1933; Byers observed that ‘there is no danger of Formosa becoming a second Ireland… The arm of the police in Formosa is long, sudden and ruthless’ (quoted in Hoare 2010).

Conclusion

Lin Hsien-Tang dedicated almost his entire life to the improvement of the status of Taiwanese under Japanese colonial rule. However, how to achieve his goal was a great challenge, as Taiwan was a ceded territory and legally belonged to Japan. There were two potential ways, militant or peaceful, and he chose the peaceful route.

The current paper has tried to explain why Lin chose the peaceful route. We found that in addition to his own personality and the disadvantages of using force against colonial authority, Lin was advised and convinced by a prominent Chinese politician in exile, Liang Chi-Tsau, to follow the example of the Irish Home Rule movement.

In order to understand the Irish way of resisting colonialism, John Redmond is a good comparison for Lin, and the paper has therefore discussed Redmond’s leadership of the Home Rule movement up to 1918. He succeeded in passing the third Home Rule Bill in 1912, a major triumph for Irish nationalism. However, this achievement was nullified by the 1916 rebellion and, just nine months after Redmond’s death, the Home Rule movement was eclipsed by physical-force republicans. As a moderate politician, Redmond, like his predecessors, worked within the confines of the British parliamentary system to achieve concessions for Ireland. Through the efforts of the Home Rulers and the benevolence of successive British governments, the land question had been solved before the outbreak of the Irish revolution. Additionally, infrastructure, old age pensions, and a
new university had been set up in Ireland since the turn of the century. Despite these gains, radicals usurped the political leadership of nationalist Ireland in the turmoil of 1914–1918 and violent methods were applied in the pursuit of similar goals to those pursued by the Home Rule movement.

Turning to Lin’s political movements in Taiwan, these can be divided into two stages: first, the Assimilation Association and Law 63 abolition movements, and, second, the Taiwanese Assembly movement. We have seen that in spite of co-operation between Lin and Taisuno Itegaki, a renowned Japanese politician, the Assimilation Association movement ended in failure due to the opposition of the governor-general and of Japanese residents in Taiwan. The Law 63 Abolition movement did no better, as it was not only rejected by the colonial government, but was also rejected by the younger generation of leaders, who regarded it as a complete subjugation of Taiwan to Japan, in which Taiwan would lose all national characteristics.

The second stage of Lin’s activism, the Taiwanese Assembly movement, involved a great deal of time, energy, and personal wealth. He at first led, and later supported, a lengthy and large-scale movement to petition the Japanese Diet fifteen times between and 1920 and 1934, in order to establish an independent Taiwanese Assembly elected by the Taiwanese people. He succeeded in enlightening and mobilizing the Taiwanese to support his challenging movement, but it was all in vain. On the one hand, the Japanese colonial administration feared that Lin’s demands would mean that it would lose its political grip on Taiwan. Further, the Imperial government gradually developed an aggressive policy in the 1930’s which included unilateral suppression of dissent. On the other hand, the disruption of the Taiwanese leaders made things even worse. In 1927, the left wing rose to replace Lin in leading the anti-colonial movement, criticizing him as a collaborator with the colonial government. Lin even went abroad to avoid difficult situations from 1927 to 1928. Without a popular and honourable leader, the movement lost its momentum and came to an end in 1934.

Lin and Redmond both had similar experiences in fighting for Home Rule. First, they both adopted a moderate approach instead of opting for violence. In his role as leader of the Irish nationalist MPs at Westminster, John Redmond worked towards enhancing political rights and the social position of nationalists in Ireland while maintaining a peaceful political co-existence with his opponents, just as Lin wanted to achieve equality between the Taiwanese and the Japanese. Second, both the Taiwanese and Irish Home Rule movements faced opposition and suppression from the colonial rulers. Third, both succeeded in keeping the flame of national consciousness alight in their people. Fourth, both Lin and Redmond were sabotaged and attacked by radicals of their own side and lost the hegemony of their respective movements. Eventually, Lin and Redmond both ended their political careers in frustration and disappointment.

However, Ireland was comparatively more fortunate than Taiwan. Unlike Lin, Redmond did achieve the passage of the Third Home Rule Bill, which in theory should have established a peaceful political framework through which the Irish in different political camps could live in harmony and eventually enjoy an equal political status with Britain. Additionally, Redmond and the Irish Home Rule movement generally had great success in fundraising and garnering support from
the Irish diaspora in America and elsewhere. This played a key role in funding the Irish Parliamentary Party. Unfortunately, the passage of the Third Home Rule Bill led to the emergence of rival paramilitary organizations in Ireland and, in 1914, the island stood on the brink of civil war. This culture of paramilitary drilling and the arming of citizen-soldiers, which had begun with the tacit approval of democratically elected politicians – including Redmond – eventually led to an ideological shift towards independence by force of arms. In the process, the Home Rule movement was destroyed and the Irish state established in 1922 was one born out of bloodshed.

Taiwan was not as fortunate as Ireland in the pursuit of autonomy. It was always strictly controlled by the Japanese colonial government from 1895–1945. Further, it went on to experience a prolonged period of authoritarian rule under the Republic of China (ROC) after Japan surrendered in 1945, which lasted until the lifting of martial law in 1987. Despite their geographical distance, it has been shown here that there are many similarities in the historical experiences of Ireland and Taiwan and there is much fertile ground for comparison.

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33 Redmond fundraised throughout his entire political career. He is particularly remembered for the success of a venture to the United States in 1910 which raised $100,000 for the beleaguered party funds (Gwynn 1932: 184).


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Cinema, Identity, and Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on A City of Sadness and The Wind that Shakes the Barley

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Abstract

On the surface, A City of Sadness (Beiqing Chengshi, 1989, dir. Hou Hsiao-Hsien, Taiwan) and The Wind that Shakes the Barley (2006, dir. Ken Loach, UK) may have little in common. However, both films employ powerful filmic languages to express contested identities. While the latter depicts proactive and passionate heroism, the former embraces silent and passive endurance. A comparison between these two films will help illuminate the cinematic strategies adopted by filmmakers to reflect identity politics in different contexts. It will also demonstrate the complexity and diversity of resistance as a concept and as a form of action.

Introduction

According to Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Yueh-Yu Yeh (2005), it is important to consider carefully both the issues surrounding films as language and languages used in films. This is a useful approach that may be applied to resistance films for two reasons: first, film itself is a special symbolic language that is composed of cinematic codes such as camera shot, lighting, framing, performance, narrative structure, editing and montage, sound and music, mise-en-scène, etc (Monaco 1981: 121–191). This has made cinema an effective medium for communicating and representing identities on many levels (personal, regional, national, cultural, social, and political). Second, the issue of languages employed in cinema can be extremely significant when used to express identities. For example, in Taiwan and in Northern Ireland, the troubled histories of both places mean that the use of verbal and written language in many of films may be, consciously or unconsciously, laden with political meanings. Language may evoke a sense of nostalgia or hostility, enhance regional flavour or promote national unity, or create intimacy or distance, for various linguistic communities and for different reasons.

This paper seeks to compare two seemingly unrelated films: Taiwanese filmmaker Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s A City of Sadness (Beiqing Chengshi, 1989, Taiwan), and British director Ken Loach’s The Wind that Shakes the Barley (2006, UK). Upon close examination, both can be categorized as resistance films, although they offer different discourses and representations of resistance. The term ‘resistance film’ is loosely defined here to refer to cinematic works that foreground
the actions and notions of resistance. Most typical examples can be found in the cinema of anti-colonialism. One example is *The Battle of Algiers* (*La Battaglia di Algeri*, 1966, dir. Gillo Pontecorvo, France/Italy), which depicts events during the Algerian War against French occupation in 1954–1962. The film focuses on the years between 1954 and 1957, when the freedom fighters struggled to combat a systematic attempt by the French colonial power to eliminate them.

Studies of resistance cinema include Del Mundo’s (1998) book on native resistance in Filipino cinema and colonialism, and Burns (2006) on cultural resistance in Turkish-German cinema. Diawara (1988) pays particular attention to racial politics, and discusses how spectators of different racial backgrounds may problematize identification and resistance. For example, the ‘Gus chase’ sequence from *The Birth of a Nation* (1915, dir. D.W. Griffiths, US) shows a white young girl chased by a black man. Diawara points out that the editing, *mise-en-scène* and narrative content ‘all combine to compel the spectator to regard Gus as the representation of danger and chaos’ (68). The spectator, regardless of race or gender, is supposed to identify with the white hero, Little Colonel, in the film and to hate Gus. However the resisting spectator recognizes that

*The Birth of a Nation* appears to misread history for ideological reasons. Not only is Little Colonel a fake father and hero’ as he symbolizes resistance to the ideals of democracy, ‘but the black experience is rendered absent in the text… It would be worthwhile to note how spectatorial resistance to the racist ideology encoded in *The Birth of a Nation* is expressed, often in ‘realist’ terms, by invoking an alternative account based on Afro-American historical experience.

(Diawara 1988: 70)

In other words, ‘resistance films’ can be a vast and diverse discursive category. Yet when we situate *A City of Sadness* and *The Wind that Shakes the Barley* within this category, it becomes particularly striking how comparable these two films have become. In both cases, the filmmakers employ similar cinematic languages in distinctive ways to signify conflicting identities and to portray diverse forms of resistance.

Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 533) observe that ‘there has been a rapid proliferation of scholarship on resistance but little consensus on its definition.’ After surveying a wide range of literature in sociology, anthropology, and political science, the two authors recognize that the term ‘resistance’ is used to describe ‘a tremendous diversity of behaviors and settings’, among which

the most commonly studied mode of resistance is material or physical, involving the resisters’ use of their bodies or other material objects. ‘Resistance’ is most readily thought to refer to social movements… and ‘contentious politics’.

(Hollander and Einwohner 2004: 535–536)

Loach’s *The Wind that Shakes the Barley* deals mainly with the most overt form of resistance: military combat. The film is set in 1920, when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was fighting a guerrilla war against the British for the independence of Ireland. When a truce is reached and the Irish Free State proclaimed in 1922, the Irish Civil War then broke out between radicals and moderates. As the film critic
Nick James has noticed, many familiar elements of the resistance film can be found here. For example, ‘the training of rookies, the experience of torture, the near-rape of a lover, the first betrayals and the need for them to be punished by death, the difficult transition to wielding local power’ (James 2006: 26). According to a typology outlined by Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 544–545), what is portrayed in *The Wind that Shakes the Barley* is the least controversial type of resistance, as the action is both intended and recognized by the actors and the observers as resistance.

On the other hand, scholars have identified that in addition to the physical mode of resistance, other forms of resistance may be ‘accomplished through talk and other symbolic behaviour’ (Hollander and Einwohner 2004: 536). Hou’s *A City of Sadness* tells the story of a Taiwanese family during the turbulent years between 1945 and 1949. This is the transitional period during which Taiwan’s former colonizer, Japan, left the island and Taiwan was taken over by the Nationalist (i.e. Kuomintang or KMT) government of the Republic of China (ROC). *A City of Sadness* depicts mostly a more subtle and less visible form of resistance than that performed in *The Wind that Shakes the Barley*. Described as an ‘everyday’ form of resistance, the film stops ‘well short of collective outright defiance’ (Scott 1985: 29), but still qualifies as resistance because it allows the powerless to ‘deny or mitigate claims made by appropriating classes’ (302). As Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 539) note, low-profile techniques of everyday resistance ‘can go unnoticed by the powerful, which helps protect the powerless from repression by masking the resistant nature of their activities.’

Nevertheless, explicitly confrontational actions and more implicitly commonplace resistance are not mutually exclusive. While *A City of Sadness* pays particular attention to ordinary details of how the characters in the film maintain their quiet dignity under difficult circumstances, we also learn of the formation of citizen groups that intend to voice oppositional opinions, and witness a riot involving everyday items as well as traditional weapons. Similarly, although *The Wind that Shakes the Barley* gives the viewers brutal accounts of guerrilla warfare, there are reserved moments which signal inner strength and resilience. It can be argued that both films echo Hollander and Einwohner’s (2004: 537) observation that while ‘resistance is generally understood to be a political action,... resistance can also be identity-based.’ In other words, what is resisted is sometimes ‘not (or not only) political or social conditions but also the resister’s expected or attributed identity.’

I will firstly offer an overview of the historical backgrounds to *A City of Sadness* and *The Wind that Shakes the Barley*. I will then investigate how both films employ cinematic strategies to deliver a representation of their respective histories. I aim to focus on how narratives and languages are used by Hou Hsiao-Hsien and Ken Loach to express different cultural identities. Finally, I will examine how the two filmmakers use the portrayal of female characters to express their own political convictions.

**Background to A City of Sadness**

*A City of Sadness* is Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s ninth feature film, and it is iconic in both the history of Taiwan and the history of Taiwan cinema. The island was under authoritarian rule for forty years, until martial law was lifted in 1987. Political reform
posed serious challenges to existing norms and ideology, but the process also brought with it anxiety and uncertainty. For the first time in living memory, people on Taiwan were able to have a needed open discussion about their suppressed history and identity in order to re-establish a new consensus. *A City of Sadness* is the first film to embark on this soul-searching journey. Hou Hsiao-Hsien admitted that he sees *A City of Sadness* as a ‘self-conscious practice of discovery, recovery and remembrance’ (Harrison 2004–2005: 13). He said that making this film was ‘a process of learning about history, people and life itself’ (13). When the film was first released in Taiwan, it attracted much attention and controversy. People fought to get into the theatre to watch it. As Reynaud (2002: 48) recalled:

> *A City of Sadness* had a tremendous, long-lasting effect on Taiwanese audiences. In one of his earlier made-for-TV dramas... Tsai Ming-Liang shows spectators lining up in front of the theatre to make sure they would get in, and poor people stockpiling tickets to sell them at higher prices.

*A City of Sadness* has been canonized because it is part and parcel of the process of political, social, and cultural democratization in Taiwan.

Moreover, *A City of Sadness* was the first film from Taiwan to win recognition at a major European film festival, when it received the Golden Lion Award in Venice in 1989. Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s ‘minimalist imagery, complex framing, elliptic rendering of interpersonal relationships, and the disruptions created by his storytelling techniques’ has led *A City of Sadness* to be hailed as ‘one of the supreme masterworks of the contemporary cinema’ (Reynaud 2002: 9). The Golden Lion Award generated much pride and excitement in Taiwan. As a result of media frenzy over *A City of Sadness*, box-office receipts in Taipei alone exceeded US $3 million and ‘it was the number one movie in both Taiwan and Hong Kong. It did even better outside Taipei’ (Curtin 2007: 97). This was a sensational box-office record for a domestically-produced film on the island, at a time when the home audience was beginning to lose interest in all Chinese-language films. In fact, Udden (2007: 193) notes that *A City of Sadness* enthused an imitative trend in Taiwan cinema in which many filmmakers, including newcomers (such as Lin Zheng-Sheng) and established veterans (such as Edward Yang), began to follow Hou’s distinctive style.

Furthermore, the subject matter of *A City of Sadness* is of particular significance to people on Taiwan. The film is set against the historical backdrop of the most contentious political event in pre-democratic Taiwan, commonly known as the 2-28 Incident. This began when a relatively minor accident on the street on 28 February 1947 ignited long-accumulated social tension which spiralled into a near-revolution. As a result of 2-28, it is estimated between 10,000 and 20,000 citizens in Taiwan were killed by the Nationalist (KMT) army. The trauma of this tragedy has haunted Taiwan’s politics and society for several decades and the Incident itself was taboo until 1987, when the government finally lifted martial law. However Taiwan viewers’ immediate reaction towards the film was polarized. For example,

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1 For more details on the 28 February Incident of 1947, see Kerr (1966); Chen (1989); Lai, Myers, and Wei (1991); 2-28 Research Committee of the Executive Yuan (1994); Li (1998); Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001: 77–106).
Liao (1999: 85–114) was bitterly disappointed that the film did not seize the historical moment of democratization of the 1980s and produce a more aggressive Taiwanese nationalist declaration. On the other hand, Qi (2000: 331–332) argued that Hou’s work has become a critical social text and thus has inspired multidimensional discourses.

Background to The Wind that Shakes the Barley

The Wind that Shakes the Barley is the nineteenth feature film of seasoned filmmaker Ken Loach, and it won the Golden Palm Award in Cannes in 2006. Prior to The Wind that Shakes the Barley, Loach had received numerous international film prizes, dating as far back as Kes (1969, UK), and including Looks and Smiles (1981, UK), Fatherland (1986, UK/Germany/France), Hidden Agenda (1990, UK), and Land and Freedom (1995, UK/Spain/Germany/Italy). Loach is well-known for his socialist ideals and political activism (Hayward 2004; Jacobson 2007: 21–22; Hill 2011). Interestingly, while The Wind that Shakes the Barley is a recognized British production, it also won the Best Irish Film Award in 2007 as voted by the audience of the Irish Film and TV Awards (IMDB, undated).

The film takes place between 1920 and 1922, and is based on historical events. It ‘employs a fictional cast of characters synthesized from the experiences of real-life participants’ (Crowdus 2007: 55). While the Irish rebellion against the British in the early 1920s was a painful history, it has never been a taboo subject and public discussion has never been suppressed. Ten years prior to the appearance of The Wind that Shakes the Barley, Michael Collins (1996, dir. Neil Jordan, UK) was another high-profile project, similarly dealing ‘with the Irish War of Independence (1919–21) and the ensuing Civil War (1922–23)’ (55). This film was nominated for Academy Awards and won the Golden Lion Award at the 1996 Venice Film Festival.

Loach was thus on a very different historical and political trajectory from Hou Hsiao-Hsien when he produced The Wind that Shakes the Barley. In 1989, Hou dealt with the subject of the 2-28 Incident for the first time in Taiwanese history. Thus there was a tremendous sense of remembering, recovery, and reconciliation in Hou’s desire to produce the film. In contrast, Loach’s purpose in shooting The Wind that Shakes the Barley was not to search for an Irish identity, but instead to remind viewers ‘that the IRA’s original cause was irrefutably just, whatever its subsequent behaviour’ (James 2006: 26). As Loach’s scriptwriter Paul Laverty has revealed in an interview:

I have always been fascinated about how empires tell lies about their history and there have been more lies told about Ireland, Britain's oldest and closest colony, than anywhere else.

(Archibald 2007: 29)

Therefore, Loach and Laverty ‘have never shrunk from using their artistry to promote romanticized versions of history in what they see as a good cause’ (James 2006: 26). As a result, Loach and Laverty demonstrate repeatedly in The Wind that Shakes the Barley that ‘revolutionary violence, with its demand for
internal discipline and purity, is inherently tragic... Loach has made a film for our moment, a time of bewildering internecine warfare' (Denby 2007: 150–151).

**Narrative Strategies, Contested Histories and Identities**

In her study of Aborigines in Taiwan, Brown contends that:

> One of the most fundamental misunderstandings about identity is the widely accepted view that ethnic and national identities are based on common ancestry and/or common culture and therefore that identity is grounded in antiquity... However, culture and ancestry are *not* what ultimately unite an ethnic group or a nation. Rather, identity is formed and solidified on the basis of common social experience, including economic and political experience... [It is] real in the sense of being meaningful and motivating to people.

(Brown 2004: 2)

This allows us to begin to see Taiwan's contested history in a new light. The importance of narrating this history as a journey of self-exploration and self-discovery is also heightened.

In directing *A City of Sadness*, Hou Hsiao-Hsien did not aim to provide one authoritative account of past events or to speak on behalf of one particular political perspective, but to look at histories from bottom-up in order to reflect the previously suppressed, 'the very personal, experienced-based feelings of individual members of identity groups' (Brown 2004: 2). By representing the political reality of the late 1940s indirectly through a fictional family saga, *A City of Sadness* chronicles the intertwining lives of four brothers in an apolitical Taiwanese family from the end of the Japanese colonization in 1945, to the breakout of the 2-28 Incident in 1947, and finally to the arrival of the Nationalist (KMT) government in Taipei in 1949.

**Family Saga and Brotherhood**

*A City of Sadness* opens with a credit sequence-shot of total darkness. The only background sound is the voice of the Emperor Hirohito in a radio broadcast, announcing the unconditional surrender of Japan. The setting is then faintly illuminated by candles. We witness an anxious Taiwanese family busy preparing for the imminent birth of a child in the middle of a power-cut; when the electricity is restored, the father-to-be tries to fix the light and then leaves the room. Hence the light that continues to shake slightly becomes the main focus of the scene, while outside the camera shot we hear the sound of a crying baby after the painful screams of the expectant mother. An inserted text then reveals that Lin Wen-Heung's mistress has given birth to a son, whom they name Kong-Ming, meaning light. The mise-en-scène is rich in meanings and metaphors. The parallel is with Taiwan's liberation from Japanese colonial rule, an event which had given people on the island a real sense of optimism, though also uncertainty; Kong-Ming is Wen-Heung's illegitimate son, and his legal status may become a problematic in

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2 The Romanization of characters’ names is based on the English subtitles provided by the video released in the UK by Artificial Eye.
the future. This can be taken as a metaphor; identity has been a thorny issue for people on Taiwan since 1945, while Taiwan’s collective identity has been problematic for the international community since the Nationalists (KMT) were defeated by the Chinese Communists (CCP) in 1949.

Wen-Heung is the eldest brother of the Lin family. He is a local business owner, and has a background involving gangsters. He finds his livelihood constantly undermined by ambiguous government policies and subject to severe interference by politically-connected Shanghai gangsters. Eventually, his business is closed down and he becomes an alcoholic, before he is finally shot dead by the Shanghai gangster boss. Wen-Heung has one of the most memorable lines in the film: ‘How pitiful we are living on this island! First it is the Japanese, then the Chinese. Eaten by everyone, ridden by everyone, sympathized by no one.’

We do not see the second brother, Wen-Sun, at all. He is a diligent physician and is missing in action in the Philippines. We are reminded of his existence by his wife’s insistence on cleaning his clinic every day in the hope that he will return one day and everything will go back to normal.

The third brother, Wen-Leung, was originally a victim of shell-shock during the Japanese campaign in Shanghai during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). When he recovers from hospital, he joins the family business but also gets involved with Shanghai gangsters. After a dispute with his business partners, Wen-Leung is arrested and physically tortured. When his eldest brother secures his release from prison after bribing mainland officers through well-connected gangsters, Wen-Leung is already permanently brain-damaged.

The youngest brother, Wen-Ching, is a deaf-mute photographer. He communicates through photographs, and by pen and paper. Throughout the film, he is mostly an innocent observer, although he is sometimes forced to be a participant. The audience often witnesses events through the eyes of Wen-Ching and the narrator of the film, a young nurse named Hinomi who later becomes Wen-Ching’s wife. It is often commented that Wen-Ching’s ‘inability to speak symbolizes the Taiwanese as silenced by their oppression’ (Harrison 2004–2005: 14). While some critics are deeply offended by Hou’s choice of a deaf-mute character to represent Taiwanese history, I will argue that by making the main protagonist a deaf-mute photographer, Hou Hsiao-Hsien turns Wen-Ching into an intense and perceptive witness of his surroundings, of people, and of his time. For the audience, Wen-Ching’s account of events not only conveys a more rounded and reflective impression of the past, but also represents in more depth the intricate and problematic process of history-writing.

The Wind that Shakes the Barley adopts a similar strategy, similarly dramatizing the history of the Anglo-Irish War from a grassroots perspective. For example, the Irish revolutionary leader Michael Collins is only glimpsed in a newsreel; Arthur Griffith, the founder and the third leader of Sinn Fein, does not appear; and Eamon

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3 The dialogue quoted here is based on the English subtitles provided by the international version of the film released by Era Communications Ltd at the time of the 1989 Venice Film Festival (Reynaud 2002: 13).

4 ‘Hinomi’ is the Japanese pronunciation of the female character’s Chinese name, written as ‘Kuang-Mei’. During the Japanese colonial period, it was customary for the Taiwanese middle class to adopt the Japanese pronunciation of their Chinese names.
de Valera, who was against the Peace Treaty of 1921 and who later became the Irish prime minister, is not even mentioned. This perspective is like that of *The Wind that Shakes the Barley*, and Loach structures the major storylines around two fictional brothers from County Cork, Damien and Teddy O’Donovan.

The younger brother, Damien, is a junior medical doctor-turned-freedom fighter. He was on his way to London to embark on a medical career, but he was instead prompted to stay after witnessing insufferable harassment and injustice inflicted on ordinary Irish citizens by vicious British soldiers. He joins his elder brother, Teddy, and other IRA members including farm labourers, army veterans, and factory workers, to form a flying column to wage guerrilla warfare against the British army.

When the Anglo-Irish Treaty is signed to establish the Irish Free State while preserving Ireland’s dependent status as a dominion within the British Empire, the O’Donovan brothers are finally forced to part ways, for their beliefs now differ. Damien continues to fight for complete separation from the United Kingdom and a socialist revolution in Ireland, while Teddy agrees to a ceasefire with the British by accepting the Treaty as the best possible compromise for the time being.

As Ken Loach has pointed out in an interview:

> There are many different points of view within the Republican side. We wanted to relive the experience of the people who went through it and to examine why the British acted the way that they did, which the character of Teddy understands better than anyone else. Teddy understands the *realpolitik* of why the Republicans are not going to get everything that they want in one go. That’s why he argues that the British are never going to cede full independence.

(Loach, quoted in Archibald 2007: 28)

Loach’s primary political target ‘is not the British per se but rather the divisions sown among the [IRA] forces’ (James 2006: 26). What is problematized in *The Wind that Shakes the Barley* is not Irish identity, but the history of internal struggle for independence and the ideologies of socialist revolution. Therefore, in the first half of the film the enemy is clearly defined, as the audience can easily identify what and whom Damien and Teddy are resisting *against*. Yet towards the later part of the film, what and whom our revolutionary heroes should fight *for* becomes more opaque. As Denby (2007: 150) summarizes it, ‘The British are gone (except from Northern Ireland), but revolutionary solidarity among the Irish collapses into civil war. There’s our theme: the revolution devours its children.’

**The Use of Languages and Sound**

In addition to the intricate narrative structures, characterization, and visuals, Hou Hsiao-Hsien inserts another layer of text that is equally compelling and intriguing and further enriches the complexity and meanings of *A City of Sadness*: languages and soundscape. I shall focus on these two elements to demonstrate how Hou creates an aural world that reflects Taiwan’s identities as multiple, fluid, and politically problematic.

This can be seen in relation to the languages used in the defining moment of the film; that is, the sequence depicting the events of the 2-28 Incident. Hou Hsiao-
Hsien avoided retelling the Incident directly through one linear viewpoint or timeline, but to allow the tension and confusion of events to unfold before our eyes. Governor Chen Yi’s heavily accented Mandarin is first heard in an announcement imposed against a rural skyline, informing the public that ‘on the night of the 27th, during an investigation in Taipei, someone unfortunately was killed… We have arranged treatment for a woman with slight injuries.’ Meanwhile, we see a group of doctors and nurses gathering to listen to the radio. Wen-Ching, and the young nurse Hinomi’s brother, Hinoe, are at the hospital waiting for Hinomi. When Hinomi appears, Chen Yi’s broadcast gradually fades out. Later, when we hear Hinomi’s narration in Taiwanese as she writes in her diary, we get a private account of the story that differs from the official version announced earlier. Hinomi writes:

Today, the radio reported fighting in Taipei between Taiwanese and mainlanders. Taiwan is under martial law. At the hospital, we’re all afraid. A war has just ended. How can another begin? My brother came to see me. He’s going to Taipei with Wen-Ching. It’s so dangerous. They must have important business to do there. I’m very worried but I dare not say so. Wen-Ching with his handicap, you must take care of him, brother.

Night falls. Hinomi is at home, but she can hear distant noise through her window. Next, we see the hospital becoming busy and chaotic. Civilians, doctors, and nurses rush in and out carrying the wounded. A group of people march towards the hospital carrying torches and shouting, but they are turned away by the doctors. At this point Chen Yi’s Mandarin speech again cuts in, to report ‘measures to handle the unrest’.

As we see the doctors and nurses in the office listening to the radio, the transmission is interrupted by static interference. A young doctor fixes the receiver and Chen Yi’s Mandarin broadcast resumes, announcing that ‘a special committee will be set up. They will be representatives from government, the judiciary and the council member of the public will also be included in order to reflect the true opinion of the people.’

The image turns to the hospital hall. Wen-Ching walks in and sits on the doorstep. There are dark circles around his eyes and he looks confused. He tries to scribble something, just before Hinomi finds him. She is worried, takes his notepad, and writes him a question. Wen-Ching manages to write her a reply and then passes out. The next day, over an empty landscape, we hear Chen Yi’s third Mandarin broadcast declaring martial law. He gives warnings to ‘the majority of peace-minded people’ and asks them: ‘do not listen to the rumours about spies…

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5 Chen Yi’s radio broadcast in the film follows the text of his actual broadcasts in 1947. English translations in this section are all based on English subtitles provided by the video released in the UK by Artificial Eye.
6 Hinoe is the Japanese pronunciation of the character’s Chinese name, Kuang-Rong.
7 Hou and his screenwriters ‘read government documents, interviewed survivors or victims’ families, reviewed diaries and personal letters’ in order to grasp and represent ‘the overall ‘structure of feeling’ of the period’ (Yeh and Davis 2005: 166). Hinomi’s diary and letters are constructed based on materials from the creative team’s field research.
Our target is only a handful of rebels and traitors for each day that they are not eradicated peace-loving citizens must endure another day of unrest.’

Hinomi pays Wen-Ching a visit at his studio. Through their exchanges we are given another piece of the jigsaw about what happened to Wen-Ching and Hinoe during their trip to Taipei. Wen-Ching writes: ‘Hinoe is safe. He sent me ahead. Mr Lin, the teacher, is on this special committee. Many in Taipei have died. People are scared.’ A flashback shows a train stopping in the middle of nowhere. A group of hoodlums with weapons chase after someone. There is shouting and screaming. Hinoe stands in the field looking disgusted by what is happening around him. Two hoodlums with sticks in their hands get onto the train. They cruise the corridor and spot Wen-Ching, who sits nervously, and they ask him in Taiwanese: ‘Where are you from?’ Wen-Ching stands up slowly, takes off his hat and mutters hesitantly in the same language but in a strange voice: ‘I am Taiwanese.’ Unconvinced, one of the hoodlums decides to ask the same question in Japanese: ‘Where are you from?’ Since Wen-Ching can neither hear nor answer the question, the hoodlums are just about to beat him up when Hinoe arrives in the nick of the time.

Hou Hsiao-Hsien does not directly imply in the long sequence described above who is right or who is wrong, but he portrays the fear, confusion, hatred, and danger that spread throughout the island at that time. Many mainlanders became victims of street violence during the riot, but the Taiwanese paid a harsh price in the aftermath. We can analyse the languages used in this sequence to understand how Hou Hsiao-Hsien expresses different cultural identities and political convictions in the film.

Chen Yi’s accented Mandarin is the official language and is identified as the oppressor’s language. The locals mainly speak Taiwanese among themselves. However, Taiwanese can be the language of aggressors, too: for example, the shouting and cursing outside the hospital is conducted in Taiwanese. The two hoodlums who almost beat up Wen-Ching on the train also speak Taiwanese and force him to articulate his identity in a language that he is not able to use. When Wen-Ching pushes himself to utter in broken Taiwanese about where he is from, the two hoodlums then ask him the same question in Japanese.

The use of the Japanese language, aside from the Japanese Emperor’s announcement at the beginning of the film, is less political than cultural. It symbolizes a shared life experience for the Taiwanese and is a part of the cultural identities of that particular generation. While many mainlanders from Fujian Province are able to speak Taiwanese, and some others have learned to speak local languages while living in Taiwan, most are unable to understand Japanese at all, as they did not live through 51 years of Japanese rule. Hence, the Taiwanese language as spoken by the native characters in A City of Sadness ‘is laced with Japanese words and phrases’ (Reynaud 2002: 61).

The second element that I would like to focus on concerns three songs: (1) a Mandarin song, Liuwang San Bu Qu (The Song of the Exiles); (2) a Japanese song, Huang Mache Zhi Ge (Song of the Carriage Sapporo); and (3) a Taiwanese song, Chunhua Menglu (Dripping). In an early part of the film, Hinoe and his intellectual friends have a social gathering in a restaurant where they swap amusing anecdotes about misunderstandings between Taiwanese and mainlanders. Although Hinoe admits that he does not trust Chen Yi, he and his
associates all feel hopeful about the future of Taiwan as the island has finally returned to the motherland. Hence when they hear from outside the restaurant some strangers singing The Song of the Exiles in Mandarin, they decide to join in. The act of singing in Mandarin expresses their desire to connect with their imagined motherland and mainland compatriots.

However, their dream of autonomy is soon dashed. Following the 2-28 Incident, we see Wen-Ching locked up in prison and sitting by a jail door. The guard comes and calls out two names. Two young men stand up and gather their things quietly. At this moment a Japanese song, sung by a male chorus, fades in. Because the framing of the cell on screen allows us to see only Wen-Ching and the two men who are led away by the guard, we cannot see the inmates who sing Song of the Carriage Sapporo. It was a popular Japanese song in Taiwan during the 1940s, and it expresses the mood of someone who is watching friends leave by a carriage, knowing that they will never meet again. When the song stops, we hear two gun-shots from outside the frame. The song not only suggests that these Taiwanese intellectuals are aware of the death penalty awaiting them, but also reveals their bitter disappointment with nation-building under the KMT (Chiao 2000: 60–61). In contrast with the Mandarin song playfully sung earlier in the film, the Japanese song sung here before their lives are to be abruptly terminated seems particularly poignant. By singing farewell in a language to which the oppressor cannot make a claim, the disillusioned elites display their ultimate defiance and invisible resistance.

When Wen-Ching is released from prison, he visits one inmate’s widow and children in order to deliver the personal belongings of the deceased, including a will. It reads: ‘Face the world without shame. Your father is innocent.’ As the widow cries over the will, non-diegetic music fades in and the screen cuts to Wen-Ching’s family home, where Grandpa Lin and his folk-musician friends are playing and singing a Taiwanese tune, Drifting. The non-diegetic music turns diegetic. The mournful sound and lyrics originally referred to the sorrow of Taiwanese wives when their husbands were drafted into war by the Japanese and never returned home; however, the same song sung here becomes an accusation against KMT brutality as Taiwanese women continue to grieve over lost husbands when the new regime kills innocent men in order to consolidate power (Chiao 2000: 56).

The soundscape does not occupy as prominent a position within The Wind that Shakes the Barley. However, Loach’s use of languages and music performs several important functions.

In an early part of the story, we see that the O’Donovan brothers’ revolutionary war efforts are aided by a young woman, Sinead, and her family members in a local farm house. Sinead’s brother, Micheál, was a 19-year-old lad who had been beaten to death by brutal British Black and Tans paramilitaries at the beginning of the film simply because he refused to speak in English. Micheál’s name is mentioned repeatedly throughout the film and turns him, and his insistence of speaking in his mother tongue, into a symbol of martyrdom and heroism.

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8 This writing is taken from a genuine historical document.
9 Diegetic music is defined as an integral part of the film, while non-diegetic music is added externally to the film (Gow 2010: 171).
Moreover, at Micheál’s funeral, we hear the Irish rebel song which is used as the title of the film, *The Wind that Shakes the Barley*, for the first time:

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\text{T’was hard the woeful words to frame} \\
\text{To break the ties that bound us} \\
\text{But harder still to bear the shame} \\
\text{Of foreign chains around us} \\
\text{And so I said, ‘The mountain glen} \\
\text{I’ll seek at morning early} \\
\text{And join the bold united men} \\
\text{While soft winds shake the barley.}^{10}
\]

The song is sung in English, just as most of the dialogue in the film is delivered in English. However, as the storyline progresses, the use of Gaelic increases. There is a sequence when a young member of the IRA unit is coerced into leaking information to the enemy. As a result, the O’Donovan brothers and their IRA brigade are captured by the British army. Teddy O’Donovan is interrogated and tortured. On screen we see the British officers pull out Teddy’s fingernails when he refuses to give names. In the next prison cell, Teddy’s IRA comrades at first feel powerless and helpless, until they begin singing in Gaelic in unison to show their moral support for Teddy. The sequence expresses a strong Irish identity and demonstrates the protagonists’ courage and defiance against the British. This passionate display of cultural and political identity inspires an Irish-Scots soldier in the British camp to defect in the subsequent sequence, and to help all but three IRA prisoners to escape.

Moreover, the skilful employment of the tranquil background Irish music complements Loach’s endeavour of depicting a cultural Ireland, as ‘the look, feel, and form of a film are just as important as its “themes”’ (Denby 2007: 150). The combination of the visual and the aural enhances Loach’s version of Ireland as a naturally gentle rural place populated by handsome freedom fighters battling the hateful, sadistic British soldier. That they do so in fetching trench coats and dashing flat caps of sumptuous browns and reds set against vivid green countryside is certainly part of their appeal as cultural heroes — as freedom fighters shaking free of British rule at last.

(James 2006: 26)

Nevertheless, *The Wind that Shakes the Barley* is not a standard, overly sentimental resistance film, because Loach refrains from relying too heavily on idyllic Irish folk tunes or rousing rebel songs. The written messages and letters and the arguments in late-night meetings add to the sense of the danger, excitement, and importance of the clandestine activities in which the protagonists engage. Further, in a sequence set in the courthouse, Loach allows the viewers to witness and listen to a heated discussion about what kind of an Irish society the freedom fighters should strive to establish. Similar debates resume among Teddy’s IRA squad after they are informed of the Peace Treaty, firstly through a written

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10 Based on the English subtitles provided by the DVD released in the UK by Pathe.
message delivered to them from their national leaders and later through the public screening of a newsreel. The ideological dilemma experienced and quarreled over among the protagonists does not only lend a fresh look to the film (for it shows how public debate may contribute to shaping a future), but also offers an important moral anchor to the internal conflict that follows within (and without) the film.

**Female Roles, Civilization and Resistance**

While a patriarchal force is seen to drive forward the plotlines of both *A City of Sadness* and *The Wind that Shakes the Barley*, the female characters provide the story with a sense of hope and optimism. This is because women in both films represent stability and civilization. For example, in *The Wind that Shakes the Barley*, when Teddy's flying column is losing ground, it is Sinéad and her family who offer them much-needed shelter, cover, and all kinds of assistance until the freedom fighters have regrouped and regained their strength. In the previously discussed courthouse sequence, it is the women (Lily, Sinéad, and another unnamed female character) who are in charge of the Republican Court and who try to establish a new social order that is different from that of the English Court. When Damien and Teddy finally part and the latter is forced to execute his younger brother, Damien writes his final letter to Sinéad declaring his eternal love and his dream of true freedom. It is through Sinéad's tears over her lover’s letter that the audience is made to accept Damien's sacrifice for the cause he believes in and to hope with Sinéad for a brighter future.

The female roles in *The Wind that Shakes the Barley* perform overt functions of resistance alongside the male characters, to great effect. They actively assist the men in their war effort, while at the same time offering emotional support and comfort when required, familial and social stability to the local community, and an attempt to build and maintain a new, free, and just society.

In contrast, the female characters in *A City of Sadness* are seemingly much more passive and inactive. Nevertheless, I women are indeed the real anchor of Hou’s masterpiece, even though many of them are background characters. It is through the female cast that Hou delivers the most subtle but long-lasting signs of everyday resistance. According to the typology categorized by Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 545), everyday resistance may be of at least three types: (1) *covert resistance*: this refers to ‘acts that are intentional yet go unnoticed (and, therefore, unpunished) by their targets, although they are recognized as resistance by other, culturally aware observers’ (545); (2) *unwitting resistance*: this ‘is not intended as resistance by the actor yet is recognized as threatening by targets and other observers’, even though sometimes such acts (for example, socially unexpected behaviours by girls) may not truly have a target; and (3) *externally-defined resistance*: this refers to ‘those acts of resistance that are neither intended nor recognized as resistance by actors or their targets, but are labelled resistance by third parties’. For example, the unconscious act of using a specific language in verbal or written form, as well as the private expression of self-identity through the self-writing of history in a way that differs from the official account.

Two female roles depicted in *A City of Sadness* in particular demonstrate this. The first role is a category that includes several domestic women who do not necessarily have names in the film: the first brother’s wife and their daughter Ah-
Shue, the first brother’s mistress, the second brother’s wife, and the third brother’s wife. These women stand for family, endurance, and everyday existence. Their collectivity offers stability and symbolizes civilization. For example, as previously mentioned, the second brother, Wen-Sun, went missing in action during the war. However, his presence is felt throughout the entire film because his wife keeps her daily routine of cleaning and tidying his clinic in preparation for his eventual return. Although the disused clinic accentuates a sense of loss (the loss of a husband, a father, a brother, and a son due to Japanese colonial rule), it at the same time sends a signal that life goes on and normality can resume.

The act of normality is not only a strategy of survival, but also a form of resistance: resistance to being consumed and beaten by grief and trauma. Whatever tragedy occurs in *A City of Sadness*, women are always calm and busy cooking, cleaning, taking care of children, working on household chores, and keeping things in an orderly, civilized manner. By maintaining a normal pace of life, these women in the film appear dignified and resilient, even though they may experience inner sadness. For example, when Ah-Shue finds the brain-damaged Wen-Leung eating offerings put on the altar of the ancestors, she tries to take the food off him gently, but without success. So, she simply leaves him be and makes herself busy in the kitchen without making too much fuss. Afterwards, it becomes a fixture of the film that we see Wen-Leung sitting quietly next to the altar gobbling food, and occasionally someone will try to stop him. Sometimes they succeed but sometimes they fail. It becomes a new normality for the Lin family.

After Wen-Hueng is killed by Shanghai gangsters, we witness a funeral where everyone stands still. Wen-Ching is positioned in the centre of the procession as the new head of the household, and the atmosphere is sombre. The funeral scene then cuts to a long take and long shot of a silent landscape. We then begin to hear faint non-diegetic noise. As the sound becomes louder, the setting changes to Wen-Ching and Hinomi’s wedding, at which women are in charge. The family has moved on, everyone has a role to play, and the scene is full of life.

In the final sequence of the film, after we learn of Wen-Ching’s off-screen arrest and eventual disappearance through Hinomi’s narration in her letter to Ah-Shue, we see on screen another family, gathering at a dinner table. The brain-damaged Wen-Leung sits next to Grandpa Lin and both eat as normal. The brother of Wen-Hueng’s mistress comes in and out of the dining room, holding a rice bowl and eating casually. Meanwhile, domestic women are busy serving food for everyone and looking after the children. In his interview with Reynaud, Hou explains:

> A woman accepts what is happening outside – silently. Yet this is how woman becomes the really strong persistent force in the Chinese family. This is what I

\[\text{\tiny 11 In cinema, a long shot is typically taken by a wide-angle lens to show the whole object (for example, an entire building, human figure, landscape, and so on). The purpose of using a long shot is normally to place the object in relation to its surroundings. A long take is ‘a single piece of unedited film, which may or may not constitute an entire sequence’ (Henderson 1992: 315). The combination of a long shot and long take has become one of Hou’s favourite techniques to achieve his desired narrative effect.}\]
wanted to show by staging so many eating rituals, in which we see men eating and
two women standing on the side, taking care of domestic affairs, of the kids.

