

TERRORISM AND DEVELOPMENT

LSE

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Speakers:

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Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Good evening and welcome. My name is Dennis Rodgers and I am with the Geography Department here at the LSE. It is my delight to be able to welcome you to this round table debate on terrorism and development. It is a very timely event, obviously with the recent bombings in London, Sharm El Sheikh and Bali, as well as the almost daily bombings that are going on in Iraq. But it is a particularly timely event because much has been said recently, a lot of which - if I may say so - is not terribly intelligent, about terrorism, about development and about the whole notion of violence between East, West, North, South. This debate is hosted by DESTIN, the Development Studies Institute here at the LSE, and the Crisis States Research Centre which is a DFID funded research centre based in DESTIN but autonomous. We'll hopefully breakdown some of these dichotomies, some of these stereotypes which tend to sort of litter the debates which are going on in the media.

The contributors tonight are very well positioned to introduce this debate because they all stand in different ways at the crux between studies of violence, crisis and development. The first five contributors tonight are all from the LSE and have all contributed to a special issue on terrorism and development of the Journal of International Development, which is one of the premier publications in the field. First we have Professor Jo Beall, who is Director of DESTIN and who has written an extremely interesting paper on cities and terrorism, then we have James Putzel who is the Director of the Crisis States Research Centre who has written about the new imperialism of the US, which is one of the key issues undermining or underpinning the whole theme of terrorism today. Then we have Ben Wisner who will be talking, not giving a paper as such but more will be commenting on other people. Ben is an Associate Fellow of the Crisis States Research Centre and a Visiting Professor of Environmental Studies at Oberlin University in Ohio. After Ben we have Professor Jude Howell who is Director of the Centre for Civil Society here at the LSE, who will present on terrorism, globalisation and civil society and finally we have Professor Ian Linden who is Associate Professor with the School of Oriental and African Studies here in London. Each speaker will speak for about 10 to 15 minutes and then we'll open up the debate to everybody who wants to participate. Now without further ado I will let Jo introduce the debate and introduce the main themes before opening it up to everybody else.

Jo Beall

Well good evening everybody and welcome to this evening's deliberations hosted jointly by the Development Studies Institute at the LSE and the Crisis States Research Centre, which is one of the two major research centres that we have within the

Institute. I am not going to talk to my paper on cities and development right now, you'll hear from me again on that, I just want to use this opportunity to introduce some of the key themes to the debate, drawing on the introduction that we wrote for the Journal of International Development Special Issue, 'we' being myself, James Putzel and Tom Goodfellow who is sitting over there. And I want to just start by citing two statements made by international development cooperation agencies in the last year or so, the first is from CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency. *"Canadians who come from every corner of the globe understand that the life we enjoy in Canada depends increasingly on helping to make the world a better place. Canadians cannot be safe in an unstable world or healthy in a sick world nor can we expect to remain prosperous in a poor world. Failure to achieve significant political, social and environmental progress in the developing world will have an impact on Canada in terms of both our long-term security and our prosperity. Security and development are inextricably linked."* The second is from Danish Development Aid and the statement goes like this: *"Security is a necessary precondition for development, a contribution to the re-establishment of security and the promotion of peace in countries and regions where there was previously systematic violence, crime and terror. It is an investment in poverty reduction and economic growth."* Denmark was one of the first countries to establish clear principles for development activities against terrorism. Now what's remarkable about these two statements is that they have both come from development agencies which have the reputation for promoting pro-poor development, human rights agendas and who have pushed the most benign of aid agendas in the world. And what they point to is a growing tendency not only to link security and development but to link 'our' security in the North with 'their' development in the South. And this we come to in two ways. First we see this security development nexus as a new and worrying trend but secondly we see it as part of a longer-term process and one in which development and security have always been linked. Development grew up in the era of the Cold War, which coincided with the first development decades, the 1950s and '60s, which saw development and security very much linked. During this time development was very much couched in Cold War agendas. From the 1970s there was a long hard battle on the part of people working in bi-lateral and multi-lateral development agencies to de-link the development and security agendas. Of course development aid has always been linked to the interests of donor nations but by the mid-1970s the explicit aim of overseas development assistance came to be seen as something promoting poverty reduction.

The important thing was that the agendas of poverty reduction and economic growth came to be seen as important issues in their own right, de-linked from military and security agendas and it has been a long hard fight to keep those issues separate. Yet what we are seeing now is a re-emergence of the development security nexus. At one level it is hardly surprising, given events of recent years, notably 9/11 and the London bombings. Since the US led 'War on Terror', the development and security agendas have become inextricably fused.

However, we also point to another tendency which is that during the 1990s there were a lot of people who mourned the failure of post-Cold War development agendas to attain the same prominence as foreign policy agendas or even as other line ministries concerned with overseas issues, be it Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Defence and so on. As a result, during the 1990s and in addition to pushing a development agenda,

there was a strong push towards increasing the visibility and status of international development and increasing development aid budgets. The significance of development was sold in relation to joined up thinking across government ministries and successfully. In a way what we now observe is a case of 'be careful what you wish for' because as development has grown in prominence, and as this profile has been accompanied by increased budgets for development aid, more and more, other agencies, departments and ministries have started eyeing development budgets. So, for example, if you take the UK's Department for International Development, we had a highly successful Secretary of State for Development in the form of Claire Short and the profile has been maintained by Hilary Benn. But what has happened is that the increased spending on development is something that the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are interested in, so that joined-up thinking might come to equal joined-up budgets. Ironically, therefore, it seems that just at the time when development funding is better than it has been for a very long time, the autonomy of development agencies to administer ODA according to their own terms may be under threat.

What we do in the paper, and I am not going to go into this in great detail in my presentation, is that we look - to the extent that it is possible to discern - at the relationship between development rhetoric and the reality aid flows. Now unfortunately the OECD figures on development aid only go up to 2003 and most of the rhetoric about the development and security links actually begins in 2004/ 2005 so one cannot systematically trace aid flows versus military spending and how that has changed in response to the change in rhetoric. However what it is possible to demonstrate is that across all development sectors spending has increased towards countries that have a significant role to play in the 'War on Terror', either as allies or because they constitute neutral front line states or because they are non-Arab Muslim nations. This is the case not only with USAID, which is where you might expect this to be the case, but across the board. For instance, Japanese Aid and French aid are cases in point. Although France has been strongly supportive of Algeria aid to this country has increased since 2003 along with increased aid to Central Asia. Pakistan is now the highest recipient of aid out of all countries across a number of bi-lateral donors.

I just want to say one more thing in relation to development aid and the security development nexus. That is it is not just about the foreign policy of bi-lateral donors but it also extends to multi-lateral agencies, increasingly operating in a uni-polar world. The World Bank and the UN both have quite serious hawks located high up in the hierarchy, appointed by the Bush administration: in the form of Paul Wolfowitz and John Bolton, at the Bank and the UN respectively. This cannot go unremarked and is bound to affect the relationship between security and development. What I have talked about mostly in this introduction is the 'War on Terror' and its impact on development cooperation. I am going to hand over now to James Putzel who is going to talk about US imperialism and David Keen, who is going to talk about other aspects of the 'War on Terror'. I will pick up, along with our other speakers, on aspects of terrorism and development more specifically in the latter part of the debate. So thank you. [APPLAUSE]

James Putzel

Good evening everybody. I'm happy to see that the room is packed. I'm sorry about the people who are left outside; we were told that no longer can we have people sitting on the floor; this is a change in recent years, but I hope that, as this special issue of the Journal of International Development gets out, we can disseminate some of what we want to say tonight more widely. I am talking to a paper that is coming out in this Journal entitled '*Cracks in the US Empire: Unilateralism, the war on terror and the developing world*'. I think this perspective is really rather important to inject into the discussion about the war on terror and about the phenomenon of political terrorism today. In the aftermath of the bombings of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in 2001, where 3,000 people were tragically killed, the Bush administration declared a war on terror. On the basis of that war on terror the US very quickly launched an invasion and occupation of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban government that had, as you know, admitted to sheltering Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network who proclaimed responsibility for those attacks on New York. There was a fairly broad coalition behind the United States in that invasion. But less than a year and a half after that attack on New York, the Bush administration, under the banner of the war on terror, launched an invasion and occupation of Iraq, closely supported by the Government of the UK, with a much smaller handful of countries backing them. Since then, the estimates of civilians killed, and the numbers are very bad on this, are over 125,000 Iraqis dead as a result of the invasion and occupation. Some 67,000 to 70,000 were civilians, another 50,000 were combatants and some 3,000 were Iraqi police and military personnel working with the US. There are another almost 2,000 soldiers of the invading and occupying forces who have been killed up until the beginning of September, 2005. The lion's share of those being US, since they make up the majority of the forces who are operating in Iraq. There are about 140,000 US troops in Iraq and another 23,000 from more than 27 countries that are participating with the United States.

