

## **Director's Dialogue with Dr Javier Solana<sup>1</sup>**

Date: Thursday 20th February 2003

Time: 1pm

Speakers: Professor Anthony Giddens and Dr Javier Solana

### **Anthony Giddens**

Well, good afternoon everybody. This is the third of these Director's Dialogues: the first, if you remember, was with George Soros; the second was with Susie Orbach; there was going to be one with Joschka Fischer which he had to cancel because he had to chair the UN Security Council, but he's promised that he'll come at some point in early April, of course depending on what happens in the wider world.

I'm very pleased that Javier Solana was able to come today. Javier was originally Professor of Physics at Madrid Complutense University. After moving into politics he held a succession of cabinet posts in the Spanish government from 1982 to 1995, including Minister for Foreign Affairs. From 1995 to 1999 he was Secretary General of NATO. Since October 1999 he is Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and is in charge of common, foreign and security policy for the EU.

Javier is at the vortex of world affairs at the moment so I'm very grateful to him for coming. This is the second public discussion we've had, because I went to Barcelona recently where we had a discussion publicly about at least some of the issues that we're going to cover today,

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<sup>1</sup> Edited version.

but it's extremely generous of him to come and honour this commitment because everybody knows there is something of a global crisis going on, Javier is at the middle of this global crisis, so initially would you please give him a very warm LSE welcome.

[AUDIENCE APPLAUSE]

I thought where we'd start is - not with the Middle East initially, where we will get to - but the current situation in European politics and I'd just like to talk to you a bit about what your view about what the future of European social democracy is.

A few years ago, most people here will know, 13 out of 15 EU governments were ruled by left of centre coalitions or left of centre parties. Now, that number is down to about five or six and there is a massive return of the right in Europe. You have the rise of a populist far right in Europe as well, and of course you have Mr Bush in the US, a switch from a Democratic presidency to a Republican presidency. Now, it seems to me that there isn't, as it were, a massive ideological shift underlying this transition because some of the changes that have happened in Europe and elsewhere have been a result of the fragmentation of the left. I think you could say we would not be in the situation in the world we are today if Ralph Nader had not decided to stand against Al Gore in the US, as that was crucial in George Bush's victory. But the same thing has happened in Europe: in Italy the left fragmented whereas the right managed to unite and the kind of *reductio ad absurdum* of that was what happened in the French presidential elections, when the left simply fragmented on the first vote and as a result you got this run off which nobody particularly wanted.

So, there are some contingent factors but it seems plain there are also ideological ones and these are related to the rise of the far right with its themes of insecurity, immigration, crime and I think some kind of fear of globalisation. I think there is a kind of polarisation of politics between, as it were, the new far left with the rise of the anti-globalisation movement on that side and the rise of the far right who are also, but for very different reasons, very hostile to this larger cosmopolitan world which is being created.

So, I don't know if that gives you some kind of springboard to give us some views.

**Javier Solana**

I will try to.

Let me start by thanking you very, very much. I have been a Professor of Theoretical Physics for a long part of my life and I can tell you that never have I been received as I've been received today. So, thank you very, very much.

**Anthony Giddens**

We like to treat our visitors well in the LSE community, don't we?

Well, I think, it's an indication of people's interest in world affairs that we've got such a massive audience. I was saying to Javier beforehand we could have sold the tickets three times over for this event.

**Javier Solana**

Well, thank you very much again, it's a great pleasure to be London.

I mean Tony has asked me to talk a little bit about the European Union and the left. Let me start by saying that I have all my life been a social democrat. I was born in a family of social democrats and I hope that I will die as a social democrat. I think this is an ideology that makes the balance between, I think, the basic values: freedoms, charity, and compassion – that beautiful word that exists in English and is very difficult to translate to other languages.

You asked me about social democracy in Europe and I think it's very difficult to answer that question, because I think that the cycles of political life in Europe do not exist in the same way that they do in the market. I think that there exist cycles of political life in the different countries of the European Union, but I think it's difficult to talk about a political cycle in the European Union as such. You see, when a country begins to move to the left another country begins to move to the right, and that has consequences: it means that we still don't have European public opinion as such; we don't have the citizenship of Europe that reacts in the same manner to the same policies or to the same situations in the world and it's something that we have to fight for and it's part of the debate on the construction of Europe that I think is fundamental. I believe that in the construction of Europe one important thing is to have a real citizen of Europe at the same time as they are citizens of their respective countries, and also that we have political parties and political life in Europe which is European. We don't have it yet and I think that is a very, very important thing we have to fight for it.

Now, I think that in different countries the social democracy has been diminishing in some and increasing in others – look at the Netherlands. In the Netherlands we had, in a question of three months, dramatic changes, remember what happened? A populist leader apparently unknown took most of the votes.

**Anthony Giddens**

He was a sociologist, a professor of sociology, this guy!

**Javier Solana**

He was assassinated, they have elections, there is a tremendous sweep in the public opinion and three months later they needed elections again and the social democrats and the Christian Democrats came along with the same number of votes. So, it's very difficult to say, as I said before, that there is a European tendency, instead there are still tendencies that belong to different countries.