(Hou, quoted in Reynaud 2002: 70)

Moreover, the trivial activities performed by the female characters add another
important function to the film: ‘they furnish an appearance of everyday life, adding
small but significant details’ that enhance an appeal to the day-to-day reality of the
time’ (Hallam and Marshment 2000: 16). In other words, the authentic atmosphere
of emotions and feelings in A City of Sadness is grounded in the existence of these
domestic women.

The second role that I would like to address in detail is that of Hinomi, Wen-
Ching’s female counterpart. According to Hou:

Hinomi plays the role of an observer. It allowed me to create an ambiguity in the
narrative structure which I found very exciting – how the whole story is told from the
point of view of a woman, who reports the events while expressing her emotions – a
point of view that is both objective and subjective.

(Hou, quoted in Reynaud 2002: 69)

The meeting between Hinomi and Wen-Ching proves an ingenious device for
structuring and narrating the stories before and after 2-28. It is through Hinomi’s
writing, her written exchanges with Wen-Ching, and her occasional letters to Ah-
Shue, that the audience receives an intimate, independent, and female viewpoint
that has been largely ignored both by Taiwan history and Taiwan cinema. Her
written words become an integral part of the film that conveys dreams, thoughts,
passions, and memories in a measured way. It also relays a distant perspective
that abolishes barriers of verbal language between the characters in the film.

Moreover, Hinomi’s demure disposition renders her quiet for most of the times
when she is around men who can hear her. Hinomi’s silent modesty is sometimes
interpreted as Hou’s exclusion of women from participating in history and another
sign of Taiwanese people’s passivity in taking control of their own fate (Mi and
Liang 1991; Qi 2000: 325–327). Nevertheless, I shall argue that, upon closer
analysis of Hinomi’s character, she is much more proactive, independent, and
determined than the first impression gives. In addition to the fact that A City of
Sadness is a Taiwanese historiography woven through Hinomi’s active writing and
narrating, two examples further demonstrate Hinomi’s courageous quality.

First, immediately after the 2-28 Incident, Hinomi accompanies her injured
brother home. Their parents decide, for everyone’s safety, to send Hinoe away into
hiding and to forbid Hinomi from going back to work or having further contact with
the Lin family. However, as soon as she receives a letter from Ah-Shue telling her
that Wen-Ching has been released from prison, Hinomi goes to visit the Lins
against her own family’s wish. It is not surprising that Wen-Ching’s eldest brother,
Wen-Heung, has to shame Wen-Ching for not proposing to Hinomi after her visit.
Wen-Heung says to his brother: ‘When a girl visits us, with no regard for her self-
respect, it’s very clear what’s up. Can’t you see? What are you waiting for?’ This
shows Hinomi’s quiet determination in steering the course of her own destiny.
Therefore, shortly after Wen-Heung’s tragic death, Wen-Ching follows his brother’s
advice and marries Hinomi.
Second, the final section of the film is told through a series of silent images accompanied occasionally by the soulful theme tune of *A City of Sadness* as non-diegetic background music, and by the soothing voice of Hinomi’s narration in two pieces of writing: a diary entry and a letter to Ah-Shue. These are dramatic events, yet Hinomi’s presence on screen and her voice-over remain poised and full of self-dignity. Partly through her diary but mainly through the silent images, we learn that since the wedding, Hinomi has given birth to a baby boy, Ah-Chieh. Although, like most families at that time, they are living under a dark and oppressive political, social, and economic cloud, Hinomi says that she feels content as long as she has Wen-Ching and Ah-Chieh around her. They continue to make financial donations to Hinoe in the mountains and feel reassured whenever someone from Hinoe’s community is able to come and collect money from them, because this is the only way they know that Hinoe and his friends are safe and continuing to struggle for their ideals.

Hinomi’s diary entry ends here. What follows are several scenes without narration. We see that one evening, Wen-Ching receives notification that Hinoe has been arrested, and both Wen-Ching and Hinomi appear devastated. We then witness: a sequence showing the police making arrests in the mountains; Wen-Ching, Hinomi, and Ah-Chieh on a platform with two small suitcases, watching a train leaving; and Wen-Ching dressed up, combing his hair carefully, and taking a family portrait for himself, Hinomi, and Ah-Chieh. We hear a camera click, and the frame freezes to form a photograph.

Afterwards, we hear Hinomi’s voice-over once again, narrating her letter to Ah-Shue. Hinomi discloses the news that Wen-Ching has been arrested. Her letter reads:

> We thought of running away, but there was nowhere to go. I’m writing so long afterwards because only now do I feel calmer. The photograph was taken three days before Wen-Ching’s arrest. When they came he was taking someone’s portrait. He insisted on finishing the job before they led him away. I’ve searched and enquired everywhere in Taipei but I’ve no news. Ah-Chieh is teething. He has a lovely smile and he has your uncle’s eyes. Please come and see us soon. It’s getting colder in Chiu-Fen. The autumn blossom is out. The hills are all white. It’s like snow.

This is a letter written by a woman with tremendous self-control. Her passion is displayed through her stillness and silence, and her strength is manifested in her courage to lead a normal life as much as in the external circumstances which allow her to. The contrast between her description of the scenery here and her description of the scenery when she first appears in the movie reveals the change of space and time, and reflects her internal journey. Hinomi’s writing has invited the audience ‘into a cinematic space, not to understand, connecting cause and effect, but to experience’. It is ‘an aesthetic of deliberation’ that privileges ‘aura, ambiance, and mood, leaving temporal markers as mere footnotes’ (Yeh and Davis 2005: 134). This is why the history and identity revealed in *A City of Sadness* feel authentic but ambivalent, reserved and yet powerful.
Conclusion

Resistance can be an enabling analytical concept. When we recognize that A City of Sadness and The Wind that Shakes the Barley share a central theme of resistance in dealing with the respective colonial histories of Taiwan and of Ireland, a comparative approach to the two movies not only enriches our readings of the narratives and characters in the stories, but also highlights vast variations in representations and notions of resistance. Holland and Einwohner (2004: 547) note two core elements of resistance, which are action and opposition, and define “overt” resistance, which is intended by the actor and recognized by both targets and observers. They also find that two issues, recognition and intent, lie at the heart of disagreement regarding the limits of the concept.

This paper has attempted to add to our understanding of resistance by analysing filmic languages employed by Hou Hsiao-Hsien and Ken Loach. While Loach’s The Wind that Shakes the Barley depicts proactive and passionate heroism, Hou’s A City of Sadness embraces silent and passive endurance. On the one hand, both films portray overt and covert resistance, in varying degrees, through familial storylines, grassroots perspectives, written and verbal exchanges, as well as direct and indirect representations of violence on screen. This shows commonalities of resistance against oppression, whether the background be Taiwan or Ireland. On the other hand, A City of Sadness articulates much more extensively an externally-defined, identity-based resistance, which not all observers may interpret as a form of resistance. The differences between the two films therefore become particularly revealing of the different cultural, political, and historical trajectories taken by the two filmmakers when they produced their works. In this way, a comparison between A City of Sadness and The Wind that Shakes the Barley helps illuminate the cinematic strategies adopted by filmmakers to reflect identity politics in different contexts. The comparison also demonstrates the complexity and diversity of resistance as a concept and as a form of action.

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Voices from Two Theatrical Others: Labour Issues in the Theatres of Ireland and Taiwan

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Abstract

Ireland and Taiwan, as two island nations, have always been comparable subjects in terms of their political and economic relationships with their respective mainlands. However, although their rapid economic growth stems, to a significant extent, from the contribution of the working classes, the voices of this social stratum are rarely accentuated, due to the mass media’s more usual focus on captivating and dramatic global and national issues. This paper will therefore study a selection of Irish and Taiwanese plays that address labour issues, in an attempt to show how playwrights use the theatre as a medium to counteract the domination of exploitative class relationships by considering minority communities.

Introduction

At first appearance, the working classes of Ireland and Taiwan do not appear to have much in common, living on opposite sides of the world and speaking unrelated languages. Further, the two countries have never established standard diplomatic relations or had much cultural exchange. The leaders of their labour unions do not engage in reciprocal visits, nor do they support each other on relevant issues. Nevertheless, the working classes of the two countries have affected each other at a distance, long before the term ‘globalization’ arose as the focal point of attention towards the end of the twentieth century and transformed social, economic, and cultural situations worldwide. Specifically, Ireland has borne the unpleasant consequences of Taiwan, and other Asian countries, dumping their low-priced and machine-made products on other countries since the 1960s. The consequences, interestingly, are illustrated in Frank McGuinness’s 1982 play The Factory Girls, which portrays Irish women workers’ failure to maintain their production of hand-made shirts after machinery has taken the place of human labour: ‘Do you know what a flooded market means? Shirts selling for half nothing from Korea and Taiwan’ (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 34). This mention of Taiwan, though brief, suggests that Taiwan should not be excused for its role in causing...
rising unemployment in Ireland in the mid-twentieth century, although Ireland may also have benefited from transforming its economy from reliance on labour-intensive farming to high technology. Ireland’s (pre-crash) title of ‘Celtic Tiger’ and Taiwan’s title of ‘Asian Little Dragon’ was at the expense of socially marginalized workers. What is worth noticing is how, due to their under-representation in the public domain, lack of education, and the domination of transnational enterprises, workers in the two countries have been largely disadvantaged and their interests often ignored. Only a small number of playwrights, particularly those with a working-class background, have attempted to mark the vicissitudes of their lives with certain social agendas. This article will explore the similarities, differences, and contradictions in the theatrical representations of workers and the social and political concerns common to both countries. Interest will be focused most particularly on how contemporary Taiwanese playwrights create new dramaturges to illustrate new representations of exploited labourers and empower their once-suppressed voices. A post-colonial approach will thus be adopted to examine the deprivation that has persisted into this century’s era of globalization.

Ireland and Taiwan are often treated as comparable subjects, in that geographically they are both small island countries on the fringe of a continent and liable to isolation. Economically, they do not possess substantial natural resources; politically, there is a history of tense relationships with their neighbor: Great Britain is Ireland’s former colonizer, while China is an emerging world power which takes Taiwan for granted as part of its territory. The working classes, as the silent but essential foundation of the industrial development of both countries, are objects easily neglected and unnoted. However, Irish and Taiwanese playwrights, some with blue-collar backgrounds and sensibilities towards the deprived, have dramatized their nations’ dilemmas and concerns as a way that calls attention to social inequalities, unsettling national male-dominated social hierarchies. Moreover, many Taiwanese and Irish women labourers are still subjugated by ideologies which can hardly be resisted, Confucian or Catholic. Without other role models available, many women workers continue to be silent, submissive, and self-restrained in the context of male-centred families.

Despite liberation from colonialism, the working class may remain ‘re-colonized’ or continuously subjugated by political antagonisms, literary censorship (against leftism), or denominational vendettas. Local corporations and transnational enterprises dominate, and working-class subjectivity remains vague and divided. Oppression may also come from within workers’ social circles or unions. The dramas which this article will discuss illuminate, to differing degrees, the working class sub-culture and the prejudices which force the working classes into the social margins. In this way, they attempt to provide a voice for the deprived and to construct a recognizable identity with particular social agendas.

In the post-colonial perspective, theatres are perceived not only as places of entertainment, but also as centres for the exposition of different self-reflexive responses to national formation. Playwrights do not always endorse ‘the pedagogical’ discourse of nationalism, socialism, or religious ideologies, but, as proposed by Bhabha (1990: 293–322), instead manoeuvre the power of ‘the performativ e’ to critically examine political and cultural intricacies. In Bhabha’s view, ‘the performativ e’, which applies repetitious, recursive strategies in nation formation, conflicts with ‘the continuist, accumulative temporality of the
pedagogical’, in that the former always ‘intervenes in the sovereignty of the
nation’s self-generation by casting a shadow between the people as ‘image’ and its
signification as a differentiating sign of Self, distinct from the Other of the Outside’
(1990: 146–147). Acting as meta-novelists, some playwrights challenge
conventional dramaturgies by presenting the fictional and the real in more
ambiguous ways, questioning authority, omniscient authorship, and historical
chronology. This article considers how dramatists jeopardize the pedagogical
given, noting how socially marginalized characters interact with the politically and
economically advantaged, and how dramatists produce recursive strategies.
Issues of social hierarchy, gender, and politics are considered, as well as how
some working-class dramas create a ‘third space of enunciation’, or a
‘contradictory and ambivalent space’, for the isolated and unprivileged (Bhabha
1994: 35, 37). This article will attempt to reconstruct the ‘third space of
enunciation’ of the working class particularly through the experimental tent theatre
of Chung Chiao (鍾喬) in Taiwan.

The article focuses on several plays that address class issues with a distinctly
political, but not necessarily socialist, agenda: Fred Ryan’s The Laying of the
Foundations (1902); Sean O’Casey’s Juno and the Paycock (1924); Brendan
Behan’s The Big House (1957); Castrated Rooster (1943), by Zhang Wen-Huan (張
文環) and Lin Tuan-Qiu (林燾秋); and The Wall (1946), by Jian Guo-Xian (簡國賢)
and Song Fei-Wo (宋非我). The current article will also consider the Uhan Shii
Theatre Group (歡喜扮劇團) and the Assignment Theatre Company (差事劇團),
founded by Peng Ya-Ling (彭雅玲) and Chung Chiao (鍾喬) with the agenda of
addressing the exploitation of labourers in the age of industrialization and
globalization.

The ‘New Theatre’ movement (台灣新劇運動) (1923–1936) was initiated by a
group of Japanese-educated Taiwanese elites, some with leftist leanings. They
aimed to create new plays with Taiwanese scenarios, using more refined styles.

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2 The ‘third space of enunciation’ is phrased by Bhabha as a mode of articulation, referring
to a hybrid identity emerging from a contradictory and ambivalent space. This ‘space’
‘m[ight] open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based… on the inscription
and articulation of culture’s hybridity’ (Bhabha 1994: 38). It aims to blur and test the
boundaries and limitations of existing identities and culture.

3 Jain was a novelist and playwright whose work was banned, and he disappeared during
the 2-28 Massacre in Taiwan. Song was a cultural activist and radio broadcaster.

4 Other plays which also deserve mention in this context include A. Patrick Wilson’s The
Slough (1914); Oliver St John Gogarty’s The Blight (1917); Daniel Corkey’s The Labour
Leader (1919); James Plunkett’s The Risen People (1958); John Arden and Margaretta
D’Arcy’s The Ballygobshane Bequest (1972); and Jimmy Murphy’s Brothers of the Brush
(2001). The first three were premiered at the Abbey Theatre. The Slough was regarded as
the first play at the Abbey Theatre that specifically addressed Irish urban poverty, and was
written nine months after the Great Lockout of 1914, ‘indict[ing] the political and economic
structure of the city for its urban conditions and to arouse his Dublin audience’s sympathy
by exposing the plight of Dublin’s starving poor’ (Burch 2003: 66). The effectiveness of
these dramas lay in the fact that the working-class struggle was brought to the Abbey’s
predominantly middle-class audiences. The Wall, by Jian Guo-Xian, portrayed the huge
social gap between rich and poor and was produced before the 2-28 Massacre.
The pioneers were the Star Drama Society (星光演劇研究會), founded by Zhang Wei-Xian (張維賢) in 1924, and the Ding-xin Society (鼎新社), and they garnered a great deal of critical acclaim. The Pacific War brought this dramatic movement to a halt after 1943. Most of the ‘New Theatre’ scripts are no longer extant, and are traceable only sparingly through secondary sources such as memoirs and newspapers. Martial law from 1949 to 1983 further cut off Taiwanese intellectuals from the theatrical legacy of their ‘New Theatre’ (新劇) predecessors. Consequently, there are only a few plays which challenge sensitive labour issues. Zhang’s *Castrated Rooster*, which was commissioned by the Hou-sheng Drama Society (厚生演劇研究會), was performed in 1943 and was probably the final play of the movement. It was banned by the Japanese for having characters refer to Taiwanese folklore. Nevertheless, Zhang’s original short story is widely recognized as a masterpiece, and it is one of the very few ‘New Theatre’ stories which still returns to the stage from time to time, most recently in a 2009 adaption by the Tainaner Ensemble (台南人劇團) at the National Theatre in Taipei. Jian’s and Song’s plays provide an in-depth understanding of the social contexts of the following period, during which the KMT government retreated to Taiwan, while the contemporary Taiwanese theatres of Peng and of Chung show how the critical agenda of the ‘New Theatre’ has been restored through ground-breaking dramaturgies.

In the case of Ireland, although early scripts are still likely to be available, the public suspicion of playwrights’ political motives and denominational leanings would often dismay those who wanted to dramatize the truths they perceived. Riots following the premieres of W.B. Yeats’s *Cathleen ni Houlihan* and J.M. Synge’s *The Playboy of the Western World* are notable examples from the early twentieth century, even though these playwrights contributed to the revival of Irish

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6. For possible reasons for this loss, and for the history of theatrical productions, see, for example, Lu (1961) and also Yang (1994). In 1991, Chiu Kuen-Liang expended Lu’s and Yang’s studies to cover ‘new dramas’ after 1936 (Chiu 1991). These publications, however, are mostly sociological and historical, and do not consider textual sources which would help to reconstruct the neglected experiences of labourers. In contrast to other forms of literary endeavour, research into theatre during the Japanese ruling period is very limited.

When writing up this article, the author attempted to approach the families of a few playwrights for scripts; for instance, that of Chen Qian-Yun (陳乾雲), the renowned organizer of Xun-Feng Theatre Group (薰風劇團) active from the 1930s to 1940s. According to his family, the scripts of his theatre might have been either destroyed out of fear during the ‘White Terror’, or simply lost during several home moves. It is likely that the unavailability of scripts is due largely to political considerations of the period. Public awareness of the historical significance of those playscripts came too late. Chen himself no longer gives interviews. A record of Chen’s contributions is provided in Chiu (2000: 227).

7. Zhang’s original short story was first published in Japanese and has had a number of translations. The original script for the 1943 premiere has been lost; the version used in this article was translated by Chen Ming-Tai (陳明台) and collected in Zhang (2002). According to Jiang, at least five amateur and professional theatre groups have worked on productions of *Castrated Rooster* in Taiwan since 1990.
We are building a new city and we must build square and sure. In the city of the future, there must be none of the rottenness which you and your class made in the city of old; in the new city you will have no place... The city whose foundations are laid in Liberty and Truth... The city of the future demands it. It can be nothing else but war.

(Ryan 1970 [1902]: 36–37)

Ryan's play is socialist propaganda rather than a work of art, directing the audience to see current Irish troubles as a struggle between capitalists and proletarians, or between exploiters and the exploited, in contrast to taking a nationalist perspective. This socialist, or leftist, influence also gave intellectuals in
Taiwan a theoretical basis for how the oppressed could be liberated from their downtrodden condition. Some of the Taiwanese elite involved in the anti-Japanese movement in China greeted the ‘New Theatre’ with expectations that the movement would solidify ethnic identity and therefore strengthen cultural and nationalistic awareness; this was similar to how Irish Revivalism was received in Ireland, and it has been noted that many Taiwanese anti-imperialist advocates regarded Irish independence as a paradigm for Taiwanese cultural separation from Japan (Yang 1994: 50).

Mid-twentieth century Taiwan, especially after the Japanese defeat, was marked by social corruption, inequality, price fluctuations, and political agitation, and there were the same kind of class exploitation as found in Ireland. Politically, most of the native Taiwanese elite were excluded from key government positions, and many were executed without trial during the 2-28 Massacre for suspected socialist leanings or for making anti-KMT criticisms. Disillusionment with the nationalistic KMT government led some playwrights to turn to Marxism to explore the social functions of literature. Their devotion to the exploited – who suffered hierarchal suppression – was in expectation of building up a new nation, not necessarily independent from mainland China, which would ensure proper social development. Jian Guo-Xian, Song Fei-Wo (宋非我), Lu He-Ruo (吕赫若), and Lan Ming-Gu (蓝明谷), amongst others, endowed their dramas with socialist concerns about the suppressed Other, or the proletariat, whose own voices were censored by the KMT government, and promoted a new Taiwanese literature.

Like Ryan, Jian was deeply concerned about the divisions that created an underclass, and The Wall has similar concerns to those of The Laying of the Foundations. Jain portrays two families, from very different social classes. These are the families of Chen Jin-Li (陈金利), an affluent and snobbish landlord and business magnate, and of Beggar Hsu (许乞食), who rents a small and squalid next-door room from Chen. The stage is divided by a high wall, on either side of which Hsu and Chen lead strikingly different lives. The play begins with Chen repetitively calculating his income, identifying him as a miser at a time when a large number of families are just above the starvation line. As a landlord, he is delighted that his house is ‘awash with money’; he feels that ‘business is no different from playing a cheap trick’; and he experiences gastric distress from overeating (Jian 2006 [1946]: 159). By contrast, Hsu, his tenant, is ill and impoverished, barely able to afford the rent and making his son earn a living as a peddler. Class distinctions are shown even more clearly when Hsu’s hungry son is forced to steal food from Chen’s livestock, which are well-fed on human leftovers.

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8 According to Yang, the example of Ireland was introduced by Liang Qi-Chao (梁启超), during his visit to Taiwan in 1911. This was at a time when the Japanese colonial government was trying hard to erase Taiwanese culture and identity. Lin Xian-Tang (林獻堂), who hosted Liang at his estate in Tainan, was one of these. However, it seems likely that Liang meant ‘independence’ in the context of minimizing Japanese influences, rather than the political separation of Taiwan from China (Yang 1994: 50; Tsai et al. 1971: 285).

9 Song Fei-Wo was the pseudonym of Song Xian-Zhang (宋獻章), and was used from the age of seventeen to express his anarchist ideals. In Song’s own words, ‘Fei-Wo’ means ‘not I for myself’ (非我之我) (cited in Lan 2006: 65).

10 Translation mine.
Having been caught stealing, Hsu’s family is evicted. Ironically, the eviction is carried out by a monk who is over-friendly with Chen and avaricious of secular wealth. Hsu, in despair, after poisoning his son and blind mother, commits suicide by banging his head against a wall. The play ends tragically with his cry of desperation:

‘The wall, the wall! On the other side of you is rice hoarded as high as the house, with all the luxuries that only a paradise deserves, while you are only a hungry ghost on this side of the wall, scarce with food. I am so doomed in this hell that I cannot but end my life now… Oh, the wall is so thick and high that my little fists and thin arms cannot break it. Oh, the wall, the wall! Why cannot this wall be shattered? Oh, the wall, the wall!’

(Jian 2006 [1946]: 176)

The play, which realistically portrays the bitterness of the proletariat and contrasts the nouveau riche and the working class, enjoyed huge success and positive reviews. A reviewer from Xin-Sheng Daily (新生報) commented that, ‘The Wall, in order to present a contrast and dramatize the complex facets of society, is most critical of the unreasonable social hierarchy, and urges the necessity of social reform. This play, which has become popular through word of mouth, is worthy of recommendation’ (1946, cited in Lan 2001: 47). Another reviewer, Lin Qian-Da (林千達), from People’s Directives (人民導報) (1946), elaborated on how a realistic play such as The Wall could promote the solidarity of the underclass, and speak to the needs of reformists:

Arts enrich human spirituality, and human beings cannot be parted from community life and social reality. Thus, a drama that is both artistic and pragmatic must show social contradictions between the dominator and the dominated, and the struggle between the exploiters and the exploited. Only this kind of play can incur the empathy of the audience and maintain its modernity.

(cited in Lan 2001: 51)

However, The Wall was banned after four runs as ‘unsuitable for the public’ and for provoking class conflict (Lan 2006: 120).

Ryan’s The Laying of the Foundation and Jian’s The Wall share similar sympathies for those in the lowest social stratum, and provide a new perspective from which social injustice can be revealed to the audience. The stage, in this way, helps formulate a socialist discourse and possible solutions to relevant social complaints. In Ryan’s drama, Michael, the saviour or hero, is celebrated for his courageous stand against corrupt builders, with a call for ‘class war’. Intellectuals noted that The Wall’s banning ‘makes clearer the intention of the authorities concerned, for they expect citizens not to reveal the truth… If the government supposes that social satire is illegal, and is unwilling to overturn the ban, we could not feel more helpless’ (1946, cited in Lan 2001: 56).

The following year, Jian was arrested as part of the 2-28 Massacre, and he was sentenced to death in 1954. Lu He-Ruo and Lan Ming-Gu also perished during this
period of ‘White Terror’, while Song Fei-Wo was exiled to China.\textsuperscript{11} The KMT regime further suffocated theatrical development in Taiwan over the next four decades, until the late 1980s. Only dramas morally unproblematic and securely in line with the prevailing patriotism could be produced.

The ‘New Theatre’ on Radio

The playwrights of the ‘New Theatre’ movement also wrote radio dramas and worked as broadcasters, thus highlighting the close relationship between radio entertainment programs and political argument.\textsuperscript{12} Song Fei-Wo stated that ‘through the wireless I simply wanted to indirectly bring the anti-Japanese campaign into effect’ (cited in Lan 1993: 27), and in an interview with Lan Bo-Zhou (2006: 87), he recalled that ‘my scripts were often based upon Jian Guo-Xian’s drafts in Japanese... and I was the first one who criticized the government and its policies through drama.’ The mobility of underground broadcasting, and of radios, allowed broadcasters to evade censorship and brought drama to those unable to attend the theatre. Radio dramas therefore reached their anticipated performative effects against the rulers and deserve serious study.\textsuperscript{13}

Jian’s \textit{The Wall} was among the plays broadcast, and Song also produced a series of plays entitled \textit{Tour of the God of the Land around Taiwan} (土地公遊台灣), which continued to be broadcast even after the defeat of Japan. These plays told the story of how Tu-Di-Gong (土地公), the God of the Land, a respected household deity, dealt with the social corruption prevailing in almost every corner of the island. Tu-Di-Gong and his wife, both in human form, are greatly displeased with the corruption of officials and the desperation of the people. As expected (by the audience), the deity became a man of justice, fearless of revenge from social superiors. The plays’ popularity derived from the truth they manifested. Although no scripts are extant, Song is known to have structured his plays in a lively...

\textsuperscript{11} Song returned to Taiwan in 1987 and left again in 1989. Reportedly, he died in a car accident in Quan-Zhou (泉州) in 1992.

\textsuperscript{12} The first radio station in Taiwan was set up on 16 June 1925, to Nipponize (皇民化) Taiwanese people and to celebrate the thirty-year anniversary of Japanese rule in Taiwan. Broadcasting lasted for ten days, and resumed on 1 November 1928. Despite its Nipponizing purpose, the station began to air radio dramas in Taiwanese from October 1942. Although there are few records as to why the Japanese government started to air programs in the Taiwanese dialect, Lu (1961, cited in Chen 1999: 39) notes that many programs during this period were war-time propaganda, and it seems likely that the government wanted to counteract underground stations which they could not censor but which were popularizing anti-Japanese sentiment.

\textsuperscript{13} Research into radio dramas as a source of entertainment during the Japanese period has been hindered by the attitude of the KMT rulers after Japan’s defeat. The KMT had a Chinese-centred historiography, and Japan’s contribution to Taiwan went unrecognized. Documents were not preserved, and Japanese publications were banned, in the words of governor Chen Yi (陳儀), in order ‘to quickly eradicate the slave mentality of Taiwanese people and to construct a revolutionary mindset’ (cited in Huang 1991: 103–104). The ban effectively forbade Taiwanese elites and creative writers from using Japanese, their most familiar language, to communicate with the public.
manner, ‘calibrated with twists and humour’ so as to ‘allow the social problem to be dissected more precisely’ (Lan 2001: 66). Song’s mastery of the Japanese and Taiwanese languages also contributed to the popularity of his plays, which not only reflect the everyday situation of the underclass, but significantly deepen listeners’ understanding of social problems and of their government. Jian and Song’s collaboration continued until the outbreak of the 2-28 Massacre in 1947.

Similar to Song, Brendan Behan was also a prolific writer for both theatre and radio. One Behan radio drama, *The Big House*, revolves around an Anglo-Irish landowner who resides in a big house, and his tenants, who can only entertain themselves in a pub ironically named ‘The Big House’. The lives of all the characters are lived in or around ‘big houses’, while the rigid social class structure drastically differentiates them in terms of life quality. Mr Baldcock, the landlord, has strong prejudices against the Irish: ‘If an ass is born in a stable, does that make it a horse?’ (Behan 1978 [1957]: 362). In his eyes, nationalists such as Eamon de Valera, who are jeopardizing the given superiority of the Anglo-Irish aristocracy, are rebels to be condemned. As landlords become afraid of the growing Irish unrest and grow desperate to return to England, rent collection and evictions are entrusted to local police and to land agents, represented in this play by Mr Chuckles. Agents form a new class between landowners and tenants, and take all manner of advantage behind the landlords’ backs. Their lands are sequestered by agents who, politically, always fall between two stools like ‘a tea leaf’, should there be a fortune to make (374), and they justify their illicitly-taken advantages with observations such as ‘old Baldcock got the land off Cromwell’s soldiers by using his load… the same as I’m using mine’ (374). The greater suffering remains that of the proletariat, who own almost nothing but are subject to all the classes above them. Mr Chuckles is presented as deserving little sympathy from the audience.

Behan, Song, and Jian, amongst other Irish and Taiwanese playwrights, have contributed significantly to working-class historiography, challenging the official line that is usually imposed by the social elite and/or which favours the advantaged. Nevertheless, their shared sympathy for deprived labourers does not bar them from depicting their wickedness, but rather illuminates how oppression passes down unrelentingly from one social rung to another. In *The Wall*, the monk who works for the rich landlord as a messenger to Beggar Hsu, and those who refuse to give him spare change, are depicted metaphorically as the murderers of his family. Likewise, Behan, whose father had been a house-painter, stated about his community that: ‘I think that the Irish that I know and the Irish who I like, who are ordinary blokes, taxi-drivers, house-painters, bookies’ runners – I don’t say honest workers… some of them are extremely dishonest workers – but they’re the people I care about’ (Behan 1982: 145). The Irish and Taiwanese playwrights under discussion seem always to present their homelands in a bitter way, although another remark by Behan can also apply to his Taiwanese comparators: ‘the world is divided into two classes: invalids and nurses. I’m a nurse… I’m a nurse in the sense that in my plays and in my books I try to show the world to a certain extent

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14 Behan’s *The Big House* was first commissioned as a radio drama in 1957, and staged at the Pike Theatre Club on 6 May 1958. It can be said that the radio served as a more economical channel for playwrights as the budget for performances was limited, and that it possibly had further-reaching effects on a nationwide working-class audience.
what's the matter with it, why everybody is not happy' (Behan 1982: 142–143). Consequently, their characters are less the products of authorial imagination as drawn from real people with whom the playwrights once talked, drank, and celebrated life. However, they also form part of national memory, to be re-awakened, re-justified, re-built, and possibly refuted, but not easily erased.

The Silence and Defiance of Women Labourers

The experiences of lower-class women also feature in Irish and Taiwanese drama; two examples are Sean O’Casey’s *Juno and the Paycock* (1924) and *Castrated Rooster* (1943), from a short story by Zhang Wen-Huan (張文環) and adapted for the stage by Lin Tuan-Qiu (林摶秋).

*Castrated Rooster*, as discussed above, is one of the most significant works performed during Japanese rule as part of Taiwan’s ‘New Theatre’ movement. The play depicts the rise and fall of two traditional families in the 1920s, when a town is about to be urbanized. As a plan to acquire some valuable land, Yu-Li (月里), the daughter of a Chinese pharmacist, is forced to marry the only son of a local shipping magnate, A-Yong (阿勇). The marriage is arranged for Yu-Li’s father to obtain the ‘golden area’ near a planned train station in the neighbourhood of the shipping company, and for A-Yong’s father to procure the pharmacy as Yu-Li’s dowry.

As a woman labourer in a patriarchal society, Yu-Li, although possessing much passion and intelligence, has no freedom to acquaint herself with other suitors, nor is she able to protest against the arranged marriage. The marriage becomes a deadly shackle, for she is expected to be a decent woman (良家婦女), unconditionally faithful to A-Yong so as not to disgrace her family. Unfairer still are the circumstances which soon follow; A-Yong’s father dies very soon after Yu-Li’s wedding, A-Yong becomes ill with malaria and is unable to work, and the government’s urban planners decide not to build a railway in the anticipated ‘golden area’ after all. Facing huge debts and lacking options but unwilling to sell her soul, Yu-Li becomes a pig farmer at home while also working part-time in the city, and has to endure jeers and derision levelled at her by her community.

Urban planning is a game involving various interested parties and the government; its decisions do not necessarily benefit the working classes, but rather further disillusions them with government. Unable to resist all these subjugating forces, Yu-Li can only repress herself, comforting her husband as a proper wife: ‘I am pleased that you don’t want to give up. You see how tearful I am now...’ (Zhang 2002 [1943]: 133). Lin’s stage adaptation simplified Zhang’s story to make Yu-Li less passionate and sexual, but his adaptation consolidates the sense of patriarchal morality and fits into the general expectation of an ideal wife, whose hardships are all for others but not for herself.  

\[15\] As noted in footnote 7, the original script has been lost. However, the stage version referred to in this article is believed to be closest to that of the premiere, although the ending is different from that of the original short story. In this stage version, Yu-Li is consistently faithful to her husband in her arranged marriage, while in the short story she has a love affair with an artist, with whom she later commits suicide. Yu-Li’s striving for freedom is remarkable, and so are the curses against her.
intention, *Castrated Rooster* shows how women labourers in a land-based farming community are constantly under exploitation and emotionally oppressed. Her tears are thus signs of all the unpleasant feelings and experiences in this arranged marriage. She is no more than an object, under double deprivation of traditional patriarchy and Japanese rule. Both Yu-Li and A-Yong are the embodiments of the ‘castrated rooster’, which is not only physically incomplete but dysfunctional, and they both have to bear the capitalistic, colonial, and patriarchal violence that casts them from the social centre to the margin.

Yu-Li’s story exemplifies how Taiwanese women were/are subject to the patriarchal teachings of Confucianism, whether cast as loyal assistant or sole breadwinner. Likewise, their counterparts in Ireland were/are also under the double influence of Catholicism and Victorian culture, often restricted to the domestic arena as ‘the angel in the house’. Most women in Taiwan have to fulfil patriarchal obligations, behaving in accordance with the ‘three rules and four virtues of obedience’ (三從四德), as Confucian teachings prescribe. Self-esteem is bound up with devotion to sustaining the dignity of their fathers, husbands, male siblings, and relatives. The same expectation is also applicable to Catholic Irishwomen, who should by all means honour their husbands: ‘if [women] want to find out about something, ask their husbands at home. It is a disgraceful thing for a woman to speak in church’ (1 Corinthians 14: 35). Unmarried women should be as ‘consecrated virgins’, and restrict themselves from any intimacy with men. This highly conservative ethos in Taiwan and Ireland thus prevented female workers from being prominent in labour movements, and usually from leadership positions. Only in recent years in Taiwan have female activists outspoken on issues of employee rights, domestic violence, female sexuality, and the rights of sex workers received some degree of respect and media attention.

In O’Casey’s *Juno and the Paycock*, Juno, the mother, is the only working member of her Catholic family, in contrast to her drunkard husband, Jack Boyle, who continually evades work by feigning illness. Her son, Johnny, has lost an arm in the Irish Civil War and is thus unable to work. Mary, her daughter, joins the lock-out, as the trade union expects. The family is economically deprived by the forces around them and is almost below the starvation line. Worse, a lawyer who falls in love with Mary and makes her pregnant later brings a false message that a distant deceased relative has left them a large amount of money as a bequest. Expecting, but not having received, the money, the Boyles purchase a few luxuries on a mortgage. The whole course of events turns out to be a disaster for the family, as the lawyer disappears after taking advantage of Mary, and the Boyles fail to pay back the loan and are evicted by the landlord. Jack spends the last of their money in a pub; Johnny is killed by the IRA for being unwilling to join its campaign after losing his arm. Mary is disowned by her father and has to find shelter, with her mother, in a relative’s house. This play, overshadowed by the Civil War, criticizes the war’s inhuman consequences and how those in power take advantage of the underclass and drive them further into destitution.

The play has received mixed reviews. According to Raymond Williams, ‘O’Casey fails to dramatically engage with the “feelings of the fighters” or with the “need and the oppression” which drove them to take up arms… [The play became] the sound… of a long confusion and disintegration’ (Williams 1978: 151). By contrast, Christopher Murray judged *Juno and the Paycock* to be a social drama in which
the traumatic birth of the nation is ‘most passionately, most powerfully and most memorably dramatized’, with ‘a greater range of vivid and original characters, male and female’ (2001: 88). The mixed reviews of the play suggest that what concerns the playwright is not the social privileges enjoyed by the well-to-do, but the tyranny that is imposed on the oppressed.

O’Casey grew up in a working-class Protestant family, and was at one time secretary to Jim Larkin, a socialist leader during the 1913 Dublin Lockout. He skilfully draws the attention of the audience to the problematic natures of Irish patriotism and the labour movement, through the eyes of ignored female working-class characters and across denominational divisions. In other words, what prompts Juno to find work is not just her husband’s joblessness or idleness, but also the long-term political unrest that has resulted in a widespread economic depression. She can only take a few odd jobs on an irregular basis; as for the ‘workers’ principle’, for which Mary is an enthusiast, she may not have realized that its anti-capitalistic agenda also involved an anti-colonial element, as most of the economic advantage from work went to the Anglo-Irish ascendancy and British investors. It is probable that she does not even think about the fact that the trade union, whose members are largely Catholic, does not consider gender equality. Her position in the union is doubly marginalized, so that its patriarchal nature remains secure. Her out-of-wedlock pregnancy further implies her failure in this power struggle, given that the runaway lawyer not only takes her virginity and leaves her holding the baby, but also shatters the family and leads to its dispossession. Johnny’s lost arm, meanwhile, makes him a damaged man with no job prospects. Ironically, the union, which has been incapable of helping those who are physically well but hungry due to joblessness, cannot secure Johnny’s working rights. That he is murdered by the IRA is thus no less different from being starved to death, as he has no chance either way. The Boyles, inarguably, are under the tight control of capitalism and can survive only with extreme difficulty.

Many of O’Casey’s works were banned in Ireland, including Within the Gates (1933), Windfalls (1934), I Knock at the Door (1939), and Pictures in the Hallway (1942). Comparing Juno and the Paycock with the Taiwanese dramas of Jian, Song, and Zhang discussed above, it can be seen that their plays were banned or led to controversy most probably because of their supposed Marxist standpoint in favour of the dispossessed. Further, the working-class characters whom these playwrights portray are either ill or disabled in some way; they are thus like the ‘castrated rooster’ which is to some extent dysfunctional, but they still manage to live on with some little dignity.

The role of working-class women as breadwinners, or as the central pillars of a family during a national crisis, means that their voices need to be taken into account in social and political analysis. The following section will therefore examine how contemporary Taiwanese and Irish playwrights delineate the ignored experiences of women of the underclass, in order to build up a working-class ‘her-story’, within a still male-led historiography.

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16 Clerical antagonism against works by James Joyce, Samuel Beckett, and O’Casey prompted O’Casey to forbid all professional productions of his plays in Ireland until 1964.
Social Minorities and Transnational exploitation

As discussed above, theatres can be political or ‘performative’ spaces where dramatists express criticisms or suggest areas for reform. Theatres can provide the audience with an escape to the unreal, or a chance of self-recognition through the stories being enacted on stage. Contemporary Irish and Taiwanese dramatists engaging with this approach pay particular attention to minorities in different corners of society, whether defined by ethnicity, geography, or economic situation.

*We Are Here (我們在這裡)*, was written and produced in 2000 by Peng Ya-ling (彭雅玲), director of the Uhan Shii Theatre Group (歡喜扮劇團). The play is particularly concerned with the almost *triply* marginalized women of the Hakka diaspora. What is peculiar about this play is that it aims, as the dramatist specifies in the prologue, to unearth ‘the ignored experiences of this diaspora around the world, while their familial ethics, musical conventions, language, culture and traditional industry, of which they used to be proud, are being buried consciously and unconsciously’ (Peng 2002 [2000]: 237). The drama consists of four episodes, and features the lives of working-class Hakka women of differing ages and the hardships which they bear but which are largely ignored outside their community. The four episodes, though performed by different characters and consisting of disparate stories, are connected by the oldest actress carrying a blue cloth shoulder pack throughout the play. The working-class women of the Hakka diaspora are shown to be subjected to male domination throughout their lives: as infants, they can be ‘exchanged’ for daughters of other Hakka families as future ‘daughters-in-law’ (童養媳). They are mostly deprived of personal choice, or even of an identity, long before they can be aware of having one. The price for choosing their own husband is heavy, as shown by the protagonist Jiao-Mei (蕉妹) in the fourth episode. She is disowned by her family for marrying a mainlander rather than a Hakka. She is warned by her own mother that she will be ‘chopped into pieces of pig food’, and further admonished: ‘do not ever come back home’ (Peng 2002 [2000]: 274). Nevertheless, those of her siblings who marry Hakka men are

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17 The play is available to watch online: <http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/dacs5/System/Exhibition/Detail.jsp?OID=2510203>.

18 The Uhan Shii Theatre Group was established by Peng in March 1995. The actors and actresses are mostly seniors, aged 65 years old or older. Their repertoire consists of plays based on the real experiences of the theatre members, who come from different ethnic groups in Taiwan; these include Minnan, Hakka, and mainland-born. The aim of the group is to introduce theatrical performance to both seniors and young people, attempting to bridge the generational gap and to present the overlooked historiography of the socially marginalized. The group has toured with the Age Exchange Theatre Trust in Europe and the USA, and been well received.

19 This is probably done in order to maintain the purity of the Hakka diaspora, which is constantly on the move. Also, as soon as they are able, future daughters-in-law can provide labour for a working-class or farming family.

20 ‘Mainlander’ here refers to immigrants from China who are unable to speak Hakka. Their immigration to Taiwan began in the seventeenth century, and huge numbers arrived with the KMT from 1949. Mainlanders claimed most of the political and economic advantages, and tense relationships ensued with local ethnic communities.
not necessarily guaranteed a good life, but can usually expect to be ‘blamed, abused, without respect, spending their whole life with endless complaints’ (Peng 2002 [2000]: 255). They can never be financially independent but must rely on the meagre incomes of their working-class husbands. The lack of money is a common cause of family dispute, and Hakka women are often forced to take odd jobs. Never receiving adequate attention within the patriarchal Hakka community, they often keep a blue cloth pack with them to take wherever they are exiled, and they have to come to terms with all manner of hardships.

The Hakka women in the separate episodes of the play do not know each other, although the audience can see that they share similar circumstances in that their happiness is determined by capitalism. Their individuality is usually undeveloped, and integrated within the male-led community, and they are triply marginalized by a multitude of political, economic, and cultural forces. As the Hakka community will never be a political majority in Taiwan, unlike the communities of mainlanders and Minnans, there is little political, economic, or social support they can claim. Lacking social assistance, many even choose to conceal their minority identity when outside their own community. Women in the Hakka community are thus disadvantaged and always remain lookers-on from the social margins. It is ironic, but also a factor evoking sympathy, that it is often only when these working-class Hakka women have retired, or after their children have started their own families, that they can start to reconstruct their own individualities. Peng’s Uhan Shii Theatre Group therefore provides these senior amateur Hakka men and women with a chance to demonstrate themselves as artists.

While *We Are Here* provides a voice for largely-neglected working-class women on the social margin in Taiwan, Frank McGuinness’s *The Factory Girls* (1982) might be its Irish counterpart. *The Factory Girls* realistically exemplifies how Irish female workers are subjugated by local patriarchal forces, and, distantly but influentially, by Taiwan’s extensive export trade. Superficially, the Irish and Taiwanese working classes have never shared any reciprocal relationships, but Irish workers have been affected by Taiwan’s cheap labour and low-priced exports; this is documented in *The Factory Girls*, as quoted at the beginning of this article. The low-paid Hakka women workers of Taiwan, along with other ethnic groups, have caused female factory workers in Ireland to lose their jobs. Underpaid and aware of the threat of being laid off, the women workers in *The Factory Girls* go on strike by locking themselves inside a factory, disregarding the condemnations of the parish priests and pressure from their own community. Although Taiwan is mentioned only in passing, it can be argued that McGuinness intended to show how workers, exploited by a socially privileged class, can clash across borders. The winners will never be the exploited but the entrepreneurs, who not only dominate their human resources but enjoy all the social and economic advantages that industry brings.

What makes *The Factory Girls* special amongst working-class dramas is not only that it revolves around issues concerning the working conditions of a small factory in Donegal, ‘a jiggledy-piggledy bit at the top of the country’ remote from Dublin, but that the factory is presented as an epitome of the power conflict between the classes during the early stages of globalization (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 23). That is, a global market can be of little benefit to those who are always on the lowest social rung, and they continue to be exploited. In McGuinness’s
observation, Irish entrepreneurs facing massive imports from abroad and possible bankruptcy are rarely concerned with the welfare of employees, but always with maintaining their pecuniary advantage: ‘A unit of production that I need to see go out this factory quicker and in greater numbers if against all the odds I’m to make this hole of a place survive’ (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 37). To increase the factory’s output of hand-made shirts and in the face of machine-made imports, the owner sacks older employees, cuts salaries, and, worst of all, disallows the workers from taking breaks. These female workers are therefore turned into cheap ‘slaves’ competing against machinery, and describe themselves as such (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 33).

Ironically, the workers’ union takes a condescending attitude towards these female labourers, who can get support from nowhere else and so resort to rioting. The union disapproves, and indeed helps the factory owner to turn down their petition, resulting in more tension between the oppressors and the female working class. The male representative from the union, Bonner, boldly condemns senior workers who do not accept ‘voluntary redundancy’ as ‘very foolish’ (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 35). Lacking community support but under tremendous pressure, these women workers are greatly isolated, or even demonized for not behaving with proper respect towards God.

McGuinness, by depicting a rather small-scale Irish riot in a remote shirt factory which is close to being closed down due to imports from Taiwan, demonstrates that the exploitation of the working class is transnational. In both _The Factory Girls_ and _We Are Here_, inadequately educated female workers are deprived of career choices but devote themselves to working primarily for their families. _We Are Here_, as noted above, shows how Hakka girls would be exchanged with other families to provide labour from a very young age. There is no independent female role model for them to aspire to in their community. In _The Factory Girls_, women have to support themselves by either ‘tak[ing] the boat [to emigrate] or getting married’ (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 45). Those who are unable to get married and cannot afford a passage abroad have to find a factory job, as the Irish economy was so depressed at the time. They ask: ‘where will [Irish men] get the work to support us?’ (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 45) Compared with the frequently abused and underrepresented Hakka women, the Irish female workers, though not physically injured in _The Factory Girls_, suffer a similar mental suffocation. However, whether or not they choose to riot against the given power structure, their action will hardly change the fact that they are born to be ‘martyrs’ on the social fringe, lacking choices. If working conditions remain unimproved and there is continuing and relentless deprivation of workers, ‘martyr’ looks set to remain a current term in the context of globalization. A transnational corporation will probably be more desperate to find cheap labour from across national boundaries, but this will leave class conflicts unresolved and lead to prolonged suffering.

Although the reference to Taiwan in _The Factory Girls_ implies that Taiwan gained the upper hand in the 1980s through cheap exports, its success actually resulted in even worse conditions for Taiwanese workers during the following two decades. The enormous impact of transnational enterprises on the disadvantaged working class, although not fully developed in _The Factory Girls_ and _We Are Here_, resonates in the productions of the Assignment Theatre Company (差事劇團), founded in 1996 by Chung Chiao (鍾喬). Unlike the dramas discussed above, most
of Chung’s plays are in the style of magic realism, and are often produced in an open-air tent with an explicit concern for the most deprived of the working class in the age of globalization. The ‘assignments’ to which his tent theatre is committed, according to the playwright, include ‘to accommodate those completely broken souls in the dominion of imperialism and capitalism; the tent is thus a performative arena in which these souls can be conjured up through imaginative power struggle’, and so counteract the conventional, capitalistic manner of performance (Chung 2003: ix). Specifically, most of Chung’s characters have been injured or poisoned during the process of manufacture, or are characters on the social margin whose lives have been directly or indirectly subject to the actions of gigantic native and foreign corporations.

One example is The Platform of Memory (記憶的月台) (2000). A-Gen (阿根) is a victim of dioxin pollution to which he has long been exposed in a hardware factory; Little Red (小紅) and Shen Hui (沈惠) suffer from radiation poisoning emitted by a nuclear power station. In The Hotel at Sea (海上旅館) (2001), a group of nameless, illegally-hired Chinese fishermen work night after night in fishing vessels that offer little comfort. The Darkness of Tide (潮暗) (2004) deals with a larger number of people at the very bottom of the society, and their much-ignored voices; for instance, foreign brides living with domestic violence, illegal immigrants who are drowned; a dying veteran who has given most of his life to fighting in the civil war but received little in return; homeless and aboriginal people who are desperate for social recognition. These socially under-represented characters and the open-air venues substantiate a distinctive collective discourse and aesthetic, providing ‘an alternative to the highly stylized and commercialized mainstream theatres’ (Chung 1999: 188).

By illustrating the misery of the socially marginalized, Chung’s dramas challenge not only imperialistic capitalism but also social bureaucracy and stereotypes of blue-collar workers. In this way, he reveals the distressing facts of gender inequality and the unequal distribution of social welfare. The playwright’s magic realism allows the traditionally less-attended working class to express freely their experiences and dreams in a convention that is more creative than naturalistic dramas. On the other hand, the visualization of neglected communities serves as a healing practice through which mentally scarred individuals may vent their resentments and rebuild their identities, although the harm caused is unlikely to be lessened so long as the tide of globalization keeps coming in. In terms of theatrics, Chung’s magic realism is a significant breakthrough in the dramatization of social and humanitarian issues. That is, his plays create a platform on which the socially suppressed can visualize their dreams, unconstrained by traditional realism. Chung’s series of tent dramas thus portrays exactly working conditions endured under the cloak of economic success. Notably, his theatre does not have a regular audience like other commercial theatre companies, but his non-mainstream, tent theatre allows him to conduct many theatrical experiments in characterization, theme, and setting. His theatre is, in the post-colonial sense, more ‘performative’ and conceptually radical, and in practice unerringly resists the transnational
exploitation which subjugates lower-skilled labourers during the process of globalization. 21

Conclusion

The story of Taiwanese dramas on labour issues as discussed in this article contains a hiatus between the 1940s and the 2000s. This is because of unrelenting censorship between 1949 and 1987 which left Taiwanese theatres and other media with few innovative dramas to produce, and which prescribed either patriotic and anti-communist or apolitical works. Critical plays on sensitive labour issues and social corruption like Jian’s The Wall are scarce, as they tended to irritate the KMT. Most media ‘consciously or unconsciously served themselves as a tool of propaganda for the ruling regime, and promoted the expected loyalism to the KMT/state’ (Chen 1999: 76); KMT censorship resulted in self-censorship.

Irish artists also had to deal with The Censorship of Publications Bill, passed in 1928 and only gradually relaxed in the late 1970s. This censorship was not against alleged communist influences, as was the case in Taiwan, but rather had a religious mission of forbidding obscenity and information about abortion. This official censorship brought about a ‘spiritual emptiness’ which disabled Irish artists from producing new dramas as remarkable as those of their predecessors (Merriman 2003: 148). Once censored, playwrights in Ireland and Taiwan could only look inwards for insular and safe topics, rather than trying experimental theatrics. However, this in turn gave impulse to the playwrights of the next generation to produce works which either express critical views or are experimental. Taiwanese plays by Peng and Chung, for instance, are celebrated for their unconventional innovation and theatrical significance. It is worth noting that Chung and Peng, like their predecessors, Jian, Song, and Lu, and a contemporary critic, Lan, are all of Hakka origin. This does not mean that there are few playwrights of other ethnic origin prominent in Taiwan, but Hakka playwrights, being an ethnic minority, seem to know how to create plausible works from their usually harsh and exploitative everyday experiences. Ireland’s Fabulous Beast Dance Theatre, established in 1997, can be viewed as a counterpart of Chung’s experimental theatre, with a new dramaturgy that ‘fuses the visual immediacy of dance with the narrative strength of theatre’ (Fabulous Beast 2010). One key difference between Chung’s theatre and Fabulous Beast is that the latter has made a successful transition from local experimental group to globally-renowned commercial project, while their productions are no less artistic and creative.

Having examined different styles in representing labour issues on Irish and Taiwanese stages, it can be seen that playwrights in both countries have endeavoured to give voice to the politically and economically marginalized. They

21 Another notable play is The Story of Nei-Wan (內灣線的故事, 1994), written and directed by Chiu Juan-Juan (邱娟娟), founder of the Corn Field Theatre (玉米田實驗劇場). This retrospective play documents the deprived life of miners during the period in which Taiwan was in a transition from farming to industrialization. Miners transferred to cement plants, which offered the most benefits but took little responsibility for deaths or injuries. These miners contributed to the globalization of Taiwan’s industries, but their lack of education and voice have meant that their contribution has not been well documented.
take either a journalistic approach to the working class, or audaciously try a mixture of experimental dramaturgies: from naturalism to magic realism, framed stage to open air, professional playwriting to amateur story-telling, and narrative drama to dance theatre. Ireland and Taiwan, culturally and politically, have both experienced a de-colonial process; many nativists and intellectuals have strived to raise public awareness of lost tradition by reviving local languages or ethnic identities. Working-class dramas should thus be given more recognition within discussion of nation-formation in Taiwan. Significantly, although Jian, Song, and Zhang always delineated the social problems of their times through an idealized, socialist lens, their plays were mostly produced in Taiwanese, a language most familiar to their less educated native audience, rather than in Japanese, a foreign tongue which can easily reveal a self-endorsing elitism.

The Irish playwrights discussed in this article, from Fred Ryan to Frank McGuinness, do not appear to have considered language issues, and their work is in English rather than Gaelic. Although the public prevalence of English in Ireland is due partly to a failure of cultural nationalism in the early twentieth century, the use of English for theatrical performances does not bar Irish playwrights from critiquing local or transnational enterprises which subjugate personal life or the State. Even before the crash, it was suspected that globalization, once so celebrated in Ireland, had not ensured the stability of the Celtic Tiger, but rather triggered an increasing number of redundant, low-skilled (migrant) workers. Irish labourers, both local and migrant, are still heavily exploited in the global market. In both locations, workers have become similarly aware of the imperative need for counteracting the exploitation of cheap labour. Theatrical performances may not bring immediate relief to the unemployed or the exploited, but the collaboration of playwrights across national borders, in different forms, can help create a secure space of enunciation, as Bhabha suggests, in which labourers can identify with each other and their pending challenges. They may be able to forge an alliance, rather than, as McGuinness prophesies in *The Factory Girls*, remaining as foes or competitors in a global sweat factory. The working classes of Ireland and Taiwan, co-acting more cohesively and amplifying their voices in this age of globalization, might more effectively resist (in)visible powers wishing to exploit them. The power they accumulate will only be louder through words on stage, and it will set an inspiring example for those still suffering in the Third World.

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The Political Incorporation of Taiwanese Americans and Irish Americans Compared

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Abstract

This paper reviews theories of immigrant political incorporation and compares the social and political adaptation of two very different ethnic groups in American history and contemporary politics. Immigrants and their descendants from Ireland are now considered a symbol of success in social integration and political incorporation by becoming ‘white’ in US racial politics. Taiwanese Americans, on the other hand, are considered part of the migrant population from Asia who has been paradoxically characterized as a ‘yellow peril’, a ‘model minority’, and the ‘perpetual foreigner’ throughout US history. What explains the paradoxical gaps in social and political incorporation among Taiwanese Americans? What accounts for the differences in political incorporation between Irish and Taiwanese Americans? And how can the Irish American experience help explain the prospect of political incorporation for Taiwanese (and other Asian) immigrants as well as the role of ethnic homeland politics in the process? We take stock of historical, institutional, and behavioral evidences related to the evolution of the two ethnic groups to challenge the validity of the conventional pluralist framework and liberalism’s assumptions of immigrant incorporation for an emergent, non-white, and majority-immigrant community. We present empirical evidence and comment on the prospects of the political incorporation of Taiwanese Americans at the end.

Introduction

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Irish Americans¹ and Taiwanese Americans² appear to be two very different and unrelated population groups in US

¹ The term ‘Irish Americans’ refers to US residents of Irish and Scotch-Irish descent who may or may not be American by citizenship.
² The term ‘Taiwanese Americans’ is here used broadly to refer to US immigrants from Taiwan and their US-born descendants, who may or may not identify themselves as Taiwanese or as Taiwanese Americans, who may or may not be American by citizenship. Due to the complexity in the transition of political power in China, especially after World War II, Taiwanese immigrants in the US today may include persons born elsewhere but latterly settled in Taiwan before migration to the US, as well as individuals who had ties to the KMT
society and politics. The two are set apart not only by racial and ethnic origin, dominant religion, population size, growth trend, and most other demographic characteristics, but also by citizenship status and political identity. The Irish have the reputation of being one of the oldest and most politically active immigrant-turned-ethnic groups in American history. The Taiwanese are part of the ‘new’ Asian migration that was mostly blocked between 1882 and 1965 and, despite having a model minority image, the community has been striving to gain a distinct identity and fair treatment in US polity and society. In the politics of counting by the US Census, in recent decades the former group has faced the problem of declining identification, while the latter has enjoyed a rising interest in identification. Nonetheless, both communities face the same challenge of formulating an accurate account and full understanding of its population. Scholarship on the immigrant incorporation of both communities also holds an increasingly dubious attitude towards the unconditional claim of ‘success’ in the country of settlement.

The two US populations also share a history of colonization and divided politics, in that their respective island homelands are situated next to an empire nation. The island of Ireland was partitioned into two jurisdictions by the United Kingdom in 1921. Today’s Ireland became a free state in 1922, gained full sovereignty from the United Kingdom in 1937, and declared itself to be a republic in 1949. The political history of Northern Ireland, which remains a part of the United Kingdom, is more colorful and has an uncertain future as regards reunification with Ireland. Although Taiwan was freed from Japanese rule and returned to the Republic of China at the end of World War II, it was ruled continuously until 2000 by the Nationalist Party (KMT), which had retreated to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Today, many consider Taiwan to be a de facto independent nation and a fully vibrant democracy. However, Taiwan is not officially independent, and the pursuit of political independence has been a controversial goal. The politics of ancestral homeland has been a subject that has both excited and divided the diaspora in the United States for both communities.

The similarities between the two US populations go beyond concern over group identity and the politics of homeland independence. Examining the history and experience of immigrants from Taiwan through the perspectives of ethnic Chinese in the United States, one finds an incredibly intertwined relationship with Irish immigrants, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century; this was when the first large wave of Chinese merchants and male laborers arrived in San Francisco to mine gold. The unequal treaties signed by the Chinese government with the British government at the end of the two Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860) led to the cession of Hong Kong, heavy taxation, and the Taiping uprisings (1850–1864). These were among the ‘push’ factors, in addition to famine and overpopulation, which led war-torn and impoverished Chinese to cross the Pacific from the late 1840s (Chan 1991). Their perceived economic competition with the Irish and other white ethnics, compounded by cultural differences and white racism, explained the hostility towards the Chinese workers seen in brutal and systematic ‘ethnic cleaning’ that resulted in their legal exclusion in 1882 (Pfaelzer 2007). This occurred even though immigration statistics show that the size of the Chinese

government in China prior to its relocation to Taiwan in 1949. These individuals may often be called Chinese Americans or Taiwanese Chinese Americans in other contexts.
population was only a fraction of that of the Irish, and even though Chinese workers were paid only half of what Irish workers earned when both were hired by the Central Pacific Railroad to build the first transcontinental railroad (Takaki 1989).

Despite interethnic conflicts, the two groups are nevertheless connected through a shared history of group discrimination, labor exploitation, as well as intermarriage. Compared to the Irish, the Chinese faced higher taxes, denials of citizenship and immigration, and were barred from testifying in court against white assailants. Compared with Anglos and Irish Protestants, Irish Catholics faced religious discrimination, economic subordination, and cultural denigration in the New World (Brown 1966; Jacobson 1998). During the first few years after the American Civil War, Irish and Chinese males were recruited from overseas as indentured workers to fill armies and build railroads (Nelson 2007). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Chinese male immigrants in New York City and San Francisco frequently intermarried with Irish immigrant women (Tchen 1999).

Some argue that the post-1965 immigration of highly educated and skilled individuals from Asia, and especially from Taiwan, is simply another, more contemporary form of globally recruited labor (Brodkin 2000). In recent US census data, Taiwanese Americans score a much higher level of educational achievement and per capita income than Irish Americans. However, the former also registered a much lower citizenship rate and a higher poverty rate that the latter. Moreover, the high skills, high education, and material resources of Taiwanese Americans do not seem to spare them from racial discrimination, nor do they lower the entry bar into mainstream American politics (Aptekar 2008; Toyota 2010). What explains the paradoxical gaps in social and political incorporation among Taiwanese Americans? What accounts for the differences in political incorporation between Irish and Taiwanese Americans? And how can the Irish-American experience provide insight into prospects for political incorporation by Taiwanese (and other Asian) immigrants, or into the role of ethnic homeland politics as part of this process?

Because migration to and from Taiwan are examples of movement in the Chinese diaspora and of the global transfer of labor, we maintain that a proper comparison of the political experiences of Irish and Taiwanese Americans will need to be situated and understood within the context of US racial politics and Asian/Chinese American experiences throughout US history. In this paper, we first define the meanings and discuss past research into the political incorporation of immigrants. We then take stock of historical, institutional, and behavioral evidence related to the evolution of the two ethnic groups, in order to challenge the conventional pluralist framework and liberalism’s assumptions of immigrant incorporation as they relate to an emergent, non-white, and majority-immigrant community. Among topics we consider, we compare and contrast the significance of race and racialization in group history and in US policies towards the admission and naturalization of immigrants from Asia and Europe. We also examine the mediating role of political parties as agents of (re)socialization/incorporation as well as the role of ancestral homeland in the development of nationalist identity and consciousness which, in turn, may mobilize political participation across the Atlantic/Pacific. This is followed by an evaluation of the latest statistics collected by
US government agencies to help assess the current social and political status of the two communities and how the evidence sheds light on theories of immigrant incorporation. We close by taking a critical view of the current status of political participation by Taiwanese Americans. We believe that a comparison of the unlikely pairing of Irish Americans and Taiwanese Americans may yield empirically and theoretically interesting results for the advancement of Taiwan Studies, American Studies, international migration, and political science research as a whole.

**A Review of Theoretical Frameworks on Immigrant Political Incorporation**

What is political incorporation? In a recent critical review of the literature, Minnite (2009) finds a conceptually muddled and over-stretched field. This is result of American political and other social scientists striving to comprehend the experiences of post-1965 immigrants, who tend to possess racial and social backgrounds that are different from those of earlier waves of immigrants. Political incorporation may involve either the inclusion or the absorption of outsiders. It can be studied as a process or as an outcome, or as both, of how new or subordinated groups enter the political system. Beyond mere participation and representation, it can refer to the extent to which a marginalized group is able to exert influence within the political system. Although Minnite does not dispute Jones-Correa’s (2005) observation that what is ‘political’ is often inconsistently conceived and applied, whether in relation electoral or non-electoral phenomena or both, she notes the relative neglect of the concept of ‘incorporation’ in scholarly deliberations. For her, ‘to incorporate means to unite into one body, to mix thoroughly together, to put into or include in the body or substance of something else — to form one integral body’ (53) under conditions set by the social contract in a liberal democracy. Because of this premise, she warns that we need to be aware of the biases in the two liberal assumptions regarding political incorporation: that all outsiders can be converted into insiders, and that outsiders want to be included in the liberal polity. If democratic institutions contain mechanisms that are considered discriminatory to a certain segment of the population, then insiders can be disincorporated and outsiders may be perpetually excluded. Thus, although incorporation is the expected outcome of the pluralist model of politics, and although it may be rational for outsiders to seek incorporation into the liberal polity under normal conditions, liberal assumptions may be wrong for some groups under certain conditions. In other words, political incorporation may be contingent, segmented, and reversible for some groups, with non-white, non-Christian, and non-Anglophone immigrant groups being more vulnerable to exclusion and marginalization than others.

Observers of American politics have typically invoked one of two seminal works on political incorporation, depending on the centrality given to race in the experiences of the population(s) under investigation. Those who believe in the fairness and openness of the political system to all active and legitimate groups tend to cite Dahl’s (1961) study of New Haven politics as evidence for the possibility that pluralistic democratic government can absorb the interests of the working-class, who are mostly of white European descent. Dahl argues that all immigrants will eventually be assimilated into the American political system.
through the mechanism of ethnic politics. However, he also believes that ethnic politics is a temporary phenomenon and that once working-class immigrants and their descendants achieve upward mobility, their ethnic-specific concerns go away and political assimilation occurs. Other observers of (white) ethnic politics disagree. Glazer and Moynihan (1963), in their study of New York City politics, do not see class politics replacing ethnic politics. Rather, they see the two co-existing as invigorating elements in local urban politics. Wolfinger (1965) notes that ethnicity can be sustained past the first-generation, and becomes a core component of partisanship that can be passed on to the next generation. Parenti (1967) goes further in insisting that upward mobility in class status might reinforce the political salience of ethnicity. Gimpel and Cho (2004) examine the persistence of white ethnicity in over 1,500 New England towns in six states. They find that support for the Democrats in contests between 1992 and 2000 correlates closely with support for the party in elections between 1956 and 1964, suggesting that ethnic groups do not de-align or become assimilated over time. Rather, group identity may persist despite social mobility, even if the relationship to partisanship is weaker today than fifty years ago. Irish Americans, for instance, become less Democratic in partisanship once they move to the suburbs. All of these scholars, nonetheless, treat issues affecting immigrants and native minorities as ethnic factors, and they do not address the influence of a dominant, white-supremacist ideology on the structuring of political institutions in American political development (King and Smith 2005).

Scholars focusing on the political incorporation of domestic racial minorities often cite Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) path-breaking study of black and Latino politics in the San Francisco Bay area as a starting point. These authors were interested in the extent to which racial minority group interests are effectively represented in policy making. To them, the key to minority incorporation is mobilization, either by protest or by electoral strategy, and the formation of bi-racial or multi-racial coalitions in the governing process. This model has attracted a large following, in part because of innovations in the development of quantifiable measures of political incorporation. For instance, Wolbrecht and Hero (2005) suggest, in the introduction to their edited volume, that their concept of democratic inclusion, which is the incorporation, influence, and representation of various disadvantaged social groups within democratic institutions in the United States, can be measured by five sets of benchmark indicators: full access to participation; representation in important decision-making processes and institutions; influence on government decisions; adoption of public policies that address minority group concerns; and socioeconomic parity across groups. Acknowledging the sustained difficulties that face non-white groups in seeking incorporation, Hero (1992) postulates that there is a two-tiered form of pluralism: full incorporation for the racially whites and marginalization for the non-whites. Furthermore, he contends that while non-white groups are generally disadvantaged and less incorporated than whites, different non-white groups may occupy different positions in the continuum between fully incorporated and fully marginalized.

Although the racial hierarchy model is a considerable improvement over the ethnic integration model in understanding minority incorporation, critics point out that the racial model assumes group solidarity by race, and neglects intra- and inter-ethnic competition among non-black minority groups (Clarke 2005). Further,
minority elected officials may lack the resources to bargain, and are prone to co-option during negotiations with the majority (Thompson 2006). Turning to the structural constraints of racial/ethnic change in local politics, Stone (1993) notes that powerful local regimes may not be easily dislodged through electoral mobilization alone. More importantly, this race-based model does not question the validity of liberal assumptions about racial minorities. Minnite (2009) notes that reliance on electoral strategy may be less useful for the incorporation of emergent immigrant communities who do not possess similar citizenship and voting rates or the same level of English language proficiency as more established groups. Moreover, incorporation does not necessarily shield contemporary immigrants and minorities from labor exploitation and political reversals and disincorporation, as happened to blacks in Los Angeles after the 1992 Riots (54).

None of the above models is based on examining the situation of an emergent, non-Christian, non-white, and immigrant-majority community that cannot be characterized working-class status alone. Questioning whether a black-based minority group model can be applied to the experiences of Afro-Caribbean immigrants, Rogers (2006) observes several major differences between African Americans and contemporary non-white immigrants. First, African Americans were for the most part involuntary immigrants, while most non-white immigrants came to the United States of their own free will. Second, the new generation of immigrants has the ability to maintain close homeland ties, due the availability and advancement of transoceanic transportation and communication technologies. Third, the history of and struggle against slavery is exclusive to the African-American community. Arguably, the tactics developed by the African-American community in their struggle for political incorporation are in many ways a manifestation of its historical bondage. This is a group experience shared by no other non-white immigrant group. Appreciating the roles of pre-immigration socialization and post-immigration re-socialization, Rogers advocates using the political learning model in conceiving immigrant minority politics. In this approach, experiences formed in the home country and learned in the host county are both keys influences in the success of immigrant political incorporation. Although he does not use the term, Rogers’ model incorporates the concept of transnationalism, highlighting the key roles of home country ties and cues and their relationship to host country cues in the politics of immigrant incorporation. Nevertheless, he does look critically into the capacity and will of mainstream institutions to incorporate non-white immigrants, nor does he consider international relations between the home country and the host county as a factor, although these may have an impact on the opportunity for incorporation.

Scholars focusing on the political experience of Asian Americans, especially Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans, find it difficult to ignore the influence of negative images and perceptions of the homeland state in Asia, contentious US–Asia relations, and/or Asian ethnic groups’ mistreatment in the host country of the United States. The internment of Japanese American residents on the US West Coast during World War II, including US-born citizens who made up two-thirds of the interned population, is a glaring example of citizenship violation due to presumed Asian homeland ties (Daniels 1988). The inept and corrupt Qing dynasty in nineteenth-century China and its racial violence against the US-Chinese is another. Ngai (2007) uses the term alien citizen to describe the unenviable
situation of US-born Asian Americans who acquire American citizenship by virtue of birth in the US but whose citizenship is suspect, if not denied, on account of the racialized identity of their immigrant ancestry. However, the issue of political disincorporation or exclusion is not restricted to the pre-1965 era. Gotanda (2001) links the 1996 US presidential ‘Asian Donorgate’ campaign finance scandal involving Taiwanese Americans with three US Supreme Court cases dealing with Chinese exclusion in the late nineteenth century to extend the theory of citizenship nullification, by which an individual is deprived of citizenship rights ‘through the use of the implicit link between an Asiatic racial category and foreignness’ (80).

Looking also into the meanings and implications of ‘Asian Donorgate’ and the 1999 Chinese espionage case of Dr Wen Ho, a naturalized American born in Taiwan, Michael Chang (2004) uses the term transnational citizenship to refer to the nature of citizenship as flexibly construed and applied in the age of globalization. His book’s primary theoretical framework is critical transnationalism, which specifically opposes celebratory discourses of transnationalism that wishfully foresee the end of world divisions and inequality in the era of globalization. Rather, as informed by prior conceptions of flexible citizenship (Ong 1999), racial formation (Omi and Winant 1994), and dual-domination and extraterritoriality (Wang 1995, 1998), Chang views as inevitable the emergence of new power hierarchies that may transcend national borders but still maintain the structures of inequality within each nation-state and other social and political boundaries. Because Chinese/Taiwanese and other Asian Americans are arguably the most transnationally-affiliated US population, Chang raises a grave concern, like the other scholars discussed above, about the possibility of non-incorporation and disempowerment for this relatively affluent but foreign and racially suspicious population.

This theoretical review shows that the concept of political incorporation can be variously defined, studied, and assessed. Due to the dramatic transformation of the racial, cultural, and social order of post-1965 America created by the influx of immigrants from Asia and Latin America, recent scholarship on political incorporation has increasingly been dissatisfied with traditional models that derive from observations of old, white European immigrant groups (such as Irish Americans) as well as old, US-born minority groups (such as blacks). Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008), for instance, call for new models for understanding immigrant political engagement, taking into consideration the structural inequality of civic engagement and political organization across groups. Expressing their own dissatisfaction with the status quo, Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009) propose a kitchen-sink model for understanding the political incorporation and non-incorporation of immigrant groups in both the United States and Europe. Schmidt et al. (2009) empirically assess the political incorporation of non-white immigrants in terms of four frameworks: individual assimilation, ethnic pluralism, bi-racial hierarchy, and multiracial hierarchy; they find each to have its followers and challengers. We wish to complement these previous efforts by trying to identify theoretical framework(s) that may be better able to capture the political incorporation of Irish and Taiwanese/Chinese Americans. In the next section, we take a quick walk through a tangled history to attempt to compare the fate of two visibly different ethnic groups in the US, the Irish and the Chinese.
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A Tale of Two Communities: A Quick Walk Through History

Early Irish immigrants, many of whom came as semi-free indentured laborers, began arrive in the New World as early as the late 1500s. By 1790, there were approximately 400,000 people of Irish birth or decent residing in the US, making this the largest group of non-English immigrants during the colonial period (Blessing 1980). Being the first non-Protestant group to arrive in large numbers, the Irish often faced both religious and ethnic prejudice from the Anglo-Saxon population. The strength of the anti-Irish sentiment peaked in the mid-1850s, when the catastrophic Potato Famine (1845–1853) in Ireland triggered a mass exodus, in which the deliberate departure of the generally literate peasants also increased the chances of survival of those left behind. Many new arrivals were forced to work for low wages and lived in abysmal conditions. Anti-Catholic, particularly anti-Irish Catholic, feelings led to the formation of the Know-Nothing Party. Politically active from the early to mid-1850s, the party's prominent members included the Mayor of San Francisco, Stephen Palfrey Webb, and the Governor of California, J. Neely Johnson (Anbinder 1992). Anti-Irish sentiment also led to the de facto barring of Irish Americans from entering middle-class, white-collar professions, thus concentrating them in domestic service, building, and factory work. This was the situation when large numbers of ethnic Chinese workers recruited from Guangdong by industrial forces associated with British and American companies arrived at San Francisco by steamboat.

The number of immigrants from China in the 1850s was only 36,000, a figure 96.5 per cent lower than the number that emigrated from Ireland during the same period. However, in next decade the Chinese figure rose to 54,000, which was 87.4 per cent lower than Irish immigration, due in part to aggressive recruitment efforts by the railroad companies who needed cheap, hard-working, and tractable stoop labor for dangerous work constructing the first transcontinental railroad (Nelson 2007). While the Chinese were first hired to break the threat of strikes by white workers, Chinese workers were paid less than European immigrant workers and subjected to harsher work conditions. These included whippings and a ban on quitting. When the Chinese workers protested against this mistreatment in 1867, the strike they organized was met with the stoppage of payment and food supply (I. Chang 2003). Meanwhile, perceived economic competition from the Chinese gave rise to the formation of the Workingman's Party under the leadership of an Irish immigrant named Dennis Kearney in the 1870s. Herein, according to Saxton (1971), lies one of the ironies of US labor history. Whereas the Chinese were indispensable to the capitalists who needed cheap labor, they were also indispensable to the labor organizers who found that nothing united factions among whites more quickly than the cry of 'the Chinese must go'. This popular sentiment eventually led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which barred the entry of all Chinese with exceptions for the merchant class, teachers, students, and clergy. The Act also included a ban of the naturalization of Chinese immigrants which was not lifted until 1943.

Economic competition was not the only reason for Irish–Chinese tension. Racial anxiety was another. In a nation and society that legally discriminated against the citizenship of blacks and other non-whites through the 1790 Nationality Act, the Irish in their struggle for equality and an American identity were eager to align
themselves with the superior white Anglo race by denigrating the Chinese who were defined as racially inferior, the men as sexual predators and the women as prostitutes. Ironically, these were the same terms that were used to associate the Irish with blacks in pre-Civil War era in the North, where the two groups competed for the same low-skilled and low-waged jobs (Roediger 1999). Even in 1876, the popular press ‘would place the Celt and the Negro on the same level of civic virtue’ (Jacobson 1998: 55). The Irish-born found a convenient scapegoat in the Chinese-born for their unfittedness to assimilation and ineligibility for US citizenship. By defining Americanness as whiteness, Irish Americans were accepted into the white class while Chinese Americans were made into a permanently lower and excludable class. Facing high levels of racial discrimination, many Chinese workers turned inward to self-employment and thus created an ethnic niche in the laundry industry that was originally occupied by Irish women.

It would be unfair, however, to describe Irish–Chinese relations solely in competitive and hostile terms. Both were oppressed in their homeland by the same imperialist power, and both received similar mistreatment after their arrival in the US. Further, in the nineteenth century, the two populations differed significantly in the ratio of men-to-women. Few married Chinese women accompanied their men on the journey to the New Golden Mountain. The small number of Chinese women who traveled alone to the American West Coast could often only find work as prostitutes or undertaking menial labor (Tong 1994). In 1975, the perception and fear that Chinese, Japanese, and other ‘Mongolian’ women were entering prostitution after arriving in the US prompted Congress to pass the Page Act. The dearth of single Chinese women, in combination with an excess of Irish working-class women, more of whom had survived the Irish famine than Irish working-class men, led to a surprisingly high rate of intermarriage between Chinese men and Irish women (Tchen 1999). For example, between 1820 and 1870 in New York, there were 75 Chinese men, or roughly a quarter of the Chinese male population, who were either married to, or at least lived with, an Irish woman. Such Irish–Chinese unions, however, were not received well by white society, and 14 states passed anti-miscegenation laws to prohibit both Asians and blacks from marrying whites.

While both immigrant groups initially suffered from discrimination and injustice, the two groups eventually developed different experiences of political incorporation in their adopted country. Whereas the Chinese were racially excluded from American polity, the Irish had the right to US citizenship. Proficiency in English and Western customs and the establishment of American citizenship helped Irish Americans secure their white status by becoming politically incorporated through involvement and dominance in Democratic Party politics. According to Blessing (1980: 535), Irish immigrants were advantaged in their political mobilization through their participation in mass-based anti-British efforts in the homeland organized by Daniel O’Connell’s Catholic Association. Their concentration in big eastern and midwestern cities (such as New York, Boston, and Chicago) enabled the operation of ward-based urban machine politics, where local ethnic politicians traded food baskets, coal in winter, access to governmental and legal assistance, and patronage for just a vote at election time. Meanwhile, the businessmen provided the bosses with bribes in return for favorable decisions or rulings. Though corrupt and undemocratic, these machines brought order to a fragmented city and
actively worked to incorporate working-class immigrant groups. Yet, this practice of political incorporation was selective and ethnocentric. Not only did the Democratic Party pass its first anti-Chinese resolution in 1852, only a few years after the group’s arrival in San Francisco, but none of the new immigrant groups that arrived from Eastern and Southern Europe after 1890 benefitted much from machine politics. In fact, Erie (1988) observes that, throughout most of their history, urban machines controlled by Irish bosses did not incorporate immigrants other than the Irish. Because the machine’s benefits were of a scarce nature, the Irish could not readily translate political power into group economic advancement; and whatever prize that was won was of a limited nature and guarded jealously; the Irish only sparingly accommodated the latterly-arriving Southern and Eastern European immigrants and African Americans (6).

The practice of selective mobilization by political parties is also seen in contemporary politics dealing with African, Latino, and Asian American communities (Jones-Correa 1998, 2005; Frymer 1999; Leighley 2001; Wong 2006; Kim 2007). Unlike the parties described in Dahl (1961) and other pluralists, which played a key role in incorporating the Irish, today’s parties do not have the resources nor the interest to organize new immigrants, who happen to be largely non-white, into citizens and voters. Leighley notes that, because political parties are strategic institutions created to win elections, they seek to mobilize not voters in general, but supporters in particular. She finds that racial and ethnic minorities, especially small and emergent political communities, are exposed to substantially lower levels of campaign mobilization efforts than are Anglo whites. Even for established and proven minorities such as African Americans, Frymer contends that the Democratic Party would simultaneously expect the black vote while doing its best to keep race off the agenda so as to appeal to the median majority-white voters. Instead of political parties, Latino and Asian American communities have relied on community-based resources such as immigrant-serving organizations, church-based groups, and labor unions, to conduct citizenship classes, voter registration education campaigns, and get-out-the-vote drives. Inconsistent and limited funding support has rendered these organizations and groups unreliable and fragmented armies for political mobilization, which, in turn, hurts the chances of political incorporation for these communities.

Another issue worth investigating is the factor of homeland politics and its effects on immigrant groups in the United States. Immigrants’ involvement in homeland politics is usually treated with suspicion because of the loyalty issue (Harrington 1980). However, in Irish American history, a paradoxical thesis has been advanced that links the development of Irish American nationalism to Irish American aspiration for incorporation in the host country. According to Brown (1956, 1966), the economic exploitation and religious prejudice experienced by Irish immigrants in mid-nineteenth century America contributed to feelings of homesickness and oppression that were in turn transformed into revolutionary nationalism for liberating the colonized homeland with an intensity and passion far beyond that which was felt by their kinsmen in Ireland. Their compulsive sense of inferiority, sensitivity to criticism, and yearning for respectability were rooted in their aspirations for equality, prosperity, and freedom in the New World. Instead, they found poverty and low status, which many blamed on the oppressive and discriminatory rule of the British. Consequently, many Irish Americans believed
that an independent Irish nation-state was necessary to help not only rid the Old Country of its oppressive ruler but also to help Irish Americans garner respect in American society (McCaffrey 1976).

Although Irish American nationalism had in many ways enabled the work of independence in Ireland, there were also moments of disjuncture in the nationalistic movements on either side of the Atlantic. In his detailed account of the Fenian movement in the United States, Brown (1956) contends that this movement reveals itself at times to be ‘directed toward American and not Irish ends’ (358). While many Irish American nationalist organizations existed at the time, such as the Fenian Brotherhood, it is often the case that ‘a free Ireland would reflect glory on the Fenians’. The practical purpose of these associations was to act as pressure groups for improving the lives of the Irish in America. Focusing on the role of women in Irish American nationalism, Janis (2009) notes that although the Irish Ladies’ Land League might have been founded to raise funds for the independence movement in Ireland, it quickly became an important forum for women to assert their own American-inflected concerns and convictions.

Irish Americans not only donated large sums of money to sustain every revolutionary and constitutional expression of Irish nationalism; some would cross the Atlantic in the hope of changing the fate of the homeland. Although the demise of Irish American nationalism came quickly after the treaty of 1921, which granted independence to the Irish state, fund-raising activities remained vigorous until 1937. In the late 1960s, as public unrest in Northern Ireland increased, nationalist activists staged a series of equal rights campaigns for Catholics. In the 1970s, influential Irish American Congressmen attempted to negotiate a united Ireland through visits and pronouncements (Harrington 1980). Since then, the activity of militant Irish nationalists in America has waned and the majority of Irish Americans support the peace process through diplomatic means (Almeida 2006).

Homeland politics also played a key role in the development of Chinese American history. Chinese Americans in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century drew on a complicated network of transnational resources to fight racial injustice in the US immigration, social, legal, and political system, to negotiate their identities between being Chinese and being American, and to help improve the political and economic status of the homeland in the process (Chan 2006). Shehong Chen’s (2006) research on the transformation in Chinese America after the Chinese revolution of 1911 found that immigrants’ concern and frustration over homeland political development helped define and change their identity from being Chinese to being Chinese American. A further transformation occurred during World War II, when Chinese American women worked together with white women to solicit humanitarian aid for war-torn China and earned, in turn, respect as worthy allies and potential citizens (Leong and Wu 2008). Like Irish Americans, Chinese Americans saw an interlocking relationship between their fate in the New World and the political order in the Old World. Because of American racism, Chinese immigrants turned their struggle into a trans-Pacific effort by sending money from the United States to help strengthen and modernize their native homeland (Y. Chen 2006). The overseas community became a bastion of fund-raising for various projects dealing with homeland political change. Before the lifting of racist immigration quotas and the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, which opened the door for blacks and other
minorities to participate in US electoral process on a more equal footing, non-incorporation was the norm for Chinese Americans.

