

## **'Communism' in Taiwan and the Mainland: Transmission of the Great Leap Famine and of the White Terror**

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*I present the results of two local studies of the transmission of great state violence, one in the People's Republic of China, the other in ROC Taiwan, in both of which the word 'Communism' has had effects on the ways the experience of the violence is transmitted. In both cases, the experience of violence was accompanied by shame and dishonour. Also in both cases, the very political change that has enabled more open transmission has also been accompanied by great economic changes. Together these have created a generation gap, with the consequence that the young are not much interested in the history of past suffering. The two cases raise interesting questions and issues of the ways in which the recalling and transmission of personal experience are affected by printed and other forms of public transmission, including schooling, when the experience is part of something given great political significance. I conclude with a reflection on the distance between the ways people in both cases have found to commemorate, even without naming, the acts and experiences of state violence and more official public transmission and consider whether the archive of records, including our own oral histories, may or may not lead to new historical directions and stories.*

I am concerned with the formation of the records, narrations, and transmission of a recent shared experience and their entry into a politics of history in two cases, one from mainland China, the other from Taiwan. They offer intriguing points of similarity, as well as expected contrasts.<sup>1</sup>

More generally, the dynamic that interests me comes from two kinds of experience – of memory and of learning. On the one hand recalling something experienced, recalling it to oneself or for interpersonal transmission, can produce not just an interpretation but also possibly an alternative or more conflicted sense of what is transmitted much more simply in public memory. On the other hand recalling even personal experiences is strongly affected by what is learned

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through the transmission of public memory. So there is a dynamic between the experience and the ways of sharing experiences that are learned in the process of remembering.

Public memory is always hierarchical, an honouring and a denigrating power of authoritative recognition. As a result, narratives that are interpersonally transmitted, whether habitually or consciously, have a ranked or even completely excluded possibility of identification with the public memory presented to the transmitters. Exclusion can give rise to the demand for inclusion, which is to demand a new establishment of public memory. The feeling of such a demand can be long-lasting and a version of the feeling can be transmitted, either by those whose experience it was or by others on their behalf, as grievance, for instance about shared harm caused by the powers that control public memory. It is transmitted as a painful feeling of social injustice. Its demands and any resolution of them will be determined by the political and legal culture in which it is transmitted and by the surrounding authorities to which it can appeal. Such groups of sufferers of shared harm can form into something like cults of affliction, finding solace in others who can be expected to know from experience what cannot be adequately expressed, and at the same time finding articulation in making a joint case for recognition and often also restitution. They can be continued over more than one generation from the original sufferers – prisoners of war from a particular camp, veterans' organisations, or victims of Japanese chemical and biological wartime experimentation are examples. It is usual that the formation of a political will to organise such groups takes a generation. On the other hand, it can happen that shared experience does not have the means, the precedent, the motivation or the external agency and politics for a righting of wrongs.

### **The two case studies**

Through interviews and secondary resources, I have been studying two instances of the transmission of shared and catastrophic loss, both of which involve political terror, acts of state violence. One is an encirclement campaign by Nationalist (Guomindang) troops and police of some hamlets in the mountains of Luku in northern Taiwan in the winter of 1952-3. It has been established without dispute that the whole young and middle-aged male and much of the female population of the upper parts of Luku were rounded up and confined in the local temple, branch school and a local hall where they were interrogated and beaten into identifying who were the leaders and participants in what was claimed by the police and the military court to have been an armed Communist base. Thirty-five were executed, 97 imprisoned, and 32 went into hiding or were kept under surveillance but not sentenced. In all, 164 of the economically active men were thus removed from the mountain area, most of the male working population of the worst affected parts of Luku village (Zhang and Gao, 1998: 30-31). The operation is now seen as part of the period called the White Terror, and the families of the executed and imprisoned villagers have been compensated with cash and a memorial to the wrongs done to them. Their senses of having been wronged have been mobilised. Victims have been identified, most of the jailed and the close family of the executed and jailed have been named and brought together in two volumes of testimonial interviews

by Professor Zhang Yan-xian and two co-researchers. But the victims were never organised as a group.

My research colleague Dr Shih Fang-long and I later interviewed many of those who had been imprisoned, many of them already interviewed by Professor Zhang, as well as others of the same generation who are also from the area, and a younger generation of people both from outside who have come to live in the area and from local families near the area affected.

The second event took place in mainland China. It is the famine that occurred not just as a result of the Great Leap Forward but which was made worse by the continuation in 1959 of the campaign to raise production of grain and steel despite evidence of famine. Any complaint or disobedience of orders to report what were obviously inflated figures and absurd instructions were prevented by political shaming and use of force in an Anti-Right-Opportunist campaign in that year. The famine was of course far greater in scale than the Luku Incident. But by confining attention to a single locality, as in Luku, the event becomes more comparable. Certainly the Luku Incident was, for people of that locality, a major and a shared catastrophe.

For the Great Leap famine my research colleague Professor Wang Ming-ming and I interviewed people in the Quanzhou region of southern Fujian, not a severely affected area but in which people nevertheless suffered acute malnutrition to the point of oedema for the only time in their lives. In any case this famine differed from previous famines by being nation-wide and was a result of state policy and the fear of being accused of being a Rightist. Most of those we spoke to lived in a village to which Wang Ming-ming and I have been returning since 1991. Others to whom we spoke were in two rural townships of the same county, in the county (*xian*) capital, and in Quanzhou city itself.

In each place, my colleague and I interviewed a judgemental sample (not a representative sample, rather one that maximised contrasts across a number of variables that I judged to be significant) of people of different ages, positions or statuses, including some who are in a position to contribute to the compilation of records and the public narration of histories. The samples include people who lived through the event and younger people who only know about it through personal transmission, through public commemoration, or through the mass media and school.

### **The importance for transmission of a major shift in politics**

In the People's Republic of China there were reversals of verdicts for many of those accused and sentenced for being Right-Opportunists as early as 1962, when there was a mass amnesty of 70% of cadres and all the ordinary people who had been labelled 'Right-Opportunists' (Bernstein 2006). In 1981 there was a partial condemnation of the leaders responsible for the policies that led to the famine and a further bout of reversals of verdicts. But reversals of verdicts and sentences of leaders have concentrated on the years of the Cultural Revolution. There has been no designation of the famine itself and those who starved in it as a period of culpable disaster, such as the decade labelled Cultural Revolution. There has been no judicial sentencing of those responsible for it, as there was for the so-called Gang of Four held responsible for the Cultural Revolution.