There is a real brutality that has come across in the context of this invasion of Iraq. The brutal face of the United States has been revealed to us through photos of US Marines shooting dead defenceless old men as they occupied and emptied the town of Fallujah and the photos that have emerged from the prisons of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. So there is an ugly side to this imperial adventure that has begun to strike us and strike the public around the world. In my paper I situate this argument - this analysis of what is happening in the US - against the writings of a number of different authors. I do not have time to go into that, but just to mention perhaps three people who I discuss in more detail in the paper, who encapsulate some of the opposing interpretations of what is going in the US war on terror. The first is Michael Ignatieff - many of you may know of him and his work - who essentially has argued about a US "imperial project", but one that is benign; one that forms the context for humanitarian interventions now and in the future. Another is a recent book by Deepak Lal, who is an economist who launched quite a serious attack on our profession some 20 years ago - the profession of Development Studies - who has written a book, *In defence of Empire*. From an economic perspective, he argues that the US, again, is a benign power that has the possibility of ruling over a liberalised world economy now and in the future. The third author that I cite, and one to whom I am more sympathetic, is Mahmood Mamdani, who is originally from Uganda and who is now at Columbia University. He has written a book called *Good Muslims Bad Muslims*. I think it is a very important book to read if one wants to understand the complexities of modern political terror. Mamdani argues that we have to understand the United

States action in the tradition of Western Imperialism, but he thinks that there are some very important distinctions in terms of the role the US is playing today. Most importantly, he argues that the United States, in its defence of democracy, in its defence of liberal markets over the past few decades, has actually transgressed the line and opened the doors to political terror in its own actions around the world; its own military interventions. We can talk about this and debate this in the discussion period. In other words, they pursued an intervention internationally that violates international law and involves the application of what we know as “collective punishment” to those societies and political systems with which they disagree. Mamdani sees, in US patterns of intervention, a knee-jerk reaction over the past three decades to any expression of militant nationalism in the developing world. I think his argument is very important, but there are some ways in which I also would take my distance.

All three of these authors argue that the US position in the world today is unassailable and the unilateralism of the Bush administration is fixed in stone. I try to argue, as I’ve written in this paper, that there are real “cracks in the US empire”, that the economic foundations of US power are questionable and perhaps difficult to sustain over time. Moreover, I would argue, in a way that sometimes enrages the critics of the United States, that there really is a debate in the heart of the United States. It is a debate that is reflected between what the Bush administration calls “Old Europe” and the United States, and that is the debate between unilateralism and multilateralism. There was a multilateralist position that was weakly defended by the critics of the invasion of Iraq among European state leaders. The multilateral position offers a different trajectory for the projection of what we might all agree are imperial interests. That debate, I think, is the most strategic one that is going on; it is a debate that exists inside the United States around which the American population was polarised in the last election, but so far has not been resolved in the United States. I would even argue that it has not been articulated very clearly. So there is a weak political opposition in the United States defending a position of multilateralism, or even weak multilateralism, that for me offers the only hope to create a different kind of international context to rein in some of the more bellicose actions of the United States and perhaps begin to create a context in which the grounds for political terror can begin to be removed. That is the argument I develop throughout the paper.

Let me very quickly sketch some of the important points that I try to make in the paper. I think the first point has to do with the consolidation of the US position under the Bush administration. It was a clear departure from what was being pursued by the democratic administration earlier, and this departure is marked by the publication of the National Security Strategy of the George Bush White House in September 2002, just one year after 9/11. In that National Security Strategy there were three crucial developments. The first was an unadulterated commitment to unilateral action, to unilateralism, and a move away from multilateralism. The second was the doctrine of pre-emptive action and the third, and much less talked about, was the commitment to an unconstrained proliferation - or, not proliferation but rather - the unconstrained development of nuclear weapons technology by the United States. On all three scores I would argue that this represented a departure - a consolidation of a foreign policy - a policy for imperial projection that is defended by those who we have come to know as the “neo-cons”, or the neo-conservatives, in the United States. The unilateralist position has been articulated by the Secretary of the Department of State, Condoleezza Rice. Even before the Bush administration was elected, during the

campaign, she talked about an international community that was “illusory”. Rather like, recalling the discussion of Margaret Thatcher about society, ‘there is no such thing as society’ - anybody remember that? - Condoleezza Rice said, ‘there is no such thing as an international community’; that was the crux of the critique of the Clinton White House and the Clinton foreign policy. The NSS advanced a doctrine of pre-emptive action that basically declared that the US could at any time, anywhere, attack anyone who in its estimation poses a potential threat to US national security. This stands in the face of, and violates, embryonic international law and opens the world to basically a world beyond law. Finally, the national security strategy celebrates the strategic Arms Agreement signed between Bush and Putin, which basically removed all limits on the expansion of the US nuclear arsenal. This is something that I think needs a lot more attention and I hope the students at the LSE might research into this and look at it more carefully.

The second thing that I want to mention is the war in Iraq and the motivations that were involved in going into Iraq - the motivations of the United States. I don’t have time to put all the arguments I put in the paper. Suffice it to say that, first of all, the arguments around weapons of mass destruction existing in Iraq have been totally disproven as many of us argued before the invasion occurred. There were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Secondly, arguments about human rights, or the defence of human rights in the face of what was a tyrannical Saddam Hussein Ba’athist Party regime, begin to pale and to look rather hollow, in light of the scale of deaths and violations of rights that have occurred in Iraq since the invasion began. It is very difficult to defend the invasion on that score. I would argue that the Iraq War, the move into Iraq, represented a confluence of interests behind this coalition that came to power with George W. Bush. We have plenty of evidence that before they even came to power the group behind Bush were dead set on removing the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. I want to read one quote, even though I know I have very little time, because I think it is very striking. This comes from a strategy paper that was put together by leading interests within the Republican Party before Bush came into office. They were summing up the situation in the Middle East and the situation in Iraq arguing: *“The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein”*. It goes on to say, *“from an American perspective, the value of such bases [that is, the bases in the Persia Gulf region] would endure even should Saddam pass from the scene. Over the long term, Iran may well prove as large a threat to US interests in the Gulf as Iraq has. And even should US-Iranian relations improve, retaining forward based forces in the region would still be an essential element in US security strategy given the long standing American interests in the region”*. There was a very determined group, and a determined opinion, to remove Saddam Hussein from a very early stage, long before 9/11. But also it is clear that the United States moved into Iraq to demonstrate its fortitude, its commitment, to the doctrine of pre-emptive action on the one hand and also as a statement to the United Nations to say that US power would no longer be constrained by worrying what happens at the Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, there was a motivation that very much was driven by a particular group within and behind the George Bush administration that simply defends the “power of the fist” in foreign policy and I could say more about what that means in the discussion.

