‘Othering’ the ‘Left-Behind’?
A Critical Discourse Analysis of the representation of Leave voters in British broadsheets’ coverage of the EU referendum.

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ABSTRACT

The 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum has been widely discussed and researched over the course of the last year. As a contribution, this thesis assesses media representations of the specific group of Leave voters labeled as ‘left-behind’ in political literature. In particular, it evaluates discursive presentations of the ‘left-behind’ as ‘Other’ in British broadsheets with widespread discourse access and social power. The research draws on theories that emphasize language and discourse as sites of ideology and meaning; media ownership over social symbolism; voice and listening as tools of legitimation; and discursive ‘Othering’ as mechanisms of social differentiation and omission. Applying Critical Discourse Analysis to 12 articles published in The Guardian, The Telegraph and The Times in the immediacy of the referendum, the findings suggest that the conception of the ‘left-behind’ as ‘Other’ is reinforced in the British press. However, it will be argued that the extent of ‘Othering’ through absence and discrimination differs according to the ideological and partisan affiliations of the discourse producer, with the traditionally left-leaning The Guardian in particular constructing the ‘Other’ as vastly different from the ‘Self’. Conversely, broadsheets more supportive of Brexit are likely to legitimate or sympathize with the ‘Other’, albeit maintaining a distance between the ‘left-behind’ and the neutral or intellectual ‘Self’.
1 INTRODUCTION

Right now it feels like the whole of British politics and society has been divided into two; the one half symbolised by ‘white van man’, the manual worker of low educational achievement, parading the national flag from the window of his work vehicle; the other half symbolised by the bearded hipster — his trips to Berlin for art, Ibiza for dancing, now in question, and the assumed cultural dominance of his social liberalism and anti-racism under threat. (Mason, 2016)

On June 23rd 2016, the British electorate engaged in ‘one of the largest exercises in democratic decision-making that Britain has ever seen’ (Goodwin and Heath, 2016: 325). Voting on the future of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, 51.9% of the electorate voted to withdraw its membership in a referendum that stunned the continent (ibid; Arnorsson and Zoega, 2016: 3). Not only did the result bring to the forefront commotion within domestic party politics and questions about the organization of the constitution, but too, it shed light on ‘broader fault lines that run through contemporary British politics and society’ (Goodwin and Heath, 2016: 323-324). These fault lines, it is argued, are brought about by factors such as globalization, immigration, and stark economic and educational differences, which has in turn fuelled Euroscepticism and anti-institutionalism (ibid; Hobolt, 2016; Arnorsson and Zoega, 2016).

Cutting across traditional patterns of party support, the vote to leave the EU outnumbered remain across the majority of districts in the UK, notwithstanding Northern Ireland, Scotland and London (Arnorsson and Zoega, 2016: 2). According to research conducted after the referendum, the support for Brexit was strongest in economically disadvantaged communities inhabited by individuals with lower than average educational achievements, where globalization and mass immigration has not been seen as to contribute to any increase in life standards (Goodwin and Heath, 2016: 325; Hobolt, 2016: 1260). Indeed, the vote illuminated the highly relevant thesis of the ‘left-behind’ (ibid). Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath categorize the ‘left-behind’ as follows:

social groups that are united by a general sense of insecurity, pessimism and marginalisation, who do not feel as though elites, whether in Brussels or Westminster, share their values, represent their interests or genuinely empathise with their intense angst about rapid social, economic and cultural change. (2016: 331)

The thesis reveals a fundamental inequality in democratic society, namely that between ‘voters for whom the vote is one resource amongst many and others with only a single chip on the table’ (Coleman, 2013: 16). While the so-called ‘left-behind’ were not univocally in support of Brexit, and
though many voters were driven by other sentiments and experiences than the abovementioned (Goodwin and Heath, 2016), it is time to address the persistence in British society of social groups who feel eluded by Western democracy. In fact, it is far from a new phenomenon. Research conducted in the mid-90’s on representations of democracy forecast some of the growing disenfranchisement amongst political subjects: it was found that, while participants recognized the UK as a democratic country, ‘they could not square this knowledge with their everyday experience’ (Gervais, 1999: 436). That is, their conceptions of society at large and their conception of their own lives where incongruent. Many participants ‘witnessed an experience of constraints and inequality’, residing in issues such as unemployment, class divisions, structural injustice and ‘a growing gap between rich and poor’ (ibid). So how come, at a time when both the personal and political is increasingly expressed within and across borders at a faster pace than ever before, that these sentiments have gone largely unforeseen?

In attempt to contribute to the challenge that lies ahead – in answering this question in not only the UK, but in various political constituencies across Europe and the US - this paper addresses the role of the media in upholding the image of the ‘left-behind’ as ‘Other’ to the desired political system and the status quo. Centrally, it evaluates the representation of Leave voters by applying Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to articles published in British broadsheets around the time of the EU referendum. In order to situate my research in relation to relevant theory and research, the first section will assess existing literature on language and media discourse, emphasizing in particular the media as a site of representation, voice, listening and ‘Othering’. Then, I will justify why CDA is an appropriate tool for analyzing the dynamics expressed in the literature. The third section is devoted to analyses and findings, and it will be argued that political partisanship and ideological convictions may disable the media from inclusive representation of the ‘left-behind’.

2 THEORETICAL CHAPTER

In order to assess the representation of ‘left-behind’ Leave voters as ‘Other’ in British broadsheets, it is useful to illuminate a few different theoretical approaches through which social and media representations can be analyzed. This chapter will thus begin by outlining theories on discourse, ideology and media teachings, and discuss existing research on discursive representation through voice, listening or, conversely, ‘Othering’. The theoretical backbone will then be synthesized in the thesis’ conceptual framework, before outlining its central research objectives.
3 LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Language and discourse

Language and discourse play key roles in establishing dominant and alternative knowledge about the world and its various constituents. Theories including, but not exclusive to, critical social theory, social constructionism, social representations theory and semiology, have established that knowledge, meaning and belief systems are socially constructed and embedded (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 3; Carvalho, 2008: 162; Hall, 1997: 6; Gervais et al., 1999: 422). More, approaches concerned with the politics of representation are interested in the particularities of how discursive knowledge production ‘connects with power, regulates conduct, makes up or constructs identities and subjectivities, and defines the way certain things are represented’ (Hall, 1997: 6). Drawing chiefly on the latter, this research is concerned with the various ways in which discourse creates and sustains dominant knowledge about and representations of the social world.

The conceptualization of language and discourse as meaning-makers is plentiful in media and communications research, and only a few but significant perspectives will be elucidated in the following. First, a few definitions are in order. Language can be theorized as ‘a representational system’ or medium in which meaning, knowledge and social identities are produced, exchanged and sustained (Hall, 1997: 1, emphasis in original; Fairclough, 1993: 134). Stuart Hall argues that, as an analytical object, language can be treated as signs or symbols that represent various meanings in society (Hall, 1997: 5). Spoken and written language, as well as symbolic and semiotic practice, constitutes what is now known as discourse (Fairclough, 1993: 134) and discursive formations (Hall, 1997: 6), which define and construct our perceptions of knowledge and meaning (ibid; Gill, 1998).

According to Pierre Bourdieu, symbols ‘make it possible for there to be a consensus on the meaning of the social world, a consensus which contributes fundamentally to the reproduction of the social order’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 166). He sees symbolic structures such as discourses central in the exercise of symbolic power; ‘a power of constructing reality’ (ibid). Bourdieu further emphasizes the centrality of ideology in shaping discourse, serving not only the interests of the class fractions attended by its articulations, but also the interests of its producer (ibid: 169). Similarly, critical scholars such as Teun van Dijk see discourses as sites on which ideologies are ‘acquired, confirmed, changed and perpetuated’ (van Dijk, 2006: 115). Ideologies as such are defined as fundamental, axiomatic belief systems that are socially shared and gradually acquired by a collectivity or group (ibid: 116-117).

However, discursive ideology need not be exercised only as a means of oppression by the dominating, but too, as a means of resistance by the dominated (van Dijk, 2006: 132). Indeed, discourses can be considered sites on which the struggle and negotiation over meaning and belief occurs. Influenced in part by the Western Marxist contention that language is not simply descriptive, but also embedded in power and ideology (Carvalho, 2008: 162), discourse analyst Norman Fairclough argues that discourse is ‘ideologically shaped by relations of… and struggles over power’ (Fairclough, 1991: 134-
135, emphasis added). That said, not only Fairclough and van Dijk (1993), but also theorists such as Hillary Janks (1997) and Ruth Wodak (2016), have addressed how discourses that are ideologically embedded may reproduce or justify social inequality. In particular, the emphasis of this research will be the study of discourse as a site where ‘the ideological polarization between ingroups and outgroups’ occurs (van Dijk, 2006: 115), and where ‘the power of a dominant social group or class’ is legitimated through the naturalization of dominant beliefs and the exclusion of others (Eagleton, 1991: 5).

3.2 Media discourse

It is widely accepted that media institutions act as highly influential owners, producers and transmitters of discourse and social symbols within and across cultures (Thompson, 1995; Gamson et al., 1992; Jaworski, 2007). According to William Gamson, media messages ‘act as teachers of values, ideologies and beliefs’ (Gamson et al, 1992: 374). This teaching occurs in multiple forms, with varying degrees of authority. For example, by naturalizing certain assumptions, media messages influence our conceptions of the taken-for-granted and common sense (ibid: 380-381). Michael Billig’s social psychological account of ideology and opinions may usefully be revisited in this context (Billig, 1991). According to Billig, societal notions of common sense are contingent on ideological underpinnings that confirm and uphold existing patterns of domination and power (ibid: 1). Social representations theory similarly points to how dominant systems of belief and knowledge become ‘naturalised and lived out in taken-for-granted social practices’ (Garvais et al., 1999: 422). Commonsensical notions, structures of meaning, or and articulations of truth (Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006: 1) are thus not neutral, but features of the ideological hegemony established in particular societal contexts (Gramsci, 1971, in Gamson et al., 1992: 381), and they may be reproduced and stimulated by the representational work of the media (Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006: 1). Such descriptions tie neatly into the critical classification of discourse as discussed above.

Yet, the extent to which media discourse univocally defines the tenets of social reality is debated. For one, recent development in the media landscape has allowed for the proliferation of ownership over meaning and discursive knowledge (Lacy and Rosenstiel, 2015: 5; Mutz and Silver, 2014: 77). What is more, while much of ‘reality’ is certainly pre-packaged, framed or constructed in the media, audiences are also ‘active processors’ that decode media messages in different ways (Gamson et al., 1992: 384). That is, audiences engage in the struggle and negotiation over meaning, reality and taken-for-granted articulations, rather than simply yielding to that which is structured by media agents (ibid). This can be achieved by integrating various resources beyond media discourse, e.g. ‘popular wisdom and experiential knowledge’, into our frame of reference (ibid: 390). However, such understandings do not contest the fact that media outlets have a definitional advantage when it comes to dominant discourse – rather, they suggest that audience agency is also intrinsic to the interpretation and dissemination of media messages.
3.3 The mainstream media and British press

Drawing on the abovementioned articulations, this paper scrutinizes the intricacy of discursive representation in the UK’s mainstream media outlets. The latter can be categorized as follows: ‘large scale and geared towards large, homogenous (segments of) audiences; state-owned organizations or commercial companies; vertically structured organizations staffed by professionals;’ and centrally, ‘carriers of dominant discourse and representations’ (Carpentier et al., 2003: 56). By conveying complex information about ‘abstract topics of which the readers might have little or no direct experience’, mainstream media play a central role in the formation of public knowledge and understanding (Chauhan and Foster, 2014: 390-391). Further, analyses of knowledge and communication under the conceptual umbrella of social representations studies have frequently investigated knowledge production in media outlets such as newspapers, as they are considered integral in the circulation of ‘representations and ideas’ (ibid: 391). Due to their extensive circulation and readership, apparent trustworthiness vis-à-vis for example tabloids (Ipsos MORI, 2008), and consequent ‘authoritative status’ (Jaworski, 2007: 271-272), broadsheets in particular engage in important representational work.

Though liberal democratic societies expect media institutions to fulfill the role of watchdog and to challenge dominant and abusive power and ideology (Cammaerts et al., 2017: 2), their tendency to serve the interests of particular and politically powerful segments of society has been discussed in great depth in communications research (ibid; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Bennett, 1990; Gamson et al., 1992). In the British context in particular, a tradition of political partisanship influences whose interests are served by discourse. Partisanship is a known feature of newspapers in the country, as these ‘are not subject to the impartiality requirements imposed on broadcasters’ (Levy et al., 2016: 7). This was reflected also in the run-up to Brexit, as newspapers covered the event ‘in a highly partisan way, reflecting the position of each paper’ (ibid: 6). This renders the British press a relevant site to study the ways in which ideology plays in on discursive representations.

3.4 Representation: voice and listening

This thesis is broadly concerned with the mechanisms through which British broadsheets enable or disable the representation of voters. Michael Saward’s influential account of the representative claim, albeit intended to illustrate the reciprocal and complex dynamics of political representation enacted by political figures (representatives) on behalf on their constituents (represented), is valuable and arguably transferable in the mediated context (Saward, 2006: 301-302). Specifically, the term describes ‘a claim to represent or to know what represents the interests of someone or something’, and is expressed the depiction of the electorate ‘as this or that, as requiring this or that, as having this or that set of interests’ (ibid: 305, 302). By means of the production of discourse and social reality, I would argue that the media, too, can be seen as ‘makers of representative claims’ (ibid: 301). Indeed,
according to Justin Lewis et al. (2005: 26), journalists ‘clearly dominate’ the statistics of who actually speak about – and thus represent – public opinion. They should therefore be understood as integral to the act of symbolic representation (Saward, 2006: 300). The following section will thus explore how citizens may be represented and legitimated in this discursive arena, chiefly through processes of voice.

First, it is useful to distinguish between electoral and non-electoral voice. For, a common way in which democratic citizens voice their political opinion is in electoral settings. Stephen Coleman’s (2013) research on voting distinguishes between traditional and modern voting practices, and contends that its traditional implementation to a greater extent encompassed the notion of voice. Meanwhile, modern voting is increasingly a technology ‘for making preferences countable’, a process which necessarily compresses ‘multivocality into a single communicative act’ (ibid: 10-12). His research contributes to a complex and nuanced understanding of the voter as simultaneously present and absent, recognized as part of the political machinery yet misrecognized in terms of its individual voice, preferences, needs and wants (ibid: 16).

While political voice and electoral representation are closely intertwined, non-electoral representation must also be taken seriously (Saward, 2006: 297). The latter is to a greater extent exercised on the discursive arena, for example by making visible or invisible the sentiments of the electorate. Nick Couldry’s research on voice in the neoliberal context is a valid entry point for such conceptualizations, especially because he sees the media as ‘the domain where we often look to find voice’ (Couldry, 2010: 73, emphasis in original). He draws a distinction between voice as a process and voice as a value, with the former meaning ‘the process of giving an account of one’s life and its conditions’ (ibid: 7). Couldry’s conception of voice as a value encourages attentiveness to the conditions that render voice effective, as well as the various ways in which voice might be devalued or undermined (ibid: 2). Seeing voice as ‘socially grounded’, he offers a useful account of how it may be contingent upon individuals’ ‘capacity for narrative’, symbolic status and the possibility of being ‘recognized by others as having a voice’ (ibid: 7).

Developing this notion of recognition, one might conveniently assess the centrality of listening and its inevitable linkage to the legitimation voice. Andrew Dobson offers one way in which to do so, addressing ‘the listening aspect of democratic conversation’ (Dobson, 2014: 2). He explains listening in the theoretical context of sensory democracy, accounting not only for speech, but also for ‘our auditory capacities’ (ibid: 7). Here, the overwhelming focus on the ‘aligning of speech and political “beingness”’ – which is arguably manifested in both Couldry and Coleman’s articulation of voice – is a potential hindrance to fully exploring the power of listening in the democratic context (ibid: 18). As such, Dobson interrogates whether the legitimation of voice is achievable without listening. ‘Withholding listening is an expression of power’, he argues, and thus voices have limited influence when void of active listening from society at large (Dobson, 2014: 22). Similarly, drawing on Susan Bickford’s conception of political listening and intertwining it with the more thoroughly theorized
notion of the politics of voice, Tanja Dreher draws a distinction between speaking up and being heard, where the latter shifts greater responsibility ‘on to the conventions, institutions and privileges which shape who and what can be heard in the media’ (Dreher, 2009: 447).

3.5 Representational ‘Othering’

Beyond withholding listening, discourses may silence or otherwise delegitimize minority viewpoints by creating a dichotomy between the positive ‘Self’ and the negative ‘Other’ (van Dijk, 1993: 263; Janks, 1997: 329). This Self-Other distinction, reflecting by and large the ideological underpinnings of discourse, is widely researched in the field of media and communications. In particular, Chantal Mouffe has been pivotal in expressing the need to present the ideological ‘Other’ less as ‘an enemy who’s repression is legitimated’, moving instead towards an agonistic environment in which ‘the ideological ‘other’ is positioned as an adversary’ (Mouffe, 2005, in El-Issawi and Cammaerts, 2015). However, as this research will eventually illustrate, such philosophies are frequently neglected, albeit in subtle ways. In the case of the ‘left-behind’ Leave voter, I will focus on the pervasiveness of two representational pathways: “‘Othering” through representational absence’ and “‘Othering” through representations of difference’ (Chauhan and Foster, 2014: 398).

Othering’ through representations of difference appears to be the most commonly discussed form of self-other distinction in media and communications literature. This refers to how ‘the Other is an embodied recognition of its departure from the constitutive elements of the self’ (Chauhan and Foster, 2014: 399). If we take as true Saward’s (2006: 302) claim that ‘the depicting of a constituency as this or that, as requiring this or that, as having this or that set of interests’ is integral to act of representing, then we should also look at what a constituent is indeed depicted as and the extent to which it departs from our depictions of the ‘Self’. This is a central theme in Hall’s articulation of ‘the spectacle of the “Other”’, where he looks in part at how difference is represented in popular culture (Hall, 1997: 225). His analysis of visual representation critiques in particular the depiction of subjects who are ‘represented through sharply opposed, polarized, binary extremes’ (ibid: 229). In discursive practice, it is argued, binary oppositions are always embedded in power relations (Derrida, 1974, in Hall, 1997: 235). Beyond binary oppositions, difference can subtly but powerfully expressed through the implementation of content bias. Robert Entman’s (2007: 165) research is useful in this regard, articulating in part media discourses ‘in which the framing favors one side over the other in a current or potential dispute’.

