

# **U.S. Foreign and Defence Policy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

**Public lecture by Mr. Robert McNamara  
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## **Introduction**

Mr McNamara served during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as Secretary of Defence. He went on to head the World Bank from 1968 until he retired in 1981.

Mr McNamara was born in 1916. He graduated from the University of California in 1937, also studied at Harvard and taught there for a period before he was commissioned in the Air Force during the Second World War. He served in the UK, India, China and the Pacific before he went on inactive duty as a Lieutenant Colonel in April 1946. He served as Director and as President of the Ford Motor Company before President Kennedy asked him to become his Secretary of Defence, a position he then held from 1961 until 1968.

## **Robert McNamara**

I want to begin my remarks this afternoon by telling you of my earliest memories as a child. My earliest is of a city exploding with joy -- the city was San Francisco, the date was November 11, 1918, Armistice Day. I was two years old. The city of course was celebrating the end of World War I, but it was celebrating not only that victory, but the belief of many Americans and particularly of President Wilson, our President at the time, that we and our allies had won a war to end all wars. They were wrong, of course. The 20<sup>th</sup> century was on it's way to becoming the bloodiest in all of human history, during which something on the order 160 million people were killed by conflicts: conflicts within nations and conflicts across the globe. Were similar conflicts to occur in this century, when population will have risen three-fold and when wars are likely to be fought with weapons of mass destruction, the fatalities of course would be substantially higher, say 300 million. Now, is that what we want from the first century of the new millennium? I hope not. The time to think about the problem and initiate action to prevent it is now. I believe we should begin by establishing a realistic appraisal of the problem -- it's very complex and very dangerous, more complex and more dangerous than I think most of us understand.

The Carnegie Endowment established a commission known as the Carnegie Commission, chaired by the former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and by David Hamburg, the Chairman of the Carnegie Endowment. One of the members of that Commission was your own ex-Foreign Minister, David Owen. That Commission said this: 'Peace will require greater understanding and respect for differences within and across national boundaries. We humans do not have the luxury any longer of indulging our prejudices and ethnocentrism, they are anachronisms of our ancient past. The world-wide historical record is full of hateful, destructive behaviour based on religious, racial, political, ideological and other distinctions, holy wars of one sort or another. Such behaviour in the next century will be expressed with weapons of mass destruction. If we cannot learn to accommodate each other respectfully in the 21<sup>st</sup> century we can destroy each other at such a rate that

humanity will have little to cherish.'

That was the statement of the Carnegie Commission; it's a statement which I very much agree with. They were saying in effect that the end of the Cold War in 1989 did not and will not in itself result in an end of conflict. I think we see the evidence for that truth on all sides every day -- the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the civil war in Yugoslavia, the tension between India and Pakistan, the unstable relations of the Middle East, the conflict across sub-Saharan Africa. These all make clear that the world of the future will not be without conflict, conflict between disparate groups within nations and conflict extending across national borders; racial, religious, ethnic tensions will remain, nationalism will be a powerful force across the globe, political revolutions will erupt as societies advance, historic disputes over boundaries will endure and economic disparities within and among nations will increase as technology and education spread unevenly around the world. The underlying causes of conflict that existed long before the Cold War began remain now that it has ended. It is just such causes of conflict that in the past 50 years have contributed to about 125 wars, causing 40 million deaths. So in these respects the world of the future will not be different from the world of the past. Conflicts within nations, conflicts among nations will not disappear.

In relation to the new century, I believe the conflicts of the past 100 years have two fundamental messages for us. These may be among the most contentious statements I make today. These messages can be conveyed in the form of two imperatives, which I think should shape US foreign policy and indeed the foreign policies of other major nations. The two imperatives are these:

First, the moral imperative. I believe we should establish as a major goal of US foreign and defence Policy, and indeed of foreign policies across the globe, the avoidance in this century of the carnage of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The second imperative is even more contentious. I believe that politically, economically and militarily the US is today and will remain for as far ahead as I can see, several decades at a minimum, by far the most powerful nation in the world, politically, economically and militarily. But I believe that we should never utilise that power other than in a multilateral context. Now, many say, when they're talking about the US, that we're isolationist. I don't think this label is correct. I would term us unilateralist, arrogantly unilateralist. In contrast, I believe we should never, with the qualification of an attack on the continental US or Alaska or Hawaii, we should never utilise our economic, political or militarily superior powers, other than in the context of a process of multilateral decision making. Before turning to what that process might be I want to talk briefly about relations among nations in this century.