There is a very important point that I make in the paper about the strategic weakness of the United States, which I think needs to be injected into this discussion. I think we can see this in two principle factors. First of all. the United States lives at the level that it does, and US military spending has reached the heights that it has, because of the position of the US dollar in the world economy. I would argue that its position is very fragile indeed. The United States operates on a plummeting deficit, both a current account deficit that has meant that structurally it no longer is a leader in world exports - it is rivalled by Europe and Asia in that regard and that even in imports European countries, from a much more balanced budget position, are creeping up on the United States as a market for the world's products. The US has a burgeoning government deficit that has reached \$500 billion by the end of 2003 and continues to grow. The only reason it can continue to grow in that way, and the US can sustain itself, is because the dollar is the currency of deposit internationally, where all the world's savers, all the countries of the world, guard their reserves in US\$. But this is a very fragile position, especially now that we have the Euro. Internationally we see the Euro gaining as a currency of deposit at the moment and we see the fundamentals of Europe much stronger in a way than the United States. This represents some very basic cracks in the United States. However, at the present moment, if we look at the politics of Europe, or if we look at the position of Asia, neither is in a position economically or militarily to challenge US hegemony tomorrow. So, almost by a process of elimination, the only hope for a change in the direction of US interventions internationally, and in the doctrine of pre-emptive war, at the present moment, seems to be down to what happens within the US political arena. That is where the debate between unilateralism and multilateralism could influence the future direction of international politics. At the moment, I do not end on a very optimistic note because we cannot see a strategic policy articulated by the political opposition in the United States that really is believable at the present time. Nevertheless, I think that is where we have to look for some challenge to the US and its current strategy of war on terror. Thank you very much. [APPLAUSE]

David Keen

Ok I'm sorry I was a bit late, this is partly because I was detained under Anti-terrorist Legislation at the door [laughter]. I had a bit of trouble convincing them that I was a Speaker which tells me that although I am going grey, I'm not going grey enough. In terms of what I want to say - I have also written a paper for the Journal of International Development. One of the reviewers said he didn't think I had anything to say about development and he wondered whether that would be a problem for the editors which is a call for Jo to make I think but Development is a broad church anyway so it may turn out to be relevant. I should say, Dennis has asked me to introduce myself, so I am David Keen and I teach Complex Emergencies here at LSE.

One of the things I try to talk about in the paper is that I think there are important lessons to be learned from attempts to combat the use of terror within a range of civil wars, lessons for example from Africa or parts of Africa, and one of these is that proliferating weapons and often times pretty deep seated anger at political and economic exclusion have fuelled conflicts that I think can't be understood or addressed as a struggle between two teams, let alone between good and evil as we are sometimes invited to believe. Another lesson I think is that abusive counter

insurgency or counter terror by extension profoundly shapes patterns of violence in any given context, often attracting supporters to an otherwise or hitherto relatively weak rebellion. Now you know that some US administration officials have optimistically compared Al-Qaeda to a snake that will die when the head is cut off. Other analysts I think argue more plausibly that the network resembles a kind of a mould, you have to tackle the environment in which it grows, and this kind of war-of-analogies (often in the sense that it is analogies that are implicit rather than explicit) is quite crucial, I think. It so happens in this case that the mould is a more apt analogy and also that chopping off heads or chopping off, eliminating the leadership of Al-Qaeda (which has been an enterprise in which the US in particular has been actively involved) is something that in so far as it succeeds in the immediate objective tends to increase the decentralisation of Al-Qaeda and actually to help to produce an organisation which in some sense is more difficult to monitor or to control or get a handle on. There is I think an assumption (which we see often also in civil wars) in the war on terror, that the troublemakers are a discrete group of essentially evil individuals whose elimination will solve the problem, and part of what we have to do, and I am probably preaching to the converted to a large extent, is to look at processes of becoming, and this I think demands a sense of history, and since that often gets lost, our willingness to face up to the damaging effects of one's own nation, for example political and military interventions over a long period. History in a way for Bush and Blair that has been narcissised and projected into the future. When they speak of history, it is usually in terms of how history will judge their interventions, but I think we need another kind of discussion.

As with civil wars in which politically and even militarily, counter-productive tactics are prevalent, it is important I think not to take the expressed aims of the war on terror as a given and to look at the functions of the violence and even the functions of the predictably counter-productive tactics in a certain amount of detail and I think that includes, I don't really have time to get into a lot detail, but political, economic and psychological functions within the US, the UK and a whole range of governments who have been to a greater or lesser extent recruited into this so-called war on terror. What you tend to find I think with civil wars in many parts of Africa is that the designation of a particular source of unrest or rebellion or evil provides a lot of opportunities for a whole range of actors within a very diverse counter insurgency or counter terror structure for abuses of their own. The more universally despised the enemy, for example the RUF in Sierra Leone that was doing all the amputations and so on or Al-Qaeda itself, then the more likely it is that they are going to be very significant spheres of impunity which powerful actors are able to carve out for themselves within the context of an alleged counter insurgency or counter terror operation. So part of what I am trying to do, and I'm not the only one, is to map that complicated coalition and to question the degree to which all the actors that make up that counter terror coalition actually have a genuine interest in eliminating or weakening precisely the phenomenon which gives them the opportunity as it were to play other political and economic and psychological games that may stand them in good stead. So there's an idea there about looking at systems rather than contests. I think there are important shared dynamics between counter insurgency and counter terror networks. One of these is the prevalence very often of these counter-productive tactics which predictably induce support for the named opposition. I think abusive counter-intelligence and counter-terror tend to have the effect of knitting together what are often quite diverse grievances, grievances among those whose targets for

violence might otherwise be resolutely local. So for example Hugh Roberts has stressed that anti-American feelings are neither natural nor of long standing in countries like Algeria and Egypt but that in some sense aggressive US actions have tended to superimpose an American enemy on top of local grievances.

Revealingly I think the idea that bad things are the responsibility of a few evil individuals has informed both the tactics in the war on terror and the official US response to revealed abuses like those at Abu Ghraib, which were dismissed as you remember as the work of a few bad apples and the use of torture in third party countries like Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia has also preserved in a sense the idea that bad things are the responsibility of “them” and not us and these denials of responsibility are closely linked I think to a persistent tendency to exaggerate the decentralisation of violence in relation to ones friends. One can see this also in terms of the Cold War period which was another war in which there was a designated and demonised enemy and another war in which very valuable opportunities for abuse and exploitation arose for those collaborating in the struggle against this named enemy. So, exaggerating the decentralisation of violence among ones friends and alongside this an enduring habit of underplaying the decentralisation of violence among ones enemies, in this case the terrorists. So abuses in the counter terrorist system if they are admitted are said to reflect a breakdown in the chain of command while the enemy's abuses are said to reflect a ruthless imposition of command and I think this mis-characterises for one thing the nature of Al-Qaeda, it side-steps the responsibility of the West and also widespread anger and that has informed acts of terrorism and what you have in some ways is a model which I equate with a kind of rebirth of magical thinking in the West which supposes that by eliminating a designated set of evil individuals you can solve this particular problem. This is a kind of a rebirth of thinking associated with the old witch hunts I think. It centres very much on the idea of pre-emption as James Putzel mentioned. Pre-emption in turn depends on the idea of being able to judge somebody's intention which can take you into a sphere that is well beyond this sphere of evidence-based conclusions.

