

Local Governance and Democratization: The Roadmap for a Responsive Accountable Egypt

Salwa Tobbala

Faculty of Economics and Political Science – FEPS

Cairo University

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Abstract

As Egyptians took to the streets January 2011, they were expressing deep frustrations with a closed and centralized political system that was unwilling to open a space for meaningful public dialogue to meet the social and economic challenges facing Egypt. This paper aims to study democratization in transitional democracies in Eastern European countries, focusing on Poland, as they restructured their political and state systems as a reaction to the political and economic failure of the authoritarian centralized systems during the Soviet Union era. Moreover, this paper is an attempt to study the decentralization process in both Poland and Egypt as decentralization and devolution of power from central to local authorities is one of the priorities to make the state more democratic and efficient in delivering public services and promoting economic and social development. Finally, the researcher intends to draw on lessons learned from the Polish local administration reform through political, social and economic case to present a roadmap for the Egyptian initiative to implement decentralization and provide practical solutions for political, administrative and fiscal reforms.

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Introduction:

“Bread, Freedom, and Social Equality “

At Tahrir Square during January 2011, the calls and slogans were concentrated on “Bread, Freedom, and Social Equality”. Egyptians summarized their frustration of the centralized, corrupt and failing government, which is unable to deliver services to its citizens. Egyptians united their call for a responsive accountable government capable of meeting the social and economic challenges of today’s world. Since 1952’s revolution and the military control over power, successive Egyptian governments have worked on depriving average Egyptian citizens from referencing their poverty to being deprived of their political rights. Moreover, The elite was dominating the wealth of the state through a corrupt system lacking an enabling environment for using youth talents, ambition, energy and denying their rights to an effective education system.

Mohamed El Baradie, former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and considered by many Egyptian youth as the God-father for Egypt’s revolution, wrote on Twitter on January 13, 2011: “Tunisia: repression + absence of social justice + denial of channels for peaceful change = a ticking bomb.” Moreover, Egyptians and Tunisians both realized that their society’s economic problems are mainly caused by lack of political rights.¹ The people reflected the above-mentioned issues in the uprisings of 2011. For the first time many of the poor Egyptians realized the casual link between democracy and poverty. Moreover, Egyptian youth identified the root cause of all their problems through lacking their political rights through today’s democratic governance systems

¹ Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2012). *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. New York: Crown Publishing Group. Print. pp. 2-3.

prevailing in democratic countries. The corrupt institutions and the elite dominating political life with no hope of alternation of power caused Egypt's economic problems. They also realized that the corrupt government is incapable of delivering public services to its people and is a root cause for the lack of equal opportunity.

What is today's Democratic Governance?

Today's democratic governance is known as a combination of both the values of democracy through a process of governance that involves interaction among actors representing the State, civil society and the private sector. The process of governance is therefore based on universally accepted principles ensuring the balance of power, checks and balances. The principles mainly include: participation, accountability, and transparency, rule of law, separation of powers, access to justice, subsidiarity, equality and freedom of the press. Moreover, democratic governance cannot work without these principles, since deficiency in power and freedoms will be a direct result if any of the above mentioned is missing. In addition, there will be loss of balance between the three powers: executive, legislative, and judiciary, which will consequently affect the checks and balances, and freedoms negatively.

In addition to the balance of power, checks and balances, each society functions with a set of economic and political rules created and enforced by the state and citizens collectively. Political Institutions in a nation determines the ability of citizens to control politicians and influence how they behave and hence control the use of power entrusted in them. Institutions within a nation are the

cause of success or failure of the state.² Moreover, states that apply democratic governance, its main citizens' aim is for having a responsive, transparent and accountable government. In most developing countries poor people are lacking prompt, efficient public service including education and healthcare. An effective government should enable the state to deliver services more effectively to all its citizens, specially the poor.

Is Egypt Ready for Democracy?

A question that has been ongoing recently since the re-election of Mubarak in 2005 and even today after 2011's revolution. For nearly 7,000 years, Egypt has operated as a unitary state with one of the longest histories of a centralized, top-down, decision-making process and traditions in the world. After 1952 revolution, Nasser tended to increase centralization through the prevailing socialism spirit generated by the Soviet Union. Moreover, Egyptians have been deprived of their rights to participate in Egypt's political life leading many Egyptians to lose self-confidence and accumulate ignorance of the meaning of a democratic state. This typical authoritarian type of centralized planning system and tightening of the military control over the state's institutions and systems continued to persist up through Mubarak's outset in 2011.

