

The Future of World Society: Europe and Asia

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This lecture today is the third in this series of five. I have to apologise to anyone who is lured in under false pretences because originally I was going to talk about Europe and Asia, to talk about both simultaneously but I don't think that's possible so I'll be talking a bit about Asia in the last lecture of the series and will be talking today mainly about Europe and its position in the world, partly in relation to the United States and what happens next.

Last time I talked to you it was six days before the US Presidential election, now as they say it's the day after and as we know it is almost certain that George Bush has won another four years. I mean as I said in my previous lecture I was unashamedly I suppose a partisan for John Kerry and I feel saddened for America, I feel saddened for the world because I think a John Kerry presidency would have made a difference for the reasons I outlined previously in both domestic policy and foreign policy but it is not to be, it was a razor edge thing like before with an almost complete reproduction of the results previously so I think my conclusion that the United States is a 50/50 society is actually borne out by the results even though those results produce a continuing Republican dominance.

Last time I told a joke about George Bush, I suppose I ought to even it up a bit and just tell a joke about John Kerry even as he disappears into history, assuming he disappears into history.

Dick Cheney goes on this TV show and accuses John Kerry of being lacking in profound convictions and later in the day John Kerry hits back and says, 'that's not quite the case'.

In other words I think maybe if Kerry had come out a bit more as a conviction politician it might have just swayed the difference in the election result.

Well this time I am going to talk primarily about Europe and I think when you start out to talk about Europe and its place in the world you can see there is a big difference between its presence and the presence of the United States. If I were to ask you who was the outgoing President of the United States and who is the current President of the United States after last night, assuming the results are still for Bush, everybody in the audience could tell me and everyone in the world more or less could say but supposing I asked you who was the outgoing President of the European Commission and I might ask you who it was...if you put up your hands who knows was the outgoing President of the European Commission?

[PAUSE]

Well that's a relatively small proportion of the audience. It was Mr Prodi who came to lecture at the LSE quite recently so you should know about him! There are not many jokes about Mr Prodi at least as European President of the European Commission. I was searching the internet to try and find a joke about Mr Prodi but I couldn't find any. Hands up who knows the current President of the European Commission.

[PAUSE]

Well, it's Jose Manuel Barroso and although there may be jokes about him in his home country of Portugal, I couldn't find any jokes about him either as the President of the European Commission and that says something in a way about the relationship between Europe and the United States in relation to world power. In his book that I mentioned previously, Timothy Garton Ash just wrote this book called *Free World* in which he went round the United States asking people what they thought of Europe and he goes to somewhere in Missouri and asks people in the local town what they think of Europe and the sort of people he's asking kind of shuffle in an embarrassed way and kind of grin in an embarrassed way and eventually one of them says, 'well I guess there's not much hunting down there', which shows you that Europe does not have the global presence that the United States has so we are dealing with two different centres really of world power with very different influence over them.

Now, one of the themes that I've suggested in these lectures is the theme of the relationship between identity and emancipation. What we've been arguing is that we live in a world which is marked by the transformation of tradition, custom, something happening all over the world. We have a different relationship to time, we have a different relationship to the past than previous generations have had and that relationship means that for all of us we face much more open futures than before. We do on an individual level and on a global level have more freedom than previous generations have had. We have a more open future as individuals as nations, as transnational organisations we're less defined by the past than previous generations have been but the other side of that is an identity crisis. The other side of that is the problem of finding what one's identity is. The problem of deciding on an individual level too I think who one is. What should I be? What should I aim for in life? What does it mean to be a woman, what does it mean to be a man in the contemporary world? These are much more open questions than they ever were before and I'll be trying to set it in the global age these run through a whole series of other issues which affect social institutions as well as individuals and their emotions.

I said in the last lecture this is true of the United States and it's manifestly true of the European Union. Europe has an identity crisis, not the same as the United States, but certainly an identity crisis of what it is, what it's for and what it should be for in the future and when you look at the question of Europe, you start out to discuss the question of Europe,

I think it's pretty plain that what Europe started out as is not what Europe has to become. Europe, European Union, post-war Europe started essentially as a Cold War formation, like so many other things in the world. It began as most people here will know, in the mind of Robert Schumann and one or two other visionaries who first established what was essentially an economic integration of Europe.

In the European steel and coal community, the original idea of Europe was to have a bit more pooling of economic markets in what was originally six countries which originally constituted the foundation of the new Europe and the original idea was to build on that economic integration something much more profound and that economic integration, as I said, started out with steel and coal therefore was a relatively limited aspect of Europe and even Europe's economic identity. That became the European Economic Community set up in 1958 and that endured, the European Economic Community, for several decades but over that time as everyone in the audience I'm sure will know, you had four progressive phases of expansion that the European Union grew through 15 members to the 25 members it now has

and the 25, the European Union 25, like so many other things we're talking about in these lectures, is essentially post 1989 formation because it marks something really fundamental I think in spite of the trite way in the way people reacted to it, the reunification of Europe which was divided for such a long time after World War 2.

The original motivation of having an intensified identity for Europe underlying the formation of the EEC, I think there were plainly several linked motivations. There was the economic one, you get more economic weight if you pull your resources. There was the military one because what those who founded the EEC originally wanted was to ensure that Europe would be a continent free from major war. Europe of course had been the site of two large-scale wars, both became global wars, and those who wanted to establish a new European identity wanted to ensure this would not happen again. This included Winston Churchill who originally was favourable to the idea of the European integration and gave a famous speech about it not long after the War and also importantly it included the Americans. The idea of European identity as from the beginning has been supported by almost all American administrations who wanted distinct European identity, not just for the reasons I just mentioned, economic reasons, the reason of avoiding past conflicts which has scarred the whole continent but also because of a third reason which was the Cold War. The United States supported European integration as a buffer between the US and the Soviet Union as a way of containing communism and an enormous amount really about the history of Europe over the 30 or 40 years after that, you can explain in terms of Cold War polarity.

This is true for example I think of social democratic thinking, social democratic politics. The Centre Left as it were, the European social model developed over that period, that the European social model got its identity partly precisely from this Cold War polarisation. It got its identity from being different from liberal American market capitalism and different from Soviet communism with its state dominated economy on the other. The European model, the European social democratic politics, very much defined pre 1989 by that kind of division. It asserted itself as it were ideologically in the middle of the other two frameworks of possibility and when in 1989/1990 Soviet style economy founded and disappeared, European Leftism was also in a situation of not clearly knowing what its identity was, not clearly knowing what it should aim for and many of the debates that I've been involved in, politically attempt to find a new form of Centre Left which reacts to globalisation which is appropriate for dealing with this new global age in which we live. It's a struggle to redefine the left in a situation where it was no longer defined by this polarity and where everybody has to recognise that markets and competitive markets must play a very significant role in producing an effective economy so many of the dilemmas of the left, many of the possibilities of the left hinges very much on this sort of version of this process of emancipation, in this case emancipation from Cold War dualism, it did so much to structure Europe.

Whatever Europe is now, like the United States, and I suggested in the last lecture the difference between the United States and Europe in terms of identity is not so great because it is not clear what the United States is anymore, whether it is a nation, whether it is a quasi imperial system as has global spread, as its identity changes. Well, there's not that much difference because the European Union has to make parallel shifts. Whatever the European Union is today, which I'll come on in a second, it's plainly has to be defined as a response to the global age, as a response to globalising processes no longer as a Cold War formation getting its identity between the two different sides within in which it was sandwiched.