I think among political theorists this is quite a controversial topic. Those who are classified as realists (and I believe that is the majority) predict a return to traditional power politics. They argue that the disappearance of ideological competition between East and West will trigger a reversion to traditional relationships based on territorial and economic disparities. They say that the United States, Russia, Western Europe, China, Japan, and perhaps India will seek to assert themselves in their own regions while still competing for dominance in other areas of the world where conditions are fluid. This realist view has been expressed most notably perhaps by Professor Michael Sandel of Harvard. He writes that, 'The end of the Cold War does not mean an end of global competition between the superpowers.

Once the ideological dimension fades what you are left with is not peace and harmony but old fashioned global politics based on dominant powers competing for influence and pursuing their internal interest.'

Henry Kissinger, an old, old friend of mine, is also a member of the realist school. We couldn't disagree more on this particular point. He has expressed a conclusion very similar to that I read from Michael Sandel. Kissinger writes: 'Victory in the Cold War has propelled America into a world which bears many similarities to the European State system of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. The absence of an over-riding, ideological or strategic threat frees nations to pursue foreign policies based increasingly on their immediate national interest. In an international system characterised by perhaps five or six major powers and a multiplicity of smaller states, order will have to emerge much as it did in past centuries from a reconciliation and balancing of competing national interests.'

In contrast to Sandel and Kissinger, Carl Kasen, the former Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton, has written this: 'The international system that relies on the national use of military force as the element which guarantees security and the threat of its use as the basis of order is not the only possible one. To seek a different system is no longer the pursuit of an illusion but a necessary effort toward a necessary goal.' I very, very much agree with Kasen.

Kissinger's and Sandel's conceptions of relations among nations in this post Cold War world are, of course, well founded historically, but I would argue that they are inconsistent with our increasingly interdependent world. No nation, not even the United States, can stand alone in a world in which nations are so inextricably intertwined with one another, economically, environmentally, politically and with regard to security. I believe that for the future, the United Nations Charter offers a far more appropriate framework for international relations than Sandel's and Kissinger's doctrine of power politics. I would also argue that their emphasis on the balance of power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century assumes we will be willing to continue to accept a foreign policy which lacks a strong moral foundation. I'm quite aware that the majority of political scientists, particularly those who are members of the realist school, believe that morality, as contrasted to a careful calculation of national interests, is a dangerous guide for the establishment of foreign policy. They would say, I think with some justification, that a foreign policy based on moral considerations promotes zealotry and a crusading spirit with potentially dangerous results. But surely in the most basic sense one can apply a moral judgment to the level of killing which occurred in the 20<sup>th</sup> century: there can be no justification for it, no moral justification, nor can there be any justification for its continuation into this century. So on moral grounds alone I believe we should act today to prevent such an outcome. A first step would be to establish such a moral imperative as a primary foreign policy goal for our nation and for the entire human race. We're far from accepting that objective.

Now, if we achieve that objective, if we're to avoid in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the tragic loss of life we lived through [in the last century], above all else special emphasis must be placed on avoiding conflict among the great powers. We have made some progress in that direction but we have a long way to go. Excluding the end of the Cold War I believe the two most important geopolitical events of the past 50 years have been the reconciliation between France and Germany and the establishment of peaceful relations between Japan and the US, after one of the bloodiest conflicts in the

modern era.

... It is inconceivable today that either Germany or Japan would engage in a war with any of the great powers of the western world. Now, can't we move to integrate both Russia and China into the family of nations in ways that make war between them and other great powers equally unlikely? We've begun to do so, but much, much more is necessary. We've made, I think, rather substantial progress in integrating Russia, particularly with Europe, but more generally with the US and Japan in ways that reduce the risk of war between the great powers, Russia and Europe or Russia and Japan or Russia and the US. But much, much more is required, particularly with respect to China. The Chinese are rapidly expanding their military budget -- I don't suggest they're expanding it because of aggressive intentions, but the fact is they are vastly expanding that budget, they are going to continue to do so and they are building a 'projectible' military power. That is something we should be concerned about. This is a force in the world we should think about and relate to and I don't think we in the US have done nearly enough about it.

I turn now to a second issue that I think we must address if we are to avoid in this century the loss of human life due to conflict that we saw in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. That subject is nuclear weapons. Immediate action by you, Britain, and we in the US is needed if we are to avoid the further proliferation of these weapons and the risk of their accidental use leading to the destruction of nations, in the event that wars among nations of the kind we saw in the 20<sup>th</sup> century continue into the 21<sup>st</sup>. I doubt that many in the room realise that today, twelve years after the end of the Cold War, the US has something on the order of 7,000 strategic offensive nuclear warheads, each one of which has on average 30 times the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb. The US has 7,000 strategic offensive nuclear warheads directed at Russia and Russia has something on the order 6,000 directed at the US. In total they have a destructive power, if you can imagine this, 300,000 times that of the Hiroshima bomb which killed something on the order of 100,000 people. It's insane, absolutely insane and I want to spend a few minutes talking about that.

We in the US and all other inhabitants of our globe continue to live with the risk of nuclear escalation and nuclear destruction. The US and NATO's war planes today, your war planes, provide for contingent use of nuclear weapons just as they did when I became Secretary of Defence 40 years ago. But I don't believe the average American or the average Briton recognises that fact. You may remember that the initial arms control agreements in the 1990s were designed to bring the offensive forces of the US and Russia down from a total strategic offensive force of something near 20,000 warheads to 13,000; then negotiations a couple of years later envisaged the reduction of that total of 13,000 down to 10,000. In March of 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin spoke of taking the total of 10,000 down to 6,000, compared with the 13,000 we still have today. But even if such a limit were to be approved by the US Congress and the Russian Duma, which is far from likely, the risk of destruction to societies across the globe, while somewhat reduced, would be far from eliminated.

So, the question is: can't we go further? Surely the answer must be yes. The question I think points to both the opportunity and the urgency with which the world should re-examine the possession of nuclear weapons by other nations. I think we should begin with a broad public debate -- we haven't had it in the US and I don't

think you've had it in Britain. (If you have I was unaware of it.) I think such a debate should open with a discussion of the moral issues relating to the use of nuclear weapons: there's a very, very fundamental moral issue here. I said that most political scientists, most security experts, oppose introducing moral considerations into discussions of international relations and defence policy. I do know that in many situations they provide at best ambiguous guidance. But surely the five declared nuclear powers should be prepared to accept that it would be totally immoral for any one of them, no matter what the provocation, to believe that its leader acting alone has a right to initiate action that would destroy another nation. It would be morally unacceptable if *that* action by one leader should destroy not only the other belligerent, but non-belligerent nations as well, through the spread of radioactivity. Yet that would have been the result if either Russia or the US had implemented the nuclear strategy which each nation followed for 40 years and continues to follow today, along with your own nation.

After starting the debate with consideration of the moral question, we should then move on to more detailed considerations, including the military utility of nuclear weapons. Perhaps one could override moral considerations if there was tremendous military utility. But we should also consider the military risks of their use. I think that the debate on military utility and risk would support the conclusion that we should move back to a non-nuclear world. In support of my position on nuclear weapons I want to make three points.

First, I want to tell of the experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and in particular what we have learned about it recently. I want to make clear that so long as we and other great powers possess large inventories of nuclear weapons we will face the risk of their use and we will face the risk of destruction of nations.

The second point I want to make is that that risk, if it ever was justifiable on military grounds, is no longer justifiable. There is no military utility for nuclear weapons today other than to deter one's opponent from their use.

Thirdly, I want to say that in recent years there's been a dramatic change in the thinking of leading Western security experts, both military and civilian, regarding the military utility of these weapons. More and more of them, while certainly not yet a majority, but more and more of them are expressing views very similar to those I've expressed. First, let me deal very quickly with the Cuban Missile Crisis.