**How the Present-day Communities Compare: A Snapshot through US Government Data**

Immigrants from Taiwan do not have a recorded presence in data released by the US government until the 1950s, when a small number of mostly middle-class college-educated students entered to pursue graduate studies in elite universities (Ng 1998; Chee 2005; S. Chang 2006; Gu 2006; C. Chen 2008). Among this group were mainlanders who had been born in China and who had evacuated to Taiwan around 1949; others were Islanders or native Taiwanese whose families or ancestors had migrated from southern China and settled in Taiwan before 1945.\(^3\) The oppressive KMT rule, which featured a Mandarin-only language policy, compulsory military service, strict media censorship, ideological indoctrination, and the brutal handling of the 2-28 Incident in 1947, was a push factor for the exit of the latter group (Williams 2003). These students-turned-immigrants played a key role in founding the Taiwanese independence movement in North America (Shu 2002; Williams 2003; Lin 2006). For those who were displaced from China, their journey to America can be considered either a continuation of their exile or as a search for a second or third home (Fung 2002). The literature on these Taiwanese Chinese Americans is scarce, and their stories are both under- and misrepresented due to being lumped together with Chinese from mainland China, Hong Kong, and elsewhere (48–49). This is also the case with the few scholarly publications on Taiwanese Americans. Consequently, there has been hardly any scientific study of identity differences among immigrants from Taiwan or the factors which have an impact on their political attitudes and behavior toward homeland and host country politics (although see Lien 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).

Immigration statistics published by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) show that there were 721 immigrants from Taiwan who were admitted as legal permanent residents between 1950 and 1959. That number grew more than eight-fold, from 15,657 in 1960–1969 to 132,647 in 1990–1999.\(^4\) This exponential growth partly reflected changes in US immigration policy made in 1965 that lifted discriminatory quotas and created an opportunity for highly-educated and highly-skilled individuals from Taiwan to emigrate as professionals. The normalization of

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\(^3\) This mainlander–islander dichotomy is an over-simplification of the identity issue in Taiwan. Following Storm’s (2008) argument, the preference for this usage, rather than a ‘Chinese–Taiwanese dichotomy’, is to emphasize the fragmentation and hybridity of both concepts (41). However, this formulation does not represent the identity of those who are in or from a ‘third-generation mixed marriage’.

\(^4\) Statistics for legal immigrants only are recorded here. According to Zhao (2009), a further 649,000 to 780,000 Chinese persons from the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan may have arrived undocumented by 2000. This represents 23–27 per cent of the Chinese population in the 2000 US Census for those who are either solely Chinese or in combination with other race and ethnicity. The majority of illegal immigrants are individuals who over-stayed their visa permit. Undocumented entry through routes such as people-smuggling is a relatively minor source.
US relations with the PRC and the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 created another wave of emigration from Taiwan, tending to consist of middle- or upper middle-class families who sought stability and better educational opportunities for their children. Until Taiwan lifted its own emigration restrictions in 1980, seeking graduate education abroad was the only means of exit for the unconnected and those with fewer resources. The creation of a separate annual quota of 20,000 for Taiwan in 1982, heavily lobbied for by Taiwanese-American organizations, helped bring in large numbers of family members and relatives of immigrant professionals.

Between 1950 and 2008, the total number of immigrants admitted to the United States from Taiwan was 435,783, which is smaller than the comparable figure from Hong Kong (481,398), and much smaller than that from China (1,084,293). However, migration from Taiwan was about five times that of the number from China in the 1970s, and it peaked in the 1980s and 1990s when Taiwanese numbers exceeded those of Hong Kong. Between 2000 and 2008, there were significantly more migrants from Taiwan than from Hong Kong, although the number of migrants from China was almost tenfold the number from Taiwan. By contrast, there were only 12,670 migrants from Ireland in 2000–2008, which is just less than 98 per cent smaller than the figure from China. This is the opposite of the immigration pattern seen in the 1850s. These migration patterns beg the question of who the ‘new’ Chinese Americans from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are. How do they compare with the old Irish and the new Irish immigrants? More importantly, will we see a discontinuity in the political incorporation of the Taiwanese and the Chinese because of the removal of discriminatory laws and changing demographic patterns?

A brief methodological note is in order. The US Census provides the single best resource for studying US population groups. However, any attempt to study the two in a truly scientific manner is marred by methodological limitations, such as the unequal census enumeration method between the Chinese and the Taiwanese, as well as the challenge of declining interest in identifying with the ancestral origin of Irish. The collection of Irish-American data using an open-ended ancestral question (rather than a check-box under the racial question) may also add to the problem of under-counting the population. In addition, the practice of tabulating only the first two ancestral answers excludes multi-ethnic Irish Americans who do not list Irish as their first two responses to the ancestry question. The Taiwanese-American community has sought to alleviate the under-counting of the population in the census enumeration scheme, which provides a check-box for the Chinese but permits only a write-in option for those who identify as Taiwanese. Taiwanese Americans are urged by community advocacy groups such as the Taiwanese American Citizen League to check ‘other Asian’ in the section on Race and Ethnicity and to write in ‘Taiwanese’ to show a distinctive identity other than

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5 This figure also refers solely to legal immigrants. Almeida (2006) estimates that about 50,000, or 15 per cent, of the new migrant population from Ireland may be undocumented.

6 An official with the Census Bureau admitted that ‘Taiwanese’ could not be listed as an Asian American category along with ‘Chinese’ due to political concerns over international relations with China (Kim 2007: 103–104).
Chinese. Readers are advised to keep these caveats in mind when reading the latest statistics regarding these populations.

According to the ancestry data reported in the Census 2000 Brief prepared by Brittingham and de la Cruz (2004), the percentage of Americans who identified as of Irish ancestry dropped from 38.7 million (15.6 per cent) to 30.5 million (10.8 per cent) between 1990 and 2000. Those of Scotch-Irish⑦ decent experienced a similar decline from 5.6 million (2.3 per cent) to 4.3 million (1.5 per cent). Meanwhile, the number of those who entered ‘Taiwanese’ in the ancestral question rose from 192,973 in 1990 to 293,568 in 2000, representing a 52 per cent increase, even if they were still no more than 0.1 per cent of the US population. The rise and fall of these populations is consistent with the pattern observed among the largest European and Asian ancestries. Holdaway (2007) uses the 5 per cent Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), and finds that the percentage among the Taiwan-born who report their ancestry as ‘Chinese’ decreased from 73 per cent in 1980, to 54 per cent in 1990, and to 32 per cent in 2000. Yu and Chiang (2009), using responses to the write-in race question in the US Census to study the phenomenon of the rising Taiwanese identity, find that both the older generation and recent Taiwanese immigrant arrivals, as well as those who live in Los Angeles, are more likely to identify as Taiwanese than Chinese. In contrast, those who are acculturated, more fluent in English, or who migrated to the States at a young age before the 1980s, are less likely to switch their identity from Chinese to Taiwanese. The authors suggest that entering ‘Taiwanese’ on the census form appears to be a political act of asserting identity and expressing solidarity with their compatriots in Taiwan.

To enable some sense of a systematic comparison between the Irish and the Taiwanese, as well as other related population groups covered in the literature review, we collect and report in Table 1 (see page 16) statistics from the 2006–2008 American Community Survey (ACS)⑧ three-year estimates, which are based

⑦ ‘Scotch-Irish’ is a term invented and used almost exclusively in North America. It refers to Protestant Irish immigrants, who came from the Province of Ulster primarily during the eighteenth century, and their descendants. The equivalent term in Britain for the same group is ‘Ulster Scots’.

⑧ The American Community Survey (ACS) is an annual survey conducted nationwide in every US county and Puerto Rico, with the intention of providing the most current economic, social, demographic, and housing information about the US population. It uses a series of monthly samples to produce annually-updated data for the same small areas (census tracts and block groups) formerly surveyed via the decennial census long-form sample. Each year, approximately 3 million housing unit addresses in the US and Puerto Rico are selected for participation. The data collection operation for housing units (HUs) consists of three modes: mail, telephone, and personal visit. The ACS includes twelve monthly independent samples. Data collection for each sample is for a period of three months, with mail returns accepted during this entire period. In January 2006, the ACS was expanded to include the population living in group quarter (GQ) facilities such as college dorms, nursing homes, correctional facilities, and homeless shelters. Field Representatives collect data from approximately 195,000 GQ sample residents each year. To ensure the participation of non-English speakers, the ACS language assistance program provides translated instruments and other survey materials, the recruiting and training of bilingual interviewers, and the provision of
on data collected between January 2006 and December 2008. These represent average characteristics over a three-year period and have a larger sample size than the one-year estimates, although they are also less current than the one-year estimates. It is deemed the best dataset to date for comparing our populations of interest, due to the possibility of analyzing information by ancestry group, ethnic group, and country/place of birth (for the foreign-born) using data collected contemporaneously and by a rigorous and comparable research procedure.

To facilitate discussion from reading this fairly complex table, we have selected several pairs of groups for comparison as a starting point for assessing the relative social status and prospect for political incorporation in our populations of interest:

A. Between Irish and Scotch-Irish: Our data show that there are still two Irish Americas in the twenty-first century, separated by religion, partisanship, and class. Those Irish Protestants who identified as ‘Scotch-Irish’ are older, per capita more affluent, and better educated than those who identified as ‘Irish’. Among the tiny foreign-born population, a much higher percentage of the Scotch-Irish population reported being born in North America than in Europe; the reverse is true among foreign-born persons identifying with Irish descent. Although the number of persons of Irish descent was seven-times higher than those who identified as being of Scotch-Irish ancestry, to this date only one of the 19 US presidents who have been able claim an Irish tie has been Catholic. Being non-Protestant may continue to be a hurdle in contending for the highest office in the US

B. Between Irish and Taiwanese: Compared to persons who identified themselves as Irish, persons who identified themselves as Taiwanese are slightly younger in age and predominantly foreign-born. Among immigrants, a higher percentage among the Taiwanese identifiers did not enter the US until 2000 or later. Despite their belated entry into the host country, the Taiwanese have a higher naturalization rate than the Irish. Still, only 77 per cent among the Taiwanese have US citizenship, compared to 99 per cent of the Irish. The heavy immigrant background among the Taiwanese identifiers is reflected in the high usage of a non-English language at home. Living up to the positive group image, Taiwanese identifiers are much better educated, have much stronger presence in professional/managerial occupations, especially among males, and are better-off in all economic indicators than Irish identifiers.

C. Between Taiwanese and Taiwan-born: Not all Taiwanese identifiers were born in Taiwan (only 69 per cent were), and not all who registered their country/place of birth as Taiwan would identify themselves as Taiwanese but as not Chinese. Given that the number of Taiwan-born is more than three times the size of Taiwanese identifiers, the numerical gap between the two may be more than an issue of census under-enumeration, as Taiwanese American lobbying groups would contend. It may be an issue of political preference. A 2007 survey of US immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong shows that just over half of the native Taiwanese respondents (individuals from Taiwan who were born in Taiwan telephone or Internet assistance in multiple languages. The ACS, CATI, and CAPI survey instruments are currently available in both English and Spanish. Interviewers can conduct interviews in additional languages if they have that capability.
### Table 1: Comparison between Irish, Taiwanese, and Chinese Americans by Ancestry, Ethnicity, and Country/Place of Origin, 2006–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancestry Group</th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>Taiwanese</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Median Family Income ($)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31,366</td>
<td>73,176</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Female Full-Time, Year-Round Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean earnings for full-time, year-round workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$29,088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Per Capita Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median Family Income ($)</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31,366</td>
<td>73,176</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### % Management/Professional Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Bachelor degree + (aged 25 or over)</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### % Non-English Only Household

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Non-English only</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### % Citizen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Citizen</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### % Naturalized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Naturalized</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### % Born in N. America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Born in N. America</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### % Born in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Born in Europe</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### % Enrolled in school, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Enrolled in school, 1990</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### % Enrolled in school, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Enrolled in school, 1999</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### % Enrolled in school, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Enrolled in school, 2000</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### % Fathers and/or mothers present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Fathers and/or mothers present</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### % Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Employment</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

#### % Family income below poverty level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Family income below poverty level</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Ancestry Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancestry Group</th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>Taiwanese</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Total</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and who have either of their parents born in Taiwan) but only 17 per cent of Taiwanese mainlander respondents (individuals from Taiwan who were either born in China or Hong Kong or were born in Taiwan but have parents born in China) would call themselves Taiwanese or Taiwanese American, while 58 per cent of mainlanders would identify themselves as Chinese or Chinese American (Lien 2008b). Alongside this observed ethnic identity gap, we note from Table 1 that if those who identify as Taiwanese in the US Census project a highly successful group image, those who were Taiwan-born in the same dataset may seem even more successful in their economic adaptation and citizenship acquisition, in spite of having a higher degree of language isolation and of being older.

D. Between Ireland-born and Taiwan-born: Using data in the country/place of birth columns, we attempt to provide fairer comparison of the evidence of incorporation between contemporary Irish and Taiwanese immigrants. Compared to the Taiwan-born, Irish immigrants were on average much older, have had a much longer tenure in the United States, and have the highest per capita income and mean earnings of all groups, especially among males. These are factors that should give the Irish immigrants an edge in becoming politically incorporated through naturalization. However, the Irish naturalization rate is actually three percentage points lower than for the Taiwanese. Politically-motivated migration from Taiwan and the desire to situate family members in a society with greater educational opportunities and a better quality of life may account for the greater Taiwanese naturalization rate. Compared to the Taiwan-born, the Ireland-born also have a much lower share of college-education as well as proportion of persons in professional/managerial occupations. This observation, that new Irish immigrants are less educated and have less occupational prestige than Taiwanese immigrants but enjoy a greater income reward, provides evidence supportive of the racial disadvantage thesis in the workplace for well-qualified Asian immigrants (Woo 2000).

Finally, we wish to make a few brief comments concerning the differences found between Taiwanese and Chinese as well as between the Taiwan-born and the China-born. Because of differing reasons for exiting and differing conditions of entry, immigrants from Taiwan are expected to have far better social and political standing than early immigrants from Guangdong. Taiwanese immigrants are not only voluntary immigrants who tend to be equipped with personal or family resources upon arrival, but they are eligible to seek naturalization and reap the benefits of US citizenship (such as voting and sponsoring immediate family

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9 The Chinese American Homeland Politics (CAHP) survey was a telephone survey completed between October and November 2007, based on 603 US adults residing in Chinese-surnamed households who can trace their personal or ancestral origin to China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong. The sample was drawn from a national list of phone numbers of Chinese households identified by two different sampling firms through a listed surname approach. Due to the uneven distribution of the US Chinese population, the national sample was drawn to target five metropolitan areas with the heaviest concentrations of Chinese: Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Houston, and Chicago.

10 Theses statistical averages may obscure the class divisions within Taiwanese and Chinese Americans communities discussed by several authors (e.g., Kwong 1987; H.-S. Chen 1992; Zhao 2009).
members and relatives to the United States). The timing of their entry made them the first group of ethnic Chinese who have an equal opportunity to seek political incorporation in the US. The selective preference system in US immigration policies, combined with differences in the degree of development and affluence in the Asian homeland, may have contributed to the relatively high socioeconomic profile of the Taiwanese American community. Compared to immigrants from China, average immigrants from Taiwan (and Hong Kong) are better educated and have a higher occupational standing and income. The allowance of dual citizenship by the government in Taiwan may also help explain the higher naturalization rate of immigrants from Taiwan than from China, whose government prohibits dual citizenship. Nevertheless, we also note that the gender gap among Taiwanese immigrants and Taiwanese identifiers tends to be much wider than is found among immigrants from China and Chinese identifiers, with women receiving less college education and less income reward for their work. Women’s economic subordination among Asian Americans may be the intersectional outcome of racism, sexism, and capitalism (Espiritu 1997). However, the wider gender gaps found among Taiwanese than among Chinese Americans is a curious phenomenon worthy of further investigation.

Assessing the Political Participation of Taiwanese Americans

To make a small advance toward assessing the political incorporation status of present-day Taiwanese Americans, we examine the extent their of political participation as voters, candidates, and public officials, as well as their involvement in political activities beyond voting, such as lobbying and contacting public officials, making donations to political campaigns, attending political rallies, protests, and demonstrations, and signing petitions. There are no publicly available mass opinion datasets gathered specifically for the study of Taiwanese Americans. However, there are datasets on Chinese, Asian, and other Americans that include persons from Taiwan or of Taiwanese descent that are used here. Because there is no mass opinion survey of contemporary Irish Americans, we use average figures regarding non-Hispanic white Americans as surrogate measures of their level of political participation.

Without a doubt, one reason why Irish Americans are considered a mainstay in US electoral politics is the presence of prominent American politicians of Irish-Catholic descent, such as the Kennedy family, as well as numerous Irish-Protestant Americans who have served as US presidents, US Supreme Court justices, US senators and representatives, and in other high government offices. Comparatively few Americans of Taiwanese descent or migrants from Taiwan have made it into the political arena. Among the pioneers are Lily Lee Chen, who was elected to the city council of Monterey Park, CA in 1982 and became a mayor in 1984, and S.B. Woo, who served as Delaware’s twenty-first Lieutenant Governor from 1985 to 1989. In recent years, the election of David Wu (D-Oregon 1st) to the US Congress in 1998, and the appointment of Elaine Chao as US Secretary of Labor (2001–2009), are considered to be the high watermarks of Taiwan-born Americans in the national political arena. At the state level, John Chiang has been a popular California State Controller since 2006, and Ted Lieu, who has been a vocal California Assemblyman since 2005, recently came short in
a run for the position of state Attorney General. Both Chiang and Lieu are the sons of Taiwanese immigrants. Elsewhere in the nation, a Taiwanese immigrant named Jimmy Meng became the first Asian American to win a seat in the New York Assembly, in 2004. He was succeeded by Ellen Young, another immigrant from Taiwan, who was succeeded in turn by Grace Meng, daughter of Jimmy Meng. At the local level, John Liu, who emigrated from Taiwan at a young age, was the first Asian American elected to the New York City Council (in 2001), and he currently holds the position of New York City Controller (since 2010).

These examples show that Taiwanese Americans have been able to make small but increasingly significant political gains, despite their limited immigration history and population size and the declining role of political parties in mobilizing and organizing the ethnic vote. The lifting of racial restrictions to immigration, citizenship, voting, and other civil rights, the rise of candidate-centered politics, the availability of transnational capital and other resources, as well as the group’s superior socioeconomic status, have made it possible for members from a previously excluded, non-native English-speaking, and non-Christian community to contend and win popular offices and key political appointments, even within the first generation. The electoral victories of well-qualified Taiwan-born candidates is a phenomenon not predicted even by Robert Dahl or by other advocates of ethnic pluralism and integration. In this case, Taiwanese Americans seem to face an easier time than Irish (especially Catholic) Americans in becoming politically incorporated into the adopted land. Nevertheless, their prospects for becoming fully incorporated may be overshadowed by the perpetual foreigner image and other factors not experienced by the preponderance of Irish Americans in the present-day. Previous research also demonstrates that being incorporated into the electoral process at the governing elite level is not sufficient to assume full, substantive citizenship for the ethnic community. Other necessary components include policy responsiveness and full access to political and social rights.

Data from the November 2004 elections show that, compared to non-Hispanic white Americans, Taiwanese Americans have an overall lower citizenship rate, but a higher naturalization rate among the foreign born (see Table 2, page 20). Because of the predominance of the foreign-born, voting-age Taiwanese Americans have significantly lower voter registration and voting turnout rates than voting-age whites. These racial gaps are significantly reduced when we examine eligible persons only (i.e., citizens eligible for voter registration and those registered for voting). Also, among the US-born, Taiwanese Americans are not less likely to become registered and have a voting rate only five percentage points lower than their white counterparts among the registered. Other entries in this table show that, compared to other Chinese respondents from China and Hong King, and to Asian American respondents as a whole, respondents from Taiwan are relatively more likely to become naturalized (except those from Hong Kong), to be more active in becoming registered, but to be less active in their voting turnout. This is true regardless of whether or not they were US-born. This is a curious phenomenon awaiting further investigation.

While voter turnout provides a preliminary understanding of the ‘simplest’ form of political participation, it does not fully illustrate the scope of political participation among the citizenry. As for other indicators of political activity, limited data from the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin/Race*</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Asia n</th>
<th>Non-Hispanic White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among Foreign born</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among Citizens</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Foreign born</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--US born</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among the Registered</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Foreign born</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--US born</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted N (x1000)</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>9,44</td>
<td>151,410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Except for the Non-Hispanic white column, figures reported are for voting-age persons who either themselves or at least one of their parents was born in Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, or anywhere in Asia. All tests of significance are conducted with re-weighted data calculated by subtracting the mean adult weight from the final adult weight for each case, in order to adjust the size of standard errors.

### Table 2: Voting and Registration in November 2004 Elections among Taiwanese and Other Americans

2000–2001 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS) show that, among those who originated from Taiwan, 20 per cent report having done volunteer work with others to solve a community problem, 13 per cent report having attended at least one meeting or rally, and 11 per cent report having contacted government official(s). These figures are comparable to the average figures for Asian Americans, but higher than those for respondents originating from China or Hong Kong. Contrary to media stereotypes, ordinary Taiwanese Americans are among the least likely group to donate to political campaigns. Only 6 per cent report having donated to a political campaign in the four years preceding the 2000 election, which is half of the rate reported for Asian Americans as a whole and much lower than the average rates reported by white and black respondents in national surveys. Results from the 2007 CAHP survey, which differentiates between Taiwanese and mainlanders among Taiwanese Americans, show that only 8 per cent of Taiwanese report having made campaign donations to a US political candidate, in contrast to 19 per cent of mainlanders. Rates of
campaign donations to candidates in Taiwan are in the same order, but at a smaller scale. For both Taiwanese and mainlanders in the US, the most common participatory act beyond voting is activism in ethnic community organizations and hometown associations (Lien 2010).

Conclusion

In this preliminary attempt to compare the process of political incorporation of the Irish and Taiwanese populations in the US, we make a case for the need to broaden the scope of inquiry into the historical construction of the white race and of the Chinese/Asian race, in order to contextualize the observed experiences. In addition, we see a need to take a more critical look into the theories and assumptions of political incorporation for racial minorities and immigrants. It is in the context of a white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, and capitalist society that one understands the sources of conflicts between two working-class and culturally subordinated immigrant groups, the Irish and the Chinese, in nineteenth-century America. It is in the separate issues of immigration and citizenship policies, as well as in differential capacity and strategy of the major political parties (especially the Democratic Party) to mobilize the Irish and non-Irish groups, that one sees the different degrees of political incorporation by race and ethnicity, both then and now. And it is through their sense of a symbiotic relationship between oppression felt in the home country and discrimination faced in the host country that immigrants developed nationalistic feelings for the homeland which, in turn, helped immigrants develop their sense of being American. Because of these factors, we do not believe the political incorporation of Irish immigrants can be satisfactorily explained by the ethnic integration model. And we see that it is the combination of factors dealing with race, culture, and class that help to account for the exclusionary immigration and citizenship policies against early Chinese immigrants as well as, to a large extent, the continuing barriers to accessing equal citizenship and political rights among the very successful ethnic Chinese immigrants from Taiwan and elsewhere in the post-1965 era. In this sense, the political incorporation of Taiwanese Americans, when it happens, may be temporary, contingent, and reversible. Getting citizenship is a good beginning, but it is hardly sufficient and secure. An example for this is a current proposal to remove the birthright citizenship warranted to children of immigrants in the Fourteenth Amendment. If successful, it will have severe consequences on the predominantly foreign-born population. It will also send a very chilly message to all US minorities, foreign-born or not.

Except for the few who entered prior to 1965, today's immigrants from Taiwan entered United States at a time when equal rights are protected and naturalization is allowed and welcomed. They also arrived from a homeland that has undergone a profound but peaceful political transition from an authoritarian regime in the post-war era to an economically prosperous and vibrant democracy since the mid-1990s. Yet, even if today's Taiwanese immigrants may be very well connected with their homeland in Asia and show a high level of interest in and concern over politics in that homeland, unlike in the past it is difficult to imagine a mass mobilization of the overseas community based on homeland independence or some other political cause. This is because increasingly homeland-regarding
politics among Taiwanese Americans is divided along partisan ideological, ethnicity, and class lines. And, like Irish Americans, the middle- and professional-class background of today’s Taiwanese Americans may make them more interested in the type of homeland politics that engages peaceful rather than radical means of change. Regardless of their internal differences, Taiwanese Americans may be expected to band together and work on enhancing the protection of immigrants and minorities in US laws, such as passing hate crime legislation and improving elements in US trade and immigration policies to facilitate business transactions and migration across the Pacific.

Given the preliminary nature of this investigation, we have hardly scratched the surface of the various other ways to measure political incorporation for Taiwanese Americans. Future research will need to explore other indicators of political incorporation such as interest representation in the making and implementation of public policies and the issue of equity in social outcome. So far as we can see, even though Taiwanese immigrants may have a much better opportunity for political incorporation than the earlier Chinese immigrants, their political fate is inseparable from the other ethnic Chinese in the country of settlement, as well as from those who were left behind. Their prospect of future success will depend as much on the degree to which their host county of the US is moves away from white Protestant domination as on the degree of trust and respect the US government will extend to the homeland governments across the Pacific.

Bibliography


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Developmental Immigration in the Republic of Ireland and Taiwan

Bryan Fanning
University College Dublin

Abstract

Both the Republic of Ireland and Taiwan have followed distinct developmental nation-building projects of economic development since the 1950s. Both late-developing countries have since transformed from predominantly agricultural societies to ones characterized by the rapid expansion of human capital and high levels of recent immigration. The main focus of the paper is upon explaining the influence of Irish developmental goals and choices upon recent immigration policy. Irish choices are contextualized by reference to similarities and differences with Taiwan. This approach highlights the role of national ideological and political influences on economic goals, responses to globalization, and immigration policies.

Introduction

The notion of a ‘Celtic Tiger’ resulted from comparisons drawn with East Asian ‘tiger states’. The initial analysis was facile (Ireland had achieved levels of economic growth akin to, but of far lesser duration than, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan), but the name stuck. Subsequent comparative analyses of the Irish and East Asian tiger economies found some commonalities and several differences between the nature of inward investment by Multi-National Companies (MNCs) and where it came to the roles of states in fostering economic development. Ireland and Taiwan both embarked on developmental nation-building projects of economic modernization from the 1950s, and in both cases these intersected in complex ways with political nationalism. Developmental modernization resulted in societies with ‘new immigrant’ populations, a term needed to distinguish these from immigration by co-ethnics in both cases. In seeking to understand how Ireland, a mono-ethnic nation-state with a long history of emigration, came to proactively promote immigration, the aim here is to make comparisons and draw contrasts with Taiwan, where nationalism and ethnic politics are uniquely configured. Firstly, this analysis fleshes out the comparisons drawn between Ireland and Taiwan during the 1990s. It then locates the narrative of Irish economic modernization – a story of conflicts between developmental and cultural nation-building goals – alongside that of Taiwan. A focus on comparative nation-building narratives, as distinct from economic comparisons (the initial
comparisons were between ‘tiger’ economies), is employed to interrogate how both
countries instigated large-scale immigration and responded to its consequences.

Until its mid-1990s boom, Ireland had a long history of large-scale emigration,
punctuated by a few short periods during which some members of the diaspora
(former emigrants and descendants of emigrants) returned to live in Ireland. By
European standards Ireland’s experience of immigration – immigrants became
more than 10 per cent of the population in less than a decade – is unusual, but so
too, the academic literature on the ‘Celtic Tiger’ phenomena has argued, was
Ireland’s trajectory of economic development. When Ireland began to achieve very
high growth rates compared to other European countries, attention turned towards
comparison with the East Asian tiger countries that included Taiwan. This literature
suggests some value in further comparisons between Ireland and the so-called
East Asian tiger countries. A key focus of comparison is upon how both states
precipitated and responded to large-scale immigration. To a considerable extent in
both cases the drivers of immigration were indigenous labour shortages. Both
cases suggest developmental nation-building projects within which economic
growth potentially superseded other political goals. Yet the economic nationalisms
that in both cases sanctioned immigration were accompanied by essentialist
ethno-nationalist legacies that again in both cases influenced how immigration was
regulated.

Tales of Two Tigers

The term ‘Celtic Tiger’ was first coined on 31 August 1994 in an article published in
the newsletter of the American investment bank Morgan Stanley, suggesting
comparisons with the East Asian tiger economies (Gardiner 1994). It was quickly
adopted by Irish financial journalists and economists and soon became ubiquitous
within media and political debates. That this re-branding of Ireland coincided with
the Irish Republican Army ceasefire was significant; one of the themes of this
article is the complexity of intersections between economic nationalism and ethnic
nationalism. The Northern Ireland peace process dominated Irish politics, yet a key
element of this was the abandonment by the Republic of Ireland of aspirations to a
united Ireland except by the consent of the Northern Irish population. In effect, the
‘Celtic Tiger’ was a metaphor for a break with the past as well as one for rapid
economic growth. Comparative analyses on how and to what extent the Irish
‘economic miracle’ bore resemblance to East Asian experiences came later.

In Inside the Celtic Tiger: The Irish Economy and the Asian Model (1998), Denis
O’Hearn argued that the few widely agreed characteristics of tiger economies were
largely descriptive and superficial. The deeper that one looked at particular cases
the more disparate these ‘tigers’ appeared to become and the greater the
differences seemed to be how and why particular countries achieved their
economic success. Yet, the original four East Asian ‘tigers’ shared some core
economic characteristics. Each had maintained average annual economic growth
rates of more than 8 per cent from the 1960s until the 1990s (O’Hearn 1998: 3–5).
Between 1960 and 1990 Taiwan’s GDP rose by an average of 9.3 per cent per annum.
Such growth rates were very high compared to European averages of 2
per cent across the same period. During the same period Ireland’s GDP expanded
at almost twice the European rate (averaging 3.9 per cent per annum) but also at
about half the rate of those East Asian countries to which it was being likened (O’Hearn 1998: 61). Whilst Irish growth rates stood out compared to the rest of the European Union, these were modest compared to Taiwan and the other East Asian economic tigers. But by the early 1990s Irish growth had begun to accelerate, for reasons that suggested that comparisons with East Asian economic development were valid. During the 1970s, productivity *per capita* was only half that of the United Kingdom. By 1996 it had exceeded British levels (O’Hearn 1998: 65).

Ireland and Taiwan were still poor, peripheral, and technologically backward societies in 1950. By the end of the 1960s, state-led industrial development policies had emerged in both. Both countries rapidly expanded levels of indigenous human capital between 1960 and 1980 (Breznitz 2007: 7), and in both cases the state actively promoted economic development. There are some similarities in how they went about this. Both countries introduced duty-free export processing zones (at Shannon Airport in Ireland in 1961 and near Kaolsuing in Taiwan in 1964) aimed at encouraging foreign manufacturers to establish factories. Ireland attracted a mixture of European- and American-owned companies, Taiwan attracted predominantly Japanese firms. Both have sought to attract Multi-National Companies (MNCs) and pressure these to source a significant percentage of their components locally (Breznitz 2007: 194).

There were some broad similarities between the development trajectories of the Irish and Asian tiger economies. All benefited from large-scale inward-investment MNCs. Each developed strong niche sectors in high tech production – computers in all cases and also pharmaceuticals in the Irish case. However, the nature of MNC investment differed in the Irish case from that experienced in East Asia. Inward investment into Europe and Ireland predominantly came from the United States. American MNCs typically established US-owned subsidiaries whereas in East Asian cases inward investment was predominantly from Japan and Japanese MNCs had tended to established joint-owned enterprises. Partly, this came about because Japanese MNCs favoured sub-contracting over direct investment in subsidiaries. Its domestic labour supply was small compared to that of the United States and labor shortages precipitated the shift of productive capacity to other countries. This encouraged the growth of domestic industrial sectors in countries where they invested. This involved the downward shedding of technologies and was met in host countries by concerted efforts to then upgrade their technological capacity. For example, Taiwan built steelworks to supply Japanese industry and then used the steel to build a machine-tool industry (O’Hearn 1998: 22).

There were also some crucial differences. Since the late 1960s Ireland has focused mainly on foreign direct investment-based industrial development policies. In Taiwan the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), mistrusted large-scale private industry. The state took on a larger role in fostering industrial innovation, for example through state-led research agencies. In Ireland the role of the state in co-ordinating industrial development was more hands-off. The state actively solicited inward investment and provided through its Industrial Development Authority (IDA) advance factory sites and other facilities to attract inward development, but the nature and extent of state co-ordination in both cases came to differ. Taiwan had a Japanese-style state bureaucracy where civil servants and even politicians tended to have specialist skills: for example, qualifications in engineering. Ireland inherited
an English-style bureaucracy dominated by non-specialist civil servants. This contributed to a less-direct management of industry by the state in the Irish case.

Both states successfully attracted foreign-owned computer industries. Unlike Ireland, Taiwan then pushed these to procure an increasing number of components locally and to transfer production expertise to local suppliers. The state also promoted the use of Taiwanese venture capital to expand the information technology sector (Breznitz 2006: 684). Taiwan developed a viable computer manufacturing industry that included internationally successful brands such as ACER. In the Irish case, the state neither prioritized capital investment into computer manufacturing nor did it seek to compel foreign-owned companies to foster Irish supply chains. Partly for these reasons computer manufacturing faltered. American MNCs characteristically shared technology with and purchased components from their own subsidiaries. More sustainable successes were achieved in software design where human capital was a key factor of production.

Different models of inward investment were met by somewhat different state-led developmental policies. Comparative analyses have emphasized differences between the East Asian Bureaucratic Developmental State (BDS) model and what emerged in the Irish developmental state approach. The BDS model adopted from Japan combined elements of protectionism and state enterprise that differed considerably from what pertained in the West. East Asian developmental states articulated projects of economic nationalism by means of state control over finance and the labour market. These blurred distinctions between public and private ownership and, more generally, between the state and the market (Woo-Cummings 1999: 21). Characteristically, the state intervened directly in the economy, for example by controlling wage levels and promoting indigenous capital formation (Huff 1995).

Academic comparative analyses of the Celtic and East Asian tigers have identified much stronger state controls over the factors of production in East Asia than were evident in the Irish case. During the 1980s the Irish state put in place a system of developmental corporatism or ‘social partnership’ that negotiated national development plans and wage agreements with employers and trade unions which fell considerably short of the degree of state control and coordination of economic activity found in the East Asian tiger countries (Ó’Riain 2000: 158). In Ireland, through semi-state agencies like the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) the state gave grants and subsidies to MNCs. It expanded the education system to provide skilled workforces. However, it also removed all protectionisms against foreign capital in 1964. It also introduced low rates of corporation tax that succeeded in attracting disproportionate levels of inward investment into the European Union to Ireland. Between 1988 and 1998 Ireland attracted 40 per cent of American electronics investment into Europe. A similar but smaller agglomeration of pharmaceutical companies occurred during the same period (O’Hearn 1998: 73).

Taiwan’s Bureaucratic Development State approach to economic modernization emerged through top-down directives within a system of authoritarian capitalism. During the period of martial law between 1948 and 1988 strikes were illegal and labour was organized into a government-controlled union (L. Cheng 2002: 95). The policy-making processes of the ruling Kuomintang KMT party and the state were effectively indistinguishable (Lin 2008: 53). Later, during the 1980s and 1990s
social movements and civil society emerged to open out political decision-making. An opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was founded in 1986. Martial law was lifted in 1987 after thirty-eight years. Democratic elections to the National Assembly were held in 1991 and to the Legislative Yuan in 1992. In 1994 the constitution was amended to allow presidential elections. In 2000 the DPP won the Presidential election for the first time.

In the Irish case, according to Ó'Riain (2006), a ‘flexible-developmental state’ emerged whereby the state encouraged (rather than coerced) corporatist planning along neo-liberal responses to globalization. Unlike Taiwan, Ireland was a multi-party democracy where the state had a limited capacity to command the economy and direct the productive capacities of society. Free-market neo-liberal responses to globalization were managed through a system of ‘social partnership’ agreements between the state, employers, and trade unions. Under Ireland’s ‘competitive corporatist’ or ‘competition state’ model the role of government was to facilitate the free movement of capital, goods, services, and labour (Roche and Cradon 2003: 73). In articulating these neo-liberal goals Irish politicians and media used terms such as Ireland Inc. or Ireland PLC.

Between 2001 and 2004 Ireland was ranked as the most globalized country in the world according to the AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine Globalization Index. During the same period Taiwan was ranked as considerably less globalized: 32nd in 2002, 34th in 2003, and 36th in 2004. The index measures four kinds of global integration: ‘economic integration’, ‘personal contact’, ‘technological connectivity’, and ‘political integration’. ‘Economic integration’ (where Ireland ranked highest), contains combined data on trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), capital flows, and investment income payments and receipts. Taiwan ranked 27th in this category in 2004; in 2002, an AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine report noted that Ireland attracted an FDI inflow of US$ 24.7 billion. ‘Personal contact’ compares international tourism and cross-border remittances; Ireland ranked second for 2004, while Taiwan ranked 32nd. In the ‘technological connectivity’ category, Ireland ranked 14th and Taiwan ranked 17th. The ‘political integration’ category tracks state membership of international organizations and ratification of international treaties; Ireland ranked 11th, while Taiwan ranked as the lowest of all 62 countries included in the Index. That Singapore ranked 2nd on the composite index for 2004 (high on economic integration, low on political and personal integration) suggests the need for caution about grouping all East Asian ‘tigers’ (Hesham 2006: 7). However, comparisons between Ireland and Taiwan reveal that the Irish economy is considerably more open, and that the Taiwanese economy is considerably more protected. This suggests considerable underlying differences in the nature of state developmental approaches in both cases.

Cultural Contexts of Economic Development

Taiwan’s experiences of state formation and ethnic politics clearly differ from any norm (Chun 2007: 77). Taiwan formally became a province of China (the Taipei Prefecture) in 1886, but was ceded to the Japanese Empire in 1895 and remained under colonial rule until after World War Two. The dominant sense of ethnic nationality in Taiwan – The Republic of China (ROC) – has developed in complex symmetry with that of the mainland People’s Republic of China. Lucie Cheng
identifies the emergence of a diasporic concept of ethnic Chinese as Zhongguoren during the early twentieth century. Both Chinese states came to enshrine ethnic conceptions of nationality whilst at the same time contesting the legitimacy of one another since 1948 (L. Cheng 2002: 92). The arrival of over a million migrants from mainland China in the aftermath of Chiang Kai-Shek’s defeat by the People’s Liberation Army, in essence China’s old government and army in exile, profoundly changed Taiwan’s ethnic and cultural composition. Before 1949 mainlanders made up just one quarter of Taiwan’s population. By the early 1950s two million refugees from the mainland were claimed to live Taiwan, forming one third of a total population of six million. Excepting only small minorities of Aboriginal peoples, most of the rest of the Taiwanese population consisted two Han Chinese ethnic groups, Minnan and Hakka. Other accounts in Taiwanese peer-revised journals put the number of mainlander migrants at a much lower figure (Lin and Lin 2005: 71).

Post-1949, Taiwan has been characterized as ‘a newly formed quasi-nation seeking a new republican identity to mark itself off from the colonial past, as a capitalist society performing some socialist practices and as an allegedly democratic polity under military dictatorship’ (Wang and Heath 2008: 22). The Republic of China (ROC) based in Taiwan retained a government structure that claimed sovereignty over all 35 provinces of China as well as layers of ‘local’ government. The ROC was based in Taiwan but symbolically and institutionally distinct from the province of Taiwan. By the 1950s, as the exile of the ROC in Taiwan looked increasingly long-term but political goals of preparing for return to power remained, a new state-led modernization project emerged. The population of Taipei rose from 200,000 in 1949 to more than one million by the mid-1960s. By 2005, Taiwan had a population of 23 million. Mainlanders and their children comprised 13 per cent of this population (Lin and Lin 2005: 71).

The cultural politics of post-1949 Taiwan encompassed a period of de-Japanization followed by a pronounced ‘Sinic Revival’ during the 1960s (Wang and Heath 2008: 35). In reaction to Mao’s 1966 Cultural Revolution on the mainland Chinese culture was strongly promoted by the ROC in school curricula and other areas. As put by Cheng-Yi Lin and Wen-Cheng Lin:

> Through politically-screened teachers and deliberate design of the school curriculum, the ROC government promoted China as the motherland as well as a Chinese national identity among Taiwanese. Mandarin was stipulated as the sole language, and other dialects were banned at schools, in the military, and at all levels of the government. TV and radio programming in dialects was kept to a minimum. To an extent, political socialisation in Taiwan was successful during the first four decades of KMT rule. The majority of the people in Taiwan identified themselves as Chinese and supported Taiwan’s unification with China in 1989.

(Lin and Lin 2005: 72)

In effect, the post 1949 period witnessed the growing dominance of Chinese culture. As summarized by Wang and Heath, citing the work of Alan Chun, this occurred in several phases (Wang and Heath 2008: 37, Chun 1996: 55). Firstly, a period of ‘cultural reunification’ (1945–1967) saw emphasis on reconsolidating Chinese culture, purging Japanese influences, and upon suppressing local
Taiwanese cultural expression. This included imposing Standard Mandarin as the official language and banning Taiwanese and Japanese from the mass media. It also saw, through the ‘Model Taiwan’ policies of the 1950s, a strategic focus on modernization and industrial development (Chun 1996: 45). Secondly, a ‘cultural renaissances’ period witnessed a systematic attempt ‘to cultivate a large-scale societal consciousness’ of traditional Chinese culture. Here the ROC deployed the classic nation-building techniques as depicted in the West by Benedict Anderson (1983) and Ernest Gellner (1987). As put by Chun: ‘By invoking “tradition”, the authorities appeared to resuscitate elements of the past, but they were clearly inventing tradition (by virtue of their selectivity). The government in effect played an active role (as author) in writing culture’ (Chun 1996: 56). However, this did not result in an uncontested ‘Chinese’ national identity.

Ireland achieved independence in 1922, having been part of the United Kingdom since 1801. Its post-independence politics were preoccupied with cultural nationalism and de-colonization. Its education system prioritized the intergenerational reproduction of Catholicism and cultural identity (the Irish language) over the expansion of human capital. Cultural protectionism was paralleled after 1932 by economic protectionism that included a prohibition on the investment of foreign capital. Its politics were preoccupied to a considerable extent with the ideal of a 32-county united Ireland, meaning the incorporation of Northern Ireland into the 26-county Irish Free State that in 1948 was declared the Republic of Ireland.

The political sanctioning of large-scale immigration would have been difficult to foresee given the mono-ethnic history the Irish nation-state constructed for itself and given Ireland’s long history of emigration (Fanning 2010). In many respects Ireland was a typical European kulturnation, built upon the foundations of nineteenth-century romantic nationalism to create a dominant shared sense of ethnic shared identity made possible by mass literacy, education, and other aspects of modernity. This Irish-Ireland nationalism came symbolically to dominate the new state from the 1920s to at least the 1960s (O’Tuataigh 1991). After independence Irish-Ireland cultural nationalism served to promote both cultural and economic isolationism. According to Garvin:

> From the 1890s to 1960s, nationalist and nativist themes were used to erect ideological and organisational defences against the cultural and political assaults seen to be emanating from the Anglo-Saxon world and elsewhere... In particular, the fear of secular individualism, seen as threatening Irish communal values, was often associated with a fear of the modern and an imperfectly camouflaged hatred of Protestant culture.