The concept of ‘Othering’ through representational absence is influenced by Gervais’ research on absences in social representation (Gervais et al., 1999), although various other scholars have articulated absence in slightly different terms. For instance, Michel Foucault emphasizes how ‘power relations operate to silence voices – that is, to create absences’ (Gervais et al., 1999: 420); and Dreher argues that the media operates by conventions that may ‘silence or to mute a whole array of differences of belief and politics, identity and desire’ (Dreher, 2009: 445-446). Further, in his research
on representing reality, Jonathan Potter articulates representational absence through ontological gerrymandering (Potter, 1996: 4, 183-185). By means of ontological gerrymandering, actors with definitional power may ‘place a boundary between assumptions which are to be understood as (ostensibly) problematic and those which are not’ (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985: 216; in Potter, 1996: 184). Here, the narrator focuses only on ‘particular range of phenomena’ that s/he considers relevant, avoiding or downplaying other aspects and issues (ibid: 184-185). Albeit subtle, these forms of representational absences contribute to ‘Othering’ by introducing only a ‘partial construction of the object’, which may be indicative of how ‘power dynamics in the social world influence the construction of reality’ (Gervais et al., 1999, in Chauhan and Foster, 2014: 398).

3.6 Conceptual framework

Drawing on these theoretical assumptions, the following analysis asserts that texts as meaning-makers do not reflect any pre-existing reality, but rather emerge ‘from a system of differences and relationships’ that are socially constructed and embedded (Gervais et al., 1999: 420; Hall, 1997: 5). The relation between knowledge, discourse and power – as well as their effects on identity, subjectivity and representation – makes my approach discursive more than anything (Hall, 1997: 6). While the discursive is often seen as widely different from the semiotic, both concepts will be useful in a textual analysis that combines both the poetics of language and the ideological specificity of discourse (ibid).

What is more, in accordance with both communications research and political literature, the media will be considered a central arena in which ‘reality’ is articulated, portrayed and contested, and where symbolic representation occurs (Saward, 2005). Mainstream media in general and the British broadsheet environment in particular has been subject to criticism based on their partisan affiliation (Levy et al., 2016) and obvious ideological positioning, as this may affect their respective expressions of political ‘truth’. As such, these sites are considered analytically fruitful.

Theories on discursive ideology and media power (Hall, 1997; Bourdieu, 1991; van Dijk, 2006; Fairclough, 1991; Wodak, 2016; Janks, 1997) also inform the debate on how media representations may serve to perpetuate historically dominant notions of common sense (Billig, 1991), delegitimize particular communities or reinforce their presentation as ‘Other’ (van Dijk, 1993). Media discourse will be evaluated both in terms of what is being said and how it is said, in terms of both the content and the context of its expressions (Billig, 1991: 20). Specifically, I am inclined to explore the conceptualizations of ‘Othering’ through representational absence or representations of difference (Chauhan and Foster, 2014). I will also keep in mind Mouffe’s contention that the ‘Other’ can be presented in a manner that serves to legitimize rather than oppress. The significance of potential ‘Othering’ will be juxtaposed with instances of voice and listening as articulated by Couldry (2010) and Dobson (2014), as both the ability to give an account of one’s life and one’s capacity for narrative are here considered integral to representation and legitimation of political subjects.
3.7 Research objectives

This research sets out to explore the extent to which ‘Othering’ of the ‘left-behind’ (Goodwin and Heath, 2016: 331) is instructed and reinforced in influential mainstream media discourse in the UK. Considering the immediacy of not only the actual implementation of Brexit, but more importantly, the widespread sense of political disenfranchisement among various groups of ‘left-behinds’ in Europe and the US, I consider this a topical and important theme. As a Critical Discourse Analysis, this thesis will contribute to existing conceptualizations of the ways in which media discourses shape and naturalize our understanding of reality (Bourdieu, 1991). Juxtaposing the question of voice (Couldry, 2010) and listening (Dobson, 2014) with the more theorized concept of ‘Othering’, I hope to shed light on different discursive mechanisms that enable or restrict public representation. Indeed, while various theorists have discussed the underlying incentives of the ‘left-behind’ Leave voters (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016; Arnorsson and Zoega, 2016), their representation in media discourse is still largely unaccounted for. As this might have to do with the relatively short time that has passed since the referendum, this research aims to initiate the debate.

Centrally, the research attempts to answer the following research question:

1. To what extent is the image of the Leave voter as ‘Other’ reinforced in British broadsheets? In order to answer this question as productively as possible, a set of sub-questions have also been articulated and investigated:
   a) How and using what textual and discursive devices is the voter voiced in the discourse?
   b) How and using what textual and discursive devices is the voter ‘Othered’ in the discourse?
   c) Do the aforementioned create any particular social realities in which the Leave voter is ‘Othered’?

The applicability of these sub-questions and the specific tools employed to allocate voice and ‘Othering’ respectively will be further highlighted in the following chapter.

4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research strategy: Critical Discourse Analysis

This analysis applies Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to investigate the various ways in which mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, presence and absence, voice and ‘Othering’, is coopted by discourse. Specifically, it evaluates the extent to which British broadsheets’ application of such mechanisms reinforce societal dividends in the UK by exempting Leave voters from thorough representation. Both theoretically and methodologically, it draws on the conception that discourse, as a social practice, is ‘socially shaped’ by and ‘socially constitutive’ of identities, relationships and systems of belief (Fairclough, 1993: 134).
What makes CDA the most appropriate method for this particular research is its emphasis on the ‘linkages between discourse, ideology and power’, and in particular, how such linkages are textually, discursively and socially embedded (ibid: 135-136; van Dijk, 1995: 24). My approach is critical to the extent that it aims to ‘investigate and analyse power relations in society and to formulate normative perspectives from which a critique of such relations can be made with an eye on the possibilities for social change’ (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 2, emphasis added). Further, I am interested in ‘the content and organization’ of text and the constructive nature of language and discourse (Gill, 1998: 141). Treating texts as rhetorically organized, CDA evaluates how discourse, as one among various other forms of social practice (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 7), ‘is involved in establishing one version of the world in the face of competing versions’ (Gill, 1998: 4). That is, discourse enables the exercise of social power and ideological dominance of particular groups over others, for instance through ‘the positive representation of the own group, and the negative representation of the Others’ (van Dijk, 1993: 249, 263).

Analyzing how language, discourse and social reality are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, I have found Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework methodologically intriguing (Fairclough, 1993, 2013). The approach enables the researcher to systematically analyze not only written text, but also the ‘discourse practice involving the production and the interpretation of text’ and the ‘social practice’ of the discursive event (Fairclough, 1993: 136). Beyond the discipline of CDA, I am also interested in methods or interpretations that in other respects take as their objective the various ways in which media discourse enables or disables positive or negative representations of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. For instance, Couldry (2010) and Dobson’s (2014) articulations of voice and listening do not appear to lend themselves exclusively to the discursive arena, and Entman’s (2007) analysis of content bias is more lenient towards theories of agenda-setting and methods of content analysis than to theories of meaning-making and methodological CDA per se. However, multidisciplinary approaches are appreciated and ‘positively valued’ by critical discourse analysts (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 4; van Dijk, 1993: 252).

4.2 Sampling

British newspapers have published a significant amount of stories about the EU referendum. Considered integral in the circulation of ‘representations and ideas’ (Chauan and Foster, 2014: 391), they are useful sites on which to conduct CDA. Indeed, a journalism poll conducted by YouGov’s (2012) insight group Gorkana in 2012 showed that 82 percent of respondents believed that British newspapers ‘had “power and influence” over their readers’. Broadsheets in particular are also more trusted by their readers than are their tabloid counterparts (Ipsos MORI, 2008). What makes The Guardian, The Telegraph and The Times analytically fruitful is that they do not only have a tradition of supporting different parties, but too, their views on Brexit were largely incongruent. The former has traditionally supported Labour and liberal governments, and came out in support for Remain (Guardian, 2016; Huffington Post, 2016). Conversely, The Telegraph (incl. Sunday) has a tradition of
supporting conservative administrations, and backed Brexit (ibid). The Times, which has historically been more diverse in terms of party support, was split on the Brexit vote: while the Daily edition supported Remain, the Sunday edition backed Brexit (ibid). Such diverging political preferences are thought to allow me to allocate how ideology and partisanship plays in on discursive representations.

The specific articles to be analyzed (Appendix 1) are the result of theoretical sampling, and the final sample is ‘guided by emerging theory’ (Draucker et al., 2007: 1137). In the process of finding a relevant sample, I determined what sources ‘could yield the richest and most relevant data’ and what cases were ‘most likely to provide empirical indicators needed for category development’ (ibid: 1138). That is, I had a set of concepts and theories that I was interested in exploring prior to finding my samples – specifically, voice and ‘Othering’ in British media discourse - and I found data that correlated with those concepts through objective selection. Using the Nexis database, I searched for pieces with a relatively high count of the terms ‘Leave’, ‘Brexit’ and ‘voter’, with a particular emphasis on the latter (or different reiterations of the term). I chose to focus on editorial opinion pieces and longer news stories after conducting a pilot study, where I found that these would enable a more explicit analysis of how ideology and partisanship form the papers’ belief systems (editorial pieces) and compositional priorities (news pieces).

Initially, I intended to analyze articles published approximately 3 weeks before and after the referendum. This timeframe would presumably highlight broader and thoroughgoing discursive happenings in the British press, and the ways in which discourses about voters shape our ongoing perceptions of particular voting groups. However, in conducting the pilot study, I found that immediacy had a significant impact on discursive representation: the closer we got to the EU referendum, the more forcefully the broadsheets defended or discredited particular voting groups and the more forcefully they revealed their own political and ideological sentiments about the state of Britain, her future and her constituents. After the referendum, the more fiercely the respective papers went about in applauding or rejecting its outcome and those who brought it about. Thus, the articles in my sample are all published within a relatively limited timeframe before and after the referendum was held on June 23rd, 2016, ranging from 14.06.2016 at the earliest to 03.07.2016 at the latest, with most articles published within few days of the vote. My final sample consists of four texts from each broadsheet: two opinion pieces and two news texts respectively, with one of each published before and after the referendum. This combination applies for all papers to ensure consistency and to avoid excessive irregularities in the discourses.

4.3 Design of research tools

The 12 texts selected after the abovementioned sampling procedure have been coded according to Fairclough’s (1993) three-dimensional framework. As the framework does not imply any specific coding practice, I have found Janks’ methodological application to be the most analytically fruitful (Janks, 1997). According to Janks, each dimension ‘requires a different kind of analysis’, namely
description (textual analysis), interpretation (discursive/processing analysis) and explanation (social analysis) (ibid: 329). She suggests that such a three-fold analysis can be captured by the embedding of three boxes, one for each dimension and analysis, allowing the researched to better allocate the interdependence between the textuality, discursivity and sociality constructed in the text (ibid). Thus, embedded boxes were created for each article (in Appendix 3, a sample) and coded according to the following criteria:

- The textual analysis encompassed narrative structure, grammar and vocabulary (Fairclough, 1993:136), and an assessment of whether such textual elements confirm or reject the status of Leave voters as ‘Other’. What is more, I analyzed the modality (instances of ‘we/they must/should’) and the eventuality (instances of ‘we have the truth versus they are misguided’) of the textual compositions (van Dijk, 2006: 125), and how these inform the positioning of the ‘Self’. I also emphasized the use if binaries, and in particular the occurrence of binary extremes, so to understand their contribution to the articulation of ‘Otherness’ (Hall, 1997: 229).

- The discursive analysis entailed interdiscursivity, namely the reiteration of discursive practices in new discourse (Fairclough, 1993: 137), and intertextuality, ‘how an individual text draws on elements and discourses of other texts’ (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 7). The former was analyzed by looking at which institutional, political or personal discourses were framed in a more favorable manner through the implementation of content bias (Entman, 2007: 166). In terms of intertextuality, I found Lewis et al.’s (2005: 17-19) research on citizen representation in the media particularly useful, highlighting the reiteration of discourses in the form of quoted speech and indirect inferences. The latter refers to statements ‘that infer something about public opinion in general’ without systemic or specific evidence of such opinion (ibid). Such inferences may ‘do important narrative and ideological work’ (ibid: 92). Indeed, I attempted to allocate how intertextual references shape and naturalize a dominant knowledge of the Leave voter as ‘Other’. Lastly, the genre of the text might inform the positioning of the writer or ‘Self’ of the text.

- The two aforementioned dimensions produce discourses that contain or promote certain societal norms, values or expectations, which make up the social dimension. Although Fairclough (1993: 137) argues that power and ideology ‘may arise at each of the three levels’, I accentuated how
particular textual and discursive events may fortify particular ideologies or beliefs and thus inform the social analysis. This dimension concerns also the subtle ways in which the ‘production process’ in different broadsheets shapes the texts (ibid: 136), the social knowledge they make dominant, and whose interests they serve and negate (Janks, 1997: 329). I further evaluated the social, political and institutional environments made dominant in the discourse ((Fairclough, 1993:137; Janks, 1997: 329), and the extent to which these rendered the Leave voter as ‘Other’.

4.4 Ethics and reflexivity

Prior to completing this thesis, I have acquired ethical approval from the London School of Economics. No considerable ethical concerns were noted. However, a few elements should be justified and explained before proceeding on to the analysis. First of all, CDA is largely an interpretative and hermeneutical approach, and may be affected by the researcher’s subjective understanding of symbols. Any work on representation should account for the fact that meanings and interpretations may be contested (Hall, 1997: 9), and that ‘a researcher’s preconceptions about a social object can shape her interpretation of empirical absences’ (Gervais et al., 1999: 420). Indeed, my theoretical and methodological expectations as to what absences exist in the text, in particular with reference to the voices I might assume to be silenced in public discourse surrounding the referendum, can influence my weighting of analytical findings. This obstacle could have been overcome by applying multiple methods to enhance the validity and the explanatory power of discovered empirical absences (ibid: 434). However, as this is beyond the scope of this research, I have instead insisted on being cautious not to over-interpret absences, and to only comment on absences at appear ‘empirically real’ (ibid: 421, 428). What is more, the sample size of n = 12 articles allows for only a limited interpretation of patterns and their relative duration. The approach will not allow me to infer anything about broader configurations and patterns, which is better achieved through for instance more thoroughgoing content analyses (Entman, 2007). The articles included in here are neither considered representative of the respective papers’ referendum coverage nor of the general narrative surrounding the ‘left-behind’. Rather, they are merely illustrative of some of the different ways in which representation fails to occur.

5 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

This chapter summarizes the main findings and attempts to answer the research objectives. Due to my concern not only with discursive representation as addressed by critical discourse analysts, but also with the terminologies of media scholars more broadly, the results are organized according to the theories that inform the research questions rather than the above three-dimensionality. Thus, the findings are synthesized and discussed according to a) instances of voice and listening (Couldry, 2010; Dobson, 2014); b) instances of ‘Othering’ through representations of difference (Chauhun and
5.1 The Guardian

Voice and listening: Both textually and discursively, the sentiments of Leave voters are partly echoed in The Guardian’s discourse. Textually, there is a reliance on negatively connoted nouns and adjectives, highlighting for instance their ‘frustration’ (ibid: 1), ‘grievance’ (ibid: 2) and ‘burning anger’ (ibid); apparently feeling ‘ignored’, ‘ill-used’ (ibid: 7) and ‘disaffected’ (ibid: 1). Idioms reinforce the contention that these voters wish to ‘kick against’ the economic and political order that has let them down (ibid: 1), and take back ‘political control’ (ibid: 8) over their borders, job security and livelihoods. The rationale for voting Leave is further expressed in specific situational depictions that confirm the voters’ positioning as ‘left-behind’, including ‘Labour’s estrangement from whole swathes of its old electoral base’ (ibid: 2) stagnant wages (ibid: 1), immigration and integration (ibid: 7), as well as xenophobia (ibid: 8). Recognizing these concerns, it is once argued that the Brexit vote requires the establishment of ‘new bonds at home’ (ibid: 7).

Limiting the listening aspect and impacting how these voices are ‘heard’ (Dreher, 2009: 447), however, there is a tendency to structure the narrative so that instances of voice and legitimation are met by counter-arguments or delegitimation. Take this example, from an editorial opinion piece published after the referendum:

Large numbers of people feel ignored and ill-used, with little sense that they are benefiting from integration. In the UK, lies about straight bananas and exaggerations about the EU’s opacity fuelled feeling against the institution, compounding a sense that the political classes are out of touch with ordinary life and have often put profits before people (Appendix 1: 7).

Although this extract conveys that Leave voters feel ‘ignored’, ‘ill-used’, and apparently discontent with institutional politics, their political emotions are partly delegitimized by linking them to ‘lies about straight bananas an exaggerations about the EU’s opacity’, as the latter may be considered the very opposite of articulations of ‘truth’ (Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006: 1). Similarly, in an article published before the referendum, it is argued that though ‘the EU is part of an international economic order that has been unkind to many’ and ‘the wish to kick against it’ can be understood, that very same wish ‘is mistaken’ (Appendix 1: 1). Such evidentiality about the wrongful rationale of Leavers may color the vote as illogical and fallacious.
In its discursive dimension, most articles implement either direct quotations or indirect inferences (Lewis et al., 2005: 17-19) to feature the perspectives of the ‘left behind’. Multiple statements referring to who the voter is, how s/he feels and why, are based on indirect remarks that infer something about their opinions or sentiments in general without systematic support (ibid). First, an example of indirect inference:

On the other hand are millions of people, often resident in post-industrial towns and cities, who are much less enthusiastic about a globalized world, and – needless to say – full of angst and anger about post-2004 immigration (Appendix 1: 2).

This inference arguably corresponds with the image of this voting group as ostracized. However, it should be stressed that such indirect compositions reveal a dichotomy within the discourse itself: although an article might textually lend itself to the articulation and representation of voters’ concerns, its discursive dimension can reveal a whole other set of power relations that are not necessarily implicit to the mere semiotics of the discourse. Indeed, using indirect inferences, the journalist takes on the role of a maker of representative claims (Saward, 2006: 301), speaking on behalf of a generalizable constituency without actually enabling any one constituent speak for himself or listening for alternative articulations. What is more, such indirect claims can be embedded in ideological work (Lewis et al., 2005: 92).

‘Othering’ through representation of difference: Habitually juxtaposing the incentives and qualifications of Leave and Remain voters, The Guardian’s discourse lends itself to ‘Othering’ through representation of difference (Chauhan and Foster, 2014: 399). Instances of binary representation are particularly significant in this sample. For example, the extended version of the above text presents the Leave voter as ‘loud’, convinced, ‘post-industrial’, and ‘full of angst and anger about post-2004 immigration’; conversely, their opposites are depicted as hesitant, qualified, ‘middle class’, ‘metropolitan’ and ‘enthusiastic about diversity’ (Appendix 1: 2). Another article similarly distinguishes between the global, futuristic and inclusive Remain camp on the one hand, and the angry, nationalistic and misguided Leavers on the other (ibid: 1). Needless to say, such articulations represent only the ‘binary extremes’ (Hall, 1997: 229). Entrenching this difference further, the articles are discursively framed from the perspective of a Remainer. While the editorial pieces are structured as to reflect the opinions of the broadsheet at large, the news stories are interdiscursively and thematically planned around the experiences of Remain campaigners (Appendix 1: 2) or individuals who have been subject to the ‘frenzy of hatred’ unleashed by, presumably, Leave voters (ibid: 8). The voices of Leave voters are thus regularly juxtaposed with the reasoning of their opposites, leaving the impression that the paper favors ‘one side over the other’ in the political conflict (Entman, 2007: 165). Indeed, the side that is favored discursively and more positively emphasized textually is that with which The Guardian concurs; which confirms their conception of the ‘Self’; and which is portrayed as significantly different from the ‘Other’.
'Othering' through representational absence: In some instances, such favoring also leads to ‘Othering’ through representational absence (Chauhan and Foster, 2014: 398). For example, an article addressing the upsurge in hate-crime post-referendum (Appendix 1: 8) fails to invite a single Leave voter to respond to the narrative. Although the article specifies that ‘it wasn’t racist to vote leave’, naming such as ‘Brexiters’, ‘people’ and ‘leave voter’ might lead to a different impression over all (ibid). What is more, in an opinion piece published around the same time (ibid: 7), the paper clearly contends that the referendum results are not in line with what Britain is and seeks to be in relation to Europe at large. While emphasizing that ‘the country’ made the decision and that it should be respected, they assert that the nation ‘backed Brexit on a series of fantasies and lies’ and that ‘those facing Brexit with reluctance hope that one day we mat rejoin the club’. The discourse appears to negate not only the validity of the result, but also the legitimacy of those who voted for a UK outside the EU. Presenting the result in this particular manner, a whole range of other possible sentiments – such as optimism, agency, empowerment, or inclusion - cannot be articulated (Potter, 1996: 184-185).

Thus, in terms of the social dimensions encouraged by text and discourse, the broadsheet shapes and naturalizes our understanding of the Leave voter as someone (Saward, 2006: 302) who is inherently different (Chauhan and Foster, 2014: 399) to The Guardian’s conception of ‘Self’. The dominant knowledge in the sample analyzed here appears to be one of multiculturalism, globalization, multinationalism, and cooperation, juxtaposed with the ostensibly problematic and binary opposite comprehensions of the average Leave voter (Hall, 1997). The selected articles are deeply colored by the known ideological conviction of the broadsheet at large (Levy et al., 2016: 6), and appear to be written to those for whom their political preferences are already understood as ‘common sense’ (Billig, 1991: 1). While they occasionally shed light on historical developments that have not been equally beneficial to all, the overall discourse lends itself to a re-articulation of the current political order (van Dijk, 1995:18), and does little to legitimize the disenfranchisement felt by millions in the UK and in Europe more broadly.

5.2 Depth analysis

On June 20th 2016, The Guardian published an editorial opinion piece titled ‘keep connected and inclusive, not angry and isolated’ (Appendix 1: 1; Appendix 2; Appendix 3). In terms of representation, the sentiments of Leave voters are to some extent voiced. Articulations of how ‘people are bruised and angry’ due to disadvantageous socioeconomic circumstances and understandably wishing ‘to kick against’ the ‘economic order’ serves to rationalize the feelings of the public branch

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1 This article has been assessed in depth to illustrate in more exact terms the detailed analyses. The depth analysis should not serve to further strengthen critiques directed at The Guardian; all broadsheets will be critiqued or complemented based on their collective representations.
of the Leave camp. More, the article initially holds leading Brexiteers, politicians and the press responsible for national divisions and misconceptions. Conversely, the public is presented as in a position to act against the divisive and misleading strategies of the aforementioned. However, such articulations are faint compared to the overall rationale of the narrators, highlighting for example how ‘the wish to kick back’ against the international economic order ‘is mistaken’ – a swift textual move towards delegitimization. Using such evidentialities rather frequently, the texts presents itself in a patronizing manner, articulating solutions to the problem of socioeconomic misfortune as though the voters do not know what is best for them. Thus, although the voters are not completely silenced to the extent suggested by direct representational absence (Gervais et al., 1999: 420), the text places ‘a boundary between assumptions which are to be understood as (ostensibly) problematic and those which are not’, tying neatly into Potter’s account of ontological gerrymandering (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985: 216; in Potter, 1996: 184). This conception may be allocated at the intersection of the textual and the discursive dimensions, highlighting not only what is being done in terms of textual representations, but also the ways in which the discourse allows for the omission of particular narratives.

Centrally, rhetorical devices such as idioms appear rather frequently. The act of voting Leave is portrayed as a rather mischievous task: for instance, it could embolden ‘dark forces’, which are in turn based on a ‘narrow insistence on putting the indigenous first’. Similar idioms also contribute to binary representations: ‘cutting yourself off’ and ‘sheltering behind’ borders versus ‘working across’ them, for instance. Indeed, there exists a clear distinction between the supposed sentiments and aspirations of Remainers (e.g. connected and inclusive, one member of a family of nations, using the head, future-driven) and Leavers (e.g. angry and isolated, country keeping to itself and bolting the door, using the heart, idealizing an imaginary past). These dichotomies are also built up by rhetorical questioning. Generally, the questions portray the notion of voting Leave as unreasonable and largely egocentric: articulations such as ‘who do we think we are’ and ‘cannot play by shared rules’ have inevitably negative connotations. Although such binaries do not consistently reference a particular voting group, they do contribute to an understanding of a dichotomous population in which one way of thinking and voting is more desirable than another, the latter portrayed as neither ‘fair’, ‘responsible’ nor ‘worth it’. The Guardian’s discursive strategies and overall narrative structure suggests that this is a plea to voters to, say, do the ‘right’ thing.

Socially, there exists an overarching dichotomy between (positive) discourses of globalization, cooperation, diversity and futurism vis-à-vis (negative) discourses of nationalism, uniformity and the misleading idealization of the past. The text anticipates a shared history and a shared future, in particular with regards to globalization and inclusivity as the dominant knowledge. The cooperative and inclusive nation and EU-member is to a great extent presented as the recipe for democracy, and vise-versa, with exclusivity and close-mindedness (and Nigel Farage, Tories and anger) presented as its opposite. Billig’s account of ideology and opinion may be usefully revisited here, explaining how
the prevalence of a set of common-sensical notions relates ‘to patterns of domination and power’ (Billig, 1991). One way in which the discourse articulates knowledge that is to be understood as common-sensical, is through the aforementioned strategy of rhetorical questioning. The questions asked intend a response that is to be understood as true; the questions have one right answer, and that answer is not to opt out. More, the assertive modality and evidentiality of the discourse in general displays a nonnegotiable notion of a truth that exists out there, and in the minds of the writer, that is to be read as precisely that – the truth – rather than the personal conviction of those behind the message. As such, The Guardian exercises invisible ideological domination (Janks, 1997: 341).

5.3 The Telegraph

*Voice and listening*: In the selected texts from The Telegraph, the emphases are sufficiently different from The Guardian that any suspicion about the effect of political partisanship and ideological conviction on discursive representation is confirmed. For instance, positively connoted words appear more frequently in The Telegraph’s coverage, using adjectives such as ‘instrumental’ (Appendix 1: 3), ‘rational’ (ibid: 9) and ‘courageous’ (ibid) in describing voters’ motivations and actions. Indeed, Leave voters are to a greater extent attributed agency in The Telegraph’s depictions. In one article, the vote is described as a ‘revolution’:

>`Thursday’s referendum was a revolution – and we welcome it. The Britons who voted to remain inside a free trade zone in 1975 formed a sizeable proportion of the people who voted to leave an outsized political project in 2016. It was a rational decision and a courageous one. (Appendix 1: 9)`

The editors describe the act of voting Leave as a ‘solid rejection of the status quo’ and a ‘lash of rebellion’ against Labour leadership (ibid), stressing also the historical context in which the voters decided ‘that on the experience of the past 40 years Britain would be better off’ outside the EU (ibid: 3). Both the editorial opinion pieces and the news articles are to a greater extent discursively organized around the sentiments of this older, traditional generation of voters, favoring their side in the political dispute (Entman, 2007: 166).

That said, the portrayal of Leave voters as dispirited – mainly through the use of negative language - persists also in The Telegraph’s discourse. For instance, Brexit supporters’ ‘deep feeling of insecurity’ (ibid: 10), disaffection with Labour leadership (ibid), fractured ‘hopes and dreams’ (ibid: 3) and apparent unjust treatment by political elites (ibid: 4 and 9) inform our conception of these voters as ‘left behind’. However, the negativity is often rebutted with defense or justification; the articles appear to salvage citizens’ voices by countering arguments that serve to delegitimize them. This move is largely a result of *intertextuality* (discursive) and *modality* (textual). For instance, one article focuses in part on a political conflict between Boris Johnson and David Cameron, fuelled this time by the latter’s ‘insulting’ tone towards leave voters (ibid: 4). Intertextually organized around Johnson’s
column/plea to voters, published the very same paper the same day, the composition of quoted speech serves to defend voters who are presumably offended by Cameron. Similarly, an opinion piece published before the referendum critiques Cameron for calling older voters ‘quitters’, arguing instead that they are instrumental, reflexive and duly dissatisfied political constituents:

\[
\text{It is possible that the voters now being told they are putting the futures of their grandchildren on the line have changed their minds for a very good reason: they have seen how the promises made then were either fallacious or never fulfilled (Appendix 1: 3).}
\]

Such assertive modality serves to justify the rationale behind the vote to Leave. The discourse lends itself to the rationalization and legitimization of these voters vis-à-vis a fractured political system and faulty leadership, providing an account of reality (Couldry, 2010: 7) that encompasses the voices of the ‘left-behind’.

‘Othering’ through representations of difference: While The Telegraph’s discourse as such may serve to contradict any notion of the Leave voter as ‘Other’, I should briefly discuss whether this fully materializes. For one, distanciation through naming contributes to a dichotomy between the writer (neutral) and voter (‘they’). Examples of this are plentiful in the opinion piece published before the referendum (Appendix 1: 3), where the voter is labeled ‘these voters’, ‘these people’, ‘they’ and ‘Leavers’. The voting group is also describes as ‘traditional’ and ‘working class’ (ibid: 10), labels that appear to diverge from the standpoint of the writers. However, the writers do not imply any specific ‘Self’ in this text, nor assume that the ‘Self’ has any distinct traits that differ from those of the voter. Consequently, they occur as representatives for a particular group of ‘Others’ with which they sympathize more so than they portray themselves as a ‘Self’ against which the ‘Other’ should be seen as an extreme binary (Hall, 1997). Thus, the requirements of ‘Othering’ through representations of difference are only partly fulfilled.

‘Othering’ through representational absence: What is more significant, however, is an absence in this sample from direct quotations from ‘left-behind’ Leave voters themselves, and an overreliance on indirect inferences (Lewis et al., 2005) and statements from powerful political figures. It is useful to discuss briefly how the consistency of generalizable inferences and political commentary could impact the articulation of otherness. To start, the news articles are organized according to the utterances of leading political figures (Appendix 1: 4 and 10), for whom the Brexit campaign is undeniably a question of ideology, power and leadership. Further, while the opinion pieces may serve to defend (ibid: 3) and empower (ibid: 9) the Leave voters, these are not exempt from the ideological convictions of the writer. Combined, any representation of the voter is therefore ‘shaped by relations of… and struggles over power’ (Fairclough, 1991: 134-135) that may exist outside the individual Leave voter’s axis of personal, political or ideological incentives. While this does not lead to outright ‘Othering’ or omission per se, it could ‘serve to silence or to mute a whole array of
differences of belief and politics, identity and desire’ (Dreher, 2009: 445-446) among the voting group. However, this point should not be stressed too heavily, as this analysis itself departs from a rather uniform conception of the voter as ‘left-behind’.

Socially, a commitment to nationalism and conservativism is rather apparent in the broadsheet, which partly confirms their traditionally right-of-center ideological viewpoint. Beyond that, the abovementioned findings inform the social dimensions in various ways. In terms of representation, The Telegraph’s discourse reinstates agency and emphasizes the rationality of the incentives to leave the EU, legitimizing the underlying currents that brought about the vote. Indeed, knowledge about the inability of the powerful to serve their constituents is made dominant throughout their narratives, and the issue of EU-membership is frequently framed as a question of faulty leadership rather than one of a disengaged constituency. As such, their discourse is largely committed to the articulation of structural injustice (Gervais, 1999: 436), resistance to its disproportionate or unequal consequences (van Dijk, 1995: 18), and solidarity with those who are suffering under it (ibid). However, focusing chiefly on politicians and campaign representatives, the coverage adopted a clear ‘game frame’ (Levy et al., 2016: 5), emphasizing and largely criticizing the top-down workings of politics. By downplaying conversation and association with the voter, the overall discourse does not lend itself to the articulation of a ‘Self’ in which the Leave voter is incorporated; rather, The Telegraph presents itself as a sympathizing ‘big brother’ to those ‘out there’ in need for structural reform.

5.4 The Times

*Voice and listening:* In its articulation of voter concerns, The Times expresses both agency and apathy. On the one hand, a vote to Leave is textually conveyed as a ‘choice’ (Appendix 1: 11) and a vote for ‘change’ (ibid: 5), appealing to ‘action over inertia’ (ibid). Idioms also reinforce this conception of agency: the vote is depicted as ‘protest against political elites that will echo down the ages’ (ibid: 11), enforced by ‘the millions who have let Brussels and London know loud and clear that in the EU prosperity has eluded them’ (ibid), and guided by the appeal of ‘seizing back control’ (ibid: 5). On the other hand, the vote is tied to ‘concerns’ about a rising population (ibid), towns suffering ‘from a “double drain” in that they are close to dynamic cities’ (ibid: 6), and long-term societal divisions (ibid: 11, 12). The Times largely present these challenges as something which should be addressed at the institutional and governmental level, by David Cameron’s successor (ibid, 11) or by the members of the Union:

*It [the EU] faces an imperative to reform, including reform of the rules on freedom of movement. If enough countries want a brake on numbers, they should be allowed to have one. (Appendix 1, 5)*
Such articulations also express a listening aspect, reinforced too as the broadsheet highlights that ‘democracy demands’ that the vote to Leave be respected (ibid, 11).

What is more, an article about voters in Rochdale (Appendix 1: 6) grants voters both voice and recognition through direct conversation. Interdiscursively, the article draws on an incident in which Gordon Brown called a Labour voter concerned about immigration a ‘bigoted woman’, an event that has been used as ‘proof of the political elite’s disdain for the grassroots voter’ (ibid). From there, the narrative follows locals’ view on the referendum, in what may be read as an investigation – and justification – of the views held in the town, ‘whose shops struggle to compete with the shiny allure of nearby Manchester’; labeled as ‘one of the three places that have fared worst’ after the recession; and who has ‘one of the highest numbers of asylum seekers in the UK’ (ibid). Both the direct quotes from and indirect inferences about voters in the city – chiefly those who want to opt out of the EU – are framed in the context of a town that has not benefited from political and economic reforms. Incorporating various different and authentic explanations as to why many locals want out, the article enables ‘the process of giving an account of one’s life and its conditions’ (Couldry, 2010: 7).

‘Othering’ through representations of difference: What is striking about this sample, is that The Times rely overwhelmingly on the opinions and prognoses of experts in subtly articulating their own positioning. This is particularly evident in the discursive dimension, as their direct quotations are picked from a pool of consumer champions (Appendix 1: 5), economists (ibid: 6), chief executives (ibid: 11) and professors (ibid: 12). While the broadsheet’s positioning in general appears more aligned the opinions of experts and intellectual argumentation than with the sentiments of any one camp, the experts cited univocally come out in support for Remain. The coverage may therefore hint at a subtle content bias (Entman, 2007: 166), and favors those with apparent political expertise over those with political emotion. Such strategies appear also create a near-paternalistic dichotomy between the expert ‘Self’ on the one hand, and ‘those’ (Appendix 1: 5) for whom Brexit was the best option on the other. That said, the broadsheet emphasizes that they should not be ‘regarded as part of the establishment’ (ibid), and that they ‘respect’ (ibid: 11) the results of the referendum. While the former is not realistically reenacted in their discourse, the expression may mitigate the implications of the aforementioned dichotomy on negative representations of the ‘Other’ (van Dijk, 1993: 263).

‘Othering’ through representational absence: What is more intriguing, is that instances of subtle ‘Othering’ through representational absence ensues the (intertextual) implementation of expert opinion and The Times’ apparent affiliation with these. For instance, it is chiefly intellectuals who are invited to voice the very incentives of the Leave camp, and their explanations naturally reflect their own political prognoses. For example, in a news article published shortly after the referendum, a professor is quoted in making indirect inferences about Leave voters that have been ‘dissatisfied with what they had’, clarifying too that their expectations are far from realistic (ibid: 12):
They believed in the Brexit promise that Britain can be great again, but we were living off the proceeds of the end of the empire back then. They believe that the shipyards will reopen, but sadly they won’t. (Appendix 1: 12).

Such indirect depictions are recurring in this sample, portraying the ‘left-behind’ as having several interests, desires and knowledge that are not aligned with the expectations of intellectual or economic elites that appear to ‘know better’.

The broadsheet’s concomitance with such expert opinion is also made evident through modality and eventuality (van Dijk, 2006: 125). It is claimed that experts ‘overwhelmingly concur’ with The Times’ prognosis that ‘a vote for Brexit is unquestionably economically riskier than a vote to remain’; argued that there is ‘no good reason to disregard’ the ‘judgment of top executives’; suggested that the ‘economic perils of leaving the EU are clear’, and that indeed, ‘the United Kingdom has done well in Europe’ (Appendix 1: 5, emphases added). With such assertiveness, the discourse necessarily negates or downplays a whole range of phenomena and experiences (Potter, 1996: 184-185) that could have better justified the reasons that indeed exist - emotionally, economically and politically – for the rationale of the ‘left-behind’, as well as their disregard of elite opinion. It should however be noted that these sentiments were largely modified in the aftermath of the vote (Appendix 1, 11).

