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    Liam Kofi Bright (LSE): “The Scientists Qua Scientist Makes No Assertion”

Liam Kofi Bright (LSE): “The Scientists Qua Scientist Makes No Assertion”

15 January 2019|

Liam Kofi Bright (LSE): “The Scientists Qua Scientist Makes No Assertion”

 

Assertions are, speaking roughly, descriptive statements which purport to describe some fact about the world. Philosophers have given a lot of attention to the idea that assertions come with special norms governing their behaviour. Frequently, in fact, philosophers claim that for something to count as an […]

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    Catrin Campbell Moore (Bristol): “Imprecise probabilities and undermining scenarios”

Catrin Campbell Moore (Bristol): “Imprecise probabilities and undermining scenarios”

6 November 2018|

 

Catrin Campbell Moore (Bristol): “Imprecise probabilities and undermining scenarios”

Sometimes one ends up in an unfortunate situation when you cannot come to a stable opinion: whatever belief you adopt makes you want to change your mind. I suggest that in such scenarios you should adopt imprecise probabilities.

Catrin Campbell […]

John D. Norton (Pittsburgh): “The Infinite Lottery”

24 April 2018|

 

John D. Norton (Pittsburgh): “The Infinite Lottery”

An infinite lottery machine induces a non-standard inductive logic that turns out to be the same logic appropriate to a problem in inductive inference arising in present theories of eternal inflation.

John D. Norton is Distinguished Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, and author of the […]

Anna Alexandrova (Cambridge): “Defining Mental Health”

20 February 2018|

 

Anna Alexandrova (Cambridge): “Defining Mental Health”

Today mental health is a universally valued outcome. It is prioritised by governments, hospitals, schools, employers, charities. And yet mental health appears to be prized more as a label than as a concept, because remarkably for a state so uncontroversially prized, it has no accepted definition. In this talk based on joint […]

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    Jeff McMahan (Oxford): “Might We Benefit Animals by Eating Them?”

Jeff McMahan (Oxford): “Might We Benefit Animals by Eating Them?”

30 May 2017|

 

Jeff McMahan (Oxford): “Might We Benefit Animals by Eating Them?”

Leslie Stephen once wrote that “The pig has a stronger interest than anyone in the demand for bacon. If all the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at all.” In recent debates about the ethics of eating animals, some have advanced the related claim that if […]

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    Hasok Chang (Cambridge): “If you can spray phlogiston, is it real? A pragmatist conception of reality”

Hasok Chang (Cambridge): “If you can spray phlogiston, is it real? A pragmatist conception of reality”

17 May 2017|

 

Hasok Chang (Cambridge): “If you can spray phlogiston, is it real? A pragmatist conception of reality”

Any statements we make in science are about some presumed entities (e.g., hormones, electrons, or the gross national product), unless it is a pure report of sensation within oneself. Entity-realism is prior to truth-realism, since it would not make sense to maintain […]

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    Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow): “Scrutability and the Problem of Cross-Family Quantification”

Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow): “Scrutability and the Problem of Cross-Family Quantification”

7 March 2017|

 
Stephan Leuenberger (Glasgow): “Scrutability and the Problem of Cross-Family Quantification”

In Constructing the World, David Chalmers aims to defend strong reductionist claims he calls “scrutability theses”. One such thesis says, roughly speaking, that every truth about the world could, in principle, be “read off” a complete list of the physical facts and the facts about conscious experience. However, […]

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    Campbell Brown (LSE): “Priority vs. Equality: What’s the Difference?”

Campbell Brown (LSE): “Priority vs. Equality: What’s the Difference?”

21 February 2017|

 
Campbell Brown (LSE): “Priority vs. Equality: What’s the Difference?”

Abstract: Prioritarianism is often considered a preferable alternative to egalitarianism. However, seeing exactly what distinguishes these two views can be difficult. Prioritarianism says it is better to benefit the worse off (other things being equal). Egalitarianism says it is better to reduce inequality (other things being equal). But by […]

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    Miklós Rédei (LSE): “Properties of Bayesian learning based on conditional expectation as a conditioning device”

Miklós Rédei (LSE): “Properties of Bayesian learning based on conditional expectation as a conditioning device”

25 October 2016|

 

 

Miklós Rédei (LSE): “Properties of Bayesian learning based on conditional expectation as a conditioning device”

This talk investigates the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a probability measure from another that is regarded as (uncertain) evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference […]