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X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
X-ORIGINAL-URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161031T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161031T184500
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160515T074948
LAST-MODIFIED:20161027T142503
UID:6219-1477934100-1477939500@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Fiora Salis (LSE): "Models as scientific representations: fiction\, reference and make-believe"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In this presentation I develop a novel fictionalist account of how models represent. To this aim I offer a general definition of models as representations\, I present a fictionalist account of what models are that draws on Walton’s theory of fiction\, I assess current fictionalist accounts of models as representations\, and I finally offer an explanation of how models represent in terms of the crucial notions of reference and make-believe. The key idea is that the representation relation between models and the world is a kind of indirect referential relation that is mediated by propositional imagination of the make-believe variety.\n\nFiora Salis is a Marie Skłodowska Curie Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS) at LSE.
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/fiora-salis-lse-models-as-scientific-representations/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:ph551 Research Seminar in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences
ORGANIZER;CN="Bryan%20W.%20Roberts":MAILTO:b.w.roberts@lse.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161031T183000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161031T200000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160912T123618
LAST-MODIFIED:20160912T123618
UID:7069-1477938600-1477944000@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Future Sex: Technology\, Desire\, and the New Rules of Engagement (the Forum)
DESCRIPTION:In a year of heated discussions about campus rape culture and street harassment\, the merits of sex positivism\, and the implications of trans-identity for feminism\, we ask what is the future of sex and sexuality? Have the rules of sexual engagement changed in the twenty-first century and has the discipline of philosophy managed to keep up? How do we start to think afresh about desire\, after Freud and into the future? And what is the future for sex as our conceptions of the body are reframed by culture\, bionics\, and even the law?\n\nSpeakers\nKatherine Angel\, Author and Lecturer in Creative Writing\, Kingston University London\nKate Devlin\, Senior Lecturer\, Department of Computing\, Goldsmiths\, University of London\nRebecca Reilly-Cooper\, Teaching Fellow in Political Theory\, Politics and International Studies\, University of Warwick\n\nChair\nShahidha Bari\, Lecturer in Romanticism in the Department of English\, Queen Mary\, University of London and Forum for European Philosophy Fellow\n\n \n\n#LSEFEP
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/future-sex-fep/
LOCATION:New Academic Building\, London School of Economics\, London\, WC2A 3LJ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:the Forum
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161108T183000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161108T200000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160912T123856
LAST-MODIFIED:20161103T105612
UID:7070-1478629800-1478635200@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Brain in a Vat and Other Stories: A Celebration of Hilary Putnam (the Forum)
DESCRIPTION:Does perception give me any reason to believe in an external world\, or could I be a "brain in a vat" that is fed information by a malicious (or benevolent) scientist? And if I were such a brain\, could I ever say or think this? This is just one puzzle raised by the Harvard philosopher Hilary Putnam\, who died last year. Though its origins are in Augustine and Descartes\, Putnam revolutionised its implications for our understanding of knowledge\, language\, and the mind. We bring together a distinguished panel to discuss his life and work.\n\nSpeakers\nJulian Baggini\, Writer and Editor-in-Chief of The Philosophers’ Magazine\nJesper Kallestrup\, Professor of Philosophy\, University of Edinburgh\nChris Norris\, Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy\, Cardiff University\nSarah Sawyer\, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy\, University of Sussex\n\nChair\nPeter Dennis\, Fellow\, Department of Philosophy\, Logic and Scientific Method\, LSE and Forum for European Philosophy Fellow\n\n \n\n#LSEFEP
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/brain-in-a-vat-and-other-stories-fep/
LOCATION:New Academic Building\, London School of Economics\, London\, WC2A 3LJ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:the Forum
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161109T173000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161109T190000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160927T134943
LAST-MODIFIED:20161031T162858
UID:7150-1478712600-1478718000@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Eric Olson (Sheffield): "Why definitions of death don’t matter"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Definitions of death are said to be important because they tell us at what point someone dies\, which ethicists need to know in order to work out when someone loses the intrinsic moral status of the living.  This paper argues we need not know what death is or when it occurs in order to answer these ethical questions.  Questions about the significance of death are really questions about the significance of the various specific losses that figure in definitions of death.  Which of those losses amounts to death makes no difference.\n\n \n\n#LSEChoiceGroup
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/eric-olson-sheffield-definitions-of-death/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Choice Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161114T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161114T184500
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160923T131503
LAST-MODIFIED:20161104T102737
UID:7143-1479143700-1479149100@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feraz Azhar (Cambridge): "Three aspects of typicality in multiverse cosmology"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Extracting predictions from cosmological theories that describe a multiverse\, for what we are likely to observe in our domain\, is crucial to establishing the validity of these theories. One way to extract such predictions is from theory-generated probability distributions that allow for selection effects – generally expressed in terms of assumptions about anthropic conditionalization and how typical we are. In this talk\, I urge three lessons about typicality in multiverse settings. (i) Because it is difficult to characterize our observational situation in the multiverse\, we cannot assume that we are typical (as in the "principle of mediocrity"): nor can we ignore the issue of typicality\, for it has a measurable impact on predictions for our observations. (ii) There are spectra of assumptions about both conditionalization and typicality\, which lead to coincident predictions for our observations\, leading to problems of confirmation in multiverse cosmology. And moreover\, (iii) when one has the freedom to consider competing theories of the multiverse\, the assumption of typicality may not lead to the highest likelihoods for our observations. These three entwined aspects of typicality imply that positive assertions about our typicality\, such as the principle of mediocrity\, are more questionable than has been recently claimed.