By contrast, in Taiwan, as in Germany since the Second World War, there has been an acknowledgement and an apology by the government of the same country for its past guilt. And as in Germany, what has made this possible is a more dramatic change in politics and in the writing of a past and its trajectory to a future than there has been in the People's Republic of China. In Taiwan and Germany, there has been compensation and ceremonial commemoration for the families of victims. Common to both Taiwan and Germany are notions of the state's guilt. The Guomintang government was induced, under President Lee Teng-hui, to acknowledge its guilt, as was Germany, under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, for the annihilation of Europe's Jews. Not only has the secret name 'White Terror' been officially authenticated as history, so has its largest single operation been named the 'Luku Incident'.

On the other hand, in contrast to Germany and like the PRC, in Taiwan perpetrators have not been tried. And there is a contrast to be made between the new histories in Germany and in Taiwan. German history now favours German pride in unification of the territories of the defeated Germany, in having performed a miracle of economic reconstruction and in becoming an economic powerhouse in the European Union, but not in the fulfilment of a single national historic destiny. In contrast, instead of being a part of a nation that is also a sub-continental civilisation, such as Europe or China, the history of Taiwan is being rewritten as the story of an island people treated as its own autonomous subject. The White Terror is easily accommodated into this as a period of Taiwanese suffering and humiliation before rising triumphantly towards freedom. The context of the commemoration of the Luku Incident is Taiwan's burgeoning self-identification against the threat from the mainland.

The accusation of being a 'Communist spy' was one weapon in an armoury used by the Guomintang military command of Taiwan to censor and eliminate political opposition to its rule. But it is also possible and justifiable to understand the Luku Incident as a continuation of the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists, even though most of the villagers involved were not aware of the ideologies and politics of the China-wide conflict. Indeed, it could be said that the very name White Terror sanctions this, referring back to the slaughter of Communists by the Guomintang Republican government between 1927 and 1931. There could be an identification of Taiwanese compatriots with Communists as fellow sufferers of the Guomintang government, but, as we shall see, this understanding is marginalised because the spread of the Civil War between Communists and Nationalists to Taiwan in the years from 1945 to 1953 does not suit the new history of Taiwan.

There are two quite different uncertainties about the public memory of the Great Leap famine on the one hand and the Luku Incident on the other. In the case of the famine, the change of regime after the death of Mao and of the way history at the time was written, public memory has concentrated on the Cultural Revolution and its link to the Great Leap Forward as a leftist trend and error called 'the Communist wind'. But there has been no commemoration or compensation of the victims of the famine. The fear of being labelled 'Rightist' has been removed, but the subject of the famine is still censored. In the case of the Luku Incident, by being included in the White Terror, the victims have been commemorated and compensated, but there is still a political problem, even a taboo, on the question

of being sympathetic to what was at the time labelled 'Communist'. How these two exclusions are exercised in public memory, including the writing and teaching of history, and how they affect interpersonal transmission of the memory will be the subject of this paper.

### **Comparative recalling of 'Communism'**

'Communism' figures in both, but in quite different ways. For the mainland, 'Communism' is not a scare word, as it is in Taiwan. Instead, it is in the name of the ruling Party. But one of the reasons now given for the excesses that caused the famine is the 'Communist wind' – the idea that in a short time, of a few years, production of steel and grain would reach UK levels and then the highest, of the USA, and that these would be reached by organising not only production but consumption on a large collective scale, and that people would be able to eat according to need, instead of according to the work they put in. In Taiwan, 'Communism' still bears many if not all of the connotations of the Chinese civil war as seen from the perspective of the Guomintang. For the almost forty years of what is now named 'White Terror', from 1949 to 1987, the problem of true or false accusations of being a Communist spy (*'feidi'*) and the threat of being accused of *panluan*, subverting the Guomintang's Republic of China, was constant.

In the mainland, 'Communism' is still in power but in charge of a change of politics and an even faster change of economics than in Taiwan. This change in policy has slowed down to an indifferently distant future the era of Communist abundance. It has speeded up the appearance of capitalist inequality and prosperity, complicated by the fact that the leaders of the capitalist reform, including Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, were complicit in the Great Leap Forward.

In Taiwan, anti-Communism has been overlain by fear of a Chinese-Communist-Party-led threat to Taiwan. The existence of a Taiwanese Communist Party has been made a barely noticeable past. Compensation for White Terror state violence against those accused of being Communist spies excludes those who are found actually to have been Communists, just as in the People's Republic of China, reversal of the verdict of having been a Rightist is subject to testing for having actually been a counter-revolutionary. The clarity of the issue in Taiwan is muddied by the fact that two prominent ex-Communists ran the Red-labelling terror – Gu Zheng-wen, head of investigation and surveillance and his boss Mao Ren-feng, head of the Secret Service (the Bao Miju).<sup>2</sup>

### **Some methodological findings and further considerations**

What people told us about the catastrophic event was always heavily affected by what they had learned from other sources than their own or family members' experiences. In particular, they were aware of what was still censored. In the

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<sup>2</sup> I am most grateful to Professor Chen Yung-fa, a historian of the Chinese Communist Party at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, for this information, provided during discussion at a conference there, 4-5 November 2005, to which I presented the results of our research on Luku.

mainland to talk of greater suffering after Liberation (1949) than before was not permitted. In Taiwan to speak of having been sympathetic to the ideals of social justice taught by 'Communists' is an act of daring. At the same time they always kept something in reserve from the narratives they had learned. The degree to which something was held in reserve, and our access to what it might have been, varied a great deal, and it presents the most interesting subject and problem for my research.

Whatever the experience, its memory is always greater than what can be recalled and is actually transmitted. It is always to some extent personal and individual. Personal recall is always, inevitably, more detailed and more mixed with associated memories than any historical account. But when it is given social significance and that significance is changed radically it becomes a conflicted experience, at the same time shared and isolated from others by the humiliation, fear or shame that first accompanied it, and then the more recent change of significance creates another confusion.

From comparison with reports of other parts of China than Quanzhou, I have concluded that people will speak about what they had to do to survive the famine, but where they were not able to find sustenance for a member of their household they feel shame, and others do not identify them so that their shame need not be exposed. This does not apply to villages where so many died of famine that most families failed to ensure that all members survived. In these villages it is possible more openly to share the experience. In any case the shared hardship of what are still named, in a political downgrading of their significance, 'the three years of hardship (*sannian kunnan shiqi*)' is at the same time a playing down of the experience and a playing up of being together in the same predicament. Something similar happens in the transmission of the experience of concentration camp survivors: they cannot easily speak of the humiliation and degradation themselves, but prefer to speak of how they survived, including the occasional help of some SS guards (see for instance Bodemann 2005: 28-30).

But concentration camp victims were also victims of targeted violence, as in the targeting of the so-called Communists in Luku. They are isolated from everyone else. Indeed, for the whole of the period of martial law in Taiwan, the families of victims were isolated not only from everyone else but also from other victim families, no-one daring to recall the experience outside close family and friends. In sum, the different social politics of the experience of a social event at the time subsequently determine how an experience is recalled, how much it can be shared and the terms on which it is recognised as shared.

Before turning to the political uncertainties that affect how people have spoken about the catastrophic events in Quanzhou and Luku I want first to add the obvious but important fact that both the mainland and Taiwan have changed economically as well as politically, and therefore the reality and senses of reality and of what is important have changed.

## New realities and their effects

### *Mainland China*

The accounts given by those who were cadres at the time vary according to their willingness to admit responsibility, which is probably affected by how well they could trust us. Two who could trust us admitted they were responsible for carrying out orders against their better judgement. Those who were not in positions of any kind of power or who were among those identified as being 'bad' class elements were more willing to blame the whole Party, including its highest leader, Mao. Otherwise there was little difference in general tenor and shape between their accounts and official history, promulgated soon after the ending of the Great Leap campaign that the famine was the result of natural disaster and Leftism in the direction of policy, except that they provided far greater detail of the campaigns and the ways in which they cheated inspectors to enable them to give reports of high production figures and meet the wildly exaggerated quotas and so avoid being labelled Rightists.

We went to visit Mr Li, a lively septuagenarian who had been a 'bad element' because he is descended from a great imperial official and landlord whose house is now being promoted as a tourist site in a rural township. We spoke with him in the great house, where he works as a custodian (22 March 2004). He had told us that a few people had died of starvation during the famine in the township.

*Did you tell your children and grandchildren about your [famine] experience?*

Yes. But they just comment on how 'useless' [*'meiyou yong'* – South Fujianese: *'bou lou ieng'*] we were.

The same phrase, 'useless' (in the same language) was often on the lips of our interviewees in Taiwan as well. But there it always referred to the irrelevance of the history and the commemoration of the Luku Incident to current concerns of surviving and prospering. To Mr Li in a small town in the Quanzhou region it also refers to current circumstances, but only as a reason for the young not being able to understand how the older generation had put up with the commands of cadres that were obviously impractical and dangerous. It expresses incomprehension, rather than a context of what is useful. But the issue of the relevance of the past to the present is common to both.

Across this gap between generations made by the great political and economic changes that followed the death of Mao and the trial of the Gang of Four, the young think that their elders must have been stupid to follow the commands of the Great Leap Forward.

A retired cadre, who at the time was vice-chief of a brigade, answered our question

*Do you tell your children about those times?*

Yes. Some ask why we worked so hard. Others say 'you were so stupid.'

A middle-aged companion who was present added that his 20-year-old son said 'you must have been lazy not to have enough food'.

Apart from finding it incomprehensible in their own contexts, the young appear to reject the past of their elders, saying that it is not their own past. For their part, members of senior generations experience from the young a disowning of their pasts. But when they die, their lives are remembered conventionally with gratitude for the sacrifices they had made and the hardship they had suffered for their children. This was a general sentiment, without specifying the Great Leap famine.

Some idea of what the post-Mao generation say comes from a 31-year-old tea businessman in the main village of our Quanzhou research. We asked him:

*From whom did you hear [about the difficult years]?*

From my father's generation.

*Why did they talk about them?*

It was 'whip talk' ['bianci'], to teach children 'remember bitterness to think of sweetness' ['yikusutian'].

*Did you learn about them at school?*

No.

*Should it be taught at school?*

It's in the past. Teaching about it is useless.

But he did acknowledge a debt to Mao. He said, using the term Mao had used, that a *fanshen*, a turning about, had occurred because Deng Xiaoping took power. He added that Mao had created the foundation of enterprise (*qiye*), and then Deng had harnessed it. His wife agreed but had a different attitude to what young people should learn. She was the cadre in charge of women's affairs in the village. She said that children should be taught about the years of hardship, including the years of hard toil under the leadership of Mao:

Now we have the single child system and a very high standard of living. We are very happy. It is important children know that *lai zhe bu yi* – to have reached this point was not easy.

The continuation of terms and genres coined during the Mao era is worth remarking in another instance from the young man's response. 'To remember bitterness to think of [present] sweetness' became a regular feature of ritualised meetings in which, during the Mao years 1949-1976, memories of suffering before the Chinese Communist Party took state power in 1949 were recounted in order to highlight Liberation (*Jiefang* – which also names the year 1949) from that suffering. Remembering a time *after* Liberation as bitterness was still felt as a very recent taboo by some of our informants and during the seventies it had indeed to be kept hidden.

Then we asked two middle school students who had been listening to this,

*Have you learned about the hardship years?*

No.

*Have you been told about them by older people?*

No.<sup>3</sup>

Among the abrupt changes, one that I would single out, because of its having to do with public memory, is tourism as a way of preserving the past. In the mainland, one effect of recent political history on tourism has been to add the birth and campaign places of other leaders of the armed forces of the Communist Party than Mao, such as Deng Xiaoping as a military leader in Baise town, Guangxi. But a far greater effect has been to endorse the rebuilding of local temples, ancestral halls, and the refurbishing of the houses of what in the pre-Communist past had been the local elite. One result has been that the time of the Mao years, which had put all such institutions into a bitter and rejected past, have been put into a framework in which they themselves appear as a time of past hardship. This diminishes the Mao years, making them one turning point among others that preceded the prosperity after the Mao years for those who look back from the present.

The point I want to stress here is how the great changes and the generation gap have created a barrier to the transmission of the memories of those who lived through the famine. Although they are far freer to talk about it, few people in the next generation are interested.

