José Díez (University of Barcelona): Selective Scientific Realism, a New (Old) Anomaly

Abstract: Selective realism (SR) is the version of scientific realism most prominent in our days, and in fact the only version of realism defensible after Laudan’s Pesimistic Induction (PI) criticism. SR holds that: (i) the part of a theory’s non observational content that is responsible of successful AND novel (i.e.that the theory is not designed to accommodate) observational predictions, is (approximately) true, and (ii) subsequent theories that preserve such predictions also (approximately) preserve such non observational content. SR is a (meta) empirical thesis which must be tested (verified or falsified) against historical data. In this talk we review the main  versions of RS and its historical anomalies, including a new (old) one that, according to us, is particularly dramatic.