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/feraz-azhar-cambridge-multiverse-cosmology/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Sigma Club
ORGANIZER;CN="Bryan%20W.%20Roberts":MAILTO:b.w.roberts@lse.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161115T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161115T153000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160520T160042
LAST-MODIFIED:20160921T155803
UID:6305-1479218400-1479223800@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Justin Sytsma (Victoria University of Wellington): "Are religious philosophers less analytic?"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Some researchers in philosophy of religion have charged that the sub-discipline exhibits a number of features of poor health\, prominently including that "partisanship is so entrenched that most philosophers of religion\, instead of being alarmed by it\, just take it for granted" (Draper and Nichols\, 2013\, 421). And researchers in experimental philosophy of religion have presented empirical work that supports this contention\, arguing that it shows that confirmation bias plays a notable role in the acceptance of natural theological arguments among philosophers (De Cruz\, 2014; Tobia\, 2015; De Cruz and De Smedt\, 2016). But while these studies indicate that there is a correlation between religious belief and judgments about natural theological arguments\, they do not establish that causation runs from belief to judgment as has been claimed. In this paper I offer an alternative explanation\, suggesting that thinking style is a plausible common cause. I note that previous research has shown a significant negative correlation between analytic thinking style and both religious belief and religious engagement in the general population (Shenhav\, Rand\, and Greene\, 2012; Gervaise and Norenzayan\, 2012; Pennycook et al.\, 2012\, 2013; Jack et al.\, 2016). Further\, other research has shown a significant positive correlation between analytic thinking style and training in philosophy that is independent of overall level of education (Livengood et al.\, 2010). Pulling these threads together\, I hypothesize that there is an especially strong correlation between thinking style and religiosity among philosophers. This hypothesis is tested by looking at a sample of 524 people with an advanced degree in philosophy. The results support the hypothesis\, showing a medium-large negative correlation between analytic thinking style and religious engagement that is roughly twice as strong as has been reported for the general population (r=-0.39 among men\, r=-0.34 among women). And the correlation is even stronger if we restrict to Christian theists and non-theists (r=-0.61 among men\, r=-0.62 among women).\n\nJustin Sytsma is a Senior Lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington in Wellington\, New Zealand\, and author of The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy (with Jonathan Livengood).\n\n \n\n#PopperSeminar
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/justin-sytsma-are-religious-philosophers-any-less-analytic/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Popper Seminar
ORGANIZER;CN="Philosophy%2C%20Logic%20%26amp%3B%20Scientific%20Method":MAILTO:philosophy-dept@lse.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161116T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161116T163000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20161114T110746
LAST-MODIFIED:20161114T110746
UID:7442-1479308400-1479313800@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Matthieu Gallais (University of Lille): "A Modal Epistemology of Scientific Models: Structures\, Make-Believe and Properties"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The modal epistemology I develop aims to describe how scientific models and target systems are related by comparing theoretical properties with world-lines\, that is to say to epistemic constructions across possible situations. I suggest that what must be considered as remaining the same from models to real systems is the properties\, rather than the structures. As I will explain\, conventional structuralism on its own is not enough to relevantly study the relation between models and target-systems. However\, one of the major issues in my project is that the same property can be exemplified in different ways: sometimes perfectly so\, sometimes approximatively. Then\, how to study the identity of a property in modal contexts? My approach should be considered as a fictional one because its starting point consists in comparing scientific models to works of fiction and because it uses the notion of games of make-believe. But on the other hand\, instead of considering the existence of a unique fictional model-system\, I suggest that a model is about different kinds of situations compatible with it. That is why modal logic is useful to understand the applicability of models\, notably by analysing the identity of properties across possible worlds.
