

The Future of World Society: the new terrorism

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Speaker: Professor Lord Giddens

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Can I just say this the 4th in the series of 5 lectures that I'm giving. I hope I might persuade at least some of you to stay on for the 5th lecture next week which is going to be about global divisions, global inequalities, major structural conflicts in the world and therefore I hope is still a theme of interest to most people here.

In starting this lecture, can I take you back to where I began in the first lecture I gave where I was talking about what it means to live in a global age and I was arguing in that lecture that I have a different view of globalisation from most of the people who currently write about it, a different view in two respects. First of all most writers tend to equate globalisation with the expansion of markets, the expansion of free trade if you like across the world which for me however is only one narrow aspect of what's happening in the world, that one wants to subsume under the ideas of globalisation and the global age. Globalisation is about more far than that and second, most writers today do something which they shouldn't do I think, that is they treat globalisation as something out there for the industrial countries. Globalisation is like either a synonym for what's happening in the international arena or it's a kind of synonym even for the developing world but I've tried to argue through these lectures that globalisation fundamentally influences and changes the nature of the industrial countries too, our societies in which we live and one of the prime reasons for that is that the driving force of globalisation or the global age, in my view anyway, is not markets, it's the impact of communications and media which means we seem to have a different texture of experience from previous generations where the kind of immediacy of communication that we have now, which is only really constructed over the past 30 or so years, this is something really new in people's experience and it's a new feature in the structuring of our societies too and as I will be arguing in this lecture it is very intimately related to the rise of the new terrorism and the impact of terrorism in our lives today.

Think back to the American election. Just before the American election Osama Bin Laden produced a video which played some part, we don't know what, in the electoral process. I don't think you'll find any previous selection with an analogue to this where many quite serious commentators in the newspapers were asking who did Osama want to win in the American election. Did he want Bush to win or did he want to Kerry to win and there are commentators who took both sides of that argument.

Not only that, I don't know how many people here have either seen the Bin Laden video or read the text of it but that's also extremely interesting because the text of the video seems to imply that Osama probably saw Fahrenheit 9/11 because there's one telling phrase in it. How many people here have seen Fahrenheit 9/11? Well, that's a lot. You remember what to me was one of the most transfixing parts of the film was when George Bush himself was transfixed in the school classroom when he was listening to the story about a goat and he stayed, for what was it, about 4½ minutes in a classroom when the twin towers were attacked and Bin Laden in his video says what kind of leader is this when his country is under intensive attack, sits in a classroom being preoccupied with a story of a goat!

There is something about the immediacy of this relationship which I've argued, it's not just a political thing, it's a kind of everyday thing for us and I called that in the first lecture, everyday culture shock. Everyday culture shock is not always shock but it's an everyday contact between the different cultures of the world which are no longer out there for us, they're here and they're present and they're everywhere and their manifestations are everywhere. Think of the horrific murder of the journalist that just happened in the Netherlands, a journalist who spoke out very forcefully against what he saw as the intolerance of Islam and was murdered in a brutal way, in a way which has a clear analogue to the kidnapping and murders that have happened in the context of the Iraq war, it might have happened before who knows, but there seems to be a tele-visual link in these occurrences. Everyday culture shock is something that we have to live with but something which sort of very much influences, our decisions, our lives and even the political process in western societies today.

What you can say here that we no longer have to go out and get to the world. You can't insulate the problems of the world from our societies. Those problems will come to you. If you don't deal with those problems those problems will now come to you and you should remember 9/11 is perhaps the most, still the most dramatic expression of that because it was the first major successful attack on the American mainland since the British raised the capital Washington some 200 years previously. America seemed to be territorially secure, way different from the big conflicts of the world which to some extent it had sponsored and certainly had been involved in during the cold war period. Those things never came to America. Of course the threat of nuclear annihilation was always there, those missiles could come to America but this was a kind of coming to America which really shattered people's sense of security and geographical integrity. One of the things Europeans on hold still find it difficult to grasp is what dramatic impact September 11 had on the American psyche and it's no doubt that that impact was a continuing feature really of the results which are for better or for worse, propelled Mr Bush back to power. So part of my theme in this lecture is the intrinsic connection between communications and violence just as a whole theme of all the lectures really is significance of communications and transformations in our lives.