Nevertheless, the early days of Tahrir Square proved that Egyptians are ready for democracy and youth led the calling for nothing but their participation in the decision making through a democratic governance system based on representative democracy. Egyptians risked their lives to outset one of the mightiest dictators in the Arab World in 18 days of peaceful protest. The people

²Acemoglu and Robinson. pp. 42-43

showed their call for a governance system that is delivering to its people. The call was for the Egyptians' right for a democratic civilian state ensuring protection of civil rights, social justice, independent judiciary system, and retribution for the thousands of lost martyrs and freeing civilians from military prisons.

In a nutshell, decentralization is one the reforms states need to adopt to recover from oppressive authoritarian regimes and move to a democratic governance regime. The road is not easy and the milestones need to be met. East and Central European countries passed through the same road of transition during the early 1990s during their transition from being socialist oppressed systems to today's democratic governance systems as part of the European Union community.

Democratization through Decentralization:

Decentralization is a major reform to the state's institutions promoting and implementing self-governance to develop the state's institutions and enable citizens to exercise their civil rights. It is a fundamental reform during transitions aiming to expand and develop local self-government institutions.

Increasing overall quality and effectiveness of the state's governance system can be achieved with a consequent increase in the authority and capacities of subnational government levels. In addition, decentralization, when appropriately structured, provides an arrangement through which critical issues such as national unity and indivisibility are countered; ensures local development and equity in the distribution of resources, and hence local autonomy can be realized.

Contrary to authoritarian systems, in a decentralized system, the function of the state differs from controlling to setting macro development goals and monitoring performance of subnational governments to implement development strategies with a local perspective.

Therefore, decentralization is not an objective in itself but a process to transfer functions, responsibilities and resources from the central authority to local governments. Decentralization's aim is based on the subsidiarity principle bringing decisions closer to the beneficiaries at the most effective level of local government and therefore increasing effectiveness, transparency and curbing corruption.

During transition to democracy from an authoritarian regime, the state should undergo major public administration reforms. Considering the shift of the relation between the state and its citizen from control to responsiveness, therefore the state's administrative apparatus must undergo major shifts.

In authoritarian governments as the communist states in Eastern and Central Europe, and similarly Egypt post Nasser's era since 1952, the states control citizens and force them into directed behaviors by the political authorities and its security forces.

In a democratic nation, the state is not superior to its citizen, but governments' main objective is to serve its people and create an environment for development of its citizens. Therefore institutional reforms are a pre-condition for building democracy during transitional phases to allow for the inclusion of the citizens in the decision-making process.

Many countries have made efforts to decentralize their political, fiscal and administrative systems. These efforts were met with varying degrees of success because each country responds in its own way to unprecedented changes and challenges in its administrative and political performance.³ Poland is considered one of the successful examples for decentralization with its 20 years efforts on the road to decentralization and democratic governance considering its growing economy and its developing democratic governance system among its peers from Central and East European countries.

Poland's Decentralization Case: The “Know-How”



Why to Decentralize?

By the end of 1989, and the fall of the former Soviet Union, as most of the Central and East European countries, Poland chose to decentralize decision-making aiming to achieve economic development and provide more effective service delivery at the local level. Consequently, decentralization and the

³ United Nations Economic and Social Council (2006). *Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and public administration*. New York.

devolution of power from the central to the local municipalities became among the priorities in changing the state to be a more democratic and responsive state to its citizens' needs.

Poland in 1990, created a legal environment to give Polish local governments the authority they needed to be able to meet their responsibilities as delegated by the central government and as required by their local communities. The main aim of Poland's shift towards decentralization was to relieve the central government of their local responsibilities that they used to handle under the old communist system and to delegate the power of meeting local community needs to the democratically elected local councils.

Local and Central Institutional Arrangement

It was necessary for Poland to go through the different stages to achieve decentralization by implementing fiscal decentralization, devolution of responsibilities, better and effective management and more opening to public participation in the decision-making process. It is worth noting that the success of many Polish municipalities depended on their ability to respond quickly to the rapidly changing internal and external conditions.