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/matthieu-gallais-university-of-lille-a-modal-epistemology-of-scientific-models-structures-make-believe-and-properties/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS) public lecture
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161116T173000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161116T190000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160908T114941
LAST-MODIFIED:20161104T123313
UID:7032-1479317400-1479322800@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Johanna Thoma (LSE): "Temptation and Preference-Based Instrumental Rationality"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In the dynamic choice literature\, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that\, on the one hand\, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation\, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally rational for her to resist temptation. On the other hand\, resisting temptation also requires her to act contrary to the preferences she has at the time of temptation. But that seems to be instrumentally irrational as well. I here consider the two most prominent types of argument why resisting temptation could nevertheless be instrumentally rational\, namely two-tier and intra-personal cooperation arguments. I establish that the arguments either fail or are redundant. In particular\, the arguments fail under the pervasive assumption in both decision theory and the wider literature on practical rationality that the agent’s preferences over the objects of choice are themselves the standard of instrumental rationality. And they either still fail or they become redundant when we give up that assumption.\n\n \n\n#LSEChoiceGroup
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/johanna-thoma-temptation-and-preference-based-instrumental-rationality/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Choice Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161116T183000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161116T200000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160912T124136
LAST-MODIFIED:20160912T124136
UID:7071-1479321000-1479326400@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Improv Your Mind: Philosophy\, Music\, and Making Things Up (the Forum)
DESCRIPTION:From Nietzsche’s dalliances with tragic drama and Adorno’s adoration of Schoenberg to Badiou’s writing on dance\, philosophy’s love affair with the performing arts has been long and thoughtful. In this debate\, we discuss the ways philosophy thinks about performance. Is the logic of philosophy in tension with the imaginative and improvisational aspects of performance? Or is there a place for improvisation in philosophical thinking too? "Jazz is like bananas – it must be consumed on the spot"\, declared Sartre. Join us for musings and some music too. Bring your own bananas.\n\nSpeakers\nAndrew Bowie\, Professor of Philosophy and German\, Royal Holloway\, University of London\nLaura Cull Ó Maoilearca\, Reader in Theatre and Performance\, University of Surrey\nAndy Hamilton\, Professor of Philosophy\, Durham University\n\nChair\nShahidha Bari\, Lecturer in Romanticism in the Department of English\, Queen Mary\, University of London and Forum for European Philosophy Fellow\n\n \n\n#LSEFEP
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/improv-your-mind-fep/
LOCATION:London School of Economics\, London\, WC2A 3LJ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:the Forum
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161121T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161121T184500
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160923T143335
LAST-MODIFIED:20160928T111525
UID:7145-1479748500-1479753900@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Luke Fenton-Glynn (UCL): “Probabilistic Actual Causation” (BSPS Lecture)
DESCRIPTION:Abstract. Actual (token) causation – the sort of causal relation asserted to hold by claims like the Chicxulub impact caused the Cretaceous-Paleogene exitinction event\, Mr. Fairchild’s exposure to asbestos caused him to suffer mesothelioma\, and the H7N9 virus outbreak was caused by poultry farmers becoming simultaneously infected by bird and human ‘flu strains – is of significance to scientists\, historians\, and tort and criminal lawyers. It also plays a role in theories of various philosophically important concepts\, such as action\, decision\, explanation\, knowledge\, perception\, reference\, and moral responsibility. Yet there is little consensus on how actual causation is to be understood\, particularly where actual causes work only probabilistically. I use probabilistic causal models to cast some light on the nature of probabilistic actual causation.\n\nLuke Fenton-Glynn holds a Lectureship in Philosophy at UCL.
