Encoding the Social
A Critical Discourse Analysis of Mark Zuckerberg’s Construction of Mediated Sociality

Sam McGeachy
ABSTRACT

This research seeks to uncover discursive features which characterise Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s rhetorical construction of the social in his attempts to persuade the public about Facebook’s role in the future of mediated sociality. Using Critical Discourse Analysis, seven texts were examined by the researcher. The sampled texts comprise public utterances made by Zuckerberg ranging between 2009 and the first quarter of 2018. By employing Norman Fairclough’s three dimensional model of Critical Discourse Analysis, three particular discursive themes are observed and discussed: technological utopianism and determinism; the conflation of connectivity and connectedness; and top-down personalised governance. The findings suggest that through the frequent mobilisation of concepts such as openness, connection, and transparency, Zuckerberg masks explicit normative assumptions regarding his vision of the social, which are in turn reflected in the structuration of Facebook as a platform.
1. INTRODUCTION

Over the course of its now fourteen-year history, Facebook has weathered a number of privacy-related scandals, sparking criticism from its community of users, legislators, and digital rights advocates alike. The first notable case arose following the launch of News Feed in September of 2006, a feature which began publicising in a central location formerly discrete information regarding users’ actions performed on the platform. Although many users initially felt this new feature to be overly intrusive (Arrington, 2006), it has gone on to become a permanent fixture in the site’s architecture. Just over a year later, in November of 2007, Facebook launched Beacon, its first foray into ‘social advertising’. Through Beacon, users’ activities on external partner websites were collected and published publically by default on their friends’ News Feeds (Clark, 2007; Story, 2007). Facing a number of class action lawsuits (Kincaid, 2008), Beacon was eventually terminated in 2009. Most recently, Facebook has received a considerable amount of criticism in the wake of the ongoing Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which over 80 million users’ personally identifiable information was surreptitiously accessed, harvested, and allegedly used in attempts to influence voter behaviour and public opinion during both the 2016 United States presidential election and EU referendum in the United Kingdom (Davies, 2015; Cadwalladr, 2018).

In spite of these telling moments and the opportunities for intervention they have ostensibly afforded, it would appear that the stakes of Facebook’s privacy violations have only increased alongside its growing presence in the lives of its users. Of course, it is certainly important to acknowledge the significance of the debates and discussions regarding individuals’ right to privacy online which have received widespread attention in the aftermath of these scandals. Nevertheless, what is at times glossed over in these discussions is a critical interrogation of Facebook’s assimilation into a significant portion of Internet users’ everyday social experiences on the Web. Indeed, Facebook has not only become a pervasive element in the constitution of everyday social relations, but has also leveraged its position in order to purposefully reorient and reconstruct both the forms and conditions of possibility in which
mediated social relations may manifest (Dodge and Kitchin, 2009: 1344; Alaimo and Kallinikos, 2017; Couldry and Kallinikos, 2018: 147). In turn, underlying Facebook’s structural interventions, as in the case of both Beacon and News Feed, are particular beliefs proscribing an ideal form of mediated sociality in which the social is increasingly reconceptualised as and made into a new site of economic value (Couldry and Van Dijck, 2015).

In the context of growing monopolisation, in which but a handful of tech behemoths are distinctly privileged to command and direct attention, influencing the behaviour of their users as they see fit, it is imperative that media scholars critically interrogate the words and beliefs of those currently at the helm of these sites of power. The prominent position of influential institutional actors (Cukier et al., 2009) has allowed them to make critical decisions that not only affect our collective sense of privacy, but also our sense of togetherness and how we come to define what it means to be social. This project therefore begins from the assumption that the social remains an important site of contention and thus warrants greater academic scrutiny. This work therefore seeks to determine the manner in which Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg engages in the discursive construction of the social in relation to Facebook as a platform through a close analysis of a sample of his public utterances between 2009 and 2018. In doing so, this work hopes to contribute important insight into Facebook’s self-conception vis-à-vis Zuckerberg’s professed vision of mediated sociality going forward.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Discourses surrounding new media technologies exert an important influence upon the manner in which these technologies come to be embedded within pre-existing systems of social value and meaning, both enabling and limiting the ways in which innovations come to be situated and understood (Tuominen, 1997). Individual actors, however, remain differentially situated with respect to their capacity to actively shape discourses surrounding particular technologies. Subjects in possession of greater social or economic capital are often disproportionally empowered to promote particular discursive conceptualisations (Bourdieu, 1991), and are therefore more effective in terms of their ability to influence the
meanings which come to be associated with certain technologies (Van Dijk, 1997; Sterne, 2003; Gillespie, 2010). As Habermas (2006) has argued, institutional actors are often positioned in such a way as to exert a significant influence upon the formation of public opinion on a variety of issues. Similarly, as Cukier et al. (2009, 177) have suggested, this inequitable distribution over the conception and advancement of discourses, in which civil society actors are comparatively disadvantaged, relates in part to institutional actors’ privileged access to mainstream media networks. However, this does not necessarily suggest that institutional actors are in possession of a monopoly over the discourses surrounding technologies, but rather that they are “in a position to leverage the power and reach of mass media to promote particular views of a technology” (Hoffmann, Proferes and Zimmer, 2016: 201). When one approaches the multiplicity of discourses forwarded in relation to the technologies such actors attempt to characterise—and through which these communicative acts are often mediated—what emerge are “forms of power that are reactive, concealed, and which are shaped [by] multifarious points of communication” (Beer, 2009: 996).

When compared to the body of research devoted to users’ experiences with social media, it would appear that scholarship focussed on the discursive influence of corporate actors has received less academic scrutiny. As Beer and Burrows (2007) have stressed, scholarship which disproportionally privileges investigations into the ways in which users contribute to discourses surrounding new media often inadvertently neglects the manner in which corporate actors contribute to the rhetorical construction of social media platforms and other relevant technologies. In their exploration of manifestos drafted by prominent business figures, for instance, Van Dijk and Nieborg (2009) observed a rhetorical pattern characterised by a purposeful blurring of the boundaries between the categories ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ in favour of a narrative of co-creation which attempts to obscure the ways in which social networking sites profit from the commodification of the routine engagements of their ‘prosumers’.

Likewise, scholarship concentrating on the narratives Facebook and its prominent figures seek to forward about themselves has identified a number of demonstrative themes. In Payne’s
(2014) analysis of Zuckerberg’s mobilisation of the term ‘sharing’, he argues that the rhetoric surrounding the concept works to depoliticise an otherwise intricate field of social and economic relations, in turn affording a greater capacity to commodify the actions undertaken by Facebook’s users on the site. In addition, as Raynes-Goldie argues, Facebook can itself “be seen as an embodiment of a philosophy of information in which ‘information wants to be shared’,” (2012: 146), a conception which in turn impacts, as Zimmer asserts, “the values built into the design of Facebook, ranging from its user interface, privacy policies, terms of service, and method of governance” (2010). Approaching this notion from a political economy perspective, Fuchs argues that Facebook instead seeks to manipulate users’ perception of privacy by “complexifying the understanding of targeted advertising in its privacy policy, minimizing advertising control settings … and reducing privacy to an individual and interpersonal issue” (2011: 13).

1.1 Computational Culture

The various functions to which algorithms are put to use continue to encroach upon the role traditionally ascribed to culture insofar as both can be understood to accomplish, through contrasting means, what Bruno Latour (2005) has termed the ‘reassembling of the social’. The expression of and possibilities afforded through mediated communications have become increasingly subjected to and filtered through a distinctive anticipatory computational logic (Adams et al., 2009: 260; Amoore, 2011: 29; Aradau and Blanke, 2017: 375). Through the use of sophisticated analytical tools, ever-expanding corpuses of data are trawled in an effort to uncover or generate behavioural patterns and degrees of association between seemingly disparate entities (Striphas, 2015: 398; Andrejevic, 2013; Hallinan and Striphas, 2014). As Alaimo and Kallinikos (2017: 179) observe, this computational logic underlying the architecture of most social media platforms ultimately seeks to establish a “dynamic regime of quantified interaction between user data and user behaviour” in which the information generated by the user is continuously repurposed in an effort to both influence and anticipate future behaviour. This procedural feedback between behavioural data and its repurposing, in which the consumption of information simultaneously results in the derivation of further
actionable data, has likewise been characterised as a form of participation which in itself grounds surveillance through the collapsing of ‘reading’ (i.e. user-end experience) and ‘writing’ (e.g. surveillance, encoding, computation) upon one another (Chun, 2016: 367).