That I think is the first point I would like to make, through I'd say it with a little bit of sadness because I would much prefer to already have a political life which would be of a European nature. But no doubt that the question of insecurity in the broadest sense of the term is absolutely fundamental and the leaders of the central left have to tackle these questions in an intelligent manner.

I think in your country some progress has been made and I think New Labour has done important things in that respect, better than in other places. I think that the French left was not able to tackle these questions in an intelligent manner

**Anthony Giddens**

You mean, for example, the question of crime?

**Javier Solana**

Right, of crime, migration etc.

Now, what about migration? I read yesterday a very good report about the future of the economy in Europe in the year 2050. That report points very clearly to the aging of the population in Europe and therefore the need to open the doors of the European Union to new people.

### **Anthony Giddens**

Two examples of the ageing population of Europe sit before you, here! Still vital aren't we though?

### **Javier Solana**

This question has to be resolved, it is not just a matter for the right to resolve, it's a matter for the central left to resolve also. We have to have an economy that is proactive and an economy that generates jobs, so, that's the first answer. Second, as you said and I agree completely with you, that populism, and the threats to the central left as far as voting is concerned, are very much linked to security - security understood in the widest sense and I think we will talk about that along the session.

### **Anthony Giddens**

Yes, because that lies behind lots of things going on I think in a broader sense. But I think if we just briefly consider the Pim Fortuyn phenomenon, the Dutch phenomenon, because there you had in many ways what seemed to be the most effective social democratic consensus in Europe. You had very high employment, very low unemployment, a consensual way of doing politics and a pretty successful society, as it would look to most people from the

outside. Everyone talked about the Dutch model and it was zapped out over night. It's true that the social democrats have got back to much the same position they had before but I think there are phenomena underlying this: the insecurity of the population; people's reactions - whether they are right or wrong - about immigration; crime and also crucially about the European Union - a lot of people in some sectors of society are now, I think, very hostile to the idea of the European Union. There is something there which is quite deep in politics and I see it in every country really; it's linked to a certain disaffection among a substantial proportion of groups in a society with the whole political process, and also I think with what the wider world is doing to our societies, they feel the world rushing in on them and they want to defend identity, and attacking immigration is one way in which they respond to that.

**Javier Solana**

Let me bring in another example which is not the example of the Netherlands, which has been so important and so worth the study. I do think that in my own country there was maybe a change from a central left to a central right . . .

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, it was the other way round before wasn't it when you were in government.

**Javier Solana**

Right. I mean there are countries that go out of synch and a reality of Europe is that it is very difficult to find a time in which all of the different political parties which are in power belong to the same family, this surely never has happened.

**Anthony Giddens**

But if you take the issue of immigration, Javier, I mean can the social democratic left get the decent position on immigration which will respect liberal values but also allow the left still to do well in elections? Is that possible, or is it not?

### **Javier Solana**

I think it must be possible to do it. I think that we have to be able – you have to be able – to respect that you have the two elements. One, we need new people, we need not only to help the poor people in the world to get a better place if they do so want that; but also we need it to maintain our economic system. But at the same time, that has to be done in such a manner that maintains security and at the same time does not lose the trust and the confidence of the majority of the people. But the difference between the United States and Europe as far as migration is concerned is very clear from the economic point of view to my mind. In the United States you have a migrant that comes and has no rights and no social security at all. If he has a job, he has a job, if he doesn't a job he doesn't have a job, nobody cares about him, etc. In the European Union we have a certain sentiment of compassion for somebody who comes to our country, we treat them in a more decent manner and therefore it's more costly. It seems to me from what I know from the rest of the world that the model that is more appealing to my mind at this point is the model of Canada. I think Canada has been able to find an equilibrium between what is the traditions of the United States and the classical models ...

### **Anthony Giddens**

Someone's laughing down there, but I don't know whether you're laughing approvingly or critically, but I think Canada has actually been most successful as immigrant country of any country...



[DISCUSSION WITH CANADIAN AUDIENCE MEMBER WHO AGREES]

**Anthony Giddens**

Of course, you've got a lot more space!

Shall we go on to the EU itself? I think there is this worry about people deserting the European Union - and the European Union is not just trying to respond to rightists who want to overthrow it - but I think there are more general worries about the progress of Europe in two ways, as I would see it. One is economically, by trying to get Europe as competitive as it could be and hopefully getting somewhere near to overtaking the US perhaps economically, which is essentially the Lisbon Agenda and the follow up to the Lisbon Agenda; and the other is the European Constitution, an attempt to make changes that will make Europe more democratic and therefore in some sense closer to the people, a sort of famous democratic deficit argument if that is valid - I'm not sure it is valid myself.

Can we talk about the first of these because over here – as I was just mentioning before we came in - most people might have seen in their papers, the Treasury has issued a report which is very critical of the European Union overall in terms of its levels of competitiveness, it's labour market flexibility and it's productivity in relation to the US; and it suggested that Europe has not really implemented the Lisbon Agenda, has not therefore generated enough jobs and is likely to continue to lag indefinitely behind the US.

I mean you must have a lot of views on this, because to me if the European Union is going to be successful it won't be primarily because of the constitution, it'll be primarily through

whether or not it does things that people want, which is above all to help generate jobs and produce economic prosperity with solidarity and social protection.