### *Taiwan*

There is not the same sharpness of a generation gap, nor the same coincidence of political and economic change in Taiwan. The changes in politics marked by the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the Presidential apology in 1995 for the 2: 28 1947 massacres of Taiwanese from 28 February to May 1947 and the subsequent years of White Terror by the Guomindang troops and police were preceded by economic growth that had many years before 1987 turned Taiwan from a predominantly agrarian into a predominantly industrial economy.

In Taiwan, what is of greatest significance is that, since 1987, rising incomes and increasing leisure time have coincided with the political movement of indigenisation, placing emphasis on Taiwanese history and identity. Prosperity has generated tourism in Taiwan. The mountainous areas of the border between Shiding, Xizhe, and Nangang, where the Luku Incident took place, are within easy reach of the growing city of Taipei and have become a resort for day visits. The economy of the mountains had until the 1970s been bare subsistence farming and coalmining. The execution or imprisonment of so many of the men forced the women of the Luku villages to seek work in the mines or elsewhere. Many moved away. Then when the coalmines closed for economic reasons, the area was

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<sup>3</sup> A man in his thirties, met in London January 2006 in the course of presenting this research, was born in a poor village in north-western China. He was frequently hungry as a child. But when he told his parents he was hungry, wanting to eat more and therefore depriving his younger sister of food, his parents would admonish him 'do you think you were born in 1960?', which was the middle of the famine. So, even subsequent severe shortage was nothing compared to the famine. Such reminders in everyday domestic life are a marker of the event, even without its being an official historical event. But it is not easily specifiable.

further depopulated. Its main sources of income are now related to tourism and associated industries of special foods (ginger, bamboo shoots, soybean, *lingzhe* edible fungi, tea) and crafts (woodcarving, dyed textiles, painting). On this basis outsiders are repopulating the area.<sup>4</sup> At the same time there has also been a return of the victims to claim their land for themselves and their families. They come to their old houses and spend the days there, doing odd jobs, before returning to the town or city home of the child who looks after them. Between them and the outsiders who have come to live in Luku, there is both a generation gap and the distance of a native from a newcomer.

We interviewed one outsider, the cook at a teahouse built during the nineties just above the road that is a route of buses that bring visitors to this picturesque mountain area. It is immediately above the memorial to the victims of the Luku Incident, to the side of the road coming up from Nangang. Just down the hill from the teahouse and the memorial is the Taipei Tea Museum. Both the memorial and the tea museum are stops on the route of a coach tour of this mountain area. He gave us a business card of one such tour organisation.

We asked him 'Do many tourists who come to the tea-house ask about the memorial?' 'Many do.' But he later qualified this when he told us that his parents, who lived in Taipei city, knew about it and added that anyone over the age of seventy would know about it and want to know more. A Taiwanese customer told him that he had been in Japan at the time of the Incident and read about it in Japanese newspapers, and that was why he had come to visit. In other words the generation that was adult at the time is likely to know about it and to be curious to remind themselves or to find out more. But younger people are not as interested, even when they live in the area. For them, as for him, the memorial is one spot on a tour.

Compare this with a man who was born in Luku but then moved to Taipei with his father, found various kinds of work there, married and had children, divorced and then after his father's death returned in middle age to his old home and rebuilt it. He remembered as a child seeing his father talking to others of that generation about the Incident. They would constantly look around in case anyone from another place was coming near, and would fall silent even when he, a child in the household, approached. His father warned him never to get involved with politics and politicians. In fact, in the course of his work in Taipei city, before returning to Luku, he had gone against his father's advice and made good contacts with a number of senior politicians of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), then the chief opposition party. When Shih Fang-long informed him that one of them had written a book on Communism in Taiwan, the skin on his arms immediately roughened into goose pimples. Both of them noticed and he observed how the fear from the old days had become instinctual.

He has made sure that his two daughters, in the local primary school, do know about the Incident. But none of the other children at the school, even the few others who come down from the Luku villages, know or care.

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<sup>4</sup> A restaurant and health resort using *Lingzhe* fungi has been built where the Taiyang coalmine clubhouse was until the mine was closed. The clubhouse was the venue of an initial rounding up of 'Communist' suspects in the Luku Incident.

A good friend of the same age from another part of Shiding is a keen local historian and a businessman in the flourishing tourist economy, whose promotion he is leading. He takes tourists to visit the temple, which was the main site of detention and interrogation and tells visitors what he knows. He is haunted by the thought that many were killed there because he saw human bones in the temple when he visited it as a child and thought [wrongly in fact] that they must have been the remains of those killed in the operation. But even he thinks historical knowledge for its own sake is 'no use'.

Economic reason vies with personal experience and interest for him, as it does for some of the victims, such as the wife of one of the executed, who cannot help recalling her terrified experience yet also asked what use is recording it. For her, it is no help in bringing her husband back or in alleviating what she had to endure to survive. She does talk about it, but at the same time it is no use. Her daughter therefore knows about it, but seeks to stop her mother from recalling it in a vain wish to stop her suffering.

For interpersonal transmission to be recorded and for a version of it to cross this gap between generations and include people who are not local depends on such public institutions as schools. The same applies to the public memory of the Great Leap famine.

### **School history**

Schooling is an instrument of inculcating habits of learning and senses of belonging, of having a shared past with other citizens and subjects of the country whose government has the authority to oversee the coordination of a national curriculum. In all countries, advance from schooling into higher education brings greater opportunity to read and to choose relevant reading, except that infant and primary education is where teachers have the greatest freedom to choose and create their own teaching materials. Within these generalisations, which are true of all modern states, there is great variation in the extent to which states govern national curricula and allow teachers and students their initiative in following them, in particular the curriculum of modern history and within that the history of the peoples of their nation.

School history teaching in mainland China and until very recently in Taiwan has been very prescriptive.