Now, many say that the contemporary time that the European Union and European identity are under enormous strain, under enormous pressure that the very process of the transformation of 1989 and the Cold War has left the European project foundering and if you look at the statistics they do tend to support that or a prima facie they seem to support that. For example only about 25% of the population in the new east European members of the European Union actually voted in the last election, it's quite extraordinary given, it seems to me to be the world historical significance of the reunification of Europe. It's as if once you got something you no longer value it. Once you've got something you no longer...you lose the sort of dramatic significance of it. If you look at approval ratings of the European Union there is an organisation called Euro Barometer which regularly publishes surveys about what people think about Europe. If you look at the most recent surveys you find some countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece where over 50% of the population still give positive appraisal of the European Union. If you ask them do they think of the European Union positively, about 58% of the population in those countries say they do but you look at other countries and you find that proportion is shifting fairly markedly downwards. It's well under 50% in France. It's under 40% actually in the last Euro Barometer survey of Germany and I mean you are sitting here in the UK, you can guess where Britain stands in this hierarchy can't you? Only 23% of the British population think of the EU positively in the last Euro Barometer poll. The whole lot has kind of been shifting downwards and the UK has always been at the bottom in these surveys which have carried on for the last two or three decades but very small, relatively small proportion of population now endorse something which is changing all our lives because you know there's no mistaking the impact of the European Union on Britain.

Most of the legislation which affects this country now is actually European legislation. It has shifted the structure of sovereignty. That's what the Euro sceptics of course don't like but it is a pretty fundamental change and the nature of the country and its relation to the world we have somehow has always been defined as the reluctant Europeans. Always going along but going along in a grudging way, going along kind of mumbling about it, going along swearing about it but at the same time seemingly wanting to be a free rider to get the advantages of the European Union but at the same time to grumble about it, at the same time to disapprove, at the same time to constantly hover about the possibility of even withdrawing from it. No clearer definition of a free rider than that I think and the UK has been a kind of free rider on Europe, even its contributions if Mrs Thatcher had not been commensurate to its population or its economic weight.

So the European Union if you look at statistics seems to be in a certain amount of trouble and there are structural reasons for this which I'll come on to in a minute but there is another point of view and that point of view has recently been expressed quite eloquently by an author called Jeremy Rifkin who just wrote a book called *The European Dream* and Rifkin argues that the United States has been carried along by the American Dream. The American Dream is an energising dream of the nature of America. It's the thing that you think of when you pass the Statue of Liberty, when you come into the United States in New York, you come on a boat, it's an energising dream of a society which is free and open, where people can find their own place in that society no matter what background they come from but Rifkin argues the American Dream is dying. The American Dream is dying because it's not appropriate he says to contemporary globalised conditions of inter-dependence. The American dream stresses individualism.

The American Dream...George Bush will, forgive me, has a sort of cowboy mentality. In this case Rifkin says this is a kind of positive idea of individualism in America that Europeans think of a cowboy president as a rather disastrous thing but Americans quite often think of the cowboy, as I think many people in Europe used to do 20 or 30 years ago, somebody who is free, who lives a free life, who's on the frontier, who's able to precisely create a new life for themselves but Rifkin says this kind of dream is too individualistic. It's too materialistic. It's linked to economic success primarily. It's linked to social mobility and Rifkin says quite rightly, it's a myth that the United States is a more open society than other industrial countries are. It's not and all the studies of social mobility show this. Although there is a strong ideology of freedom and mobility, if you look at the actual statistics of social mobility, the United States actually has less mobility than some European countries do, both in terms of career mobility and mobility across the generations. So countries like Sweden, for example, most of the Scandinavian countries have more chance of someone from a poorer background getting to a decent position in the society than is true of the United States.

So Rifkin says that this dream does not really match up to reality. It's also a dream that exists with a kind of dominance of American power in the world that we talked about last time in which Rifkin says is not really sustainable form of power in the world. The United States he says, and I think this is more or less right, is kind of holding the world to ransom in a certain way. It's voters are over two issues, the issue of Israel where it's very hard for American presidents to move and create a more harmonious society in the Middle East which surely the rest of the world wants and needs and second on ecological issues because it's extremely difficult for any American president to endorse a rise in gas prices or to change the relatively profligate use of energy which distinguishes the position of the United States ecologically in the world so he says this is not a sustainable dream and it's not a generalisable dream and although he might quite rightly, I think, say it's a good thing to want to spread democracy across the world, it's a very good thing and we should want to do that. To spread as it were the American way of life across the world is not he says a sustainable thing.

