

The Future of World Society: the coming of the global age

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It is a pleasure to be back at the LSE even if in a more marginal capacity than when I was Director of the School and if there is anyone here who is new to the LSE let me say, I hope you have a wonderful time while you're here. I think if you just came here be assured you made the right decision because the LSE is really the best place I think in which to be a social scientist and one of the best things about the LSE is simply the kind of in the world role which it has. I don't know how many people here went to hear Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister last night but he's the kind of person that the LSE so readily attracts. One of the leading Europeans and indeed one of the leading global figures of the moment so anyone who is new to the LSE, even though I no longer have the right to say this to you I do hope that you'll take advantage of all the external lectures that the LSE has to offer. It's a truly marvellous place for visiting speakers.

What I am going to do in this short course, which is five lectures, is cover the following topics. This time I'm going to talk about this amazing age in which we live today. This age of, for me, mixture of anxiety and emancipation where the kind of intersection between the emotions of anxiety, emancipation, identity affect us all on a personal level but where these issues also go through truly to a global level establishing the identity and the issues facing, not just nations but also blocks of nations in the world. What is the relationship between emancipation, anxiety, threat in this new global age in which we live because I want to argue in this lecture that we do live in a new global age in some respects, distinctively different from the past.

Second, the next lecture, I'll be looking at the nature of American power and to some extent the nature of American society. The dominant power in the world, what is one to make of that power? What does America represent to the rest of the world? How does it sit in this relationship between emancipation, anxiety, danger? It sits obviously at the top but in a very problematic position in the global age.

Third, I was originally in the third lecture going to try and discuss Europe and Asia at the same time but I actually think that's impossible so in the third lecture I'll be talking mainly about European identity and looking at the role of Europe in the wider world, the changes going on in European society and raising issues like the geo-political role of Europe in relation to Turkey and other surrounding countries.

In the fourth lecture I'll be looking at the dialectic of violence in our world because a key part of the global age is shifting structure of violence and I want to argue that the patterns of violence associated with contemporary terrorism, obviously a problematic term to define, but crucial term for us, sort of shifted the balance of violence and even the aesthetics of violence in a contemporary world for reasons that I'll partly try to sketch in today.

The final lecture I am going to talk about the rich and the poor, the divided nature of global society, how one understands these divisions and what one might do practically to try to resolve them and heal them up.

My starting point today is this issue of uncertainty really. We live in a world which seems to be sort of spinning out of control and when you place our world, the 21st century world back in the history of social thought, it doesn't really fit very well because if you look at the early philosophers of the ... well the philosophers of the late 18th century, the early philosophers of modernity, when modernity was as it were unleashed on the world, modern industrial civilisation was unleashed on the world, they had a particular view of what the world in the future would be like and our world now does not resemble the view which they held. The enlightenment philosophers, I think completely reasonably, thought that with the advent of modernity, with the spread of modern institutions and modern ways of thinking across the world, we would become the masters of our future. The more we accumulate knowledge about ourselves, the more we accumulate knowledge about the world of nature, the more we can control our own history, the more we will be the masters of our own fate.

This enlightenment view was crucial to the 18th century philosophers and also crucial to Karl Marx too because Marx's whole idea for the world was essentially that we are the products of history but we've never controlled our history. Marx argued the issue for us is to direct history to human purposes and these thinkers right the way through to mid point of the 20th century, from mid 18th century/mid 20th century believe that the accumulation of knowledge would yield a more certain world for us, would yield more control over nature and more control over ourselves. It hasn't turned out that way, at least in my opinion it hasn't turned out that way. Our world does not look like that, our world looks like a world of uncertainty where the future has gone opaque. Very hard for us to actually see what the future is, to envisage an avenue into the future in a way which enlightenment thought tended just to take for granted that we'd continue to have a continuing bridgehead to the future.

Now the fact that we are not fully in command of our world, that we live in this world of spinning uncertainties, albeit with certain areas of course, is not just the result of human ignorance. It's not just the fact that we don't know enough which would be essentially the traditional enlightenment view. There are areas where we don't know enough, for example, we don't know how to predict where earthquakes will happen. Presumably at some point in the future scientists will be able to predict with more accuracy when and where earthquakes will occur but the most significant forms of uncertainty for us don't come from areas of our ignorance. They come precisely from the accumulation of the knowledge that we're supposed produce to certainty for us. The very accumulation of knowledge actually changes history but it changes history in unpredictable ways as much as predictable ones.