### **Javier Solana**

I am very much a pro-European, so I am not Euro-sceptic. I believe in Europe and I believe that what we can do together in the European Union is much better than what we can do in a separate manner, economically.

I think that the Lisbon Agenda that Professor Giddens has mentioned has to be implemented and it has to be implemented with more, much more vigour than has been up to now. The fact that we had the most important economy of the European Union, Germany, - which is about 30% of its economy - practically at growth zero with problems of very structural dimension is a very bad manifestation of the problems we had. If the most important economy is going that way then it stops the rest of the countries growing. Therefore I think the transformations that you have mentioned in the labour market, liberalisations and all these things that can be done and should be done, should be in the agenda of any central left political party and should be implemented and rapidly.

One of the things that to my mind the European Union does which is inconvenient and which I would like to see changed is the rhythm at which things take place - it is too slow. The Lisbon Agenda is now old and it takes a long time before the decisions, which are taken in one council, are implemented. I'd like to say that the unit of time of the European Union is the month, nothing happens in between one month and another. I mean today the unit of time in the world we are living is not a month, in one day you can have a meeting between two important global companies and things can change completely: that's the structure of the

world and we cannot respond to that. So I think that the one important thing that we have to do, related to what you have said about London and the Lisbon Agenda, is first to have the will to do it, and second have the will to do it rapidly, and not at the rhythm that we now move. The European Union is too slow an animal and we have to make it move it faster, and move faster in the correct direction. Nobody has any doubt that the Lisbon Agenda is correct, but the implementing of it is not produced at a speed and with a determination that to my mind is necessary.

### **Anthony Giddens**

But, can I press you on that? You can see such big problems, because as you said before, European nations have their own momentum, and this is true economically. I mean how is the German economy going to become dynamic because Mr Schroeder has, I think, quite a decent reform programme, but it's extremely hard to get it through, partly because the unions, partly because of other of institutional stasis in Germany and many people have said that Germany could become like Japan and this is not, I think, an inconceivable scenario. It would become kind of frozen and with that large chunks of the EU economy become frozen. Then you've got France which says "Well, we're not going to implement chunks of the Lisbon process because..." - if you see it from the outside anyway - "We want our companies to be able to invest in Europe but we don't want other companies to be able to invest in France." So you seem to have a lot of barriers to this actually being realised. It was hard to see how you can mobilise on a European level as a way of overcoming them.

### **Javier Solana**

I think you are pointing to one of the problems. I mean let me say a word about Germany as I see it.

I think that the present political situation in Germany and the manner in which the economy can be handled, is linked now to how to find agreement with the Christian democrats on important issues on the economic reforms. That agreement will have some beneficial consequences in order to transform some of the more difficult parts of the economic life or the structural life of German society, and that so far has been difficult to produce.

Now, let me go to France. It is true that in a moment when the Lisbon Agenda was being applied in France some of the reforms, for instance privatisations, were very difficult to come across. Now, this brings us to the same question that Professor Giddens asks at the very beginning; you see we don't have the same political cycle, sometimes we have more difficulties because we don't have this - we are not a country and therefore we sometimes have to be wasting a little bit of time because of the lack of being in the same country, but being the different countries that belong to the European Union. This is going to continue to happen in the process of enlarging, I mean we're going to get another 15 countries in the European Union, let me give you two figures so you have an impression.

These 15 countries are going to join the European Union, more or less, which if they were a country would have about 100 million people, a very big country; but if you look at the GDP of that country, it will have a GDP, more or less, of the Netherlands, which has 50 million people. So, we're going to have to make a tremendous effort with the process of enlargement to mobilise the resources, the energy, to construct a European Union which is from an economic point of view as solid and productive and job-creating and as innovative; but I think this is what we have to do.

I think we have three basic pillars that we have to transform; one, we have mentioned before, is the population; a second, some of the structural reforms; and a third innovation is in technology. In innovation we could do much, much more than we are doing and in the universities this is fundamental. The human and intellectual capital that we have in the European Union when we put it together - the number of universities and research centres, etc., - could better coordinate the efforts and the resources that we have. If this was the case there is no doubt that we would have a society which is much more innovative than we do today; and that is something that we have to think about.

### **Anthony Giddens**

I would think for that you really need a limited number, five or six, super universities for Europe, actually. I think the main problem at university level is a bit like in the rest of Europe, there is some collaboration but it's actually very difficult, there's not much movement of personnel between university systems in different countries. You've got Erasmus programmes and that kind of thing, but universities are still pretty nation bound. I think that Europe doesn't have anything really to compare with the kind of top level US universities in terms of scientific innovation, not as yet anyway.

### **Javier Solana**

I tend not to agree with you on that, Tony. The level and standards of the universities of Europe are splendid. I mean if something is free to move it's science, it's knowledge, there are no barriers for that - maybe there are barriers because of the language, but practically in science and knowledge English is the *lingua franca* - so there shouldn't be any difficulty in creating a really compact European Union as far as knowledge is concerned. That is

something that I would like to do when abandon that job and I hope that you will continue doing.

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, yeah, when I abandon this job, which is pretty soon.

**Javier Solana**

We'll do it more or less at the same time.

**Anthony Giddens**

There should be about five or six super universities and the LSE should be one of them, that's my opinion.

**Javier Solana**

No doubt about that!

**Anthony Giddens**

But I think the result of this is, that everyone can see that there are still very, very big barriers to European structural reform and the mechanisms for achieving some kind of catch up with the US seem to me to be still pretty formidable.

What about the Constitution, Javier?

**Javier Solana**

I think that on the question of the Constitution, you know, from the moment in which the UK government accepted the Constitution as part of the reforms of the Convention I think the Constitution is not any longer the big subject. The Constitution we want to have is short, I think it was Jack Straw who said that a good Constitution should be put into your pocket, you should be able to wear it within your pocket, and then it would be quite an important achievement if we do that.

The thing which is really important in the Constitution is if we can represent nations, the European Union and the regions - the three levels. It's a very difficult thing but I hope that we will be able to do something constructive on that. But I think that on the question of a constitution - if we try to avoid some nominalisms, avoid terminology which is offensive for some but it doesn't really mean much - we will be able to come up with something which is very good.

But the Constitution is not the most important thing. I think what is more important is the political will to do things together. We will come later on to the questions of foreign policy in the European Union, but we may have the most important division between different institutions in the European Union if the political will of the different countries doesn't exist. You may have the most beautiful institution and it will lead nowhere and that is what to me is important, the political will to be able to put in common some of the basic policies that we have put in common, if Europe as a whole wants to play a role in the international arena and I think we have the obligations to do that.

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, I must say I agree with that, but political scientists often make distinctions between two kinds of democracy: representative democracy and discourse democracy. Representative democracy is how you have a mechanism for voting linked to a constitution. Discourse democracy is the open discussion of public issues and problems. There is a speech being given here later today, at the LSE, by a professor from Harvard, who's arguing that the European Union is actually much more democratic than many people, especially critics, tend to say. I think this is true because if it's primarily a discourse democracy, it's primarily a way of solving problems together in an open fashion, and I think most of the mechanisms of discussion in the European Union are actually pretty transparent, and are more transparent than those of quite a few of the nations that actually make up the European Union. I think this business of Europe being undemocratic can easily be overdone and in the end people's disaffection with Europe isn't primarily with that, it's primarily a lack of economic performance and those sort of 'on the ground issues' which I think we have to improve.

Can we move on at this point to the issues, which I'm sure most people have come to primarily hear Javier talk about. This is first the relationship between Europe and the United States at this point in history.

When we had our previous discussion in Barcelona we started off by talking about the thesis of Robert Kagan, who has achieved great prominence in international relations recently on the basis of an article he wrote called 'Power and Weakness'. He's recently written a book to follow up on this which has just been published, and the *Sunday Times* has gone big on this and has published, I think, two big excerpts from the book over the last couple of weeks. The basic theme of the book – I'm not sure how far the audience will know – is essentially that "those that can do". If you can do something you will do it. Well, Europe has, according to



Kagan, created a kind of postmodern universe of relative harmony beyond the old military adventures of the past. The US on the other hand has to bear the burden of having military power on which Europe and the rest of the world depends for some kind of stability; and so Kagan says each side tends to give a kind of rhetorical flourish to its own position. Europe is militarily weak and therefore stresses collaboration, multilateralism and international organisation. It's got its own civilising mission. Its civilising mission is to export the model of Europe of peaceful collaboration above the level of the nation. The US, on the other hand, is forced to live in a much more Hobbesian world of power. Kagan says that Europeans are in bad faith in some degree on this because they want to criticise the Americans but the prosperity of Europe would not be possible without American military power, American military power protected Europe, he says, from the Soviets and Europe couldn't even resolve its own internal problems in Bosnia and Kosovo without the very substantial use of American military force; and this thesis has got enormous amount of attention in intellectual as well as in practical discussions. So, what's your opinion of this?

### **Javier Solana**

You have described the thesis very well. I tend to disagree with that approach, although it does have some merit. I tend to disagree because I do think that this attack on multilateralism is a mistake. I don't think that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century you can do things alone, you need always to do it with others and for the Europeans the possibility of multilateralism is not just something that came from the blue, from heaven. When we didn't have multilateralisations, and the European Union is of one of them, we had a continent at war. Last century we had the scenario of two terrible wars that started in Europe and become world wars.

Now, today, it is absolutely impossible to imagine anything like that taking place in Europe and the reason for that, or at least one of the reasons for that, is because we have constructed a European Union which is a multilateral organisation that is ruled by law, it is ruled by norms that everybody obeys or tries to obey, etc. I think this is very fundamental thing that sometimes the United States does not understand.

Second, when we say that Europe doesn't have a military power in the sense that they cannot be deployable in other places of the world, we have to remember something very simple. During the second and the Cold War the obligation of the countries of the European Union was to have military capabilities to defend the borders of their own country, that was the task that the European Union countries had in NATO. Suddenly, with the end of the Cold War the Americans demand that the Europeans are immediately able to have deployable armed forces. That is very, very difficult, I can remember it very well, I quote you two examples.