In addition, according to Cheney-Lippold (2011: 172), algorithms correspondingly construct a “cybernetic relationship to identification” through the creation of particular categories of identity. As such, users are themselves computed on the basis of discrete, measurable behaviours which, when compiled into larger data sets, reconstitute the user as an identifiable and actionable object (Desrosières, 1998). In turn, it can be argued that encoding—which is to say, the process through which user activity can be transformed into formats capable of being engineered (Alaimo, 2014; Alaimo and Kallinikos, 2016)—as a form of power remains strictly bound to its metric reconfiguration of both concrete elements and abstract social facts. Thus, an “understanding of metrics as descriptions can help us in dealing, analytically, with their becoming operative prescriptions,” particularly in cases where metrics are “[sunken] into the system and become both invisible and inevitable” (Rieder, 2012). It is in this sense that we can understand the centrality of quantification and its significance as a precondition for the circulation of power online insofar as it functions so as to establish what is of importance, what forms it may take, and how it will be put to use by first insisting upon the standardisation and operationalisation of the governed object. Put simply, as Badiou has concisely asserted, “what counts—in the sense of what is valued—is that which is counted” (2008: 2).

It is perhaps this multiplicity of social meanings encoded within data as they are generated, compiled, analysed, and repurposed which render the phenomenon of ‘algorithmic culture’ (Galloway, 2006) at once both fascinating and disconcerting, as it entails profound implications for the future of mediated sociality and the notion of possibility more generally. As cultural objects, data are “embedded and integrated within a social system whose logic, rules, and explicit functioning work to determine the new conditions of possibilities of users’ lives” (Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 167). With this system in mind, one may draw parallels with what Jacques Rancière has termed the ‘distribution of the sensible’: a political-aesthetic logic of revealing whereby individuals who seek to claim a share of what is common to their
community are limited “based on what they do and on the time and space in which this activity is performed” (2004: 12). It is in this sense that measurement ultimately “functions to define what is valued and what is seen to be worthwhile, which in turn then shapes what is seen to be desirable and therefore possible” (Beer, 2016: 139).

Furthermore, as Berry argues, the logic underlying algorithmic computation consequently “enables the assemblage of new social ontologies and the corresponding computational social epistemologies that we have increasingly grown to take for granted” (2012: 381). Indeed, as Bucher notes in her analysis of Facebook’s News Feed content ranking algorithm, Edge Rank, software configures sociality online “by encoding values and decisions about what is important, useful, and relevant and what is not … [thereby restricting] certain activities by making others possible or impossible” (2012a: 485). This further demonstrates the value of technical and architectural understandings of the organisation of power in the context of networked surveillance infrastructures online, which stress “an analytics of visibility, rather than merely transposing the concept of surveillance onto new objects” (Bucher 2012b: 114-5). Moreover, insofar as social media platforms may themselves be considered mediated “spaces of appearances” (Arendt, 1960), it is necessary to engage with the “complex projection of intersecting calculative forces” which render the possibility of appearance deeply contingent upon “the result of prior computer-based calculations … driven by a particular kind of economic motivation through which data from online forms of sociality are traded in a complex ecosystem of advertisers, data brokers and other interested stakeholders” (Couldry and Kallinikos, 2018: 147).

1.2 Encoded Sociality

The affordances of mediated platforms of communication have had and continue to exert a profound influence upon on social norms and conceptions of self. As Dodge and Kitchin contend, “software is increasingly making a difference to the constitution and production of everyday life” (2009: 1344). Extending from the preceding section, it can be argued that “the novelty of social media platforms is not that they allow for making connections but lead to engineering connections,” resulting in the displacement of sociality online away from voluntarily
interactive behavioural patterns, and instead toward an increasingly engineered reconfiguration of sociality (Van Dijck, 2012: 168). Moreover, the technical affordances of social media platforms in turn lead to the emergence of new social affordances, influencing norms regarding social expectation and behaviour in accordance to the constraints particular to a given structure (Cirucci, 2015: 2).

Changing norms regarding the appropriateness of and increased tendencies toward self-disclosure (Bauman, 2007) have come to exert a profound influence upon the conditions surrounding self-expression online. Users must often “present a constrained, unitary identity to multiple audiences” (Tufekci, 2008: 35) whose composition cannot be anticipated in full due to contextual ambiguities and the absence of temporal fixity in digital mediums. This stands in contrast to early expectations regarding the liberating possibilities of pluralistic self-expression in digital environments (Baym, 2010: 106). Despite the normative ambivalence linked to the collapsing of social contexts online and the technological affordances which confound traditional understandings of communicative relationality (boyd, 2011; 2008), these ‘new norms’ of transparency and publicness have been repeatedly contextualised by Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg as merely being a part of a larger, ongoing historical transition (Arrington, 2010).

Indeed, by insisting upon a presumed “innate desire to connect with other people and share information,” Zuckerberg seeks to naturalise Facebook’s “construction of sharing by connecting it to innate human sociality” (Hoffmann, 2014). This, Casilli argues, simultaneously represents an attempt to legitimise “connectivity services that are based on extracting consumers’ personal data by incorporating them into a wider collective process” (2015: 4). Considering both the propensity to and manner in which those in positions of power seek to establish particular structures in an effort to rework social norms (Foucault, 1979), the intentions underlying these utterances may seem evident to the critically-minded reader. Reflecting upon Zuckerberg’s discursive characterisation of Facebook’s efforts to nudge its users toward increased public disclosure, Raynes-Goldie has identified two rhetorical strategies that warrant quoting at length:
In the first narrative, changes with respect to privacy are inevitable and are occurring on their own. Facebook’s ‘role’ is simply to help people get through ‘hurdles’ that are holding them back from falling in line with broader social change. In this version, Facebook Inc. cannot be blamed for giving users what they apparently want. In the second narrative, Facebook is responsible for ‘pushing’ things forward and changing privacy norms for the betterment of society. (2012: 163)

Here, Raynes-Goldie describes an interesting tension within the discursive framing of Facebook’s role in exerting influence upon broader social norms, whereby an underlying rhetoric of technological determinism ultimately betrays Zuckerberg’s somewhat teleological account of the gradual dissolution of privacy norms as both a naturally occurring and inevitable process.

Zuckerberg’s static characterisation of privacy as simply an outdated and increasingly obsolete concept in need of reconfiguration likewise denies the manner in which notions of privacy are fundamentally socially constructed according to relational, pragmatic, and contextual judgements regarding what is suitable for disclosure and what subjects believe ought to be kept private (Grimmelmann, 2010: 800). As such, social media scholars have observed a variety of behavioural patterns among users with respect to the negotiation of privacy online. These include visibility optimisation through algorithmic awareness (Gillespie, 2014; Bucher, 2017), collaborative identity construction through practices of tagging (Trottier and Lyon, 2012), and the adoption of privacy enhancing tactics in an effort to restrict access and reduce the ambiguities of online audiences (Stutzman, Gross and Acquisti, 2012; Powell, 2011: 166). Given the fundamentally interactive nature of social media platforms, it is inevitably the case that the individual cannot be constructed entirely in isolation within these environments. “No one wants ‘to be left alone’ on social platforms,” Casilli reflects, “and yet everyone expresses a care of privacy that is specific to them” (2015: 9). A history of negative user responses to Facebook’s attempts to compel users toward automated and ubiquitous self-disclosure through changes in the platform’s architecture (e.g. Facebook’s ill-fated Beacon
advertising service) are therefore representative of both Zuckerberg’s misunderstanding of the dynamic nature of privacy and his rhetorical strategies in a more general sense.