Look at the role of science and technology for example, look at the current debate over global warming. You could say that for many, many years human beings were afraid and had anxiety about the world of nature because of the risk of natural hazards, poor harvests, climatic change of a natural kind and so forth. But over the past 50 or so years we've shifted our orientation to nature to a certain point which you can trace actually I think with some accuracy, when we started worrying less about what nature can do to us and more about what we've done to nature. What we've done to nature is the result of the expansion of human science and technology. It takes science to understand what we've done to nature but nature has been fundamentally transformed through the impact of human technology guided in the backdrop by the expansion of science itself. To the intrusion of science and technology into the world is not a simple matter of allowing us more mastery, it also introduces problematic horizons of risk for us.

One of the things about the global warming debate which is characteristic of many forms of modern uncertainty which I describe as manufactured uncertainty because they say they are created by human knowledge, by human history. One of the features of new risk environments, new environments of anxiety, is that we don't really know what the risk is. You can't calculate it in a statistical way. You have to infer what will happen if you don't take action. You can never conclusively demonstrate that global warming is happening as a result of human intervention but we must take action because the evidence is strong that it has. There are many areas such as those associated with genetic technologies, GM crops and so forth where the advance of science and technology creates puzzles and problems at the same time it helps us resolve them and what is true of science and technology is true of the whole range of our knowledge. We are living in a world of uncertainty. It may not be more uncertain than the past, I doubt that it is, I don't think it's more risky than the past but the nature of risk, the nature of uncertainty has shifted and it's shifted in this puzzling and interestingly paradoxical way in relation to the very accumulation of knowledge.

The experience of living in this world which I want to call the global age, I want to say is that one of the features of it is what I would describe as everyday culture shock. Instead of getting culture shock when you go outwards and you meet up with other cultures as the travellers did or the explorers did in the 15th/16th centuries going out from Europe, it's an everyday thing for us, an everyday culture shock. Think of the picture of that poor woman on the front of all the papers today who has been abducted in Iraq. Look at the expression on her face. This was transmitted from a video taken by the captors and is now everywhere and has an immediacy for us that we are forced to relate to. Think of the Russian siege, the school, it had an immediacy for us that we are forced to relate to. Many children in schools in London, while that siege was happening, were asking what does it mean for us, are we secure? This information, culture shock, comes with an immediacy that was simply not possible for previous generations. I can give you another sort of homely, ad hoc example. I was in a seminar about strategic security the day Saddam Hussein was discovered in his bunker and one of the people in the group was Iraqi and he had a mobile phone and he got, you know that famous picture of Saddam looking in a way a bit like Marx actually, coming out of the bunker. He had this picture before it was transmitted widely on the TV and the radio. He had it immediately and transmitted to him from Iraq and this is what I mean by everyday culture shock by a kind of instantaneous and continuous contact with the diversity of experiences around the world.

Now this world we're living in is shaped by the impact of globalisation and when I was here giving what I used to call the Director's lectures and I now have to call these as it were the ex-Director's lectures, I used to talk quite a lot about the globalisation debate. I am not going to talk about that in these lectures because there are many people in the LSE who are very well able to do that, especially Professor David Held who some people here might know, who is one of the leading figures really in the debate about globalisation.

There are two things about this debate that I would like to register with you though before moving on from the term globalisation. One is that this debate has been too narrow in my opinion. It's mainly been a debate about the role of global markets. I will be talking about global markets and inequalities in the final lecture but that to me is manifestly only one aspect of what globalisation is and does to us. Globalisation means interdependence, right, the simplest definition of globalisation is interdependence. We are much more interdependent with other people across the world than any generation has ever been before but it's obvious I think, or should be obvious that this is not just economic interdependence. Think of the

examples I just gave you, you can see there's a crucial political, cultural dimension, many dimensions to the new independent world in which we live.

Second that the debate about globalisation, certainly in recent years, has tended to equate globalisation with what goes on in the international arena with the impact of the IMF, with the role of the United Nations, other transnational institutions. That's right and proper because it is very important what is happening in the international arena but you mustn't use globalisation as a synonym for international relations because globalisation in its various forms, at least as I'll argue in this lecture, is effecting all of our societies. So you look in our society, you see the problem of political apathy for example, very much related to the global forces I'll be describing today. You look in our society you see new divisions, new class divisions which I'll be talking about a bit later in this lecture. These result from or intertwine with the impact of globalising processes. So globalisation is not something just outside western countries which is being projected into international arena, it's a series of institutional shifts which are affecting all of our societies and affecting western society just as much as any other societies through the world.