In 1989, the first change has occurred in relation to the major political change. The transition from centrally planned economy to market economy and non-democratic policy making to democratic decision making that required many decentralization reforms and introduction of a more decentralized and democratic local governments. This initial step also required administrative change and the establishing of about 2500 gminas (municipalities or commune) with the

responsibility of delivery of basic communal services totally on their own, including the development of communal infrastructure.⁴

The legislation changes of 1990 were of revolutionary nature while the later changes seemed to be gradual improvements within the general framework of an already created system. An enormous change has occurred inside the local governments with the newly elected officials since they were no longer having burden of the old centralized system and were looking for new and more effective ways to manage local services and develop local infrastructure.

To illustrate, at the beginning of decentralization reform, Poland only had one tier of local government, the *gmina*, i.e. the basic municipal level of government. The municipal authorities obtained a substantial autonomy over resources and decision making with a much stronger political position in relation to what was experienced before 1990. Later in 1998, Poland witnessed a later stage of local government reform, and two other levels of local government were formed. Since then, the local governments have been operating on 3 tiers including 2413 municipalities (*gmina*), which are the basic local government unit, 379 counties (*powiat*) and 16 regions (*voivodship*).⁵

Yet, the constitution of 1997 was the main pillar to preserve the decision to shift towards a decentralized system. In Article 15, it stated that the territorial system of the Republic of Poland shall ensure the decentralization of public power. Moreover, it mentioned that the basic territorial division of the State shall be determined by statute, allowing for the social, economic and cultural ties which

⁴ Kowalczyk Andrzej, Local Government in Poland, *In Decentralization: Experiments And Reforms*, Horváth, Tamás M (ed), Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2000

⁵ Kowalczyk Andrzej, Local Government in Poland, *In Decentralization: Experiments And Reforms*, Horváth, Tamás M (ed), Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2000

ensure to the territorial units the capacity to perform their public duties. The constitution also designated chapter 7 to Local Government, and their autonomy. Therefore, the constitution safeguarded the autonomy of the local governments through their financial resources and capability to raise it.

Local Government Revenues & Expenditures:

The new divisions of functions and responsibilities included a new layout for collecting revenues and spending of expenditure.

Own source revenues –

Local Government has limited power of taxation. For most of local taxes, property tax and tax on agriculture are the most significant, Local Governments have limited discretion to decide over tax rates. Normally, there is a maximum ceiling rate and local council may decide for the local rate up to this ceiling. In 2009 local governments own source revenue reached 48.6% of their budget, according to IMF and EU sub-national governments report.

General purpose grant –

is decided by the formula. The largest part is called “education subvention” and is no lower than 12.8% of central budget revenues. There is also an equalization element - received by local governments with own revenues below 85% of national average.

Specific grants –

there are either specific grants for current operation decided by separate legal regulations or specific grants for capital spending, which are distributed by the regional governor.

As for the Polish local governments' expenditures, according to the IMF and EU Sub-National basic facts, Poland local expenditures moved from 19 % of National Budget expenditures in 1998, to 20% in 1998 and finally reached about 30% in 2006. This shows the development in the shares of local governments from the central budget and therefore an indicator of the economic improvement of service delivery at the local level.

Capacity Building:

The normal argument against implementing a decentralized local administration system is always focused on the risks faced through the low capacity at the local level. Therefore, while setting the decentralization strategies, capacity building is a cross cutting reform challenge to the three pillars of decentralization: administrative, political and fiscal. Poland's National School of Public administration was a parallel reform to local governments capacity and image within a decentralized system.

- **Poland's National School of Public Administration - KSAP**

A National School of Public Administration KSAP was established in 1999 and was officially operating in 1991 known today as KSAP, the first institution in the post-Communist countries to be responsible for building the capacity of local governments. The first democratically elected government in Poland took the decision to establish this institution to prepare the capacities needed for local governments to implement local governance reforms through decentralization.

KSAP students are selected through a transparent and competitive recruitment procedure including criteria of an upper age limit of 32 and possessing a Master's degree. Students are trained for 18 months and are obligated for employment in the central administration for a minimum of 5 years. The Prime Minister makes available posts to be selected by the students⁶.

