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Trust in the Police and Criminal Courts: A Comparative European Analysis

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European Social Survey Rotating Module in Round 5 (data for 27 countries). Some publications associated with the data: 

Criminologists are becoming increasingly interested in questions of trust in justice, the legitimacy of justice institutions, and people's commitment to the rule of law. When we and colleagues working on an EU project on this topic – entitled Euro-Justis – had an opportunity to design questions for the fifth European Social Survey in early 2009, we eagerly seized the opportunity. The resulting module, which contained 45 questions, went into the field at the end of 2010 in 28 European countries. In March 2012 data from 26 countries were made available. Some initial analysis was funded by an EC FP7 project entitled Fiducia.

The original proposal, module template and final questionnaire detail the concepts and measures driving the ESS module. 

Crime-control and social regulation

A guiding premise of the module (and of Euro-Justis and Fiducia) is that European Union institutions and Member States need evidence-based indicators of public trust and institutional legitimacy if they are to devise, track and evaluate criminal justice policies. Trust and legitimacy indicators are vital for (a) better formulation of the problems of public consent and support for justice systems and (b) more effective monitoring of changes in public trust and institutional legitimacy in response to policy innovation.

This module thus ties in with the promotion of crime control policies that recognise that the legitimacy of institutions of justice is of critical importance in securing public commitment to the rule of law. If Member States are to achieve balanced and effective crime policies, they need to pay closer attention to issues of trust and legitimacy. Measures of trust in justice and the legitimacy of legal authorities can be used to inform careful and long-term policies to foster public compliance instead of short-term and 'electioneering' strategies that exploit public feelings for political gain. 

In order to assess the empirical evidence for a model of regulation based on the social value of legitimacy, this rotating module also tests two frameworks (Tyler, 2004, 2006, 2008). The first focuses on instrumental factors informed by rational choice. This assumes that people are governed by self-interest in the form of sanctions or incentives. People will comply with the law when they judge it likely that they would be caught and punished if they committed a crime. If true, then the government should encourage pro-social behaviour by demonstrating that the police are effective in fighting crime and that rule breakers will be punished. Strategies such as the mass imprisonment that characterizes the US and Russia rely for their effectiveness either on imposing a price on offending that is high enough to deter those who are tempted to crime, or else on incapacitating those that do offend through imprisonment. Repressive 'social control' or 'deterrence' strategies (Nagin, 1998; Kahan, 1999) are obviously unavoidable for some sorts of offender.

But it seems costly to continually send messages of capture, punishment and deterrence. Indeed, these messages, incentives and rewards may not actually work for the vast majority of the population. The second framework states that trust in justice fosters police and court legitimacy which, in turn, fosters public compliance with the law and cooperation with legal authorities. A value-based approach to legal regulation designs institutions in ways that promote the development of social values such as legitimacy. In turn, legitimacy encourages people to follow the rules, not out of fear of punishment but because they believe they ought to. 

Compared to crime-control policies based around deterrence and instrumental models of cooperation (which seek to demonstrate to citizens that the police are effective and the courts are punitive), a values-based model may be a more efficient and effective basis for encouraging people to bring their behaviour in line with law and legal institutions. If most people obey the law without the active force of deterrence and punishment, then the police can target the hard-core whose behaviour is motivated not by values, but by the rational choice of likelihood being caught and the severity of subsequent punishment. Without voluntary compliance, and without most people obeying most laws most of the time, there is significant cost for criminal justice.

What is trust?

'To say we trust you means we believe you have the right intentions toward us and that you are competent to do what we trust you to do.' (Hardin, 2006) 

The police and criminal courts carry out important functions in society. We outsource deterrence and justice to these institutions. In return, we expect them to be fair, impartial, efficient and effective. Trust in justice is the belief that the police and criminal courts can be relied upon to act competently (i.e. effectively), to wield their authority in fair ways (i.e. procedurally just), and to provide equal justice and protection across society (i.e. distributively just). Trust implies the recognition of a shared moral commitment, where police/courts take the interests of citizens into account. Trust is revealed in beliefs about current affairs, but also expectations about future behaviour. 

What is legitimacy?

Legitimacy is partly the subjective state of mind of the governed. When citizens see criminal justice institutions as legitimate, they recognise the system’s authority to determine the law, to govern through the use of coercive force, to punish those who act illegally, and to expect cooperation and obedience. Following David Beetham we regard legitimate authority as made up of three elements:

  • legality (acting according to the law);
  • shared moral values (values that are shared by those with authority and those subject to that authority); and,
  • consent (the sense amongst the policed of a moral obligation to obey the authority).

Viewed in this way, legitimacy is both the public recognition of authority and the public justification of power. Legitimacy is present not only when individuals recognise the authority of institutions and feel a corresponding duty of deference to them (consent); it is also present when individuals believe that justice institutions have a proper moral purpose (shared moral values), and that justice institutions follow their own rules as well as the rules that govern everyone in society (legality). 

On the one hand, power transformed into rightful authority is exhibited when people accept that justice institutions have the right to issue certain sorts of commands, and that those commands should be obeyed. This is felt obligation to obey: people internalize the value that they should obey the law and abide by the directives of justice officials. On the other hand, justification of the holding of power is created when individuals believe that justice institutions have a set of moral values that align with their own. This is moral alignment, in which normative justifiability of power creates political obligations through a sense of shared goals.

Publications

Aside from topline findings (see above) and this blog post, some other related published papers, chapters and encyclopedia entries: 

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