I'm sorry I've been told to finish up and I think I will, thank you. [APPLAUSE]

Jude Howell

I will be fairly brief and talk about my paper in the JID which is looking at the effects of the global war on terror, on civil societies. First of all I want to say that I take the global war on terror to be a complex term which has a range of meanings and functions which of course makes it very malleable. So I think about the global war on terror as a mobilising discourse, which global and national leaders make full use of as an expression of a polarising vision of the world which pits modernity against backwardness, barbarity against civilisation and freedom against oppression and a term that has a very militaristic content. The language itself is militaristic – for example, ‘war’, ‘terror’ and its association with pre-emptive military intervention. It also embodies the idea of a global political re-ordering, the reshuffling of global alliances and divisions amongst states in the world since 2001 and also as Jo Beall pointed out, a new set of institutional and policy arrangements which gives rise to this rather disturbing nexus between development and security. And of course in terms of the world debate and development, the global war on terror has, as several of the speakers have pointed out, led to a change in the ideological justification of aid on the

interconnections between development, security and foreign policy and also changes in the direction and flows of aid. So what then has been the effect on civil societies? Of course it is very difficult to demonstrate any neat direct causal effects though already there are some very visible explicit effects which I will talk about. But it is difficult to establish direct neat causal relationships because in many ways the processes that the global war on terror has kickstarted are about the intangible creation of climates of opinion or shifting attitudes and a semantic construction and manipulation of 'others' and enemies.

I am going to briefly mention three key effects of the global war on terror on civil society and development and then talk about six key challenges that arise for civil society actors that need to be dealt with. Firstly I think one of the main effects has been the constriction of spaces in many countries, whether we are talking about the North or the South. Two things are important here, first many governments have proved very skilful at deploying the language of terrorism to undermine and oppress perceived enemies and although they may have done this a bit before now the language of terrorism gives those efforts a new resonance and a new, stronger justificatory power. I am thinking here of course of Uzbekistan, if you remember the uprising in Abadajon where some of the people who participated in that had been depicted as terrorists. Similarly in China the secessionist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet are also cast in the mould of terrorist activities, extremist, terrorist, religious and so on. Zimbabwe is another example. More generally many governments in deploying the language of terror have cast a veil of suspicion over civil society actors as potential terrorist fronts. If we take the case of the US for example, the US has drawn up a list of specially designated global terrorist organisations. Interestingly, it is only Muslim charitable organisations that figure in this list. In Britain there was an investigation of the NGO Interpal which is on the US list of global terrorist organisations. Yet when the Charity Commission investigated this case they could find no evidence that Interpal was linked in any way to terrorism. And so the story goes on. I think what is disturbing is that the targeting of Muslim organisations in this way creates a tendency to construct groups in which Muslims participate as having some affinity to terrorism. It creates the notion of a dangerous other and ultimately undermines the rights of Muslims to associate and organise and be part of civil society.

A second key effect has been the suspicion that has been cast upon relations between Northern and Southern NGOs and this can be seen in the crude, very crude surveillance and monitoring of links between donor agencies, foundations, bilateral agencies and so on and NGOs in the North and South. To give you a very explicit example, all US donor agencies, be they bilateral agencies, NGOs or Foundations, are expected to make sure that their partner organisations in the South do not have any links or associations with so-called terrorist organisations. For example USAID requires all its partner organisations to sign an anti-terrorist certificate saying that they have no links to any terrorist organisations or that none of their employees in their offices are associated in any way with terrorism. Of course this has had knock-on-effects of money being withdrawn from some NGOs - for example operating in Palestine - because they cannot show that they are not linked to terrorism. Recently I was talking to some people in a well-known UK NGO who were telling me about another similar story about some NGOs in Palestine which have refused to take US money because they don't feel they can be absolutely firm in signing the certificate

because it is almost impossible to know. Similarly in other countries, Russia, Uzbekistan, China, moves are also being taken against NGOs. Putin for example in 2003 and again in July 2005 came out strongly against Western NGOs and their strategies in the former Soviet Republics. In particular he linked Western NGOs to democratisation agendas because we know that US NGOs have a big role in democratisation agendas in the former Soviet Republics but Putin linked this also to regime change and that they played some fundamental role in the colour revolutions of Kurdistan, Georgia, Ukraine. Interestingly in the case of China, the Chinese government has also become quite worried about these colour revolutions and the role of Western NGOs and local NGOs in China. It is very concerned that these may be playing a rather different role than they are presenting and has instigated investigations of foreign NGOs and local organisations in China during this year.

The third key effect is around this issue of humanitarian intervention and some of the issues that both Jo and David have talked about in their papers and the key issues around how to maintain the principles and neutrality, impartiality in independence. This is a very live issue in Afghanistan and Iraq where the military are increasingly playing a role in relief and development work which is very confusing indeed on the ground. That's a whole subject in itself but it obviously presents a lot of dangers to humanitarian, NGO humanitarian workers who are working in the field.

What then are the implications of all of this, of these very immediate consequences for civil society actors? I think there are a number of challenges and I'll briefly draw your attention to these. First of all there is a big issue like how, as a donor agency, how do you handle the monitoring of award holders. How do you handle that and what is the effect of this on the relationship between grant givers and grantees. How do you maintain trust when there is this air of suspicion surrounding your activities? Apart from of course the administrative burden of trying to manage this. I've heard that various Foundations have found it a big administrative burden to try and sort out all of these anti-terrorist certificates and so on. For humanitarian workers there is a big issue about how to maintain a commitment to the principles of neutrality and impartiality. I think it is not enough to re-assert a code of conduct but in the longer term we need to look much more closely at the role of humanitarian agencies and the foreign policy agenda of the countries and devote more time to understanding the complex politics of the countries where they are operating and may be in particular to clarify the identities. Are organisations operating as nationless international organisations or national agencies operating internationally?

The third point is that NGOs, such movements and activists need to think about how to continue to organise, advocate and campaign around marginalised interests particularly where certain groups and certain issues are constructed as linked with terrorism.

My worry is, my fourth point, that development agencies which have had a somewhat benign and euphoric approach to civil society organisations in the 1990s are going to actually become much more conservative in their choice of partners to work with. My concern is that in that process the voices and interests of more marginal groups that may be seen as a bit risqué are left out and that the spaces brought by participation and inclusion that were prized open in the 1990s are going to be increasingly constricted. For advocates of particular causes I think it is very important to remain

on the alert, whether we are talking about refugees, asylum seekers, Palestine Secessionist Movements or whatever. There are particular challenges here about how you continued to advocate around marginalised issues, how you keep things on the political agenda when the governments of different countries and global actors are trying to present those issues as not political but as an economic problem or as a cultural problem. So it raises a lot of questions about how you frame your demands, how you shape your questions, how you seize the discourse in this new context. Linked to that I think we also have to remain alert to what is happening in countries that are the new allies of the United States or other Western powers where any human rights abuses or restrictions on civil society will be rather conveniently overlooked. I think Uzbekistan until recently was a very good example of that and therefore I think that, as in the Cold War period, we have to remain alert to what is going on in the countries of so-called allies as well.

And, my final point is really about issues of accountability and legitimacy of civil society organisations which in any case has become an important issue over the last few years. In this situation NGOs actually do need to be ahead of governments and to get their own houses in order.

So in a nutshell I think that civil society groups, actors, organisations need to be actually more pro-active and more organised, more strategic in defending and expanding the spaces for dialogue and engagement and for determining the rules underlying how groups within civil society, how donors and civil society relate to each other and how the states in any particular context and civil society relate to each other. So it is time to move away from defensive reactive responses and move towards strategic thinking and positioning. Thank you. [APPLAUSE]

Jo Beall

I am going to be very brief and just say something about the relationship between cities, terrorism and development. I think the history of warfare has always seen cities as sites of both protection and sites of attack. The attack on the Twin Towers in September 2001 made it very clear that cities are also vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In the burgeoning literature on the 'War on Terror', coming in the wake of 9/11, there was a lot written on cities but it was about cities of the North, of the global North. What I argue in my paper, also in the *Journal of International Development* collection, is that cities of the global South are important to consider, if we are going to understand anything about the urban dynamics of terror and development. Yet when reference is made to cities of the global South its invariably in terms of 'breeding grounds' for terrorists or 'hiding places' for radical Islamists. But what I try to point out is that cities of the South have themselves been targets of both episodic and sustained acts of terror. Here I am thinking of Mumbai and Bogotá, and Karachi and Kabul, amongst many others.