#### *Taiwan*

Until 1996 the government of Taiwan ran a school system with unified and standardised textbooks in Chinese, history, social studies, and geography at all levels of schooling. The Ministry of Education had a monopoly on the production of textbooks (Chang 2002: 235-238). It was not until 2002 that local culture, with materials developed by the teachers, became a compulsory and graded subject in all of the first 9 years of schooling. For higher levels of schooling a rewriting of textbooks has been in preparation for a long time. In the early eighties members of the Institute of History and Philology and then in the Institute of Modern History in the central research institution, Academia Sinica, were commissioned by the Ministry of Education to form two groups to prepare for rewriting history books for

junior middle and high schools, using oral history to compile materials, so that the history of Taiwan could be better included.<sup>5</sup> One of the best-known such set of textbooks *Knowing Taiwan* ('*Renshi Taiwan*') was produced under the direction of the then head of the Institute of History and Philology in 1995. In 1997 three textbooks, on Taiwanese history, geography, and society, were used from grade 7 (13 years old). Their original overseer is presently (since 2004) the Minister of Education and is now overseeing the autonomy of schools and their teachers to choose their own textbooks from both government and non-government publishers. One effect of this freedom has been that with changes in the party of local government, the three *Knowing Taiwan* textbooks could be abandoned in favour of others. In 2001, knowledge of Taiwan was integrated into a more general field of social studies and *Knowing Taiwan* was withdrawn from junior high school and a new version introduced for senior high school students in 2006 (Tu 2007).

In any case, textbooks for Middle and High school in Taipei that we have seen include only very short sections on the White Terror period, under one page long. The teachers' handbooks accompanying them expand the information to naming a number of well-known intellectuals and organisers who were prosecuted. But they include nothing on Luku. The only way in which it might be included is in primary school materials for *xiangtu jiaoxue*, studying the locality. The county, in this case Taipei County, issues the textbook for local studies. But it includes nothing on the White Terror, let alone Luku. So that leaves the extra materials that teachers in the local schools have the responsibility to compile.

We interviewed the head teacher of the school that caters for children from the Luku area. We found that the only local person on the staff of the school was the caretaker. She knows about the Incident, but she has not been included in the compilation of teaching materials. Inclusion of the Incident depends on outsiders taking an interest, but at the same time judging what are the priorities.<sup>6</sup> In 2005 the school organised the first trip for the whole school to visit local sites. One is planned to happen every year. Individual teachers go first to prepare students for their work reports (*xuexi dan*) to be completed after the trip. The teachers had asked local older people about the Luku Incident, but they were not willing to talk.

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<sup>5</sup> Many thanks to Dr Hsiung Ping-chen, one of the members involved, for this information.

<sup>6</sup> The school has a large catchment area, including pupils not only from Shiding but some from the neighbouring township of Shenkeng, and it is a model school pioneering the integration of nine years, of primary with junior middle school classes. According to the head teacher there are two types of book: popular (*minjian*), produced locally, and centralised (*tongbian*), issued by the state. Teachers are expected to produce their own materials to complement both. Taipei County's book describes each of the County's regions, including this one, Wenshan *qu*. In addition, the school is a centre for a view of local affairs and events, providing the locality with a library, which for instance contains a report (*baogao*) about the area produced by staff of the Huafan Buddhist University in Shiding. It omits the Memorial and the Incident. More personal reports (*qinzi gongbu*) can also be included. It is only in such reports that the history of Luku might figure in the future.

The head-teacher had noted the importance of the Incident when he came to the job and had kept a newspaper cutting about it, which he had framed. But he had subsequently found that, as he put it to us:

There are so many points about the Luku Incident that remain inexplicable [*jie bukaide m*]. The older generation are not willing to talk about it [*bu yuanyi tiqi*]. Their minds are still constrained by terror [*kongju*]. If you ask them about it they feel you are threatening them with something. So from the school's point of view, the attitude of the old seems to be that they just want to forget. The school doesn't want to cause them to feel terror. All the teachers are from outside and they do not understand what actually happened in Luku so whatever they might say would be without a basis in evidence [*buyao luanjiang*]. Moreover, there are many other things to teach about, such as the local geography, environment, community, and local culture. As for an unclear and indistinct historical event [*buming bubai lishi shijian*], the school has marked it [the Memorial] on the local map [*xiangtu ditu*] and taken students to visit it. That is why the teachers do not teach about the Luku Incident in the classroom.

It seems to me he is latching on to the condition of teachers doing their own oral historical research when he could have used Professor Zhang's two volumes of interviews.

The Memorial does contain some information. A plaque on one of its low walls describes the political situation after 1949 as unstable and autocratic. It goes on to give a brief factual summary of the event, set in tones of emotive sympathy:

In the encirclement of the mountainous area of Luku, villagers were detained under suspicion of being members of an armed base of Chinese Communist sympathisers. [...] This was the biggest political incident in Taiwan in the 1950s. [...] The villagers were detained in the Vegetarian Hall of Luku, now called the Buddhist temple of Broad Enlightenment [Guangmingsi] [where they were] beaten into confession or charged on the basis of informants' intelligence without any evidence being brought forward. [...] The result was countless wronged souls [of those killed] and suffering in prison. Families were broken, suffering torments of grief.

The last paragraph then states the purpose of the monument. It is

not only to commemorate those who died unjustly but to learn the lesson from their arbitrary arrest and sentences that human rights were crushed and that we should today join hands to make Taiwan a democracy and a society in which rule of law and fair justice prevail.

But not even this memorial text is used in school lessons. So, the Luku Incident is not taught locally because it is, on the head-teachers' evidence, still too frightening for the witnesses to give teachers their testimonies. The memorial's inscriptions are written in the same tone as Professor Zhang Yan-xian's introduction to the first of two volumes of testimony that he published. Those two volumes show that victims were willing to speak to some extent. But they spoke to Professor Zhang and his two assistants in circumstances in which they knew that they could claim compensation for having been wronged. Now that time has

passed. They were subsequently willing to talk to us, because we came to them recommended by close local acquaintances or, in one instance, with Professor Zhang's own endorsement. But we might with some confidence conclude that the testimony they gave him and us was partial and that much of what is transmitted within families and among close friends has been withheld from public memory by political confusion and caution.

By contrast, the famine in China is definitely an item in school textbooks. But the problem there is how it is played down. The famine is not a named event.

### *China*

The Chinese Communist Party is still a master of history. Its decisions on Party history to a great extent determine how and what history is taught in schools. A resolution was adopted by the 6th plenum of the 11th central committee of the CCP on June 27 1981 on the 60 years of advance from its foundation in 1921. Its stress was on the decade 1966-76 during which Proletarian Cultural Revolution was maintained as a Party aim. The resolution sealed a repudiation of mass mobilisation politics and turned it and its culmination in the Cultural Revolution into a regretted past.