Establishing of KSAP was critical to implementing decentralization. KSAP was capable in changing the capacity of local governments and hence the success of local administration reform in Poland. Moreover KSAP's success in meeting its objective to build the capacity of subnational governments countered the argument about low capacity of local governments and their inability to implement under a decentralized local administration system.

Lessons Learned from the Polish Experience:

Based on the Polish experience in implementing decentralization, the most common opponents to decentralization and institutional reforms were⁷:

1. Central Administration:

A natural opponent to decentralization since it limits the central administration's right, power and authority. The shift of relation between the central and local level requires greater effort to control the local level through different legal and economic tools, in contradiction to normal hierarchy through a centralized system.

⁶ KSAP official website <http://www.ksap.gov.pl/ksap/>

⁷ A practical Guide to Building Local government, The Polish Experience, Jerzy Regulski, Local Government and Public Service Reform Institute, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2010

2. Fiscal Administration:

Fiscal decentralization means autonomy of local resources and therefore losing control by central governments over major portion of public finances. Ministry of Finance is therefore a major obstacle to fiscal decentralization.

3. Politicians at the Central Level:

Administrative decentralization limits the central authority over the subnational levels by cutting the hierarchy relations. Politicians' power is limited in respect to affecting local administrative decisions.

4. Leadership of Public Institutions and Enterprises

Being part of the local subnational government, they are held accountable to local governments with closer supervision through the local communities, hence losing their influence, independence and prestige. Reporting to the local level Mayor and not the central level Minister diminishes their self-esteem and status.

5. Trade Unions:

Acting as the negotiators with the central government by representing large number of workers, is a status that they lose under a decentralized system where the local authorities step in and political power is lost with central governments.

Opponents to decentralization change based on the vested interest within each state. Losing power will remain the major criteria to opponents for decentralization and therefore it is very important to take opponents into consideration while designing the reforms looking for compromises to eliminate opponents through legislative or political routes.

Egypt's Decentralization: Roadmap for a Responsive and Accountable Egypt

Egypt's Democratic Transition phase is very critical in designing its future. There are essential factors that should be assisted to ensure the success of the transition. These factors are mainly summarized in the existence of: political will, expert knowledge, social support for the reform, and adequate human resources capable of realizing the change.

There is no one model for reform or implementation of decentralization, but deep analysis and thorough design of the reform accompanied by close monitoring and adjustment is the road for a successful implementation. Nevertheless, the three pillars of decentralization should be equally valued and footed during the decentralization strategy's design phase to include: political, administrative and fiscal decentralization.

Egypt Local Government Structure:

Egypt's local government system is largely a centralized hierarchy system with some deconcentrated features. The local administration system in Egypt is more of a local administration and not local governance structure. Although elected local popular councils are present at the different local levels, the hierarchy system within the elected and appointed local councils in addition to the non-defined roles and responsibilities represent the root cause of its ineffectiveness.

Law 43 of 1979 is the law that governs local administration in Egypt. The following modifications increased localities to five levels by adding the *hai* and *markaz (Kism)*, in addition to the governorate, city and village. Additionally, a

council of governors has been created, headed by the Prime Minister and including all governors as well as the Minister responsible for local administration. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the system applied in Egypt is mainly administrative and executive, and has no political functions.⁸.

Egypt's Shaking Transition 2011-2012:

Post Mubarak's ousting on February 11, 2011, the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) took over power until a new president was elected. SCAF was entrusted to run the transitional period with a non-bias towards all Egyptian movements, political parties and minorities through justice for all.

Egyptians entrusted SCAF blindly to lead the road of democratic transition, which was riddled with unclear goals and distorted political tracks. The transition period was characterized by lack of transparent transitional plans with no clear milestones. The route started with Constitution referendum in March 2011, Constitutional Declaration by SCAF, People Assembly's elections (Lower House) November through December 2011, Shoura Council's elections (Upper House) January-February 2012, Presidential Elections May 2012.

In spite of the fact that the Parliament was seated in January 2012, SCAF dissolved the Parliament in June 2012 based on the constitutional court decision of the unconstitutionality of the election of 1/3 of the members.