(Garvin 1998: 146)

The 1932 Fianna Fáil government was elected on a platform of economic isolationism. Eamon de Valera, the dominant political figure for the next two decades, promoted a doctrine of economic self-sufficiency, preventing imports, discouraging foreign capital, and promoting import substitute manufacturing. Once elected in 1932 he introduced the Control of Manufactures Act. This required that the majority of capital in Irish companies should be Irish-owned. The aim was to undermine British dominance within Irish industry. De Valera also imposed tariff
barriers aimed at fostering import substitution. This precipitated the so-called ‘economic war’ with the United Kingdom, of mutual tariff barriers, that lasted until 1938 when the British removed restrictions on imports from Ireland (Garvin 2005: 113).

To some extent the economic development policies of the post-independence era resembled those of the KMT. In addition to restrictions on foreign capital, these centred on the formation of semi-state companies to produce electricity (ESB), harvest turf for use as fuel (Bord na Mona), process sugar beet (Comhluacht Sucra Eireann), or develop air travel (Aer Lingus). This predominance of state-led capital investment in the Irish economy coincided with a de-colonizing period of pronounced cultural nationalism.

‘Irish-Ireland’ nationalism depicted the new state as homogenous, even though there were a number of distinct minority communities. These include the Travelling People, whose claims of ethnic distinctiveness continued to be opposed by the state; a small Jewish community, who experienced overt discrimination before, during, and after the Holocaust (Irish anti-Semitism resembled that found in other European nation-states); and the once-dominant Protestant minority, who became marginalized within the new state (Fanning 2012). Catholic nationalism became the bearer of a sectarian and exclusionary religious-ethnic conception of nation.

From the 1950s the ‘Irish-Ireland’ nation-building project became contested by a developmental modernizing one, which came to emphasize economic and human capital reproduction as utilitarian nation-building goals. Political conflicts centred on the education system as a mechanism for cultural reproduction. The institutional narrative of Irish developmental modernization has tended to focus on influential state-of-the-nation reports seen to exemplify emerging new political and economic orthodoxies. Protectionism unravelled during the 1950s when import substitution policies proved unable to sustain employment (O’Grada and O’Rourke 1996: 141).

The emergence of a new developmental paradigm was signalized by the high-profile publication in 1958 of a report entitled Economic Development. Its significance was that it institutionalized the perspective that protectionism did not work. An OECD/Irish Government report of 1965, Investment in Education, has been credited with jolting the focus of Irish education from character development and religious formation to one on economic development and the human capital needed for industrial development. Investment in Education amounted to a paradigm shift whereby a combined mercantile and human capital paradigm broke earlier approaches to education. The state promoted educational reform to support economic development objectives. For example, in the Second Programme for Economic Expansion, expenditure on education was described as ‘an investment in the fuller use of the country’s primary resource – its people – which can be expected to yield increasing returns in terms of economic progress’ (Government of Ireland 1964: 193).

Key landmarks in the liberalization of trade included the removal of restrictions on foreign capital investment in 1964, the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement in 1965, and EEC membership in 1973 (Fitzgerald 2000: 3). In an example of developmental realpolitik a 1976 report from the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) argued that if the foreign investment needed to provide new jobs were discouraged Irish people would still have to work for foreign capital, but would be doing so outside of Ireland rather than at home (1976: 20). The Irish
developmental settlement occurred partly due to the co-option of erstwhile blocking coalitions within a competitive corporatist system of social partnership. Trade unions and employers repeatedly signed up for the pursuit of economic growth as a national project (Ó’Riain 2006: 213). Symbolic political preoccupations with a United Ireland seemed unfeasible. Urbanization and the expansion of education fostered secularism. Economists achieved an influence once held by clerics (Garvin 2005; Fanning 2008). In sociological terms a modernization of belonging occurred that prioritized human capital over forms of cultural capital (Fanning 2010). In the language of sociologists, the pursuit of economic growth became a hegemonic neo-liberal ‘competitive corporatist’ national project. ‘Social partnership’ agreements negotiated by the Irish state with employers and unions were in effect national plans for economic development. In this context, large-scale immigration later became justified within ‘a national interest discourse’ of economic growth (Boucher 2007: 6).

In summary, in Taiwan cultural nation-building co-existed with economic nation-building whilst in the Irish case the main phase of cultural nation-building proceeded developmentalism. Irish academic narratives emphasize the role of developmental modernizers who broke with the shibboleths of cultural nationalism. The ideological conflict was one between economic liberalism and protectionism. Having abandoned all forms of protection by the mid-1960s Ireland was open to a neo-liberal development project that resulted in it becoming the most globalized economy in the world. The underlying political acceptance of such openness – exemplified by various social partnership agreements – contrasted with a resistance to some forms of globalization in Taiwan. Clearly the uneasy relationship between the ROC and the PRC has kept the politics of nationality in the foreground whereas there has been little emphasis on cultural nation-building for several decades in the Irish case. Simply put, the goal of economic development came to subordinate other political goals in the Irish case more than it appears to be the case in Taiwan. Both states – Ireland before the 1960s and Taiwan until more recently – witnessed the subordination of education systems to cultural-nationalist goals. Sociological accounts of Irish modernization infer that increased emphasis on human capital alongside a corresponding de-emphasis upon religious or ethnic rules of belonging produced de-ethnicized rules of belonging. Such an analysis suggests a hypothesis that Irish society might be more open to immigration than in the case of Taiwan where cultural nationalism remains in the political foreground.

**Developmental Contexts of Immigration**

A 2004 report prepared for the World Bank grouped Ireland and Taiwan together amongst a small group of countries that have benefited economically from recruiting from their diasporas. It noted that both countries had ‘reverse brain drain programs that offer generous research funding and monetary incentives, as well as services and assistance to attract medical professionals’ (Lucas 2004: 14). Another attributed Taiwan’s leapfrog technology advancement in no small degree to returning scientists (Saxenian 2002). For example, Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park, a government-led initiative to attract Taiwanese R&D professionals back to Taiwan, had 2,563 returnees in 1996. This number had more
than doubled by 2000, reaching 5,025 (Lucas 2004). By 2000, over half of the companies in the Hsinchu Industrial Park had been started by expatriates returning from Silicon Valley (Saxenian 2000). Taiwan has tended to recruit professionals and highly skilled workers from Taiwanese working abroad (Lee 2009: 335). However, the number of such migrants was minuscule when compared to Taiwan’s 23 million plus population.

The East Asian tigers experienced rapid economic growth from the 1960s that led to chronic labour shortages. Economic growth was initially concentrated in labour-intensive activities, which used up more unskilled and semi-skilled labour than was being supplied by migration from rural to urban areas and rising female participation in paid work (Breznitz 2007: 113–114). Taiwan reached full employment by the late 1960s and chronic labour shortages became a problem thereafter. Between 1976 and 1980 wages doubled due to these pressures (Gold 1986: 98). By the mid-1960s in Taiwan one third of the workforce consisted of young women who moved in and out of the workforce according to their marriage and child-bearing status (Gold 1986: 89). Low-skilled labour shortages in export-orientated manufacture and other sectors were exacerbated by rising levels of education and skills and the increased unwillingness of Taiwanese to undertake so-called 3D (‘difficult, dangerous, and dirty’) low paid jobs (L. Cheng 2002: 95).

Since the late 1980s Taiwan has recruited temporary unskilled foreign migrant labour. In 2008 some 373,336 low-skilled migrants were resident in Taiwan out of a total 417,385 foreign residents. Those other than low-skilled migrants included 3,474 traders, 2,072 engineers and 6,009 teachers, again very small numbers when put beside the population of Taiwan. Well over half of all foreign residents were female. In 2008 only 7,332 of Taiwan’s foreign population were children under 15 years of age. The majority of migrants entered Taiwan with temporary visas, administered restrictively (Lee, 2009: 345, Table 22-5).

In Ireland, as in Taiwan, labour shortages fostered immigration following a period of growing female participation in paid employment. During the late 1990s women took some 70 per cent of new jobs (O’Hearn 1998: 99). However, labour shortages persisted in the face of continued economic growth. As in Taiwan, the state encouraged the return of highly-skilled Irish working abroad, though the scale of returnees was proportionally much larger than in the Taiwanese case. The return of highly-skilled Irish migrants was one of the factors of paramount importance behind the fast and successful development of the Irish IT industry (Asish and Gambardella 2004). The aforementioned World Bank report concluded that Irish efforts to tap into its diaspora exceeded those of other countries that tried to do so, including Taiwan (Lucas 2004: 14). A state-funded ‘Jobs Ireland’ initiative ran from 2000–2002, aimed at attracting skilled co-ethnics in areas such as information technology. It held employment fairs in cities around the world with Irish emigrant populations (Hayward and Howard 2007: 50). However, as the pool of such high-skilled Irish appeared to become exhausted the Jobs Ireland campaign then extended its remit to potential high-skilled immigrants from Britain, EU member-states, Eastern European states, and non-EU English-speaking countries like India. The demographic profile of immigrants shifted over time as the supply of persons of Irish ancestry willing to migrate to Ireland declined over time. Between 1995 and 2000 almost one quarter of a million people (248,100) immigrated to Ireland. This amounted to an aggregate figure of seven per cent of the total population as
recorded in the 1996 census. About half were returned Irish emigrants: some 18 per cent (45,600) were immigrants from the United Kingdom; 13 per cent (33,400) came from other EU countries; 7 per cent (16,600) came from the United States; and 12 per cent (29,400) came from the rest of the world. From 2000, non-Irish migrants exceeded migrants with Irish citizenship or ancestry: 18,006 work permits were granted to migrants from non-EU countries in 2000, 36,436 in 2001, 40,321 in 2002, 47,551 in 2003, and 34,067 in 2004. When the EU enlarged in 2004, the Irish state decided to permit migrants from the ten new Eastern European member states to live and work in Ireland without visas. All other pre-2004 EU states except Sweden and the United Kingdom delayed doing so for several years. This accelerated the pace of immigration. Between 1 May 2004 and 30 April 2005 some 85,114 workers from the new EU-10 were issued with National Insurance numbers entitling them to work in Ireland. This amounted to more than ten times the number of new work permits admitted to migrants from those countries in the preceding 12 months (National Economic and Social Council 2005: 26). By 2005 Ireland’s proportion of 10.4 foreign-born (as estimated by the OECD; see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007) exceeded that of the United Kingdom (8.3 per cent), and was a similar proportion to countries with a longer history of immigration. By 2005 this included an estimated 75,000 migrants from China admitted on student visas as part of a policy by the Irish state to pursue economic links with China. In effect, Ireland became more open to migration from mainland China than Taiwan, even though under the Taiwanese constitution mainlanders have a right to citizenship. The 2006 Irish census identified 610,000 (14.7 per cent) of the population of 4,239,848 persons to have been born outside the state.\(^1\) Taiwan in 2006 had a smaller foreign-born population even though its overall population was four times greater than that of Ireland.

A 2006 National Economic and Social Council (NESC) report, *Managing Migration: A Social and Economic Analysis*, strongly advocated large-scale and on-going immigration as a means of sustaining economic growth (2006: xxi). The foreword of the report stated that ‘immigration did not create the Irish economic miracle but, properly managed, migration can sustain Ireland’s economic growth and generate many other benefits’ (2006: xxi). The report argued that from the 1960s and 1970s government policies concerning trade liberalization and foreign direct investment began to improve the domestic economic situation and hence, eventually, reversed the net loss of population due to migration. Weak economic performance during the 1980s was accompanied by a net outflow of migrants, a trend that was reversed in the mid- to late-1990s. Economic growth during the 1990s saw the rapid expansion of the labour force from about 1.4 million in 1994 to just over 2 million in 2005. This increased labour demand was met initially by Irish nationals who had been previously unemployed or outside the labour market and then by returning Irish migrants, whose proportion in relation to in-migration by non-Irish migrants became smaller; by 2004 Irish returnees constituted less than 25 per cent of the total number of immigrants. *Managing Migration* claimed that on-going immigration was likely to make the Irish economy more adaptive and boost economic competitiveness (2006: 93).

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\(^1\) See the Central Statistics Office Ireland: www.cso.ie.
In 2007 the Office of the Minister of State for Integration Policy published its first major report, *Migration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity Management*. This stated that recent immigration was the result of the developmental ‘opening to the world’ institutionalized as a political project during the 1960s. Other key reports have emphasized education, welfare, and labour market policies aimed at promoting social conditions that would nurture and sustain individual adaptability, flexibility, and risk-taking; a ‘sustainable balance between dynamism and security’ (National Economic and Social Council 2005: 36). In this context, it was unsurprising that subsequent major statements about immigration and integration policy examined here have de-emphasized ethnocultural rules of belonging.

In summary, state-fostered recruitment of migrant workers in both Taiwan and Ireland occurred when the labour needs of both respective expanding economies could no longer be met domestically by the entrance of women into the labour market. From the 1960s in both countries female participation rose significantly, although high percentages of married women remain outside the labour market. Both countries also encouraged the recruitment of high-skilled co-ethnics. Taiwan was restricted in doing so due to its problematic relationship with mainland China. Ireland, by contrast, overtly encouraged co-ethnic migration. This included descendants of Irish emigrants to the United States, Britain, and Australia. Once the available supply of skilled migrants declined the move towards actively encouraging non-Irish migrants was seamless. Irish labour migration policy in many respects reflected its economic openness to globalization.

**Ethnic Politics, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Immigration**

Ireland is considerably more open to immigration than is the case with Taiwan. It operates no visa or residency restrictions for citizens of EU states. In effect a country of about 4 million people has opened its borders to a population 100 times this size. It has also effectively opened its borders to over 70 million people of Irish ancestry who are entitled to claim Irish citizenship under *jus sanguine* criteria. In Ireland much of the debate on the regulation of immigration has related to non-EU migrants, where the state continues to have latitude. Taiwan, because of its problematic relationship with mainland China, at once entitles mainlanders to Taiwanese citizenship yet effectively restricts their access to this and to work visas. The 1992 Employment Act made a clear distinction between *guonin*, a term that translates as ‘nationals’ or ‘citizens’, and *waiguoren* or ‘aliens’.

In 1992 Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council proclaimed that nationals of mainland China were also nationals of the Republic of China and that they had permission to enter Taiwan to live and work, but the edict also contained a caveat that because of ‘population pressure, national security and social stability, it is necessary to impose certain limitations’ (Mainland Affairs Council 1992, cited by L. Cheng 2002: 9). Entitlements to citizenship in Taiwan were on the basis of descent and ancestry, and whilst the key basis for solidarity was ethnic there were limits to this solidarity. As explained by Lucie Cheng:

> The principle of descent and ancestry gave the Taiwan state a rationale for claiming special affinity with Chinese in the diaspora, but political and economic
considerations operate to differentiate among them. While mainland Chinese are excluded, overseas Chinese, especially who are highly trained or from whom Taiwan can benefit, are given preferential treatment in law and in practice. The fact that the Nationality Law specifically allows some highly skilled occupational positions to be held by Chinese with dual citizenship, while excluding other positions, is a clear example.

(L. Cheng 2002: 92)

The Constitution of the ROC defines mainland Chinese as compatriots rather than foreigners – a colloquial term for ‘foreign workers’, *wailao*, distinguishes these from *benlao*, meaning ‘local labour’. According to Cheng, *wailou* are presumed to be temporary migrants and to some extent mainland Chinese are treated as such, exempt from some of the restrictions applied to *wailou*, but not to others. The specific concern that distinguishes their treatment from that given to other members of the Chinese diaspora is anxiety within the state about being overrun by mainland China (L. Cheng 2002: 93).

Under Article 67 of the Employment Services Act (1992), Chinese persons (*Zhongguoreu*) resident in the state who hold foreign nationality are regarded as *guonin* irrespective of what other nationality they possess. Yet Article 68 stipulates that the hiring and regulating of ‘people of the mainland region’ must adhere to criteria affecting foreign workers. This ambivalence towards mainland co-ethnics reflects sovereignty conflicts between the ROC and the PRC (L. Cheng 2002: 93).

In Taiwan, when the Act was introduced to regulate immigration, there were 44,441 foreign residents living in the country. By 2009 some 403,700 foreign residents lived in Taiwan, constituting just 1.75 per cent of the then-estimated population of 23,063,027. The restrictions on foreign workers in Taiwan imposed by the 1992 Act were strict by international standards. In common with many other countries, work permits were generally temporary (restricted to three years) and more restrictive conditions applied to unskilled workers than to professionals and high-skilled foreign workers. Employers in designated industries, including domestic employers, were required to apply for a quota permit before they could hire a foreign worker. Under the 1992 Act employers had to demonstrate that posts could not be filled by Taiwanese workers and non-transferable work permits were granted to the employers rather than to the migrants themselves; similar measures applied in the Irish case. In both cases, this fostered exploitation of migrants by employers. Specifically, such restrictions undermined the rights of migrants under employment legislation. Cheng, for example, described how employment standards mandated by the Council on Labor Affairs have not applied to migrant workers:

...The Council clearly violated this position by prohibiting foreign workers from organizing unions or going on strike, rights that are accorded to local labor. According to law, foreign workers should be paid the same wages as locals, work the same hours, enjoy the same numbers of days off, and have the same mobility. But in actuality none of the above obtain. Such inconsistencies abound but are almost never challenged, partly due to the underdevelopment of administrative law and partly to the way the legal profession is structured.

(L. Cheng 2002: 101–102)
In the Irish case, migrant workers faced similar barriers as a result of state neglect, although from poor enforcement of employment standards rather than from having lesser rights under employment law. The end result is the same. Both countries have Filipino migrant populations who have experienced quite similar forms of exploitation, especially in domestic work. In both cases this pattern of exploitation is influenced by trans-national factors, as well as by the acts or omissions of host societies (S.-J. Cheng 2003; Nithatham 2011).

In Taiwan, the criteria for admitting foreign workers under the 1992 Act were broadly similar to those imposed on non-EU emigrants by Irish legislation, yet somewhat more stringent when it came to preventing entry by family members (L. Cheng 2002: 93). Under the 1992 Act migrants were required to have regular physical examinations, including pregnancy tests, with pregnancy deemed grounds for deportation (until 2003 according to Lee 2009: 338). Migrant workers were prohibited from bringing their spouses to Taiwan or getting married, all measures designed to prevent permanent settlement (L. Cheng 2002: 98). These restrictions account for the very low numbers of migrant children living in Taiwan. Some of these restrictions have been removed or ameliorated over time.

Hsiao-Chuan Hsia locates such restrictions on immigrant families and state antipathy towards immigrant children within a discourse of national anxiety about immigration. In particular, popular anxiety about ‘foreign brides’ has been highlighted as a pivotal issue in immigration debates. In a 2003 *The Earth Geographic Monthly* survey, 60 per cent of respondents believed that the number of foreign brides, whether from Southeast Asia or from mainland China, should be restricted. A sociological study reported beliefs amongst officials and journalists that such marriages would cause the quality of the Taiwanese population to deteriorate (cited in Hsia 2007: 75). This emphasized a mixture of essentialist chauvinism – a general antipathy towards immigration shared with other Asian countries like Korea and Japan (Skrentny, Chan, Fox, and Kim 2007: 797–802) – with entrenched beliefs amongst policy makers (contradicted nevertheless by research) that ‘foreign brides’ were predominantly from lower socio-economic groups and that their children would lag behind Taiwanese children in schools. A statement in 2004 by the Junior Minister of Education exhorting foreign brides ‘not to give too many births’ exemplified a wider moral panic (Hsai 2007: 77).

Prior to the 2000 Nationality Act there was no specific provision for naturalization except through marriage. The 2000 Act sets out conditions for naturalization. These include five years of continuous residence in the ROC, having no criminal record, and the possession of a certain amount of property or professional skills. Lucie Cheng has argued that this Act, taken together with the 1992 Employment Services Act, enforces a very strong conception of *jus sanguine* dominated by the notion that ‘blood is a very special juice’:

> When we juxtapose the Nationality Act with the Employment Services Act we find that it is impossible for a designated foreign worker to acquire ROC nationality, since she is prohibited from marrying or residing in Taiwan for more than three years! As the Chinese adage goes: ‘For every policy issued by the state there is a way to circumscribe it by the people.’ A foreign worker who intends to marry a Chinese national will leave Taiwan according to the legal requirement and return as his
spouse. Quite a large proportion of so-called ‘foreign brides’ are a result of this arrangement.

(L. Cheng 2002: 103)

According to Article 3 of the 2000 Nationality Act, long-term migrants (those resident for more than 183 days each year for more than five years) can apply for citizenship. However, the Act appears to be administered in concert with visa requirements for migrant labour so that many migrants do not become eligible to apply for citizenship. The Law also allows spouses of Taiwanese citizens to naturalize after three years. In 1990, two thirds of foreigners naturalized as Taiwanese citizens were women. By 2007 this rose to 99 per cent (Lee 2009: 346). Most of these were naturalized as spouses of Taiwanese citizens. In 2007 some 10,764 persons were naturalized, of whom 10,670 were female. The intention to prevent foreign workers becoming citizens of the ROC was explicitly stated in the 2002 revision of the Employment Services Act. Article 52 extended the length of permissible employment from three to six years. However, to guard against foreign workers applying for naturalization on the grounds that they had met the residence requirements stipulated in the Nationality Act, the revised Employment Services Act mandated a 40-day break in residence after the first three days of employment (L. Cheng 2002: 103). The defining political response to immigration in the Republic of Ireland has been the 2004 Referendum on citizenship. In 2004 more than eighty per cent of the Irish citizens who voted in the Referendum endorsed an amendment to the constitution that removed the birthright to Irish citizenship of the children of immigrants. This removed the *jus soli* citizenship criteria that had never previously been problematic, because Ireland historically had rather experienced emigration. The new settlement retained *jus sanguine* provisions which permitted the descendants of Irish emigrants to claim Irish citizenship. Specifically, the Referendum was directed against asylum seekers, who were not entitled to work, rather than migrant workers and their families (Fanning and Muwarasibo 2007). The contemporaneous government decision in 2004 to engineer rapid large-scale immigration from within the EU barely caused a political ripple. This suggests a distinction between immigration and naturalization debates in the Irish case, with stronger opposition amongst existing citizens to the latter than to the former. The main political party in government ran a campaign in 2004 using the slogan ‘Commonsense Citizenship’. However, the crucial cognitive distinction in the debate leading up to the referendum, made repeatedly by government officials, politicians, and the media was a distinction between ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’. Immigrants were generally referred to as ‘non-nationals’.

The term ‘non-national’ derived from the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act (2001) that superseded the Aliens Act (1935). This systematically replaced the term ‘alien’ in Irish legislation, and was used by the Department of Justice Equality and Law Reform in security debates – in reports about crime, human trafficking, and illegal immigration – and by the Department of Enterprise and Employment to describe immigrant workers. By 2004 the ‘national/non-national’ dualism had become the prevalent common-sense conceptual framework for political and media debates about immigration. Various opinion surveys on immigration have reported a similarly large majority of citizens supportive of ethnic chauvinism. All Irish political parties contain significant numbers of supporters who endorse strict
limits on the numbers of immigrants coming to Ireland. The findings of the Irish National Election Study (INES) 2002–2007 indicate that some 62.4 per cent of respondents in 2002 (falling to 58.8 per cent in 2007) agreed or strongly agreed that there should be ‘strict limits’ on immigration (Marsh and Sinnott 2009: 137). To a considerable extent, Ireland’s strongly pro-immigration settlement has been managed by elites, whether in politics, social partnership, or business. Irish immigration policy is consistent with the country’s wider neo-liberal openness to globalization. During 2010, in the midst of an economic recession precipitated by an international banking crisis and economic mismanagement by the Irish state, both GNP and GDP levels fell into decline. Emigration reached its highest levels since the 1980s (second quarter of 2010). Yet non-Irish nationals accounted for 12.4 per cent of the workforce (and 46,000 of these were unemployed; see Economic and Social Research Institute 2010).

Discussion and Analysis

This article has examined how intersections of cultural and economic nation-building goals might account for the respective immigration policies of Ireland and Taiwan. Simply put, a different balance of cultural and economic preoccupations seems to have informed the modernizing projects of the Irish and Taiwanese states. In Ireland, economic development became foregrounded when a post-colonial cultural nation-building project had become exhausted. In Ireland, this seems to have contributed to a seamless acceptance of large-scale immigration during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom years. Ireland’s political acceptance of large-scale immigration was in keeping with other aspects of Irish open economy developmentalism. One sociological reading of the Irish case might be that cultural rules of belonging have come to matter less than human capital, or, put otherwise, that neo-liberalism has crowded out nationalism (Fanning 2010). Comparisons with the Taiwanese case, where opposition to immigration is strong and where cultural nation-building goals co-exist with economic ones, seem to bear out this analysis (see Figure 1 overleaf).

Taiwanese responses to immigration are dominated, according to Chen, by a ‘monocultural nationalist hegemony’ that, if anything, has deepened in the post-Kuomintang era:

In many regards the DPP has extended the KMT’s cultural nationalist mindset and policies to new heights, evidenced partly by the first revision of the Immigration and Nationality Act in seventy years, with its slow phasing out of dual nationality, bringing in new containment policies regarding foreign labour and more ‘liberal’ policy towards permanent residence, which now enables non-ethnic Chinese to live long-term in Taiwan but only as a permanently invisible caste, like Japan’s Koreans... People seem to have only recently discovered the advent of foreign labour, e.g. Filipino maids and Thai construction workers, despite their long presence. Even at Academia Sinica, when colleagues talk about the massive influx of foreign researchers (mostly South Asian and East European post-docs), they are not referring to their ethnic Chinese research fellows (a quarter of whom probably have US green cards or passports).

(Chen 2007: 80)
In Ireland | In Taiwan
--- | ---
A post-independence cultural nation-building period coincides with economic protectionism and high emigration. After 1958 the state plays a key role in shifting towards a new phase of developmental nation building. | Cultural nation-building coincided with economic nation-building in the post 1947 period. An authoritarian state plays a strong command role in both cultural and economic nation-building.

Developmental nation-building coincides with constitutional claims on Northern Ireland. However, Ireland becomes anti-isolationist, abandoning protectionism in 1964, joining the EEC in 1973. Notwithstanding a political focus on the Northern Ireland conflict (1969–1994), Irish-Ireland cultural nationalism declines in influence. Emigration persists from much of this period particularly during the 1950s and 1980s. | Economic expansion occurs in a context of problematic relationships between the Republic of Taiwan (ROC) and the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC). It coincides with decolonization, yet Japan becomes a key inward investor. Taiwanese development emphasizes indigenous control of capital investment and bottom-up growth of industrial capacity. Taiwan categorized as a Bureaucratic Development State.

Economic nation-building coordinated by the state and legitimized through corporatist politics. Ireland becomes a flexible developmental state with a strategic focus on encouraging unrestricted MNC capital investment (incentives include low corporation tax and tariff-free access to European community markets) and availability of Irish human capital. | Economic-nation building directed by the state within a Bureaucratic Development State/ Authoritarian capitalist model. The state retains the power to direct economic development. It fosters inward capital investment but prioritizes Taiwanese ownership of capital.

During the Celtic Tiger Period (post-1994) developmental nation-building unhampered by cultural nation-building goals. National interest predominantly defined in terms of GNP. | Although martial law is abandoned and multi-party democracy emerges, cultural nation-building persists as a political priority under the DPP.

Celtic Tiger fed by on-going expansion of labour market to include women, return Irish migrants and, from 2000, new immigrants | Taiwanese economic expansion produces labour shortages leading to expansion of labour market to include women, return Taiwanese migrants, and new immigrants.

Figure 1: Cultural, Developmental and Immigration Nation-Building Trajectories in Ireland and Taiwan (continues on next page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Ireland (cont.)</th>
<th>In Taiwan (cont.)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish state proactively recruits skilled emigrant Irish from abroad and explicitly encourages immigration from Irish diaspora (those with Irish ancestry entitled to Irish citizenship). Low-skilled co-ethnics not encouraged to migrate to Ireland.</td>
<td>Policy of ethnic preference for high-skilled overseas Taiwanese and Chinese migrants. Taiwan state proactively recruits skilled emigrants, opposes immigration by low-skilled Chinese entitled to Taiwanese citizenship. Low-skilled co-ethnics prevented from migrating to Taiwan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish state proactively encourages large-scale immigration from new EU member states (2004) and non-EU states.</td>
<td>Taiwanese state imposes strict controls on labour migration from select countries. State inability to control ‘foreign bride’ immigration expressed as moral panic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1 (continued)**

In both Taiwan and Ireland academic debates about immigration seem to have focused to a considerable extent on dominant ethnic group narratives of diaspora and return migration. Wider cultural and economic nation-building narratives present national stories that in each case have yet to come to terms with new immigrants. A combination of domestic economic prosperity and new patterns of global migration have in both countries resulted in immigration by co-ethnics and by new immigrants. In both countries, new immigrants have been at once invisible within nation-state identity politics and narratives of belonging, yet the subject of state regulation. When Irish or Taiwanese scholars write about immigration it is often difficult for them to break free of dominant nation-building narratives that find no place for outsider ‘non-nationals’ or ‘waiguoren’. In both countries there has been considerable debate about relationships with co-ethnics – Han Chinese in the case of Taiwan and descendants of emigrants in the Irish case – but there seems to have been scant discussion about how new immigrants fit into either nation.

For example, a 2006 academic study of second-generation migrants from mainland China drew analogies with post-1960s migrations from Castro’s Cuba to the United States and with migrations of asylum seekers into Fortress Europe from the 1990s (Tsay 2006: 751). The thesis of the article, that the descendants of post-1947 migrants shared characteristics with refugee migrants in other countries, is curious, not least because migrants from mainland China dominated Taiwan. Generally, refugees do not manage to politically dominate a host state or arrive with a large standing army. How such second-generation migrants have fared is obviously of immense interest to Taiwanese policy debates. Yet obvious comparisons (from a non-Taiwanese perspective) with new immigrants in Taiwan...
who, like Cubans in America or refugees in Europe, are not co-ethnics of the host population are not discussed. A non-Taiwanese reader such as this author might wonder why, until informed that the numbers of second-generation new immigrants (children of foreigners born in Taiwan) are very low because of strict labour migration rules.

Ireland by contrast already has a large rising second-generation immigrant population. It placed some restrictions on family immigration by non-EU migrants, but has otherwise not sought to prevent immigrant family formation. The defining response of the Irish state to immigrant children was to remove the citizenship birthright from these in 2004. Although overt essentialist nationalism has declined in the post-‘Irish Ireland’ developmental era, some vestiges of cultural chauvinism have continued to be politically influential. For example, the Belfast Agreement in 1998 stated that ‘the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.’ New immigrants and their children to a considerable extent remain invisible within social policy debates that tend to focus on the social inclusion of citizens. In the Irish case there remains a disjuncture between economic rules of belonging and those pertaining to naturalization and citizenship. Ireland’s inclusive response to its diaspora and its ambivalence to the integration of new immigrants through naturalization suggest that essentialist ethnic conceptions of Irishness continue to have considerable salience. Yet, in Ireland as in Taiwan the response of the state to co-ethnics abroad has often been ambivalent. The Irish state actively recruited high-skilled Irish living abroad and high-skilled descendants of emigrants, but it also prioritized the recruitment of high-skilled migrants from other countries. Prior to the 1990s economic boom, and now once again, the Irish state has presided over high levels of emigration in the national interest.

Writing in 2002, Lucie Cheng argued that Taiwan ‘as a state-in-formation in need of outside labour, must re-evaluate its state-building ideology’. There were, she argued, two possible routes, both calling for new modes of incorporation. Taiwan could either privilege foreign labour over mainland Chinese and change its descent-centred exclusionist policy, or privilege ethnic Chinese and relax its political vigilance towards PRC residents. What seems to have happened is the persistence of vigilance towards both. Irish debates have not presented such either/or options. During the Celtic Tiger era, the diaspora proved incapable of meeting Irish labour shortages, and while symbolic expressions of solidarity with the Global Irish play well within Irish debates the dominance of developmental over cultural nation-building goals resulted in large-scale immigration from both within the EU common travel area and from non-EU countries such as China.

Comparative analysis of Taiwan and Ireland has much to contribute to self-understanding as well as to mutual understanding, particularly in the domains of sociology and political economy. In the Irish case the dominant academic literature sets up conflicts between cultural and economic nation-building, the dominant perception being that hegemonic post-colonial cultural nationalism held the country back. Cultural and economic modernization co-existed to a greater extent in the Taiwanese case, suggesting that this need not have been the case in Ireland. The kind of economic nationalism attempted by the Irish during the 1930s – since represented by Irish historians as reckless, but perhaps now worthy of reappraisal as an attempt to achieve economic sovereignty – proved successful in Taiwan. At
a time when Irish sovereignty appears to have been seriously undermined by the
global economic crisis, Ireland could learn useful lessons from the Taiwanese
approach to globalization.

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A Comparative Study of Language Movements in Taiwan and Ireland

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Abstract

The movement to promote Taiwanese language has been in existence for many years, but despite this the language is still struggling for survival. Taiwanese literature is still almost invisible in Taiwan, and although Taiwanese language education was introduced seven years ago it has not so far succeeded in revitalizing the language. By contrast, the Irish Gaelic language revitalization movement has proved a success. This paper considers what the Taiwanese language revitalization movement can learn from the Irish, by comparing the political contexts in each location, the native literature movements, the language policies, and the language movements. In particular, it considers the significance of the principal institutional supports which have been put in place to foster Irish since the establishment of the Gaelic League in 1893 and the foundation of the Irish Free State in 1922. These range from cultural gatherings, print and broadcast media to education and law. The Taiwanese language movement needs to emulate its successful Irish counterpart, and draw attention to Gaelic Revitalization in ways that show their similarities.

Fort Zeelandia

——For the first Taiwanese national hero, Guo Huay

Zeelandia: when transliterated from Dutch
Means to shield from the heat
To block it outside the fort
Lock it in the never-ending stretch of Brightness
As if a million poisonous roses
Bloom on the Jianan Plains
On the backs of old water buffalos
In the fort the structures are high
To cover the sky
And all of the sights
From inside the fort
Outside, a prosperous land
Inside, brimming silos
Living in the fort are ever-hungry
Red headed wolves
So outside the fort are
Ever-hungry water buffalos
Because for the colonized
There is nothing but the thorny sun
To comfort them
Nothing but tired buffalos
To cry with
Only the empty silo at home
To tell of each
Exploited harvest
(Oh! The luscious plains
Each grain of rice shakes her head)
‘Huayi’ means the remembrance of
the motherland
The motherland is a religion
A religion that allows no heresy
The god of the Taiwanese
Huayi believed as his fellow people
That God will come
And deliver them from the mouths
of the red-haired wolves
They waited and waited
Persevered and persevered
Until one day they know that God
has abandoned them
That their own fate

Rests in their own hands
The moon shines on the ides of
August
Equally
On the happy Zeelandia
And the saddened plains
On the face of each Taiwanese
Oh the gods
May you guide the spirits of those
who died by the wolves
May you light up the path of those
who suffer
We need a road
To the battlefield of revolution
Those we climb over our heads
We will overthrow them
Anything we can grasp
Will become our weapons

All the years of desperation
Turned into the tension on our
bows
We shot out arrows of fury
The celebrating red-haired wolves
suddenly
Ran for their lives
Blood splattered on them
Their red fur became more crimson
Wolves became demons
Demons increased in number
Wolves became less and less
The victory was imminent
Hope was almost born
Huayi never would have guessed
Someone, out of fear and weakness,
Leaked their plans
Unthinkably
That someone was his own blood
brother
Out of nowhere
Like a tidal wave
Packs of red-haired wolves charged in
Bared their sharpened fangs
Lashed at the lives of our brothers
Took away the glow of hope
Huayi was killed on the road

Taking nothing but an eternal hatred
(Oh! The luscious plains
Each gust of wind sighs)
But – the blood of the Taiwanese
will not be shed in vain
It seeps into the soil
Nourishes the land
Protects all generations to come
One person’s determination
Became a million seeds
Hiding under the soil of the luscious
plains
Waiting to break free
Waiting to blossom

—December 1979.
Introduction

According to Rubin (1983: 8), many Irish scholars believe Gaelic Revitalization to have been unsuccessful, due to the fact that the originally-intended goal of establishing Irish as the household language remained unfulfilled. However, this stated aim was not in fact the movement’s real goal. The real goal was for Ireland to realize freedom, and to become an independent nation. From this perspective, Gaelic Revitalization was quite successful, although not entirely so, given that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom today. Still, even if one considers only the language movement of Northern Ireland, there are successful aspects that warrant our study.

Taiwanese nationalists have enthusiasm for discussions relating to Ireland, particularly those that relate to literary and cultural areas. The fact that English settlers in Ireland continue to write and speak in English has often been used to rationalize how the Taiwanese continue to speak and write in Mandarin, even as far as to assert that eliminating Chinese ways is both unnecessary and impossible. However, Gaelic Revitalization was one of the key factors in facilitating Irish independence, and one of its core tenets was, in the words of a speech at the Irish National Literary Society in Dublin in 1892, ‘The Necessity for De-Anglicizing Ireland’.

Taiwan needs to further understand Gaelic Revitalization, and to see what can be learnt from the Irish.

Political, Language Census and Structure

_Gaeilge_ is considered to be a form Gaelic, in modern days represented by three main languages: the modern Irish, the Scottish Gaelic, and Manx (collectively known as Q-Celtic). According to Ahlqvist (1993), the Irish language ceased to be commonly used as a mean of communication among all economic classes by around 1600, and by 1851 there were 32,000 Irish speakers out of a population of about 6.5 million. The Gaelic League was formed in 1893 to revitalize the language, and by 1926 the number of Irish speakers had risen to more than 500,000, about a sixth of the total population of the Irish Free State. In 1981, 1 million of the 3.2 million citizens of the Republic of Ireland spoke Irish (Ahlqvist 1993: 10), and a recent census has shown that a third of the current population of 3.9 million speaks the language.

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1 Rubin uses the term ‘language planning’.
2 ‘Ireland’ in this paper refers to both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.
3 This is the view of prominent Taiwanese political and cultural activists such as Lim Lo-Tsui and Li Bin-Long.
4 Q-Celtic or Goidelic, which includes Welsh and Breton, is different from P-Celtic or Brythonic, which includes Cornish (Hale 2001: 299).
5 According to Máirtín Ó Murchú (1985: 2), fewer than 12.66 per cent of children under ten in Ireland could speak Gaelic at the time he was writing.
6 In 1990, only 10,000 people were native speakers of Gaelic (Ahlqvist 1993, quoting Hindley 1990: 251).
In Northern Ireland, 131,974 individuals speak Irish out of a population of 1.6 million. This is approximately 8.8 per cent of the population; 78.1 per cent of the Irish-speaking group are under the age of 44, and 59.9 per cent of Irish speakers can read and write Irish. This shows the success of the Gaelic Revitalization in the North.

**Gaelic Revitalization**

*The Language Movement of the Republic of Ireland*

Ever since the beginning of Irish nationalism, the revitalization of the Irish language has been emphasized. Douglas Hyde, later the first president of the Republic of Ireland (1937–1945), joined W.B. Yeats and others in 1892 to create the Irish Literary Society, which was where he delivered his manifesto ‘The Necessity of De-Anglicizing Ireland’. Hyde explained the importance of language to culture, stating that ‘I wish to show you that in Anglicizing ourselves wholesale we have thrown away with a light heart the best claim which we have upon the world’s recognition of us as a separate nationality’ (Daly 1974).

The following year, Hyde established the Gaelic League. It declared itself to be a non-political, non-partisan organization, with the goals of protecting and revitalizing the Irish language, literature, music, dance, and recreation, and of encouraging Irish arts. It welcomed anyone who was interested in Irish culture, and especially unionists. To many people’s surprise, the movement soon successfully spread throughout Ireland, each branch attracting between 50 and 300 members from across all social classes and ages. The League’s most important task was the teaching of the Irish language; wealthier members who owned houses used their spare rooms for classes and meetings, while others used public halls or school classrooms (Coffey 1938: 58). Support for unionism weakened.

*Northern Ireland's Language Revitalization Movement*

In Northern Ireland, the Irish language was virtually extinct as a native language by the 1950s. In the following decade, however, eleven families decided that they wanted an environment in which their children could be raised to speak Irish. Their goal seemed difficult: they lived in an English-language city, and they themselves had learnt Irish only in their adolescence. At economic cost to themselves, they came together to form a Gaeltacht community. This community not only survived the pressure of an English-language environment; they had a decisive influence on their neighbourhood, creating a dual-language neighbourhood. The Shaw’s Road Community further stimulated other Northern Ireland businesses, particularly relating to the media and education.

**Comparison with the Taiwanese Language Movement**

Although the beginning of Gaelic Revitalization can be identified as the founding of the Gaelic League in 1893, the beginning of the Taiwanese language movement is

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7 According to the 2001 census, the exact figure was 1,685,267.
more difficult to pinpoint. We could consider the movement to have begun in 1930, although at this time it was limited to written texts and did not encourage language revitalization, Taiwanese education, or change in language policies. As will be discussed below, it was a ‘Taiwanese literary movement’ rather than a ‘Taiwanese language movement’, and it was brought to an end in 1937, when the Japanese banned all Chinese language. Its goals were far from those of the Gaelic League, which promoted both language and cultural identity.

In the 1970s, several writers expressed their determination to write in Taiwanese, but there were no organizations or community until the 1990s, when several groups were established

- 1991: The Sweet Potato Poetry Club;
- 1992: The Taiwanese Writing Forum;
- 1992: The Association for Taiwanese Language and Literature;
- 1995: The Association for Promoting Taiwanese;
- 2001: The Association for Taiwanese Romanization.

Some of these organizations emphasize literature or linguistics, while others emphasize language. However, even though the movement is no longer a competition among individuals to showcase their own ideas of orthography, the movement is now a competition among organizations. Each has its own system of pinyin, creating inconvenience and stymying the overall progression of the language movement. By contrast, because the Irish language movement began with a charismatic leader and transliteration has long since been standardized, the Irish have had the advantage of organizations unifying quickly. Consequently, even though their first few years did not see vast growth, they quickly saw breakthroughs.

However, in March 2004 World United Formosans for Independence was established, combining the resources of organizations in support of the Taiwanese language movement both on Taiwan and worldwide. This organization is the only one that approximates with the Gaelic League. Due to the youth of this organization, it remains to be seen whether its efforts on behalf language revitalization will match those of the Gaelic League.