The Party's judgement of history between 1921 and 1966, up to the Cultural Revolution, was a balancing of accounts, measuring the predominance of achievements – of economic construction and of strengthening the cause of socialism – against what it named 'mistakes' ('*cuowu*'). These were the mistakes 'of enlarging the scope of class struggle and of impetuosity and rashness in economic construction.'<sup>7</sup> The famine is buried in the Great Leap Forward and the errors of Mao 'and many leading comrades', which look forward to the Cultural Revolution.

This is also how the famine is mentioned in school history textbooks. It enters as a blip in the period of socialist construction and rising production figures until 1966.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Reprinted from *Beijing Review* 1981 as an Appendix in Martin (1982: 188).

<sup>8</sup> Note e.g. the compulsory textbook *Zhongguo Jindai Xiandai Shi* (2000) purchased in Beijing. Page 115 includes a table of falling grain production, but no figures of deaths.

Also, see *Duti yu Zuoti Gaozhong Lishi* (2003) bought in Quanzhou's Xinhua bookshop: '(1) In 1957 the extension of anti-Rightist struggle was seriously overdone. To an extremely large extent, it harmed the activism of the broad mass of cadres, the masses and especially intellectuals.

'(2) The problem of the speed and size of economic construction. In 1958, at the second congress of the 8th Plenary of the Party, the General Guideline was raised. The Guideline ignored objective regularities. It was biased in favour of and exaggerated the agency of the subject. In actual implementation [we were] blind to reality and pursued only speed. [...] In 1958 the Great Leap Forward was launched heedlessly. The result was high indicators, blind instructions, boasting wind and 'Communist' wind, which became the chief manifestations of a Leftist tendency and the mistake seriously overwhelmed the whole country. It induced imbalance of national economic ratios. In addition natural disasters had a lot of influence. The Soviet government did not keep its promises. It tore up its contract of

There is far less fictional and memoir literature by those who experienced the famine, compared to the great amount about the Cultural Revolution.<sup>9</sup> Rather, there are interviews, like the published interviews with Luku victims, in other people's reports and collections of testimony.<sup>10</sup> Other than these, as a local historian observed to us, the Great Leap famine occurs in the context of other narratives, outside school and official histories, in TV and printed biographies. Until very recently, publications of materials on the Great Leap Forward and its disastrous results provided no figures on starvation deaths.<sup>11</sup>

The period of the famine is named 'the three difficult years' (*'san nian kunnan shiqi'*). In conversation, when we mentioned this official designation, few people under the age of thirty knew what three years were meant. For instance when we asked (25 March 2004) a 19-year-old woman who had been to a vocational high school in the county town, what she associated with the years of hardship she recalled the years of her early childhood in the 1980s when her home was

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economic and technical cooperation. All this induced serious difficulties [*yanzhong kunnan*] in the national economy between 1959 and 1961' (117).

<sup>9</sup> The exception is Mo Yan (1997).

<sup>10</sup> See for instance Chen *et al* (1993): 'In Hebei province 8-10 US billions of jin of crops were damaged and in addition there was great waste in the big canteens. So in the beginning of the spring of 1959, shortage in grain farming had already shown itself. The CCP committee in Hebei province reported to the centre on 3 May saying that: "currently the situation of our province's crops is tense. There are thirty counties in our province which are short of food. The most serious include 10 counties." [In Hubei the provincial Party Committee also reported that] the condition of crops is becoming more and more tense. From last year to this year the trend of grain riots [*nao liang*] has emerged here and there. Those places that were awarded red flags reported even more seriously that the spring farming is severe because of the difficulty in transporting grains from place to place. So we estimate that in some places there will be some famine. In Wuhan [city] more than two million people had experienced the condition of supply shortage. [...]

'In February of 1959 people in some places suffered from edema because of serious shortage of food and some places suffered from the problem of abnormal deaths' (321-322).

Also see Zhang (1996): 'The government publicly advocated that the bad results of the People's Commune is because of natural disaster. And the government also described the difficult period as three years of natural disaster. In fact this conclusion does not fit the reality of Yan'guan and Haining areas [*diqu*].

'A middle-aged woman said she had four children and because of shortage of food she had to go to the canteen to get gruel for the children and she herself had to eat what they did not finish plus bark and had suffered from edema. In her village the skin of several people shone because of edema stretching it' (77).

The most extensive collection of testimonies is by Li Rui (ed.) (1999).

<sup>11</sup> Tu Wei-ming (1997: 178n3) mentions an issue of the Shanghai journal, *Shehui* (*Society*) that contained a figure of forty million deaths from starvation. The issue had to be withdrawn. A website on the famine (<http://www.chinafamine.org>) contained some articles, published abroad and containing figures of deaths. But it was censored and deleted in 2004, started again on a new site that has itself been deleted. Cai (2005) estimated 32.6 million deaths directly due to starvation and up to 12 million more from related illnesses.

designated a poverty county and when her family had only vegetables to eat and rice was a treat at New Year. She had not heard of the Great Leap Forward, though it is mentioned in Middle school history textbooks.<sup>12</sup>

Even those who can say what years, also think of a number of such 'periods of difficulty' (*'kunnan shiqi'*). An older woman, 31 years old in 2004, vaguely recalled (30 March 2004) that the Great Leap Forward was in the sixties and that there was hardship, but this was the generalised hardship suffered by the generation of her parents.

Moving back a generation, a village head in Quanzhou who was eight years old at the time of the famine said to us that it was as bitter as any time before Liberation. We knew him well from many previous interviews, and so he was willing to make this comparison. Before Liberation, he told us

We were very poor, a family of many children and too little produce.

*Were the hard years [of the famine] worse?*

Yes, a bit.

*For how many years did the hardship and hunger last?*

Between two and three years. In 1962 there was a redistribution of fields, 0.1 mu per head. Productivity was low in the brigade-held fields because people paid most attention to their own fields.

*Did anyone in - - - become very ill or die?*

No-one starved to death. But some people got ill and died from the illness. I'm not sure who.

*Have you ever talked to anyone about this time – before now?*

Never to outsiders. I have talked to my children. It was the rule that people should only talk about suffering before Liberation and therefore that only older people could 'remember bitterness' [*jap ko sitian*].

In other words he is still affected by the idea that bitterness refers only to the time before CCP rule. In general, the diminishing of the famine, as a subject for historical investigation is remarkable in both official history and in personal accounts.

The present is a time of plenty, to which the same Party has led 'us', the collective noun of all of China. In both, the famine is a mistake of excessive Leftism.