Then he thinks Europe, well, the European dream is different because the European dream emphasises inter-dependence. What's the nature of the European Union? Well, it's pretty different from for example the United Nations. The United Nations is valued I think by everybody is still an association of nation states. It gives primacy to sovereignty but sovereignty no longer can determine our reactions to some of the core questions in our world therefore the European Union is offering something different where states for the first time have go together to pool their sovereignty in order to do things collectively which they can't do alone including among those things to find a position in the world for this emerging identity of the European Union.

Rifkin also says, I mean I have to say I think his book is not a great book. In other words much too favourable to Europe I think for reasons I'll come on to a bit later but it's an interesting reversal of the normal view. Economically it's normally assumed the United States is along way ahead of Europe and it is in terms of growth rates, something I'll also come back to, it is but if you look at productivity, quite a few European countries are more productive per worker than the United States is and what Europe has done is kind of negotiated a freer life he says because Europeans work much less than Americans do and in several EU they are more productive but rather than choosing to work all the time and drive GDP endlessly up, they choose in a certain sense to have more free time, to have more leisure time, to have more holidays and have a different style of life, a slower style of life if you like than the United States has and he says also you look at the European Union, it's endorsed transnational

international law. It's enshrined a version of international law into its own Euro legal institutions. The United States still refuses seemingly to sign up to the idea effectively of international law with T.

He says the European Union is much more ecologically sensitive than the United States is in terms of its policies. It's sort of built in a commitment to ecological policies, not just by signing up to Kyoto but the actual framework of some aspects of what the European Union actually is so he says there is a new dream there as it were and that dream is a dream of an inter-dependent world in which nations can co-exist harmoniously and in which we can build upon that inter-dependence to create a more specific and economically sustainable form of life than the United States represents. So there is a counter view and that counter view, whatever the faults of the book, are expressed with considerable force by Rifkin.

Now, very quickly when you look at the position of the European Union I want to suggest to you that there are four main questions that we have to try to discuss and I will try and buzz through them fairly quickly even though they are all very important ones so as to leave time for this famous discussion and debate.

First of all we have to answer the question, what actually is the identity of the European Union? What is the European Union and what should be its identity? What kind of animal is the European Union?

Second, I think we have to ask again the question what is it for because what the European Union was for in the Cold War period cannot be exactly the same as what the European Union is for in the contemporary globalising world.

Third, we have to ask what are its main weaknesses and these weaknesses I think are considerably more extensive than Rifkin tends to imply and some other supporters of the European Union tend to imply.

Fourthly, we have to ask...come back to the question of the United States, should the EU have geo-political ambitions and if so what should these geo-political ambitions be and how can Europe sustain them.

All big questions so all I can offer are a variety of my own comments on how to resolve them.

If you turn first to the question of identity, continuing kind of issue for Europe, but one which that I have said emerges differently post 1989. What should Europe be? How should we think of Europe? I think there are only three ways in which you could answer this question. There are only three versions of what European identity could be. One is what the Tory party in this country wants Europe to be. You could think of Europe simply as a free trade area, analogous to the free trade area of the Americas for example, analogous to NAFTA which involves United States, Mexico, Canada, some other countries, a pure trading zone with no further integration. My view on this is that no-one really looks at Europe seriously can sustain this because European Union is already way beyond being simply a free trade area. It's impossible I think to see that it could go back to being simply one because it has much higher levels of economic integration and it's developed much more of a single market place, far more than is in the case of NAFTA which doesn't have the same mechanisms at all so I don't think it's

feasible to suppose that the European Union could revert to such a structure and I certainly don't think, my own view is, that it would be desirable that it should do so.

The second vision is the traditional vision of Europe really. The vision of Europe as a federal system and this idea of Europe is very much bound up with the original members of the European Union some of whom wanted to see Europe as a counter balance to American power, who wanted Europe to be as important in the world society as the United States is and saw Europe as a kind of power centre unable to challenge the United States. A federal view of Europe would place a lot of emphasis on the idea of Europe, in other words European culture, European identity in some sense central to what Europe is. It would suggest that you have a mechanisms of integration which would parallel those of the American constitution and quite a few federalists have seen the American constitution as their model really, the emergence of the United States of Europe but the best latter day version of a federal model of Europe was that given by Joschka Fischer, as you obviously know as I mentioned last time visited the LSE recently about 10 days ago, and the German Foreign Minister who about four or five years ago gave a famous speech arguing that the way forward for Europe has to be federalist but even Joschka Fischer has now largely, as I understand it anyway, abandoned this view in the way he first proposed it and I think that the weight of opinion in Europe is moving towards the third position which seems to me to be the only feasible one.

I don't think you can sustain the idea of a federal Europe, certainly not in the short term, when Europe has expanded to 25 nations. Those 25 nations possible expanding to some 40 nations in another 10 to 15 years time where those nations will never be like states of the United States, where they will continue to be substantially sovereign nations in spite of having surrendered considerable chunks of their sovereignty to the European Union. So I think we should see the EU as post-modern device, a post-modern system which is neither a traditional state nor simply a free market area which is pioneering something new in a world society and that something new is essentially I think the sharing of sovereignty and the disciplinary mechanisms of political advance of democracy, economic advance of competitive markets and human advance of human rights which goes along with the accession criteria into the European Union.

The European Union for me therefore has no fixed identity and I'm not sure it should have a fixed boundary either. I'm not sure there should be finality to the European Union. I see the European Union as a kind of move towards a segment if you like of world government which is situated in a particular part of the world rather than aspiring to be a genuine world government but a new form of mechanism of sovereignty, new form of relationship between nations.

For that reason, I don't know what the people in the audience feel but for that reason I strongly supported the acceptance of Turkey as an accession country in the European Union. That decision still has to be ratified by the European leaders in about a month's time. It's been accepted in principle by the European Commission. It's dividing Europe, many people on the Left who are hostile to Turkey being part of the European Union because big country, poor country predominantly Muslim country, those who are critical argue that it's on the edges of Europe rather than being central to the European experience by myself I hold very strongly the opposite view. I think it's crucial that Turkey does become an accession country. It's crucial for especially geo-political reasons which I'll come on to towards the end of what I have to say.

I think Europe should aspire to be significant geo-political actor in the world. It's not enough you know to have a world where no one makes jokes about Romano Prodi. We want a European leader who is sufficiently prominent in world society for people to see that there is power there and where there is power you are going to make jokes about the person. Joking is a kind of reflection of the significance as I said before of a leader in world society. I think we should aspire to have that for the European Union. I don't think the European Union can have that if it shirks the geo-political significance of accepting Turkey as an accession country, not the same as accepting Turkey immediately of course into the European Union since even those who are most favourable to this process say that it can't happen before at the earliest 2015 or something like that but it is a major commitment to an insipient process of democratisation, economic advance in a crucial corner of the world. So my view is that it is very strongly supportive of this position which means that you probably don't have finality to Europe because you are going to have consider what other countries should be accepted within the European Union which will again will transform the identity of what Europe should become. So I see European identity partly as a process not as a fixed geographical or cultural identity in the way which the Federalists want to have it.

Secondly, why should the European Union continue to exist? It's important to ask the question because of the rising tide of Euro scepticism but I want to answer it very quickly really because I want to come on the concluding part of the meat of the lecture about the geo-political role really of Europe. I think the reasons are overwhelmingly powerful as to why the European Union exists. It exists above all because of the pooling of sovereignty that I just mentioned. It exists because of the economic power that it gives individual nations. European Union nations trade with one another, they are not as I said a free trade zone, they are economically strongly integrated. Well over 40% of the trade of this country, the United Kingdom, is with other EU countries and the same thing is true in reverse. The economic reasons are very powerful for further expanding and integrating the single market in Europe.

The civilisational reasons are very powerful. Look what happened in Spain, look what happened in Portugal, look what happened in Greece, those were countries which had dictatorships. You might assume the history of Europe has been the history of democracy but this is not completely true. Those countries had military dictatorships and were relatively poor, only some three or four decades ago. The succession criteria has been a civilising process for those states as is happening in the east European countries too and that civilising process happens before you become a member not just after you become a member. Look at the progress of Spain which is completely amazing, could not have happened without the European Union. Look at the progress of Ireland, the most competitive country it's said now in world society, it could not have happened without the European Union. The civilisational aspect of the European Union is surely crucial to what it exists for but it also exists I think for the prevention of war.

There are those who say that now we are no longer in a Cold War period, nations are not going to fight one another anyway and there is some truth in this. Nevertheless we don't know what would happen in Europe if Europe broke up into a whole aggregate of whole nation states again. It's not a risk I think historically which Europe should take. The European Union is and has played a role. It certainly didn't prevent Bosnia, it didn't prevent internal wars but it has prevented major wars within nations. They have become largely unthinkable. This is not just because of global integration, is because the very existence of the European Union itself but the European Union does have weaknesses which Rifkin doesn't discuss effectively.

These weaknesses are fairly well known and they are part and parcel really of some of the rise of Euro scepticism over the last 10 to 20 years. There is the legendary weakness of the democratic deficit of European Parliament and European transnational institutions. Should we be worried about this? Well, we certainly should be worried about it in terms of how the electorates think about it but I am very sympathetic to those who say that actually what the European Union is doing is pioneering a form of democratisation above the level of the nation, it certainly is, and that in some respects, this form of democratisation is actually more democratic, not less democratic than the individual nations. The reason being that democracy is not just about how you vote and who you vote for, democracy is also how you reach agreement. Whether you reach agreement through public discussion, whether you reach agreement through negotiation or whether you simply reach agreement through power and what happens in those nations is that many agreements are reached through power but in the European Union they cannot be. You have to reach decisions through negotiation, you have to reach decisions through an open consensus. You have to reach decisions through transparent consensus too so whatever the scandal that existed in the European Union is arguably creating a form of democratisation which in some respects could be said to be actively even more democratic than those of its component nations. Whatever the problems of legitimacy that go along with that structure.

There are of course of foreign policy in Europe. There's the famous Henry Kissinger question. Who would he telephone in a situation of global crisis because Europe has no single foreign policy leader? Well, it does have one in a way, at least now, and that foreign policy leader is visiting the LSE next week, Javier Solana and I think he is coming next Thursday to a thing I am chairing here and he's the person that you would phone. Nobody would say Europe has an integrated foreign policy but it certainly has an individual to who one can turn and who the various component national leaders turn in situations of economic crisis.

The big problems of Europe it seems to me, the big reason for the declining legitimacy of Europe are not primarily to do with those issues. They are not primarily to do with democracy. They are not primarily to do with foreign policy. They are primarily economic and this is where I quite substantially disagree with Rifkin because I think the problems of the European Union are strongly related to this lack of economic dynamism, its lack of overall competitiveness, its sluggish nature of economic growth in its core economy, Germany. One of the main problems for Europe is growth is very slow in Germany. That Germany is the motor, German economy is easily the biggest economy, is the motor of the European Union. Not easy to deal with a national issue when it affects a transnational organisation like the European Union.

The European Union has a major demographic crisis which I'm sure most people here will know. If you look at the demographic profile of the European Union countries and you compare it with the United States, even more so, was going to do so in this lecture, with India or China, the difference is quite staggering. India, China and the United States too have a vibrant younger generation. The United States is largely because of legalisation of originally mass illegal immigration into the United States. The United States has a lot of young people coming into the economy. The European Union does not. The birth rate in the European Union on average is only about 1.7 and in some countries like in Spain or Italy the birth rate is down to 1.2, the lowest birth rate ever known actually in human history, nowhere near close to replacement rates so its not surprising has a massive pensions crisis, a very big older generation with no one in the younger generation to pay for them but who still expect to be supported by the state but more importantly is hard to see where the economic dynamism will

come from which would regenerate economic growth in Europe and without Europe performing economically for its constituent nations it's hard to see that it will recapture the kind of legitimacy that it should have so I think a great deal of Europe's problems come back to its economic position, its lack of dynamism and I did bring one or two figures on this. If you look at the period 1990 – 2001 over that period the GDP of China grew by 226%, the US by 85% and the EU by only 15%, a very, very massive differential and I think people sense that in their relationship to what the European Union is.

Finally, in a way most importantly, what should the geo-political role of Europe be? Here we again have to consider now there is a Republican administration in the United States some key figures of which have expressed enormous reservations about Europe. Who seemingly want Europe to be divided rather than integrated as all previous American administrations wanted the Continent to be. Who see Europe as weak and see the United States as strong. What kind of geo-political role can Europe forge for itself? Well here again I think there are three and only three possibilities.

First of all you could have what I would define as sleepy Europe. Sleepy Europe would be Europe turned in on itself. Sleepy Europe would be Europe which refuses any effective geo-political role partly because it refuses any kind of expenditure on military capability and partly because it simply wants to turn away from the wider problems of the world. What did the vote in Madrid mean after the Madrid bombings when the Government of Aznar was thrown out and the new socialist government elected? Did it mean that Europeans want their shirk their wider responsibility? Did it mean they want an easy life? Did it mean that they want to somehow separate themselves from the broader problems of the world? If they do they have to be sure this is not an option. Sleepy Europe is not an option because there are forces out there and I am going to discuss them next time. I hope one will come next time, I will be talking about global terrorism. There are forces out there that will not allow Europe simply to be sleepy Europe. Europe incidentally imports more of its oil from the Middle East than the United States does so is heavily dependant on geo-political stability in that area which is however not in a position to guarantee.

Second version of Europe which at one time is very appealing to me and I think is the Rifkin version, I would describe as easy multilateralism. Easy multilateralism is the idea that Europe can export its model to the rest of the world. What has Europe created? It's created I've suggested a kind of post-modern identity around the pooling of sovereignty based on the idea that we live in a much more inter-dependent world and this is the process whereby we can accommodate to that world. It's quite a seductive idea to say well Europe can generalise this model to the rest of the world just in the way the United States seeks to generalise its model to the rest of the world. Maybe other parts of the world can also pool sovereignty. Maybe they can kind of copy the European Union and therefore the European Union will have a civilising role in geo-politics because others will accept it as its model. I know longer think this is an option although I did use to think that this was the way in which one should think of Europe. Mainly because of Robert Kagan type arguments, mainly because the rest of the world is not like that. Many parts of the rest of the world, you are dealing with nations, sometimes aggressive nations, sometimes failing states, sometimes rogue nations, a world of power where military force cannot be ignored.

So I think there is only one way forward for Europe to sustain a geo-political role and that is through what I define if you'll forgive the term as hard nosed multilateralism. Europe I think should stand for a multilateral world, it's not a sign of weakness to say that the world is inter-

dependent. It's not a sign of weakness to say that we need collaboration of nations across the world to resolve the world problems. We do need such collaboration. It's not a sign of weakness. It is not a sign of absence of power but it's not enough. Europe must be able to back up its involvement in the wider world of society by the use of force when that use of force is necessary and it will always be debatable when it was necessary. Was it necessary in Kosovo? It was certainly used in Kosovo but in Kosovo the Europeans could not manage without Americans. At the moment Europe is not able to play this role because it cannot manage without America. As I think I mentioned last time Europe has a whole morass of troops anywhere. It doesn't have the logistical capability to mount rapid reaction outside of the European continent but if you don't have that and if you are not prepared to endorse that and spend money on that, if you are not prepared to have greater military integration Europe will not be able to be the geo-political actor which I think it quite rightly should aspire to be. Europe therefore must make progress on having more independent military presence to back up its multilateral position in the world and that way I think which will be discussed by Solana when he comes here in a week's time is the way for Europe really to sustain itself in the world. For Europe to become known in the world and for us to have a lot of great jokes about Romano Prodi.

Thanks very much and I'm sorry not to have finished to allow discussion.