One of Facebook’s most powerful and perhaps most successful architectural strategies, however, comes in the form of its ‘real you’ policy. Indeed, as Cirucci notes, this strategy of “asking for users to insert their legal names and to only create one profile highlights the conception of one, monolithic, ‘authentic’ self” in which “Facebook authorizes selves that are ‘real’ because they are unitary” (2015: 2). In positioning itself as a type of online identity registrar, Facebook seeks to articulate itself as “a core social infrastructure for the Web,” justifying this policy through various discursive strategies ranging from “social reasons (i.e. safety and accountability) as well as financial ones (i.e. increased engagement and advertising impressions)” (Haimson and Hoffmann, 2016).

1.3 Political Economy of Privacy & Participation

The importance of privacy’s function in society can be understood in part through its socio-political and psychological benefits. In the case of the former, privacy creates opportunities for political expression, criticism, and choice in contexts free from unreasonable interference, allows individuals to prepare and contemplate matters before opening up discussion to larger audiences, and helps secure the right to participate at one’s discretion in both political and non-political forms of association (Westin, 1967). In the case of the latter, privacy is fundamental to psychological well-being, affording individuals opportunities to reflect, to be oneself outside the contextual expectations of others, experiment with self-presentation, and so forth, and is thus fundamental to the development of individuality and personal autonomy (Margulis, 2003: 246; Altman, 1975). While some theories of privacy focus on the voluntary displacement of the individual from collective life, and therefore centre privacy on the recognition of the sovereignty of the individual (Emerson, 1970), others have instead argued that privacy is itself constitutive of society and must be understood in accordance to the social role it performs (Cohen, 2000; Schwartz, 1999). According to legal scholar Daniel Solove, privacy can likewise be interpreted as “the protection of the individual based on society’s own
norms and values,” and is thus “not simply a way to extricate individuals from social control, as it is itself a form of social control that emerges from a society’s norms” (2007: 763).

Of course, in the context of social media platforms, social understandings and legal interpretations of privacy are unfixed, pliable, and subject to the discretion of the platform’s proprietors, engineers, as well as an assortment of stakeholders involved in the creation of their legal policies. According to Nissenbaum, “the dominant approach to addressing [privacy concerns] online is a combination of transparency and choice,” in which the central course of action involves “[informing] website visitors and users of online goods and services of respective information-flow practices and to provide a choice either to engage or disengage” (2011: 34). However, as privacy policies may evolve over time in response to new legislation and may change suddenly for other more arbitrary reasons, information disclosed privately in one context or at one point in time may become publically indexed, searchable, and shareable at a later date. Indeed, as Powell notes, “these ‘bait and switch’ tactics employed by social networking [sites] have resulted in user confusion as to what information is accessible to the public, thus exposing them to unnecessary risk of harm” (2011: 169). It would appear, then, that “privacy is threatened not by singular egregious acts, but by a slow series of relatively minor acts which gradually begin to add up” (Solove, 2007: 769). As such, it is necessary to extend our attention to these incremental and purposeful changes institutionally privileged actors elect to make in the context of new media industries.

A significant proportion of current debates surrounding mass surveillance in the West remains centred upon a forced dichotomy between privacy and security. This opposition, Casilli argues “is instrumental to the promotion of the indiscriminate collection of personal data, which is seen as the only guarantee against the domestic and external threats that democracies face” (2015: 2). Indeed, underlying much of the rhetoric surrounding this dichotomy are the lucrative industries of data mining and data brokering. In the case of Facebook, the justificatory imperative for data collection is only occasionally oriented toward discourses of securitisation, and instead largely focuses on the notion of sharing and transparency as a social good. Nevertheless, as Hoffmann notes, “for Zuckerberg, openness is reduced to little more
than some quantity of information to be shared … while connectedness denotes simply those kinds of connections that Facebook facilitates” (2014). What constitutes the central discourse surrounding the notion of sharing on the platform therefore entails in large part an especially narrow set of activities, in which users circulate personal and behavioural information between one another, all the while eliding the extent to which access to that information is sold for profit to a number of interested third-parties (Van Dijck, 2013). This appropriation of user data for commercial purposes stands at the centre of Facebook’s business model. As such, Facebook can be understood both as a platform that exists to display and circulate the targeted advertisements of its commercial partners as well as an environment through which the information necessary to generate such targeted advertising can itself be aggregated in the first place. In his theory of audience labour, political economist Dallas Smythe (2001) described the role of the audience (1) as a commodity whose attention could be sold to advertisers and (2) as a community performing the labour of learning how to desire mass-produced goods, thereby generating demand for said goods and services. While well-suited to the dynamics particular to the dominant medium of its time, Smythe’s model of audience commodification cannot fully account for the integral shifts which have taken place in the context of contemporary social media. Although the commercial style of social networking sites “can be situated within more general capitalist processes that follow familiar patterns of asymmetrical power relations between workers and owners, commodification, and the harnessing of audience power” (Cohen, 2008: 8), the most striking feature remains the sheer scale of the appropriation of users’ labour; particularly in relation to the manner in which this appropriation takes place through the fusion of production and consumption.

Indeed, this dynamic flattening of these two categories has been broached by a number of scholars, and has in turn received a variety of names including “free labour” (Terranova, 2004), “immaterial labour” (Côté and Pybus, 2007), “playbour” (Kücklich, 2005), “connectivity” (Van Dijck, 2012), “communicative capitalism” (Dean, 2005), and “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2015), among others. What unites many of these perspectives, however, is a broader characterisation of labour in which the user (as productive consumer) “produces the
informational and cultural content of the commodity” (Lazzarato, 1996: 133) through a series of actions which inculcate an affective dimension “of ease, well being, satisfaction, excitement or passion” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 108) within the user, whose actions (when appropriated collectively) result in the preservation and reproduction of the economic prosperity of the contemporary social media landscape (Cohen, 2008: 9).

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & RESEARCH QUESTION

Given the scale of the research project, it is my hope that the literature broached in the preceding section represents a satisfactory and comprehensive overview of the conceptual elements which will help guide the investigation of the research question posed below. Although gaps persist with respect to literature devoted to the critical analysis of discourses forwarded by prominent business figures in the field of new media and technology, what does exist acknowledges the centrality of power in its multiple forms in the creation and crystallisation of hierarchies of discourses surrounding these tools. In order to contribute to and expand upon the existing literature in this particular realm of communications scholarship, this research takes into consideration conceptual elements and theoretical contributions from a diverse range of fields including critical data studies, political economy, software studies, critical theory, and likewise incorporates legal scholarship devoted to the interpretation of privacy in online contexts.

The literature review therefore sought to bring to the fore a number of key concepts which relate to the central research objectives of this project and will in turn inform the analysis that follows. As has been argued, the contemporary character of and possibilities afforded to mediated communications have become (1) increasingly subjected to and filtered through a distinctive anticipatory computational logic (Adams et al., 2009: 260; Amoore, 2011: 29; Aradau and Blanke, 2017: 375) and (2) transformed through their conversion into a source of economic value (Couldry and Van Dijck, 2015: 2). The nature of encoding, as a process through which user activity is transformed into formats capable of being engineered (Alaimo, 2014; Alaimo and Kallinikos, 2016), has been described as a form of power strictly bound to its metric
reconfiguration of both concrete elements and abstract social facts. In turn, software configures sociality online “by encoding values and decisions about what is important, useful, and relevant” and consequently shapes what actions are either possible or impossible for users to perform (Bucher, 2012a: 485). Taken as a whole, we can understand the centrality of quantification and its significance as a precondition for the circulation of power online through its capacity to determine what is of importance and in what forms it may emerge by first establishing the standardisation and operationalisation thereof (Rieder, 2012).