I think it is now widely recognised that the actions of the US, Cuba and Russia/Soviet Union in October 1962 brought the three nations to the verge of war. But what wasn't known then and is not widely understood today is how close the world came to the brink of nuclear disaster. Some six years ago the Kennedy Library released highly-classified tapes which provided new insights into the near catastrophe from a US point of view. A few months before a somewhat similar account had been published of Khrushchev's state of mind. Both accounts are frightening; neither the Soviet Union nor the United States intended by its action to create the risk that they both incurred. I want to take a moment to remind you of what happened at the time.

The crisis began when the Soviets started moving nuclear missiles and bombers to Cuba, secretly and with the clear intent to deceive. In the summer and early fall of 1962 the missiles were to be targeted against cities along America's east coast,

putting 90 million Americans at risk. Photographs of the deployment of the Soviet missiles in Cuba were taken by a U2 aircraft on October 14 1962 and came to President's Kennedy's attention the day after that. Kennedy and his military and security advisors believed that the Soviet action posed a threat to the West, as did your Prime Minister at the time. Kennedy therefore authorised a naval quarantine of Cuba, effective on Wednesday October 24. Preparations also began for air strikes and a land and sea invasion. The contingency plans for air strikes called for a first day air strike of 1,080 sorties, a huge air attack, larger than any single day's attack in Kosovo. An invasion force totalling 180,000 troops with supporting ships was assembled in southeastern US ports. The crisis came to a head on Saturday October 27 and Sunday October 28. Had Khrushchev not publicly announced on that Sunday that he was removing the missiles, I believe that on Monday a majority of Kennedy's military and civilian advisors would have recommended the attacks.

To understand what caused the crisis and how to avoid similar events in the future, high ranking Soviet, Cuban and American participants in the crisis met for a series of meetings over a five year period between 1987 and 1992. During the meetings we considered the risks faced by each side. The majority of President Kennedy's advisors were prepared to recommend attack, although at the time the CIA said they believed that there were no nuclear warheads on the island. The majority of Kennedy's advisors believed there would be no Soviet military response. At the time the CIA reported there were some 10,000 Soviet troops on the island. We learned many, many, years later there were 43,000 Soviet troops there and 270,000 well armed Cubans who, in the words of their commanders, were determined to fight to the death. Their commanders said they had expected to suffer 100,000 casualties. The Soviets who were present at this meeting in Moscow, who included, among others, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, and the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoliy Dobrynin, expressed their utter disbelief that we, the senior advisors to Kennedy, could ever have thought that, in the face of such a catastrophic defeat as they would have suffered after a US attack on Cuba, they would not have responded militarily some place in the world.

Now, in 1962, some of us, particularly President Kennedy and I, believed the US faced great danger during that crisis. But later we learned that both of us and certainly our associates had seriously underestimated those dangers. At a meeting in Havana, in January 1992 – that's 29 years after the crisis – we learned for the first time that contrary to the CIA estimates there were nuclear warheads on the island of Cuba on October 28 1962. Subsequently we learned that not only were there warheads for the strategic missiles there in Cuba, but there were tactical warheads as well which were to be used against US invasion forces. At the time, in 1962, the CIA was reporting no nuclear warheads there. (They thought that the first batch of 20 was coming by ship.)

In November 1992, some ten months or so after the meeting with Castro in Havana, when we had learned for the first time of the nuclear warheads there for the offensive strategic weapons, we learned that there were a total of 162 nuclear warheads on the soil of Cuba. Ninety of these were to be used against an invasion force and the other 70 to be installed on the missiles targeted on US cities.

Moreover, it has been reported in the Soviet Press that on October 26 1962, which was a Friday night, two days before the critical date of October 28, that the Soviet

commander in Cuba had ordered the movement of the nuclear warheads from their storage sites to a place closer to their launch vehicles. He sent a cable informing Malinovsky, the Soviet Defence Minister, of that fact. Malinovsky had sent it to Khrushchev, who had sent it back to Malinovsky with 'approved' scrawled across the document. So clearly there was a very, very high risk that in the face of a US attack, which the majority of Kennedy's military and civilian advisors were prepared to recommend, the Soviet forces in Cuba would have decided to use their nuclear weapons instead of losing them. We did not speculate upon what would have happened in that case. A US invasion force would not have been equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, because when President Kennedy and I received a request from our commander to equip his troops with nuclear weapons, we turned him down. The commander said he had to be prepared to use them, because he was sure the Soviets had them. We told him he was crazy as hell, the Soviets didn't have them and by God he wasn't going to have them. So the invasion force would not have had them. But no one should believe that had American troops been attacked with nuclear weapons, the US would have refrained from a nuclear response. We would have activated fighter aircraft with nuclear weapons from some place in the southeastern US. Where would it have ended? In utter disaster, not just for us, not just for the Soviet Union, but for you! There would have been uncontrolled escalation I'm sure.

Now, the point I want to emphasise is this: human beings are fallible. We know we all make mistakes. In our daily lives mistakes are costly but we try to learn from them. Conventional wisdom says that we don't make the same mistake twice -- well maybe we can make it twice, or three times, but not four. Military operations are much, much more complex than civilian operations -- this is the meaning of the phrase 'fog of war'. This is something that you don't understand unless you have been a military commander. What it means is there are more variables in military operations than in civilian operations. It's more difficult to predict the reaction of those variables to forces that react against them. So mistakes are much more likely, they happen all the time. Just last week you may have read of the deaths that occurred due to 'friendly fire' in Afghanistan. Against friendly forces or against enemy forces, mistakes are common in conventional war. But mistakes in conventional war with conventional weapons don't destroy nations. In nuclear war there isn't going to be any learning period. If you make one mistake, you are going to destroy nations.

So I think the lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis is that the combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons carries a very high risk of potential nuclear catastrophe. Therefore I think we must move to eliminate, or nearly eliminate, nuclear weapons.

Is there a military justification for continuing to accept the risk of their use, inadvertent or accidental? I think the answer is no. The US and NATO policy today is essentially as it was when I became Secretary 40 years ago. We refused then and we refuse today to adopt the policy known as 'no first use'. We've always refused and we refuse today, all of us, you, we, and other NATO members, refuse to adopt a 'no first use' policy. Instead we state: we are prepared and indeed we will initiate the use of nuclear weapons against either a nuclear or non-nuclear state when we believe it's in our interest to do so. However, during the 40 years that I've been working on issues relating to US and NATO nuclear strategy and war plans, I have never seen a piece of paper that outlines a plan for initiating the use of

nuclear weapons with benefits to the initiator. Never, a piece of paper that outlines the benefits to the initiator of nuclear weapons use against either a non-nuclear state or a nuclear state. Against a non-nuclear state it's militarily unnecessary -- we've got conventional weapons to do whatever we want the nuclear weapon to do against a non-nuclear state. It would be militarily unnecessary and morally reprehensible, politically indefensible to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state.

Against a nuclear state, it's suicide. During the Cuban Missile Crisis we had something on the order of 5,500 strategic warheads that we could deliver on the Soviet Union. We thought they had (we somewhat over-estimated) 350 they could deliver against us. We were deterred from using our 5,500 against them because we were certain that one or two or five or 50 of their 350 would survive. What responsible leader would subject his nation to five or ten or 50 of these damn things?

So, I come back to the point: I have never seen a piece of paper that outlined how a nation possessing nuclear weapons could initiate their use against either a nuclear or a non-nuclear power with benefit. The conclusion is clear. We should move to eliminate them. Partly because of the increased understanding of how close we came to disaster during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but also because of this growing recognition that the military utility in these weapons is very limited, but that the risk of accidental use or inadvertent use in a crisis is substantial.

There has been a revolutionary change in thinking about the role of nuclear forces and much of this change has occurred in the last six or seven years. Many military leaders and civilian security experts are now prepared to go beyond the Clinton/Yeltsin agreements and some go as far as I have to state that the long term objectives should indeed be a return to a non-nuclear world. Many of your British leaders have done that. Lord Mountbatten, for example, before he was killed publicly stated he would never, when he was British Chief of Defence Staff, have recommended or authorised the use of nuclear weapons. Field Marshall Lord Carver, another former British Defence Chief who is alive today, has also stated that publicly. General Andrew Goodpaster, President Eisenhower's Military Aide and later Supreme Allied Commander in Europe has said exactly the same thing.

The Bush Administration, however, is far from supporting such a view. The Administration published not long ago what is known as the 'Nuclear Posture Review'. This has received the mandate of Congress. That posture review establishes the broad outline of US nuclear strategy and force levels for the next 10 years and beyond. The review has received very, very little attention from the media in the US and I imagine probably even less attention here in Britain. I think that's unfortunate because it increases the emphasis to be placed on strategic offensive nuclear weapons and therefore I think it deserves vigorous public debate. On November 13 of last year President Bush announced he had told President Putin of Russia that the US would reduce operationally deployed nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200, that's down from roughly the 7,000 we have today, over the next several years. That would approximate the total of 1,500 that Putin said Russian would like to move down to. The nuclear policy review, however, presents quite a different picture. It assumes that Bush's stated objective of reducing the strategic offensive missile deployment from the levels of 7,000 down to 1,700 or 2,200 would take the majority of the warheads that are moved from



deployment and put them in reserve stocks capable of being redeployed very quickly. So there would be a substantial reduction in deployed forces but not a significant reduction in the overall nuclear capability.

Now, the Administration's action, I think, is to be welcomed. The very statement that Bush would do something unilaterally to reduce nuclear risk is important and I credit him with it. But after the reductions we'd be left with, depending on the year, a minimum of 2,000 nuclear strategic warheads and the Russians with 1,500. I doubt that if there were a survivor of an exchange of 3,500 warheads, our 2,000 and the Russian 1,500, that he would notice any difference in the world from an exchange of our current number of approximately 13,000. So, it's a step forward but it leaves us with the same risk of destruction that we have today. The Administration is projecting the deployment of that large number of weapons and their associated launch vehicles far into the future. They propose to develop new warheads, they propose to develop new launch vehicles, a new land-based missile, a new sea-based missile, as well as a new bomber in a program extending into 2040. In a very real sense they are proposing to maintain large numbers of strategic offensive nuclear weapons in perpetuity.

I had hoped to talk about the potential impact of that policy, assuming I've stated it correctly, on Russia and China and on their relations with the West, particularly the US. Time won't permit that so I only want to comment on the effects of US policy on the non-proliferation regime. It has been reported that President Kennedy said he expected that twenty or thirty nations would possess nuclear weapons ten or fifteen years after his presidency. That did not occur. Today there are only eight nations possessing nuclear weapons. The reason it did not occur was that the Non-proliferation Treaty was negotiated. That treaty specifically limits the right of nations to possess nuclear warheads. Essentially these eight are it, no other nation may possess even one warhead. What will happen to that treaty if we say, 'We're different from all of you, we need several thousand of these things in perpetuity, but you're not to be allowed to possess even one?' I think you can guess, but you don't have to, because a clause of the treaty provides that the other nations will be relieved of their obligations under the treaty if the five declared nuclear powers do not move to eliminate nuclear weapons. We would be moving in directly the opposite direction under the Bush Administration's policy. It's a very, very serious risk to the future. It's made more serious by the fact that if the proliferation regime breaks down, there is a high probability that fissile materials will fall into the hands of terrorists. As many of you probably know, it's very easy to build a nuclear weapon if you have fissile materials.

A friend of mine was Head of the US Arms Control Agency. He visited South Africa, where they showed him the room in which they had built nuclear weapons. It was about as long as this stage. They built seven weapons there. They said it cost \$50 million – in addition to fissile materials – and they used 250 men. We know that Bin Laden had two conversations with the Chairman of the Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Committee. This is not a danger that is *not* present, it is not a danger we should live with. Yet we're going to live with it if we continue down the path we've embarked on.

This need not be, we can take action to reduce these risks I've talked about. The nuclear genie can be put back in the bottle. The primary responsibility for reducing the number of nuclear weapons lies with the US and Russia, particularly with the

US. But every major nation in the world -- Britain, Germany, Japan, Israel, France, Norway, all contribute to this risk, all must bear part of the responsibility for extending the future. If we do act to reduce the nuclear risk, which I think is possible, and if we do act to further institutionalise the maintenance of collective security, then the 21<sup>st</sup> century, while unlikely to be a century of tranquility, need not witness the killing by conflict of another 160 million human beings. Some of you, perhaps most of you, may think my comments are so simplistic, so idealistic as to be quixotic. But as human beings, citizens of great nations with power to influence events in the world, can we be at peace with ourselves if we strive for less? I think not and I hope you will agree with me.