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PRODID:-//Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method - ECPv4.2.1.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
X-ORIGINAL-URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20151130T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20151130T184500
DTSTAMP:20161128T161748
CREATED:20150525T104638
LAST-MODIFIED:20151113T115016
UID:3150-1448903700-1448909100@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Natalja Deng (Cambridge) "Passage and temporal experience"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The conflict between an objective passage of time and relativistic physics is sometimes summed up as follows: first\, relativistic physics implies a ‘B-theoretic’ or ‘block universe’ view of time\, and second\, the B-theory implies that there is no objective passage. Here\, I’ll take issue with the second entailment claim. I begin by presenting the case for veridicalism\, the claim that we don’t have perceptual experiences as of (A-theoretic) passage. I show how nonetheless various elements of experience (broadly construed) combine to give rise both to the theory-neutral idea that time passes\, and to an A-theoretic way of thinking about passage. I then argue that there’s a kernel of truth in McTaggart’s inconsistency charge\, which is that coherent A-theories are no nearer to doing justice to this way of thinking than is the B-theory. Thus\, there is reason to think of passage differently. I consider suggestions for where to locate passage within the B-theory\, and relate these to wholesale rejections of the A versus B distinction. Finally\, I respond to a number of objections.
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/natalja-deng-cambridge-passage-and-temporal-experience/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Sigma Club
ORGANIZER;CN="Bryan%20W.%20Roberts":MAILTO:b.w.roberts@lse.ac.uk
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