Now when you look at the origin of the term terrorism, ask yourself can the term terrorism have a reasonably objective social scientific meaning, very important issue I think, the term terrorism seems to have its origins in the French Revolution, in the revolutionary terror perpetrated during that process. The term terror wasn't invented by the revolutionaries themselves, the term terror was invented by the counter-revolutionaries, the people who despise the French Revolution and what it stood for and believe the blood letting which went on was a form of as they said terrorising the population so the term terror seems to have been invented at that period but of course you could say the phenomenon of terrorising people through violence is as old as history because if you look back into the history of ancient civilisations, everybody here will know I think that when one army invaded a city held by the enemy they would sometimes raise the entire city to the ground and kill all the men, women and children in the city. This was not at all uncommon in traditional civilisations and the point of it was terror. The point of it was not just to dispose as it were physically the enemy within the city, the point was to create terror in those living in other cities and show the power which that terror represented and of course terror was used in the practise of putting severed heads on pikes outside city limits in Britain until surprisingly late time in European history, these sorts of things were a fairly common phenomenon. So the phenomenon of using violence with the idea of terrifying populations, especially civilian populations is obviously old but the term is new and I'll be arguing that essentially the phenomenon is new

and especially what we now call terrorism is much newer phenomenon than even the French Revolution.

Terrorism as a term doesn't date for the time which terror was first coined. Terrorism only became widely used in the early years of the 20th century and when you have a fairly recent term which becomes fairly widely used, it normally reflects changes in the phenomenon and I'll be describing a bit later why I think the notion of terrorism and the fact of terrorism in a certain modern sense is relatively recent and a particular form of terrorism which I'll call new style terrorism or the new terrorism is actually very recent and linked to the phenomenon of the global age which I was discussing a bit earlier.

Now there are two questions which arise when you consider the problem, can terrorism be a useful concept for the social scientist. That is can you use it in a reasonably objective way. First of all there is the question of moral valuation. It's famous that one person's a terrorist, another person's a freedom fighter and another person's freedom fighter is a third person's terrorist so you can use these terms in shifting ways. It is also very well known that people who were terrorists at one point themselves can later come to condemn terror just as violently as they practised it and you could say, some reservations in the early history of Israel for example, was punctuated by terrorist activity but today of course the Israeli leadership is part and parcel of self declaredly of the war on terror and regards terror and terrorists as its primary enemy.

You also have moral shifts because its not that long ago that Nelson Mandela was widely regarded as a terrorist and wildly reviled actually as a terrorist leader, potential terrorist leader within the ANC, but of course Nelson Mandela has now become one of the most revered figures, if not the most revered figure of the late 20th century so there is that kind of issue. Can you free the term terrorism from a certain level of moral valuation where that moral valuation shifts across time or shifts according to the perspective of the observer.

The second issue I think is that the role of the state, can states be said to practice terrorism because whatever people now say about the big corporations or whatever, states have been responsible for far more deaths in human history than any other type of organisation. States have brutally murdered populations and this includes civilian populations. I mean states have certainly, in modern times, carried out the kind of analogue that the raising of cities that happened in traditional civilisations. You only have to think of the Queen's visit to Germany a couple of weeks ago where the issue of Dresden was raised. Dresden was fire bombed, many thousands of people died. The city was at that point was largely raised to the ground and it had no strategic advantage many historians think at that time of the War so it could be described as an act of wanton terror, certainly by the critics of the allies action it has been described in that way in which many people died and which the purpose was to produce terror within the wider society of Germany.