Language Movements

The Literary Movement in Ireland

The Gaelic League was first established with two goals: revitalizing the Irish language into a daily language and publishing new Irish literature. The leader of the Gaelic League, Douglas Hyde, already used Irish to compose poems, plays, and publish folklore; Hyde and the movement were fervently supported by his good friend W.B. Yeats, and Yeats even predicted that the future would consider their time to be the time of Hyde. This prediction was completely accurate; Hyde later became the father of Ireland, influencing Ireland even today.

Yeats’s own poetry is full of Irish myths and legends, and, as Hyde suggested, these were absorbed by his readers. However, although he encouraged friends both to learn and to use Irish, he did not himself understand Irish, and his own
writing was in English (and was thus ‘Anglo-Irish’). He was deeply conflicted over language, observing that ‘Gaelic is my native language but it is not my mother tongue’, and asking, ‘Can we not build a national tradition, a national literature which shall be none the less Irish in spirit from being English in language?’

Ireland’s most celebrated poet at the present time, Seamus Heaney, was born in 1939, the year of Yeats’s death. He declined to be classified as an ‘English poet’ when his work was chosen for the Oxford Anthology of English Poetry.

Comparison to Taiwan’s Literary Movement

As noted above, the first wave of the Taiwanese language movement was as a literary movement. This Ue-bun movement is widely considered to have begun in 1930, when Ng Si-Hui published his essay ‘Why Not Promote Cultural Literature?’ in a newspaper, Ngoo-jin. This essay instigated the first historical Taiwanese cultural-literary war. However, references to using the mother tongue in literature pre-date 1930. For example, in 1922 Chhoa Poe-Hoe published ‘To Spread the Use of Taiwanese Language and Culture’, suggesting the use of Roman letters, or Peh-Oe-Ji (POJ), for Taiwanese orthography (Lim 2006: 26). In 1924, Lian Un-Khing published ‘Taiwanese Language of the Future’,8 while in 1926, Lua Ho published ‘Comparison of New and Old Literature in Taiwanese-Japanese Newspapers’.9 Meanwhile, Lua Jin-Sing published a Taiwanese novel in 1924, entitled Mother’s Tears, and this was followed Tenn Khe-Phuan’s Out of Dead Line the year following. 1925 also saw Chhoa Poe-Hoe publish a collection of Taiwanese essays, Chap-Hang Koan Kian. Li Khin-Huann suggests that the Taiwanese language movement can be traced back to as early as 1916, when Rev. Thomas Barclay published a Taiwanese Bible written in POJ, since this influenced the usage of Taiwanese. Some people even suggest that the movement goes back to Barclay’s Taiwan Church News,10 which began in 1885 and which was the earliest newspaper written in Taiwanese.

1978 saw the second wave of the cultural-literary war in Taiwan, and the genre of ‘Taiwanese literature’ was established. However, mainstream literature continued to be written in the colonial language of Mandarin, which was imposed by the KMT from 1949 onwards. It was not until 1991 that the Sweet Potato Poetry Quarterly became the first publication of an organization created to promote Taiwanese, and this folded after seven issues. In 1996, Tai-Bun Bong-Bo was established, and there is also a sister magazine, called Tai-Bun Thong-Sin. Tai-Bun Bong-Bo is published monthly, at eight pages per issue, and as of summer 2011 176 issues have been published. Two more initiatives were established in 2001. In January, several mother-tongue literary organizations joined in an alliance to form the ‘New Taiwan Native Society’, publishing Taiwanese E-Literary Arts. This lasted for just five issues, although the Hai-ang Taiwanese Literary Magazine, which was established the following month, was more successful and has so far published 115 monthly issues. Taiwanese publications have all either had a small

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8 Published in Taiwan Bin Paper, 2, 20–21.
9 Published in Taiwan Bin Paper, 89.
10 The original publisher was the Taiwan Hu-siann Church Press, now known as the Taiwan Church Press.
circulation or short lifespan, and it is arguable whether they have had any noticeable influence on the mainstream of Taiwanese literature, which is written in Mandarin.

In Ireland, literature written in the colonial language does not always dare to call itself Irish literature, but often uses the term ‘Anglo-Irish literature’. Writers of Anglo-Irish literature are highly respectful of writers who use Irish, as seen in Yeats' attitude towards Hyde. This isn't the case in Taiwan, though. Mandarin remains the mainstream literary language, and writers of Taiwanese literature do not receive respect from Mandarin writers.

Language Policy and Mother-Tongue Education

In the Republic of Ireland, the national language is Irish, and it is also the official first language. English is the official second language.

In 1995, the United Kingdom and the Irish government signed the ‘New Framework for Agreement’, in which both agreed to cooperate on four basic principles, including: to reach agreement between the self-governed and the governed; to reach ways that are democratic and peaceful; to ensure and respect the rights and opinions of both cultures; to facilitate ‘equal and respectful treatment’. In 1998, these principles were ratified by the Northern Ireland Peace Treaty, which stated that

All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland.

In 2001 the British government agreed to adopt the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, allowing positive action to promote the widespread use of the Irish language. The Irish language was categorized under Part III of the Charter, which gives extensive application to areas such as educational, judicial, and administrative systems, as well as to social services, the media, and cultural organizations. It also promotes positive measures, such as economic and societal and international exchange (Articles 8–14) (Si 2002: 214). The Charter encouraged public speaking and writing in Irish, expanded measures to protect and develop the language, instructed the Department of Education to place an emphasis on teaching the Irish language, and called for funding for Irish film and television productions (Si 2002: 212–213). In all elementary and middle schools, Irish is a compulsory subject. Some schools even use it as the language of education. Irish is also a mandatory subject when testing for admissions to some public universities.

Language Policies of Northern Ireland

Currently, the Northern Irish Executive and Assembly has several departments relating to language policies. These include: the newly established Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL); the Linguistic Diversity Branch, established in 1999, which is responsible for implementing the European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages; the Office of the First Minister/Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), which is concerned with methods for promoting peace and equality among different ethnic groups; the Department of Education, under which is a council responsible for handling class grades and curricula involving Irish language; and the Council of Ethnic Relations, established in 1990, and its Cultural Diversity Programme, responsible for sponsoring related community activities. In addition, in accordance with the Northern Ireland Peace Treaty, 1999 saw the establishment of the North/South Language Body, directing responsibility for the Council of North/South Department Heads, under which two departments are set up. These are the Irish Language Department and Northern Ireland Language Department, both of which are responsible for promoting their respective languages, encouraging both public and private writing and speaking, and providing funds, suggestions, support, and research for their parent agencies (Si 2002: 214–215).

Comparing Taiwanese Language Policies, Mother-Tongue Education

Taiwan's language policy has always been to maintain the colonial language as the ‘national language’; during the Japanese occupation this was Japanese, and after the war, this was Mandarin. The colonial language has always been privileged, and the mother tongue oppressed. This situation did not improve until the era of Li Teng-Hui, and even then the improvement was small; although the mother tongue was no longer oppressed, it was still neglected. The national language policy that continues to privilege Mandarin was not eliminated. However, in 2000 the Democratic Progressive Party came to power; the DPP was localist, and in 2001 it began to implement mother-tongue education programs. Mother-tongue education was mandatory during the six years of elementary school, and subsequently available as an elective for three years in middle school. However, it was a weekly course of only forty minutes. The Mandarin policy remained.

In comparison with the political situation of the Irish, the DPP's advocacy of Taiwanese independence takes similar form to that of the Irish Free State in 1921; even though independence was not declared, for most purposes the country was de facto independent. During this time, the government of the Irish Free State supported the ideology of language revitalization. Hence, once the DPP came into power it implemented policies in accordance with their language ideologies. However, although the leader of the DPP was sympathetic to the mother tongue, he did not pursue mother-tongue education with enthusiasm, leading to a state of stagnation in this area even after four years of DPP government.

Factors that Contributed to the Success of Irish

Many factors contributed to the success of Gaelic Revitalization, and six major elements are outlined below. If the Taiwanese language movement wants to succeed, then it must consider carefully, learn diligently, and readjust the ways by which the movement approaches various situations.
1. Healthy Literary Tradition, Standardized Writing System

Ireland has long had a healthy literary tradition and a standardized writing system; hence, even though the language was dying, the mother-tongue revitalization movement had tradition as a foundation from the start. This is not the case with the Taiwanese language movement, which instead emphasized writing systems. Authors invented their own words and writing systems and used idiosyncratic grammar; the result was that many people cannot read Taiwanese, and hence do not support the movement. The process of standardizing the Taiwanese writing system must be sped up.

2. The Direction of the Language Movement was Correct

The Gaelic League established the direction of their revitalization movement from the start, aiming to restore their mother tongue to everyday use. With this theme in mind, they established branches throughout Ireland, opening classes to teach the mother tongue. The League did not place any emphasis on political factors, and as an apolitical, cultural movement was able to attract many supporters. As they became more familiar with the Irish mother tongue, culture, and history, they became increasingly sympathetic to the idea of independence. The Taiwanese language movement, by contrast, was overtly political from the beginning, and became categorized as a ‘Taiwanese independence’ movement in an era that looked unfavourably upon that name. This is another factor that may have contributed to the movement’s ill start.

3. The Irish Independence Movement was Led by Language Revitalization Supporters

The majority of the Irish independence movement’s leaders were advocates of language revitalization. The Gaelic League’s leader, Douglas Hyde, was a professor of Irish language as well as a writer and poet in the mother tongue. Because of his leadership, the Gaelic League went on to become an important organization within the independence movement. For this reason, Hyde was elected to be the first president of Ireland following independence. In the Taiwanese language movement, even though many linguists and writers are active participants in the independence movement, there has not been a situation where language movement activists have led the Taiwanese independence movement. Meanwhile, political leaders of the Taiwanese independence movement lack consciousness of the language movement, especially the current DPP leaders.

4. The Movement’s Employment of Many Language Discourses

According to O’Reilly (1999: 148), the Irish language movement utilized many strategies of language discourse: cultural discourses, ethnic language discourses, minority language discourses, and endangered language discourses. These strategies were used in stages as well as concurrently, strategically selecting when they were to be used and so reaching optimal effect. If only the ethnic language discourse is strongly and repeatedly emphasized, such as is the case with the
Taiwanese language movement, then the result may not be the desired goal. The movement in Taiwan stresses that if one fails to speak Taiwanese, then one is not Taiwanese.

5. Knowing How To Utilize International Movements To Promote Minority Ethnic Groups’ Mother Tongues

In the European Union, Northern Ireland took advantage of the sympathy and protection which the European Union promotes for minority ethnic languages to put pressure on the United Kingdom to great effect (Si 2002: 216). In 2001, UNESCO, on International Mother Language Day, declared a list of endangered languages, including all of Taiwan's minority mother tongues, and not counting Mandarin. The Taiwanese language movement should also use this type of international attention to promote Taiwan's minority ethnic mother languages.

6. Establishing a Reward System

Gaelic Revitalization gave the reward of a gold or silver ring to those who passed the mother-tongue exams. This is considered a great honour, and one who wears such a ring is recognized as one who knows their mother tongue. One also must pass the mother-tongue exam to enter public universities, so this can also be a type of reward. The Taiwanese language movement should also start establishing similar reward systems.

Appraisal of the Contemporary Position of Irish in the Republic of Ireland

The promoters of the Irish language revival did not realize that the race they were running in was a marathon, not a sprint, and by the 1960s they were out of breath and disheartened. Official Ireland continued to pay lip-service to the aspirations of the language movement but no longer really believed in it. This became clear when the government did not seek to have Irish – the first language of the State according to the 1937 constitution – accorded full official working status, when the country joined what was then known as the Common Market in 1973. It was content to have Irish designated an official ‘treaty’ language with only a small number of core symbolic documents being translated into Irish. At a more popular level, this crisis of confidence was paralleled by the fact that the number of schools teaching through the medium of Irish outside the Gaeltacht collapsed to just a handful at both first and second level by 1973. In retrospect, the 1970s can be seen as a watershed, a time of regrouping, when those favouring the language revival laid the foundations for the current, reasonably successful, position of Irish. The earlier policy of trying to engage the entire population simultaneously in language acquisition, use, and shift had been only partially successful. From now on, interested groups focussed their efforts on promoting and supporting initiatives which were directly linked to increased use of Irish. These efforts were often, but not always, actively supported by the state, and tacitly supported by the wider community.

The past decade has seen many advances in institutional underpinning of Irish. The Official Languages Act (2003) sets out the general parameters for the public
use of Irish, e.g. in written notices and public address announcements, in the obligation on public-funded bodies to provide an Irish version of their annual reports, and in the adoption of incremental language promotion plans. Influenced by the Canadian experience, this act also established a language commissioner, An Coimisinéir (the Commissioner), with an office, Oifig Choimisinéir na dTeangacha Oifigiúla (Office of the Official Languages’ Commissioner). January 2007 saw the coming into operation of changes to the EU Treaty which made Irish an official and working language of the European Union, albeit introduced on a phased step-by-step basis, inter alia to allow for capacity-building among translators and interpreters, editors and copy-editors, and legal and other administrators, etc. This work has been outlined and contextualized by Dr Regina Uí Chollatáin in her paper ‘From Tracts to Twitter’ (2009), particularly in relation to Láirionad de Bhaldraithe do Léann na Gaeilge, UCD (The UCD de Bhaldraithe Centre for Irish Language Scholarship), of which she is the founding Director. Proceeding from these positive developments, the Government approved a 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language on 30 November 2010. The Strategy was launched by An Taoiseach (Prime Minister) on 21 December 2010. As it was supported by all the main political parties, it is expected that it will be implemented over the coming years. The Government’s Strategy as set out in this document is organized around:

- increasing the knowledge of Irish;
- creating opportunities for the use of Irish;
- fostering positive attitudes towards its use.

Visitors to Ireland coming through Dublin airport and driving into the city centre can scarcely fail to notice that Irish is all around. Irish appears alongside English on airport signage, place-names in Irish are seen above English versions on the motorway, Dublin’s street names are bilingual, every car registration plate bears the name of a county in Irish only, the universities have bilingual signage, and the bus lanes have ‘Lána Bus’ (‘Bus Lane’) painted on them in Irish only. Irish is an official language, and it in fact makes things official – if your car is clamped, the document fixed to your wind-screen wiper will be very much in Irish as well as in English. But visitors won’t hear much Irish. If they travel on the Luas light-rail and train systems, they will hear pre-recorded announcements in Irish as well as English. Visitors may encounter Irish-medium TV and radio and hear Irish being spoken on air as they check out the various stations on the remote controls in their hotel rooms. But they won’t hear much conversation in Irish; why not?

The simple answer is because relatively few people speak Irish at home or socially. That is certainly true, as demonstrated by census statistics concerning Irish use. But there are other reasons, less obvious ones, such as social norms which create barriers. Conventionally, Irish is spoken by people who know each other, and who know that their interlocutors are competent in Irish and prefer to use the language. However, if three people speaking Irish together in a group are joined by a fourth person who has English only, the three Irish-speakers will switch to English. They will not want to exclude the English-speaker, and it is considered impolite to do so. It is scarcely ever done. This is because in Ireland there are not really two different language communities, as there are in Canada, or multiple
language groups as there are in Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland. There is no great divide between English-speakers and Irish-speakers. All Irish people speak English and a considerable number, over 40 per cent, are to some extent bilingual, on a spectrum from complete fluency in Irish to those having just a few words, known as the cúpla focal (‘a few words’). Irish tends to be spoken in more formal situations, in school, in the media, and at meetings, which are more predictable and easier for learners to handle. Informal situations in the home or in noisy pubs at closing time do not lend themselves to accommodating learners or strangers. But the English–Irish spectrum is being extended. On her visit to Ireland in 2011, Queen Elizabeth of England spoke a few words of Irish at a dinner in her honour: ‘A Uachtaráin agus a chaired’ (‘President and friends’). A few days later, the US President, Barack Obama, urged on an enthusiastic crowd in Dublin city centre with the slogan ‘Is féidir linn’, an Irish version of his catch-cry ‘Yes we can’. In other words, the cúpla focal is going global, finding its place within Anglicized Western culture in general.

But there are certainly other, more home-grown, positive indicators of the progress that Irish has made, perhaps none more so than the success of the television channel TG4, which broadcasts primarily, but by no means exclusively, in Irish. If we fast-forward from Douglas Hyde’s experiences of around 1890, when native speakers of Irish were ashamed to speak the language, to 2011, we can see an amazing difference. In the latest general election held in the Republic of Ireland in February 2011, we find that for the first time ever it was possible for there to be a party leaders’ debate in Irish. The three leaders of the main political parties participated in an hour-long discussion. All three had learned Irish mainly through the educational system, and they all acquitted themselves well in their second language. This event created quite a public stir and the broadcast on TG4 attracted over 400,000 viewers.

It can be argued plausibly that the current globalizing phenomenon of English as a second language and the consequent reduction in the domains of activity and use available to many, if not most, of the world’s other languages, big and small, means that the situation of Irish is no longer as singular as it once seemed. Indeed, the unfolding Irish, European, and global linguistic scenarios have the potential to create in the twenty-first century a more or less stable Irish-English bilingualism which was not envisaged when English began to replace Irish as a community language 300 years ago.

Conclusion

Aside from languages brought by recent immigrant, languages found in Ireland are Gaelic, Northern Ireland Scots, and English. In contrast, there are 14 languages in Taiwan. This high number creates complications; because the Holo-speaking subgroup of the Taiwanese language population was stronger, they were often stereotyped as ‘Holo chauvinists’, a contradiction that those opposed to the Taiwanese language movement and supporters of unification both use against the movement. However, this should not be an excuse for the movement’s progress to stagnate. The Taiwanese language movement needs to emulate its successful Irish counterpart, and draw attention to Gaelic Revitalization in ways that show
their similarities. In this way, differences between the two movements cannot be used as a reason to oppose the Taiwanese language movement.

The nature of the Taiwanese language movement is close to that of the Gaelic Revitalization of the Gaelic League, although the Taiwanese language movement is young still. We hope our course will be like that of the Gaelic Revitalization, and that in 27 years, we will see the same fruit of success as was seen by Gaelic Revitalization.

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Taiwan and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland: Parallels and Divergences¹

Kerry Brown
Chatham House

Introduction

The unresolved conflict between the Republic of China in Taiwan (RoC, hereafter Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) remains one of the world's great potential flash points. While largely contained over the last six decades by, amongst other things, the involvement of the United States, which supplies a security blanket in the region, the PRC still maintains the right to use force if necessary to deal with any unilateral declarations of independence on the part of Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwan maintains a de facto independence, while trying to carve out its own international space under significant military and diplomatic pressure from Beijing.

In the last decades, policy makers on both sides of the Taiwan Straits have looked at models that might potentially offer some sustainable resolution to this inherently destabilizing situation. This paper will look at what lessons from the long negotiations over the status of Northern Ireland in the UK might give to resolving the issues between Taiwan and the PRC. While there is much dissimilarity, the handling of Northern Ireland does show the final need for a political process beyond the threat of the use of military or other forms of violence. And it also offers some specific policy measures that might be transferable to other areas of conflict. While all conflicts like this are necessarily very specific, there are certain key elements that they share. This paper will attempt to identify those.

Northern Ireland: The Long March to Peace

The modern conflict in Northern Ireland has its source in centuries of complicated migrations, political, religious and social conflicts, and mismanagement by local, and mainland British, elites. The historian Norman Davies, discussing the mass migration, over the space of only a decade, of settlers originally from Scotland into the six northern counties of the island of Ireland after the conquest of the territory

¹ I am grateful for Dr Rex Li of Liverpool John Moores University and Keith Bennett for reading over a draft of this and offering comments and corrections. I am also grateful to Dr F.-L. Shih for suggesting the idea of this essay, and for the very helpful comments made by members of the seminar held at the LSE in May 2010, which I have attempted to reflect in this paper.
during the Tudor period in the sixteenth century, calls this a ‘fatal harvest’. Supported by the government in London, new settlers set up crown colonies and implemented segregation against the local inhabitants. They came with different religious and cultural values, and created a new economy. But as Davies wistfully comments, the conflicts created by this process were to be deep and long-lasting: ‘Nearly four hundred years later, the fatal harvest is still being reaped’ (Davies 1999: 482).

These conflicts ebbed and flowed over the coming centuries, but the strong desire for independence, at least in the southern part of Ireland, led to the Home Rule movement in the nineteenth century, and, after a guerrilla war from 1919 to 1921, and Civil War from 1921 to 1923, to the creation of the Irish Free State, largely autonomous from the mainland British government. It adopted its own constitution in 1937, and assumed the status of the Republic of Ireland in 1949. The six counties of Northern Ireland were also largely self-governing over this period, operating as a division of the United Kingdom under the Government of Ireland Act 1920. Large parts of its population, mostly descended from Protestant settlers, opposed moves to Home Rule and unification with the southern part of the island because of the fear that they would be a minority overwhelmed by ‘Catholic hegemony’. The province maintained its own parliament and prime minister till 1972, when direct rule was imposed from Westminster.

The roots of this modern period of unrest can be found in long-simmering discontent about discrimination practised against Catholics in the province, from housing, to work, to education. Tied to the protest movements elsewhere in Europe in the 1960s, these found widespread support amongst the Catholic population. One march in 1969 ended in violence, which, as it spread, caused the government in London to send in the British Army to restore order. This ushered in the era of the Troubles, which were to take over 3,500 lives. From 1970, the army was to play an increasing role in the security control of the area. Ironically, while they had first been involved in order to protect the Catholic population from Loyalist attacks, they were to become the main focus of aggression and anger afterwards from Catholics, and cited as proof that the province was in fact under illegitimate occupation.2

Northern Ireland under direct rule was to enter a bitter period of almost three decades of bloodshed and conflict. The main body agitating for full independence, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), was initially able to fund armed attacks against the local security forces, and against Loyalist opponents. Its main political supporting arm was the political party Sinn Fein. In the late 1970s, and into the 1980s, violence continued, and any political settlement eluded a succession of British Prime Ministers. Only with renewed attempts to negotiate with Sinn Fein in the late 1980s under the leadership of the then-British Prime Minister John Major did the possibility of a political resolution to the problems in the province become greater. This was pursued by Tony Blair on his election in 1997, resulting in the Good Friday Agreement a year later, providing the framework for a model of devolution and power-sharing between the various political parties and interest groups in the province. The elements of this will be discussed below. A local devolved parliament was set up in 2001, and existed until its suspension in 2005.

2 For a brief account of the start of the Troubles, see Marr (2007: 315 onwards).
after which it was finally re-established in 2007. In 2010, one of the most important landmarks was passed, when responsibility for courts and security was handed over to the Northern Ireland Assembly leaders. Alongside the IRA declaration of the end of the armed struggle in 2004, and an acceptance of pursuing their objectives through the political process, this has contributed to a cessation to most (but not all) of the violence, and stable governance in the area. Tony Blair’s dogged, persistent commitment stands out as perhaps his most important achievement. ‘Peace in Northern Ireland was Tony Blair’s crowning claim to have achieved something of enduring historical greatness with his premiership’, as one political commentator has written, summarizing his period in power in the UK (Rawnsley 2010: 433).

Taiwan and the PRC

The island of Taiwan, off the southeast coast of mainland China, had become a part of the Qing Empire (1644–1911) during one of the empire’s most expansionist periods in the late seventeenth century (Rowe 2009: 76–78). Annexed by the Japanese from 1895, the island returned to the victorious Nationalist (KMT) government on the mainland for a mere four years from 1945, while the Nationalists fought a bitter civil war with the Communists (CCP). This was to end in 1949 with the defeat of the KMT, and the flight of over a million of their people, and the leadership itself, to Taiwan. From here, the KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek claimed sovereignty over the whole of China, and took China’s seat at the United Nations. Neither the CCP in Beijing, nor the KMT in Taipei, ceded defeat, and both maintained their own specific version of the Cold War throughout the 1950s and 1960s, from time to time coming close to outright conflict without ever actually tipping into war. While the PRC under Mao Zedong was preoccupied with various massive internal political struggles, like the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1961, and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, the KMT in Taiwan enjoyed recognition and protection from the United States, and the ability to build up Taiwan’s economic capacity. By the 1970s, Taiwan was one of the best-performing economies in the region (Brown 2009: 2–3).

A major setback for Taiwan was the reestablishment of diplomatic links between the US and the PRC in 1972 with the visit or President Richard Nixon to the PRC, and the loss by the KMT of its seat at the United Nations only the year before. With the shifting of formal diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan to the PRC in 1979 by the United States, the only consolation was the passing of the Taiwan Relations Act, which committed the US to helping Taiwan defend itself in the event of a military attack from the PRC. In the 1980s, Military Law was lifted, and opposition parties were tolerated, leading in 1996 to the first ever direct elections on the island. By 2000, one of the opposition parties, the DPP under Chen Shui-Bian, had won power, forcing the KMT into opposition for the first time in six decades. Taiwan had made the transition to a full democracy.

The conflict with the mainland, however, continued, causing frequent diplomatic hiccoughs and conflicts. From 1972 and the Shanghai Communiqué, the US and much of the rest of the world had started to adopt a ‘One China Policy’, stating that ‘there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China’. This avoided taking sides in the conflict, and allowed for the maintenance of the status quo. But both Taiwan and
the PRC proactively attempted to win diplomatic recognition from third parties throughout the following years, as at least one sign of legitimization. The PRC, as its own economic opening-up and reform policy from 1978 started to have impact, took increasingly assertive positions on the status of the island, even undertaking major military manoeuvres in the Taiwan Straits during the 1996 elections. This may have had the unintended consequence of increasing Li Teng-Hui’s share of the vote.

There remains no peace treaty between the two. In addition, their political systems have become increasingly different from each other. The PRC, in the words of the US Department of State 2008 Human Rights Report on China, has a government structure which is ‘an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitutionally is the paramount source of power. Party members hold almost all top government, police, and military positions. Ultimate authority rests with the 25-member political bureau (Politburo) of the CCP and its nine-member standing committee.’ It is one of only five remaining states in which a Communist Party maintains a monopoly of power. Taiwan, on the other hand, has held a series of elections which have been notable for their openness, competitiveness, and stability. Power returned to the KMT in 2008 with the election of Ma Ying-Jeou. There is an independent judiciary, and a free media.

Northern Ireland and Taiwan: Differences

The issue of sovereignty lies at the heart of the conflict in Northern Ireland, and also over Taiwan. For Northern Ireland, it is a case of one significant portion of the population of the six counties saying that it wants self-determination and independence, and opposing the sovereignty of the government of the United Kingdom in Westminster. The Republic of Ireland also claims sovereignty over the North, in its constitution. In Taiwan, it is the case of a territory with de facto sovereignty which is threatened with military action and reprisals if this is asserted, and which is also denied international space within which to assert sovereignty. These remain two different aspects of one issue. Sovereignty and self-determination also relate to the recent conflicts in the Aceh province of Indonesia, and the Occupied Territories in Israel. There are plenty of other, less high profile, examples.

In terms of the internal impact of this, there are significant differences. For Northern Ireland, from 1970 onwards there were high levels of violence, suffered by all sides in the dispute. The willingness of the IRA and Loyalist paramilitary groups to deploy violence for political ends gave the conflict its distinctive characteristics. It also made it particularly dangerous and destabilizing. The IRA was able to secure funds internationally from the USA, and from other terrorist groups, to arm themselves, and to build up a powerful capacity. While the military activists may never have numbered more than a few hundred, there were enough to cause huge economic disruption, and to allow for the waging of a number of bombing campaigns on the British mainland. The IRA was also able to assassinate major political figures from the UK, including Earl Mountbatten, the Queen’s cousin, in 1979. Conservative MP Airey Neave was murdered by a Republican splinter group, the Irish National Liberation Army, the same year. As a self-described ‘liberation’ movement, these groups were able to establish a
sophisticated and very real security threat, seen most dramatically in the bombing of the Brighton Grand Hotel in 1984 during the Conservative Party conference, while Margaret Thatcher and most of her cabinet were in the building. The British internal intelligence service made combating the IRA one of their main objectives throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, and the IRA’s campaigns had a significant economic impact (see Andrew 2009: 734–752).

Between Taiwan and the PRC, while there has been the continual threat of violence, and, in the early period from 1950, skirmishes involving both sides over islands lying off the coasts of the PRC, there has not been any overt movements of pro- or anti-unification forces in Taiwan, or anti-Taiwanese independence forces in the PRC, that have mounted campaigns, or which had either the capacity or the desire to assassinate, bomb, or use disruption and violence for political ends. The threat of violence has been government-to-government, between the Beijing and the Taipei regimes, through the huge build-up of military capacity along the Fujianese coast. In Northern Ireland, it has largely been the army of the central British state pitted against that of the IRA or other para-military groups. These are absent in the conflict between Taiwan and the PRC. This is not to say that violence has not figured in the recent history of the PRC and Taiwan. In 1989, for instance, there was the bloody suppression of the student demonstrations in Beijing, and in Taiwan under martial law there were several clampdowns from 1949 and into the 1980s. But these were internal incidents, rather than related to the question of the relationship between each other, and their separate statuses.

Nor does religion enter into the Taiwanese–PRC situation, as it does in Northern Ireland. While there were significant numbers of native aborigine Taiwanese on the island when the KMT established its government there in 1949, they have become a minority in Taiwan today, and the PRC in its language about Taiwanese ‘compatriots’ likes to stress that they are of one blood, and one culture. They certainly share large linguistic similarities. In Northern Ireland, however, religion has been a dominant issue, with those largely supporting independence being Catholic, and those wishing to remain in the Union being Protestant. This has given deep ideological and cultural traction to the differences between the conflicting parties.

Finally, while Taiwan and the PRC remains a dispute between two parties over who has legitimate rights over the sovereignty of Taiwan, the dispute in Northern Ireland involves four parties: there are those in Northern Ireland who are pro-independence and those who are against independence and wish to remain within the Union of the United Kingdom, as well as the central British state and the Republic of Ireland state.

**Conflict Resolution**

Despite these significant differences, there is nevertheless a feeling that conflict reduction and resolution measures that worked in one case might be useful in another. This motivated Sinn Fein leaders to offer to help negotiators in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict in the 1990s and 2000s. Mediation through the Finnish Institute of International Affairs was effective with getting the Indonesian government and the Acehnese resistance groups around the negotiating table in 2004, leading to what has turned out to be an enduring peace agreement over an
area that had known deep, and violent, conflict since 1976. Can the Northern Ireland peace process have any implications for others looking to resolve long-term conflicts, in particular that between Taiwan and the PRC?

To answer that, one must look at the basic agreement between all sides, embodied in the Belfast, or Good Friday, Agreement, which was signed on 10 April 1998 after months of negotiations. To get to this stage, there had been big compromises on the part of Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionist Party. For Sinn Fein, there was a realization that armed conflict through the IRA had run out of steam, and was unable to deliver the final outcomes that were desired. These were a political settlement, one that would be sustainable, and the route for that, as Gerry Adams (Sinn Fein’s main leader and a key supporter of the whole peace process) said at the time, was through the ballot box. For the Ulster unionists there was also a feeling that continuing with zero-sum confrontations was leading nowhere. People in the province were tired of over two decades of constant violence, and of its economic impact. Many of the old divisions and bigotries had weakened, and in some places disappeared. The highly tribal element of some groups in society had diminished. While the rest of the UK and Europe were enjoying a continuing economic boom, Northern Ireland felt that its economy was still performing badly, with high unemployment and over-reliance on central government and EU assistance. Public pressure and international diplomatic pressure on the leadership of both sides was increasing. With Tony Blair’s focus on resolving the issues in the province, the final piece of the jigsaw puzzle fell into place, and the conditions for reaching an agreement were finally reached.

The Good Friday Agreement addressed a number of concerns. A high priority was given to starting a process of reconciliation, along with doing something about the continuing existence of weapons and arms being used in the province. A third priority was to create the political structures that would give all parties in the dispute a fair voice and an opportunity to put across their views, through proportional representation in the province and constitutional guarantees of inclusive governance. The Agreement, therefore, set out firstly the existence of a Northern Ireland Assembly, elected by local people, with devolved powers. Proportional representation methods were used to ensure that the full complexity of public opinion in the province was recognized. There were a range of other issues dealt with in the agreements:

- Release of prisoners from organizations observing the ceasefire;
- Establishment of a human rights commission;
- Legislation to promote equal opportunities between Catholics, Protestants, and other sectors of the population;
- Reform of the police and security services, agreement for the cantonment of weapons, and the demilitarization of the province;
- Commitment by all parties to use democratic and peaceful means and to strive for cross-community consensus;
- Agreement with the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the UK over cross-border issues.

There were a number of elements in the agreement that addressed the repeal of previous legislation, such as the Government of Northern Ireland Act 1920, and the
sensitive use of language about the actual name of the territory. In order to carry legitimacy, the agreement was put before the public of Northern Ireland and Ireland in the form of a referendum in May 1998, and passed with large majorities in both (71 per cent in Northern Ireland in favour, 94 per cent in the Republic).

The Mainland and Taiwan Proposals for Peace

The Good Friday Agreement was the result of painstaking negotiations between two widely divergent sides, with a number of other partners in between, in order to forge political consensus on how to handle the status and governance of Northern Ireland. The key agreement, however, was to use ‘democratic and peaceful means’ and to deal with issues through the ballot box and the political process rather than through violence, with the objective of arriving at cross-community consensus. Without acceptance of this on the part of all those involved, nothing would have been possible. One of the most successful strategies of the agreement was to put the most difficult and contentious issues down for discussion later in the process. The first steps were simply to agree to talk, within a broad political framework. I remember, in looking at the Northern Ireland Peace Process as a potential model in some respects for the Aceh conflict in Indonesia while working as a Foreign Office official, interviewing officials from the Northern Ireland Office in 2004. One of their observations was that beyond the acceptance of the peace process, the key objective was to stop violence, to have an agreed framework for political settlement, and to deal with issues like ‘obnoxious legislation’ (the freeing of those formerly imprisoned for terrorist acts) and cantonment of weapons. All of these were eventually achieved, and helped build confidence between the various parties in the peace process.

For Taiwan, there is an overarching framework for agreement between the two sides across the straits. This was first reached in 1992 during meetings between officials from the PRC and Taiwanese governments, when they agreed that there was only one China. Of course, depending on which side, there is the massive issue of which part of China has sovereignty over the other: the PRC or Taiwan. But this very informal agreement, subsequently called the ‘1992 Consensus’, at least gave the basis for future discussions by parking the most difficult issue of all, and remains in place, despite disagreements from independence-supporting groups in Taiwan, to this day. It has been referred both by former president Chen Shui-Bian and current president Ma Ying-Jeou as the basis for any future discussions on the status of relations between the two entities.

On the part of the PRC there have been two major policy statements about the approach to resolving cross-straits issues. One was made by the former President of the PRC, Jiang Zemin, in January 1995. This has been called the ‘Eight-Point Proposal’. These points are:

a) Adhering to the principle that one China is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity must never be allowed to suffer division;

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Footnote:

3 The full text of the agreement can be found on the website of the Northern Ireland Office.
b) Allowing for the development of nongovernmental economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and other countries;

c) Holding negotiations with Taiwan authorities on the peaceful reunification of the motherland;

d) Aiming to achieve the peaceful reunification of China, since Chinese should not fight Chinese, but willing to use force to resolve the issue if necessary against foreign forces who intervene;

e) Developing economic exchange and cooperation between the two sides separated by the Taiwan Straits;

f) Promoting cultural tie keepings;

g) Respecting the rights of Taiwanese;

h) Welcoming and encouraging leaders of Taiwan to visit the mainland and mainland officials to visit Taiwan.4

These eight proposals combine a series of what can be called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures to bring the two sides together. Cultural and logistic links belong to the latter. Developing political links is also important. However, the key provision in this proposal is the non-relinquishment of the right to use force, and the firm commitment to maintaining the issue of Taiwan as a domestic, and not international, issue. The link between international support and the resolution of crisis in a domestic conflict does have some parallels with Northern Ireland, and is something that is worth reflecting on. The UK government did regard the status of the province as a purely domestic issue. However, funds for the IRA in their struggle, and their supply of arms, came from supporters outside of the province, and indeed outside of the UK. There were constant issues of funds coming from Irish-Republican sympathizers in the US, and frequent high-level representations by the British government to stop this happening. There was also in the 1980s supply of arms and funds from the regime of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya. This meant that there was an unavoidable international aspect to the situation, and one which had to be acknowledged by including international actors like the US and the EU in the final process. Only with the final control of these, and other, international sources of support was a political settlement in Northern Ireland made possible, and indeed the involvement of the US through an independent observer was maintained throughout the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. While the PRC has resolutely asserted its desire not to see the issue of Taiwan ‘internationalized’, therefore, one thing it might learn from the Northern Ireland peace process is that the outside world can be the source of solutions as well as problems. The main issue is how to include it in the whole process.

That the PRC has not renounced force in the issue of Taiwan remains a major symbolic block to pursuing deeper proposals for political dialogue. The vision of policy makers around paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s was that ‘one country, two systems’ could be used to resolve the issue. However, this was in the end brought to solve the issue of Hong Kong’s status after reversion to PRC sovereignty in 1997 from the British. Once Taiwan had become a fully functioning democracy by 1996, this model became much harder to envisage ever working. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to this day, remains only a partial

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4 For a full summary of the text, see People’s Daily Online (2007).
democracy, with a proportion of its legislative council elected, and the rest appointed. Arguments continue over the introduction of universal suffrage for the position of Chief Executive, something which was promised in 2012, and which has now slipped to 2018, and may go even further.

Current President Hu Jintao has also made a six-point ‘Proposition on Taiwan’, supplementing the issues put forward by Jiang Zemin over a decade earlier, and pulling back from the more strongly pro-unification impulses in the previous president’s thinking. These included: (1) reaching a common understanding on the principle of one China; (2) ending hostility and reaching peaceful agreements under the one-China principle; (3) starting discussions between the two sides about political relations as a preliminary to reunification; (4) stepping up contacts on military issues ‘at an appropriate time’; (5) developing transport and communication links across the Straits; (6) promoting cultural exchanges.

With the return to power of the KMT in the presidential elections in March 2008, the new President Ma Ying-Jeou was seen as pursuing a more conciliatory path with Beijing, and Hu’s points have, at least in terms of creating transport and communication links between the two sides, been partially implemented. But this goes hand-in-hand with the deployment of over 1,000 missile launchers on the Fujian coast opposite Taiwan, emphasizing that President Jiang’s threat to deploy force if necessary has still not been renounced.

Ma’s own position on the status of cross-states relations was contained most recently in his National Day Address in October 2009. There he states that the objectives of policy towards the PRC were:

- Acceptance of the 1992 Consensus;
- Support for links through visits to Taiwan by mainland tourists, direct air, sea, and postal links, food safety inspections, and cross-strait legal assistance;
- An attempt to extend these into the economic realm with a free trade agreement;
- Defence of Taiwanese national sovereignty and interests, in particular protections of its democratic system;
- Development of friendly relations with both Taiwan and mainland China and the promotion of ‘flexible diplomacy’;
- A national defence strategy of ‘effective deterrence and resolute defence’ developing a professional military based to protect the security of Taiwan.

(summarized from Ma 2009)

Despite high-level contacts over the last two years, however, there has been no major breakthrough, simply because the main issue, resolving the conflict over the sovereignty of Taiwan, remains hugely contentious. Some of the feelings aroused by this whole issue were clearly illustrated soon after President Ma’s election, when a high-ranking envoy dealing with the Taiwanese issue from the PRC was attacked while visiting Taipei on 21 October 2008 (BBC News 2008a). This preceded the visit by the head of the Mainland Chinese Association for Relations Across the Straits, Chen Yulin, in November, the first visit ever by someone in this position (BBC News 2008b). Agreements on direct air, sea, and postal links were
made. But with President Ma’s fall in popularity over 2009 because of the state of the Taiwanese economy, momentum behind drawing closer to the PRC has dropped. Talks, for instance, of a free trade deal in the form of an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement have proved difficult to progress, though it now seems that these are close to finalization.

The greatest impediment, however, to any immediate resolution of the issue of possible discussions over reunification between the PRC and Taiwan remains that they now have two wholly opposed political models. The PRC remains one of the world’s last countries (there are only four others) where a Communist Party continues to enjoy a monopoly of power. Taiwan has undergone a largely successful transition to a democratic model, where there has been a major shift in power from one party to another and back again, without any social unrest. This is a remarkable achievement. It means that while some Taiwanese might emotionally like the idea of reunification, they cannot be relaxed about any final settlement with a system which is so different from their own, and where many of their hard-won freedoms might be jeopardized. This is reflected in public opinion surveys in Taiwan. Were Taiwan and the PRC to start talks about unification tomorrow, what sort of model would they use? How would their separate political structures be combined, when they are so radically different? How would Taiwan be able to assert itself against a country which is many times larger, economically now becoming much more powerful, but with very different values and systems, not least around those of the rule of law and civil society? It seems that the consensus in Taiwan remains, therefore, that until the PRC fundamentally changes its political system, talk of deeper unity has to be put on hold. And, being realistic, a harmonious unification looks more and more unlikely. Meanwhile, a generation has grown up with a much stronger sense of being Taiwanese, who find talk of being ‘of the same blood and family as the PRC’ increasingly mysterious. The sort of family links that existed between those of their parents’ and grandparents’ generations have become much weaker with the PRC. To this generation, talk of reunification comes down finally to what might be in it for Taiwan, and what they seem to gain and lose. On those grounds, the PRC offer is too vague, and has decreasing appeal. This remains a unique characteristic of the Taiwan–PRC dynamics.

Conclusion

Tolstoy famously said at the start of his novel *Anna Karenina*, ‘Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.’ The same could be said of conflicts between and within countries. This paper has shown that the Northern Ireland issue had very specific roots, and that the final agreement to resolve these issues came after a long, painful, and sometimes very bloody process. The unique feature of the Northern Ireland problem was the community within a territory broadly divided along religious and historic lines. These created social and economic injustices, which in the 1970s provoked protest and led to an independence movement, and the imposition of direct rule and military intervention. Searches for a political solution remained elusive until the 1990s, when the political commitment of both Prime Ministers John Major and Tony Blair finally brought about a framework agreement. The implementation of that, and the
renunciation of violence with the creation of a local assembly and devolved power, have taken over a decade.