When it boils down to the social dimension, the discourse is less politically partisan that what we have previously witnessed. That does not, however, mean that it is free from any ideological standpoint: for instance, the discourses draw heavily on the expectations of intellectualism, neoliberal economics, mutual trust and international cooperation. A disproportionate amount of voter sentiments in this sample are presented by the very elites that Leave voters appear to have felt disenfranchised by. The paper clearly emphasizes experts and academics in their framing (Levy et al., 2016: 5); interestingly, such elites also have ‘preferential access’ (van Dijk, 1995: 20) to the discourses in society that are out of reach for the average citizen, and to the extent they may be considered ‘powerful speakers’, these elites may structure their narratives in a self-serving manner (ibid: 22). Indeed, the discourse is rather distant from the very environment in which Leave voters are situated in; the latter are often spoken for by someone who intellectually recollects their situation, but that emotionally is far detached from it. As such, ‘the dominance expressed, signaled and legitimated’ in this discourse (van Dijk, 1993: 278) resides in institutions, rather than the electorate.

5.5 Comparative analysis and discussion

I have insofar illustrated that processes of voice and ‘Othering’ manifests itself in various and competing ways in the discourses of leading producers of social symbolisms. Before turning to some concluding remarks, I will briefly compare and contrast the findings discussed above in accordance with the questions outlined in the research objective:
How and using what textual and discursive devices is the voter voiced in the discourse? In the specific discourses analyzed here, the Leave voter is voiced through both positive and negative grammatical compositions, using nouns, adjectives and idioms that are meant to express the state and sentiments of the ‘left behind’. Discursively, voters’ accounts are articulated chiefly through direct quotations and indirect inferences. The effectiveness of voice, however, varies according to the positioning of the producer. In broadsheets supportive of Brexit or the motivations behind it, the narrative structure, modality and evidentiality construct a compassionate discursive environment. On the other hand, in discourses produced in an opinion climate that opposes the rejection of the European status quo, rhetorical devices such as questioning contribute to vocal delegitimation. As such, the latter are largely void of a listening aspect (Dobson, 2014).

How and using what textual and discursive devices is the voter ‘Othered’ in the discourse? Beyond the aforementioned delegitimation, the composition of extreme binaries informs ‘Othering’ through representations of difference. Labels and naming construct an ‘Other’ against which the ‘Self’ can be measured, a strategy that is rather consistent across the board – even when the producer appears to be neutral or sympathetic towards the ‘left behind’. The legitimacy of different truth-claims that conform to the ‘Self’ is also informed by evidentiality and modality. What is more, framing in general and content bias in particular influence our perceptions of which sentiments are to be understood as ‘true’ or ‘common-sensical’ contra those that are to be understood as problematic. In some instances, such bias contributes to the outright omission of Leavers’ point of view, enforcing ‘Othering’ through representational absence. However, there have also been instances of legitimation of the ‘Other’ as an adversary (Mouffe, 2005, in El-Issawi and Cammaerts, 2015), but only where the ‘Other’ is not represented as ideologically asymmetrical with the ‘Self’.

Do the aforementioned create any particular social realities in which the Leave voter is ‘Othered’? In the majority of articles analyzed, the writer is distanced from the ‘left-behind’ voter. However, the specific perception of ‘Self’, social reality and ‘truth’ expressed in the discourses generally differ according to the political affiliations and ideological convictions of the producer. For instance, while The Guardian’s truth is contingent on the workings of globalization, diversity and inclusivity, which are also seen as bottom-up processes, The Telegraph is more committed to expressing the ‘dark side’ of these truth-claims, which they largely understand as top-down. For The Times, the ‘truth’ is articulated in part through expert and institutional opinion, and they appear more flexible to adjusting their view on social reality in accordance with developments in the political climate. As such, the social realities constructed on the whole do not lead to outright discriminatory alienation, but they do sustain institutional and political environments in which the ‘left-behind’ may be seen as ‘Other’.

To what extent is the image of the Leave voter as ‘Other’ reinforced in British broadsheets? It is reasonable to suggest that the image of the Leave voter as ‘Other’ is discursively reinforced in British broadsheets, although with different degrees of distanciation from the ‘Self’. In particular, ideology and
partisanship have a direct effect on the ways in which mainstream media institutions relate to and represent the electorate, accentuated excessively in opinionated discourses. The Guardian’s opinion pieces largely reinforce a divide between the reasonable ‘Self’ and the angry ‘Other’; they clearly rely on strategies of ‘Othering’ through representations of difference, wherein the ‘Other’ is ‘represented through sharply opposed, polarized, binary extremes’ (Hall, 1997: 229) that depart from their articulation of the ‘Self’. The Times’ institutional point of view is less polarizing in this sense, although they, too, perpetuate conflict between sentiments that are seen as politically true and those that are emotionally driven. Meanwhile, The Telegraph appears more engaged in resisting discourses of exclusion and ‘Othering’, although other findings would be likely if we were to revert the focal point of this analysis. In the news articles assessed here, difference has been expressed in more subtly; chiefly, narrative composition and framing is telling of which side in the political conflict is favored (Entman, 2007: 165), and as such, which side may be understood as associated with the ‘Self’. Indeed, none of the broadsheets appear to directly associate with the ‘left-behind’; even The Telegraph expresses sympathy through paternalism rather than direct association. The latter two are however more likely to position the ‘left-behind’ as a legitimate adversary than as ‘an enemy who’s repression is legitimated’ (Mouffe, 2005, in El-Issawi and Cammaerts, 2015).

6 CONCLUSION

This research set out to inform debates about representation by analyzing the role of influential British media institutions in articulating the ‘left-behind’ as ‘Other’. Applying CDA, I have assessed the significance of voice and listening in media discourse vis-à-vis processes of distanciation and omission. It has been argued that the discourses analyzed here contribute to ‘Othering’ in competing but nevertheless meaningful ways. Specifically, conceptions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ are largely dependent on the ideological and political predisposition of the producer, which influences their conceptions of ‘truth’ and ‘common sense’. Broadsheets with a commitment to for example diversity, globalization and multiculturalism have proven more likely – in this sample – to reinforce the conception of the Leave voter as illegitimate or diametrically opposed to their conception of the ‘Self’, whereas discourses influenced also by intellectualism, conservativism and nationalism appear more sympathetic to the historical developments that have rendered segments of the British society in a state of ‘left-behind’. To this extent, the analysis has been rather unfair; had the tables been turned and the subject in question were to be someone that opposes the ideological commitments of conservative discourse, the findings would likely have been different. Nevertheless, this research has brought to the forefront the ways in which ideology and partisanship influence media representations of and knowledge about the constituency. In order to develop this thought further, and to evaluate the accuracy, consistency, and consequences of these findings, I encourage future research to systematically assess the content of partisan media discourse, and perhaps most importantly, to speak to individuals who identify as ‘left-behind’ about their level of perceived discourse access and representation.
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Huffington Post, The (2016). *Which Newspapers Support Brexit In The EU Referendum?* Published 21.06.2016. Available at: [http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/which-newspapers-support-brexit_uk_5768fad2e4b0a4f99ad5c6525](http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/which-newspapers-support-brexit_uk_5768fad2e4b0a4f99ad5c6525) (Accessed: 11.08.2017)


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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF ARTICLES

#Title of paper (date article was published). Title of the article as it appears online. Link to online article: .... (date the article was accessed and printed by the researcher)

Before the referendum


3. The Telegraph (22.06.2016). Older voters are not ‘quitters’ and they do not need lectures from David Cameron on the EU referendum. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/06/22/older-voters-are-not-quitters-and-they-do-not-need-lectures-from/ (Accessed and printed 06.06.2017)


5. The Times (18.06.2017) Remaking Europe. Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/remaking-europe-h7lcs8bw (Accessed and printed 06.06.2017)

7. The Guardian (03.07.2016). *A letter to Europe: tempted as you are, please don’t write us off.* Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/03/the-guardian-view-on-brexit-and-our-partners-a-letter-to-europe (Accessed and printed 08.06.2017)


9. The Telegraph (25.06.2016) *Britons must make this journey together.* Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/06/25/britons-must-make-this-journey-together/ (Accessed and printed 05.06.2017)


11. The Times (25.06.2016) *Forward Without Rancour.* Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/forward-without-rancour-6ptqtj913 (Accessed and printed 08.06.2017)

12. The Times (25.06.2016) *Old, young, rich and poor are divided like never before.* Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/old-and-young-rich-and-poor-are-divided-like-never-before-rtlbdcc9t (Accessed and printed 06.08.2017)
APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE ARTICLE (THE GUARDIAN, EDITORIAL OPINION, 20.06.2016)

The Guardian view on the EU referendum: Keep connected and inclusive, not angry and isolated.

Economics, foreign policy and Britain’s idea of itself are all on the ballot. But after a divisive campaign so, too, is our ability to get along. Another powerful reason why the wise vote is for remain.

Who do we think we are, and who do we want to be? Are we so different from others that we cannot play by shared rules? Are we one member in a family of nations, or a country that prefers to keep itself to itself and bolt the door?

All of these questions were always on the ballot in this week’s fateful referendum. But after a campaign that has been nasty, brutish and seemingly endless, the UK will be voting on another question too. With all the differences and the diversity among all of us who already live on these islands, how are we all going to get along? In the run-up to polling day this contest has risked descending into a plebiscite on whether immigrants are a good or a bad thing. To see what is at stake, just consider the dark forces that could so easily become emboldened by a narrow insistence on putting the indigenous first.