If Facebook can indeed be understood as “an embodiment of a philosophy of information in which ‘information wants to be shared’” (Raynes-Goldie, 2012: 146) it follows then that these underlying beliefs will have a tangible effect upon “the values built into the design of Facebook,” including “its user interface, privacy policies, terms of service, and method of governance” (Zimmer, 2010). In order to uncover these beliefs, a Critical Discourse Analysis of Mark Zuckerberg’s public utterances will be performed, and will seek to answer the following questions:

**RQ:** How does Zuckerberg engage in the discursive construction of the social in relation to Facebook as a platform?

**SQ1:** How is Facebook situated within this vision of the future of sociality? What is Facebook’s relationship to (and the role it plays within the context of) the vision Zuckerberg professes?

**SQ2:** What is characteristic of this vision?

## 4. METHODOLOGY

In order to investigate the preceding research questions, Norman Fairclough’s model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will be used as the principle framework through which the analysis will be conducted. This section will therefore begin with a theoretical overview of CDA. Subsequently, it will present an argument in support of the relevance and appropriateness of this method with respect to the research questions posed. Next, it will
describe the design of the research project and the logic behind the sampling procedure. Lastly, it will discuss the limitations particular to this methodological approach and in turn suggest alternative methodological approaches which may prove complimentary to similar research initiatives.

1.4 Theoretical Overview of Discourse Analysis

CDA represents one among a number of sociolinguistic approaches to the analysis of social discourse that enable researchers to investigate and analyse relations of power which manifest in society through the formulation of a normative critique thereof (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). This particular methodology is nevertheless distinct in comparison to other analytical approaches in part due to its emphasis upon the need to understand the manner in which discursive practices are socially shaped and how these practices in turn reciprocally produce their own social effects (Fairclough, 1995). Despite its strong textual orientation, CDA is well positioned to extend beyond purely syntactic or semantic concerns, and instead encourages critical interrogations of the ways in which discourses actively shape and are shaped by the social. Thus, CDA interprets discourse not simply as a means through which social actors exert influence upon a given audience, but rather as an indication of the underlying worldview of the speaker. It is in this sense that CDA acknowledges the integral connection between discourse and the tangible exercise of power, in which discourses seek the reproduction of a given social order through practices of marginalisation, valorisation, and domination (Hook, 2001).

1.5 Methodological Justification

Having taken into account the above theoretical considerations, it is argued that CDA is methodologically suitable for the investigation of the research questions posed in the preceding section. In more concrete terms, the appropriateness of CDA stems in part from its rejection of otherwise uncritical assumptions which characterise language as a neutral mechanism through which the world may come to be described, and rather seeks to engage with the fundamentally performative and constructive elements of language (Gill, 2000;
Thus, a systematic discursive analysis of the language mobilised across Zuckerberg’s public utterances offers valuable insight into the manner in which Facebook conceptualises and seeks to portray itself, its users, and the relational intersections between them. For instance, Facebook’s discursive construction of its own self-definition as ‘social infrastructure’, tasked with making the world a more ‘connected’ place, is particularly instructive as it constitutes the corporation’s attempts to suggest, stabilise, and spread specific interpretations of its significance and function in society among competing social networks. In addition, CDA similarly assists in the interpretation of a speaker’s underlying philosophical or ideological motivations, thereby affording a more expansive interpretation of the social effects and implications of the discursive act in and of itself. A systematic investigation into the broader ideology reflected in the discursive tactics mobilised in Zuckerberg’s articulation of Facebook’s ambitions, such as increasing global connectivity and encouraging the acceptance of new social norms, is therefore made possible through the methodological lens of CDA. It is in this sense that CDA affords researchers the possibility of critically interrogating the intentions which belie the intersection of speech and power, bringing to the fore those fundamentally constructive and constitutive social elements of speech which may otherwise be taken for granted.

In turn, it is of course necessary to demonstrate why an analysis of Mark Zuckerberg’s public utterances is warranted. As Facebook’s co-founder and CEO controlling nearly 60 percent of the company’s stock, and therefore a majority of the voting rights, Zuckerberg’s public statements represent a unique opportunity to glean insight into Facebook’s self-conception and long-term ambitions. Indeed, as the longstanding figurehead of Facebook, a careful and critical analysis of his public utterances made over the past decade may assist in identifying the political and ideological beliefs which inform and support his actions. As Facebook continues to expand its user base and cement its position as a relatively ubiquitous and everyday form of ‘social infrastructure’ at an international level, the repercussions of certain speech acts are by no means inconsequential. It is imperative that social media scholars critically reflect upon his espoused beliefs and encourage greater scepticism among the public.
toward the many normative claims made by Zuckerberg and similar figures as to the inevitable trajectory of the future of sociality. Such reflections may help interpret the sequence of past actions, anticipate future possibilities, all while contributing to a comparatively limited area of research within the field of media and communications.

1.6 Research Design

In light of the methodological advantages discussed, CDA will be used to accomplish the analysis of the selected texts outlined in the subsequent section. The analysis will proceed according to Fairclough’s (1992a) three dimensional discursive analysis and will entail the follow considerations:

1. **Textual dimension**: This level concerns itself with the observation of linguistic features, such as vocabulary, grammar, coherence, intertextuality, and the overall organisation of the text.

2. **Discursive dimension**: This level examines processes of text production, distribution, and consumption. It also takes into account the manner in which these processes differ in accordance to various discourses and social factors.

3. **Societal dimension**: This level concerns itself with the notion of social practice and seeks to attend to the broader implications of a given discursive event. It examines how social practice shapes discourse, and seeks to articulate the reciprocally constitutive and constructive effects of discourse upon the former.

The application of this three-dimensional structure will be employed throughout the analysis of the sampled texts in order to ensure its consistency. Particular attention will be devoted to analyses centred upon both textual and discursive dimensions. This emphasis is reflected in the system of codes developed for this project which highlights important pronominal slippages, word choice, fluctuations in verbal modalities and (in)transitivity, as well as three particular discursive themes which reappear throughout the sampled texts.
1.7 Sampling

For the purposes of this research project, seven texts were selected and analysed according to their thematic relevance to the research questions posed. In order to capture a more varied range in discursive style, the sampled texts were ultimately selected in order to reflect temporal and contextual diversity. As such, the texts chosen were taken from public utterances made by Zuckerberg ranging between 2009 and the first quarter of 2018, and incorporate interviews, a stockholder meeting, a transcribed conversation with fellow employees of Facebook, a short blog post, an open letter often characterised as a manifesto of sorts, as well as recent testimony delivered to the United States Congress in response to the ongoing Cambridge Analytica scandal. Reflected in these choices is the intention to capture explicit expressions of Zuckerberg’s understanding of Facebook’s role as an apparatus of governance and his vision of the future of mediated sociality. The selection process therefore focused on texts that were (1) relevant to the research question, (2) analytically generative, and (3) thematically concordant with one another overall. Thus, through the use of purposive sampling, the selected texts enabled a more detailed exploration, analysis, and understanding of the central themes encapsulated by the research questions (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).