So I want to draw a distinction which is the sort of basis for these lectures really between globalisation which is the process, globalisation if you like is the dynamics that forces change in the world and the global age which is the phenomenon. Globalisation is the process, the global age is the structural age in which we live, the kind of experience of uncertainty in the institutions surrounding this mixture of emancipation and uncertainty I described earlier so in this lecture I'll be asking what is it like to live in the global age. How would you sketch in the main parameters of what the global age is and if you forgive me I have got seven main characteristics of the global age that I would like to analyse and which will be the basis for the subsequent lectures I give because I think these things inter-penetrate all the issues that I'll be subsequently discussing.

First, key characteristic of the new global age is the impact of communication on large institutions but also on our personal lives. Now communication and changes in communication have always been the main levers of big social transformation however far back you go in history. Marx had like an economic theory of change but really I think changes in communication have underlain some of the big transformations in history in the past just as they do today.

If you go back to the earlier civilisations for example, civilisations of Sumaria, the near Middle East several thousand years ago, those civilisations all had writing. The invention of civilisation coincided with the invention of writing. Writing is a medium of communication. The advent of writing meant that you could actually stretch social relationship across time and space in a way which you couldn't do in oral cultures or cultures which had now writing. All societies which did not have writing were small societies. The advent of civilisation, much larger states depends upon the existence of writing as a form of communication, and writing from the beginning a medium of power. You could see the early civilisations expanding power and writing because it allows to store time and space, that's what writing does. If you take a tally for example, this was the early origins, the first origins of writing, of the amount of wheat that you've grown over a given period you can store that wheat and you can use it in a more extended way than if you don't know where it is or you can't chart what you actually have. You couldn't chart anything much before writing and you couldn't chart anything much before calendars because calendars allow you to control time. Control of time and space is therefore crucial to human social evolution.

If you jump ahead a few thousand years to the middle of the 19th century you can say there was another big time space transformation underlying the development of modernity and to some extent an early period of globalisation and this was the invention of the electronic telegraph. The electronic telegraph was invented in about 1850 or so by Samuel Morse. Significance of the electronic telegraph is that's the first time that you could send a message without going somewhere. In all previous civilisations to get a message to somebody you had to have a fast horse or have a boat or whatever, with electronic communication you can send messages across time and space without having to have a physical messenger. This transformed social relationships and as will be one of the themes of one my lectures it also transformed violence. The advent of modern war, mass war, involving disciplined armies, involving machine technology coincides with the invention of the electronic telegraph because it made possible the co-ordination of armies in a way which could never be done before. You could have mass armies and you could co-ordinate what those armies did as well as the supplying of those armies so the era of electronic communication is also the era of mass warfare.

If you jump ahead again to what I'm now calling the global age, we became citizens of a new global age in about the late 1960s again because of transformations in communication more than economic development. What happened in the late 1960s was that it was the first time in which a global satellite system was sent up above the world making possible instantaneous communication from side of the world to the other.

After this period everything shifts and many of the economic changes which people describe would not be possible without that communication anyway. You couldn't have 24 hour money markets for example without these transformations in communication which I'm talking about but also you wouldn't have this new tissue of individual experience, individual emotion if you weren't able to pick up your mobile phone and transmit a picture right the way across the world which today you very readily can do. It's a gigantic transformation of communication, all concentrated within a period of about 30 years really, 30 to 40 years fantastic transformation of the inner nature of our emotions, inner nature of our daily lives but also of more global institutions.

The global age there for me is not really to do with the mechanics of economic globalisation, it's to do with the experience of living in a new kind of world which is kind of analogous to the shifts and transformations that happened in previous generations when systems communication were transformed.

Second characteristic of the global age is the transformation of the nature of state power. The modern age if you like from the 16th century through to early 20th century was the age of collaboration of nation states, the emergence of the nation state as a form of governance coincided with the invention of the idea of sovereignty. The idea of sovereignty was only pioneered in the 16th and 17th centuries. Previous kinds of civilisations were not sovereign in the sense in which nations are sovereign because they couldn't control their own boundaries. If you think of the Great Wall of China you might think China had the capacity to readily control a clear cut boundary that separated Chinese civilisation from the rest of the world but this is not so. Chinese war was a kind of defensive formation around which you had continuous pitch battles going both sides of it. There never was the possibility of having clear cut boundaries in traditional civilisations.