In 1996 I was Secretary General of NATO. In January of that year we had to deploy the first contingents of forces from European countries into Bosnia. The Germans did not deploy forces, first because the Constitution didn't allow them to do it and second because we were not prepared because the obligation of that army had been during the Cold War to defend Germany.

Three years later, after Kosovo, the second Commander in Chief of all the forces deployed in Kosovo was from Germany. So in a very short period of time a tremendous process of adaptation has taken place.

Our American friends have always had a deployable army because their territory has never been attacked, with exception of September 11, and I think that's why so many things have changed in the United States after September 11, and I think that we have to talk about these things ...

### **Anthony Giddens**

We will.

### **Javier Solana**

... but before that, the United States and maybe to a certain extent Britain, were the only two armed forces that were able to deploy.

But I don't think that thesis - that we Europeans are unable to fight, that we are wimps, that where the strength really lies is in our friends from the United States - is true. It is true that the construction of the European Union was possible because the United States was defending Europe, there's no doubt about that and you have to recognise that and be very grateful to the United States citizens and government at the time for that. But now, I think the Europeans have to recognise that we have to make an effort too in order to have an ally of the United States. But I will not defend competing militarily with the United States, I think it will be a tremendous mistake of the European Union.

I believe in multilateralism, I think that the United States invented multilateralism but now the new administration is less keen on multilateralism. But if you remember the end of the Second World War the big multilateralisations were created by the United States: the IMF; the World Bank; the United Nations and now the World Trade Organisation. All those global

institutions that were born at the end of the Second World War were created to a certain extent by the Americans. There is a beautiful book that I read last summer, a biography of Keynes, that probably many of you have read, the third volume which is the last part...

### **Anthony Giddens**

Skidelsky - Robert Skidelsky

### **Javier Solana**

... it's a fantastic, very interesting book - I mean even for somebody like me with a background in physics. In it you see so clearly that at the end of the Second World War the Americans wanted to construct a multilateral world. What happened after the end of the Cold War, is that apparently this multilateralism is diminishing in the United States, whereas for the Europeans it's in our interest and our manner of seeing things in the world is through multilateralism. This is why I think we have a beginning of a rift between the United States and the European Union countries.

### **Anthony Giddens**

The question is whether it's a structural thing, because you've got this now famous phrase that Kagan uses, the Americans cook the dinner and Europeans wash the dishes; that is the Americans intervene militarily in different parts of the world including inside Europe, in Bosnia and Kosovo, and in Afghanistan and so forth, and the Europeans come along and they, kind of, do the business after the war has finished and you can see there is some sort of division of labour on that line; so what Kagan says is the Europeans are free riding on American military power. It seems to me that the US, at least at the moment, is actually free riding on the kind of collaboration and multilateralism, which the rest of the world adopts. I

mean the Bush doctrine to me is a straight forward, America first doctrine, which has no time really for multilateral organisations; but actually the world wouldn't function were it not for the multiplicity of multilateral organisations that exists. It seems to me that there's a strong element of free riding on both sides in this relationship. It also seems to me a problematic relationship, I take it you would agree with the idea that you don't want two super powers armed to the teeth, that would be far, far worse; but surely we do want the Americans to recognise that the world is much more interdependent than before, and they can't just be strident like some kind of military Colossus. We surely want some more military capability in the European Union.

**Javier Solana**

But why only military capability?

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, in order to intervene in local situations that might serve humanitarian ends . . .

**Javier Solana**

I think we are beginning to be too obsessed with military action.

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, it would be very nice to think so...

**Javier Solana**

I mean, for instance, take the fight against terrorism. The centre of gravity of the fight against terrorism is not military, and your country knows it, and my country knows it very

well. It is much more important to have a good cooperation on a change of intelligence and information, etc., etc., and it is very interesting that from September 11 until now the cooperation between the United States and Europe in the fight against terrorism has achieved tremendous results. Most of the important achievements have been made by the Europeans cooperating with the United States. To think that you have to measure everything by your military capability in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, I don't think is a sign of civilisation. I mean I don't think that as time goes on into the future the only unit of measure is going to be military capability, there are other capabilities which are fundamental.

Let me tell you another example, when the Afghanistan war was over I remember I was in New York with Colin Powell and the G7 and the big question, if you remember, was who was going to take the peace-keeping operation in Kabul. The politically correct statement would be to say that it has to be Arab countries - Islamic countries have to be there. We spent two weeks looking for those countries to appear. As you know in Kabul that the Islamic countries took over the peace-keeping operation was fundamental. But what is still fundamental was that you, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain and Italy, were there. That means that when the chips are down and something is needed there are the Europeans to do it, and do it properly, and I insist on this because I think that a job has to be finished, and if it's not being finished I get a little bit excited with this.

Let me give you another example: take the growth of poppies for heroin in Afghanistan, well, you remember before the war with the Taliban this was bad. Now in the year that the war is over the sale of heroin from Afghanistan has arrived to the figure of \$1.2 billions. There's a lot of things that have to be done to finish the job. If at the end of the day we're going to have a situation in Afghanistan like that, something is not being done right, and we have to go all

the way and ask who is doing that. It's being done by you, by your country, by my country by the European countries etc.

**Anthony Giddens**

But isn't that an example of free riding by the United States?

**Javier Solana**

But the message I'd send on this is that this sentiment that everything has to be measured by the unit of your military power is not necessarily the only measure that you can take, I mean it's important no doubt about that, but I don't think that it is everything - and this has been said by somebody who has been Secretary General of NATO and led a campaign in Kosovo. So, I know very well of what I am talking about, but I do think honestly that we have to begin to think of other elements, of a balance in the world which is not necessarily only about military power.

**Anthony Giddens**

Yeah, I think also with American military power, you rapidly get a situation of overstretch. The US will get in a situation of overstretch if it simply applies its current policy, it just won't be able to cope. We'll come onto this in a minute, but whatever happens in Iraq the Americans are going to have to foot the bill, the American tax payer, and you already have massive problems in the American economy. It's not the way to run the world. I completely agree with you that there are other forms of power beside military power and some of them are crucial ones which can really save the world in the current age, and which do not involve deploying military force. On the other hand there is this division of labour, and what you say,

Javier, also reflects this division of labour. It's quite hard to see how one can get over that unless Europe can have a bit more independent military input.

### **Javier Solana**

I am for that and I am very much in agreement with the position that UK and France made, which they repeated on the 4<sup>th</sup> February. I think that this is a good decision, we're going in the right direction but let's act in a way that corresponds to every statement that we make.

### **Anthony Giddens**

Can we just go to NATO quickly? I mean here you have a situation where what might happen in Iraq is seemingly dividing all the major councils of the world: the United Nations; the European Union and NATO. What does it mean for NATO? Everybody asks does NATO have role now? What will happen? Will the Americans take out some of their military influence from NATO? They don't seem to want to use NATO anyway . . .

### **Javier Solana**

Well, NATO, as you know, was an organisation with a defensive mission. Now the enemy is an enemy which is very different to the classical enemy and therefore NATO has to adapt itself to the new reality. During some of my time with it, we took over missions of peace-keeping in Bosnia and in Kosovo, we trained men in the possibility of being in the Balkans in general terms. Now we have – NATO has - to adapt to be able to go to what we call 'out of area', out of the European borders. This is a very difficult thing to do. There are countries which are not very keen on doing it, but it seems to me that the only possibility of maintaining NATO as an active role, apart from being a place where the transatlantic relationship in the debate about security is done. In particular now that NATO is going to



increase the number of members, many of the members will not be able to have the military capabilities which are needed for the deployment that we have been talking about before, but I think, as I said before, they have to adapt. NATO has to adapt to a new reality but I think it has a very important roles to play, only one of which is to be the place where the Europeans and the Americans get together to talk about a question pertaining to security. And the other thing that into my mind is fundamental, is this is the basic coalition between the United States and the Europeans. When I listen to some of the leaders of the United States, who use this phrase that the mission determines the coalition, it for me is a phrase that represents a negation of the existence of NATO; the coalition exists already, which is NATO. Therefore then you can increase, or you can change, or you can put more members in the coalition, but I think the coalition exists, and if you recognise that the mission determines the coalition I think it's given a blow, a very tough blow to the idea ...

### **Anthony Giddens**

Yeah, I don't want to mention Kagan again, though you could say that's an example of Kagan again, because the Europeans want to collaborate and the Americans just want to deploy military power, and that's the kind of fracture which is now at the heart of NATO because the Americans ignore NATO when they want to.

### **Javier Solana**

They did, yes, they did. But NATO has to use Article 5, which has only been used once in their life. It was after September 11, after having taken that decision nobody looked at NATO again which was really I think quite a mistake.

### **Anthony Giddens**

But, I mean you would agree that it's crucial to try and keep NATO together presumably?

**Javier Solana**

I think that NATO has to change, there's no doubt about that, it's is trying to do that, but I think that the importance of NATO nowadays will be more and more the place where the transatlantic relations will continue to be incubated.

**Anthony Giddens**

Can we now at this point move on to September 11 and Iraq.

Let's begin with the issue of terrorism because it's seems to me that there is a real change in the world after September 11 - I'd like to find out how much you agree with this - between what I call old style terrorism and new style terrorism.

Old style terrorism is the kind that we're familiar with both in the UK with the IRA and you in Spain are with the Basque Separatists. This is local terrorism orientated towards a specific goal which is normally national separation or national independence.

But now you have something new - geopolitical terrorism - which is organised on a global basis, which draws on the power of civil society. I mean people have drawn, and you won't take this too far I hope, I think quite valid comparisons between civil society organisations like Friends of the Earth and organisations like Al Qaeda: they're both global networks; they both operate outside the sphere of the state; they both have a sense of mission which holds the whole thing together; they both have branches in many countries and they both have many imitators. One of the disturbing things about what seems to be happening in a new

geopolitical terrorism is that Al Qaeda is only one of quite a diversity of groups which are targeting, essentially, the west. There is an Al Qaeda website - several Al Qaeda websites actually – and if you look at it and it seems to reveal that Al Qaeda is not just a religious organisation, it has economic motivations too. The economic motivation is a bit like the one we were talking about earlier, to stop the process of globalisation, that is to push the west out of countries around the world where the west in its view does not belong; hence the bombing Bali and so forth by some of these groups. It's an agenda to sink the United States and the west economically. That's why you could argue the Middle East is a kind of cockpit for all of this, given the dependence of the west on oil.