Among the texts sampled, five out of the seven were obtained from the Zuckerberg Files, an archive created by researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee aiming to compile and catalogue Mark Zuckerberg’s public utterances from 2004 until the present. At the time of writing, however, the Zuckerberg Files archive is only inclusive of utterances made until the end of 2017, as the transcription of public statements after this date is currently ongoing. Thus, in order to include statements regarding more recent events, the last two texts sampled are derived from transcriptions of an interview and testimony given by Zuckerberg in the first quarter of 2018. The inclusion of these two texts was understood to be particularly important as they are demonstrative of the rhetorical style and discursive patterns of a public figure under (1) close scrutiny from the public and (2) considerable pressure from both public officials and business partners, and are therefore a source of valuable insight for this research project.
This selective approach to sampling imparts a variety of beneficial attributes with respect to this research project. It ensures that an appropriate variety of contexts are taken into account and thus helps reduce the unintentional privileging of particular discursive patterns over others. Given the sheer amount of material available on the *Zuckerberg Files* archive in conjunction with the particular temporal constraints of this research project, it became necessary to prioritise the inclusion of analytically generative texts of a sufficient length. Consequently, a number of factors have been taken into consideration in order to ensure a viable diversity in the discourses present across the sampled texts. First, the sample encompasses an assortment of audiences, including business partners, co-workers, government officials, and Facebook’s (English speaking) user base. Second, the variety of contexts in which these audiences are addressed likewise helps capture a plurality of linguistic registers as well as rhetorical strategies; fluctuating between confident, optimistic and visionary conversational styles to more defensive, cautious, and self-reflective speech patterns. As a result, the sampled texts assist in uncovering discursive habits which appear to be common across distinct contexts, thereby enabling a cross-situational reading of both recurring and idiosyncratic patterns of speech. In turn, this sampling method likewise affords the observation of discursive divergences in accordance to the contexts in which they emerge.

1.8 Methodological Limitations

In spite of the many significant methodological advantages discussed in the preceding sections, it nevertheless remains necessary to discuss and critically reflect upon the limitations of CDA in relation to the proposed research. As a fundamentally qualitative methodological approach, CDA has received criticism due to its distinctly subjective analytical character (Billig, 1999; Schegloff, 1997). As a result, what emerges from the researcher’s analysis is necessarily contingent upon the standpoint from which the text is approached, including “the particular social issues in focus, and the social theory and discourse theory” the researcher elects to draw upon (Fairclough, 2003: 16). Indeed, as Potter asserts, one of the main issues researchers must inevitably confront “is that by its very nature such critical work is often undermining some versions of social arrangements while simultaneously presupposing
This inherently subjective quality consequently limits the extent to which one may take into consideration the plurality of potential ways a text may be construed (Blommaert and Blucaen, 2000), and must therefore privilege the interpretations, underlying assumptions, and theoretical extrapolations of the researcher. It is consequently imperative, with this notion of interpretive foreclosure in mind, that researchers who make use of CDA meaningfully incorporate practices of self-reflexivity, both examining and making clear intervening elements or personal experiences which shape their selection and interpretation of the texts under analysis. It is hoped that the rationale behind the sampling procedure outlined in the preceding section suitably addresses these concerns.

1.9 Complementary Methodologies

Insofar as this particular research question is concerned, it would appear that CDA is uniquely well suited to address the considerations entailed in spite of the methodological limitations discussed. Nevertheless, alternative methodologies can likewise contribute unique means through which notions of transparency, openness, and sociality can be analysed and made contextually intelligible. For instance, a content analysis of Facebook’s interface prompts, such as text boxes that appear at the top of a user’s News Feed alerting them that Facebook cares about the content they post, or the language surrounding Facebook’s Look Back feature,\(^1\) can help demonstrate the affective lexical dimensions of Facebook’s attempts to forward certain understandings of the social; particularly with respect to Facebook’s attempts to inculcate in its users a sense of community and belonging. In addition, an in-depth analysis of the platform’s user-end architecture would also be useful in helping map out the concrete manner in which Facebook actively orients and directs ‘social’ interactions on the platform (see Skeggs and Yuill, 2015). In turn, a close examination of the values encoded within these processes would help draw more explicit linkages between the values espoused by Zuckerberg in his

---

\(^1\) An automated, retrospective slideshows of a user’s old posts repurposed into new content to be shared. Showcases metrics quantifying various behaviours, such as how many times a user ‘Liked’ content that year or which of their photos received the most engagements from their ‘Friends’.
public utterances in juxtaposition with the actions undertaken by the engineering team at Facebook over time.

5. ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

The following section will present, describe, and evaluate the findings of the data analysis conducted in accordance to the textual, discursive, and social practice levels described in Fairclough’s model of Critical Discourse Analysis. What is presented here is not an exhaustive representation of the analysis undertaken, and is instead limited to the most commonly recurring themes observed throughout the sampled texts. The general challenge of the analysis stemmed from the abundance of detail worthy of examination (Fairclough, 1992b), and ultimately required a more selective analytical approach as detailed in the preceding section. As will be shown, the focus of the analysis is devoted to discourses pertaining to sociality, connectivity, and governance. In addition, particular attention was given to pronominal slippages and verb modalities during the coding process.

1.10 Technological Utopianism and Technological Determinism

Before addressing other themes, it is important to first identify and contextualise the philosophical beliefs which permeate and motivate the central trajectory of Facebook’s development over the years. Frequently, Zuckerberg’s public utterances are characterised by a particular idealism in which Facebook’s intervention in and technological disruption of contemporary social practices is framed as enabling the world to become more open and communicative:

_The structural change comes from this point of openness. We talk about this concept of openness and transparency as the high level ideal that we're moving towards at Facebook. The way that we get there is by empowering people to share and connect. The combination of those two things leads the world to become more open. And so as time has gone on, we’ve actually shifted a bit more of a focus not just on directly making it so people can use Facebook and share and be open on_
Zuckerberg expresses the value of openness and transparency as ‘the high level ideal’ that orients and guides Facebook, positioning its ongoing achievement as an objective enthusiastically pursued through the direct intervention of Facebook’s engineering team in the experiences of their users. The use of the definite article ‘the’ further demonstrates the centrality of these concepts to Facebook’s overarching philosophy, suggesting them to be singular in nature and of utmost importance, as that which can be said to motivate Facebook’s decisions in a broader sense.

Insofar as this ideal relates to Facebook’s ‘global community’ of users, Zuckerberg has at times characterised their “journey to connect the world” (Appendix 5) as their “mission” (Appendix 4) and “responsibility”, as well as “a moment of truth” and “the path forward” (Appendix 5). Across these excerpts, a sense of inevitability, necessity, and righteousness is indiscrete. At once, a linear narrative appears in which a moral urgency serves as a structuring agent: it is Facebook’s responsibility to connect the world, and increased connectivity is unambiguously declared to be the definitive ‘path forward’ for a global society that is understood to be “more divided than ever” (Appendix 4). Indeed, Zuckerberg maintains that “progress now requires humanity coming together not just as cities or nations, but also as a global community” (Appendix 5), once again articulating a modal sense of obligation through the use of ‘requires’, in which resistance to Zuckerberg’s personal ideals is portrayed as a hindrance to human progress in a transcendentally global sense. The structural decisions Facebook makes, regardless of their actual consequences, are therefore rationalised and justified by this moral imperative.

With respect to Facebook’s initial goal of “making the world more open and connected” and their current mission statement of “bringing the world closer together” (Constine, 2017), Facebook is centred as an active agent in the shepherding of its global community toward the acceptance of social norms entailing greater expressions of openness and transparency. Facebook is the active subject who moves, empowers, connects, gives to, enables, and leads
Encoding the Social
Sam McGeachy

(Appendix 1, 5, 7) its comparatively passive global community of users. Indeed, Facebook users’ capacity to act is necessarily contingent upon the extent to which the possibility to act is conferred upon them by the core agent that Facebook represents; as that which is empowered to ‘empower’. Both the establishment of the conditions permitting an action’s possibility and the shape an action may take are therefore largely divorced from users’ personal sphere of influence.

Interestingly, however, in Zuckerberg’s articulation of his ideals, Facebook also appears to engage reflexively with itself. As evidenced in the latter half of the above excerpt, Facebook has not only applied this ideal of openness to the manner in which users are made to interact through the platform, but also to the overall structure of the platform as a whole. In this sense, the prescriptive beliefs of Zuckerberg’s understanding of a “radical transparency” (Kirkpatrick, 2010: 200) are in turn sunken into the platform’s infrastructural ecology (Rieder, 2012; Star and Ruhleder, 1996: 113).