7.1 Head and heart

7.2 The backdrop has been the most unrelenting, unbalanced and sometimes xenophobic press assault in history. The leading political lights of leave have claimed to be pro-immigrant and yet have, at the same time, been ruthlessly fearmongering about Britain being overrun by Turks, after a Turkish accession which they understand perfectly well is not on the cards. The mood is frenzied, the air thick with indignation, and clouded with untruths. The best starting point for Britain to reach a sound decision on Thursday is to cool the passions of the heart, and listen to the head.

All reason tells us that the great issues of our time have little respect for national borders. The leave side has attempted to turn “expert” into a term of abuse, but one does not need the IMF, the Bank of England or any special knowledge to grasp that these border-busting issues range from corporate power, migration and tax evasion to weapons proliferation, epidemics and climate change. Not one of them can be properly tackled at the level of the nation state. Impose controls on a multinational corporation and it will move to a softer jurisdiction. Crack down on tax evasion and the evaders will vanish offshore. Cap your own carbon emissions in isolation and some other country will burn with abandon. In so far as any of these problems can be effectively addressed, it is through cooperation. A better world means working across borders, not sheltering behind them. Cutting yourself off solves nothing. That, fundamentally, is why Britain should vote to remain in the club that represents the most advanced form of cross-border cooperation that the world has ever seen.
We need, too, to remember our history. Britain was formed and shaped by Europe. And we are – in historical as well as cultural, geographical and trading terms – a European nation. In almost every generation of European history until the past 70 years, people from these islands have fought and died in European wars. But within the borders of the European Union, there has been no war at all. This has not been an accident. To turn our back on that is unworthy of our traditions.

This is not to dispute that there are flaws in the way that Europe is constituted and led. The EU is a union of nations working together, it is not and never will be a United States of Europe, and so its leadership is bound to depend on the imperfect leadership of all these countries. The single currency has been a flawed project and has set one nation against another, forcing the poor to pay the price for propping up a shonky structure. But Britain is not part of the eurozone, and the EU is not a plot against the nation state. Britain is still robustly herself too, warts and all.

If the EU has become a whipping boy, that is in large part because of the frustration that many inevitably have with day-to-day life in Britain. There are millions of citizens whose wages have been stuck for many years, whose job security has been hollowed out, and whose hopes of a fair deal are being undermined, all at a time when immigration has increased. People are bruised and angry, and many are ready to take it out on those they feel have let them down. Even if the UK government itself actually bears far more of the responsibility, it must be admitted that the EU is part of an international economic order that has been unkind to many. The wish to kick against it can thus be understood, even though it is mistaken.

For the core issues here are labour standards, and they are more effectively governed collaboratively, or else the great danger is of a competitive pressure to strip away protections covering hours, discrimination or agency and temporary working. More broadly, there is no crisis in Europe which is so serious that it would be better for the British prime minister to be outside the EU knocking on the door pleading to be heard rather than inside the room sorting things out. A leave victory would not solve the problems that cause such anger. On the contrary, it would make most of them worse.

The only argument about the immediate economic effects of Brexit is the depth of the hit that the economy would take, not whether it would take a hit at all. The political victors would not be those who wish to rebuild politics. They would be rightwing Tories, and ruthless plutocrats who want freedom to reorder Britain and make money as they choose. They have no interest in fairer taxes on the rich, or higher spending on the NHS. They have spent their so-called Brexit dividend – which in reality is almost certainly a negative number, not the mendacious £350m a week which has earned them an official reprimand – many times over. A significant group of them are flat-taxers who are whispering about deep cuts to corporation taxes. Facile Brexiter talk of a more buccaneering Britain – presumably a country fit for Sir Philip Green or Fred Goodwin to capture other galleons – offers precisely nothing to assuage the fears of elderly voters who simply want nothing more to change.

It is a fantasy to suppose that, if Britain votes to leave, these victors would want to maintain or extend protections for pensioners or workers. On the contrary. Human rights, equality, health and safety, and aid to refugees would be out of the window. Those who vote to leave as a protest against the elite will, in truth, be handing the keys to the very worst of that very elite. There would be no “taking back control” for most working-class leave voters, just less control over their diminishing share than ever. Those who have not yet made up their mind in this campaign should ask themselves this: do you want
to live in a Britain in the image of Nigel Farage? Yes or no? For that’s the choice on offer. If the answer
is no, then vote remain.

7.3 Fantasy island

Thursday’s vote is in some ways a choice between an imaginary past of which too many in this country
cannot let go and a future about which all of us are inescapably uncertain. If it goes in favour of leave
it will hand Britain’s young people a country that most of them do not intend to vote for. Is that fair?
It may push Scottish nationalists to proceed with a break-up of Britain that was rejected less than two
years ago. Is that responsible? It will put the settlement in Northern Ireland – the fragile prize won so
recently from decades of hatred – at risk. Is that worth it? Not at all. Instead we should be putting our
shoulders to the task of building a democratic, devolved, multicultural Britain with a fair deal for all,
connected to the world and working with our European neighbours.

The campaign has further alienated voters who were already disaffected. To an extraordinary degree,
it has inflicted the Tory party’s pathological obsession with the EU on a country that does not ordinarily
share it. No one bears more responsibility for this whole unedifying event than David Cameron, it is
true. In the end, though, Thursday’s vote is not about him. It has become a turn-in-the-road issue for
Britain and Europe alike. Imagine a world without the EU – without the clout to face down Russia
over Ukraine, without the ability to put together coherent answers to carbon emissions, to protect
standards at work from a race to the bottom. Like democracy, the EU is an imperfect way of answering
the modern world’s unrelenting challenges. But the answer to its imperfections is to reform them, not
to walk away – still less to give in to this country’s occasional hooligan instinct in Europe.

Like democracy, whose virtues are in our minds afresh after the violent death of the committed and
principled MP Jo Cox, the EU is not just the least bad of the available options. It is also the one that
embodies the best of us as a free people in a peaceful Europe. Vote this week. Vote for a united country
that reaches out to the world, and vote against a divided nation that turns inwards. Vote to remain.
APPENDIX 3: CDA APPLIED (THREE-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK)

The Guardian: The Guardian view on the EU referendum: keep connected and inclusive, not angry and isolated (20.06.2016) (article 1)
Social dimension

*Dominant knowledge*: Remain-oriented, neoliberal (intl. trade), global (border-crossing)

*Positive*: future, globalization, cooperation,

VS *Negative*: past, “indigenous first”.

Discursive dimension

*Genre*: opinion/plea: “Vote for a united country that reaches out to the world, and vote against a divided nation that turns inwards. Vote remain.”

Textual dimension

*Binaries*: “wise”/unwise; “inclusive”/isolated; “connected”/angry; “head”/heart; future/past; united/divided; “member of a family of nations”/”country that prefers to keep itself to itself and bolt the door”

*Nouns/adjectives*: angry, isolated, unworthy (of traditions), bruised, unrealistic, scared, elderly, working class

*Idioms*: “dark forces”; “narrow insistence”; “cutting yourself off”; “turn our back on”; “kick against”; “handing the keys”; “putting our shoulders to the task of building”
Modality and eventuality: assertive, portrays Remain as ‘truth’

Rhetorical questioning: “Who do we think we are, and who do we want to be?”; “Are we so different from others that we cannot play by shared rules?”; “Are we one member in a family of nations, or a country that prefers to keep itself to itself and bolt the door?”; “how are we all going to get along?”; “Is that fair?”; “Is that responsible?”; “Is that worth it?” → frequently followed by ‘right’ answer.

Truth claims: highly influences by dominant knowledge

And for comparison, The Telegraph: Older voters are not ‘quitters’ and they do not need lectures from David Cameron on the EU referendum (22.06.2016) (article 3)
Historical specificity: 1975 onwards, changes from the tenets of the Common Market

Conflict: political elites versus the public (‘wont get fooled again’)

Genre: defense, justification

Nouns/adj: “not quitters”, “do not need lectures”, “instrumental”, “good reason”, “Baby boomer generation”

Modal/evid: assertive, “these people are not quitters”, presents claim to fight back as truth

Idioms: “morphing...into a political union”, “witnessed at first hand”

Intertextuality: indirect inferences and quoted speech, chiefly drawn from political elites. Various indirect inferences about the incentives and motivations of Leave voters.

Dominant knowledge: political disenfranchisement, victimhood of the ‘Baby boomers’. Influences truth-claims

And The Times: Remaking Europe (18.06.2016) (article 5)
**Economics:** presents knowledge of economic institutions as true

**History:**
- **Nouns/adj:** “no confidence”, “change”, “risk”, “enthusiastic”, concerns felt, neglected, “fear” (of losing control)
- **Binaries:** “pragmatic”/”enthusiastic”; “status quo”/”change”; “risk aversion”/”risk”; “inertia”/”action”
- **Mod/evid:** assertiveness in what is true vs what is not true

- ‘falsehood’ vs discourses of ‘fact’.

**Interdiscursivity:** drawing on previous political events (e.g. speech in House of Lords). Also emphasizes discourses of

- **Elitism:** Focus on business

**Intertextuality:** texts/sentiments of experts, consumer champions, banks and trade organizations

**Focus on preventing Russian dominance**
leaders, entrepreneurs

*International relations:* “the EU is a symbol of western soft power”

*Globalization:* living, working and trading across borders
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