There are, however, a number of practical lessons that the Northern Ireland process does give. These can be summarized as follows:

- The need to have an overarching political framework agreed by all sides in a dispute, where issues are sequenced, and the methods of discussion are accepted. The Good Friday Agreement supplied this, and meant that parties with a long history of distrust and hostility were at least able to sit down and use a common language to try to resolve their differences. Without this framework, discussion would have been impossible;
- The crucial need for top-level political support on both sides of a dispute. Prime Ministers John Major and Tony Blair, and even Gordon Brown, over the issue of transference of security powers to the Northern Ireland devolved assembly in 2010, gave the peace process their full support, and put immense political capital into it. Prime Ministers of Ireland also supported it, along, finally, with key members of the international community. Therefore, for any discussions to be meaningful across the Straits, the support of leaders on both sides would be necessary. As of 2012, it is hard to see President Hu Jintao or the other key leaders of the CCP being in this position where they would be able, and would have the political will, to offer this kind of support. They are hugely preoccupied with other issues. This means that they are content to support the status quo. Any future moves to closer dialogue and discussion would need the absolute support of key political figures. And for that, the CCP in particular would have to be highly unified in its detailed policy on the treatment of Taiwan, something that is not the case at present;
- The involvement of the international community has to be factored into any process. Any moves by the PRC towards Taiwan become, in effect, moves that bring in the US. The US remains committed to supporting Taiwan’s security through the Taiwan Relations Act 1979. It sent aircraft carriers to the region during a difficult period when the first elections were held in Taiwan in 1996. According to one analyst I spoke to in 2008, ‘While Taiwan is a democracy and the PRC remains as it is, it would be impossible for the US to stand by if the PRC were to make aggressive military moves against the island.’ On the other hand, as the Bush presidency showed with Chen Shui-Bian, any declarations from Taiwan’s leaders leading towards talk of out-and-out independence would also not be supported. While the leadership of the CCP in the PRC might, therefore, be highly resistant to involving the international community, and suspicious of its role, they should also see it as playing a potentially positive role.

For Taiwan and the PRC, inter-communal violence and religious differences have not been important. The main issue has been the status and sovereignty of Taiwan, and its right to have self-determination. Since 1949, both sides have sparked low-level clashes, especially on some of the smaller islands within Taiwan’s territory, but there have not been any outright hostilities. Instead, there has been increasingly intense diplomatic movement, with the PRC largely eroding
Taiwan’s international space, taking its seat at the UN, winning US diplomatic recognition, and then circumscribing and controlling Taiwan’s international space. Allowing observer status for Taiwan at the World Health Authority in 2009 was considered a major compromise on behalf of the PRC.

All this, as stated above, is due to the huge differences between their political models. If and when this issue is resolved, most likely through the PRC introducing political reforms, then perhaps a reconciliation process and the sorts of structures introduced in Northern Ireland might be possible. But that is a huge ‘if’ and is unlikely to happen any time soon.

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Changes in China’s Domestic Politics and the Implications for Taiwan

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Abstract

Given China’s crucial role as one of three actors in a triangular relationship across the Taiwan Straits, China’s domestic politics have relevance to developments both in Taiwan and in American policy. This paper examines recent changes and developing trends in the PRC’s leadership, nationalism, localism, and public opinion, all of which will have implications for Taiwan.

The Hu–Wen Administration, which marks the fourth generation of PRC leadership, advocates using The New Three People’s Principles to implement a Harmonious Society of people-centred politics within the context of a ‘New Deal’. Although this sentiment was received positively by James Soong during his visit to the PRC in 2005, the Administration’s aim is to give long-term legitimacy to the CPC’s one-party government, and to ease rising tensions in China’s society. While the new leaders make political use of economic growth, they continue to maintain strict control over mass media and in many cases remain willing to use force to maintain stability. Hu Jintao’s praise of the North Korean regime reflects his unwillingness to make any dramatic ideological alterations, although the 2005 memorial given to Hu Yaobang indicates he is willing to make some popular changes. The Anti-Secession Law is for the internal purpose of balancing China’s nationalism and localism, rather than for the external purpose of deterring Taiwan from seeking to change the status quo. Although the government attempts to make use of Chinese nationalism, its huge impact and new form will shake the CPC’s legitimacy and the economic growth on which its stability relies. Trends towards reverse-nationalism and transnationalism are more concerned with China’s democratization than its reunification. Further, given the increasing development gap in different regions of China, the emerging localism has conflicting ideas on development priorities and distribution, and on the Taiwan question. Three perspectives on Taiwan can be found from China’s north to its east and southeast regions: war, peace, or compromise. Further, among public opinion, there are liberal, realistic, ideological, and identity-constructivist ideas which have evolved in relation to the Taiwan question and China’s politics.

Introduction

In 2003, I was the chief editor of and main contributor to a book entitled Jiedu Xin Zhengfu (Interpreting New Government). This was just after the formation of the
Hu–Wen Administration at the 16th CPC Congress and the 10th National People’s Congress. Several contributors to the book attempted to predict China’s policy and the measures it would adopt on topics such as governmental structural reform, finance and taxation, state-owned enterprises, agriculture, peasants and rural areas, and anti-corruption. I wrote the first chapter, which was a general analysis of the new leadership, and the last chapter, which considered foreign affairs policy and China’s reunification: i.e., the Taiwan question. However, the publishing house, the CPC History Press, thought the topic of Taiwan was so sensitive and complicated that the chapter was deleted to avoid possible political trouble.

In my deleted chapter, I conclude that that the PRC’s new leadership, consisting of comparatively young technocrats, will be less dogmatic in its ideology and more pragmatic in governance. As it attempts to spur economic growth, it may also carefully initiate long-delayed political reforms and approach social problems in a scientific way, thus maintaining lasting stability and giving long-term legitimacy to their governance. Since Taiwan is a strategic problem rather than a tactical one, it needs much more time and greater attention from China’s economy and politics in order to achieve reunification. However, given that the leadership has only from five to ten years in power, so long as the authority in Taiwan does not declare an independent Taiwan Republic, it will do more than reaffirm the ‘one country two systems’ principle, in order to maintain the status quo. If Taiwan’s leaders provoke China verbally or promote a referendum, Chinese leaders will probably reduce the pressure of rising Chinese nationalism by reaffirming their willingness to use military means, either through words and media attacks or by launching a military exercise. It may, though, be better to wait and see: Hu Jintao doesn’t like to express the same kind of rhetoric as of that often used his predecessor, Jiang Zemin.

Since 2003, there have been many changes in China’s politics and policies. On the one hand, the Chinese leadership has promoted the idea of ‘the Harmonious Society’, but on the other hand it takes tough measures in relation to Chinese civil rights activists and has enacted an Anti-Secession Law to reinforce commitment to reunification. While China is arguing that its rise is a peaceful development, it eagerly wants the EU to remove its arms embargo, and the violence of anti-Japanese demonstrations makes the world worry again about Chinese nationalism. Further, although the Chinese economy is growing continuously, internal economic conflicts have increased progressively due to uneven development. An emerging localism is challenging the central governmental authority, not only in the socio-economic field (trade, investment, taxation, environment, education), but also to a greater or lesser extent in relation to political and foreign affairs. News media remain tightly controlled, but public opinion is diverse and this is widely reflected on the internet and in word-of-mouth conversations. This paper will examine the recent changes in PRC leadership, nationalism, localism, and public opinion, all of which will have specific implications for Taiwan.

Leadership

Since Hu Jintao (head of the CPC, PRC, and People’s Liberation Army) and Wen Jiabao (PRC Premier and Member of the Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau of CPC) came into power in 2003, their so-called Fourth Generation Leadership has made many changes in China’s politics, ideology, society, and policy on Taiwan. Overseas Chinese media labelled these as changes as ‘Hu–Wen’s New Deal’, and domestic media applauded their measures as a ‘People First Policy’ or ‘Humane Administration’. There is constant media coverage of their inspections and close contacts with ordinary people, along with reports of Hu’s words on people’s welfare, as well as Wen’s tears for the poor and the help he gave to a peasant-worker for her to get her wage. I will analyse the political implications of the Hu–Wen New Deal.

Change 1: From Three Represents to New Three Principles of the People

Although Hu has been a Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo for many years, he used to be careful to give the spotlight to Jiang Zemin and other leaders. After he became President, he emerged from Jiang’s shadow and began to build his own authority. Jiang’s political legacy is the theory of Three Represents, which had been put into CPC’s charter before Jiang retired. Since Jiang’s Three Represents was long, abstract, and difficult to grasp (The Chinese Communist Party ‘must always represent the requirements of the development of China’s advanced productive forces, represent the orientation of the development of China’s advanced culture, and represent the fundamental interest of the overwhelming majority of people in China’), Hu simplified its meaning and concentrated on the last Represent, the interest of the people. He developed his own ideas, which are: ‘(1) Power must be used for the sake of the people; (2) [Cadres’] sentiments must be tied to those of the people; and (3) material benefits must be sought in the interest of the people.’ This is called ‘The New Three Principles of the People’.

The name was a reminder of Sun Yat-Sen’s original ‘Three Principles of the People’ (‘nationalism, democracy, people’s livelihood’), which was central to the doctrine of the KMT. When James Soong, Chairman of Taiwan’s People First Party (an opposition party which had split from the KMT), visited China in 2005, he quoted Hu’s New Three Principles and wrote the following words in Sun Yat-Sen’s Mausoleum in Nanjing: ‘Government of the people, by the people and for the people; Three Principles of the People will unify the Greater China.’

Like Abraham Lincoln, Sun Yat-Sen stressed the power of the people, meaning that power belongs to the people. Government by the people means democracy, and the power of government or the ruling party comes from people. However, Hu’s principle stresses the power of the CPC rather than the power of the people. According to him, the party should use its power for the people, but he does not explain who gives the party its power, how the party gets its power, and who can supervise or balance the power. Consequently, although Hu’s principle seems to be an improvement on the CPC’s older doctrine, it falls short of the belief expressed on Taiwan, that sovereignty belongs to the people (‘zhu quan zai min’).

Change 2: From Building a Well-Off Society to a Harmonious Society

The Harmonious Society is another change in Hu’s thinking. Previously, both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin aimed at building a well-off society. Deng encouraged a
proportion of the population to get rich first, and Jiang advised ‘fewer words, bigger fortune’ (‘men sheng fa da cai’). Deng and Jiang tried to use economic growth and market prosperity to maintain social and political stability, but following thirty years of economic reform under a deadening political stability, there are numerous social problems, and a large-scale social crisis is emerging. The gap between the rich and the poor, between urban and rural areas, and between east and west is widening. Chinese society appears to be well off, but there is everywhere corruption, pollution, unemployment, poverty, violence, large-scale accidents, drugs, AIDS, prostitution, and organized crime. Education, housing, and health care remain unaffordable, there is a loss of respect and morality, and conflicts between the haves and the have-nots. So, in order to build up his authority and maintain a lasting stability, Hu initiated the idea of building a harmonious society instead of, as previously, a well-off society that focuses on material prosperity only.

The new leadership also revised the concept of ‘Two Civilizations’. Previously, this referred on the one hand to material civilization (economy and wealth), and on the other hand to spiritual civilization (culture and value). Now, there are ‘Three Civilizations’; political civilization has been added, which refers mainly to constructing democracy and the rule of law under the leadership of CPC. However, this ‘on the third hand’ has another connotation in Chinese: only a thief has three hands.

To build a harmonious society, the government has taken some popular measures. For example, some amendments have been made to the constitution to confirm that the country preserves human rights and protects private property: the long-standing agriculture tax was abolished in 2006 to decrease the burden on the rural population, and the central government calls on local government and real estate developers not to press ahead with demolishing houses without the prior agreement of the owner or occupier.

However, the concepts of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘political civilization’ are controversial. Some argue that a harmonious society requires respect for human rights, the fair distribution of public power and social wealth, the giving of a wide role to civil society, and allowing independent media to scrutinize the government, etc.; political civilization, meanwhile, requires democratization, transparency, general elections, and the rule of law rather than the rule of the party. Given the current situation and the CPC’s dictatorship in China, Hu’s theory is just an ideal to ease tensions in Chinese society. Real harmony and a real renewal of Chinese civilization would require substantial political reform in China, which the new leadership seems to have no intention to promote. That is why the PRC has no political attraction for democratized Taiwan.

Change 3: Keep Advanced Education [bao xian jiaoyu]

With the increasing decline of communist ideology in China, especially with the huge impact of the _Nine Commentaries on the CPC (jiu ping)_ and systemic corruption among CPC cadres, in 2003 Hu launched a nation-wide movement to educate CPC members and to mobilize the masses. This movement is called ‘Keep Advanced Education’, and its aim is for the CPC to become an advanced force leading China, with CPC members acting as role models in every aspect for the masses to follow and to learn from. The idea is not just for CPC members to be
educated in various forms of propaganda or to study the teachings of Marx, Deng, Jiang, and Hu himself, but rather for all the Chinese people to know about the latest developments, just as they are influenced every day by news media.

I doubt the motive and effectiveness of this expensive and time-consuming movement. For Hu, he may want to renew the Party during his term of governance. On one hand, he is maintaining a link with communism to ensure the Party’s power and attraction; on the other hand, he is using the movement to build his own authority, prestige, and popularity, through constant reporting on his speeches, comments, and opinions, as expressed either at conferences or during inspections. Like many other brain-washing movements since China’s opening up and reform, the Keep Advanced Education movement has not worked as well as Hu expected. Chinese people seem to believe in pragmatism and consumerism rather than communism. There are even many jokes at the expense of the movement: ‘Advanced’ in Chinese pronunciation sounds like ‘xian’, which means ‘fresh’. So, the Chinese say it is better to put the CPC into a huge fridge to keep fresh. Further, there is also a similarity with ‘xian jin xing’, which means ‘advanced sex’.

Hu may personally have a deep belief in orthodox communist ideology. Soon after he came to power, he stated that ‘the comrades in North Korea and Cuba are always correct in politics’. This sentence astonished most Chinese. Kim Jong Il’s visit to China in 2006 was kept out of the Chinese media. Further, the Chinese government has reinforced control over the media and army during Hu’s term. The CPC’s Ministry of Propaganda remains a powerful governmental organ which reaffirms the theory of ‘pen and gun’; this was revealed in 2005, when an editor at China Youth Daily (a newspaper under the direct control of the Communist Youth League) posted an open letter on the internet complaining about censorship. This letter stated that the CPC remained committed to ‘pen and gun’, meaning media and army, to keep one voice and to safeguard political stability. Afterwards, a weekly section of that newspaper called Freeze Point (Bin Dian) was discontinued.

In Chinese, ‘pen and gun’ can also be called the ‘Theory of Two Sticks’ (‘liang gan zi’). However, ‘liang gan zi’ is often read as ‘er gan zi’, which in northern China means ‘foolishly bold’. ‘Pen and gun’ helped the CPC win and maintain power, and nowadays it seems that Hu still wants to use this approach to safeguard the regime. It is not a surprise that some liberal newspapers, such as the South Metropolitan Daily (Nan Fang Dou Shi Bao) and New Beijing Daily (Xin Jing Bao), were reorganized, and some staff were fired, punished, or put into jail. For the heavily-controlled internet, the Chinese government is using its Golden Shield Project to block many foreign websites and to monitor many popular discussion forums in China.

In a larger sense, both Keeping Advanced Education and ‘pen and gun’ are strategies to avoid a so-called colour revolution (such as the Velvet Revolution) breaking out in China, and to avoid the CPC losing power, as happened to the KMT during the process of democratization. So, the CPC leaders fear both a colour revolution, as occurred in Eastern Europe and central Asia, and the democratization process as occurred in Taiwan.

The implications for Taiwan are that Beijing and Taiwan are getting closer in economy, trade, and even in culture, but further apart in politics and ideology. A lacking of common ground in politics is one of the obstacles to reunification.
Hu's background and experience might explain his belief in communist doctrine. He began his career as a political tutor at Tsinghua University in the 1960s. Most of his political years were in the leadership of the Youth League in the 1980s, then as CPC General Secretary in Guizhou, Tibet. He returned to Beijing in the early 1990s and was put in charge of ideology, propaganda, and the Party School. His promotion came from taking full advantage of the existing system; he is very familiar with its ideology and institutional structure and wants to make full use of these for his position and interest. In his on-going 10-year term, he has no need and no intention of changing the system.

The problem is that in today's China there seems to be no one but Hu who believes in communism. It would be fortunate if all the Chinese were to believe in communism, or fortunate if all the Chinese did not do so; however, it would be unfortunate if none of the Chinese believed in communism besides Hu, the country’s leader.

*Change 4: Peaceful Rise to Peaceful Development*

The term ‘China’s rise’ was probably first used in the early twentieth century by Zhou Enlai, when he was asked in his boyhood why he went to school. Prior to that, Sun Yan-Sen used the term ‘restoring China’, later replaced with ‘reviving China’. Since then, ‘reviving China’ has been widely used in different periods and in many cases, but ‘China’s rise’ did not become part of the discussion until 1998, when Professor Yan Xuetong published a book entitled *Assessment of the International Situation for China’s Rise*. However, Yan's term was controversial at the time and was criticized by Chinese officialdom because it conflicted with Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy strategy: ‘conceal abilities and bide time’. ‘Rise’ was also very sensitive, since it was thought to remind the world of the rise of Hitler’s Nazi regime. However, Jiang later made several references to ‘bringing about a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’, which seemed have the same meaning as ‘China’s rise’ in the Chinese context. In 2002, Jiang officially declared during the CPC’s 16th congress: ‘strive for a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. At the same time, with China’s entry into the WTO and successful bid for the 2008 Olympics, Chinese media and scholars came to make frequent use of ‘China’s rise’ or ‘China’s peaceful rise’.

Hu Jingtao also accepted the term ‘China’s rise’. Consequently, the Chinese government has given a great deal of money to the CPC’s Party School and Ministry of Propaganda to develop a theory of ‘China’s Peaceful Rise’. However, the word ‘rise’ remains ambitiously aggressive, and has connotations of political and military aspects. Therefore, Chinese officials began instead to use the term ‘peaceful development’, which implies mainly economic and social affairs.

However, ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘peaceful development’ remain debatable at home and abroad, due to the meaning of the word ‘peaceful’. Externally, the Chinese government hasn’t renounced war as a solution to the Taiwan question, and is lobbying the EU to abolish its arms embargo. Internally, the CPC regime seems more and more dependent on the army, as well as armed and secret police to maintain stability. Facing rising social conflicts, the government is more often willing to use force to suppress the increasing mass assemblies and
demonstrations for civil rights, as seen in the shootings at Gongdong, Shaanxi, and Hebei. Further, Falun Gong followers and sympathizers continue to be intensely persecuted. Externally, there is a potential war across the Taiwan straits; internally, there are conflicts and oppressions. In such circumstances, can China indeed rise peacefully?

In the history of the world, there is no nation which rose without a war. China may be an exception due to its unique culture and huge domestic market, and the different international structure today. It may be assumed that China would rise peacefully, but if there is no democracy its rise may develop like that of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.

Change 5: Hu’s Four Points on Taiwan before and after the Anti-Secession Law

Regarding China’s Taiwan policy, Ye Jianying outlined Nine Principles in 1979, Deng announced ‘one country two systems’ in the mid-1980s, and Jiang’s listed Eight Points in 1995 (Chinese leaders like to play number games). Since Hu Jintao came to power, he has outlined two slightly different Four Points on the Taiwan question.

The first Four Points were announced at the 10th NPC, when Hu was elected President of PRC:

1) Always adhere to the principle of One China;
2) Increase economic and cultural exchange between the two sides;
3) Pin the hope of reunification on the Taiwanese people;
4) Unite the people of both sides to promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

The second Four Points came after the Anti-Secession Law. These were four ‘Absolutely Nots’:

1) Absolutely not waver on the principle of One China;
2) Absolutely not give up efforts for peaceful reunification;
3) Absolutely not change the guideline of pinning hope on the Taiwanese people;
4) Absolutely not compromise in fighting against Taiwan secession activities.

Comparing these two four-point guidelines, we can find, apart from repeating the One China principle, Hu pays more attention to Taiwanese people, and he thinks that sooner or later the majority of the Taiwanese will support reunification. That is why the Chinese government valued so highly the visits of Lien Chan and James Soong. Chinese leaders think that Taiwan’s domestic politics will change in favour of the One China policy when the KMT returns to power, since CPC can do no more but repeat the ‘one country two systems’ principle. Nevertheless, it is unknown whether Hu is aware that Lien and Soong wanted to make use of their mainland visits to make up for their loss in the presidential election. What they said in China is one story, and what did after they returned to Taiwan is another. What is more, Ma Ying-Jeou, the new chairman of the KMT, strongly advocates democracy, and that is the biggest challenge to the CPC’s legitimacy.
Facing increasing pan-Green challenges for Taiwan’s independence, the CPC now prefers the KMT, its historic rival, much more than any other group in Taiwan. The CPC always highlights the so-called ‘1992 Consensus’, in which both sides agreed in the One China principle – although from Taiwan’s perspective this refers to the ROC rather than the PRC. This is enough for Hu Jintao. He can use the resumption of this ambiguous term to ease the pressure of Chinese nationalism.

Further, Hu Jintao has made some changes; for example, commemorating Hu Yaobang, a liberal leader whose death triggered the movement in 1989. Having no direct link with the suppression in Tian’anmen Square, Hu is attempting to come out from Jiang Zemin’s shadow and to build up his own prestige. Hu is comparatively young among Chinese politicians, and he has been in power much longer than the presidents of Taiwan.

Nationalism

The CPC was formerly opposed to nationalism, and prevented its growth in the PRC. Prior to the 1980s, it instead engaged in communist-style internationalism; for example, exporting revolution, involvement in the Korean War and in wars in Indo-Asia, and huge assistance to Third World countries and to Albania. Today, although China it is still governed by a communist party, it is run along lines of nationalism rather than communism. With the economic boom and the realization of the dream of China’s rise, Chinese nationalism has become much stronger than before.

Chinese historically have a negative attitude towards several countries: Japan, for its invasion of China; the US, for its strategic containment, for the 1999 embassy bombing in Belgrade, and for the 2001 Hainan Island Incident; towards Russia, for lost territory; and even towards South Korea, which used to be behind China in development but which has now become China’s economic competitor and cultural model (South Korean television series, pop music, and fashion are astonishingly and increasingly popular, although many Chinese are concerned about the impacts of han liu, a mania for Korean pop culture). However, concerning the Taiwan issue, Chinese nationalism is much more complicated. It involves not only history, territory, and sovereignty, but also shared culture, a prosperous community, and a love-hate relationship.

Like many other governments, the Chinese government wants to make use of nationalism, and so it is more likely to take control of it. That is why American and British diplomats were puzzled when there was sudden silence after two days of angry student demonstrations and protests at their embassies after the Yugoslavia embassy bombing. I was at Tsinghua University and witnessed how the government organized the demonstrations to ease an urgent pressure, and then stopped them out of a fear that rising nationalism would disturb its negotiations and compromises with the USA.

The reason for controlling Chinese nationalism is that the Chinese government is concerned that the continued growth of nationalism will cause instability, undermine the CPC’s authority, and force it to take drastic measures against the provocative words of Taiwanese politicians. However, given that they cannot control Taiwan’s voice, they instead try to control Chinese voices. This control
ranges from conventional mass media to the internet, and to mobile SMS at the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstration.

From 2006 on, all pay-as-you-go mobile users in China have had to re-register, giving their real name, address, and profession. The reason, aside from fraud and the sending of pornographic messages, is that SMS is often used for spreading political information that undermines the CPC’s governing. At the anti-Japanese demonstration, there seemed to be no visible organizers or coordinators. Instead, many mobile users read and forwarded texts they had received, which told them the time, route, and even the slogans for the upcoming demonstration. People went to protest spontaneously and simultaneously. It was hard for police to find the organizer of the demonstration, though afterwards a man in Chongqing (named Xu Wanping) was arrested and sentenced to 12 years in prison. He was accused of illegally forming an organization with the intent of overthrowing the government by organizing anti-Japanese activities.

In terms of controlling nationalism, the Chinese government may relax controls on individual protests against Japanese militarism and Taiwanese secessionism, but they will maintain strict control over mass demonstrations and organized protests. Otherwise, such movements would naturally lead to the development of political organizations or underground parties calling for real freedom of expression, assembly, and symbolic association, as protected by the PRC’s constitution. So, nationalism can develop into democratization. In particular, Chinese nationalism in relation to Taiwan is regarded nation-wide as a form of patriotism that is helpful to the cause of unification and of maintaining territorial integrity. The CPC regime is in a dilemma caused by nationalism: if nationalism is allowed free rein, the resulting democratization will probably mean the CPC losing power, as happened to the KMT in 2000; but if it oppresses nationalism in relation to Taiwan, it will be criticized by the Chinese people for a lack of patriotism, and lose legitimacy.

Of course, extreme nationalism is dangerous for China too: violence and damage to Japanese property (including Japanese-made cars) will frighten Taiwanese and foreign investors, who are rather important for maintaining the growth of the Chinese economy.

On the other hand, the Chinese government might need be vigilant over two related trends: these are reverse nationalism and transnationalism, both of which may challenge the CPC’s legitimacy and cause political change in China.

Reverse nationalism refers to a form of fundamentalist nationalism which rejects perceived shortcomings in contemporary Chinese culture. Adherents attack the CPC for its past misconduct, and complain that its imported communist ideology has damaged or twisted the traditional culture and values of the Chinese nation. In contrast, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan are regarded as having made good use of Chinese culture, and China needs to learn from them.

Transnationalism refers to Chinese nationalism as spread overseas through Chinese immigration and diasporas. Adherents have absorbed ideas of democracy, liberty, and modernity, and they remain in constant contact with mainland Chinese through websites and other means of communication. The information that their websites convey often has a nationalist perspective. Although this is popular among Chinese both at home and abroad, such sites are disliked by the CPC and are usually shielded or monitored. Since the creators of these sites
have more opportunities to have contact with Taiwanese, their ideas on Taiwan are more tolerant and moderate.

With the development of new technology and increasing shuttling by Chinese between home and abroad, the CPC government will have to find a balance between the various new forms of Chinese nationalism. It is hard for the CPC to deal with the combination of nationalism, patriotism, and potential democratization; the last of these is often identified by Taiwan as a condition for a rather lengthy process of reunification.

**Localism or local Protectionism**

‘Localism’ often means ‘local protectionism for economy and trade’. There are numerous examples of such localism in China. For example, in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan, only locally-made cars are licensed as taxi-cabs. In 2006, an explosion at a chemical factory along a river in Jilin Province caused serious river pollution; this caused severe panic and loss in the province of Helongjiang, which is downstream, but the government of Jilin denied responsibility. A third example is a complaint made by the Vice-Minister of Education at a press conference in 2005, that the central government’s policies could be implemented only within Zhongnanhai, where the government is based. This was because many provinces often ignored education policy, and did not like to offer financial aid to poor students.

An economic gap and the uneven regional distribution of resources mean that residents care only about their local economy and prosperity. Local officials quarrel with other regional leaders, and they bargain with central government. Powerful leaders at the centre, such as those from the wealthy areas of Shanghai, Guangdong, and Fujian, have to take measures favourable to the coastal provinces in order to get political and financial support. In the 1990s, smuggling was seen as a way to become rich, and there was organized smuggling in China from along the coastal areas of Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, to Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan Island. Most of this organized smuggling was permitted by the local government, and customs officials and local police provided assistance to the smuggling companies. The scandal of the Xiamen (Amoy) Yuanhua smuggling case, in which many high officials were involved, was just the tip of the iceberg; such smuggling is always linked with corruption. The administration of Zhu Rongji spent a long time and put a great deal of effort into dealing with the smuggling, which caused considerable damage to the national economy and social order.

The emerging localism has come to have a great impact not only on China’s economy and society, but also on Chinese politics and its Taiwan policy. In the mid-1990s, Zhu Rongji divided the national tax system into state taxation and local taxation. When, during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Lee Teng-Hui threatened to attack Shanghai with missiles if the mainland bombed Taiwan, public opinion in Shanghai as expressed on-line suggested that Shanghai’s huge local tax revenue meant that it could build an independent Theatre Missile Defence system if the central government did not have a sufficient national defence budget.

A popular Chinese saying fully expresses the impact of localism impact on China’s Taiwan policy: ‘Beijing prefers war, Shanghai prefers peace, Amoy prefers
surrender to Taiwan’ (‘Beijing zhu zhan, Shanghai zhu he, Xiaomen zhu xiang’). While Beijing is the military centre and political capital, Shanghai by contrast has attracted a large amount of Taiwanese investment and thousands of Taiwanese residents, and Xiamen/Amoy (the closest city to Taiwan) has a considerably tight economic tie with Taiwan. People in Shanghai and Xiamen are afraid that war would destroy their prosperity, and that tension would prevent economic cooperation with Taiwan. Xiamen people in particular admire the Taiwanese lifestyle, and they would probably like to become a part of Taiwan, as Jinmen (Kinmen).

The passing of the Anti-Secession Law also reflects differing local perspectives. Although the overwhelming majority of the NPC's more than 2,000 representatives voted in favour of the law, there were two abstentions and three non-responses. Given that the people's representatives come from different parts of China, this rare case might reflect signs of localism.

The articles of the Anti-Secession Law indicate that the law's targets include localism or those with different views on Taiwan. Two articles out of the total ten relate to all Chinese people, rather than just 'Taiwan secessionists':

Article 2  ...Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.

Article 4  Accomplishing the great task of reuniting the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.

In the long history of the Chinese empire, there were always struggles between central government and local forces. The death blow to the Qing Dynasty was when several provinces declared independence after the nationalist rebellion in Wuhan. Consequently, the Chinese government has to control emerging localism, preventing it from misleading or obstructing Taiwan policy, or from perhaps even leading to other provinces seeking separation.

Public opinion

Theoretically, the mass media sets the agenda of public opinion, and public opinion is reflected by the mass media. In China, however, media are tightly controlled and subject to strict censorship, and are instead treated as a mouthpiece through which the CPC publicizes policy. Consequently, information about Taiwan is often one-sided and misleading. For example, instead of explaining Taiwanese democratization and giving an even-sided view of political affairs, China's media are more likely to report verbal abuse or physical conflict in the Legislative Yuan, and to give coverage to demonstrations and temporary disorders on the streets. In contrast, there is hardly any reference to the fact that society as a whole remains stable. In my opinion, Taiwan politicians' quarrels or fights in congress are much more preferable than the fights that occurred during the Cultural Revolution, or the shooting in Tian'anmen Square. The scandals in Taiwan politics are problems in the process of democratization; however, China's media suggests to the public that this shows the poor quality of Taiwan politics, the
ridiculousness its elections, and why the same kind of the democracy would not be good for Chinese people.

My research on Chinese public opinion relating to Taiwan is not based on Chinese media reports of comments. It is instead derived from an independent questionnaire involving students at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Thirty student volunteers from different family backgrounds and from different areas of China were sent to rural and urban areas in the east and in the west. Each student took 20 copies of the questionnaire on China’s domestic affairs and Taiwan. This was done twice, during the winter and summer vacations of 2005 respectively. The valid return rate was 522 copies, representing 87 per cent.

The interviewees were asked to rank a list internal issues with which they were most concerned. The reunification of the motherland did not come in the top five concerns, but instead came after housing, anti-corruption, social security, education, and pollution, but before unemployment, hosting the Olympics, travel safety, and inflation.

However, in a list of external affairs, it ranked second after China–US relations, but before Diaoyu Island, exports, and study abroad. Table 1 shows how differences are perceived.

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<th>What is the biggest difference between the mainland and Taiwan?</th>
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<td>Economy</td>
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<td>Political system</td>
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<td>Ideology and education</td>
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<td>Language</td>
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<td>Culture</td>
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<th>What is the most important reason for Taiwan’s secession?</th>
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<td>Conspiracy by the USA</td>
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<td>Secessionists in power</td>
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<td>Economic gap</td>
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<td>Political and ideological differences</td>
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<td>Changes in Taiwanese identity</td>
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<th>Which is the most important factor to achieving reunification?</th>
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<td>The rise of China</td>
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<td>Economic and personal exchanges</td>
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<td>War</td>
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<td>A change of Taiwan’s authority</td>
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<td>Chinese military deterrent</td>
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**Table 1: Chinese attitudes to Taiwan**

For most ordinary Chinese, the Taiwan issue is not as important as their housing, education, or health care. However, in a large sense, Taiwan is regarded as a strategically important territory of China and a vital issue in China–US relations.
A further analysis of the questionnaires, placing the relevant information into a theoretical framework, reveals four kinds of thinking in Chinese public opinion about Taiwan.

**Realistic Thinking**

This perspective sees Taiwan's secession as due to two factors: China lacks the force to deter it, and China cannot risk confrontation or conflict with US before it can match US power militarily and strategically. The continued growth of China's economy and defensive power will solve the Taiwan problem. The realistic view, also called the 'power' or 'strength' approach, is more popular among ordinary Chinese people.

**Liberal Thinking**

This perspective stresses free trade, and takes the view that increasing exchange of economy and individuals on both sides will gradually lead to an interdependent integration.

During this process, both sides will increase existing cooperation and construct new institutions to extend cooperation from the economic to the political level. The liberal view puts great emphasis on cooperative institutions and organizations, which it is believed will lead to deeper union, like the development from the EEC to the EU. This perspective is also called 'institutionism', and it is popular among industrial and commercial groups. (In Chinese, 'money' and 'forward' have the same sound of 'qian'. ‘Xiang qian kan’ will lead to ‘xiang qian kan’; that is, looking at money together will result in looking forward to a mutually beneficial union.)

**Ideological Thinking**

In this perspective, Taiwan's secession is due to the different ideologies and political systems of Taiwan and China. The reunification of a nation-state, as a highly political matter, needs common ground in politics and ideology. Since it is ridiculous for Taiwan to give up its democracy, the only possible way is to promote China's democratization. However, thus far there is no other party which can replace the CPC’s dominant role in the mainland, and the cost of political change in China will be unbearable. Without stability, the economy will experience crisis, and China will experience a crisis like that of the former Soviet Union. In that case, China will lose not only the CPC’s totalitarianism, but also Taiwan or other territories. Witnessing what happened to Russia, many Chinese officials think that to seek reunification with Taiwan is also a struggle or competition between Taiwan's system and mainland socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the moment, they think ‘one country two systems’ is sufficient.

**Identity Constructivism**

This view is taken by many intellectuals, who think that Taiwan's different history and its long-term lack of contact with the mainland have resulted in Taiwan
constructing its own identity, consciousness, values, and way of living. Taiwanese speak Chinese, just like many people in Singapore and Malaysia also speak Chinese, but they are not Chinese like mainlanders. Military means or two systems can unite the country physically, but hardly mentally. For real and lasting unification and reconciliation, both sides need to construct a common ground in culture, tradition, value, and religion respectively in the process of building a civil society.

There may also be some other public opinions; for example, some Chinese say ‘let it be, let Taiwan go as it likes. Do not spend so much money to bid for diplomatic relations in Latin America, Africa, and Oceania. Concentrate on China’s economy and defence; once China rises and becomes a superpower, it will take over Taiwan and maybe more.’

Conclusion

Facing increasing separation from Taiwan, China’s politicians have two options: peaceful means or military means. Both options require them to take into account their leadership position and many changing aspects of China’s domestic politics. If Taiwan will maintain the status quo for five to ten years, China would like to choose a peaceful solution, which is simply to repeat stiffly the policy of ‘one country two systems’ without substantially effective measures.

However, choosing a peaceful way does not mean that China’s present leaders believe that Taiwan will return to the motherland peacefully and willingly. Rather, it is chosen because they do not want to risk their term of office, economic growth, or political and social stability. The problem can instead be passed to the next generation of leaders, just as their predecessors passed it on to them. Deng Xiaoping promised that China’s reunification was one of the three great tasks that would be accomplished in 1980s. Later, in the mid-1990s, he said he firmly believed that the future generation would find a wiser and better way to solve the Taiwan problem.

If Chinese leaders choose military means, there will be three possible outcomes: victory, defeat, or stalemate. Stalemate would be as same as the current status quo, and so declaring war would serve no purpose. Defeat would mean Taiwan’s complete independence, and this is another reason not to choose war. Victory would certainly bring about China’s reunification, but it would be hard to obtain while the US remains a superpower and while there are other uncertain variables relating to the Taiwan issue domestically and internationally. These difficulties mean that Chinese leaders would not wish to declare war; they will instead continue to seek a possible peaceful solution, hoping that authority over Taiwan can be achieved through negotiation. At the same time, their focus is on domestic politics, and the need to reinforce stability and legitimacy in a country where nationalism is rising along with the economy, and where it is difficult to block democratization.

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This brief review focuses on the inaugural issue of the *Dublin James Joyce Journal*, published in 2008. The journal offers itself as a forum not just for Joycean scholars but also for the wider audience of Joyce. In line with this stated aim, the journal opens up the possibilities for scholars working in other fields to keep abreast of Joyce studies and to contribute to discussions across fields. Amongst the articles published in the journal, Cóilín Owens’ article “The Charity of Silence”: “After the Race” and the Emmet Centenary’ offers a particularly stimulating analysis of Joyce’s short story that might not immediately have been apparent to the casual Joyce reader. Although all the articles are enlightening, and the journal itself offers up an appropriate mix of historical research and literary analysis, comparative studies were somewhat lacking in the journal. Given the post-colonial bent of the articles by Malcolm Sen and Fintan O’Toole, which focus on Joyce’s Orientalism, and the historical and political bent of the other articles, comparative studies might have offered up new possibilities of looking at Joyce’s work in new ways and, indeed, assessing the expanding audience of Joyce as his work continues to be translated and received by new generations and cultures; a milestone of which was marked by the completion of the Chinese translation of *Ulysses* into Chinese by Xiao Qian and Wen Jieruo in 1995, although many extracts had been translated previously.

Using the relatively young field of Taiwanese Literature Studies as an example, we can find several parallels in the colonial and post-colonial histories and literatures of Ireland and Taiwan. Liang Qichao’s exhortation for Lin Xiantang to use the example of Ireland’s resistance to British rule to resist the Japanese in Taiwan spurred a series of comparisons between Taiwan and Ireland, which have continued to this day. Despite the differences between the two, they have undergone similar journeys from the colonial era to post-modernity. Taiwan has looked to Ireland, and Joyce’s work in particular, as a mirror for itself in some ways. The Irish Literary Revival in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its opposition to the literary modernism of authors like Joyce (who recognized the globalization of the world and rejected the insularism of the Celtic Twilight, as Fintain O’Toole points out in his article, “I Suppose They’re Just Getting Up in China Now”: Joyce, the City and Globalization’), are echoed in the Nativism versus Modernism debates that came with the transition to democracy gripping Taiwan in the 1990s and beyond. Indeed Wang Wenxing was singled out specifically for the influence that Joyce had on him, criticized as absurd for being a Taiwanese author who did nothing but ‘swallow the author’s words whole, like a date, pit and all,
without any critical or skeptical reflection. Then he’d publish an article brimming with high expectations and self-confidence, referring to himself as “Taiwan’s Joyce” (as charged by Song Zelai, writing in 1981; translated in Helmut Martin, *Modern Chinese Writers: Self Portrayals*, 1992: 235). According to research by Professor Lin Yu-Chen, Joyce was first introduced to Taiwan through Canadian missionaries and Chinese scholars who fled to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War (*Joyce in Taiwan*, 1). Parts of his work were later translated by the magazine *Modern Literature*, founded by Bai Xianyong and Li Oufan, amongst others, and had a profound impact on the Taiwanese modernist movement.

Many of the articles made interesting insights into the inspirations behind Joyce’s work, and its critical reception; these include Anne Fogarty’s article on the role of sculpture in Joyce’s work, Terence Killeen’s exploration of Alfred Hunter as the inspiration for the character Leopold Bloom, and Christian O’Neill’s exploration of the role of Niall Montgomery as one of the first critics to see value in Joyce’s work. The article by Stephanie Rains provides an interesting insight into nineteenth and early twentieth century Orientalism in the bazaars that attempted to represent cultures including Japan; this offers an interesting comparison with the way Japan represented the Orient, itself, and its imperial dominions at around about the same time in the exhibitions which were frequent during Japanese Colonial Rule in Taiwan – and in fact how ‘Oriental Orientalism’ functioned as a part of the narrative behind Japan’s imperial ambitions (see Emma Jinhua Teng, *Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures*, 1683–1895, 2006, 13) compared to the European Orientalism that Rains touches upon in her article. The postcolonial tone of her article when it refers to the protagonist’s reaction in ‘Araby’, faced with the woman with the English accent at the bazaar, puts one in mind of the Taiwanese protagonist of Yang Yunping’s *(楊雲萍)* ‘Curry Rice’ (1927) and his reaction when he spends all his money on a plate of curry rice and is intimidated by the Japanese girls in a Japanese restaurant, which only goes to underline the commonality in the postcolonial writing of Taiwan and Ireland.

“Wonder what I Look Like to Her”: Joyce’s Views on Animals in *Ulysses* (in *Chung Wai Literary Monthly*, 32.9: 7–40, 2004), and ‘Joyce, Language and Postcolonial Conditions’ (*Chung Wai Literary Monthly*, 27.9: 44–63, 1999); Iris Tsung-Huei Huang (National Taiwan University), who authored the papers ‘The Gift that Always Reaches Its Destination?’: The Economy of Gift in *Ulysses* (in *Concentric: Studies in English Literature and Linguistics*, 29.1: 175–197, 2003) and ‘The Desire to Feed or the Desire to Be Fed?: The Entangled Relation Between Bloom and the Maternal Figure in *Ulysses*’ (in *NTU Studies in Language and Literature*, 12: 23–49, 2003); and Chuang Kun-Liang (National Taiwan Normal University), editor of *Joyce in Taiwan* (Taipei: Bookman, 2008). Hopefully, through more comparative studies the journal will be able to encompass a larger range of interpretative perspectives.

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A Hungarian friend of mine has visited Dublin several times over the past seven years. Her daughter, who originally went to Dublin for her law degree, had married a fellow student, from South Africa. Later, Dublin became home to this immigrant couple from Hungary and South Africa with their locally born mixed-race son. Integration into Irish society is part of their daily life, and the citizenship of their son is an issue that emerged as early as his birth in the republic. Focusing on integration, Bryan Fanning’s *Immigration and Social Cohesion in the Republic of Ireland* illuminates challenges to immigrants such as the family of my friend’s daughter, as well as to the host Irish society. The transformative experiences of Irish society, from being an emigration society to an immigration destination (19), render comparative insight for Taiwan, an island that is also experiencing such a quantitative and qualitative transformation.

Fanning’s survey of recent immigration to Ireland begins with a cautious note about viewing immigration within the framework of multiculturalism. Post 9/11, multiculturalism in the west as a political discourse and a set of public policies is besieged by counter-discourses of anti-terrorism and calls for strengthening security and border control. Fanning’s studies of immigration to the Irish Republic are valuable resistance against this kind of overarching discourse. In line with Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive freedom, Fanning argues that immigrants’ integration is as much an issue of desirability as one of ability (6–7). Located in ‘concrete situations’ (2), his research draws on social policy that aims to induce social integration, and he explores the impact of social policy on immigrants’ well-being. In this undertaking, social integration is defined as the process by which ‘immigrants become accepted into a society, both as individuals
and as groups’ (1). With the insight that integration requires an immigrant to acquire not only the knowledge of social norms, values, beliefs but also economic skills to survive in the new environment, Fanning examines social integration through concepts such as social capital, cultural capital, human capital, and human capacity (2). More importantly, he broadens the concept of integration to ‘social cohesion’, which not only involves immigrants’ adaptation to the social norms of the mainstream society but also the inclusion of the host citizenry, particularly those who are socio-economically deprived (55).

Notable elements of immigration to the Irish Republic are its rapid growth and the diverse national origins of the immigrants. Fanning informs us that in one year, 2004–2005, Ireland found itself hosting foreign-born residents making up as much as 10.4 per cent of the total population. The 2006 Census identified foreign born residents as making up 14.7 per cent of the population, and nearly 10 per cent of the total population as ‘non-Irish nationals’. Fanning attributes the surge of immigration to a policy announced in 2004, that there was to be no quantitative control of immigration from the ten new EU member states (16, 60). He notes that, on average, immigrants to Ireland are strong in terms of their human capital advantages. In 2001, the percentage of those who obtained tertiary education was 1.8 times more than that of their host population. Not only was this found amongst high skilled non-EU workers, it was also evident amongst asylum seekers (63).

Behind Ireland’s open door policy is, Fanning argues, an ‘institutional narrative’ that advocates developmental modernization as new social and economic orthodoxies. This is found in Managing Migration: A Social and Economic Analysis, a report published by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) in which large-scale and ongoing immigration is promoted for sustaining economic growth (17). The commitment to development and pursuing economic modernity, Fanning argues, makes Ireland a ‘growth-oriented’ society, and this developmental mentality becomes an element of nation-building (22).

As an island country that is known for its economic ‘miracle’, Taiwan in recent years has also become a major migration destination within East Asia. Facilitated by the state, in 1992 Taiwan’s domestic labour market was opened to foreign labour from selected countries in order to supply workers for those industries that suffered from a shortage of labour. However, this rationale of ensuring economic growth is as far as similarities with immigration to Ireland go. Under Ireland’s immigration laws, long-term residency is available to migrant workers, and, on being granted a residency permit, immigrants are permitted to take part in local politics as voters and candidates (173). Fanning explains that immigrant organizations in Ireland, such as the African Solidarity Centre (ASC, later renamed the African Centre), have exercised collective pressure on political parties to incorporate immigrants’ welfare into their election manifestos (154–156). In addition, the Polish community has designated representatives in the two major political parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (158–159).

In contrast, Taiwan is amongst several East Asian countries where guest workers remain guests of the host society, and no residency or family reunion is available. Productivity and security, rather than integration, is the priority agenda of Taiwan’s immigration policy. In spite of their rising numbers, without allying themselves with local activists migrant workers in Taiwan have less capacity to develop into independent pressure groups such as ASC, which have direct input to
the political system. Another contrast to the Irish case is that immigration to Taiwan is marked by the dominating number of female migrants. Not only is more than 60 per cent of the foreign labour force female, the great majority of foreign residents are the wives of local citizens. They are from China and Southeast Asia, and their marriages to local citizens enable them to migrate to Taiwan.

Although these immigrant wives also encounter racism and discrimination based on their ethnic or national origin, just as immigrants in Ireland also do (73), the former are imposed upon via a different set of discriminatory attitudes intertwined with gender. Unlike many immigrants in Ireland, who have a higher educational attainment than the host population, Chinese and Southeast Asian wives on average have received lower education than the host population, as found by a 2003 census and 2008 survey. Because of this lower education, and lack of ability in the Chinese language, they are imagined to be incapable mothers who have difficulty in raising their children. Compounded by their presumed higher birth rate, they are blamed for ‘downgrading’ the quality of the future population. As a consequence, it is believed that they will erode the base of Taiwan’s economic prosperity, an integral element to Taiwan’s self-identity as an affluent democracy. This eugenics-tainted scenario is characterized as a national threat by the 2006 National Security Report. Therefore, while immigration is imagined as contributing positively to Ireland’s economic modernity, immigration to Taiwan is said to undermine the sustainability of Taiwan’s economic prosperity.

Fanning notes that, in spite of the immigrants’ higher educational attainment and the belief that immigration contributes to economic growth, immigrants’ human capital advantages do not necessarily translate into easy employment in Ireland. Lower English-language proficiency is a key explanatory variable to this occupational handicap (65). In the case of Taiwan, lower Chinese-language proficiency is also identified by the above mentioned 2003 census and 2008 survey as the key obstacle to immigrant wives’ employment. However, while employment in both societies is recognized as essential to integration, the employment of immigrant wives in Taiwan is additionally impeded by prevalent gender norms. These norms affect immigrant women’s employment in two ways. It is believed that their sole motivation for seeking marriage in Taiwan is to find employment and to send remittances back to support their family. However, if they are permitted to engage in waged employment outside of the home, they will be under the influence of unscrupulous elements including fellow immigrants or Taiwanese gangsters. They will be either pushed by the former into competition to achieve a higher remittance, or duped by the latter into sex work. As a result, they may desert their homes, a scenario socially known as ‘runaway’. To prevent runaway, some consular officials or immigration officers suggest to Taiwanese husbands that they should provide their immigrant wives with monthly allowances, so that they will have no incentive to work outside of the home. Gender norms are also invoked by the state when it comes to decisions about work for immigrant wives, because their wages are seen as supplementary to the family income. In other words, immigrant wives’ right to work is not premised on their individual need to survive independently but on their collective contribution to the health of the family economy.

In addition to applying the concepts of social capital, cultural capital, and capacities to analysing immigrants’ prospects for employment or for functional
integration, Fanning also explores whether these critical means can contribute to political integration, characterized as civic and political participation (96–100). Drawing on small-scale research of eighteen candidates who have stood for local council elections, Fanning finds that identity with their immediate local area and the desire of to improve local facilities and amenities is a common interest shared by all immigrant candidates (96). It is worthwhile to note that in Ireland, immigrants having children living with them seems to be one driving force for participation. As an African respondent explained: ‘Yes, I am a migrant, but I’m also a woman. I’m also a mum who has got children who are in school like everybody else so participation would have been a very big issue’ (96).

This candidate’s statement resonates with the results of my interviews with immigrant women in Taiwan. Vietnamese, Filipino and Indonesian Chinese women explained they would go to vote because they cared about their children’s well-being and would want to elect a good government to ensure a sound living environment for their children. In spite of this similar motivation for civic participation, a critical difference in the two countries is that immigrants cannot vote in Taiwan until they acquire citizenship. This marks the fundamental divergence between the conceptualization of voting rights in Taiwan and in Ireland. In Taiwan, voting rights are carefully guarded and reserved for formally admitted citizens, whereas in Ireland, as also in a few other European states, civic participation at local level is encouraged as a channel conducive for integration.

Voting is an important aspect of civic participation. Not only is it an indication of social integration, but also a channel for realizing positive freedom. Nevertheless, preliminary research on Taiwan’s political parties’ election campaigns and policy platforms suggests that immigrant votes have not been seriously sought by political parties, and that Chinese immigrants are peculiarly overlooked in the already-limited publicity. This is a critical deficiency given that the ratio of immigrants’ acquisition of citizenship in Taiwan is not low (44 per cent), and the number of male and female foreign spouses who acquired citizenship has risen to 204,640 in August 2012. Fanning’s research on politics and citizenship also shows that in spite of the rapid growth of the immigrant population, major political parties had little or no engagement with immigrant communities, or ‘had never given the issue of immigrant participation in politics any thought’ (55). Given that the two island republics are transforming from an emigrant society to an immigrant society, and the incorporation of outsiders with differences will be a fundamental challenge to both nations, the lack of interest or professionalism on the part of the major political parties calls for more study. What is critically needed is to go beyond election campaign rhetoric (or ‘immigrant populism’, as defined by Fanning, 154) to scrutinize how political parties evaluate the impact of immigrant voters on electoral politics, such as their vote share, and whether they have tangible policy platform to attract immigrant voters. Potential subject areas include immigrant voters’ motivations for political participation, the decision-making of party manifestos, interaction with immigrant advocacy groups, strategies of candidate nomination, management of local factions, and the development of immigrant communities.

Research on the development of immigrant communities may lead to discussion of integration to a group level where individual agency may converge and the collective agency will be utilized for organizational mobilization. Studies such as
these will deepen our understanding of migration as an ongoing process and integration as a two-way interaction between the host and the outsiders.

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Viewed comparatively from the perspective of a Taiwanese-language activist, the grass must seem much greener (including as a political hue) on that other ‘beleaguered isle’ where Irish enjoys constitutional status as the first official language. From its inception the Irish state, whilst acknowledging English, declared Irish its national language. There was a commitment to maintain the Irish-speaking region (the Gaeltacht) in the west of Ireland. The new independent state sought to promote or resuscitate the Irish language across the country (where it very much played second fiddle to English). Irish was made a compulsory subject in schools; basic competence in Irish was required for employment in the public sector; efforts were made to modernize and standardize the Irish language; and, to quote Geróid Ó Tuthaigh, ‘a range of incentives were introduced to encourage increased competence in Irish within the apparatus of the state’. Since the turn of the current century, there appears to be evidence of the continued valorization of Irish. In 2003, the Official Languages Act was passed, giving the right to provision of public services using the Irish language. In 2007, Irish secured recognition as the 23rd official language of the European Union. According to Suzanne Romaine, ‘The 2006 census reports that 1.6 million of the four million population can speak Irish… Proportionately speaking, the numbers represent a remarkable upsurge in the percentage of the Irish-speaking population from 24.5 per cent in 1861 to 41.9 per cent in 2006.’ Further, ‘in terms of status and the legal framework guaranteeing it… few languages rival Irish.’ If we focus upon the status dimension and policy pronouncements and read census statistics selectively, then Irish bucks the general trend of minority languages losing or forfeiting their ethno-linguistic vitality. In these respects, Irish might be viewed as a touchstone against which to gauge the revival or otherwise of, inter alia, the Taiwanese language.

At the other extreme, however, there are those who see Irish more in terms of tombstone than touchstone. They view efforts to revitalize Irish as failing defibrillation for a language suffering a chronic and life-threatening condition. Most prominent of these prophets of doom is Reg Hindley, who pulled no punches in titling his 1990 volume *The Death of the Irish Language: A Qualified Obituary*. Such commentators base their pessimistic prognoses on analyses of survey data among native Irish speakers, and making altogether different sense in how they disambiguate census statistics. When attention shifts from the question about how many can speak Irish to how many actually do speak it, and with what degree of fluency, then an argument that Irish may be in its death throes seems, unlike the language itself, to be sustainable. The policies devised and the measures
implemented over the last century seem ineffectual and may, in fact, contribute to what they were supposedly designed to prevent. The first definitive results of the 2011 Census were released by the Central Statistics Office earlier this year (March 2012). The census found that Irish with 82,600 people speaking it daily outside the school context is now the third most used language in Ireland, lagging behind English and the 120,000 or so who speak Polish at home. Even in the Gaeltacht areas, only a third of respondents said they speak Irish on a daily basis outside of the education system. Such findings might well temper the enthusiasm of a Taiwanese-language activist for the Irish-language model as precedent.

Not that surprisingly, the twenty essays that comprise A New View of the Irish Language eschew both extremes and give mixed reviews of the contemporary state of play. Overall, verdicts tend toward the view that policy and provision with respect to the Irish language are not so much ‘cure it all’ as ‘curate’s egg’ (partly bad, but with some redeeming features). According to the two editors, ‘the contributors tell the story as it is, a glass both half-empty and half-full’ (viii). There’s something of the ‘blind men describing an elephant’ about the collection, as each essayist views the situation from their own partial perspective, providing their own independent storylines and assessments. Thus, Pádraig Ó Riagáin in his piece on ‘Irish-language Policy 1922–2007: Balancing Maintenance and Revival’ concludes that in Ireland there are ‘major problems with both the processes of bilingual production and of bilingual reproduction’ (64); Conchúr Ó Giollagáin and Seosamh Mac Donnacha, writing on ‘The Gaeltacht Today’, lament that ‘the Gaeltacht as a linguistic entity is in crisis and struggling with the pressures of an advanced stage of language shift’ (119); Suzanne Romaine’s thoughtful essay on ‘Irish in the Global Context’ acknowledges various declines in the language, but opines that ‘Irish would certainly be a lot worse off without all the work on its behalf. Most threatened languages will not achieve anything like the relative success of Irish’ (24).

Aidan Doyle adopts a condemnatory tone in his piece on ‘Modern Irish Scholarship at Home and Abroad’, suggesting that deficiencies in Irish scholarship will not be addressed because ‘it would mean officially acknowledging that the teaching of Irish has failed across the whole educational system’ (206). Also in the realm of education, Anna Ní Ghallachair is concerned about the questionable return on the investment of an average per pupil 1,500 hours of tuition in the Irish language over 13 years (192). This point is reiterated and amplified by John Harris who argues that ‘the key challenges… [are of] a significant minority of children fail[ing] to make worthwhile progress in learning to speak Irish and… a substantial long-term decline in standards of proficiency over the last two decades or so’ (178).

There is a marked contrast of viewpoint depending on whether the vantage point is from prose or poetry. In a lyrical essay, Liam Ó Muirthile starkly concludes that ‘The poem in Irish is in freefall’ and goes on to say that ‘Literacy in the language has all but collapsed… since 1968’ (150). Caoilfhionn Nic Pháidín, whose topic is ‘Corpus Planning for Irish – Dictionaries and Terminology’ similarly regrets the ‘decline in written standards’ and reckons that ‘the sustainability of any meaningful literacy is now in question’ (94). In marked contrast, Máirín Nic Eoin, in writing of ‘Prose Writing in Irish Today,’ is considerably more upbeat: ‘The sheer volume of prose works published in recent years is in itself remarkable... ’ (131) ‘Popular
fiction in Irish today is cool and contemporary…’ (133) ‘Irish-language journalism is also healthier than ever…’ (137). Also, ‘there is no indication that the recent flowering of literacy activity in Irish is going to cease…’ (138). Lillis Ó Laoire, in her essay, suggests that ‘the current situation of music and language in Irish is a moderately healthy one’ (130), a prognosis midway between those for prose and poetry.

If the previous three paragraphs feel rather discursive (in the sense of running off in different directions) then, in miniature, this is what the book felt like to me, too. The essays are on twenty different topics. Each has its merits, and there are some tasty morsels in this smorgasbord of a book. Given the wide array of topics, it is inevitable that some essays will appeal to some readers more than others. In their brief foreword, the two editors tell us that ‘we adopted the title of A New View in honour of the ground-breaking View of the Irish Language (1969)... edited by Brian Ó Cuív’ (vii). There is something rather quirky about this claim. Only two authors make any substantive reference to the earlier work. And, given the way in which each essayist develops his or her own narrative, like ‘the blind men and the elephant’, the point seems to be that there is no singular viewpoint. Why, then, A New View? The viewpoints are multiple, and there has been no attempt to orchestrate or review – or, indeed, allocate a structure to – the score of essays. The whole is not more than the sum of its parts, consequently. I am not suggesting that the essays be shoehorned into consensual convergence, but a critical meta-view or theorized guidance as to how the multiplicity of perspectives might be synthesized to allow a more comprehensive view of the ‘elephant’ would have been appreciated. The foreword is a mere four pages, rather anodyne in tone, and seems to hover over, rather than engage with, the contributions.

What is lacking is a concerted and comparative perspective. Each chapter stands aloof from the others, and the findings of one essay are not compared with those of the others, whether by the authors or the editors. My reading would have benefitted from a directive introduction, and, ideally, a critical reflection on what to make of this batch of essays. There was only occasional reference to the situation of Irish in Northern Ireland, a comparative perspective that could be fruitful, given developments there in the last decade or two. Similarly, Suzanne Romaine’s essay aside, there is a dearth of comparative perspective on the situation of minority languages elsewhere. A comparative perspective invokes understanding relationally, an understanding derived not from looking in depth at the thing under scrutiny for an essentialist understanding, but from looking laterally at what that thing isn’t, what it’s similar to, and how it’s significantly different from. An understanding of the Irish language can be enhanced by looking at, for instance, how Welsh or Catalan or, indeed, Taiwanese fare in their separate contexts. Furthermore, to understand the place of Irish in Ireland it is incumbent upon the analyst to research the wider linguistic ecology of the island (and beyond) where English (the language which Irish is not) is so dominant, but other languages (Polish and French, in particular) have a significant presence.

Lastly, on the issue of a comparative perspective, I want to address the editors’ opening sentence: ‘This book is the most substantive, dispassionate overview of the Irish language by practitioners and scholars, in almost forty years’ (vii). Is its substantive stance one that is to be compared to a theoretical perspective, and, for that reason, an excuse for not providing an orchestrated overview of the essays?
Why stress the dispassionate nature of the volume? Is this because the book’s contributors, without exception, ‘speak and write the language fluently and the vast majority use it daily in their professional lives’ (ix)? This is hardly a representative sampling, in that case, of the fast-dissolving communities of Irish-speakers. Should a dispassionate view not include the views of English monoglots and others who are not passionate about learning Irish? Ciarán Mac Murchaidh, in his essay on ‘Current Attitudes to Irish’, gives a flavour of such a counter-position, when he quotes a 16 year-old school student. She stated:

Ireland is not bilingual, and if it ever will be, the second language will be Chinese or Polish, not Gaeilge... In fact I don’t think that Irish is alive any more... Nothing irritates me more than all of these great government initiatives to keep Irish alive...

foisting the responsibility for upholding a decayed language on us simply isn’t fair. (215)

More such qualitative (quasi-ethnographic?) materials might provide a worthwhile antidote to the quantitative approaches for which Romaine has tailored the epithet ‘Irish By The Numbers’.

The Irish government has claimed that Irish is the ‘oldest spoken literary language in Europe’ (24). Ruairí Ó hUiginn, in his essay on ‘The Irish Language’ which opens the volume, tells us that ‘it has been postulated that the first speakers of Celtic language came to Ireland around 500 BC’ (3), and that from ‘the late sixth century onwards we have copious written materials in the native vernacular’ (4). Till the seventeenth century, Irish was the language of the vast majority of the people of the island, but over the next two centuries the establishment of an English administration and the Plantation of English-speaking settlers led to a marked decline in the proportion of the population speaking Irish. Ó Tuathaigh judges that ‘approaching the end to the 19c, Irish as a living language seemed doomed to extinction within a relatively short interval.’ (26) Also, ‘by the early 20c Irish was spoken by less than one in five of the population: its heartland was overwhelmingly in the western periphery, its core-base, of agricultural smallholders and fishing families, an economically depressed and vulnerable community, experiencing heavy emigration’ (27) – a scenario which is a close match for contemporary Taiwan. This is the unpromising situation which the Gaelic League and then the newly formed Irish state inherited and sought to address through the twentieth century. A hundred years ago – indeed, as far back as 150 years ago – Irish was a language on the wane. There are precious few examples globally of the successful resuscitation of a language ‘making a comeback’. Suzanne Romaine’s essay on ‘Irish in the Global Context’ is, in my opinion, the keynote address of the volume. Her verdict is that, when viewed in a comparative perspective, what has been achieved with the maintenance and revival of Irish, despite definite shortcomings, is ‘hardly failure’ (24).

Pádraig Ó Riagáin starts his essay on Irish-language policy with the view that ‘there has always been a good deal of confusion about the ultimate objective of Ireland’s Irish-language policy’ (55), particularly whether it is the ‘displacement of English by Irish’ or the setting up a ‘bilingual state’. He convincingly demonstrates that
from an international perspective, the bilingual policy pursued by the Irish state... contain[s] two key objectives. The first was the maintenance of Irish as the spoken language in the Gaeltacht areas where it was still the community language... [while] elsewhere the objective was the revival of Irish... In this region, the bilingual policy was not, therefore, one designed to meet the needs of an already existing bilingual community, but rather it sought to create one. This feature gave a unique character to Irish-language policy. (56)

The state did not, and has not, lived up to its own aspirations, but then, perhaps, it was always a goal too far. Even in the Gaeltacht, the numbers speaking Irish in the home or community or with their peers have diminished to such an extent that the language is no longer being viably reproduced outside the educational context. There are some notable achievements, as Breandán Delap notes, in the establishment of Irish-language radio and television, and other authors allude to the propitious utilization by (green?) grassroots groupings of new media forms in a bid to create virtual communities of Irish-language adherents. Some of the failings certainly seem to be iatrogenic in character – the outcome of governmental policies themselves. As Ó Tuathaigh affirms, ‘the state’s revivalist commitment was most aggressive in the education system’ (29). Schooling carried an inordinate weight, and too heavy a load, to be able to ‘compensate for society’ (to use the phrasing of the pedagogical theorist Basil Bernstein). There are interesting and promising developments with the relatively recent growth of Irish-language medium schools (outside the Gaeltacht) giving some propulsion to the production of Irish-language speakers (and listeners and TV-viewers) through education. There is still a widespread attitude, tied up with a key sense of identity, that ‘Irish is good for you’, or, rather, that it is good for the next generation to have a taste of it.

The Irish state’s effort over the last century to revive the Irish language through the vehicle of education when viewed in terms of its own aspirational targets – rather than in comparative terms – are (pace Romaine) hardly successful. If a Taiwanese-language activist is to find an example of a minority language being revived through educational enforcement (though not through educational enforcement alone) to become both the official language and the language reproduced through the home as well as produced through the school, then he or she might consider the situation closer to home, where, since the late 1940s, the KMT (Nationalist) regime could be regarded as having successfully revived what was then a minority language, and the third language of Taiwan (behind Taiwanese and Japanese), guoyu (Mandarin Chinese).

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The meaning and significance of celebrity in the modern world is a topic of burgeoning debate and critical engagement: aspects that particularly provoke vocal – and often scornful – reactions are the ‘celebritization’ of news and politics, and the ascription of fame to ordinary individuals who have become (and maintain being) ‘famous for being famous’ rather than because of special achievement or exceptional ability in a particular career path. This is, therefore, just the right moment for increased academic interest in popular fame. The journal *Celebrity Studies* was founded in 2010 (by one of the co-editors of the volume under review), and the international and cross-cultural relevance of the subject was demonstrated in the same year with the publication of *Celebrity in China* (co-edited by Louise Edwards and Elaine Jeffreys, and published by the Hong Kong University Press). The achievement of *In the Limelight* is to relate celebrity studies to critical gender studies, drawing on case-studies from the UK and the USA.

The book’s juxtapositions show that the fame of female celebrities has been deployed in a variety of ways, and ascribed meanings that are either exemplary or cautionary. In the former category, the late Hollywood actress Hedy Lamarr has found new posthumous fame as a role-model for girls interested in technology, based on her war-time invention of a Secret Communications System. In the latter, we have female stars whose private lives (and, in some cases, professional performances) have collapsed into ‘train-wreck’ chaos: ‘One reason why stories of professionally accomplished/personally troubled female celebrities circulate so actively is that when women struggle or fail, their actions are seen to constitute “proof” that for women the “work–life balance” is really an impossible one’ (2). Of course, there is also media fascination with troubled behaviour by male stars, but scandals ‘characteristically (though not inevitably) fortify conventional understandings of gender, age, class, sexuality, and race/ethnicity’ (3). Hedonistic excess by male stars is read as an expression of ‘essential’ masculinity’ (203); by contrast, the singer Britney Spears is abused by sections of the public in sexualized terms (‘whore’, 320) for her perceived failings as a performer and as a mother. One article argues that Spears’ image ‘came to represent a larger threat to the structuring principles of American national identity’ (330), and that ‘as a target for misplaced public hostility’ (329) she served as distraction from critical scrutiny of George W. Bush during setbacks in the Iraq war.

The subjects of *In the Limelight* range from Lily Langtry (a former royal mistress who became a stage actress in the late nineteenth-century) to the singer MIA; the book is organized roughly chronologically, and there are no wider thematic groupings of chapters. Singing and acting remain the most active sites for the generation celebrity status; there is a chapter on Mia Farrow in the context of the social changes of the 1960s, and an analysis of the ‘cool postfeminist’ aesthetic of Sofia Coppola. In the case of MIA, the essay charts how the contemporary Sri Lankan-born British rapper has transitioned her politically controversial public persona into the American mainstream.

However, other forms of celebrity are also given consideration. A chapter on Helen Keller discusses how she used public fascination with her physical disabilities to promote political causes, while an essay on the television presenters
Suze Orman and Rachel Maddow explores how their public presentation of their lesbian sexualities relies on ‘homonormative, postfeminist, and neoliberal conventions’ (253). Another chapter draws attention to Ruth Snyder, who can be fairly described as a ‘celebrity “murderess”’ (66), and whose execution by electric chair in 1928 provided newspapers with a dramatic (surreptitiously taken) front-page photograph. Other essays take a thematic approach: there are chapters on the older actress as a ‘grotesque’, on discourses of mental distress in the memoirs of British female celebrities in the context of 1990s ‘pop-feminism’, and on the meanings of the ‘2007 “flashing” fad among young female celebrities in Hollywood’ (224). The reception and consumption of celebrity culture are also given their due, as well as the meaning of the desire for fame.

In the case of Langtry, the chapter author notes that her success, and public criticism of it, show that ‘the concerns of our mid-Victorian ancestors remain – in many ways – peculiarly familiar today’ (35). However, while the analysis here is solid and convincing, it does not surprise. Similarly, it is unremarkable to observe that the media generation of high-profile women criminals in the 1920s ‘threatened many long-held stereotypes about the female subject’ (78). However, some chapters urge us to reconsider commonplace assumptions about fame. An empirical study of young women on performing arts courses argues that ‘the image of young female “wannabe” has psycho-pathological undertones, where girls’ desires to become celebrities are read as deluded fantasies in need of correction. These debates do not capture the complexity of young women’s relationship with contemporary celebrity’ (150). Similarly, it would be easy to regard the performances of older female actresses in grotesque roles (most memorably, Bette Davis in the film Whatever Happened to Baby Jane?) as ‘self-travesty or feminist false consciousness’, but such roles in fact allow actresses ‘to dramatize the problems of female celebrity’ and to ‘display their talents as performers’ (107).

The relationship between celebrity and postfeminism underpins much of the book’s analysis; several essays draw on Angela McRobbie’s work on postfeminism and popular culture, and postfeminism is the most extensively indexed theoretical term in the book. Postfeminism is interrelated with pop-feminism, which marked ‘the popularization and commodification of seemingly feminist sentiments regarding the empowerment… of young women in the West’ (200). In 1990s Britain, this pop-feminism was most memorably enacted in the way the Spice Girls pop group was marketed as representing ‘Girl Power’. The ‘playful sexuality’ of the group was set against more traditional (and, many would argue, more substantive) forms of feminism, which was undermined and even sometimes explicitly repudiated in dismissively clichéd terms: ‘bar-burning lesbians’, in the words of group member Geri Halliwell. A few years later, memoirs by Halliwell and other members of her milieus have tended to ‘self-pathologize’ their pasts, with accounts of eating disorders and addiction formulated as ‘penitent tales of “unfeminine” sin and “feminine” regret’ (221). Contemporary female celebrity can thus be situated in relation to a ‘postfeminist backlash’. Postfeminism is also used to describe Sofia Coppola, whose ‘girlish’ persona ‘dismantles and diffuses the potential threat of her status as a female director-as-star’ (196).

This is part of a wider debate about ‘Girl Power’, which has been discussed in relation to Taiwan by Fran Martin. Martin draws on the analysis of Catherine Driscoll, who sees ‘Girl Power’ as a potentially positive formulation that is
sometimes devalued because of its mainstream positioning. Martin, in her essay ‘Feminist Girls, Lesbian Comrades’ (in Jennifer Helgren and Colleen Vasconcellos, *Girlhood: a Global History*, 2010, and based in part on earlier articles), discusses the Mandopop singer Sandee Chan in the context of ‘Spice Girls fever across the East Asian region’ (91). She notes that ‘the rise of girl rock in Taiwan is inherently linked to transnational cultural flows and the globalization of musical girl cultures. One particularly interesting way in which this happens is in the local reworking of globalizing discourses of pop feminism and “girl power”’ (90).

*In the Limelight* demonstrates the creative potential of critical gender studies in relation to celebrity studies. Read in conjunction with Martin’s essay, we can glimpse how the fields of enquiry which the book opens up might be applied fruitfully to East Asia in general, and to Taiwan in particular.


Gerardine Meaney over the last decade has worked on uncovering and challenging patriarchal discourses in Irish national identity and culture and, indeed, in Irish Studies. Her book *Gender, Ireland, and Cultural Change* is a theoretically-sophisticated collection of essays that explore changing constructions of Ireland, focusing on ‘cultural processes and social movements that have impacted on the most intimate experiences and the most deeply held senses of identity’ (xvii). The book’s themes are developed through an analysis of canonical and lesser-known literature, as well as films, television dramas, and documentaries. Meaney uses Lacanian psychoanalysis, feminism and post-colonial theory as overlapping, though hardly frictionless, interpretative frameworks to examine how patriarchy and xenophobia helped to form, and remain embedded within, Ireland’s post-colonial identity. She also draws attention to ‘manifestations of the official gendering of Irish national identity and of resistance to those official identities’ (xviii), and she is critical of how post-colonial studies has been applied to Ireland.

Meaney’s work shows how the study of nationalism in Taiwan and in Taiwan Studies could benefit from the three strands of her approach. While there are some critiques of nationalism in Taiwan from a post-colonial perspective, psychoanalytic and feminist critiques of nationalism in Taiwan are largely undeveloped. One of the few studies analysing feeling is Horng-Luen Wang’s essay *Ressentiment in Modern Communities: Some Preliminary Reflections on Taiwan’s Experience* (2004), which draws on Nietzsche’s term *ressentiment* to interpret in a general psychological way Taiwan’s attitude towards China and international society.

One example of a post-colonial critique of Taiwan’s nationalism is Mark Harrison’s *Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity* (2006). Harrison’s intervention in debates about national identity in Taiwan begin with a critique of the European liberal assumptions which have underpinned
national movements in Taiwan (and Ireland); namely, the assumption that a nation is the natural expression of an ethnos, the basic unity of identity as expressed through a distinct language, culture, literature and so forth. Drawing on post-colonial and post-structuralist theory, Harrison argues that Taiwan is not a given (national) fact but has, rather, been brought constantly into existence by naming practices – Formosa, Republic of China, Chinese Taipei, Taiwan – that imply competing fields of values, facts and so forth through which the island has been made available for description and analysis. In short, for Harrison identity is always a fabrication in the making and what needs to be studied are the processes through which identity-making is authorized.

One passage in Meaney’s book has particular resonance for Harrison’s approach to Taiwan, where she observes that ‘the danger to the postcolonial critique now in Ireland is that it will be co-opted to a discourse of the authentic and native, sometimes called shared history’ (16). This is arguably what occurred when the KMT replaced Japan as the rulers of Taiwan, and then again when the KMT’s imposition of a Chinese identity gave way to an essentialized ‘Taiwanese’ identity. As Meaney notes, ‘the inevitability of the process whereby new nation-states operate in remarkably similar ways to their imperial predecessors from the point where they acquire armies, borders and institutions limits the liberationary potential of even the most utopian nationalisms’ (143).

Meaney’s essays are grouped into three parts: ‘Race, Women, and Nation’; ‘Writing, Bodies, Canons’; and ‘Race, Masculinity, and Popular Culture’. The book’s gender perspective in particular, could be used to re-examine the construction of Taiwan’s nationalisms and to challenge patriarchal nationalist discourses. Feminist critiques in Taiwan did not emerge until the late 1980s, when they began to explore male domination and gender inequalities in the contexts of the family and workplace in terms of biological essentialism. These critiques have since the 2000s moved on to the notion of gender as a cultural construction, re-examining gender subjectivities and domination as a systematic property of socio-cultural production as a whole (Sangren 2009). However, very few feminist scholars on Taiwan have extended their work, like Meaney, to issues of national subjectivities; one exception is Fang-Mei Lin’s ‘Women’s Organizations and the Changing State/Society Relationship: Resistance, Co-option by the State, or Partnership?’ (2008), although Lin’s paper is concerned primarily with whether it is possible for feminist advocacy organizations to forge a new governmentality linking the state and feminist subjectivities. Lin also edited a special issue of Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies entitled ‘Transnational Taiwan’ (2010), in which she argued that in order to

construct a Taiwan(ese) national identity or subjectivity, one must negotiate with and among a range of complex factors. These include not only history, colonialism and geopolitics but also inter-textuality, cross- or intra-cultural translation and the narrative arts of cinema and the novel. (3)

However, feminist critiques have left nationalisms and nationalist narrations in Taiwan largely un-gendered.

Meaney’s first chapter can be seen as laying out a feminist analytical framework for the whole volume, and her approach could also be applied specifically to
Taiwan. She begins by quoting Anne McClintock: ‘all nationalisms are gendered’ (quoted on page 1), and later draws on McClintock’s observation that: ‘Excluded from direct action as national citizens, women are subsumed symbolically into the national body politic as its boundary and metaphorical limit’ (quoted on page 4). Meaney further develops this gendering approach into the context of ‘Virgin Mother Ireland’, arguing that:

> the centrality of Mariology in Irish Catholicism and the extent to which issues of reproduction and sexuality dominated public debates and anxieties around modernization while sharing many of the general characteristics of the gendering of national identity... are in the Irish case also powerfully linked to residual anxieties around race and Ireland’s postcolonial position as a white European nation. (6)

As such, the emerging field of ‘feminisms and nationalisms’ in Irish Studies could offer a new direction for Taiwan Studies, exploring the extent to which gender (and race/ethnicity) constitutes a fundamental structuring principle in the construction of a common (shared) national identity and subjectivity, and in making the distinction between the colonized self and the colonizer other; in Shelley Feldman’s words, with ‘women as symbol, men as agents of the nation, colonized space as feminine, colonial power as masculine’ (quoted on page 1).

Among the topics of the first part of Meaney’s book is an examination, and critique, of the ‘imposition of a very definite feminine identity as guarantor of the precarious masculinity of the new state’ (5), in which women’s sexuality was inscribed in religious imagery and severely socially regulated; she is critical in particular of how gendering and racializing strategies are naturalized through the figure of the Virgin Mary in Ireland. Meaney regards the decoding of such strategies as vital, and she discusses how women’s writing ‘in the margins of the national project’ (77) engages with alternative possibilities of nation and state. She urges readers to ‘deconstruct the binary of colonizer and colonized, agency and victimization, pure and hybrid, and acknowledge the extent to which complex processes of accommodation, resistance and opportunism have shaped the concept of “Irishness”’ (7). She further argues that by moving beyond representations of Ireland as a feminine land and landscape, ‘the national body could no longer be a body to be possessed, but to be lived in’ (77). Feminists in Irish Studies are now working to effect a different kind of nation-state, and Meaney indicates that:

> Yet it remains important to understand the basis of the affiliations between women and nationalism, which historically has publicly operated in situations of national crisis...It is equally important to be aware of and challenge the sacrificial logic that structured that affiliation. (77)

By contrast, very few scholars of Taiwan’s literature have brought gender perspectives into their analyses of national narratives; one exception is Chia-Ling Mei’s ‘Gender Discourse and the Development of Post-war Fiction in Taiwan’ (2003), which focuses on the symbolic imaginaries among the nation, the family and gender. However, although literature scholars in Taiwan have begun to touch on gender and nationalisms, their analyses, unlike Meaney’s, approach the
development of national imaginaries and nationalist narrations largely uncritically. Despite this significant gap, though, there are new approaches which, although they tend not to engage explicitly with critiques of Taiwan’s nationalisms, go around the subject of nationalism by exploring Taiwanese women’s subjectivities in relation to transnationalism; one example is Kuei-Fen Chiu’s ‘Documentary Power: Women Documentary Filmmakers and New Subjectivities in Contemporary Taiwan’ (2012).

Meaney’s first essay of the second part further develops the theme of gendering writing, through seeking ‘the traces of cultural, political and social agitation excluded from existing histories of Ireland between 1922 and 1960’ in ‘the “minor” fiction of the time’ (120). Of course, the censorship and cultural pressure experienced by Irish writers was less extreme than the contemporaneous military rule in Taiwan, but that does not necessarily mean that dissent or cultural critique was impossible (and Meaney’s book also reminds us not to ignore the output of exiles and those looking in). Although the second part in particular presents an alternative assessment of Ireland’s literary landscape that reaches beyond the ‘canonical’, James Joyce nevertheless looms large, and a long essay at the heart of this part discusses Joyce in relation to modern critical (re)assessments, literary responses, and Joyce’s place in Dublin’s heritage industry.

A discussion of John Huston’s adaptation of The Dead is fruitfully compared with Ousmane Sembène’s Xala, and this juxtaposition between Ireland and post-colonial Senegal raises the possibility of further comparison with Taiwan: in both cases discussed by Meaney (quoting Laura Mulvey on Xala) ‘the question of language is at the political centre of the drama’ (148), with characters in both stories reproached for a fondness for French (the colonial language in the case of Senegal, and of international high culture in turn of the last century Ireland) over their own language. Also, in both cases, the main character is not in control of the narrative. Meaney points out that national histories and national identities are both ‘subject to haunting by the excluded, the subjects of expedient amnesia, the spectres of change’ (152). She then argues that if Irish nationalists would move beyond ‘the fetishized authenticity of the traumatic past’, they need to take on the challenge of ‘rearticulation of the boundaries of the sayable’ (152) demanded by the haunting ghosts.

The final part of the book reminds us that a country’s particular discourses about itself are not the only way in which culture is constructed, by looking at ‘Irishness’ and Irish masculinity as it appears in American films and in American and British television series. The Irish experience and character have become a rich resource for exploring American history and culture (Meaney discusses Martin Scorcese’s Gangs of New York); in contrast, it is difficult to think of anything comparable in relation to Taiwan, which is largely absent as a distinct location in western popular entertainment, but perhaps Taiwanese characteristics in the Chinese imaginary – beyond official pronouncements about the island’s status – is a subject worth comparable exploration.

Also, Meaney notes that the way that Irish ethnicity is used as a theme in American dramas such as Rescue Me and The Wire. In these shows, Irish heroic figures tend to be represented as having self-destructive characteristics, ‘with their Irishness functioning as a protective distance (they are not quite American heroes)’. Flawed Irish Americans in these television series ‘expressed the desire for unity
and the terror of disintegration in a divided nation’ (190). While Meaney questions this stereotype from her feminist perspective, Taiwan has yet to reflect on ‘ethnicity’ in any way in its television dramas. Ethnicity, as Meaney observes, ‘is a matter of family history’ and that ‘makes the history of immigration personal’ (190) and intimate.

Overall, Ireland and Irish Studies as described in Meaney’s book bear many striking similarities with Taiwan and Taiwan Studies. Ireland and Taiwan are both made complex by [their] ability to celebrate [their] multiculturalism and simultaneously restrict national citizenship on the basis of ethnicity’ (153). Also, Irish Studies and Taiwan Studies have both invested heavily in their own particularities; ironically, ‘a particularity that seeks exception from the global system that produces it’ (20). The search for genuine and authentic native voices in Ireland and Taiwan needs to bear in mind Vincent Cheng’s warning, as quoted by Meaney, that such a search may ‘serve only to provide us with a feel-good liberal and multicultural glow – while in actuality merely recycling tokenism and nostalgia’ (15). The issues discussed in Meaney’s book require careful and critical re-examination in relation to Taiwan, especially in the contexts of economic turmoil and global migratory flows. Meaney commends Vincent Cheng’s use of James Joyce as a resource for the construction of ‘all sorts of cosmopolitan, migrant, hyphenated and intercultural identities’ (15), in contrast to elements of Irish cultural criticism that privilege Joyce’s Irishness. It is an approach that parallels thoughts elaborated in this special issue of Taiwan in Comparative Perspective on ‘Taiwan and Ireland in Comparative Perspective’.

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Submission Details

Academic articles
Articles should contain a comparative perspective in the widest sense. This could mean comparisons between Taiwan and other parts of the world, Taiwan in the past and in the present, different regions and cultures of Taiwan, or different methodological and disciplinary approaches to the study of a theme or issue concerning Taiwan. Articles for inclusion in the Journal should be around 8000 words, and should follow the Harvard style of referencing. Manuscripts should begin with an abstract of around 100 words.

Commentaries
As well as formal academic work, the Journal is also interested in receiving relevant critical and theoretical writing aimed at an educated general readership. Such pieces should engage with a current political, socio-cultural, or economic issue, dealt with in a comparative or interdisciplinary perspective: for example, comparing Taiwan with another part of the world, Taiwan in the past and the present, different regions or cultures of Taiwan, or different theoretical approaches. Commentary articles should be around 4000 words, and footnoting should be kept to a minimum.

Review articles
Review articles should be around 1500–2000 words, and should contain no footnotes. Reviews should be of a comparative nature: either comparing a work (e.g. a book, film, or exhibition) on Taiwan with a work on another area, or bringing in background knowledge from a different area. Reviews may also be written on Taiwan-related material contained within volumes that have a wider scope, such as edited volumes with a chapter on Taiwan. The journal also welcomes reviews of older ‘landmark’ texts about Taiwan reviewed from a contemporary perspective; for example, a re-appraisal of George Kerr’s Formosa Betrayed (1965) four decades on would be suitable.

Making the Submission
Submission should be made by MS-Word compatible email attachment with a file name based on the title of the article to F.Shih@lse.ac.uk. On the cover sheet, please give your full name, institutional affiliation (if any), and a brief biographical note of your research interests. Please do not include your name on other pages. All manuscripts should be double-spaced.

All submissions that meet the above requirements will be reviewed by two referees. Articles may then be accepted subject to revisions being made by the author.

Articles that are finally accepted will be returned to the authors for proof-reading before publication. The editors reserve the right to make changes to articles regarding content and length, although any substantial alterations will only be made in consultation with the author.

References
References should follow the Harvard Style. Citations should appear within the text in parentheses, and consist of the author’s surname followed by year of publication and, if appropriate, specific page numbers – e.g. (Yang 2005) or (Smith and Lin 1999: 74). If there are more than two authors, please indicate this as (Lee et al 1978). Where an author has more than one work cited which originated in the same year, the dates should be distinguished in the text and bibliography by a letter – e.g. (Hirose 1987a). Where several references appear consecutively, these should be chronological, or if from the same year, alphabetical – e.g. (Perkins 1997; Wu 2003) and (Adams 2003; Pan 2003).

Illustrations and tables should be referred to as Figures and given numbers – e.g. ‘Fig. 1’. They should be submitted on a separate sheet with their captions, and the manuscript should indicate where they should appear in the text.

Transliteration
Articles are permitted to contain Chinese characters, although the complete form is preferred. Pinyin is also preferred, except for proper names.

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