Present in many of Zuckerberg’s public speeches is the recurrent discursive contention of privacy’s waning value and eroding significance as a social norm. As someone who allegedly “doesn’t believe in [privacy]” (Van Buskirk, 2010), Zuckerberg repeatedly seeks to articulate a form of radically transparent sociality (Raynes-Goldie, 2012: 145) which privileges public disclosure as a social imperative and normative ideal. In doing so, Zuckerberg often sidesteps the more common discursive arena, where discussions often focus on the contemporary tensions between privacy and security, and instead frames profuse public self-disclosure as both a normative social good and an indication of individual morality. For instance, while he does not appeal to the somewhat pervasive rhetoric surrounding the ‘nothing-to-hide’ argument (see Solove, 2007), Zuckerberg has admitted that “he thought it was ‘lying’ to show people different aspects of oneself, depending on the context or relationship” (Raynes-Goldie, 2012: 166). As evidenced by Facebook’s “real you” policy (Cirucci, 2015), it is clear that Zuckerberg’s philosophy of radically transparent sociality seeps into his understanding of mediated social presentation, whereby users’ restriction to a singular, monolithic identity on the platform is the end result.
A persistent effort to bring to the fore narratives of user control over personal information following, for instance, controversial changes in default privacy settings functions as a clever rhetorical reversal. Although Zuckerberg insists Facebook seeks to “give people the control that they [need] to be really be comfortable” (Appendix 1), he omits the fact that his ideal of radical transparency can only be achieved through the *deliberate manufacturing* of the conditions in which users come to be encouraged and compelled to divulge increasing amounts of personal information. The extent to which users are given control is ultimately contingent upon whichever privacy standards optimise disclosure, giving users just enough privacy to encourage them to share more information, and thus striking a balance between the maximisation of disclosure and minimisation of privacy (Raynes-Goldie, 2012: 160).

By framing this orchestration as a form of both individual and collective empowerment that helps ‘bring the world closer together’, Zuckerberg disguises the intentionality of the site’s architecture and pre-empts resistance to their practices through the mobilisation of discourses of free choice, personalisation, and a more general neoliberal rhetoric of self-responsibilisation. In this sense, both the *discursive* and *structural* inequalities underlying these utterances can be understood accordingly: as an institutional actor uniquely situated at the heart of Facebook (Hoffmann, Proferes and Zimmer, 2016), Zuckerberg makes use of his prominent position to promote particular views about mediated sociality, while also ensuring that his values and beliefs are in turn codified through their reinforcement within the platform’s architecture. When taken together, these discursive and structuring acts represent a deliberate attempt at diminishing the validity of competing discourses (Foucault, 1978: 101) which privilege privacy and denounce the routine commercial exploitation of user data that remains central to datafication (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013; Van Dijck, 2014: 201).

In addition, Zuckerberg often fuses privacy-related discourses with narratives of progress and globalisation. As a company that “stands for bringing us closer together and building a global community” (Appendix 5), Zuckerberg conflates connectivity with notions of togetherness when gesturing toward Facebook’s ambitions to expand its global presence and reach hitherto
untapped markets. Interestingly, Zuckerberg fluctuates between portraying the world as a monolithic global community in need of technological intervention to recognise its fundamental interconnectedness, while at times conceding that inconsistencies between different societies will have to be taken into account when grappling with culturally sensitive issues. The solution he ultimately proposes is highly individualistic, suggesting the implementation of personal and regional standards, established via “a system of personal control over our experience” in order to filter problematic and sensitive content on the platform (Appendix 5). The incommensurability of difference experienced in coming ‘together’ is therefore paradoxically resolved through users’ voluntary adoption of filters which isolate them from that which is found to be disagreeable in one another.

What unites Zuckerberg’s characterisation of transparency as a necessary social good and the inevitability of global connectivity are particular assumptions characteristic of technological utopianism. As such, rather than considering the discourses forwarded by Zuckerberg as unitary and in isolation, it is important to stress their historical connection to and perpetuation of particular belief systems. Though made up of seemingly incongruent worldviews comprising, among others, cybernetics (Pickering, 2010), New Communalist counterculture (Turner, 2006), and neoliberalism, what has been referred to as the Californian Ideology (Barbrook and Cameron, 1995) unites these discursive predecessors through the shared lens of technological utopianism and technological determinism. In doing so, it is posited that increased efficiency, transparency, the flattening of social hierarchies, and the free flow of information “are seen not only as a social good, but as the logical evolutions of human communication and society” (Raynes-Goldie, 2012: 144).

According to the set of beliefs characteristic of the Californian Ideology, the means through which social change can be brought about necessarily implicates and intersects with the logic

---

2 Consider, for instance, the long-term financial motivation behind this narrative of ‘connective connectedness’ that characterised Facebook’s attempted Free Basics program in India (see Bahtia, 2016).
of free market capitalism. Ideological adherents to this model therefore believe in the value of social change, though argue that it is best accomplished through corporate structures, driven by technological means, and its righteousness measured according to its success in the market (Barbrook, 2007). In past interviews, Zuckerberg has indicated his commitment to this particular socio-political project and the concomitant means through which it ought to be accomplished. Indeed, according to Zuckerberg, although he and early Facebook staff “always talked about [Facebook] as a movement, not as a website”, he insists that “the reason we built a company is because I think that a company is by far the best way to get the best people together and align their incentives around doing something great” (Appendix 2). This insistence has the effect of discursively undermining the legitimacy of alternative organisational structures’ capacity to bring about meaningful social change, and instead centres the ideology of neoliberal capitalism as both an economic order and a global socio-political movement for the betterment of society.

1.11 Conflation of Connectivity and Connectedness

The tension between Zuckerberg’s discursive characterisation of mediated social interaction and the structural materiality through which it is designed, regulated, and controlled emerges frequently in his discussions of Facebook’s role in contemporary sociality. As has been addressed in the preceding section, it is Zuckerberg’s contention that “Facebook’s mission is about giving people a voice and bringing people closer together” (Appendix 7), and thus “the value that Facebook creates is that it opens up communication channels and builds relationships” (Appendix 1). Here, Facebook is mostly characterised as a complement to traditional forms of sociality, existing as a supplementary medium through which pre-existing affiliations can interact. However, the distinction between offline connectedness and platformed connectivity is at times more explicitly flattened, as Zuckerberg likewise insists that “the need to open up and connect is what makes us human … brings us together … [and] brings meaning to our lives” (Appendix 3). The use of ‘open up’ and ‘connect’ is strategic and seeks to legitimise emergent practices of mediated self-disclosure by rhetorically entangling the impetus of connectivity within relational norms of reciprocity and mutuality. In doing so,
Zuckerberg elides the fundamentally intermediary function at the heart of social media platforms, in that all relationships are inevitably affected by or are themselves the products of the logic of connectivity rather than social connectedness in and of itself. Through these rhetorical appeals to a kind of fundamental human nature, Zuckerberg in turn obfuscates the computational processes beyond users’ control that are responsible for the types of connections to which he alludes. Consider, for instance, Facebook’s People You May Know feature through which users are prompted to initiate ‘friendships’ exclusively within the platform (and therefore through its computational estimation of user-to-user affinity), rather than appending relationships formed outside its boundaries in a more voluntary manner.