Moreover, in terms of focusing on cities, the London bombings of July this year demonstrated just how interlinked terrorist networks are and how they span very permeable borders. So from Leeds, to Karachi, to Lahore and finally London, the planning and execution of those bombings operated across cities as nodes, linking international networks.

Now I know that addressing issues of terrorism gets us into very tricky definitional ground and I want to make it clear as to how I am using the definition of terrorism here. I am referring specifically to terrorist *acts* rather than terrorist actors. I do this in order to avoid (a) the vexed question of when one person's terrorist becomes another person's freedom fighter; and (b) to disassociate my analysis from the more essentialist approach linked to much of the commentary on the 'War on Terror'. I am happy to come back to this issue in discussion.

What is important though, is that the geography of terror has moved on to the global stage by way of cities; by way of cities and specific urban symbols. The message of the London bombers, for example, was that any war perceived to have its origins in London would come back to roost in London. This is something that adds to the complexity of the development security nexus.

It is important to say why the city is important with regard to acts of terror. One aspect is the physical environment of cities; the density of populations; the concrete symbols of urbanism and urban life and urban power. Cities are important because they are the engines of economic growth for most national economies. In addition, economies of scale can be derived from cities in terms of reaching the welfare objectives of states. In other words, infrastructure, basic services and so on reach more people in a more cost effective way in urban contexts than if these same services were extended to rural villages. So this means that cities are important as symbols and for impact. Terrorists are not going to blow up a remote village, as no-one would notice. This in turn points to the fact that terrorism is not only an act perpetrated on urban residents but also something of an international language where messages are sent by way of particular targets.

The next point I want to make in relation to cities is that although there are commonalities, we need to differentiate between cities of the North and South. Cities of the South have actually experienced far more terrorist attacks than cities of the North. Some of these attacks are of domestic origin but such cases often get caught up in and translated through international agendas, most recently the discourse on the 'War on Terror'. Hence they become internationally linked whether or not they are so. Secondly, the vulnerability of urban citizens differs in cities of the North compared to cities of the South. Within cities it is often the everyday people on their way to work on the Tube or people living in hazardous conditions in crowded slums and so on who are the innocent victims of acts of terror.

In looking at terrorism in relation to other hazards, risks and vulnerabilities facing urban populations in the South, it is important to recognise that terrorism is only one kind of urban violence that they face. Cities are sites of political conflict and opposition, as well as civil war as both Jude and David have talked about. There is violent conflict in cities over resources that are scant and scarce and those kinds of battles over access can intermesh with other forms of urban violence like criminal violence, gang warfare and other features of the brittleness of urban life, especially for the urban poor. It is important that violent conflicts such as these should not be confused with internationally linked terrorism, although in the rhetoric of the 'War on Terror' they often are. Here too we have to see terrorism as just one of many other risks, risks associated with environmental hazards, poor people in shacks on the sides of cliffs that suffer from landslides, or who live near industrial areas and are

vulnerable to petro-chemical explosions and other industrial accidents. It is useful here is to make a distinction not only between different forms of risk but to try to identify the difference between cities in developing countries and cities in the North, in relation to the notions of vulnerability and risk. Ultimately vulnerability for people in cities of the South, and especially for the poor, is far greater. Thus what terrorism is doing in terms of risk is levelling the playing field between North and South, but not so in terms of vulnerability.

The only other point I want to make in relation to cities and terror is that I include in my definition the notion of 'state terrorism'. This is controversial and some people would argue that what I call state terrorism is in fact a violation of human rights by states. Nevertheless I choose to talk about state terrorism because the kinds of acts of ethnic cleansing and urban cleansing, such as we have seen in Harare where whole areas of urban settlement have been destroyed by the Mugabe government, are to me acts of terror. But this is again something we can come back to in discussion.

In terms of the impact of terrorism on development, I think it does two things and this is to come back to this distinction between vulnerability and risk. It increases the vulnerability of poor people. It is far more difficult for cities of the South to recover from destruction. Reconstruction takes longer, and it diverts resources from other areas of development spending towards reconstruction rather than development. States that are seen as terrorist, or as failed states, have resources withdrawn by bilateral donors and that again reduces potential investment in development. Further, when you have a situation of high risk and high insecurity you have an increase in gated communities, where the better off begin cutting off, closing down, shutting up, building walls around themselves. And hence they disengage from development initiatives, disengage from working with governments, disengage from paying their municipal taxes. So you have a breakdown in governance and democracy and that is one of the biggest casualties of terrorism in respect of development. [APPLAUSE]

Ben Wisner

Thank you for all coming and thank you for being such a patient and attentive audience. Hopefully we will draw this to a conclusion fairly soon and hear from you, which is very important. I learned my rhetorical style from Fidel Castro, I had a seven hour presentation prepared and I have been told by my friend Dennis I only have ten minutes, so let me try. I work in Disaster Risk Management, and I work as an Adviser to the Secretariat of the United Nations Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the newly-founded United Nations University Institute in Bonn, which is a research and training centre on environment and human security. I am going to talk about one of the additional cracks in US imperialism that is, in fact, a crack at home which is visible through the hurricane Katrina and the way in which the war on terrorism has actually eroded the capacity of nations around the world to deal with vulnerability and with risk. These risks are really daily and chronic and episodic, and much more frequent than terrorist attacks. But let me back up and make a couple of more general points. I do so in awareness that many of you are Masters and PhD students and I always like to throw out some seeds. I'm going to throw out a dozen seeds for really wonderful dissertations and studies in books, so please go off and do some of these things. I think James also did that.

Terrorism and counter-terrorism have a long and complex interrelationship with development and under-development and I would say probably with mal-development. If one defines terrorism as acts intended to produce mass casualties among civilians in situations of political conflict, the history of the relationship is ancient. Caleb Carr in his book, *The Lessons of Terror*, proposes a broad definition of terrorism. He says this should be conceived as a contemporary name given to, in modern terminology, "warfare deliberately waged against civilians with a purpose of destroying their will to support either their leaders or policies the agents of such violence find objectionable". In this broad sense the definition is applicable certainly for instance to the wars of national liberation in Algeria, Vietnam and Mozambique, and the struggle against apartheid. I think as such it is extremely important for us to look at the long term impacts of the form of development that those successful revolutions came to practice. In particular what you got in those cases, and as well in the Soviet Union, Cuba, China and a number of other places where national development emerged from the cauldron of terror and counter-terror, was an initial centralism and commandist, modernisationist stance toward development which seriously moulded the development of five-year plans and the entire project of development for decades. I think it is important to look back at that also as an heritage of the relationship of development and terror and counter-terror.

Moving on to another important point, and this is just to add perhaps a gloss or a footnote to the whole notion of the seedbed, the breeding ground of terrorism, that James and Jo and others have mentioned. I am teaching a seminar at the moment at Oberlin College on Food Security, and I have been reading a wonderful book called *Food Wars* that an old friend of mine, Tim Lang, and Michael Heasman wrote a couple of years ago. In the book they show that in many, many countries of the Middle East and Asia they have simultaneously at this moment an epidemic of obesity in children, side by side with continuing chronic stunt and wasting of children. In fact in Egypt for instance between 1978 and 1996 child obesity has quadrupled -- increased four times -- at the same time as you have continuing patterns of under nutrition. Now I would submit that this is for middle class and working class recruits to whatever you might call terrorist organisations, a very offensive symbol of westernisation and Americanisation. This goes hand in hand with the fact that the State in many cases such as the Egyptian State cannot provide a safety net and the basic services for people who the losers in the global, economic globalisation process. Quite the contrary, Islamic organisations, the NGOs that other speakers were referring to, are providing some of the basic health, agricultural extension and other services, including educational services, in these communities. I think that the conjuncture of the two actually have to be considered as part and parcel of the causal network that actually is producing what we see as contemporary terrorism.