Our witnesses link their privation to the collective canteens, the small smelters, and absurdly close cropping. For many it is also linked to the Anti-Right campaigns. Political criminalisation and persecution can become a subject for juridical review and reversal of verdicts. It is then a separate issue. For our interviewees, however, the campaign is part of the general experience of the Great Leap Forward. Shared suffering, even the loss of members of family and the infertility caused by malnutrition, do not qualify for any juridical process. Instead, shared privation is the general sense made of the famine years. Concern with hope in the future and with the hardship still evident in villages in some parts

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<sup>12</sup> Our talk, not an interview, was very relaxed but it was our first and only meeting. It may be that if we had known her better, we may have discovered that she could remember school and something more from her history lessons.

of Quanzhou (though nothing like famine malnutrition), is combined with a reluctance to rake up bitter pasts. A bitter past, as some young members of the audience to a lecture I gave on this project commented, is anyway the standard of Chinese history.<sup>13</sup>

Some of our witnesses did say that the famine was worse than pre-Liberation poverty. And witnesses of the far more severe conditions elsewhere than Quanzhou redouble this speaking bitterness of the years of Party leadership.<sup>14</sup> But I do not think that this, as yet, amounts to an alternative history of the famine, although of course historians outside China (such as Roderick MacFarquhar, Jasper Becker and Yang Dali) have turned the accounts of witnesses and statistics into a great and tragic event. Within China, their sources are restricted documents, not for public reading.

The language of verdicts and reversals of verdicts applicable to political criminalisation and the language of claims to compensation is applied by and on behalf of victims of the Japanese occupation and its atrocities. It is not applied or even mentioned by anyone speaking about the famine. Only in the most general terms, of the pitiful condition of the whole people, does the language of victimhood appear.<sup>15</sup> It is not a verbal, politically or historically specified claim to recognition of suffering and grievance as it is for the Luku victims (*shounanzhe*) in Taiwan. Instead, on one hand, personal stories of intense suffering and horror are told and on the other hand rituals and temples that have been built or rebuilt since the relaxation of controls on 'old' things and 'superstitious' activities are, as Jing Jun has nicely put it, 'saturated with memories of loss' (2001: 215).

Famine was a cause of infertility and death. Its worst horror was cannibalism and the swapping of dead children to eat (Becker 1996: 137).<sup>16</sup> So the building of

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<sup>13</sup> Thanks to Maurizio Marinelli (10 October 2005) for drawing my attention to the standard phrase for this idea of China's history: 'eating bitterness' (*'chiku'*).

<sup>14</sup> For instance, Wemheuer (2004: 79) quotes a farmer quoted in an internal report saying that before Liberation it was possible to go to neighbouring villages for relief, but not in the Great Leap famine. And the notoriously high number of deaths from being beaten up as well as from starvation in the Xinyang region of Henan has, in a Party report, been given the name of an Incident (*Xinyang shijian*) (Wemheuer, 2004: 82).

<sup>15</sup> For instance, Felix Wemheuer reported (8 April 2005, at a workshop in Brandeis University) that villagers he talked to in northern Henan would say to him 'the condition of people was piteous [*laobaixing hen kelian*].' In a more causal expression similar to what some of the cadres we met reported as their blindness induced by fear or terror, Felix Wemheuer was told that before the Anti-Rightist campaigns 'Chinese people had human feeling' (*'yijian Zhongguoren hen laoshi*). The campaigns divided families and thus made them less human. But this is still not reported as making them victims.

<sup>16</sup> Writing of his home province Anhui, Tang De-gang, a Chinese American revisiting for the first time since his childhood, describes this same horror recalled when he was enquiring after a close paternal cousin and found that his cousin's whole family had starved to death while whole villages were wiped out in the Great Leap famine. 'Most unbearable to hear was that when young children were fast asleep their parents suffocated them with pillows or quilts and exchanged them with their neighbours to steam. This is the vivid contemporary version of what was told of past [famines], that "people swapped children to eat."' See Tang (2005). This was downloaded and sent to me by Zhang Ning. Many thanks

a far greater number of temples than had existed before Liberation to the Niang Niang (fertility goddess), as Jing Jun reports, is a way of silently recalling their demise, overdetermined by the single child policy.<sup>17</sup>

In the Quanzhou village that was the centre of our study the ancestral hall had been damaged by flooding and left a ruin in the 1950s. But in 1961, the year of recovery from the famine, with the secret support of Chen Wan-sheng, a Commune-level cadre from the village, villagers rebuilt it as a way of serving the people, as he put it, in particular as a comfort to the elderly, including feeding them with meat on feast days. It was destroyed again in the Cultural Revolution. In the 1990s, now as an *ex-cadre*, Wan-sheng openly led and managed its rebuilding and the re-compilation of the lineage genealogy. The reconstruction and reissuing of the genealogy in the village included a ritual for ‘ancestors who died without knowing their offspring.’ It was an unusual, but traditional rite that did not specify those who could have no children because of the famine. The dead and infertile were included implicitly, as we ascertained with his friend, the head of the village.<sup>18</sup>

So, what is remarkable about the public memory and commemoration of the famine is first its paucity but then also that it saturates, as a recent and shared instance of extreme hardship, the temples and rites that people have built and maintained for themselves collectively on one hand, and the eating and plentiful nurturance of life that most Chinese enjoy on the other hand. Its politics are remembered but not marked at this level, any more than they are in school histories. This is reinforced by a political reluctance to commemorate deaths in post-Liberation disasters. To some students and to older people, famine is a reminder of constant hardship and of previous famines as conditions of life.

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to Zhang Ning for drawing it to my attention and to Shih Fang-long for help with the translation.

<sup>17</sup> Cannibalism is the most extreme inversion of biological reproduction, survival at the expense of the unburiable dead. Thanks to Mark Auslander (6 April 2006) for highlighting this. Children in Chinese rituals are incomplete humans and given a cursory burial anyway. Cannibalism of adults would, in this context, be an even greater shame.

<sup>18</sup>This element of the rite was remembered by the name given to the small paper and cane soul-houses provided for the orphan ancestors: *o'kham* in southern Fujianese. ‘O’ – black – refers to the orphan souls, not to the colour of the paper houses. The rite was part of the general salvation (*pudu*), conducted in the seventh lunar month of the year in which the genealogy had been restored and inaugurated, and included the merit making (*zuo gongde*) rite of rescue of souls from purgatory. Rites were performed for the unfortunate ancestors collectively by the whole lineage and individually by their families. It was pointed out that during family mourning rituals of merit-making it is normal anyway to include songs about ancestors’ hardships and urge those who had died more recently to help their more wretched forebears (interview with Wan-sheng and the village cadre, 6 April 2004). In Taiwan, the name for the whole rite of inaugurating an ancestral hall is Ancuo Dadian – Great Rite of Pacifying the Place.

## Conclusion

There is a generation gap in both China and Taiwan across which personal transmissions of the respective catastrophes are almost entirely filtered out. But there are now written records of some testimonies, and others are being and will be compiled.

The population that starved in the famine was not a categorised and targeted population, as were the Luku villagers in Taiwan, who were listed participants in a 'Communist' base. In the case of Luku, the naming of the Incident as part of the White Terror has, as has the naming of the Cultural Revolution in China, released the representation of those who suffered to write, speak, and be represented. Even though the writing of full historical accounts of the Cultural Revolution is still forbidden, ways have been found to publish personal records, fictionalised, or accompanying old photographs, or in histories published in Hong Kong.<sup>19</sup> The famine has far fewer such records but neither have yet had their own history in China.

Naming is a political historical act, driven by many considerations, not just by the victims' claims on recognition. But the victims become an important part of the politics of history involved in the naming of the past. When there has been no naming, as in the case of the Great Leap famine, the fact that the victims are anyway not designatable as a category or group adds to this negative effect. What is remarkable in both these case studies, despite the naming of the White Terror in Taiwan, is that, without a politics to spur the rewriting of history, the official, school transmission neglects them both.

On the other hand, written record and the politics of history and public memory could be the relatively exclusive concern of intelligentsia and government, while other forms of transmission such as food stories, feeding itself, and ritual are sufficient for those outside the political class and the intelligentsia. In Taiwan, the Compensation Fund and Professor Zhang and his co-researchers use the term 'victim' *shounanzhe* (literally 'recipients of difficulties'). The victims are remembered by name in his two books and they were named in a service conducted for all victims of the White Terror, held at the instigation and expense of the Compensation Fund in 2004. But the Luku victims are like the vast majority of the victims of the Great Leap famine in inscribing themselves in their own ways through death rituals, family remembrance, and local shrines, not in the media of mass communications, nor the inventions of civic religion. They are commemorated in what tourist guides, the Memorial, TV documentaries on the Luku Incident, and the books about them say. But they are distanced from these and from the politics of rectification. They keep a large distance between this public memory and what they can tell and probably do talk about among themselves.

Stories of fatal privation in the famine might be told and shared in the most severely affected villages and regions, as I have already indicated. But even in the Gansu village about which the anthropologist Jing Jun writes so eloquently and where the famine was much more severe, it is part of the experience of being

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<sup>19</sup> See the papers in the 2005 Symposium on History and Memory, organised by the Matteo Ricci Institute, Macao, presented by Michel Bonnin, Xu You-yu, and Ding Dong.

dislocated by the completion of a water-control project. It is part of another story. In areas such as Quanzhou there were only a few, northern mountainous areas where starvation was a vivid and prominent part of the experience of the Great Leap Forward. Where we interviewed, starvation, as distinct from malnutrition, was not common or did not occur at all. In Quanzhou, it is much more likely therefore that the Great Leap Forward will merge into the past before Deng Xiaoping, into a past that is known both as hopeful and as disappointing in relation to a new state of a strong China.

However they are recalled, one thing stands out: that the experience was itself saturated in a politics of promise and disappointment associated with 'Communism'. We know in the case of the Great Leap Forward what were the promises of social justice and eventual prosperity given in Party campaigns. We also know that they were almost immediately dashed and that prosperity, although not social justice, came later, benefiting another generation. In the case of Luku we cannot tell from anything said to us directly what were the longer-term senses that the villagers had of their own lives, what aspirations they might have entertained when receiving the little bit of money they were paid by the leaders of the Communist organisation and when the school children of a few selected families were given secret, out-of-school moral and political education by the leadership of this rudimentary base area.<sup>20</sup>

It may be that the careful records of Professor Zhang and others, including Shih Fang-long's and mine, contain hints at another possible articulation of their history. It would include acknowledging the political indeterminacy of the time, the different directions of personal aspiration and government to which the Luku villagers were being introduced. For some of the prisoners, it would include what they learned from fellow prisoners about Communism. It would certainly include their identifications with a locality, which has been passed on to their children. Pride in their locality combines with and at the same is distanced from that locality as a tourist destination. It may happen that in a changed political situation, the possibilities of recalling the Luku Incident as part of the history of social movements in Taiwan, or as something distinct from the White Terror, or as a more social issue than one of Taiwanese self-identification, will release other ways of recalling the Incident, at least as one of local significance.

Similarly, it may happen that in some political change the Great Leap famine will be named as a great and deplorable historical event. If that happens, whether or rather how that will change the way its victims and their descendants recall it personally and locally will be a matter of great interest. As in Taiwan, the accumulation of materials for such a history is taking place. The materials are there for some kind of reopening of a number of silenced issues: the arbitrariness of Land Reform, pre-Cultural-Revolution Anti-Rightist campaigns, the famine, and the massacres of June 1989. What is remarkable is that from such different political events and in such different politics, remnants still exist of the fear that had, at the time, silenced transmission outside the closest social circle of those that experienced them.

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<sup>20</sup> According to interviews with two who received this political education and another whose elder brother did.

In both cases this is an effect of current politics, despite the changes undergone since the original event. Recalling an event over more than one generation can never be without some degree of politicisation. No history is apolitical. Personal stories are always and only of interest to an audience or readership for current reasons. The significance given them by their authors is always coloured by a current politics and its moral dimensions and according to what listeners identify from their own experiences with the stories they are told. But I would say that the interpersonal transmission divulged from the reserve in which it is kept from a current politicisation can be stored in archives. Those archives, such as websites or copies of TV documentaries, are marginalised by currently dominant standards of significance in both mainland China and in Taiwan. But the marginalised archives can in turn become a resource for new directions of historical signification, politics, moral appraisal and identification. The reasons for having to hold them in reserve are always charged with emotions, of fear or shame, of anger or despair, of disillusion or of grievance. And since some of these emotions are conveyed in the stored accounts, they can be recharged by the emotions that drive the writing of new histories and political re-directions in which they become a resource.

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