With the modern state, 16th century or so, you get the invention of sovereignty which means states with clear boundaries. The global age is seeing the transformation of sovereignty. It's not seeing the end of the nation states, a mistake to suppose that in the global age the nation state disappears. I mean many people have said this is happening but it is obviously I think not happening. You could even say that the contemporary age is a period of a generalisation of the nation state because until the fall of the Soviet Union you could say there were always empires alongside nations. You could say the Soviet Union was the last kind of imperial formation really in world society. Now everyone is a nation state or aspires to be a nation state so nation state has not disappeared but sovereignty is changing massively.

The sovereignty of nations is different from the past and it's different for several reasons. It's different because globalisation has a kind of push and pull affect on nations. Some powers are taken away from nations and go into the global arena. It's one of the reasons why communism failed because you could control a society until the advent of modern communications but you couldn't do so afterwards because sovereignty became more globalised in the global arena but globalisation also created decentralisation. It creates a return to local autonomy, it creates local nationalisms, it creates a retrieval of local culture and retrieval of local power.

The same time as this happens many problems in the global age, because of our communicative independence, can't any longer be resolved by nations. It's obvious that global warming for example, although you have to act locally, you have to act nationally, it's a problem which stretches massively beyond the scope of nations. The sovereignty of nations doesn't disappear but it becomes transformed and in the place of the traditional classical nation state you get a system of multi-layered governance. Many political scientists no longer talk of government, they talk of governance with good reason because in a system of governance you have numerous layers of authority and power. These stretch above the level of the nation, for example in Europe, I mean the UK and its relationship to Europe, over 60% of laws which bind this society are actually European legislation today. Whatever you views of Europe, this is pretty fundamental transformation of the legal definition of sovereignty.

The sovereignty is being transformed as a contested thing across the world and of course when we look at the United States in the next lecture we have to ask what is the nature of the United States as a sovereign nation. The United States certainly treats itself as a sovereign nation but is it a sovereign nation now. Is it more an expression of overall global culture because there are so many different groups and so many different cultures that makes up the mosaic which is the United States. Is the United States more of a kind of expression of these wider trends than a sovereign nation reacting to them or is it both? These shifting problems are really crucial for the kind of changing network of relationships between us as individuals and the wider world in which we live.

Thirdly, in the global age you get what I call a dialectic of democracy which again is so central both to global society and our own experience within our specific countries. This dialectic or oppositional movement of democracy you can sketch out in the following way. You can say that the expansion of the global age, with the spread of communications across the world, such that nobody really is outside these communications, nobody, not even the poorest people in the world are outside the revolution in communications, this experience tends to facilitate the spread of democratisation. I think we live in something like a global information order and expansion of the global information order promotes democratisation. It promotes democratisation because it's much harder for governments to treat citizens as passive in this world. Citizens are much more active because they have much more

information with which to contest their governments or with which react to their own life circumstances and this again applies to the poor as well to the rich.

If you look at the spread of democracy across the world, even if you look over the past 30 or so years, most political scientists reckon that something like three times as many democracies in the world today as there were 30 years ago even if you use a strict definition of democracy as involving an established parliamentary system, multiple parties, freedom of the individual before the law and so forth. If have a rather wider version of democratisation in which you might say, let's say, think of considering even Russia as a quasi democracy, then well there are far more countries which as it were stand on the verge of democratisation.

So on the one hand democracy is the 21st century's or the global age's success story, very much related to the trends I sketched in earlier. On the other, at the same time that democracy is spreading across the world, it becomes problematic in its countries of origin. In those countries which have been democratic for quite a while we see a rise of political apathy. We see lower levels of voting, not in all countries but in quite a few countries. The up and coming American election will be really interesting, the Presidential election has got all this massive exposure of how many people will vote. Probably only about 50% of the American population will actually vote for what some people are describing as the most important presidential election this century. In the last European elections, after the enlargement of Europe, you know when East European countries came into Europe not long ago, on average only about 18% of those countries came into Europe actually voted during the European elections. You see signs of political disaffection in many places and there's no doubt this is to some extent directly related to the role of information.