Turning to my own field of practice and study, which is natural hazards management, let me put the question I would ask about terrorism and development this way: what impact has the war on terrorism had on the worldwide project of disaster risk reduction heralded by the media coverage of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Japan in January 2005? This question overlaps quite a bit and maybe amplifies something that David Keene was talking about in relation to complex emergencies. The *World Disaster Report* for 2005 was just published a few days ago. I wrote Chapter 2 on the hurricanes in 2004 in the Caribbean. The overarching pattern shows that in the last two decades people affected by disasters has gone up by

about 60%. Now it doesn't mean there are more disasters, I mean Mother Nature is not playing up in an unusual way; it is the same old Mother Earth with the possible exception of some increased intensity of cyclonic storms but not their frequency. Basically disasters are constant, what is increasing is the number of people vulnerable to those disasters to use the same word that Jo Beall used ("vulnerability"). In facing up to this challenge the World Conference on Disasters in Kobe put forward a very ambitious view of disaster risk reduction which would include work -- serious work -- on the Millennium Development Goals, management of conflict, and reduction of global warming while adapting to its impacts. Now this probably doesn't sound like a terribly ambitious kind of final document but nevertheless you know the in achieving international consensus on a final document. The drafting committee was spending 20 hours a day trying to argue the Americans into some sensible position. I mean its very difficult as James said, but nevertheless the disaster reduction recommendations are actually quite ambitious even though the Americans insisted that there would be no targets, no new money, etc. Nevertheless the vision put forward is that disaster risk reduction is part and parcel of, and has to be mainstreamed as part of, sustainable human development.

This has extremely important legal institutional and programmatic implications, and the so-called war on terror actually undercuts the whole thing, and it undercuts it in two ways. First of all, over the last 15 or 20 years there has been a general move from military based disaster organisations in countries to civilian based disaster organisations. The military based organisations work on the basis of command and control and they are mostly interested in immediate response and that the general tenancy has been to civilianise them and to mandate them to work on prevention, long term prevention, mitigation of risk, reducing the vulnerability and preparedness and this has been going along really well, driven by a lot of assistance from the United Nations and by regional organisations such as CEDARA in the Caribbean and CEPREDENAC if you will excuse the long acronym in Central America after hurricane Mitch. Now in fact the US Southern Command throughout Latin America is going around now saying let's go back to military-centric disaster reduction organisations. In East Africa, in Kenyan Times in ... the sites of two embassy bombings within the last decade ... the US has provided enormous amounts of assistance for hospital triage in urban emergencies and for terrorist response in countries that don't even have significant nationwide networks for dealing with drought and flood ok and that don't have the public health infrastructure, even the basic primary health care infrastructure to deal with challenges such as cholera, increasing malaria as global change, global climate change changes the habitat of the anopheles mosquito or of avian flu.

The second way that the war on terror has undermined the capacity to deal with these daily disasters or at least the hazards that hang over peoples lives in a daily way and they manifest may be every five years as a major flood or major hurricane or a major drought, is that resources have been cut back. Now this brings me to hurricane Katrina and I won't go through all the tragic and deplorable scene that you have all witnessed in various forms on television and read about, but let me say that I used to work with FEMA at a certain point and beginning with the Bush administration before 9/11 but certainly accelerating afterwards when FEMA was absorbed into what many people refer to as the Homeland Security super-agency, FEMA lost many, many, many of its experienced people, they just couldn't take it. I mean I bailed out

even before that. They also lost a significant amount of their budget to other agencies within the Homeland Security Super Department and as a result we all saw the inability of FEMA to respond to hurricane Katrina. It was known in advance, we saw it coming, we had three days notice and they couldn't respond afterwards. Let me say in conclusion that the causes of contemporary terrorism are likely to include much more than poverty or simply the lack of development. More likely implicated are polarised development, economic development and social development in situations where the state is weak and cannot provide compensatory assistance to those at the bottom, the losers in the process and that the other way around, the current monomania and fixation on terrorism is further undermining the ability of many states to meet the needs of the majority of their citizens who are much more likely to suffer drought, flood, earthquake, blizzards and not to mention hunger, water borne disease and HIV aids than terrorist attack. The failure to protect citizens from natural hazards further de-legitimises the state and I think that is a big problem we have to concern ourselves with in relation to the Crisis States Programme. Thank you very much.
[APPLAUSE]

Ian Linden

Many of my friends in the 1980s were terrorists so I take this all very personally!. I think it is rather odd that in the context of 2005 we have been having a debate along the table which has been ignoring religion, or at least marginalising religion. We've conflated the genre of the 1980s, the terrorism of various organisations that might or might not have been involved in national democratic struggles and we've - I think largely because we are in a very secular university- we've particularly marginalised Islam which is very odd indeed. At the very least I think we can say that we create a very one-dimensional analysis of what's happening, if we don't understand evangelical Christianity and its dynamics in the States. And if we do not understand Jihadist Islam in North Africa and the Middle East, Indonesia and other places, we are not going to understand very much about what's happening at the moment. That's perhaps putting it a little strongly. In definitional terms, the big story of one man's terrorist being another man's freedom fighter is a very trivial and unimportant point though it messed up the United Nations' definition of terrorism for a very long time thanks to the Arab States. On the other hand, "one woman's terrorist is another woman's holy martyr" does seem to me of significant importance. It is critical if you are dealing with religion defined as narratives, practices, virtues, life worlds and symbols embedded in historical experiences in particular religious communities. If you are dealing with religious phenomena and if you are dealing with what evolves out of them in certain abhorrent manifestations, feeding on the ambiguity of violence within all religions, then you do have to understand the context, the meanings and the dynamics within important religious systems that are relevant at the moment. And obviously evangelical Christianity and Jihadist Islam are very important. Ayman al Zawahiri, second in command in what is left of the core group in Al-Qaeda spends an awful lot of propaganda time working with an apologetic position within what is essentially just war theory mediated into the Islamic tradition and the secular definition of terrorism, which are both concerned with the killing of innocent civilians. Though of course the agency is very important in definitional terms. Is it a national group or is it a sub-national group? But the core the definition is the calculated deliberate killing of innocent civilians for political, economic and other goals – and states are quite capable of that too. Now, Ayman al Zawahiti explains

that if you are dealing with Israel you are simply dealing with soldiers who temporarily take their uniforms off because they have a conscript army, if you are dealing with Britain and the United States you are dealing with people who vote the defence budget, who vote the collusion with the Israel government, and who vote the foreign policies that evolve the invasion of Muslim lands and so on. So to what degree are they are innocent within the framework of Zawahiri's Jihadist conception? Ironically a lot of this Jihadist thinking is extremely westernised. It moves from a Muslim concept of a communitarian responsibility to defend Islam, to defend the holy places, to a highly individualistic one. The change takes place between Osama bin Laden's statement in '96 and his statement in '98. In '96 he declares Jihad on the United States of America after the failure of nationalist jihadist struggles in the Middle East and North Africa. He moves from a communitarian responsibility to an individual responsibility creating in the idea/ action of Jihad a core symbolic pillar of Islam turning it into a religion of resistance focused on Jihad. In one interview he says of Jihad, I want it to be like worship. It is that central in his thinking, it is that distorted in terms of the Islamic tradition. So if you are waging a war on Islam what is more important, all those lads from Kentucky blundering around Iraq or is it somebody like Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, a major commentator on Al Jazeera, who says no. The suicide bombing in Israel for Al-Qaradawi is different; there is a war going on, it's defensive, the Palestinian people are defending themselves. The attack on the United States is totally inadmissible. Moreover he is coming out of a Jihadist tradition and Al Jazeera goes around the world into Muslim communities where people are listening. That is infinitely more important in terms of a war on terror than anything that is going on by the imposition of armed force on populations in the Middle East.