From 2011 through 2012 Egypt's path was distorted and unstable due to the lack of transparency and openness of the transitional phase. No clear milestones

⁸ ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Public Administration Country Profile, Division for Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) United Nations, February 2004

was agreed upon or shared with Egyptians, political parties or youth movements. This situation resulted in continuous chaos, and deterioration in economic and social status.

On the other hand, the transition resulted in a continuous deteriorating social cohesion, due to the rising power of the Islamists groups and their domination over the political seen with a majority in the Parliament around 70% to both Freedom and Justice Party (Moslem Brotherhood) 46.3 % and Al Nour Party (Salafists) 24.4%⁹.

Finally Dr. Mohamed Morsi, FJP President, was elected as Egypt's President on June 30th, 2012. This Islamists domination resulted in an escalated fear of Egyptians' liberals, being Muslims or Copts towards Egypt's identity as a civil state.

⁹ European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity <http://www.europeanforum.net/country/egypt>

Results of People Assembly's 2011 Elections:¹⁰

Party	Percentage	Seats in PA
Democratic Alliance (incl. Freedom and Justice Party)	46,3%	235 (213)
Islamist Alliance (incl. Al-Nour Party)	24,4%	124 (107)
Al-Wafd	7,5%	38
Egyptian Bloc (incl. ESDP*)	6,7%	34 (16)
Independents	5,1%	26
Felool parties	3,1%	16
Al-Wasat	2%	10
Reform and Development Bloc	1,6%	8
The Revolution Continues (incl. SPAP and ESP*)	1,4%	7
Total of elections	98%	498
Appointed by SCAF	2%	10
Total in Peoples Assembly	100%	508

Opportunities for Decentralization in Egypt's Democratic Transition:

A major factor of success to the decentralization process is the “Political Will” towards establishing a local democratic governance system, backed by social support for reforms through a transparent participatory National Strategy.

¹⁰ European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity <http://www.europeanforum.net/country/egypt>

Reform opponents will always argue that society is not ready for democracy and not capable of practicing reforms. Low capacity at the local level will always be the excuse to stop reform. Accepting this argument will stop reform forever. This in practice is unrealistic, as people learn by being authorized responsibilities and allowed for trainings to meet their new roles. People must understand the arguments for reform and the objective of their new responsibilities through a participatory decision that is inclusive for ideas.

Learning democracy by doing is the best option for democratic governance reform during a transition. When changes are introduced properly and the reasoning behind the changes is understood, society can adjust and learn from the new opportunities very quickly.¹¹

Egypt's current constitution contains few provisions for the devolution of power to local government, limiting the ability of local officials to respond to citizens' demands. As Egyptians are drafting the new constitution, this is a big opportunity to introduce the decentralized administrative system of future Egypt. The Shoura Council (Upper House of Parliament) presented to the Constituent Assembly (CA), during August 2012, their vision for Democratic Local Governance structure and reform to be debated and included into the new Egyptian Constitution.

The Shoura Council agreed on several key principles to guide reforms in local governance: a) devolution of authority from the central level to the local is critical; b) Elected Local Popular Councils (LPCs) should be given the full authority and means to supervise Local Executive Council (LEC) performance,

¹¹ Regulski, Jerzy, A Practical Guide To Building Local Government, The Polish Experience, Local Government And Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute–Budapest, 2010

including the right to question executive council members and governors, and the right to call for a vote of “no confidence” on such individuals; and c) that decentralization of fiscal and budgetary authorities is critical to improving local administration in Egypt.

The concept is inclusive of the three pillars for decentralization and opens space for the long-term reforms. Moreover it would ensure the government's buying to the required decentralization reforms at the sub-national level and within the central and local institutions.

Egyptians are looking forward to the new constitution as the first milestone to bridge the gap of trust with the current elected Islamic regime. The constitution will be the answer to Egyptians' calls for democracy or the proof that the current government is leading a road of a reformed authoritarian regime.