So, the question of whether you can have an objective definition therefore is a difficult one and it raises lots more issues than I can really discuss here so I am going to offer what is a fairly dogmatic conceptualisation of terrorism because I think having thought about the issue quite a bit that you can have a reasonably objective definition of terrorism and terrorism defined as I'll try to do in a minute is a major force affecting our lives today and it is different from other kinds of violence which are practised in other contexts.

So let me just say what my definition is, you've got these various elements. First of all I think terrorism should be separated from the activities of the state. Maybe there are contexts in which one can use the term state terrorism but I'll separate that from the activities of the state and I'll define terrorism as the following. Terrorism, first, involves acts of violence, physical violence, second, used by non state actors whatever these be, whether they be quasi-combat units or what, normally targeted at civilian or non-combatant targets. Normally targeted at civilians or those who are not themselves fighters and crucially where the violence involved is more symbolic than strategic. Where the violence involved is more symbolic than strategic because the point of terrorism is to terrorise the point, is to instil fear and anxiety in a principally a civilian population so the main characteristics will be violence used by non state actors directed mainly at civilian or non-combatant populations where the violence involved is more strategic than symbolic but like any concept that terrorism is fuzzy round the edges and there will always be definitional problems around what terrorism actually is.

I want to argue that terrorism in this sense as I mentioned a bit earlier a specifically modern phenomenon. I would therefore would want to separate it from acts of violence designed to terrorise that happened in previous periods of history. The reason why I think terrorism in the sense in which I'm using it as a relatively recent phenomenon is again its connection with communications. If you are going to terrorise populations on a fairly wide spectrum you need to bring the information about the violence quickly to those populations affected. So terrorism to me is largely contingent on the rise of modern communications which makes it possible to do this. The rise of modern communications as I mentioned is essentially a sort of late 19th century process with the invention of the electronic telegraph which made possible transcendence of time and space. Once this happens then you tend to get the rise of symbolic acts of terrorist violence which can be projected at distance. You don't have to be local in order to know about them.

It's very important, I don't know how far people are familiar with the sort of history of communications and geography but before the invention of the electronic telegraph it took a long, long while for news or information to percolate around. You couldn't have an immediate influence on a situation process or acts of violence in an immediate sense before something like the middle of the 19th century. Even in the early part of the 19th century, late 18th century, battles were fought in wars where peace had actually been concluded but it took so long for the news to get back that the battles were fought without people realising that the wars had ended. One of the main battles in the American Civil War for example fought out in the South, actually happened something like 2 months after the War had formally ended and this was the nature of communication in those times. So I think terror is a phenomenon that tries to influence civilian populations at distance, is a creation of modern mass communications, especially electronic communication and of course it links in with these fantastic transformations in recent times which I've mentioned in previous lectures and which I'll come back to a bit earlier.

The bulk of what I want to say in this lecture is that we have to make a distinction between what I call old style and new style terrorism. Old style terrorism is the kind of terrorism which has been dominant for something like 60, 70, 80 years in the early part of the 20th century, still exists today but has distinctive characteristics. Old style terrorism is largely associated with the rise of nationalism and with the somewhat artificial process of the establishing of nations. There are many views about nationalism and its origins but my view anyway for what its worth is a kind of Ernest Gellner type view that nationalism is a creation of modernity. It's a phenomenon of something like the late 18th century onwards although

you find residues early on. Anthony Smith argues this very strongly in the LSE, he says it goes back earlier but I think it's more of a modern phenomenon. The rise of the idea of the myth of the nation, integrity of sovereignty, the idea of bounded territories associated with national identity. Now in all nations the boundaries of nations were fixed somewhat arbitrarily. They were fixed either as lines on a map as happened in Africa or Asia, essentially by western colonisers or they were fixed through conquest battle struggle. Think of this country for example, the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is a nation with territorial integrity but of course it involved history of warfare. Scotland was brought in after several wars and the Act of Union, the Welsh were never completely integrated into wider British society and felt themselves to be to some extent subjugated people and Ireland was the crucial arena for the British in terms of its desire to have a separate national identity. I'm going back to at least the mid 19th century.