As for the Evangelical Christian side I don't think we should exaggerate its importance in the United States of America but if you look at the dynamics of American foreign policy, the sort of shifts from unilateralism to multilateralism to unilateralism again, you can see the period after the Second World War was strongly dominated by a Christian multilateralist conception, support for the United Nations, and it had strong Episcopalian, Presbyterian support. A group of church leaders in 1941 set up the Committee for the Restoration of a Just and Lasting Peace. And we have three major things that they were going for through advocacy and influence on government. One was the establishment of a solid body of international law, secondly the creation of the United Nations charter on human rights, they wanted a charter of universal human rights and the third was a Trusteeship body for decolonisation in different parts of the world. They achieved their goals through the United Nations. The evangelical Christian influence on a United States foreign policy is very different today. Just relating those three demands of that particular period shows just how different it is.

I want to leave you with two 'Thoughts for the Day', little snippets from Gilles Kepel, factoids I believe they call it on Radio 2. One little factoid concerns Mohammed Atta, a key player in the 9/11 attacks. Guess what his doctoral dissertation was on? Somebody here probably knows. It was on, let me read it out for you, 'The pluralist Islamo-Christian Urban Fabric in Aleppo-Syria'. He was very much interested in the way architecture and town planning by bringing Christians and Muslims together was a very important and significant feature of the city. He was entirely in favour of it And he wasn't in the separatist tradition whereas Ayman al Zawahiri, coming out of

an Egyptian tradition, was. And I had one other factoid for you: when the security people grabbed a computer in an allegedly Al-Qaeda house in Kabul, it had on it - guess what? - Menachem Begin's 1951 autobiography 'The Revolt'. They presumably were terribly interested in how the Jewish Irgun did their terrorism in that particular post-war period. I just leave you with those two factoids. [APPLAUSE]

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Thank you very much. Now we have about 55 minutes left and what I suggest is that I'll take three or four questions, depending on how many people have some in one go, give the speakers a couple of minutes each to come back on them and then open up the floor again for a few more questions. So, questions please. I think we have a microphone just ...

1st Questioner

Hello. Would the Panel think that in the history of the Middle East there is a long tradition of every country being dominated by tyrants and therefore Saddam, the Shah, Ottoman Empire, USA, is just another tyrant?

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Anybody else? Over there.

2nd Questioner

Yes I have a question to Dr Putzel. I very much agree with your analysis about the cracks of the US imperialism, but I have a question about your solution where you talk about the multi-national or multilateral solution sort of coming from within the United States. I would like to ask why you think that didn't gain the upper hand so much? And may be also a question that combines Professor Jo Beall's introductory presentation and the comments by Dr Keen when David Keen spoke about the comparison of the snake and the mould. Isn't the mould exactly what the EU security strategy or what the Canadian and the Danish development centres are all about, bringing development or creating opportunities for those who are marginalised but it also called draining the swamp? Thank you.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Other here and the over there. I'll come back to you.

3rd Questioner

Hello, I just wanted to ask a question to Jo Beall about the stuff about cities whether there were any more positive sides of cities that we can look at in the context of the war on terrorism? If we can bring out some of the positive roles that cities can play, that you might not be able to see at a national level and also what the city stuff you are talking about might tell us about the kind of concepts that are developed in the developing world as two separate worlds which is obviously quite damaging in that it leads to a distinction between terror, counter-terror and those kinds of issues? For anyone really on the Panel.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Ok, last question and then we'll come back to you two in the second round.

4th Questioner

Good evening, thank you. I want to raise a question <uninterpretable>.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Do you want to have a sort of minute or two and we'll just go along and then we'll come back to the questions.

Jo Beall

I'm going to be very brief because I would like to hear more from the audience. I think the last question was about the implications for development cooperation. It is very difficult to know what the implications are and how we can address issues in development cooperation more soundly. I think one of the things that we have to do is keep performing a watchdog role in relation to development organisations and processes, in order to make sure that too many resources do not get spent on war and reconstruction, as opposed to development; or that money isn't funnelled out of development budgets into military spending and so on. So that would be a brief answer to what I think I understood your question to be.

On the positive side of cities, that is really important. Just as cities are sites of war and terror, they are also very important for reconstruction and peace building. If you just think of Nicosia in Cyprus, The Green Line that divided the city above the ground, was sabotaged by the sewers and the pipes, the water and drainage, that connected people under the ground. The infrastructure had to serve both the Greek and Turkish populations despite their estrangement; so it is very difficult to 'unbundled' cities. If you take another example, that of a recent meeting between the Mayor of Taipei and the Mayor of Shanghai, here they were able to engage in ways that their national governments could never have done, by virtue of urban rather than national state agendas. And in the paper I cite the example of someone who is in prison, a Hamas leader, who was elected Mayor of a border town on the West Bank, and who despite being seen as a representative of a terrorist organisation by the Israelis, was nevertheless engaged with in terms of issues of urban development; because the trains still have to run on time and services have to continue being provided. So there are immense areas of potential for using cities in the urban context towards reconstruction and peace building. I'm going to hand over now so I don't hold the line up.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

You have to speak quite close to the microphone.

Ben Wisner

Let me just respond in a general way to a number of the things that were asked by a very perspective audience's questions. In relation to the election of conflict and international inter-group teaching as a pre-condition for development for economic and social development, you might want to know about the existence of a website, and it is basically Disaster diplomacy, all one word, Disasterdiplomacy.org. Now if you go there what you will find is a friend of mine, Ilan Kellman has actually begun to pull together all sort of interesting historical cases where disaster response and experiences has actually pulled countries together and actually begun to bridge complex and in fact the long civil war in Aceh in Indonesia has actually been at least hopefully successfully concluded in part, pushed on by the terrible experience of the

Tsunami. I also want to call your attention to the existence in New York City of a small NGO called First Responders for Peace. These are actually a group of fire fighters and emergency medical technicians who are against the war in Iraq and they've actually gone to Iraq and they've met several times with their counterparts and are campaigning together for an end to the war. So I think there are definite links within civil society as well that can help. Finally just let me say in relation to this question of implication for development cooperation. I actually don't think that the, I mean short of ... short of some terrorist using a deadly nuclear device in a city somewhere, the actual economic cost of recovery from a terrorist attack is probably not going to be very high in relation to the cost of recovery from something like the Tsunami or a major hurricane like the super-cyclone in 1999 in Orissa in India or hurricane Katrina or hurricane Mitch or for instance the Kobe earthquake, I think though that the important point is that we do maintain this watchdog role in relation to military and security spending and try to keep the development agenda from being adsorbed within the ... or re-absorbed from within the you know inside the security agenda. In fact quite the contrary, I think we should campaign to get say 10% of all the military budget in the world, not much, just 10%, in the first instance just to retrofit and protect schools. Thousands of school children died in Kashmir just a few weeks ago ok, that was not necessary, the engineering exists, the organisation exists, pilot projects from the Agha Khan Foundation, the UN Centre for Regional Development in Central Asia, all of this exists. We know how to protect schools, we know how to train local masons to protect schools and it doesn't cost very much, it doesn't cost, it's not costly. Ten per cent of the military budget could do that and could retrofit hospitals and relation them to draining the swamp, I mean how much good will would it produce to actually have schools and hospitals that didn't fall down in earthquakes.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Thank you, James, can you be brief.

James Putzel

Yes, I think so. In relationship to this idea that there have always been tyrants in the Middle East and whether the US is not just another tyrant. Well, I would just say that if we look at the history of the region since World War II, we see that various nationalist movements emerged in Western Asia, and, if anything, the United States stood against them and tended to favour tyrants. Look at what the US did in Iran and its installation of the Shah of Iran or look at Saddam Hussein himself, who was very much empowered and emboldened by the United States. I think that there was a diversity in the nationalist movement in that part of the world made much more restrictive by the attitude of not only the United States but Britain and other Western powers vis-a-vis the politics there and not least the kind of endorsement they gave to the Israeli government in terms of securing a position in the region. I say that despite my relatives who are very much believers in the Israeli project.