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/luke-fenton-glynn-probabilistic-actual-causation-2/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:British Society for the Philosophy of Science Lecture
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161121T183000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161121T200000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071918
CREATED:20160912T124757
LAST-MODIFIED:20160912T124757
UID:7072-1479753000-1479758400@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Does the Universe Have a Purpose? (the Forum)
DESCRIPTION:The traditional answer to this question is that God has a plan for the universe and we are part of it. Almost as traditionally\, atheists have countered that the universe has no purpose since a benevolent God does not exist. But what if the purpose of the universe does not involve us – or God – at all? Tim Mulgan explores this possibility in his recent book Purpose in the Universe (Oxford University Press\, 2015). He joins a panel of metaphysicians and philosophers of religion to debate his view.\n\nSpeakers\nJohn Cottingham\, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy\, University of Reading\nBeverley Clack\, Professor of Philosophy of Religion\, Oxford Brookes University\nTim Mulgan\, Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy\, University of St Andrews and Professor of Philosophy\, University of Auckland\n\nChair\nPeter Dennis\, Fellow\, Department of Philosophy\, Logic and Scientific Method\, LSE and Forum for European Philosophy Fellow\n\n \n\n#LSEFEP
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/does-the-universe-have-a-purpose-fep/
LOCATION:London School of Economics\, London\, WC2A 3LJ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:the Forum
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161122T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161122T183000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071919
CREATED:20161101T140626
LAST-MODIFIED:20161117T125944
UID:7400-1479834000-1479839400@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Barbara Osimani (LMU Munich): "Exact replication or varied evidence? Reliability\, robustness and the reproducibility problem"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The “Reproducibility Project: Psychology” by the Open Science Collaboration caused some stir among psychologists\, methodologists as well as scientists\, since less than half of the replicated studies succeeded in reproducing the results of the original ones. The APA has attributed this result to hidden moderators that rendered the replications ineffective. Also publication bias and low power have been identified as possible sources for such mismatch. While some analysts have provided formal confirmation for the plausibility of such explanations (Etz and Vandekerkhove\, 2016)\, others have further insisted on the problem of noisy data and suggested that “to resolve the replication crisis in science we may need to consider each individual study in the context of an implicit meta-analysis” (Andrew Gelman).\n\nI investigate these positions through the lenses of Bayesian epistemology\, and in particular of recent results on the Variety of Evidence Thesis. This approach will turn out to be fruitful in investigating the interaction of reliability\, independence of evidence\, and replication in scientific inference and\, more broadly\, will cast a new light on the debate between advocates of a pluralist methodology in medical research\, who insist on supporting hypotheses through various sources of evidence\, and the contending view\, represented by the Evidence Based Medicine paradigm\, which relies on an “elitist” approach\, where “best evidence” is searched for and exact replication is highly welcome.
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/barbara-osimani-exact-replication-or-varied-evidence/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Public Lectures
ORGANIZER;CN="Philosophy%2C%20Logic%20%26amp%3B%20Scientific%20Method":MAILTO:philosophy-dept@lse.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161123T173000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161123T190000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071919
CREATED:20160908T115832
LAST-MODIFIED:20161004T142429
UID:7033-1479922200-1479927600@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Davide Grossi (Liverpool): "Mutual Persuasion"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Two agents are faced with a choice between two options. They are uncertain about which option is the right one and are endowed with a personal bias\, each in favor of a different option. They first acquire independent information by observing a private signal with known quality. They then need to reveal their private signal to the other agent\, but may decide to manipulate some of the evidence the signal provides\, in order to persuade the other agent in the direction of their own bias. In this talk I present a Bayesian model capturing this form of persuasion\, analyze the strategies available to the agents and characterize the possible outcomes of the interaction. The model applies to a variety of phenomena\, like political discussions\, settlement negotiations and trade.\n\nThis is joint work with Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics\, University of Amsterdam).\n\n \n\n#LSEChoiceGroup
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/davide-grossi-mutual-persuasion/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Choice Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20161125
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20161125
DTSTAMP:20161120T071919
CREATED:20160413
LAST-MODIFIED:20161101
UID:6034-1480032000-1480118399@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Emergence and the Limit: A Workshop in Philosophy of Physics
DESCRIPTION:Recent literature on emergence in physics and on foundational issues in statistical mechanics has stressed the importance or lack thereof of the thermodynamic limit. In this workshop we will consider various case studies portraying either emergent behaviour or other important issues in statistical mechanics and assess the indispensable vs. dispensable nature of of the thermodynamic limit (or other similar limits such as the continuum limit). Our goal is is make some headway in identifying the role that such limits may or may not play in understanding emergence\, reversibility\, etc.\n\nFurther information about this one day workshop is available on the LSE Philosophy conference listing.