Now when you have patchwork nations, all nations to some extent are founded on force and a kind of patchwork, then you have many examples of what you can call and students in the field call nations without states. Nations without states are nations with a claim to having a common cultural identity, a claim to the sort of myth of the nation but without the territorial and state apparatus which normally belongs to a nation and most forms of old style terrorism are linked to nations without states and the point of old style terrorism is to establish states in areas where nations do not have control of the territory state apparatus. This is true of Northern Ireland for example or one side of the combatants in Northern Ireland, the Basque country in Europe for example and various forms of violence associated with national identity. There are issues like Kashmir and many other situations like that where the main issue is territorial integrity and identity in the formation of a state. What terrorists want to do is to have integral state in normally a sovereignty of an existing state where the existing state lays claim to overall territorial sovereignty and where terrorists are prepared to use violence to achieve their ends.

Old style terrorism is fundamentally local therefore because its ambitions are local. It wants to establish a state in a specific national area and once that ambition has been realised of course that's the situation under which terrorists can then become heroes or those who once were reviled as terrorists can become national leaders of the state which emerges and can then become as it were perfectly responsible politicians leading the new nation.

Now old style terrorism especially in recent years has had a kind of international component to it because countries like Libya or Syria and some of the East European countries for example and groups in the United States have supported the IRA in Northern Ireland and Basque terrorism to some extent has become international so you couldn't say old style terrorism is wholly local but it is mainly local, it's ambitions are local although it might involve a wider global network of supporters. It might involve the filtering of arms and drugs from different parts of the world to fund armaments and so forth. Old style terrorism is fundamentally limited in its ambitions and normally in old style terrorism the violence involved is relatively limited. Many people have lost their lives as the result of the conflict in Northern Ireland but the proportion of people killed in Northern Ireland including British soldiers is actually less than those who die in road accidents each year so although quite significant numbers of course of people who have been maimed and injured and killed, there's never been a massive extension of that level of violence and this is characteristic normally of old style terrorism because it has relatively limited aims, the violence itself tends to be relatively limited, fearsome and horrific though it may be because it is often aimed at completely innocent populations.

Old style terrorism is difficult to combat as the British have found for such a long time in Northern Ireland. For various reasons it's difficult to combat because of the strong moral compulsion of the myth of national identity. It has a very energising component to it, national identity, which can continue to fuel devotees of a movement which seeks to establish a state where there is a nation without a state and it's also especially difficult to come to terms with when there are contested claims on the same set of land and the same territory. This is true in Northern Ireland, difficult to produce a settlement or a settlement hopefully seems to be emerging because what the parties want is completely different. One group wants to be part of the United Kingdom, the other one wants to be part of Ireland. The same is true in Israel where you could say, many neutral observers anyway say that both sides have legitimacy in their claim to large chunks of the land which they occupy or of course this is very heavily contested from those on both sides of the argument, extremely hard to resolve because they are fighting over large parts of the same land not just trying to get a state where one didn't exist when there aren't subsidiary claims as there are in the Basque country for example, it's much more like a movement which seeks to go a bit further beyond the autonomy which the Basques already have.

However difficult it might be to eradicate old style violence however, myself I think it's really important to draw to a fundamental distinction between old style terrorism which if you like is 20th century terrorism and new style terrorism which is essentially the terrorism of the global age because it deploys the very techniques of communication and global spread which have constructed this new global period for us and Al Qaeda, but not only Al Qaeda, are examples of new style terrorism.

Let me list the main characteristics as I would see them of what new style terrorism is. First, new style terrorism is different from old style terrorism in respect of the scope of its claims. One of the distinguishing features of Al Qaeda's view of the world for example is that it has geo-political aims, it seeks to restructure world society. As you'll know what the proponents of certain chunks of Al Qaeda leadership want to do is to reconstruct an Islamic society, a caliphate going all the way from Pakistan into Europe, to effect regime change in the Middle East. One of the origins of Al Qaeda is to change the regime in Saudi Arabia but also to re-establish strongly Islamic governments throughout the Middle East. It's also to recapture Northern Africa and if you look at the various Al Qaeda websites, it's also partly to reconquer Europe. Al Qaeda takes a long view of history and says that over a period of a thousand years the West has expelled Islamic groups from those areas which it has legitimate claim to. It includes for example the Balkans or they include about half of Spain because half of Spain was ruled by the Moors for a long period. Quite large chunks of what we now regard as Europe were previously Islamic, were ruled either by the Ottoman Empire or were ruled from Northern Africa and the point is to re-establish the global role of Islam in these regions and areas.

So where as old style nationalism is local and linked to particular states, normally quite small states, new style terrorism is global or is geo-political in its ambitions. It wants to reverse the tide of world power. An interesting thing about Al Qaeda and similar organisations is that it is a kind of modernist anti-modernism because the new terrorist organisations make great use of modern communications. They make use of the whole palpably actually of modern communications but to criticise modernity but to reverse the tide of modernity, reverse what is seen as a corrupt style of society emanating from the West has lost the moral compass which a true society have.

Second, if the first feature is geo-political scope in terms of aims and ambitions, the second is organisation. Mary Kaldor, who is one of the heads of the Centre for Global Governance in the LSE, the very organisation to which I am also now attached, has quite interestingly pointed to the similarities between new terrorist groups and NGOs. New terrorist groups she says and I think this is quite right, Al Qaeda is like a kind of malign NGO because it deploys the same global forms of organisation as NGOs do. It's driven by a sense of mission and commitment, just like say, I don't want to say, you shouldn't draw this parallel too closely, it's an organisational parallel. If you take an organisation like Friends of the Earth, it's a very powerful global organisation because it's driven by a sense of mission and commitment and that sense of mission and commitment allows for a fairly loose global organisation to flourish. It's a network type organisation just like Al Qaeda is driven by a sense of mission and you know Al Qaeda has been very substantially weakened by the American attacks in Afghanistan but it's also strong still because the moral conviction further which drives the sense of mission can keep cells functioning even when some aspects of the overall organisation have been weakened or broken and that's we're seeing in many parts of the world today.

So there is a lot of autonomy in local cells and these can sort of breed without really necessarily being in any strong sense directed from the centre. Another characteristic is that these cells exist in many countries or these groups exist in many countries just like NGOs have global spread so does Al Qaeda. It's very contested what Al Qaeda is now especially after Afghanistan but many students of Al Qaeda, a specialist book called Inside Al Qaeda, which is one of the best ones I read, claims that there are still cells in something like 60 different countries with something like 20,000 people to die violently for the cause. Not all of them suicide bombers but a certain proportion certainly prepared to sacrifice their lives for the cause and existing semi-autonomously from as it were the centre.

The final characteristic just like NGOs is that the new terrorist organisations intercept with states. No NGO could flourish completely as a non state organisation. They all have some contacts and support from states and this is true, Kaldor says of new style terrorist organisations to and so it is so support from states say like Libya or certainly Iraq for some kinds of organisations and so forth has been quite important to the survival.

Thirdly, the third difference between old style and new style terrorism is means. Old style terrorism as I mentioned because it had relatively limited objectives, the violence involved was normally fairly limited and continues to be, normally fairly limited. Chechnya is an example where it is becoming radicalised and the two are overlapping for some substantive attempt degree. The new terrorism seemed to be much more ruthless in the means it is prepared to use and again if anyone is concerned or interested in this, which I hope in some sense everybody will be, if you check some of the Al Qaeda websites they talk in extremely destructive language of the enemy. The enemy being principally the United States but for some extent the West as a whole and they do explicitly say we should whatever means we can, we will kill as many people as we can. It's very, very different from the style of violence characteristic of old style terrorism.

Now in my view, it's these two second characteristics, organisation and ruthlessness which links new style terrorism to mass destruction, the possibility of mass destruction. It's not as such weapons of mass destruction, about which I want to, well, I want to speak a bit, already the time seems to be sort of running out slightly. You have to regard the connection between

mass destruction and weapons of mass destruction as a problematic one. Let me tell you why. If you look at the example of 9/11, what happened in 9/11? Well about 3000 people were killed in the Twin Towers but if the planes as they were designed to do, had hit at a slightly different angle and the Towers had collapsed immediately, 50,000 would have lost their lives in the Twin Towers. I remember what Al Qaeda was doing was striking at the centres of American economic power, military power and political power. The second plane hit the Pentagon but it didn't hit the part of the Pentagon where much more destruction could have happened if the plane had hit the right part. Where the networking capabilities of the Pentagon are, they could more or less have paralysed America military capability at least for a while because it's very dependent on networks communication. The third plane was only stopped from hitting the White House, you remember, by the bravery of some of the passengers on it, who brought it down before it could actually hit that target but if it had hit the White House and destroyed the White House, it would have been, at the outer edge of the possibility of 9/11, is a possibility of massive destruction with something like 60,000 people losing their lives and a kind of strike at the main nerve cells of American political, economic and military power. You see you don't need weapons of mass destruction to kill a lot of people if you're ruthless enough and you're well organised enough because only planes were used in that attack.

So the connection between weapons of mass destruction and modern mass terrorism is more problematic I think than many people assume. But what about the issue of the weapons of mass destruction? What kinds of weaponry are there around and what likelihood is there that new style terrorists could use them. Well, I was going to say more about this than I actually have time to. You have to treat not just the connection between weapons of mass destruction and modern mass terrorism, problematic, but also the concept of weapons of mass destruction. The concept of weapons of mass destruction is actually not a useful one I think when you look at the literature on weaponry can be employed. One of the things that is stunning when you to start to look at the literature is however, if you combine organisation, ruthlessness and modern weaponry there could be truly horrendous events which could be threatened by the rise of new style terrorism.

Summarising very briefly because I did want to say a lot more about this, summarising briefly, you have to distinguish among the various categories of what are ordinarily regarded as weapons of mass destruction. Chemical weapons are dangerous, yes. They could hundreds of people, who knows, thousands of people if deployed in certain ways but they don't have ultimate destructive power. The destructive power of chemical weapons, when you are talking like civilian populations rather than on a battlefield is relatively limited. Much the same is true of biological weapons. Biological weapons, for example, ricin, are pretty fearsome and could certainly have destructed potential. They could cause panic as to some extent even the original letters, you know involving Anthrax did in the United States about three or four years ago, about 5 people died then.

You could certainly kill hundreds of people by chemical or biological weapons but their lethal potential does not extend beyond that therefore I sympathise very much with people who say you must draw attention between biological and chemical weapons on the one hand, dangerous though they are and nuclear weapons on the other and the most significant problem facing the world and the most horrific conjunction between new style terrorism and modern weaponry is in the field of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation and it's nuclear proliferation which should primarily worry us because nuclear weapons give terrorists the chance to destroy a whole city. Nuclear weapons, certain kinds of nuclear weapons, if they

get in the hands of the wrong groups, could kill millions of people, not just a few hundreds of people and so much of the effort which is being directed on the so called war on terror should instead be directed not just to contain proliferation but actually produce de-proliferation in the world because the proliferation of nuclear weaponry is really dangerous and it comes not from rogue states primarily. It comes from two sources, the ex Soviet Union and to some extent Pakistan when Pakistani scientists were involved in passing nuclear secrets to some extent to different countries.

In the Soviet Union it has been calculated that it has something like 50,000 nuclear weapons and something like possibly a quarter of these are unaccounted for. We know many of them have been stolen, some of them have been recovered, we don't know who stole them. General Abed who is a famous general come politician in Russia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union gave evidence before an international committee in which he said over half of the so called suitcase bombs that existed in the Soviet Union, which were 1 kilatron bombs, have gone missing. You can take those bombs in a suitcase literally and leave them in a middle of a city.