Frequently, Zuckerberg conflates connectedness with connectivity by associating the aggregate data pertaining to users with the meaningful interpretation and use of that data by users themselves. Appealing to the authority of uncited research, Zuckerberg seeks to argue that Facebook’s ‘unique’ position as a social network, in which the variability of users’ self-expression has been flattened into a singular profile intended for cross-contextual consumption, can be understood as a means to ameliorate the quality of social interaction and civility online:

Research suggests the best solutions for improving discourse may come from getting to know each other as whole people instead of just opinions—something Facebook may be uniquely suited to do. If we connect with people about what we have in common … it is easier to have dialogue about what we disagree on. When we do this well, we give billions of people the ability to share new perspectives while mitigating the unwanted effects that come with any new medium. (Appendix 5)

Zuckerberg’s habitual referential slippage in his use of the pronoun ‘we’ is clearly demonstrated in this passage. As briefly discussed in the preceding section, the ‘we’ corresponding to the engineering team at Facebook is associated with proactive language: it is the ‘we’ that connects, does, and gives to the comparatively passive community of Facebook users hailed in the secondary usage of ‘we’, whose interests are in turn presumed to align with those of the former (i.e. Facebook’s internal corporate body). With respect to the notion of
‘unwanted effects’, it is interesting to note the determinism implied by Zuckerberg’s claim that these effects ‘come with any new medium’. Here, it is suggested that the many controversies Facebook has weathered are both commonplace and inevitable—something experienced as ‘any medium’ evolves over time—rather than acknowledging the ways in which the tools Facebook provides users, the algorithms which curate its content, and Facebook’s underlying business incentives have each contributed toward the facilitation of anti-social behaviour on the platform. Rather, Zuckerberg instead positions Facebook as ‘uniquely suited’ to fix problems it has helped create (Howard, 2016; Spohr, 2017).

In this account, Zuckerberg rejects the contextual and temporal nature of sociality by conflating the aggregation of discrete data points about a person with the process of coming to know them, consequently disregarding the significant reciprocity this latter process necessarily entails. This rhetorical strategy is supported by the ambiguity afforded by the dual meanings of ‘social’ in the context of social media platforms. In the first, platforms are framed as facilitators of social interaction and communal activities, emphasising qualities of voluntary participation and collaboration in turn grounded in an understanding of connectedness as a fundamental social good. Obscured by the former interpretation is the underside of mediated sociality, in which platformed interactions are inevitably subjected to “automated systems that engineer and manipulate connections” (Van Dijck, 2013: 6).

By encoding abstract social values into formalised structures, platforms like Facebook manipulate sociality’s conditions of possibility through the differential algorithmic amplification of visibility. In Zuckerberg’s own words, it is Facebook’s “job is to make sure that we can show you the most important things that you don’t want to miss … showing really prominently at the top” (Appendix 4). In addition, Zuckerberg’s emphasis upon the need to get “to know each other as whole people instead of just opinions” likewise shifts attention away from the manner in which social media platforms like Facebook actively shape users’ taste and curate their experiences through the purposeful engineering of everyday sociality. In seeking to evoke the notion of connectedness, Zuckerberg obscures the fundamentally computational nature of connectivity in which “the norms and values supporting the ‘social’
image of these media remain hidden in the platforms’ technological textures” (Van Dijck, 2013: 7). This works to conceal the ways in which Facebook actively commodifies both the information users divulge about themselves and the information generated from their interactions with one another on the platform by associating disclosure with the promotion of social harmony and tolerance in the face of ideological and material difference.

Nevertheless, Zuckerberg does occasionally exhibit a degree of reflexivity with respect to the discursive tension between the symbolic value of connectedness (which he routinely promotes in relation to the functionality of the platform) in opposition to the connectivity underlying the very structure of Facebook:

*I think it’s clear that just helping people connect by itself isn’t always positive. A much bigger part of the focus for me now is making sure that as we’re connecting people, we are helping to build bonds and bring people closer together, rather than just focused on the mechanics of the connection and the infrastructure. (Appendix 6)*

In order to ensure the realisation of their professed mission of ‘bringing the world closer together’, Zuckerberg acknowledges the need to look beyond the mere quantification of sociality and critically interrogate their intermediary role in a more qualitative sense. Acknowledging that “sharing is a bit different than communicating” (Appendix 1) Zuckerberg claims that it is therefore “not enough to just connect people, we have to make sure those connections are positive” (Appendix 7).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the solutions proposed to combat the spread of antagonistic behaviour call for the facilitation of personalised content sharing through the implementation of individualised content filters, rather than moderating content on the platform as a whole. According to Zuckerberg “each person should see as little objectionable content as possible, and each person should be able to share what they want while being told they cannot share something as little as possible” (Appendix 5). In this sense, Facebook once again seeks to carve out a happy medium in which users are encouraged to share as much content as possible on
the platform while experiencing as little objectionable material that may otherwise deter them from continuing to frequent the site. Since Facebook relies on the commodification of the sociality it engineers on the platform, it is careful not to offend significant swathes of users through practices of outright censorship. In response to criticism that Facebook continues to allow fringe media organisations to have ‘Pages’ on their platform, the company has maintained that they “don’t think banning Pages for sharing conspiracy theories or false news is the right way to go,” (Facebook, 2018a) as “we believe banning these Pages would be contrary to the basic principles of free speech” (Facebook, 2018b). Indeed, as Zuckerberg has himself asserted, “we always favour giving people the power to share more” (Appendix 5), regardless of the harm some of that content may yield. As a result, Facebook’s financial interests therefore ultimately undermine their attempts at fabricating, uniquely through discursive means, a morally accountable and conscientious image to the public.

1.12 Top-Down Personalised Governance
A tension persists between Facebook’s role as a platform directly engaged in the purposeful engineering of its community’s experiences and the underlying value pluralism the scale of its user base necessarily entails. Over the years, Zuckerberg’s characterisation of Facebook’s relationship as a governing body toward its community has remained ambivalent, fluctuating between democratic, dialogic negotiation of community standards, and more authoritative, top-down approaches to governance:

With a community of more than 2 billion people all around the world … where there are wildly different social and cultural norms, it’s just not clear to me that us sitting in an office here in California are best placed to always determine what the policies should be for people all around the world. (Appendix 6)

Overall, it is important that the governance of our community scales with the complexity and demands of its people. We are committed to always doing better, even if that involves building a worldwide voting system to give you more voice and control. (Appendix 5)
In the first passage, Zuckerberg acknowledges the limitations of Facebook’s positionality, electing to characterise it through language indicating spatial contingency as a principle hindrance. Put simply, the internal community at Facebook headquarters (‘us’) in California may not be well ‘placed’ to determine which policies are appropriate for Facebook users around the globe. However, Zuckerberg’s use of the word ‘always’ in the second sentence reveals a conditionality underlying this seemingly reflexive gesture. In this sense, although Facebook may not always be in a position to make appropriately mindful decisions that best serve their international community as a whole, it is implied that in some cases they are. Indeed, Zuckerberg later acknowledges this directly, insisting that the engineering team at Facebook (‘we’) “can really design these products and decisions with what is going to be in the best interest of the community over time” (Appendix 6).

In the second passage, Zuckerberg frames the issue of community governance around the notion of value pluralism more generally, reflecting on the cultural diversity entailed by its community of over two billion users across the world. Despite this, his language evokes a particular sense of unity. By generalising its users under a singular banner (‘our community’ and ‘its people’), Zuckerberg seeks to address them as a unified public. This discursive strategy echoes the philosophy behind Facebook’s mission statement of bringing the world ‘closer together’, in this instance nominally collapsing the identities of billions of individuals for the sake of a rhetorical appeal to unity. In this sense, Zuckerberg can be said to evoke a mythic construction of Facebook’s user base as a monolithic entity in an effort to inculcate in its users a sense of belonging to a community of global citizens, while simultaneously rationalising its top-down governance structure through subtle allusions to nationhood (‘its people’).

Indeed, this latter peculiarity is further evidenced in Zuckerberg’s suggestion of a democratic ‘worldwide voting system’ which would seek to ‘give you more voice and control’. Here, Zuckerberg grounds the potentially overwhelming scale of Facebook’s ‘community’ through a direct form of address (‘you’), engaging the reader as a member of this community whose ‘voice’ (i.e. participation on the platform) is integral to Facebook’s commitment to ‘always doing better’. However, the structural reality behind this rhetorical construction is readily
unveiled by the conditional composition of the last sentence. By saying Facebook will honour their commitment ‘even if’ that means having to give ‘more’ control to users, Zuckerberg inadvertently suggests that if the team at Facebook could get away with giving users less control, that would be their preferred or at least default approach. This demonstrates the fragility of Zuckerberg’s rhetorical appeals to the notion of democracy, as any power given to (or taken away from) users is done so by a handful of individuals who have come to power irrespective of the desires of Facebook’s ‘global community’. As such, beneath idealistic discourses largely grounded in notions of decentralised communication and open participation surrounding the rise of social media (often condensed under the banner of ‘Web 2.0’) lies the unequal and somewhat authoritarian relationship between platform owners and their users.

