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X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20160314T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20160314T184500
DTSTAMP:20161128T162124
CREATED:20150923T103636
LAST-MODIFIED:20160310T144744
UID:4513-1457975700-1457981100@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Anna Mahtani (LSE): “Knowledge and the Sure Thing Principle”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Suppose that you were to discover that there is some piece of evidence E that you don't currently know\, and that E is evidence in favour of some proposition P. Should you increase your credence in P in the light of this piece of information? I argue that this suggestion seems compelling\, but it cannot always be rational to adjust your credence in this way: thus here our intuition seems to go wrong. To clarify what is happening here\, I disambiguate two senses of 'knows': on one reading\, the suggestion is correct\, but on the other it is not. I apply the discussion to Savage's Sure Thing Principle\, and van Fraassen's Reflection Principle.\n\n \n\n#BSPSlecture
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/anna-mahtani-lse-knowledge-and-the-sure-thing-principle/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:British Society for the Philosophy of Science Lecture
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