Incidentally, you have to separate these from dirty bombs. Dirty bombs are simply conventional explosives packed inside radioactive materials. Dirty bombs are relatively easy to make and its almost certain that a dirty bomb will be exploded somewhere at some point but dirty bombs do not kill large numbers of civilian population. Other nuclear weapons can do.

Al Qaeda was trying to acquire nuclear weapons way back in the early 1990's and we have evidence that they made connections with a range of countries in order to seek to do so. If Al Qaeda, and there is not only Al Qaeda, there are several other such groups out there in the global internet network, if they brought a van into Times Square with a 10 kilatron bomb in it and exploded it, they could kill something like half a million people in the centre of New York City and they could devastate also wider areas around. So, it's this outer edge which is the most fearsome possible connection and therefore we need a much more rigorous regime of nuclear non-proliferation and de-proliferation than we have so far.

Since I have to accelerate, let me just conclude by a number of brief observations that summarise at least my position on this. First, as I said, the notion of weapons of mass destruction has itself to be deconstructed is not really useful notion. It least has to be deployed with some care partly because you can produce great destruction anyway without using such weapons but partly because of the differentiation between them.

Second, I don't believe in the war on terror. I don't believe in the war on terror because the whole point of new style terrorism, asymmetric violence is that it is different from conventional war. It is not a war in the conventional sense. You do have to fight it and in some parts through the use of violence. I think it was necessary for the Americans to destroy the Al Qaeda networks in Afghanistan because they were planning nuclear attacks on Western countries but it's not a war in the conventional sense and the most problematic thing, within it, it's not just a war on terror, it's the problematic edge especially of containing the possibility of nuclear violence and nuclear proliferation.

Thirdly, we all have to be alert to what I call the phenomenology of risk and violence in the kind of world I'm describing, a mediatised world where you have mass terror which is deployed through modern techniques of videos, television and so forth. The phenomenology

of terror and threat is a difficult one to manage. The phenomenology of threat and terror is that often you have to announce a threat in order to get people to change their behaviour or to take action against it. However if you announce a threat and nothing happens or if you announce a threat and through announcing that threat you neutralise it, then people will accuse you of scaremongering and this is exactly what a series of Channel 4 programmes recently made about global terror did I think. Part of the reason of why the impact of global terror is less than it was is because the organisation of Al Qaeda, in it's original sense, has been in some part crippled but of course as soon as your successful, people will say why are you scaring us in the first place but if you don't give information then they will say cover up. They will say you weren't providing enough information in the public domain and all governments have to struggle with this difficult relationships between cover ups and scaremongering which is very difficult for us a civilian population to deal with.

Next, we do have to have pre-emptive doctrines but these pre-emptive doctrines should be in no way confined to terrorism. It's absurd I think the position of the Bush administration, pre-emptive doctrines against terrorism, no pre-emptives against global warming, you need a whole variety of pre-emptive doctrines if you are going to face up to the risks and threats that we have in the world.

Finally, there is the problematic issue of civil liberties. What happens to our civil liberties in the age of the war on terror? Well, I think what is happening is wrong because first of all Guantanamo Bay is surely just a scandal, it's a kind of offshoring, an equivalent of industrial banking offshoring really and to avoid the kinds of democratic rights that surely the whole point of fighting terrorism is to sustain those rights. That's surely a scandalous thing but also I think you get an attack on civil liberties if you bracket all weapons of mass destruction as the same and you bracket all terrorism as the same. We should be concentrating far more as I've said several times upon nuclear options and upon nuclear proliferation. We should not be just producing a blunt defamation of civil liberties in order to do that because it has to be in some part geo-politically organised, not just a matter of vetting people when they come into a particular country so I think the struggle against terrorism does not necessarily mean a complete denial of human liberties and we should stand up for the things which our society asserts as against new style terrorism, human rights, democracy, political participation, equality and therefore we must resist some of the entrenched reductions or reverses of human rights that have been carried out in the name of terrorism.

Thank you very much and I hope somebody comes next week too.