The second thing I wanted to say was in answer to the question about multi-lateralism. Why didn't it gain the upper hand? Well, I think the first thing to say is the most important and that is that the multilateralist position is weakly articulated by the Democratic Party. Clinton was a hesitant multilateralist, at best, and we don't have a strong multilateralist position developed in the US. We have to understand that there is a powerful unilateralist tradition in the US, in US politics. To some extent

Mamdani - I really do urge you to read his book - gets into this in a way that is similar to certain things I have written in the past. Some of this comes out of the settler character of the US, where a whole nation was built on a genocide of indigenous people and a nation that hasn't yet come to terms with those origins. I think it has a very illiberal foreign policy since the days of 'manifest destiny' and so it is an uphill struggle to win the population over to a multilateralist position.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Right I'm going to make an executive decision and actually stop the comments here, get the two questions there and start from the other side so you get at least three comments from the other people - so those two questions there.

5th Questioner

I have a question slightly getting away from the US because I think it was also very interesting what was mentioned at the beginning - that other states also are recruited into this war on terrorism or not. Well my question is maybe it is not supposed to be so unfatalistic but isn't it just unrealistic to assume that well any kind of policy field is just going to be unaffected by these waves of public attention which are not just kind of a factor of let's say Bush manipulating the agenda? So I am not trying to say that it's all, in every case justified, but is it also a case of just sitting back and waiting the thing out a little bit because for example, if you look at some policies which are at least <? > to the European context, what actually these in general foreign policy terms, I'm not talking about specific NGOs, I just don't know enough about this, but at least so far and to my knowledge not all that much changes and it is a lot of really just symbolic politics. Is it really all that alarmist what is happening? Let's talk about really you know outside from the US where undoubtedly there has been a major sea change.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

There's a question at the back over there.

6th Questioner

Hi, I'd just like to make a comment and a question. The comment is just, there seems to me to be a risk of getting confused between the risk of a terrorist act and the risk of a terrorist campaign and it is about the risk of a terrorist campaign that I am going to ask a quick question. Terrorist campaigns obviously would be financed and that financing would then be from a black market and the question that I have to ask is, bearing that in mind, wouldn't it be appropriate for the military to be involved in order to deal with the proliferation of the black market because that would encourage an expansion of such things as arms and drugs and therefore there is a role for the military in dealing with developments?

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Are there any other questions? Three ... one over there.

7th Questioner

First I would like to agree very much with Dr James Putzel's observation that the US has played a part in the creation of the rogue states, that it is now trying to take care of itself. But the question is how would you predict the US's military presence with huge

bases in Northern Uganda and at Djibouti for the development of the whole of Africa and the sub-Saharan African region in general?

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Right and before I hand over, I'm just going to ask a quick question myself which is to a certain extent this Panel has actually created an opposition between terrorism and development, almost implicitly saying one is bad and the other one is good. If we have development we'll have less terrorism. Of course development is a very disruptive process, it comes with a lot of costs, I mean it is about social change, there are winners and losers. Terrorism of course can be possibly provoked by development in many ways so let's start with David, David do you want to come up here?

David Keen

Ok well I'm going to talk about the, another executive decision, the comment about 'is the US just another tyrant' because that's got me thinking the most in a way and I think what that does is it raises the issue which I think is very important of what are the conditions in which democracy can be established. Now in terms of British rule in Iraq and then subsequently in independent Iraq, I think you have had a situation of the predominance of a Sunni minority and this historic predominance sits pretty uneasily with democracy. If we are talking about is there a connection between authoritarianism and terrorism, I think there is. We have to look at US links to authoritarianism, we have to look at the career path so to speak of terrorists and the role for example of torture and authoritarian regimes in propelling people along that path. Where I think we have a problem is in the rather simplistic diagnosis of the Bush administration in particular that if there is a link between authoritarianism and terrorism, then the forcible removal of authoritarianism and the forceful imposition of democracy will in a sense solve the problem and I think one of the things that we are coming up against in Iraq now is the difficulty of imposing democracy very suddenly and by force on a country where there have been other traditions, other patterns of historical domination by particular ethnic and religious groups and so on. And this I think is something that we are interested in, very much in the crises states research programme, the idea that the imposition of democracy if it is done very suddenly can be something which precipitates various kinds of violence. The example of Rwanda comes up and the genocide there in reaction partly to an attempt to impose democracy very quickly. So I think it is something that we have to think about, what are the links between authoritarianism and terrorism but also what are the links between rapid democratisation and mass violence.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Ok so I think we'll give Ian the last concluding word.

Ian Linden

Thank you. In reply to the general question just to tell you a little bit about what the Ministry for International Development is doing in this country. I recently undertook a research programme looking at the way in which Muslim organisations could participate in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Because on the whole DFID had by a sort of default position tended to support secular and Christian NGOs in that order, the work that I did was largely on Islam and in West Africa and it was absolutely fascinating. It is very clear that Gellner is wrong in that elegant book

on Conditions of Liberty about the incapacity of Islamic countries to create civil society. That much is clear in Egypt where the Muslim brothers have moved into a whole range of different organisations; they control the Bar Association, they work very well with Christian Copts in the Pharmacists Association in what is a quasi trades union. This is equally true in West Africa where mosques form the basis of quite important social services and projects amongst progressive Imams and even the Dawa mission societies are doing some good science education and other work. There is such a thing as Islamic civil society. It would be surprising if there wasn't. So that is the first thing I want to say. I think the way forward developmentally is to understand the meanings and idioms and framework of what Muslims mean by development and, in dialogue with Muslim communities, to try and promote some of the ideas of development that we may have as a "development community" which may not correspond directly with those that are experienced and expressed by Muslims on the ground around the world. And obviously that is going to be an enormously different task in Indonesia to what it would be in the North of Nigeria.

The second point I want to make is that I was delighted by what a speaker said over there because all the evidence indicates that there is no connection between poverty and terrorism, that in fact all the leadership of the recent wave of international terrorism has come from people who are not poor and who show many different characteristics as well as some similar ones. Very often experience of different cultures, being a minority of a minority, Olivier Roy suggests has resulted in the invention of a religious discourse that is not embedded in the local community. These are all very much mobile people. A majority of the 9/11 bombers came from relatively lowly clans in Saudi Arabia that provided drivers, carpenters and maids and the like, they were not the top of the social ranking but they were all very upwardly mobile and geographically mobile too, and, like Sayeed Qutb who also went to the United States of America, they had experience of other cultures and countries. Those factors are probably quite important. But your link between crime, collapsed states and terrorism is obviously one that is acknowledged by all governments - except in practice they don't. I don't know whether you read that recent article on Jersey in the London Review of Books; vast sums of dirty money, from every shady source you can think of, has gone through the States of Jersey Banks, just like it goes through the Cayman Islands and various other places. Now if you want to "drain the swamp" it would be an awfully good idea to drain some of the off-shore banks and some of the Jersey fake front companies. That would make a very, very good start.

Somebody talked about wouldn't it be a good idea to "stay your hand" when dealing with some of these very intractable problems. The answer is obviously yes as Neil Ferguson says for a completely different reason, but if you haven't got trained cadres within your society able to run an intelligent civil service in the country where you are supposedly going to act as a Trustee and promote democracy and develop, you are going to make a hell of a mess. If you want to be a British imperialist in an American mode, create a trained American imperialist - the British imperialist class had a long training in working in these colonial contexts. Of course it is very difficult advocating that because Ferguson thinks the Americans should play this role. I wouldn't go along with that but he's got a point, and he's got a point because the catastrophe of Iraq is based precisely on ignorance and lack of experience in something that wasn't, it has to be said, shown to such a degree in Germany and Japan.

Chair: Dennis Rodgers

Well thank you very much Ian and that wraps up the debate for tonight, apologies for the academic terrorism of the timing but if we could have a round of applause for our speakers. [APPLAUSE]