Donors' Role in Egypt's Transition:

Egypt's transition should be led through a national dialogue developing national options for the democratic transition. Donors should support the options developed by the citizens and with the state. Egyptians will not accept imposing a model for change through the transition. On the other side, providing technical support to build the state's institutions is crucial during Egypt's transition by introducing lessons learned from previous democratic transition experiences in other countries. Institutional reforms during Egypt's transition are huge efforts that require donors' deep coordination to cover both central and local institutions.

Facilitating the exchange of experience dialogue and implementing open eye study tours for the newly elected government and parliamentarians is crucial to enable them to set a democratic governance model and develop the country's strategies based on solid examples and practical learning experience from other transitions.

Moreover, introducing new institutions and restructuring the existing institutions is a mega job for Egypt to undergo without donors' support. Building civil society to support the state's institutions and supporting the states' reform should be implemented using a mix of international and national think tanks to provide technical expertise and ensure sustainable support through the transition.

Finally, donors should support building the government's accountability through technical assistance to establish a professional independent media, setting anticorruption mechanisms, supporting human rights' monitoring groups and institutionalizing civic education.

Conclusion:

Egypt's road to democratization is definitely not an easy one looking into a country that have been ruled with tight military control and authoritarian regimes for over 60 years. The chances for success are still depending on the will of the people who called for change and the support of the international community for a real democracy and not stability with limited reforms resulting in a hybrid democracy.

January 2011 uprising by the people revealed that real democracy is the answer to stability. Stability can never be guaranteed with authoritarian regimes.

Throughout the world, change to democracy has been prevailing since the mid 1970s with more countries categorized as free according to Freedom House showing that in 1973, 43% of the world not free, while in 2011, 45% of the countries rated free.¹²

Egypt's democratic transition is a complex process and requires building trust between the state and its citizens to overcome a long history of corruption and lack of information through directed media. Building the state's institutions is a major milestone moving Egypt from a highly personalistic regime to a state of institutions.

This is similar to the same process that Eastern European countries went through to institutionalize reform while transitioning from institutionalized authoritarian systems to democratic institution building.¹³

Current inherited economic problems may complicate Egypt's transition more, since the European Union (EU) direct financial and technical support to Central and Eastern European countries is not available for Egypt's democratic transition. After the revolution Egypt's foreign exchange reserves fell from \$36 billion in December 2010 to only \$16.3 billion in January 2012, also in February 2012 Standard & Poor's rating agency lowered the Egypt's credit rating from B+ to B in the long term¹⁴.

¹² Freedom House (2011). Freedom in the World: The Authoritarian challenge to Democracy. www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2011

¹³ Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World, Rand National Defense Institute, Policy Brief, June 2012, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9673/index1.html

¹⁴ S&P Downgrades Egypt's Credit Rating, http://english.nuqudy.com/General_Overview/North_Africa/SP_Downgrades_Egypt-883

Therefore, Egypt has to be creative and go more for local options, depending on local think tanks, in containing the deep economic problems in order to make the poor more tolerant of the slow economic change. This tolerance can only be achieved through citizens' involvement in the decision making process in parallel with the government's transparency, to enable citizens' access to information and build a free and professional media.

With a more specific lens on Egypt's transition, another major challenge facing the Egyptian transition is the share of political space between both the Islamists and the secular parties and movements. Islamists have to learn from the outset of Mubarak's regime, else instability will continue through a failing economy and hence the failure to meet popular expectations of improved service delivery. Islamists tendency to lean towards a reformed authoritarian regime will disrupt the course to social cohesion and society's solidarity to build the future democratic governance systems for Egypt.

Egypt's New Constitution is the first and most important milestone for Egypt's transition and a real opportunity to build the trust with Islamist groups. The new constitution will be the road map in reaching Egypt's long term democratic objectives through ensuring Egypt as a civil state, protecting basic rights, the independence of the judiciary, and enabling for decentralization of the state's systems towards local democracy, freedom of speech, right to access information and ensure the alteration of power through free and fair elections.

Learning from the Arab Spring, looking back how youth took the World by surprise overturning Bin Ali and Mubarak, two of the most solid and stable authoritarian regimes of the Arab World; the recently emerging empowered youth should not be underestimated to fight for new social contracts to achieve

accountable, inclusive and responsive political and economic systems. In a nutshell, the people passed the road to democratic governance and the youth's determination for no returns will ensure that the goals set in 2011 are achieved.

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