Now, we're all struggling to know how seriously you should take the threat of geopolitical terrorism. September 11 did not happen in Europe, if it had, people here probably would be less complacent than many now are, but it's very difficult to work out what the strength and the impact of this threat is. What we do know is that we're far more vulnerable to a massive attack than anyone had thought before September 11. We've now looked at the vulnerabilities of our cities, for example in London the underground is highly vulnerable to a terrorist attack, and there are other areas which no one had really thought of as being targeted by attacks which could in principle kill millions of people, not just thousands. So how seriously do you take the threat and how does this relate, or is there any relationship between, what the Americans seems to be proposing in Iraq or not?

### **Javier Solana**

Well, I think as you said the terrorism that we have contemplated after September is different to what we have suffered before, but it also has elements which are common, and which you have suffered in your country and I suffer in my country. I remember very well, in your

country, when the hotel of the Conservative party conference in which everybody was living was blown out . . .

**Anthony Giddens**

In Brighton.

**Javier Solana**

... some of the leaders of the country were killed and that had a tremendous, tremendous impact on the life of the country. I was a member of a government for 13 years and rarely a week or month went by that I didn't go to a funeral for somebody killed by a terrorist attack.

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, you still have to a bodyguard all the time.

**Javier Solana**

Right, but I think what you have said is clear, that the new organisations, Al Qaeda etc. are distinguished from this. Now I would say that again that the fight against these networks is not militarily, or the centre of gravity shouldn't be military: it's intelligence, it's communication, it's trying to prevent them having weapons, etc.

Now let me mention another thing in which as Europeans, I think, we are not aware of, or at least we don't have the level of awareness that we should: weapons of mass destruction. The risk of some states or an organisation of this nature having weapons of mass destruction is a very, very, very serious business. I don't think that we Europeans are aware of what may happen, and I think that as governments and people we have to begin to think in a different

manner about these issues - in a more serious matter. I will divide it in to what we'll call strategic and tactical terrorist attacks, and the strategic would be something like September 11, it's a very sophisticated operation. A tactical thing we can call like the operation in Bali, it's very easy to do but it had catastrophic consequences when it happened; and the third level is suicide bombers like we have seen in Palestine.

### **Anthony Giddens**

You could target the world airline industry.

### **Javier Solana**

Right, so how do you fight against that? I think that you have to fight, as I said before, by communication, by intelligence etc and we have to fight also by trying to extract the roots of hatred that is still exist in the world and the roots of hatred are linked to poverty and are linked to the responsibilities that we, the people that belong to richer countries, are not willing to take, and we have to take those responsibilities. It's not enough to continue constructing a world with such tremendous difference between poor and rich, and where you have rich and poor, they will fight against you asymmetrically and this has always been history, and now we have more responsibilities, and the agenda that links this with the United Nation has to be put in place. It's not enough to spend money on the military only, we have to spend money on trying to deal with problems of this world otherwise we'll have only asymmetrical responses. One of the manifestations of asymmetrical responses is terrorism and we have to face this also. I wouldn't say that the things we've discussed are the cause because let's suppose that terrorism is so irrational that it doesn't have cause but the atmosphere, the conditions that help that to happen are there, and we in our own countries, our societies have to think that we have responsibilities to others and if we don't recognise

them we will create a world where the gap will be everyday widening and it will be a tremendous situation of unbalance and therefore of insecurity, because as I said these unbalances create asymmetric responses which are much more difficult to attack and much more difficult to defend.

That is the great concern that I have and we have to convey to our leaders, and we also have to convey to our American friends that we have to fight against poverty, against suffering in the world, all these things that without any doubt are fundamental, we want to get together in a better world and we're not doing enough. You know that is that why, when we talk about social democracy, I think that the real values of social democracy today are internationalist in the real sense, to have these values is not only important in our countries but to bring it to the world at large, and this is to my mind a big challenge that we have in front of us.

### **Anthony Giddens**

Yeah, I mean David Held, a professor here, talks about global social democracy and I think there's something in that, but those things are more long term aren't they? In the short term, well, we've now got the issue of Iraq in front of all of us and we've got geopolitical issues involved as well and we've got the most threatening thing of all I think, nuclear proliferation.

How does all this home in on Iraq, I mean, what is going to happen with this division between Europe and the United States? The current government of the United States it seems to me has just decided that they are going to war in Iraq and there is nothing that anyone else in the world community can really do which seems able to deflect them from this. How does one deal with old Europe versus the US ...

**Javier Solana**

I think that we have at this point today a position which is common and is shared by all the members of the European Union, which is basically the following: we want to disarm the regime in Iraq, number one; number two we want this to be done so that the centre of gravity is the United Nations, there is nothing outside the United Nations, the United Nations is the body in which things should be solved. Third, I think that the inspectors should be our ears and our eyes and that they should be the ones who say to the Security Council, convince the Security Council, that the work is being done properly or not, and the Security Council convinces the rest of the world.

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, Javier, can I interrupt you at that point, because I mean the inspectors wouldn't be there without the threat of force and the threat of war...

**Javier Solana**

I was going to say that. I think that without the build up...

**Anthony Giddens**

How do you balance those two?

**Javier Solana**

Right, the inspectors have not been there because they had not been allowed and I want to say now from the European Union countries there is only one country that has understood that properly, which is yours; and I think we have to pay tribute to your country because you are

the one who has contributed to the build up of forces that has allowed the inspectors to return...

**Anthony Giddens**

Yeah, but all of us approve of that.

**Javier Solana**

Okay, but I think we have to recognise that the build up encouraged it, because otherwise the inspectors would not be there and we would not be talking of this as a scheme that we had.

The scheme I think is clear, disarmament, United Nations, inspectors...

**Anthony Giddens**

But can we avoid war?

**Javier Solana**

I think war is a last resort...

**Anthony Giddens**

War is avoidable?

**Javier Solana**

I think war is avoidable and it should be avoided and we have to make all the effort to avoid it, but the responsibility, fundamental responsibility...



**Anthony Giddens**

Well, what would avoid it? How or what would avoid it? What should the European Union do? What should Tony Blair do?

**Javier Solana**

I think what the European Union and Tony Blair are to do - I mean I am not going to give advice to my good friend Tony Blair.

**Anthony Giddens**

But this is such a serious situation and I think we need to hear if there is anything that can be done...

**Javier Solana**

It's a very serious situation. We may have a crisis in the United Nations, we may have a very profound crisis in Europe and that's what I like to call attention to. We have in the European Union a crisis, a potential crisis of the 15 countries, plus the new countries like I never would have imagined were to take place. If at the end of the day we have the European Union broken that would be very difficult to fix, the wounds will be very, very, very profound so we have to try the utmost so that this doesn't happen and you can be sure that I will do everything I can to avoid that from happening. At the same time we have to maintain the United Nations and at the same time also I like to think that, probably not many people think like me, the inspection regime has to be saved. With proliferation of weapons of mass destruction we're going to have more than Iraq, and we need to have instruments within the United Nations' scheme like inspectors so that the only solution to a problem of proliferation is not preventative strike, it shouldn't be that a preventative strike is the only solution which is left.

We need to have mechanism whereby these problems of proliferations can be solved without the need of use of force.

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, do you think it's possible to involve the Arabs states at a certain point?

**Javier Solana**

I think it's not only possible, it's necessary...

**Anthony Giddens**

I mean given that the Americans won't do anything about Israel, or seemingly won't do anything about Israel, how would the Arab states...

**Javier Solana**

You touch two things at the same time.

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, they're sort of related I think...

**Javier Solana**

I honestly think that in the last few months the way which we have tackled the Middle East peace process has been a mistake. I think the Europeans have done as much as we can, but the United States should have done probably more in order to push a solution to that conflict. I think the leaders of the European Union keep talking about this and I hope they will convince our American friends that this is absolutely necessary. I was involved on the famous

military report done by Senator Mitchell and myself, and we put there everything that, at the end of the day, would be the solution, but the solution has not been...

**Anthony Giddens**

But what could be the solution to the Iraq issue? I mean could Europe and the US get together with the Arab States to, in some sense, enforce some change short of war. Could there be a much more beefed up inspection regime with surveyence?

**Javier Solana**

I will do it in three lines. I think first the Europeans have to come to a common position, a strong position about the line that we have taken on Monday. Second, we have to get a better understanding with the United States along the lines of giving time to the inspectors, not an infinite time but giving time to inspectors etc. Third we have to continue talking as we are doing now with the Arab world. At the end of the day if Saddam Hussein were to deliver the disarmament then probably the people that can put most pressure, apart from the military pressure, on Iraq is the Arab world. The Arab world can tell him very clearly that the terrible tragedy of war in the Middle East could be avoided ...

**Anthony Giddens**

Can I just ask this last question, which we were talking about on the way in, which is kind of a crunch question or two questions really. Supposing Saddam, under pressure, disclosed certain levels of weaponry, would the Americans not still invade? And, second, supposing Saddam said "Okay, I'll stand down", but he stood down in favour of a puppet ruler whom he would manipulate behind the scenes, what would the Americans do, what would the rest of the world community do?

**Javier Solana**

I think we have to send to Saddam Hussein two messages. One, you have to disarm; second if you disarm war will be avoided and I don't think that Saddam Hussein believes that even if he disarms the decision of regime change has not been taken. But Resolution 1441 doesn't talk about regime change, it talks only about disarmament and therefore we have to continue in the logic of 1441 and not on the logic of regime change.

**Anthony Giddens**

Well, I was going to say, I hope that everyone here shares our hope that war can be avoided and an outcome can be produced which is along the lines that you're suggesting. I was hoping to have time for questions but I unfortunately don't think we do have time. So, could you just please show your appreciation of Javier Solana coming here today.

Thank you very much.

[AUDIENCE APPLAUSE]