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Department of Management
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street

London WC2A 2AE




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Efficient teamwork

Wednesday 21 January 2015
Endre Csóka

4pm - 5pm, OLD 1.27, Old Building, Houghton Street 


In real-life multi-agent projects, agents often choose actions that are highly inefficient for the project or damaging for other agents because they care only about their own contracts and interests. We show that this can be avoided by the right project management. We model agents with private workflows including hidden actions and chance events, which can influence each other through publicly observable actions and events. We design an efficient mechanism for this model which is prior-free, incentive-compatible, collusion-resistant, individually rational and avoids free-riders.

Endre Csóka