You get information immediately, what does this mean? It means politics and politicians transact with the media as much as they do parliaments. For those people who are English and know about the Today programme what politicians have to do is appear on the Today programme in the morning and they might well do that before they discuss a particular issue in Parliament. I'm not saying the media is responsible for the decline of politics but the very same processes which are pushing democracy around the world, open information, immediacy of information, many, many competing providers of information is also subverting democracy arguably in its heartlands and you know these kind of amusing things that happen in the last American election which was so closely contested four years ago. You know about the things that happened in Florida, or didn't happen in Florida and the famous dimpled chads and so on, well a couple of African countries wrote to the Americans saying we are prepared to come and teach you about democracy! So there is a certain crisis of democracy produced by the very forces which are promoting democracy across the world and this is somehow become integral to our political system and political consciousness today.

Fourthly, the expansion of the global age produces new divisions within our societies, divisions which are very resonant in terms of their political implications. There is a new schism opening up in our societies in the global age. Centred partly on education, centred more generally around the possibility of having a cosmopolitan life, of profiting from an economy which has become largely geared to knowledge and services or being excluded from it. Quite large numbers of people are doing well in the new global economy and in the new global age. They tend to be more educated like I'm presuming most people sitting in this audience, they tend to be able to withstand relatively easily what I described as everyday culture shock. They are able to function in a world of multiple identities and multi-layered governance but then you have quite large sectors of the population who are not, who are not

happy with these things, who don't profit from them, who turn against them and these are the groups which tend to support, for example, the rise of right wing populism in Europe. Right wing populism is against immigration, it's against the loss of national identity, it sees the nation as embattled in the modern globalising world. It wants to stick with the past, it wants to return to the past, it blames immigrants for many of the ailments of modern societies and to some extent blames the political establishment for this.

The rise of populism is associated with what you might call the anti-political politician. The anti-political politician is someone like Le Pen for example in France or Pim Fortain in the Netherlands, politicians who declare themselves to be against politics but at the same time want to make an impact on the political sphere and they do so because of their emotional appeal to the sentiment.

You could say, crudely, although I'll come on to discussing this next time, the whole of America is divided in this way, divided regionally between the cosmopolitans who on the whole vote democrat if you like and those who want to sustain tradition, who feel hostile to abortion, to stem cell research and so forth who will form the core of an alternative picture of the world. Of course nothing is as clear cut as that but there is a sort of division at the heart of American society taking somewhat different form from Europe but it is a division you find almost everywhere, it's not just in the industrial countries. In many other countries around the world you find a kind of desire to revert to older form of identity. Quite closely connected to fundamentalism and other movements which we'll be discussing in the course of these lectures.

Fifthly, in the global age you have a new security system, a new dispersal of the means of violence and new problems associated with controlling this. If you look at the United States, it's generally recognised that there are three periods of differing forms of security and threat which the United States has faced in the post war period. You can generalise these to the rest of the world in a way because the United States has been the pivot of world society over that period. The first phase was immediately after the Second World War when the United States was the only country that possessed a nuclear weapon, possessed the atomic bomb for a short period and at that time people thought we'll scale back military forces, the United States began cutting back on conventional military forces because it thought well it's got security, being the only nuclear country.

The second phase started when the Soviet Union got atomic weapons. It first got atomic weapons in 1949 and then by the 1960s was able to manufacture atomic and then later hydrogen bombs and had a missile capability to deliver them. That's when you had the Cold War stand off period lasting from the 60's through to 1989/1990. If you like nuclear assured deterrents were a kind of pivot of world society and a pivot of people's feelings of security, consciousness of insecurity and so forth and then thirdly 1989 to 90 we had a different period again.

After the fall of the Soviet Union many people thought we might have an era of world peace and in a sense which I'll be arguing in a subsequent lecture, in a certain sense we do, or it could be said that we might do but what happened in the first part of that period was that the United States felt more secure and again started to demilitarise. European countries also started to spend less on military hardware and on military technology. This all shifted with the advent of modern mass terrorism. September 11 was a kind of emblematic event really. It wasn't that things changed on September 11, it was a kind of an emblematic event of a new

security environment in which a new form of terrorism, potentially more deadly than any before became possible largely, as I'll be discussing when I talk about it, through the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is this term we are all familiar with, weapons of mass destruction but I think that anyone who looks at literature cannot be persuaded that this is a very useful term. Chemical and biological weapons can kill a lot of people but they cannot provide true mass destruction whereas nuclear weapons of course can. We live in a world where a large proportion of nuclear weapons are unaccounted for, where a large proportion of fissionable material is unaccounted for, sort of crucial to this security environment really.

What's happening here is that the dark side of globalisation has fastened on to the same kind of techniques of organisation as civil society groups' use. The advent of civil society groups like Oxfam and so on, that's part of a good side of globalisation I think you can say, groups interested in fostering humanitarian ideals. The dark side is that terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda use the very same techniques, communication, videos, internet, high technology to create a kind of malign new form of global violence and besides the war on terror, if you want to use that term as I argue that you shouldn't really, but there are several other aspects to the dark side of the global age, there are struggles going on all around the world and I've just got a few statistics on these for you.

If you look at the issue of drugs for example, drug use is part of globalisation. The trade in drugs has become globalised. It has become part of the global age. The United Nations calculated the trade in illicit drugs in 2002 at 400 billion dollars, trade going on around the world in illicit drugs. That's about the same size as the Spanish economy and it's equivalent to about 8% of total global GDP. It's a huge trade, operating on a global level, using the same mechanisms as the more beneficent influences in world society do.

Look at the arms trade, people often think of the arms trade as conducted by nations, well a lot of it is but a lot of it is illicit. You have again a huge illicit arms trade which is not controlled by nations because it's controlled by networks. One of the things about the global age is the pre-eminence of networks operating across the boundaries of nation states, nation states finding it hard to cope with them. Again according to UN statistics, this is amazing I think really, only about 3% of the total amount of small arms in the world, is actually controlled by nations. About 18 million, believe it or not, the 550 million small arms, guns and so forth around the world, only 18 million is actually in the hands of states, all the rest is in the hands of private individuals or networks and we know that the illicit trade in weaponry now includes big weaponry. It includes the latest tanks, it includes the latest radar systems, it includes nuclear technology, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union when so much of it went "missing" and it is a gigantic element of what's happening in the world.

Finally, the same is true of money laundering. Money laundering again is a huge aspect of the global economy. It's estimated by the UN at 2 trillion dollars money laundered across the world every year and there's very sort of amusing things about it. If you look at the Cayman Islands which is a tiny little place, I don't know if any LSE students come from the Cayman Islands, but if you do apparently it has a population of 36,000 people, well, it has 200 mutual funds, 500 insurance companies, 60,000 businesses and 600 banks and trust companies registered in the Cayman Islands. When you ask why countries are struggling with taxation, why you have struggles surrounding the welfare state, this is purely part and parcel of the process.

Finally, seventhly, in the global age many of these things impinge on our personal lives which brings me back to where I started. When you talk about the phenomenology of the global age, what's it like to live in the global age, it is this mixture of freedom and uncertainty which I think most of us feel. Freedom because what is happening with the age of globalisation is a kind of freeing from tradition. Tradition and custom no longer have the same impact in people's lives as they used to do and this is happening globally.

One of the examples of it is the changing position of women across the world. Only a generation ago, in this country, if you were a woman you knew what your fate was. Your fate was to be married, have children, leave the labour force normally when you got married. Now the identity of being a woman is an open thing. You can choose whether to have children, many women are no longer having children. The average birth rate in the European Union is only about 1.7 well below reproduction rate, very much related to the emancipation of women. On the other hand it's a major burden for women to sustain an identity. Should I raise a family, how do I reconcile these two things? Many of these things are expressed through women's bodies, through the rise of anorexia, bulimia, other kinds of eating disorders, the kind of point of tension between the possibility of emancipation and the anxiety of identity which is so crucial for the modern age and is also crucial to fundamentalism because fundamentalism is a kind of restructured form of tradition.

Fundamentalism is a modernised defence of tradition, it's not tradition as it used to be. It intertwines with the global age. It is part of modernity. When you ask what's happening to fundamentalism in Islam, Christianity and Hinduism, these are not just developments from the past, they are very much part of this period which we're describing. They are the kind of extreme end of that anxiety about identity, about the past, about wholeness, about proper values, the fear of cosmopolitanism in which I was describing as a more generalised phenomenon.

There is a very interesting book that I might recommend in closing by Olivier Roy called Global Islam in which he argues the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, is it self part of modernity and it affects a lot of uprooted young men especially around the world but these young men have this very self same struggle with identity, very self same struggle with these forces and even suicide bombers who seem to be so much an example of the past of the power of collectivity over the individual, they might be themselves, he says, part of the me generation, part of a new form kind of acute identity, a form of self expression which isn't really in continuity with the past.

Well, thanks for coming. I'll look forward to seeing some of you next week when we talk about how this refracts through the power of the United States and the issue of the American empire. Thank you very much.

[APPLAUSE]