Similarly, an additional relational inequality emerges when reflecting on Facebook’s commodification of user engagement, in which users’ desire for opportunities to socialise or mobilise their social capital is inevitably performed in conjunction with Facebook’s expropriation of users’ immaterial labour (Coté and Pybus, 2007). As Zuckerberg declares, once again alluding to user empowerment through personalisation and appeals to democratic norms, “our hope is that this system of personal controls and democratic referenda should minimize restrictions on what we can share” (Appendix 5). Here, the emphasis is clearly oriented toward the creation of conditions in which user engagement is maximised rather than qualitatively refined. For Zuckerberg, sharing is unproblematically conceived as a social good in and of itself. It is suggested that avoiding deliberate limitations placed upon users’ ability to share (whatever they want, however they want, and with whomever they want) is Facebook’s primary concern. As a result, the suppression of content is portrayed as a greater threat to social harmony than the effects of the circulation of harmful content in and of itself.

With regards to Zuckerberg’s understanding of Facebook’s position relative to their users it is clear that, in spite of his rhetorical appeals to democratic norms of participation and neoliberal self-responsibilisation, he views himself and Facebook’s internal community as social leaders, innovators, and architects:
We also get a lot of people saying ‘But this isn’t as open as it needs to be.’ And in a lot of ways I think they’re right, but this stuff takes time. We’re moving [our community] along this spectrum trying to tell people to share information and be comfortable with that. (Appendix 1)

Right now a lot of people aren’t as focused on connecting the world or bringing countries closer together as maybe they were a few years back. And I still view that as an important part of our vision for where the world should go—that we do what we can to stay committed to that and hopefully can help the world move in that direction. (Appendix 6)

In these excerpts, Facebook is identified as the core instigator of social change. It is Facebook who moves their community toward norms of greater openness and self-disclosure by ‘telling’ users to share more information, to actively embrace Facebook’s vision, and to ‘be comfortable with that’. Nevertheless, with respect to Facebook’s attempts at engineering new normative approaches to privacy and sociality online, Zuckerberg has remarked that these changes are at times “so rapid that our community isn’t ready for it or isn’t happy about it when it initially happens” (Appendix 1). Here, it is implied that although users do initially resist changes imposed upon them by Facebook’s engineering team, they eventually acquiesce and embrace, perhaps hesitantly, these newly manufactured social dynamics. In the final sentence of the latter passage, however, the scope of this vision extends beyond Facebook’s current user base and sets its sights on the world as a whole. Zuckerberg therefore not only sees Facebook as shepherding its own users, but also recognises its capacity to shift social norms in a much more global sense:

It’s really easy to have a nice philosophy about openness, but moving the world in that direction is a different thing. It requires both understanding where you want to go and being pragmatic about getting there. (Appendix 1)

It would appear, then, that Zuckerberg is more aligned with the view that Facebook can and will shape the ways in which mediated sociality manifests at a global level, insisting that “not one day goes by when I don’t think about what it means for us to be the stewards of this
community and their trust” (Zuckerberg, 2011). As the ‘stewards of this community’ it is up to Facebook to guide its users according to the corporation’s conception of the social. In turn, Zuckerberg reveals the breadth of his goals, acknowledging that his global ambitions of ‘moving the world in that direction’ starkly transcend Facebook’s current user base as such. While Zuckerberg and his team at Facebook “haven’t mastered the art of moving people along in terms of change” (Appendix 1), it is clear that they are uncompromisingly committed to their vision of a future sociality whose manufactured transparency serves to benefit them handsomely should it come to fruition.

6. CONCLUSION

Having now explored a selection of Mark Zuckerberg’s public utterances, a number of discursive features have been identified with respect to the supposed nature of sociality and its future potential forms. Throughout these excerpts, the overarching themes of technological utopianism and technological determinism pervade, demonstrating the antecedent philosophical concepts which helped shape and continue to influence Zuckerberg’s vision of radically transparent sociality. Hidden behind frequently mobilised concepts such as openness, connection, and transparency are explicit normative assumptions about the ideal form of the social, which in turn reflect the architectural changes in Facebook’s interface made since its inception. Through the purposeful embedding of Zuckerberg’s beliefs within Facebook as a structure, taken in conjunction with the information gleaned from the critical analysis of his discourse, it has been argued that Facebook fully embraces its self-professed ‘responsibility’ as the stewards of its community in shepherding its users toward Zuckerberg’s personal vision of the social. In turn, it has been observed that Zuckerberg’s discourse frequently relies upon the conflation of significant social concepts with constricted, meticulously operationalised forms reflective of Facebook’s attempts to encode, control, and direct the social according to Zuckerberg’s professed vision thereof. It is in this sense that rhetorical appeals to an innate human drive toward mediated connectivity help mask the
underlying processes of computation and commodification which remain fundamental to Zuckerberg’s endeavours.

While this research sought to uncover recurring discursive patterns in Zuckerberg’s conceptualisation and construction of the social through an overview of his public utterances, it may prove valuable to provide suggestions for future research on similar topics. With regards to Critical Discourse Analysis in particular, and thematic analysis more generally, I believe an intently intertextual examination of the promotional materials Facebook advances about itself would prove to be analytically generative. As Facebook seeks to rebrand itself in the eyes of both its users and the general public following the Cambridge Analytica scandal, a critical analysis of Facebook’s attempts at meaning-making and narrative construction through the stories it tells about itself would help further interpret Facebook’s self-definitions and self-perceived role in the lives of its users going forward. In turn, significant attention should be devoted to the manner in which Facebook appropriates the actions, words, and content of specific users on the platform in order to construct these narratives.

Ultimately, the widespread acceptance of Zuckerberg’s radically transparent sociality remains to be seen. Both Facebook users and critics have and continue to express their dissent toward the platform’s attempts to guide its users in the direction of increasing degrees of public disclosure on the platform. Indeed, Facebook’s overnight loss of over $123 billion in value on 26 July 2018 serves as a harsh demonstration of the company’s disappointing earnings and stalling growth this quarter (Dillet, 2018). Although some users have deliberately chosen to limit their time spent engaging with and through the platform (or have simply abandoned it altogether), Facebook nevertheless remains a pervasive artefact of today’s Internet ecology. Through APIs like Connect and the creation of ‘shadow profiles’ (i.e. non-user data collection accomplished through the use of cookies, tracking pixels, and the seemingly omnipresent Facebook ‘Like’ button widget), Facebook has secured its position for the time being by strategically embedding itself within the broader infrastructure of the Internet. As such, it remains necessary for scholars to encourage critical, interdisciplinary approaches to the study of ubiquitous connectivity and its impact on the social going forward.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES

Appendix 1
“The Wired Interview: Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg.” (29/06/2009)
Access: https://dc.uwm.edu/zuckerberg_files_transcripts/22/

Appendix 2
“Engineering Innovation: Inventing the Future of Social.” (18/02/2010)
Access: https://dc.uwm.edu/zuckerberg_files_transcripts/82/

Appendix 3
“The Things that Connect Us.” (10/04/2010)
Access: https://dc.uwm.edu/zuckerberg_files_transcripts/246/

Appendix 4
“Facebook 2015 Annual Stockholder Meeting.” (11/06/2015)
Access: https://dc.uwm.edu/zuckerberg_files_transcripts/240/

Appendix 5
“Building Global Community.” (16/02/2017)
Access: https://dc.uwm.edu/zuckerberg_files_transcripts/294/

Appendix 6
“Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s hardest year, and what comes next.” (02/04/2018)

Appendix 7
“Mark Zuckerberg’s Wednesday testimony to Congress on Cambridge Analytica.” (11/04/2018)