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/emergence-and-the-limit/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conference
ORGANIZER;CN="Bryan%20W.%20Roberts":MAILTO:b.w.roberts@lse.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161128T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161128T184500
DTSTAMP:20161120T071919
CREATED:20160525T110409
LAST-MODIFIED:20161104T105843
UID:6360-1480353300-1480358700@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Peter Sozou (CPNSS): "Computational Scientific Discovery"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Is there a role for computers in the formulation of scientific concepts? Scientific discovery can take various forms: direct observational discovery\, finding empirical rules\, and discovery of theories. I will begin by considering the roots of scientific discovery and the basic nature of (human) discovery processes. I will then survey methods and associated applications in computational scientific discovery\, covering: massive systematic search within a defined space; rule-based reasoning systems; classification\, machine vision and related techniques; data mining; finding networks; evolutionary computation; and automation of scientific experiments. I conclude with a discussion of the future of computational scientific discovery.\n\n \n\n#SigmaClub
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/peter-sozou-cpnss-tba/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Sigma Club
ORGANIZER;CN="Bryan%20W.%20Roberts":MAILTO:b.w.roberts@lse.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20161129T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20161129T153000
DTSTAMP:20161120T071919
CREATED:20161111T152341
LAST-MODIFIED:20161115T110009
UID:7440-1480428000-1480433400@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Michael Hunter (University of California\, Davis): "Germ-line or Somatic mutations? The pitfalls and concerns for deleting and replacing the concept of race in human genetics"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Across the recent history of Population Genetics\, there have been a number of calls by historians of science\, philosophers of science\, social scientists and biologists themselves for dealing with the concept of "race" in Population Biology. Most recently\, in the article written by Yudell et al. (2016)\, the authors advocate that scientific journals and professional societies should encourage use of terms like "ancestry'' or "population'' to describe human groupings instead of the term "race". In order to put this into action\, Yudell at al. state that a panel of experts from the social sciences\, humanities\, and biology should be convened so that recommendations can be made so that research in human biological diversity can move past the use of "race" as a classificatory tool.\n\nThis talk has a number of aims: the first is to challenge the notion that anything of import will be gained from substituting different terms for "race" in human population genetics (e.g. "ancestry'' or "population''); the second is to note that even if there was something to be gained from substituting a different term for "race" in human population genetics\, there are deep and important concerns about which values in human population genetics are used to absolve the issues with wildly divergent uses of classificatory terms. In highlighting these concerns\, the aim is to have a better handle on what needs to be addressed so that human population genetics will have a viable road map to avoid the pitfalls of its past.\n\nMichael Hunter is a PhD candidate at the University of California\, Davis.
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/michael-hunter-ucdavis-germ-line-or-somatic-mutations-the-pitfalls-and-concerns-for-deleting-and-replacing-the-concept-of-race-in-human-genetics/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:ph551 Research Seminar in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences
ORGANIZER;CN="Bryan%20W.%20Roberts":MAILTO:b.w.roberts@lse.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20161202
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20161202
DTSTAMP:20161120T071919
CREATED:20161115
LAST-MODIFIED:20161115
UID:7457-1480636800-1480723199@www.lse.ac.uk
SUMMARY:History of Postwar Social Science Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Programme\n\n\n\n\n10:10–11:00\nAlice White (University of Kent): "Consultants and coal in postwar Britain: The Tavistock Institute and mining methods"\n\n\n11:00–11:30\nTea/coffee break\n\n\n11:30–12:20\nLaura Stark (Vanderbilt University): "Knowing without showing the minds of others: A reassessment of postwar methods in the social sciences"\n\n\n12:30–14:00\nLunch break\n\n\n14:10–15:00\nMarcia Holmes (Birkbeck\, University of London): "Criteria for conflicts: ‘Human engineering’ air traffic control in the postwar United States"\n\n\n15:10–16:00\nNiklas Olsen (University of Copenhagen): "The emergence of consumers’ sovereignty in economic textbooks after 1945"\n\n\n\n\nOrganisers\nRoger Backhouse and Philippe Fontaine.\n\nSupported by the CNRS European Scientific Coordination Network (GDRE #711)
URL:http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/events/history-of-postwar-social-science-workshop-5/
LOCATION:Lakatos Building\, London\, WC2A 2AE\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conference
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR